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2 **Supporting Information for** 3 **Airborne Disease Transmission During Indoor** 4 **Gatherings Over Multiple Time Scales: Modeling** 5 **Framework and Policy Implications**

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16 Infection processes in closed spaces were first examined by Wells. In his pioneering work (1), Wells
17 introduced the concept of *quantum*, defined as “the number of infectious airborne particles required to
18 infect”. Later, the work by Riley (2) studied disease transmission in a confined space exploring the
19 impact of different control measures and ventilation rates. In a subsequent work by Riley, Murphy and
20 Riley (3) extended Riley’s previous model with Wells’ definition of the quanta of infection. The Wells-Riley
21 model incorporates a probabilistic process of infection based on the average quanta of infection inhaled
22 by susceptible individuals. They show an exponential increase in the number of new infections occurs
23 when the quanta-level is assumed at a steady-state during the school day, and in the absence of biological
24 virus decay. In contrast to the aforementioned work, our modeling framework focuses on transmissions
25 between consecutive meetings with potentially varying schedules, such that infected individuals and a
26 certain volume of virus particles could be carried over from one meeting to another. We incorporate the
27 transient dynamics over meetings, the disease dynamics over the population across days, and the efficiency
28 of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), i.e. mask wearing. In addition, our modeling framework
29 incorporates several parameters grounded in physical conditions of the venue and in individual behavior,
30 that enables us to quantify and compare the effects of several policy measures such as room size, crowd
31 size, mask mandates, reductions in meeting times, lengths of breaks between successive sessions.

32 Gammaitoni and Nucci (4) studied indoor disease transmission assuming that both, the virus exhalation
33 per infected and, the rate of viral stocks removal by ventilation are constants. Further, the infection risk
34 is assumed homogeneous across the group, and effectiveness of masks are considered in decreasing the
35 infection probability. This model was applied recently to study superspreading indoor events of SARS-
36 CoV-2 (5). While our model incorporates a similar infectious mechanism, the time-scale implicit in the
37 problem we address differs from the Gammaitoni and Nucci paradigm. In particular, we investigate the
38 stationary disease dynamics attained over subsequent meetings for which the viral load can be carried over.
39 In contrast, Gammaitoni and Nucci focus on weekly meetings for which no prior source of quanta in the
40 space is assumed during each meeting.

41 The role of viral load has been studied from different perspectives and scales. For instance the work
42 by Dodd and Watts (6) consider a group where each susceptible person meets one other person at a time,
43 and from each infected person met, the susceptible host picks up a random viral load. In this work, the
44 authors assumed that if the load exceeds a threshold, the person’s likelihood of getting the disease increases
45 sharply. Thus the probability of infection depends on the number of people one meets. Our modeling
46 framework differs in this regard, while in our model the environmental viral load increases as more infected
47 individuals exhale virus in the meeting room, the within host’s viral load does not increase by meeting
48 individuals. Instead, we envision the viral load as an intrinsic characteristic of the environment where
49 individuals sojourn.

50 Jang et al (7) consider infections like MRSA (methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*) or C-diff
51 (*Clostridium difficile*) that spread via contaminated surfaces, mostly in medical facilities. They model a
52 dialysis unit with movement of healthcare workers from one patient to another and to and from dialysis
53 chairs and nurses’ stations that can carry the organisms. In our setting the transmission is airborne, and
54 individuals directly contaminate this air like a “public bad” without any human intermediation.

55 Hekmati et al. study the spread of airborne disease in enclosed space under individual-level behavioral
56 response (e.g., mask-wearing and vaccination). There are key differences between the work by Hekmati et
57 al. (8), and the proposed model: (i) the scale of Hekmati’s work considers a spatially structured population
58 (a school campus), while our proposed model focus on the disease dynamics observed in a particular group

59 having multiple meetings; *(ii)* moreover, the time-scale of the disease dynamics in Hekmati's work is
60 slower by considering a unit time of a week, our model aims to address faster disease dynamics with a
61 time unit of a meeting (that can vary in duration with unit time of hours); *(iii)* for simplicity our model
62 assumes homogeneous individual viral shedding, and homogeneous infection probabilities; finally, *(iv)* the
63 main difference between our modeling framework and the one by Hekmati et. al., is the formulation of the
64 room-scale airborne virus concentration assumed at the steady state, without assuming virus removal due to
65 settling.

66 Buonanno et al. (9) derive quanta emission rate of infected individuals under the assumption that droplets
67 and sputum have the same viral load. They then characterized quanta concentration of the disease and
68 transmission risk based on the emission rate. Zafarnejad and Griffin (10) study the spread of COVID-19 in a
69 closed environment (e.g., classrooms). They extend the viral-load model by Buonanno et al. (9), where the
70 transmission risk are now heterogeneous such that it depends both on accumulated viral load and vicinity
71 of infected individuals. Different from both models, our framework incorporates individual behavioral
72 responses and accounts for the effectiveness of mask wearing in discounting viral emission and inhalation.

73 Loy and Tosin (11) consider a network model where vertices are spacial locations and edges represents
74 connection between locations. Specifically, the disease transmission happens in each location which contains
75 a number of individuals, and the transmission rate depends on the viral load of each individual. Different
76 from their model, the infection rate in our model is a function of the accumulated viral load in a spacial
77 location. Further, we accounts for the efficiency of NPIs such as mask wearing in hindering the spread of
78 disease.

79 Frazier et al. (12) propose a multi-group simulation framework to study spread of COVID on college
80 campuses. In particular, individuals are divided into different groups, and the disease transmission within and
81 between each group is modeled by a Markov chain. Further, the individual-level disease progression consists
82 of multiple compartments (e.g., Susceptible, Exposed, Quarantine, Isolation). Based on this framework,
83 Frazier et al. study the selection of COVID-19 interventions (e.g., a symptomatic screening program) and
84 model sensitivity to various input parameters. Different from their approach, our model considers epidemic
85 processes within spatial locations, and the disease transmission happens between locations and individuals.
86 Further, we explore the impact of ventilation and class sizes on the disease dynamics.

87 Bazant and Bush (13) study indoor disease transmission with a focus on sizes of respiratory droplets
88 exhaled by infected individuals. They characterize a critical drop size below which the drops can be sustained
89 in a room for a long time. Based on the findings, they further suggest indoor safety guideline such that
90 one is safer in large rooms with efficient ventilation system. Noakes et al. (14) combined the Well-Riley
91 model with the SEIR model to account for incubation periods for many diseases. They study the impact of
92 model parameters (e.g., the ventilation rate, the occupancy level, incubation period) on disease outbreaks.
93 Issarow (15) There are many other works that study indoor infection from various perspectives (15–18).

Table S1. Model parameters and variables

Parameter	Description	Baseline value
G	Group size	100
A	Air-mass	9,000 ft ³
η	Mask efficacy reducing virus exhalation	0.1
α	Mask efficacy reducing virus inhalation	0.3
p	Proportion of the population using face masks	0.5
ρ	Ventilation system efficiency	0.1
δ	Coefficient linking hazard rate to virus load	0.226
ϕ	Recovery rate for infected individuals	0.1
ε	Relative viral shedding of exposed individuals	—
σ	Incubation period	1/9
λ	Rate of loss of immunity for recovered individuals	0.01
τ	Dummy variable of integration over time	
κ	Per-person viral shedding	
ω	Linear approximation of the likelihood of infection	
Λ	Recruitment probability	
v	Flow of virus exhalation by infected individual	
$V(t)$	Virus stock in the space at time t	
$W(T)$	Cumulative virus quantity inhaled over time T	
$P_n(T)$	Infection probability of non-masked susceptible individuals	
$P_m(T)$	Infection probability of masked susceptible individuals	

Table S2. Variations in room parameters

Room size (ft.)	Distancing (ft.)	Group size
20 × 20	3	25
20 × 20	6	4
30 × 30	3	81
30 × 30	6	16

Table S3. Scenarios, control variables and policy insights.

(a) Group size, (b) air mass (room size), (c) mask compliance, (d) ventilation, (e) break times, (f) testing. We discuss scenarios of meeting periods of 50 minutes (short meetings), and 120 minutes (long meetings). For our simulations we used the baseline parameter values.

Scenario	Description	Control variables	Policy insights
Short time-scale	Single meeting at a single day	a, b, c, d	For short meetings, ventilation and masking have similar effects. For long meetings, ventilation has a greater impact than masking.
Medium short time-scale	Multiple meetings at a single day	a, b, c, d, e	For short meetings, break times of 10 – 15 minutes have a similar impact than 50% mask compliance. For long meetings, break times of 20 – 25 minutes have a similar impact than 50% mask compliance.
Medium long time-scale	Single meeting at a multiple days	a, b, c, d, f	For short meetings, masking and testing shows a trade-off of 2:1 For long meetings, masking and testing shows a trade-off of 1:1.
Long time scale	multiple meetings at multiple days	a, b, c, d, e, f	For short meetings, a 60% testing reduction is balanced by around 20 minutes breaks. For long meetings, a 40% testing reduction is balanced by around 20 minutes breaks.

94 **Within-meetings dynamics formulation**

95 We let the group size to be determined based on the room size and the targeted physical distancing with the
96 following assumptions; (i) each individual is a point in the plane that takes zero space and, (ii) individuals

97 are positioned in a grid layout. We consider two potential scenarios for the viral dynamics across meetings:
 98 (i) having a single meeting per day and (ii) having multiple meetings per day.

99 **Cumulative viral load and infection probabilities formulation.** In this section we show the formulation
 100 of the cumulative viral load ($W(t)$) and the infection probabilities ($P_n(t), P_m(t)$) for the scenarios having a
 101 single meeting per day. Analogous derivations work for the computation of the cumulative viral load and
 102 the infection probabilities for the scenarios having multiple meetings in a single day.

103 Recall from the main text that the virus exhalation rate is given by $v = k(\eta I^m + I^n)$, where the
 104 superscripts denote the masked and unmasked population, respectively. The virus stock V evolves according
 105 to $dV/dt = v - \rho V$. Given the initial condition is $V(0) = 0$, and the solution for $V(t)$ is of the form

$$106 \quad V(t) = \frac{v(1 - e^{-\rho t})}{\rho}. \quad [1]$$

107 Solving Eqn. (2) in the main text and using equation (SI-1) for $V(t)$, we have

$$108 \quad \frac{d \ln(1 - P_n(t))}{dt} = -\frac{\delta v}{\rho A} (1 - e^{-\rho t}), \quad [2]$$

109 and integrating we get

$$110 \quad \ln(1 - P_n(t)) = -\frac{\delta v}{\rho A} \left(t - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho t}}{\rho} \right), \quad [3]$$

111 OR

$$112 \quad P_n(t) = 1 - \exp \left[-\frac{\delta v}{\rho A} \left(t - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho t}}{\rho} \right) \right], \quad [4]$$

where we have used the initial condition $P(0) = 0$ that applies to the S-types. The analogous solution can
 be obtained for $P_m(t)$, except that δ is replaced by $\alpha \delta$, due to masks efficacy. The cumulative virus quantity
 $W(t)$ available to be inhaled over the meeting period $[0, t]$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned} W(t) &= \int_0^t V(\tau) d\tau, \\ &= \frac{v}{\rho} \int_0^t (1 - e^{-\rho \tau}) d\tau, \\ &= \frac{v}{\rho} \left[t - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho t}}{\rho} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad [5]$$

113 Then, the probabilities of infection up to time $t \in [0, T]$, for the masked and unmasked susceptible
 114 individuals, can be expressed in terms of the cumulative virus inhalation:

$$115 \quad P_n(t) = 1 - \exp[-\delta W(t)/A], \quad P_m(t) = 1 - \exp[-\alpha \delta W(t)/A]. \quad [6]$$

116 Moreover, consider the limit scenario of the cumulative amount of virus available to be inhaled over the
 117 whole meeting period $[0, T]$, this is given by

$$118 \quad W(T) = \int_0^T V(\tau) d\tau = \frac{v}{\rho} \left[T - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right] \quad [7]$$

119 consequently, the probabilities of infection during the whole meeting for no masked and masked individuals
 120 are

$$121 \quad P_n(T) = 1 - \exp[-\delta W(T)/A], \quad P_m(T) = 1 - \exp[-\alpha \delta W(T)/A]. \quad [8]$$

122 **Properties of the cumulative virus stock during the whole meeting**, $W(T)$. In order to study the impact of
 123 the meeting length on the probabilities of infection, we study the properties of the cumulative virus stock
 124 ($W(T)$) available for inhalation during the meeting time $[0, T]$:

$$125 \quad W(T) = \int_0^T V(\tau) d\tau = v \left[T - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right]. \quad [9]$$

126 Differentiating equation (SI-9),

$$127 \quad W'(T) = V(T) = \frac{v(1 - e^{-\rho T})}{\rho}, \quad [10]$$

128 and

$$129 \quad W''(T) = V'(T) = v e^{-\rho T} > 0. \quad [11]$$

130 Therefore, $W(T)$ is an increasing and convex function of t , with $W(0) = 0$, but equation (SI-5) shows that
 131 for any given t , it is a linear function of v and therefore of G (remember we are regarding v as proportional
 132 to G).

133 Next, note from equation (SI-10) that $W'(T)$ is an increasing function of v , i.e. $\partial^2 W / \partial v \partial T > 0$.
 134 Therefore, T and v (or equivalently, G) are complements: the marginal increase in $W(T)$ resulting from
 135 a marginal increase in the meeting length T , is worse if G is higher. Finally, from equation (SI-1) and
 136 equation (SI-5), we have

$$137 \quad W(T) = v \int_0^T \frac{1 - e^{-\rho\tau}}{\rho} d\tau,$$

and for any t ,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial \rho} \left[\frac{1 - e^{-\rho t}}{\rho} \right] &= \frac{\rho t e^{-\rho t} - (1 - e^{-\rho t})}{\rho^2}, \\ &= \frac{(1 + \rho t) - e^{\rho t}}{\rho^2 e^{\rho t}}, \\ &< 0, \end{aligned}$$

138 therefore

$$139 \quad \frac{\partial W(T)}{\partial \rho} = v \int_0^T \frac{\partial}{\partial \rho} \left[\frac{1 - e^{-\rho\tau}}{\rho} \right] d\tau < 0.$$

140 Thus, $W(T)$ is a decreasing function of ρ ; consequently higher efficiency of filtration lowers the cumulative
 141 virus inhalation during the meeting. This is intuitively obvious, but the exact expression enables us to find
 142 the interaction with meeting length:

$$143 \quad \frac{\partial}{\partial T} \left[\frac{\partial W(T)}{\partial \rho} \right] = v \frac{\partial}{\partial \rho} \left[\frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right] < 0. \quad [12]$$

144 Thus, increasing the meeting time decreases $\partial W(T) / \partial \rho$, i.e. higher filtering efficiency is even more
 145 important for longer meetings. Similar calculations for the mask inhalation and exhalation parameters α
 146 and η show that improving these efficiencies is even more important for longer meetings.

147 **Properties of the unmasked/masked infection probabilities, $P_n(T)$ and $P_m(T)$.** The dependence of $P_n(T)$
 148 on some parameters examined one at a time is quite obvious. For example

$$149 \quad P'_n(T) = \frac{\delta v}{\rho A} (1 - e^{-\rho T}) \exp \left[-\frac{\delta v}{\rho A} \left(T - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right) \right], \quad [13]$$

150 and

$$151 \quad \frac{\partial P_n(T)}{\partial v} = \frac{\delta}{\rho A} \left(T - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right) \exp \left[-\frac{\delta v}{\rho A} \left(T - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right) \right], \quad [14]$$

152 are both positive. Remember that v is proportional to G , so the effects of group size can be found by using
 153 v as a proxy for it.

154 The hazard rate (the probability of being infected in a small interval of time $[t, t + dt]$ conditional on not
 155 having been infected before time t) is assumed to be a function of the virus concentration in space at time t ,
 156 and assumed to be linear to allow simple explicit solution, included as Eqn (2) in the main manuscript:

$$157 \quad \frac{dP_n/dt}{1 - P_n} = \delta \frac{V(t)}{A}. \quad [15]$$

158 Next consider the curvature of $P_n(T)$. Notice that $P_n(T)$ is an increasing function, where $P_n(0) = 0$
 159 and, from equation (SI-4) we see that $P_n(T) \rightarrow 1$ as $T \rightarrow \infty$. Therefore the most likely shape of $P_n(T)$ is
 160 sigmoidal. To verify this formally, we write equation (SI-15) as

$$161 \quad P'_n(T) = \frac{\delta}{A} V(T)[1 - P_n(T)], \quad [16]$$

162 consequently

$$163 \quad P''_n(T) = \frac{\delta}{A} \{V'(T)[1 - P_n(T)] - V(T)P'_n(T)\}. \quad [17]$$

164 Eq. (17) is positive if and only if

$$165 \quad \frac{V'(T)}{V(T)} > \frac{P'_n(T)}{1 - P_n(T)}. \quad [18]$$

166 Further, the stock V of the virus in the space at time t evolves according to

$$167 \quad \frac{dV}{dt} = v - \rho V. \quad [19]$$

168 Then, using equations SI-19 and SI-15, equation SI-18 becomes

$$169 \quad \frac{v - \rho V(T)}{V(T)} > \frac{\delta V(T)}{A}, \quad [20]$$

170 or

$$171 \quad v > \rho V(T) + \frac{\delta}{A}[V(T)]^2. \quad [21]$$

172 Since as T goes from 0 to ∞ , $V(T)$ increases from 0 to v/ρ , the right hand side of this inequality increases
 173 from 0 to $v + (\delta/A)(v/\rho)^2$. Thus the inequality is true for small T and false for large T . So $P''_n(T)$ starts
 174 out positive and then turns negative, confirming that the shape of $P_n(T)$ is sigmoidal. A similar calculation
 175 applies to $P_m(T)$, with the δ on the right hand side of equation (SI-21) changed to $\eta\delta$.

176 Incidentally, $P'_n(T)$ is maximized (the probability of infection rises fastest, i.e. the incremental harm
 177 from lengthening the meeting by another minute is highest) at the inflection point, which occurs when

178 $v = \rho V(T) + \frac{\delta}{A}[V(T)]^2$ Therefore it may therefore be important to keep the length of the meeting well
 179 below this threshold. To find this value, write

180
$$Y = 1 - e^{-\rho T},$$

181 SO

182
$$V(T) = v Y/\rho,$$

183 and the equation becomes

184
$$1 = Y + \frac{\delta v}{\rho^2 A} Y^2 = Y + Y^2/b, \quad \text{where } b = \frac{\rho^2 A}{\delta v},$$

185 OR

186
$$Y^2 + bY - b = 0,$$

187 where the feasible solution is

188
$$Y = \left[-b + (b^2 + 4b)^{1/2} \right] / 2,$$

189 keeping the positive root to get $Y > 0$. Then

190
$$T = -\frac{\ln(1 - Y)}{\rho}. \quad [22]$$




Fig. S1. Inflection time T of the probability of infection as a function of the number of infected individuals I .

191 Now consider $P_n(T)$ for a given T as a function of v . We see from equation (SI-4) that it is a concave
 192 function, starting at zero when $v = 0$, and rising to 1 as $v \rightarrow \infty$. (alternatively, we can see from equation (SI-
 193 14) that $\partial P_n(T)/\partial v$ is a positive and decreasing function of v .) Therefore it is not clear whether longer
 194 time or larger crowd size are more risky. If T is in the region to the left of the inflection point of $P_n(T)$ (i.e.
 195 where $P_n''(T) > 0$), then the comparison is as it was for the cumulative virus inhalation $Q(T)$, i.e. splitting
 196 a long meeting into two halves is better than splitting the crowd into two, each of the halves taking the full
 197 meeting in one session. But if the duration is beyond the point of inflection, the comparison could go either
 198 way.

199 Next consider the interaction between T and v (the latter is in turn proportional to G). For brevity of
 200 notation, write equation (SI-13) as

$$201 \quad P'_n(T) = hve^{-kv}, \quad [23]$$

202 where

$$203 \quad h = \frac{\delta}{\rho A} (1 - e^{-\rho T}) \quad \text{and} \quad k = \frac{\delta}{\rho A} \left(T - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right) \quad [24]$$

204 are both positive and depend on T but not v . Then

$$205 \quad \frac{\partial^2 P_n}{\partial v \partial T} = he^{-kv} - hkv e^{-kv} = he^{-kv}(1 - kv). \quad [25]$$

206 Using the full expression for k , this cross-derivative is positive (T and G are complements) if $kv < 1$, that is

$$207 \quad \frac{\delta v}{\rho A} \left(T - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right) < 1. \quad [26]$$

208 This is true if G and T are both small, and false if one or both are large. So if we conduct a thought-
 209 experiment of starting with a small crowd that gathers for a short time, and increase these magnitudes
 210 gradually, initially increasing one increases the marginal risk posed by the other, but eventually the effect
 211 goes the other way. This again contrasts with the clear result (complements) we found for $Q(T)$.

212 The calculation for S-types wearing a mask is similar, except δ is reduced by a factor α to $\alpha\delta$, where
 213 $0 < \alpha < 1$ captures the efficiency of masks in reducing virus inhalation; lower α implies higher efficiency.
 214 At the extremes, if $\nu \cong 0$ or A is large (open air), then $P(t) \cong 0$ for all t ; if both v and T are positive and
 215 one of them is large, then $P(T) \cong 1$. (Note that in the latter case even the masked are almost sure to get
 216 infected.)

217 **Upper bound on probability of infection.** Let $T \geq 0$ be the length of a single meeting. Suppose the
 218 objective is to keep the probability below some desired threshold. For this, we have to keep $W(T)/A$
 219 below an appropriate threshold. This criterion depends on T and the other parameters, so examining this
 220 dependence tells us how various changes make it easier or harder to meet such a target.

221 One can verify that $W(T)$ is an increasing and convex function of T , with $W(0) = 0$. Moreover, for
 222 any given T , $W(T)$ is a linear function of v and therefore of G (recall that v is proportional to G). This
 223 yields a trade-off between increasing the length of meeting time and increasing the number of participants.
 224 For example, if one has to give a 2-hour lecture to 100 people, they get less cumulative virus inhalation
 225 if the lecture is split into two 1-hour segments with the full audience (with a complete air change in the
 226 auditorium between the halves so the second half also starts with $V(0) = 0$), than if the audience is split
 227 into two groups of 50 and subjected to the full 2-hour lecture given separately for each ($2W(T/2) < W(T)$,
 228 and $2W(G/2) = W(G)$).

229 Next, $W'(T)$ is positive and an increasing function of v . Therefore T and v (or equivalently, T and G)
 230 are complements: the increase in $W(T)$ resulting from a marginal increase in T is bigger if G is higher.
 231 Thus longer meetings are all the worse for keeping the probability of infection below the desired threshold
 232 if the group size is larger. Finally, a greater filtration efficiency ρ reduces $W(T)$, and this negative effect
 233 becomes even larger in magnitude when T is larger. Therefore a higher filtering efficiency is even more
 234 important for long meetings. Similar calculations for the mask inhalation and exhalation parameters α and
 235 η show that improving these efficiencies is even more important for longer meetings.

236 These above results apply to the cumulative virus inhalation $W(T)$. The probability of getting the disease
 237 – $P_n(T)$ or $P_m(T)$ depending on the masking type – is a nonlinear function of $W(T)$. Therefore, if the

238 objective is not simply keeping the disease probability below a specified level, but a more general function
239 involving some expected cost, so the magnitude, not just the direction, of the effect on the probabilities
240 matters, we have to look at the effects of various parameters on $P_n(T)$ and $P_m(T)$ directly. This is done
241 next.

242 **Magnitudes of the probability of getting the disease.** The shape of $P_n(T)$ and $P_m(T)$ as functions of
243 T is sigmoidal: each starts out at $T = 0$ with zero slope, then rises as a convex function, becomes concave
244 at an inflection point t^* , and then asymptotes to a unit. The inflection point is where the infection probability
245 rises fastest. Therefore it is useful to know this point for plausible values of the various parameters, to
246 reduce the meeting times below it to get the sharpest reductions in infection probabilities.

247 Next consider the interaction between the meeting time T and the group size G (or equivalently v), in
248 affecting the probabilities $P_n(T)$ and $P_m(T)$. We see from (4) that $P_n(T)$ is an increasing concave function
249 of v , and to the left of the inflection point it is an increasing convex function of T . Therefore in this region
250 the comparison is as it was for the cumulative virus inhalation $W(T)$, i.e. splitting a long meeting into two
251 halves is better than splitting the crowd into two, each of the halves taking the full meeting in one session.
252 But if the duration is beyond the point of inflection, the comparison could go either way.

253 Are the two complements, i.e. is $\partial^2 P_n / \partial v \partial T$ positive? We find that to be the case, if G and T are both
254 small, and false if one or both are large. So if we conduct a thought-experiment of starting with a small crowd
255 that gathers for a short time, and increase these magnitudes gradually, initially increasing one increases the
256 marginal risk posed by the other, but eventually the effect goes the other way. This again contrasts with the
257 clear result (complements) we found for $Q(T)$. Again, a similar analysis applies to $P_m(T)$.

258 Our results fit well within the range of typical meeting times for lectures or theater performances or
259 dinners. Reducing these times by even a little would pay big dividends in reduced probabilities of infection.
260 For example, consider a 60-minute lecture with an audience of 100. If one infected student gets in, the
261 probability that one of the rest is exposed by the end of the lecture is 1.248%. However, if the lecture were
262 only 50 minutes long, this would be reduced to 1.001%. Which translates in a significant reduction of the
263 basic reproductive number \mathcal{R}_0 .

264 Modeling multiple time-scale scenarios

265 In this section we explore the multiple scenarios that our model formulation can address, the difference
266 between them is the variation of the time-scales involved. The scenarios we consider address potential
267 meeting scenarios occurring at different time-scales. We consider two short time-scale scenarios and two
268 long time-scale scenarios. In the short time-scale scenarios, individuals gather for a single or multiple
269 meetings during a single day. At this time-scale there are no dynamics at the population's scale. We track
270 the dynamics of the viral load in the meeting room and, ultimately the expected number of newly exposed
271 individuals. In the long time-scale scenarios, individuals gather for a single or multiple meetings, during
272 multiple days. At this time-scale we track the "fast dynamics" of the viral load and, the "slow dynamics" of
273 the disease spreading in the population. We assume the contagion process starts with a single unmasked
274 infected individual attending the first meeting.

275 **Short time-scale: Single meeting on a single day.** In this scenario, we capture the dynamics of events
276 happening in a single meeting at a single day, for instance people attending a bar or a party. We assume
277 individuals meet at a single day for a determined period of time and, we focus on the number of secondary
278 cases generate during the meeting. We let, the number of infected individuals attending the meeting to be
279 constant. Moreover, due to the short time-scale involved, we do not address population-level dynamics.

280 In order to compute the number of secondary cases generated during the meeting, we incorporate the
 281 room conditions stated in our model. The probabilities of getting exposed during the meeting depend on
 282 the number of masked/unmasked infected individuals present in the meeting and, are given by the viral
 283 load attained during the meeting, and described by Eqns. (3) and (5) of the main text. We let the number of
 284 susceptible/infected individuals, as well as the masked/unmasked individuals to be given as initial conditions,
 285 and we track the number of exposed individuals for different group sizes and mask wearing compliance.
 286 Since newly exposed individuals take several days in order to become infectious, we assume the number of
 287 individuals shedding virus is constant. In this scenario, the potential interventions include, the ventilation
 288 system efficiency (ρ), the room size or equivalently the group size or population density (G), mask wearing
 289 and compliance (d).




Fig. S2. The impact of improving ventilation system efficiency (ρ), for group sizes $G = 100$ and $G = 80$, when 50% and 25% of the participants use masks, for a meeting length of $T = 50$ minutes. For our selected simulations we assume $I_n = 10$ and $I_m = 0$.

290 Figure S2 show the number of newly masked and unmasked exposed individuals after a single meeting,
 291 as a function of the ventilation system efficiency (ρ), for the scenarios of group sizes $G = 100$ and $G = 80$,
 292 assuming a 50% and a 25% of the attendants use face masks. Intuitively, increasing the ventilation system
 293 efficiency plays a bigger role as less attendants wear face masks.




Fig. S3. Trade-off between the ventilation system efficiency (ρ) and mask compliance (d).

294 Figure S3 shows that during short meetings the impact of increasing the ventilation system efficiency
 295 is comparable to the impact of increasing mask compliance. However, during long meetings, the overall
 296 impact of having a better ventilation system overcomes the impact of increasing mask compliance. This is

297 an intuitive result since our model formulation shows that even with high mask compliance, the role of the
 298 ventilation system efficiency is critical on maintaining the viral load at low levels, see Eq. (12).

299 **Medium short time-scale: Multiple meetings on a single day.** This scenario resembles the meeting
 300 dynamics of single day events hosting multiple meetings with breaks between one meeting to another, for
 301 instance at a conference or a single day at school. We focus on the number of expected secondary cases
 302 generated after each meeting. At this medium short time-scale, we let the number of susceptible/infected
 303 individuals, as well as the masked/unmasked individuals to be given as initial conditions. Similar to the
 304 single meeting scenario, we assume the number of individuals shedding virus is constant.

305 In this scenario, in addition to the previously discussed potential interventions, managing the break time
 306 between meetings to let the viral load decrease due to the ventilation system represents another potential
 307 intervention.




Fig. S4. Viral load for multiple meetings in a single day, for inter meetings break times of 5 and 15 mins. For our selected simulations we assumed $G = 100$, $I_n = 10$, $I_m = 0$, and $d = 0.5$.

308 Our simulations in Figure S4A show that for break times of 5 minutes, the highest cumulative viral
 309 load (attained at the end of each meeting) follows an increasing trajectory during the first six meetings.
 310 In counterpart, for break times of 15 minutes, the highest cumulative viral load reaches an steady state
 311 after the second meeting. The divergence in the viral load trajectories is ultimately reflected in the number
 312 of secondary cases generated over the meetings series. Figure S4B shows that break times of 5 minutes
 313 would continue to generate secondary cases after the sixth meeting. The unmasked population is expected
 314 to generate more than a single newly exposed individual after the sixth meeting. On the other hand, the
 315 bounded viral load attained for meetings with 15 minutes breaks, makes the expectation of the newly exposed
 316 individuals to stay below 1.




Fig. S5. Trade-off between the break time (b_t), and mask compliance (d), on the number of secondary cases produced in 6 subsequent meetings in a single day.

317 Figure S5 shows that, in the subsequent meetings schedule, break times are effective interventions to
 318 avoid reaching high viral load levels and therefore high infection probabilities. For instance, break times
 319 of 15 – 20 minutes, after each meeting of 50 minutes, lead to similar infection levels than a meetings
 320 schedule with no breaks with mask compliance of 50%. Moreover, for schedules where the meeting period
 321 is extended to 120 minutes, break times of 20 minutes are required in order to attain the infection levels
 322 corresponding to 50% of mask compliance.

323 **Medium long time-scale: Single meetings on multiple days.** In this scenario, we assume individuals
 324 meet once per day, during multiple days. This scenario was also discussed in the main manuscript.

325 **Extreme scenarios: All uses masks versus no one uses masks.** Figures S6 and S7 show the graphs of
 326 the two cases; assuming the time-scale scenario of hosting a single meeting per day, during multiple days.
 327 By assuming the epidemic starts with a single unmasked infected individual, we simulate 200 meetings, by
 328 which time the dynamics in both cases have reached an stationary state with initial small oscillations.




Fig. S6. Dynamics of the unmasked population (S_n , I_n , R_n) and their infection probability (P_n) over iterative meetings.




Fig. S7. Dynamics of the masked population (S_m , I_m , R_m) and their infection probability (P_m) over iterative meetings.

329 The most striking feature of these cases is the dramatic difference made by mask-wearing. Without
 330 masks, and assuming a single index individual the disease propagates into an epidemic that at its peak (by
 331 meeting 10) has over two-thirds of the population infected and another quarter who have been previously
 332 infected and have now recovered. At the first meeting, the index case creates a 1% probability of infecting
 333 the 99 others susceptible. Which is in expectation almost one new infection.

334 This for the small probability that the index case will have recovered before entering the second meeting,
 335 that meeting will have in expectation 1.89 infected people, generating a probability 1.88% of infecting a
 336 susceptible at the second meeting, resulting in almost 2 new infections from the 98 susceptibles. This almost
 337 geometric growth continues, until sufficiently few susceptibles are left, and sufficiently many of the infected
 338 have recovered with immunity, to dampen the spread. However, around meeting 15 even though there are
 339 almost no susceptibles, there are over 50% infected, and almost 50% recovered, so they had been infected in
 340 the past. That is, almost the whole population has experienced the disease. Moreover, as the recovered start
 341 to lose their immunity, they become susceptible again, and the epidemic continues, albeit with somewhat
 342 less force.

343 The scenario where everyone wears masks is quite different. The index case in meeting 1 has only
 344 a 0.03% probability of infecting someone else. We see the reason from the expression for $P_m(T)$ and
 345 $P_n(T)$. The argument for the exponential on the right hand side of $P_m(T)$ has a factor α , and since we are
 346 considering here a scenario where everyone wears a mask ($I_n = 0$), it also has a factor η coming from the
 347 v . In equation (SI-4), since no one wears a mask, $P_n(T)$ lacks both these factors; and, for small positive
 348 x , $1 - \exp(-x) \approx x$. Therefore $P_m(T) \approx \alpha \eta P_n(T)$: the risk of infection is reduced by the efficiency
 349 factors of both the infected exhaler and the susceptible inhaler of the virus. Then the infected seed is almost
 350 harmless; in fact the small (in expectation) entry into the second meeting, of a person newly infected by
 351 the index case, is more than offset by the less-small probability of recovery of the index case. Therefore,
 352 in expectation, the meeting 2 has only 0.93 infected instead of the index case at the first meeting. This
 353 continues, and the infection dies down. In fact, experiments using the same parameters show that even with
 354 50% of the population infected at the first meeting, the number of infected dies down around the meeting 33.

355 In general, although we have not included differential susceptibility in our framework, the parameters ϕ
 356 and λ could be different for the masked/unmasked people, some individuals may get more severe disease
 357 that has slower recovery and shorter (or perhaps longer) immunity.

358 **Steady state when all or none wear masks.** We focus on the extreme cases where all or none of the
 359 participants wear masks, we omit the subscripts m and n for convenience. In the no-mask case, we have
 360 $v = k I$, and the expression for probability of infection in one meeting is $P(T) = 1 - \exp(-\omega I)$, where for

361 simplicity we define $\omega = \frac{\delta k}{\rho A} \left(T - \frac{1 - e^{-\rho T}}{\rho} \right)$.

$$362 \quad \begin{aligned} S_{j+1} &= (1 - P(T))S_j + \lambda_P(G - S_j - I_j) \\ I_{j+1} &= P(T)S_j + (1 - \phi_P)I_j. \end{aligned} \quad [27]$$

363 A similar equation will hold in the all-masked case except that its ω will have additional factors η and α .
 364 The steady state for the scenario when no one uses mask in Eq. (27) involves transcendental functions and
 365 cannot be analytically computed. Therefore we use a linear approximation of the probability of infection in
 366 order to get analytic insights $P(T) = 1 - \exp(-\omega I) = \omega I$. The disease dynamics over the sequence of
 367 meetings is then described by the following set of difference equations

$$368 \quad \begin{aligned} S_{j+1} &= (1 - \omega I)S_j + \lambda_P(G - S_j - I_j) \\ I_{j+1} &= \omega I S_j + (1 - \phi_P)I_j. \end{aligned} \quad [28]$$

369 with steady states $(S^*, I^*) = (G, 0)$ and $(S^*, I^*) = \left(\frac{\phi}{\omega}, \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \phi} \left(G - \frac{\phi}{\omega} \right) \right)$. In order to compute the disease
 370 persistence threshold we use the second generation matrix (19), where $\mathcal{R}_0 = G \frac{\omega}{\phi}$. In other words, the
 371 disease persists whenever $\mathcal{R}_0 \geq 1$, which defines a condition in terms of $\omega^* \geq \frac{\phi}{G}$.

372 Figure S8 shows the phase planes of Eq. (28) parameterized to low recovery/removal probability (*A*)
 373 which leads to a steady state with high disease levels and; middle (*B*) and high recovery/removal probabilities
 374 (*C*), which lead to intermediate and low disease levels at the steady state, respectively.




Fig. S8. Existence and stability of the interior equilibrium. Our simulations show that the steady state in the presence of disease may reach states of high, medium and low infectiousness among the population depending on the recovery probability ϕ_P .

375 The scenario in Eq. (28) corresponds to nobody using masks. Analogous analysis for the scenario where
 376 everybody uses masks gives the steady states $(S_m^*, I_m^*) = (G, 0)$ and $(S_m^*, I_m^*) = \left(\frac{\phi}{\alpha\eta\omega}, \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \phi} \left(G - \frac{\phi}{\alpha\eta\omega} \right) \right)$. In
 377 the scenario where everybody uses masks, the steady state supporting infections exists whenever $\alpha\eta G \omega > \phi$,
 378 therefore the threshold condition using masks as a control measure can be expressed as $\mathcal{R}_C(\alpha, \eta) = G\alpha\eta \frac{\omega}{\phi}$.
 379 That is, the critical infectiousness is given by $\mathcal{R}_C(\alpha, \eta) \geq 1$ which implies $\omega^*(\alpha, \eta) \geq \frac{\phi}{\alpha\eta G}$.

380 In agreement with our previous simulations, we show that there exists a set of conditions for which
 381 scenarios supporting infections are possible. In Figure S9, we show the bifurcation diagram corresponding
 382 to the extreme scenarios where no one uses face mask and, where everybody uses face mask.




Fig. S9. Bifurcation diagram of the steady states for the extreme scenarios when no one uses face masks (I_n^*), and when everybody uses face masks (I_m^*), as functions of the parameter ω . Low ω values does not support infected individuals at the steady states, while $\omega \geq \omega^*$ values support the presence of infected individuals in both scenarios. Higher ω value is required for an epidemic to propagate in the extreme scenario of everybody wearing face masks.

383 Figure S9 shows the double impact of face masks usage: the level of infections attained at the steady
 384 state for similar infectious probabilities (ω) is lower when everybody mask, relative to the analogous no
 385 masks scenario; and, the infection probability required to sustain infections at the steady state is higher than
 386 the one in the absence of masks ($\omega^* \leq \omega^*(\alpha, \eta)$).

387 **Stability of the extreme scenarios steady states: only mask users and, no one uses masks** The Jacobian
 388 of system Eq. (28) evaluated at the non-trivial steady state is

$$389 \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{\lambda(\lambda+G\omega)}{\lambda+\phi} & -(\lambda+\phi) \\ \frac{\lambda(G\omega-\phi)}{\lambda+\phi} & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad [29]$$

390 with characteristic polynomial

$$391 z^2 + \frac{\lambda(\lambda+G\omega)}{\lambda+\phi}z + \lambda(G\omega-\phi). \quad [30]$$

392 The sum of the roots is negative, and the product of the roots is positive when $G\omega^* > \phi$ which is the
 393 condition for an endemic state with disease ($I > 0$). Then the roots cannot be real and both positive, or
 394 real with opposite signs – they must be either real and both negative, or complex conjugates with negative
 395 real parts. In either of these possibilities, the steady state is stable. With our basic parameter values, the
 396 complex conjugate case (cyclic stability) prevails. Therefore, the steady state $(S^*, I^*) = (\frac{\phi}{G\omega}, \frac{\lambda}{\lambda+\phi}(G - \frac{\phi}{\omega}))$
 397 is stable whenever it exists.

398 **General model: mixed group scenario.** In the general model, we let $v = k(\eta I_m + I_n)$ and the infection
 399 probabilities linear approximations become $P_n(T) = \omega(\eta I_m + I_n)$ and $P_m(T) = \alpha\omega(\eta I_m + I_n)$.

$$400 \begin{aligned} S_{j+1}^n &= (1 - \omega(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n))S_j^n + \lambda_P((1-p)G - S_j^n - I_j^n) \\ I_{j+1}^n &= \omega(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n)S_j^n + (1 - \phi_P)I_j^n. \\ S_{j+1}^m &= (1 - \alpha\omega(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n))S_j^m + \lambda_P(pG - S_j^m - I_j^m) \\ I_{j+1}^m &= \alpha\omega(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n)S_j^m + (1 - \phi_P)I_j^m. \end{aligned} \quad [31]$$

401 The general model in Eq. (31) has the set of disease-free equilibria $(S^n, I^n, S^m, I^m) = ((1-p)G, 0, pG, 0)$,
 402 which depend on the proportion of the group using masks (p), and the following two steady states supporting

403 non-trivial infection levels

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_n^* &= \frac{(1-\alpha)\phi - \alpha\omega((1-p)G + \eta pG) + \sqrt{x}}{2\omega(1-\alpha)}, \\
 I_n^* &= \frac{\lambda(-\phi(1-\alpha) - \alpha\omega((1-p)G - \eta pG) + 2(1-p)G\omega - \sqrt{x})}{2\omega(1-\alpha)(\lambda + \phi)}, \\
 S_m^* &= \frac{(1-\alpha)\phi + \alpha\omega((1-p)G + \eta pG) - \sqrt{x}}{2\alpha\eta\omega(1-\alpha)}, \\
 I_m^* &= \frac{\lambda(-\phi(1-\alpha) - \alpha\omega((1-p)G - \eta pG) + 2pG\alpha^2\eta\omega + \sqrt{x})}{2\alpha\eta\omega(1-\alpha)(\lambda + \phi)},
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{32}$$

405 where $x = (1-\alpha)^2\phi^2 + \alpha^2\omega^2((1-p)G + \eta pG)^2 - 2(1-\alpha)\alpha\omega\phi((1-p)G - \eta pG)$.

406 Finally, the threshold condition for the full model can be obtained by solving $I_n^* = I_m^*$ from Eq. (32).
 407 Thus, the condition for a mixed steady state supporting infection (with or without face masks), is given by

$$\mathcal{R}_C(d, \alpha, \eta) = \frac{\omega}{\phi}(\alpha\eta pG + (1-p)G) \geq 1
 \tag{33}$$

409 which in terms of the probability of infection is $\omega^*(d, \alpha, \eta) \geq \frac{\phi}{\alpha\eta pG + (1-p)G}$. Due to the complexity of the
 410 endemic equilibria expressions, we explored their stability numerically. Notice that Eq. (33) reduces to
 411 the threshold conditions for the scenarios where all or none uses masks, as a function of d . Figure S10
 412 shows that, similarly to the reduced systems, the full model exhibit a classic forward bifurcation for the
 413 infected subpopulations wearing and not wearing masks, as the infectiousness potential (ω) increases. Our
 414 simulations show the impact of the mask efficacy on reducing the virus inhalation (α) and virus exhalation
 415 (η), by increasing the threshold condition for the infectiousness potential (ω) needed to produce an endemic
 416 state.




Fig. S10. Bifurcation diagram of the endemic equilibria for the infectious subpopulations (I_n^* , I_m^*), as functions of the parameter ω . The gray dashed lines correspond to the bifurcation trajectories for the reduced scenarios where no one and where everybody uses face masks.

417 **Long time-scale: Multiple meetings on multiple days.** In this extreme scenario, we assume individuals
 418 meet multiple times per day, during multiple days, for instance students attending school (where in the class
 419 composition is fixed), or nursing homes. In this scenario, we track dynamics within consequent meetings
 420 (short time-scale dynamics) in a single day, and we compute the number of newly infected individuals.
 421 Moreover, we track the dynamics of disease progression over multiple days (long time-scale dynamics), so
 422 that the number of infected individuals shedding virus during the daily meetings vary over time.

423 We compute the meeting- i probability of infection by using the cumulative viral load ($W(t)$), at the
 424 end of each meeting. In order to couple short time-scale dynamics we compute the overall probability of

425 infection during a single day, which is given by the cumulative probability of infection during each meeting.
 426 Let the meeting- i probability of infection be p_i , therefore the probability of infection during the day t (after
 427 n meetings), is given by

$$428 \quad P_t = p_1 + p_2(1 - p_1) + \dots + p_n \prod_{k=1}^{k=n-1} (1 - p_k) = 1 - \prod_{k=1}^{k=n} (1 - p_k). \quad [34]$$

429 Figure S11 and figure S12 show the interaction between the inter-meetings viral load (short time-scale
 430 dynamics), and the population-level disease dynamics (long time-scale dynamics). We assume a scenario
 431 resembling school attendance, that is 6 daily 50 minutes meetings during 7 days, for scenarios of 5 and 15
 432 minutes breaks between meetings. Figure S11A shows a viral load dramatically increasing over meetings,
 433 consequently increasing the probability of infection, which ultimately impacts on the number of newly
 434 infected individuals. This in turn, results in more infected individuals shedding virus on the room during the
 435 subsequent days. The increasing tendency on this feedback loop continues until the population dynamics
 436 attain a maximum number of infected individuals, so that the viral shedding over meetings “follows” the
 437 population level disease dynamics.




Fig. S11. Viral load, daily probability and infected individuals dynamics, for the scenario of 5 minutes breaks between meetings

438 In counterpart, the feedback loop shown in Figure S12 exhibit different dynamics across scales. In this
 439 scenario, the 15 minutes breaks are long enough to allow the ventilation system clean the environment
 440 better. Thus, preventing the daily probability of infection to increase dramatically and, finally ameliorating
 441 the impact of the epidemic at the population scale.




Fig. S12. Viral load, daily probability and infected individuals dynamics, for the scenario of 15 minutes breaks between meetings

442 Modeling testing

443 In this section we consider an extension of the baseline model in the main manuscript to include testing. We
 444 assume infected individuals are tested and isolated after being identified (Q), until the infected individuals
 445 recover. The model incorporating testing becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_{j+1}^n &= (1 - P_j^n(T)) S_j^n + \lambda_P R_j^n \\
 I_{j+1}^n &= P_j^n(T) S_j^n + (1 - \phi_P)(1 - P_{test}) I_j^n \\
 R_{j+1}^n &= (1 - \lambda_P) R_j^n + \phi_P (I_j^n + Q_j^n) \\
 Q_{j+1}^n &= (1 - \phi_P) P_{test} I_j^n + (1 - \phi_P) Q_j^n
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{35}$$

446

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_{j+1}^m &= (1 - P_j^m(T)) S_j^m + \lambda_P R_j^m \\
 I_{j+1}^m &= P_j^m(T) S_j^m + (1 - \phi_P)(1 - P_{test}) I_j^m \\
 R_{j+1}^m &= (1 - \lambda_P) R_j^m + \phi_P (I_j^m + Q_j^m) \\
 Q_{j+1}^m &= (1 - \phi_P) P_{test} I_j^m + (1 - \phi_P) Q_j^m
 \end{aligned}$$

447 Notice that, in the absence of testing ($P_{test} = 0$) model Eq. (36) reduces to the baseline model (7) in the
 448 main manuscript.




Fig. S13. Disease dynamics of group meetings assuming a single meeting during multiple days, for the scenario of no testing and testing probability $P_{test} = 0.15$.

449 The impact of including a testing strategy is shown in the dynamics of the viral load attained over meetings,
 450 by reducing the number of infected individuals shedding virus.

451 **Steady state when all or none wear masks.** In these extreme scenarios, and using a linear approximation
 452 for the probability of infection, the model Eq. (36) becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_{j+1} &= (1 - \omega I_j) S_j + \lambda_P R_j \\
 I_{j+1} &= \omega I_j S_j + (1 - \phi_P)(1 - P_{test}) I_j \\
 R_{j+1} &= (1 - \lambda_P) R_j + \phi_P (I_j + Q_j) \\
 Q_{j+1} &= (1 - \phi_P) P_{test} I_j + (1 - \phi_P) Q_j
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{36}$$

454 The non-trivial steady state of this model is given by

$$\{S^*, I^*, R^*, Q^*\} = \left\{ \frac{\varphi}{\omega}, \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \phi} \left(\frac{\phi}{\varphi} \right) \left(G - \frac{\varphi}{\omega} \right), \frac{\phi}{\lambda + \phi} \left(G - \frac{\varphi}{\omega} \right), \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + \phi} \left(\frac{(1 - \phi) p_{test}}{\varphi} \right) \left(G - \frac{\varphi}{\omega} \right) \right\}.
 \tag{37}$$

455

456 where $\varphi = \phi + p_{test}(1 - \phi)$. Notice that, the non-trivial steady state is meaningful whenever $G - \varphi/\omega > 0$,
 457 that is the threshold condition for an epidemic to propagate is given by $\mathcal{R}_0(p_{test}) = G \frac{\omega}{1 - (1 - p_{test})(1 - \phi)}$.
 458 Which in the absence of testing $p_{test} = 0$, it reduces to the threshold condition of our baseline *SIR* model
 459 $\mathcal{R}_0 = G \frac{\omega}{\phi}$.

460 Here we show simulations for the scenario of hosting a single meeting during multiple days, where the
 461 model formulation includes the role of testing.




Fig. S14. Trade-off between testing (p_{test}), and meeting length (T), on the cumulative number of secondary cases produced in 60 days having a single meeting, for the scenarios of 50% and 25% mask compliance.

462 Figure S14 suggest that, for meetings longer than 30 minutes, for each increment on the meeting time of
 463 around 10 minutes, it would require to increase the testing and isolation probability of infected individuals
 464 by around 5%, in order to get similar number of cumulative cases during the 60 days of meetings.




Fig. S15. Trade-off between testing (p_{test}), and mask compliance (d), on the cumulative number of secondary cases produced in 60 days having a single meeting, for the scenarios of meeting lengths of 50 and 120 minutes.

465 Figure S15 shows that the trade-off between testing/isolation and mask compliance follows a linear-like
 466 relationship. Moreover, our simulations show that that the trade-off between these control measures depends
 467 on the meeting length (T). For short meetings (50 minutes length), reducing 20% mask compliance would
 468 require to increase around 10% the probability of detecting and isolating infected individuals. In counterpart,
 469 for long meetings (120 minutes length), a reduction of 20% mask compliance would require to increase
 470 around 20% testing.

471 Finally, in this scenario we explore the trade-off between inter-meetings break times and testing.




Fig. S16. The trade-off between testing (p_{test}) and break times (b_t) on the cumulative cases generated over 60 days assuming 6 daily meetings.

472 Figure S16 shows the non-linear trade-off between allowing break times between subsequent meetings,
 473 and the probability of detection/isolation of infected individuals. Notice that identifying and isolating all the
 474 infected individuals does not eradicate the epidemic. The reasoning behind this is that our model assumes
 475 only currently infected individuals are being tested, therefore newly infected individuals keep the viral
 476 load in the environment. Finally, our simulations suggest that, depending on the meeting length, there is
 477 a critical trade-off between testing and breaks time so that the number of cumulative cases dramatically
 478 increases. Particularly, for short meetings (50 minutes long), decreasing testing capacity by around 60%
 479 for a no breaks scenario, would be balanced by having breaks time of around 20 minutes. In counterpart,
 480 for long meetings (120 minutes long), the trade-off translates into a testing reduction of 40% of testing by
 481 increasing the break time to 20 minutes.

482 More complex epidemic models

483 In this section we show that the proposed framework can be coupled with more complex epidemic models.
 484 Specifically, we incorporate the role of exposed (pre-symptomatic individuals) and asymptomatic individuals
 485 in order to illustrate our modeling framework. The results of expanding the baseline SIR model to include
 486 exposed and asymptomatic health-states are consistent with literature as expected. Consequently, we do
 487 not expect our results to change qualitatively — we can expect our results would change quantitatively as
 488 different epidemic models are formulated.

489 *Summary of observations.* Although exposed individuals might exhibit a reduced viral shedding relative to
 490 symptomatic ones, incorporating infectious exposed individuals in our model (SEIR model), increases the
 491 viral load contribution of a typical infected individual by increasing its viral shedding time. This produces
 492 more secondary cases and increases the effort required to contain an outbreak. In contrast, the impact of
 493 assuming a fraction of the infected population become asymptomatic depends on both: (i) the relative
 494 infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals and, (ii) the fraction of asymptomatic cases. For COVID-19, it is
 495 possible to argue that asymptomatic individuals would exhibit an increased likelihood of infection, however
 496 we assume its viral shedding in the absence of symptoms is reduced, relative to symptomatic individuals.
 497 Finally, it is noteworthy that, while we consider discrete-time models in this work, similar formulation can
 498 be used to couple different modeling frameworks like continuous-time models and/or stochastic models.

SEIR model. Assume the within host disease progression is given by the following health-states: susceptible (S), exposed and infectious (E), infected and infectious (I), and fully immune recovered (R) individuals. We let the population to be composed of unmasked individuals ($(1 - p)G = S^n + E^n + I^n + R^n$), and masked individuals ($pG = S^m + E^m + I^m + R^m$). Susceptible individuals become infected by inhaling the

viral droplets exhaled by infectious exposed and symptomatic individuals. Infectious exposed individuals (E), are assumed to have a reduced viral shedding rate $\varepsilon\omega$, relative to infectious symptomatic individuals. Following the formulation of Eq. (4), the overall virus exhalation rate is given by

$$v = k \left(\underbrace{\eta I^m + I^n}_{\text{Viral shedding symptomatic ind.}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon(\eta E^m + E^n)}_{\text{Relative viral shedding exposed ind.}} \right),$$

where η stands for the reduced virus exhalation rate for masked individuals and, ε is the relative viral load of exposed individuals (E). Then, the infection probabilities' linear approximations become

$$P_n(T) = \omega (\eta I^m + I^n + \varepsilon(\eta E^m + E^n)) \quad \text{and} \quad P_m(T) = \alpha\omega (\eta I^m + I^n + \varepsilon(\eta E^m + E^n)),$$

499 where masked individuals are assumed to have a reduced virus exhalation of $\eta\omega$ and, a reduced virus
 500 inhalation $\alpha\omega$, where $0 \leq \eta, \alpha < 1$. Infectious exposed individuals (E), are assumed to have a reduced
 501 viral shedding rate $\varepsilon\omega$ relative to infectious symptomatic individuals and, to become symptomatic with
 502 probability σ . Symptomatic individuals (I) produce a baseline viral shedding, recovering with probability
 503 (ϕ). Finally, immune individuals are assumed to become fully susceptible with probability (λ). The
 504 previously described model of disease progression is shown schematically in Figure S17 and formalized by
 505 the sets of equations Eq. (38) and Eq. (39).




Fig. S17. Susceptible, infectious exposed (pre-symptomatic), infectious symptomatic and, recovered individuals. Infectious exposed individuals are assumed to have a reduced viral load relative to symptomatic individuals $0 \leq \varepsilon < 1$.

506 The disease progression among the unmasked population is described by the following set of equations,
 507 where the subscript tracks the evolution of states in time, while the superscript tracks the population mask
 508 usage

$$\begin{aligned}
 (1 - p)G &= S_j^n + E_j^n + I_j^n + R_j^n, \\
 S_{j+1}^n &= \left(1 - \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon(\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) \right) \right) S_j^n + \underbrace{\lambda}_{\text{Waning immunity probability}} R_j^n, \\
 E_{j+1}^n &= \underbrace{\omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon(\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) \right)}_{\text{Infection probability}} S_j^n + (1 - \sigma) E_j^n, \\
 I_{j+1}^n &= \underbrace{\sigma}_{\text{Probability of developing symptoms}} E_j^n + (1 - \phi) I_j^n, \\
 R_{j+1}^n &= \underbrace{\phi}_{\text{Recovery probability}} I_j^n + (1 - \lambda_P) R_j^n;
 \end{aligned} \tag{38}$$

510 similarly, the progression of the disease among the masked population is described by the following equations,

511 where the mask reduces the virus inhalation, re-scaling the infection probability by a factor α

$$\begin{aligned}
 pG &= S_j^m + E_j^m + I_j^m + R_j^m, \\
 S_{j+1}^m &= \left(1 - \alpha\omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon(\eta E_j^m + E_j^n)\right)\right) S_j^m + \lambda R_j^m, \\
 E_{j+1}^m &= \alpha\omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon(\eta E_j^m + E_j^n)\right) S_j^m + (1 - \sigma)E_j^m, \\
 I_{j+1}^m &= \sigma E_j^m + (1 - \phi)I_j^m. \\
 R_{j+1}^m &= \phi_P I_j^m + (1 - \lambda_P)R_j^m.
 \end{aligned} \tag{39}$$

513 **Steady state when all or none wear masks.** Assume the extreme scenario where nobody uses masks. We
 514 compute the steady state by solving the system of equations $\{S_j = S^*, E_j = E^*, I_j = I^*, R_j = R^*\}$. The
 515 non-trivial steady state of model Eq. (38) is given by

$$\{S^*, E^*, I^*, R^*\} = \left\{ \frac{\sigma\phi}{\omega(\sigma + \varepsilon\phi)}, \frac{\lambda\phi}{\varphi} \left(G - \frac{\sigma\phi}{\omega(\sigma + \varepsilon\phi)} \right), \frac{\lambda\sigma}{\varphi} \left(G - \frac{\sigma\phi}{\omega(\sigma + \varepsilon\phi)} \right), \frac{\sigma\phi}{\varphi} \left(G - \frac{\sigma\phi}{\omega(\sigma + \varepsilon\phi)} \right) \right\}. \tag{40}$$

516 where $\varphi = \sigma\phi + \lambda(\sigma + \phi)$. Furthermore, we compute the basic reproductive number by using the second
 517 generation matrix method, $\mathcal{R}_0 = G\omega \left(\frac{1}{\phi} + \frac{\varepsilon}{\sigma} \right)$. Therefore, the impact of the exposed (pre-symptomatic) and
 518 asymptomatic individuals on the within-meeting viral load depends on their relative viral shedding ($\varepsilon_E\omega$
 519 and $\varepsilon_A\omega$), and their relative incubation period ($1/\sigma$). The steady state of the scenario where everybody uses
 520 masks is similar, including the mask efficiency factors α and η .
 521




Fig. S18. Disease eradication threshold as a function of the meeting length and the proportion of the population wearing masks, for the SIR and SEIR disease models.

522 Figure S18 shows the comparison of the effort needed in order to eradicate an outbreak for the SIR and
 523 SEIR models. We assume exposed (pre-symptomatic) individuals are 50% less infectious than symptomatic
 524 individuals, and an incubation period of 9 days. Notice that the presence of infectious pre-symptomatic
 525 individuals increases the effort needed in order to eradicate an outbreak, relative to the scenario of having
 526 no pre-symptomatic individuals.

SEIAR model. Assume the within host disease progression is given by the following health-states: sus-
 ceptible (S), exposed and infectious (E), infected and infectious (I), infectious asymptomatic (A), and
 fully immune recovered (R) individuals. Similar to the previous model we assume the total population is
 composed by unmasked and masked individuals, $(1 - p)G$ and pG , respectively. Susceptible individuals
 get infected by inhaling droplets exhaled by: (i) infectious exposed individuals (E) at a relative shedding

rate $\varepsilon_E \omega$, (ii) asymptomatic infectious individuals at a relative shedding rate $\varepsilon_A \omega$ and, (iii) infectious individuals at a baseline rate. Similar to the previous section, we let the virus exhalation rate to become

$$v = k \left(\underbrace{\eta I^m + I^n}_{\text{Viral shedding symptomatic ind.}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon(\eta E^m + E^n)}_{\text{Relative viral shedding exposed ind.}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_A(\eta A^m + A^n)}_{\text{Relative viral shedding asymptomatic ind.}} \right),$$

527 then the infection probabilities linear approximations become

$$\begin{aligned} P_n(T) &= \omega \left(\eta I^m + I^n + \varepsilon_E(\eta E^m + E^n) + \varepsilon_A(\eta A^m + A^n) \right), \\ P_m(T) &= \alpha \omega \left(\eta I^m + I^n + \varepsilon_E(\eta E^m + E^n) + \varepsilon_A(\eta A^m + A^n) \right), \end{aligned} \quad [41]$$

529 where ε_E and ε_A are the reduced viral shedding of exposed (E) and asymptomatic individuals (A) respec-
530 tively, relative to symptomatic individuals (I). The previously formulated model of disease progression is
531 sketched in Figure S19 and formalized by the set of equations Eq. (42).




Fig. S19. Susceptible, infectious exposed (pre-symptomatic), infectious symptomatic, infectious asymptomatic and, recovered individuals. Infectious exposed and asymptomatic individuals are assumed to have reduced viral shedding relative to symptomatic individuals, $0 \leq \varepsilon_E, \varepsilon_A < 1$, respectively.

$$\begin{aligned} (1-p)G &= S_j^n + E_j^n + I_j^n + A_j^n + R_j^n, \\ S_{j+1}^n &= \left(1 - \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon_E(\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) + \varepsilon_A(\eta A_j^m + A_j^n) \right) \right) S_j^n + \lambda R_j^n \\ E_{j+1}^n &= \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon_E(\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) + \varepsilon_A(\eta A_j^m + A_j^n) \right) S_j^n + (1-\sigma)E_j^n, \\ I_{j+1}^n &= (1-l)\sigma E_j^n + (1-\phi)I_j^n, \\ A_{j+1}^n &= l\sigma E_j^n + (1-\phi)A_j^n, \\ R_{j+1}^n &= \phi(I_j^n + A_j^n) + (1-\lambda_P)R_j^n, \end{aligned} \quad [42]$$

$$\begin{aligned} pG &= S_j^m + E_j^m + I_j^m + A_j^m + R_j^m, \\ S_{j+1}^m &= \left(1 - \alpha \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon_E(\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) + \varepsilon_A(\eta A_j^m + A_j^n) \right) \right) S_j^m + \lambda R_j^m \\ E_{j+1}^m &= \alpha \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon_E(\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) + \varepsilon_A(\eta A_j^m + A_j^n) \right) S_j^m + (1-\sigma)E_j^m, \\ I_{j+1}^m &= (1-l)\sigma E_j^m + (1-\phi)I_j^m, \\ A_{j+1}^m &= l\sigma E_j^m + (1-\phi)A_j^m, \\ R_{j+1}^m &= \phi(I_j^m + A_j^m) + (1-\lambda)R_j^m. \end{aligned}$$

533 **A. Basic reproductive number when all or none wear masks.** Assume nobody wear masks, in this
534 scenario the basic reproductive number becomes $\mathcal{R}_0 = G\omega \left(\frac{\varepsilon_E}{\sigma} + \frac{(1-l)+l\varepsilon_A}{\phi} \right)$. The first term of \mathcal{R}_0 accounts

535 for contributions from the mildly infectious individuals E , whereas the second term gives contributions
 536 from the infectious individuals I and, the mildly infectious individuals A .




Fig. S20. Disease eradication threshold as a function of the meeting length and the proportion of the population wearing masks; for the SIR, SEIR and SEIAR disease models and, $G = 60$.

537 Figure S20 shows the disease eradication threshold for a group size of $G = 60$, as a function of both, the
 538 meeting length (T) and the proportion of the population wearing masks (d). The impact of asymptomatic
 539 individuals with a reduced viral shedding (relative to the symptomatic individuals) is reflected on the relaxed
 540 effort required to eradicate an outbreak.

541 **SEIAR model with recruitment.** Assume the within host disease progression is given by susceptible (S),
 542 exposed and infectious (E), infected and infectious (I), infectious asymptomatic (A), and fully immune
 543 recovered (R) individuals. Moreover, assume individuals might decide to leave at a given time with
 544 probability μ regardless of their health-status. Additionally, assume non-symptomatic individuals (S, E, R),
 545 are allowed to join to the group at a constant probability Λ . This might be for instance monitored by testing
 546 before joining. In this scenario, and following similar assumptions than for the previous SEIAR model, the
 547 model of disease progression among the masked/unmasked population is depicted in Figure and, formalized
 548 by the set of difference equations Eq. (43) and Eq. (44)




Fig. S21. Susceptible, infectious exposed (pre-symptomatic), infectious symptomatic, infectious asymptomatic and, recovered individuals. Infectious exposed and asymptomatic individuals are assumed to have reduced viral shedding relative to symptomatic individuals, $0 \leq \epsilon_E, \epsilon_A < 1$, respectively. Moreover, constant recruitment into non-symptomatic health-states and, leaving rate regardless individuals' health states are assumed.

$$(1 - p)G = S_j^n + E_j^n + I_j^n + A_j^n + R_j^n,$$

$$S_{j+1}^n = \underbrace{\Lambda}_{\text{Individuals joining}} + \underbrace{(1 - \mu)}_{\text{Probability of keep meeting}} \left(1 - \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon_E (\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) + \varepsilon_A (\eta A^m + A^n) \right) \right) S_j^n + \underbrace{\lambda}_{\text{Waning immunity probability}} R_j^n,$$

$$E_{j+1}^n = \Lambda + \underbrace{(1 - \mu) \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon_E (\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) + \varepsilon_A (\eta A^m + A^n) \right)}_{\text{Infection probability}} S_j^n + (1 - \mu)(1 - \sigma) E_j^n,$$

$$I_{j+1}^n = (1 - \mu) \underbrace{(1 - l)\sigma}_{\text{Probability of developing symptoms}} E_j^n + (1 - \mu)(1 - \phi) I_j^n,$$

$$A_{j+1}^n = \Lambda + (1 - \mu) \underbrace{l\sigma}_{\text{Probability of becoming asymptomatic}} E_j^n + (1 - \mu)(1 - \phi) A_j^n,$$

$$R_{j+1}^n = \Lambda + (1 - \mu) \underbrace{\phi}_{\text{Recovery probability}} (I_j^n + A_j^n) + (1 - \mu)(1 - \lambda_P) R_j^n.$$

[43]

550 Similarly, the progression of the disease among the masked population is described by the following
551 analogous equations, where the mask reduces the virus inhalation, re-scaling the infection probability by a
552 factor α

$$pG = S_j^m + E_j^m + I_j^m + A_j^m + R_j^m,$$

$$S_{j+1}^m = \Lambda + (1 - \mu) \left(1 - \alpha \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon_E (\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) + \varepsilon_A (\eta A^m + A^n) \right) \right) S_j^m + \lambda R_j^m,$$

$$E_{j+1}^m = \Lambda + (1 - \mu) \alpha \omega \left(\eta I_j^m + I_j^n + \varepsilon_E (\eta E_j^m + E_j^n) + \varepsilon_A (\eta A^m + A^n) \right) S_j^m + (1 - \mu)(1 - \sigma) E_j^m,$$

$$I_{j+1}^m = (1 - \mu)(1 - l)\sigma E_j^m + (1 - \mu)(1 - \phi) I_j^m,$$

$$A_{j+1}^m = \Lambda + (1 - \mu) l \sigma E_j^m + (1 - \mu)(1 - \phi) A_j^m,$$

$$R_{j+1}^m = \Lambda + (1 - \mu) \phi (I_j^m + A_j^m) + (1 - \mu)(1 - \lambda) R_j^m.$$

[44]

554 In this formulation, the total group size is not constant and, the total group size follows the difference
555 equation

$$G_{j+1} = 8\Lambda + (1 - \mu)G_j \quad [45]$$

557 which implies an asymptotically constant total group size (19). By solving Eq. (45), the group size is given
558 by $\lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} G_j = \frac{8\Lambda}{\mu}$.

559 Case studies

560 In this section we illustrate the value of our framework in addressing different room types. Following (13), we
561 study three scenarios of contagion: (i) a typical American classroom, with an occupancy of 20 individuals

562 and a volume of $V = 10595 \text{ ft}^3$, meeting during 6 hours; (ii) long-term care facilities, which in New York
 563 City are required to host a maximum of 3 persons in a shared room with a volume of $V = 1890 \text{ ft}^3$; and,
 564 (iii) the Skagit valley choir super-spreading event, which is reported to have happened in a room hosting
 565 61 during a 2.5 hrs. We assume the individuals meeting exhibit different virus shedding rates, where the
 566 baseline virus shedding rate ($k = 1$), correspond to individuals breathing at rest. Individuals speaking show
 567 an increment of the shedding rate or infection quanta of 300% at the intermediate activity level, while at the
 568 high activity level there is an increment of 800% for intermediate speech.

569 **Classroom.** We assume the scenario of a classroom with occupancy of 19 students and a teacher, meeting
 570 during a week. For our baseline simulations we assumed 50% of the group use masks ($p = 0.5$), but we
 571 explore the impact of varying both, mask usage and the break time. We assume the break time corresponds
 572 to recess during which the room is empty and cleaning through a ventilation system during 30 minutes. Our
 573 selected simulations show the disease dynamics within a classroom for low activity level (breathing at rest),
 574 medium activity level (quiet speech) and, high activity (intermediate speech); these correspond to 8.8, 29
 575 and 72 infection quanta / m^3 exhaled air (13).




Fig. S22. Disease dynamics within a typical US classroom during a week, for low, medium and, high activity levels. Panel A and panel B show the viral load attained during a school day for five days, for the scenarios where individuals sustain high and low activity, respectively. Panel C shows the cumulative secondary cases generated within the classroom over the 5 days; while panel D shows the proportion of mask users and the group size trade-off required to prevent a single infection within the classroom, for the scenarios of low, medium and high activity levels. We assumed uncertainty boundaries corresponding to $\pm 15\%$ of the baseline breathing activity.

576 High activity breathing levels within a classroom elevate the viral load in a dramatic way compared to the
 577 viral low attained with low breathing levels, as our simulations in panels A and B show. This impact on the
 578 expected secondary cases generated at a single day and, ultimately impacts the progression of the epidemic
 579 (panel C). Panel D shows the disease eradication threshold as a function of both, the proportion of mask
 580 users (p) and, the group size (G), for activity levels corresponding to breathing at rest, quiet speech and
 581 intermediate speech. We assume students meet during 5 consecutive days and leave the classroom during a

582 recess of 30 mins. after 3 hours of meeting. Our results highlight the trade-off between a decentralized
 583 control measure (masks-wearing) and, a centralized control measure (group size and breaks time).

584 **Long-term care facility.** In this section we assume the scenario of infections among individuals in a
 585 long-term care facility. In order to address the higher susceptibility of elderly people we let them to be four
 586 times more susceptible than child (20, 21). Figure S23A shows the expected cumulative cases among three
 587 persons sharing a room 24 hrs/day during 5 days, where all of them wear face masks. For medium and
 588 high activity levels our simulations suggest that masking and the baseline air filtering are not enough to
 589 avoid infections. Figure S23B shows the disease eradication threshold as a function of the proportion of
 590 mask users (p) and, the group size (G). Our simulations show that for low and medium breathing levels, for
 591 normal occupancy, on average at least two residents should use mask in order to prevent infections during a
 592 days period.




Fig. S23. Disease dynamics among three elderly people sharing room in a long-term care facility. Panel A shows that even when all are masked, it is expected to have infections for low activity level of breathing at rest. Panel B shows the disease threshold conditions to avoid infections as a function of the proportion of mask users (p) and, the group size sharing a room, for activity levels of low, medium and high activity levels. We assumed uncertainty boundaries corresponding to $\pm 15\%$ of the baseline breathing activity.

593 **The Skagit Valley Choir.** Here we study the contagion process of the superspreading event during the
 594 Skagit Valley Choir practice on March 10, 2020 (5, 22). The practice lasted 2.5 hrs and, 61 persons attended
 595 the choir practice, after which 32 COVID-19 cases were confirmed and 20 more resulted probable secondary
 596 cases. It is known that this event started with a single confirmed symptomatic individual and, transmission
 597 was potentially exacerbated by the close proximity among attendants (within 6 feet) and, by the high
 598 breathing level by the act of singing (22). Previous studies indicate that an estimation of the emission rate is
 599 970 ± 390 quanta/h (5), which in our framework it translates to $k = 110$, given that the baseline $k = 1$
 600 value corresponds to nose-nose breathing activity of 8.8 quanta / m^3 exhaled air. We assume none of the
 601 choir members used face masks $p = 0$, a single symptomatic case $I_0 = 1$ and $E_0 = 10$ pre-symptomatic
 602 individuals potentially infected before the practice on March 10, for a detailed discussion see (5, 22).




Fig. S24. Number of infected after the members of the Skagit Valley Choir have a single meeting for 2.5 hrs, as a function of the break time and the proportion of masked individuals. We consider the baseline emission rate (970 quanta/h) and the uncertainty boundaries ($970 \pm 390 \text{ quanta/h.}$)

603 Our simulations in Figure S24 shows the potential reduction on the number of secondary infections
 604 produced during the 2.5 hr. choir meeting, as a function of the break time and the proportion of masked
 605 individuals. In the absence of masks, a single break of would have reduced the number of infections
 606 significantly. Moreover, combining a single break time and at least 40% of mask compliance would have
 607 reduced the number of infections by around half.

608 **Summary.** Our results highlight the impact of the multiple components involved in our modeling framework:
 609 breathing activity, group size, meeting schedule, inter-meetings breaks and, mask compliance. Increasing
 610 mask compliance relax the required conditions to avoid the disease to spread; however, the activity level
 611 shows to be highly determinant in each of the scenarios. On the other hand, under compliance uncertainty
 612 of decentralized control measures (for instance, mask wearing or social distancing), the incorporation of
 613 centralized measures (for instance, break times, isolation or testing), is critical to avoid high viral load levels.

Table S4. Results case studies

Case study	Room size ($ft.^3$)	Group size	Meetings schedule	Findings
Classroom	10595	20	2 meetings / 5 days	Break times play a critical role Small group sizes also require high mask compliance.
Long-term care facility	1890	3	1 meeting / 5 days	The high vulnerability of elderly people requires high masking levels if breathing activity is medium or high.
Skagit valley choir	28605	61	1 meeting	A single break time combined with medium mask compliance would have reduced by half the infections.

614

615 i

616 References

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