Supporting Information for

Norm-Violating Rhetoric Undermines Support for Participatory Inclusiveness and Political Equality Among Trump Approvers

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Sample Demographics

The final sample included 804 participants. Participants were 45.4% male, 72.4% White, 51.5% Republican, and 48.5% Democratic, with an average age of 32.6 (SD = 15.7). We controlled for age, gender (male = 1, female = 0), and race (White = 1, non-White = 0). All results were robust to the exclusion of controls.

Survey

To begin, please answer a few questions about your basic demographic information and political preferences.

What is your age? [Dropdown menu, 18-100]

Please select the option that best represents your gender identity:

- Male
- Female
- Non-binary/third gender
- Prefer not to say

Please select the option that best represents the race or ethnicity you identify with:

- American Indian
- Asian
- Black or African American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
- White
- Biracial or multiracial
- Other: [textbox]

Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Trump handled his job as president?

- Approve
- Disapprove
- No opinion [excluded from survey]

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent [excluded from survey]
- Other: [textbox; excluded from survey]
- Not sure [excluded from survey]

In this study, we will ask you to read some messages that President Trump posted on Twitter.

There will be **4 pages** of Tweets in total. Please take at least **30 seconds** to carefully read **each page** of Tweets.

[Tweet content are available in the Supporting Information for Clayton et al. (1), at <u>https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2024125118#supplementary-materials</u>. The exact images of the tweets are available on the Open Science Framework at <u>https://osf.io/ajwy3/</u>.

Thinking about the tweets you just saw, please share your more general views about American democracy (on a seven-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree):

- [Support for participatory inclusiveness]
 - Everyone should be allowed to vote.
 - Voting should be easy.
 - The more people participate in politics and elections, the better.
- [Support for contestation]
 - Everyone should be allowed to express any idea, even potentially dangerous ideas.
 - The government should never shut down media outlets, even if they spread disinformation.
 - \circ No idea is dangerous enough to justify censorship.
- [Support for the rule of law]
 - The president should not be above the law.
 - The law should treat everyone the same, regardless of wealth or power.
 - Men and women should have the same legal rights and protections.
- [Support for political equality]
 - Laws need to protect minority groups when society makes them vulnerable.
 - Two adults who love each other should be allowed to get married, regardless of sexual orientation.
 - The government should never treat members of one religion differently than members of any other religion.

Various types of political systems are described below. Please think about each choice in terms of governing this country and indicate if you think that it would be a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing the United States.

- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections.
- Having the army rule.
- Having a democratic political system.

Regression Models without Interactions Mentioned in the Text (with no significant experimental effects).

For the democracy-autocracy model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (coefficient: -.04; standard error: .07; not significant (ns)), general norm violations (-.14, .07, ns), election placebo (-.08, .09, ns), age (.01, .00, p < .05), male (.13, .05, p < .05), White (-.12, .06, p < .05), constant (2.93, .09, p < .05). The N is 804 and the R² is .09.

For the support for inclusiveness model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (-.09, .13, ns), general norm violations (-.16, .13, ns), election placebo (-.23, .15, ns), age (-.00, .00, ns), male (-.04, .08, ns), White (-.39, .10, p < .05), constant (6.20, .15, p < .05). The N is 804 and the R² is .03.

For the support for contestation model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (.10, .16, ns), general norm violations (.09, .16, ns), election placebo (-.02, .19, ns), age (.00,.00, ns), male (.40, .10, p < .05), White (.16, .12, ns), constant (3.66, .19, p < .05). The N is 804 and the R² is .02.

For the support for the rule of law model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (.07, .07, ns), general norm violations (.10, .07, ns), election placebo (.12, .08, ns), age (.01, .00, p < .05), male (-.01, .05, ns), White (-.09, .05, ns), constant (6.41, .08, p < .05). The N is 804 and the R² is .02.

For the support for political equality model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (-.04, .12, ns), general norm violations (-.17, .12, ns), election placebo (-.02, .14, ns), age (-.00, .00, ns), male (-.20, .08, p < .05), White (-.43, .09, p < .05), constant (6.35, .14, p < .05). The N is 804 and the R² is .05.

Regression Models with Interactions (Underlying Figure 1).

For the democracy-autocracy model, the regression results are as follows: approve of Trump (-.88, .16, p < .05), election norm violations (-.20, .13, ns), election norm violations X approve of Trump (.25, .19, ns), general norm violations (-.19, .13, ns), general norm violations X approve of Trump (.05, .18, ns), election placebo (-.16, .15, ns), election placebo X approve of Trump (.08, .22, ns), age (.02, .00, p < .05), male (.21, .06, p < .05), White (.17, .07, p < .05), constant (-.13, .13, ns). The N is 804 and the R² is .22.

For the support for inclusiveness model, the regression results are as follows: approve of Trump (-.59, .16, p < .05), election norm violations (.12, .14, ns), election norm violations X approve of Trump (-.44, .19, p < .05), general norm violations (.12, .14, ns), general norm violations X approve of Trump (-.45, .19, p < .05), election placebo (-.13, .16, ns), election placebo X approve of Trump (-.16, .23, ns), age (-.00, .00, ns), male (-.02, .06, ns), White (.04, .08, ns), constant (.40, .13, p < .05). The N is 804 and the R² is .22.

For the support for contestation model, the regression results are as follows: approve of Trump (.61, .18, p < .05), election norm violations (.14, .15, ns), election norm violations X approve of Trump (-.11, .21, ns), general norm violations (.12, .15, ns), general norm violations X approve of Trump (-.15, .21, ns), election placebo (.14, .17, ns), election placebo X approve of Trump (-

.30, .25, ns), age (.00, .00, ns), male (.26, .07 p < .05), White (-.10, .08, ns), constant (-.45, .14, p < .05). The N is 804 and the R² is .07.

For the support for the rule of law model, the regression results are as follows: approve of Trump (-.31, .15, p < .05), election norm violations (.18, .13, ns), election norm violations X approve of Trump (-.19, .18, ns), general norm violations (.24, .13, ns), general norm violations X approve of Trump (-.21, .18, ns), election placebo (.26, .15, ns), election placebo X approve of Trump (-.20, .21, ns), age (.01, .00, p < .05), male (-.00, .06, ns), White (.07, .07, ns), constant (-.14, .12, ns). The N is 804 and the R² is .09.

For the support for political equality model, the regression results are as follows: approve of Trump (-.85, .15, p < .05), election norm violations (.10, .12, ns), election norm violations X approve of Trump (-.32, .18, ns), general norm violations (.09, .12, ns), general norm violations X approve of Trump (-.41, .17, p < .05), election placebo (.06, .15, ns), election placebo X approve of Trump (-.20, .20, ns), age (-.00, .00, ns), male (-.15, .06, p < .05), White (.10, .07, ns), constant (.67, .12, p < .05). The N is 804 and the R² is .34.

Deviations from Preregistration

We preregistered our research plan at <u>https://aspredicted.org/rv8gn.pdf</u>. We made minor deviations in the following ways:

1. In our preregistration, we predicted that election norm violations would have larger effects on support for the four democratic principles (inclusiveness, contestation, rule of law, and political equality) than general norm violations, but they did not in any of our models.

2. In our preregistration, we planned to pool the election placebo and non-election placebo conditions to use as the baseline comparison group. Clayton et al. (1) pooled these two conditions in their study because they could not reject the null of no differences in means between these conditions across all of their preregistered models. However, we ultimately did not pool these placebo groups because, unlike Clayton et al., we could reject the null between these conditions in some of our preregistered models. (However, see our replication experiment below.)

4. In our preregistration, following Clayton et al. (1), we hypothesized that negative emotions mediated the effects of norm violations on support for democracy. We do not study these emotions here for the sake of space.

5. Our preregistration indicated that we would attempt to gather a sample of 1,000 participants. We initially collected 1,067 participants. However, after dropping participants who failed attention checks (e.g., "Please select the option for somewhat disagree"), our final sample was 804.

Replication Experiment

We conducted a follow-up experiment with a new sample of Republican Trump approvers for two reasons. First, the main results show that the election placebo comes close to significance when predicting participatory inclusiveness for Trump approvers (and is not significantly different from the effects of general or election norm-violating rhetoric). We suspected that result may be a product of the timing of the data collection in June-July 2022, as the midterms were approaching. During that period, 291 Republican election doubters or deniers were running for House, Senate, or key statewide offices (51% of all Republican candidates; 2) and thus any discussion of elections from Trump may well have reminded participants of Trump's explicit election norm-violating rhetoric. This dynamic contrasts with the timing of Clayton et al.'s data collection in October 2020, when Trump was likely telling Republicans to vote and endorsing candidates (akin to the election placebo) as the election approached. This difference may explain why Clayton et al. did not find differences between the election and non-election placebo whereas we did.

We presume that in August 2023 the election placebo may no longer actively prime norm violations. By this point, Trump—while still embracing election fraud claims—had largely turned his attention to claims about politicized investigations and indictments. We thus sought to replicate the experiment among Republican Trump approvers to see if the near significant effect of the election placebo disappeared. The design matched the original experiment with two exceptions: 1) respondents only received the 10 treatment primes (and not the other tweets unrelated to elections or norm violations that accompanied all conditions in the original experiment); we also informed respondents that these were past Trump tweets, and 2) we included a pure control condition with no tweets to assess whether the placebos differ from the pure control.

Our second reason for the data collection was to provide some suggestive insight on the mechanism underlying effects we found in our main study. Specifically, we evaluated whether the general or election norm-violating rhetoric reduces support for structural presidential norms (see the online appendix for more information; <u>https://osf.io/ajwy3/</u>).

The data were collected via Forthright Access on August 7-8, 2023. Republican Trump approvers were randomly assigned to one of five conditions (the four from the main experiment or a pure control condition) (N = 1,008). This sample size ensured .80 power to detect a small effect. The pre-registration is available at: <u>https://aspredicted.org/m8wu5.pdf</u>.

The central outcome variables were exactly as in the main experiment. We assessed support for structural presidential norms by asking respondents to disagree or agree (on seven-point scales) with nine items (see online appendix for more information; <u>https://osf.io/ajwy3/</u>):

- Presidents shouldn't hire their relatives to high-ranking positions in their administration.
- Presidential candidates should release their financial records, including their personal tax returns.
- Presidents should not use public office for private gain.
- When experts generally agree, presidents should listen to experts about matters of public policy.

- Presidents should enforce laws, even laws that they morally oppose.
- Generally, former presidents should attend their successor's inauguration.
- It is important that candidates for political office publicly admit defeat after losing elections.
- It is inappropriate for the President of the United States to direct government agencies to monitor, attack, or punish political opponents.
- It is inappropriate for the President of the United States to ask leaders of foreign countries to investigate political rivals.

We report the regression results below, but we highlight three key findings. First, we replicated the main experiment: Relative to the pure control, general norm violations and election norm violations significantly decreased support for participatory inclusiveness and political equality (p < .05 in all cases). The coefficients were similar to those in the main experiment. (We report the results below relative to the pure control, but the findings are analogous if we instead use the non-election placebo as the baseline and ignore the pure control, as in the main experiment.) Second, the election placebo no longer had even a close to significant effect on inclusiveness and did not significantly differ from the pure control condition. Thus, its near significance in the main experiment likely was due to timing, as explained. Third, we found evidence regarding a causal mechanism (see online appendix; <u>https://osf.io/ajwy3/</u>). Overall, the results replicate our main results, reveal that the nearly significant impact of the election placebo on inclusiveness in the main experiment likely reflected anomalous timing, and provide evidence for a mechanism.

For the democracy-autocracy model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (-.04, .07, ns), general norm violations (-.01, .07, ns), election placebo (-.00, .07, ns), non-election placebo (-.07, .07, ns), age (.02, .00, p < .05), male (.30, .04, p < .05), White (-.08, .07, ns), constant (1.98, .10, p < .05). The N is 1,008 and the R² is .18.

For the support for inclusiveness model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (-.33, .13, p < .05), general norm violations (-.30, .13, p < .05), election placebo (-.09, .14, ns), non-election placebo (-.04, .13, ns), age (-.01, .00, p < .05), male (-.27, .08, p < .05), White (-.09, .13, ns), constant (5.87, .19, p < .05). The N is 1,008 and the R² is .03.

For the support for contestation model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (.03, .14, ns), general norm violations (.06, .15, ns), election placebo (.01, .15, ns), non-election placebo (-.02, .14, ns), age (-.00, .00. ns), male (.60, .09, p < .05), White (.14, .14, ns), constant (4.32, .21, p < .05). The N is 1,008 and the R² is 0.04.

For the support for the rule of law model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (-.01, .09, ns), general norm violations (-.09, .09, ns), election placebo (-.05, .09, ns), non-election placebo (-.06, .09, ns), age (.01, .00, p < .05), male (-.07, .06, ns), White (.02, .08, ns), constant (5.77, .13, p < .05). The N is 1,008 and the R² is .04.

For the support for political equality model, the regression results are as follows: election norm violations (-.27, .12, p < .05), general norm violations (-.26, .12, p < .05), election placebo (.04, .13, ns), non-election placebo (-.01, .12, ns), age (-.01, .00, p < .05), male (-.26, .08, p < .05), White (.02, .12, ns), constant (5.22, .18, p < .05). The N is 1,008 and the R² is 0.03.

Supporting Information References

- 1. K. Clayton, N.T. Davis, B. Nyhan, E. Porter, T.J. Ryan, T.J. Wood, Elite rhetoric can undermine democratic norms. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* **118**, e2024125118 (2021).
- A. Gardner, A majority of GOP nominees deny or question the 2020 election results. *The Washington Post*, October 12. <u>https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/10/06/elections-deniers-midterm-elections-2022/</u>. (2022).