# Supplementary figures for "Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation"

Naoki Masuda

Supplementary figure 1: (a) The final fraction of cooperators c_f in the Prisoner's Dilemma on the regular random graph. The payoff matrix is represented by Eq. (2). The results for the payoff matrix Eq. (4) are shown in (b-d). (b) c_f for the regular random graph, (c) c_f for the scale-free networks, and (d) c_f for the scale-free networks minus c_f for the regular random graph.

Supplementary figure 2: c_f for the snowdrift game on the regular random graph.

Supplementary figure 3: c_f for the scale-free networks (Fig. 4(b-e)) minus c_f for the regular random graph (Fig. 4(a)) in the T-S space. (a) $h = 0$, (b) $h = 0.5$, (c) $h = 1$, and (d) $h = 2$.

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