Ref.	*Author(s)*	*Year*	*Groups*	*Conflict*	*Peace*	*Brutality*	*Loot division*	*Specifics*
[1]	García & van den Bergh	2011	variable size, migration, fissioning	between randomly matched groups	conflict inevitable, 'out-group love' possible in pairwise interactions	total	equal (no explicit loot, though, victorious groups merely survive)	explicit group selection; assortment of altruists
[2]	Bowles	2009	fixed size, no migration, fissioning	between randomly matched groups	conflict inevitable	total	equal (no explicit loot, though, victorious groups merely survive)	empirical calibration;
[3]	Choi & Bowles	2007	fixed size, random migration, fissioning and fusing	between randomly matched groups	peaceful intergroup relations possible	moderate	equal (no explicit loot, though, victorious groups merely survive)	quasi-sexual reproduction
[4]	Smirnov et al.	2007	variable size, no migration, fissioning	between randomly matched groups	conflict inevitable	total, but discussed separately	equal (no explicit loot, though, victorious groups merely survive)	differentiates 'heroism' from peace time altruism
[5]	Bowles	2006	fixed size, no migration, fissioning	between randomly matched groups	conflict inevitable	total	equal (no explicit loot, though, victorious groups merely survive)	reproductive levelling, empirical calibration
[6]	Hammond & Axelrod	2006	variable size, no migration between groups	pairwise prisoner's dilemmas only	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	spatial model
[7]	Bowles & Gintis	2004	variable size, no migration between groups	pairwise modified prisoner's dilemmas only	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	network model

Ref.	*Author(s)*	*Year*	*Groups*	*Conflict*	*Peace*	*Brutality*	*Loot division*	*Specifics*
[8]	Bowles et al.	2003	almost constant size, random migration	between randomly matched groups	conflict inevitable	total	equal (no explicit loot, though, victorious groups merely survive)	additional 'social institutions'

Table S1: Overview of recent theoretical studies investigating co-evolutionary dynamics of in-group altruism and out-group spite ('parochial altruism'). For a comprehensive listing of 183 relevant studies and reviews see Table S2.

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