Management of invading pathogens should be informed by epidemiology rather than administrative boundaries

Supplementary Material

Robin N. Thompson^{a,*}, Richard C. Cobb^b, Christopher A. Gilligan^a, Nik J. Cunniffe^a


^a Department of Plant Sciences, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EA, UK

^b UC Davis Department of Plant Pathology, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616, USA

*Corresponding author. Present address: Department of Zoology, The Tinbergen Building, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3PS, UK. E-mail address: robin.thompson@lmh.ox.ac.uk (R.N. Thompson).

Figure

Figure S1. The optimal percentage of the county to quarantine (p^*) as a function of the cost of quarantine (η per host unit in the quarantine region per year) and the epidemiological parameters: (a) rate of infection (β); (b) scale of pathogen dispersal (α_2). In (a), β is incremented in steps of size 0.001 month⁻¹ and η in steps of size 0.067. To reduce the computational resources required to produce these results, instead of running new simulations for each (η , β) pair, a database of 1000 simulations is produced for each β value examined. For each (η , β) pair, 500 simulations are then sampled out of the 1000 reference simulations. Subfigure (b) is created similarly, but with α_2 incremented in steps of 100 meters.



Table

Table S1. Table of parameters for the metapopulation disease spread model.

| Parameter | Meaning | Value used in simulations |
|-------------------|---|--|
| W | Horizontal extent of county | 50 km |
| M + 1 | Number of patches in the county | 1000 |
| L | Number of nearby patches considered on each side of county | 200 |
| $S_i(t)$ | Number of susceptible host units in patch <i>i</i> at time <i>t</i> | Initially, all host units in the landscape are susceptible |
| $I_i(t)$ | Number of infected host units in patch <i>i</i> at time <i>t</i> | Initially no host units in the landscape are infected |
| $N_i = S_i + I_i$ | Number of host units in patch <i>i</i> | Sampled from Uniform[6,14] distribution |
| β | Rate of infection | 0.1 month ⁻¹ (except where stated) |
| $\beta Z \psi_j$ | Rate of primary infection on susceptible host units in patch <i>j</i> (where <i>Z</i> is strength of infection source outside the landscape) | Z = 400 host units, ψ_j given in text |

| $eta \phi_{ij}$ | Rate of secondary infection between infected host units in patch <i>i</i> and susceptible hosts in patch <i>j</i> | ϕ_{ij} given in text |
|-----------------|---|--|
| γ | Proportion of short-range dispersal | 0.99 |
| α1 | Spatial scale of short-range spread | 20 m |
| α2 | Spatial scale of long-range spread | 10 km (except where stated) |
| $N_{ m max}$ | Maximum number of host units that any patch can accommodate | 20 |
| d | Distance between primary infection source and landscape | 30 km |
| η | Cost of quarantine per host unit per year | See figures |
| Т | Timescale over which quarantine is applied, which begins when the disease is first detected in the landscape | 24 months |
| λ | Average rate at which each host unit is traded out of the county | $1/12 \text{ month}^{-1}$ |
| q | Probability of a traded infected host unit avoiding disease detection in the trade network | 0.1 |
| ρ | Proportion of host units in nurseries | 0.01 |
| Α | Cost due to quarantine of further counties if disease escapes | 10,000 |
| $	au_n$ | Average time after infection that disease in nursery hosts is detected | 6 months |
| $	au_w$ | Average time after infection that disease in hosts in the wider environment is detected | 36 months |
| r | Average rate at which infected hosts are detected | $\frac{1}{\tau_n}\rho + \frac{1}{\tau_w}(1-\rho) \text{ month}^{-1}$ |