

Supplementary Information for
“A Multinational Investigation of Cross-Societal Cooperation”
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This file includes:

A) Methodological details

1. Pilot study
 1. Participants and design
 2. Materials and procedure
2. Study 1
 1. Participants and design
 2. Materials and procedure
3. Study 2
 1. Participants and design
 2. Materials and procedure

B) Additional analyses

1. Results pilot study
2. Further results Study 1
3. Results Study 2

C) Norm values

D) Sample instructions

A) Methodological Details

A1 Pilot Study

The pilot study examines how cooperation, measured by amounts transferred to the interaction partner in a non-incentivized one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, and expectations regarding the other players' transfer vary according to the nationalities of interaction partners.

A1.1 Participants and Design

Overall, 504 US-citizens (210 female, 292 male, 2 not reported; 18-72 years of age), recruited via *Amazon Mechanical Turk* (*Mturk*), successfully completed the study in 2013 and were included in the analyses (1). Ninety-seven additional participants were screened out since they did not pass the quality check (2). For the pilot, we used a between-subjects manipulation of receivers' nationalities, meaning that participants played a hypothetical one-shot continuous prisoner's dilemma game with an interaction partner from one out of seven different nations, namely Afghanistan, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Israel, and the USA. Assignment to the interaction partner's nationality was anonymous and random. The pilot study was the last in a row of three studies. Since the other studies addressed a completely different topic, we did not expect carry-over effects. For exploratory reasons, the pilot study also involved two additional between-subjects conditions that tested for differences between choices for female vs. male receivers from the USA ($N = 166$), for which results are not reported here.

The study was computerized and run using an online survey platform (3). Completing the study took participants about 5 minutes. Participants' payment was USD 1.10 for the whole series of studies or alternatively an Amazon voucher worth the same amount.

A1.2 Materials and Procedure

When registering for *Mturk*, participants signed a general informed consent regarding participation in online studies involving incentives and the possibility to unsubscribe from the platform without providing a reason. In addition, and before taking part in our study, participants were informed about the specific requirements and content of the study, specifically that they would be asked questions about their actions and expectations in

decision tasks. Participants choose the studies they participate in voluntarily. Data collection was managed in a way that participant anonymity was assured. Participants had the opportunity to contact us via the online platform in the case of any questions or difficulties. When starting the study, participants first read detailed instructions for the game. They then played one round of a hypothetical continuous prisoner's dilemma game without punishment with one interaction partner (from one nation out of seven). Participants were given a hypothetical amount of 10 US dollars and were asked to decide which amount c_i of their endowment to transfer to their current interaction partner, where $0 \leq c_i \leq 10$, and which amount $10 - c_i$ to keep in their private account. They were asked to imagine that their interaction partner simultaneously made an equally structured decision. Any money transferred was multiplied by a factor of 2. In addition to the decision on their own transfer, participants stated their expectations regarding their current interaction partner's transfer.

The instructions included hypothetical, between-participants versions of part 3 and 5 of the sample instructions provided in part D of the supplement. In addition to using hypothetical interactions in a between-subjects design, the pilot study differed from Studies 1 and 2 with regard to the initial endowment, which was 10 US dollars in the pilot and 1 US dollar in the incentivized studies.

A2 Study 1

In Study 1, which is the main study reported in this article, we expanded our investigation to multiple nations by including participants from six different countries of origin that were involved in cross-societal interactions with each other.

A2.1 Participants and Design

1,227 individuals (625 female; 18-83 years of age; 2 participants were excluded because they stated an age higher than 120 years), from six different nations completed the study successfully in the year 2013. Specifically, we had participants from Germany ($N = 209$; 19-75 years of age; 109 female), India ($N = 215$; 18-72 years of age; 99 female), Israel ($N = 202$; 18-72 years of age; 105 female), Japan ($N = 200$; 18-79 years of age; 104 female), Mexico ($N = 201$; 19-73 years of age; 105 female), and the USA ($N = 200$; 18-83 years of age; 103 female). Participant groups were representative for the population of the respective countries in terms of age and gender (4). Individuals were recruited via the professional online panel provider *Toluna*, which offers services mainly for marketing research companies.

Nations were selected based on the following criteria: First, values for all 5 dimensions of the Hofstede model had to be available, resulting in 66 potentially includable nations. Second, a panel of sufficient size ($> 50,000$) had to be available from the online panel provider Toluna, and, third, our selection was limited to countries with one national language that was used by the major part of the population. From the resulting 21 nations, we finally selected nations that differed in terms of their Hofstede values. For each dimension, we included at least one nation with a high (>50 out of 100) and one with a low score (≤ 50): Israel (high) and India (low) for power distance, Mexico (low) and USA (high) for individualism, Israel (low) and Japan (high) for masculinity, India (low) and Japan (high) for uncertainty avoidance, and Mexico (low) and Germany (high) for long-term orientation (for the exact Hofstede values of the included nations, see Table S1). Furthermore, we assured that the included nations differed considerably with regard to their gross domestic products (ranging

from 4,077 (India) to 53,101 (USA) current international dollars) and their distance between each other (with a minimum distance of 1,632 km between Mexico and the US and a maximum distance of 15,094 km between India and Mexico; 5).

Participants from all six sender nations indicated transfers for one-shot continuous prisoner's dilemma games with receivers from all six countries, including their own, using a strategy method (6). Participants' payment consisted of a USD 2.00 base payment plus a USD 0 to 3.00 bonus payment, depending on their decisions during the study (7).

A2.2 Materials and Procedure

Before conducting the study, informed consent was obtained from all participants by the online panel provider *Toluna* concerning participation in online research involving incentives, assurance of anonymity, and the possibility to unsubscribe from the platform. Additionally, in our study people were informed about the specific content of the study and the payoff scheme of the current research. After reading detailed instructions for the game and answering four control questions concerned with the game structure, participants indicated their transfers for the continuous prisoner's dilemma game with interaction partners from six nations. Specifically, in each of the six receiver-country blocks, they had to decide (a) how much of their endowment of 100 US cents to transfer to a receiver from the respective nation and (b) how many US cents they expected to receive from the respective interaction partner.

After finishing these six blocks, participants completed the *Instructional Manipulation Check* (IMC, 8), in which the careful reading of instructions is tested, which we used as control factor in our analyses. The participants who failed the control questions concerning the game were excluded from further participation.

In six (once again randomized) receiver-nation blocks, participants then rated receivers from each nation on several attributes. The attribute order was randomized and items were answered on a bipolar 5-point scale, the endpoints of which contained an attribute and its antonym (e.g., friendly vs. unfriendly). Ratings included four cooperation-related attributes

(i.e., trustworthy, friendly, generous, and likeable), which were selected based on research by Yamagishi and colleagues (9) and constituted a reliable cooperation scale (Cronbachs $\alpha = 0.80$). Each block also included the same amount of attributes that were not related to cooperation (i.e., attractive, spirited, extraverted, and athletic) as well as a rating on the dimension wealthy vs. not wealthy. This allowed participants to indicate multi-faceted stereotypes of nations and compensate for negative cooperation stereotypes with other factors (10). Finally, for exploratory reasons, we asked participants to state their confidence with regard to their reporting of expectations for all interaction partners and indicate with which of the six receivers they would choose to play the game, if they were free to choose (part 6 of experimental instructions).

Instructions were provided in the respective national languages. Native speakers translated the English version into the national languages. They were then back-translated to English, following the *Brislin procedure* (11). The study was computerized and run using an online survey platform (Unipark, 12). Full instructions are provided in section D.

A3 Study 2

Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend results from Study 1 with an expanded sample of ten different sender and receiver nations, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Spain, and the USA.

A3.1 Participants and Design

A sample of 485 participants (160 female; 18-61 years of age) from 10 different countries recruited via *Amazon Mechanical Turk* successfully completed the study in the year 2013. Participants came from Bangladesh ($N = 15$; 21-41 years of age, 3 not reported; 1 female), France ($N = 53$; 18-61 years of age; 17 female), Germany ($N = 57$; 18-52 years of age; 22 female); India ($N = 48$; 20-61 years of age; 10 female), Israel ($N = 28$; 18-60 years of age; 9 female), Japan ($N = 34$, 21-55 years of age; 5 not reported, 19 female), Mexico ($N = 67$, 18-46 years of age, 25 female), Spain ($N = 74$, 18-50 years of age, 20 female), Russia ($N = 51$, 19-57 years of age, 17 female), and the USA ($N = 58$, 19-49 years of age, 20 female).

We only included participants who had spent most of their lives in their home country and spoke the language of the respective country. The latter was assessed by a language test (see below). Participants were also asked to provide a self-report regarding their language skills. They played an incentivized, one-shot continuous prisoner's dilemma game with 10 interaction partners from different nations (including their own) using a 10 (sender) x 10 (receiver) within-between participant design. The order of the nations was again randomized in blocks and instructions were provided in the respective mother tongues (13). Completing the study took participants about 15 minutes. The participants' payment was an Amazon voucher with varying amounts between USD 2.00 and 5.00, which included a USD 2.00 fixed payment plus a bonus payment of USD 0 to 3.00, depending on their decisions during the study (14).

A3.2. Materials and Procedure

The materials and procedure were essentially the same as in Study 1, except for two extensions to ensure data quality in MTurk and account for the fact that responses for ten rather than six receiver nations were collected. Before reading the instructions, we included two tests to screen out participants: specifically, we included a CAPTCHA to determine whether or not the user is human (15) as well as a listening language-check asking participants to type in three words that they had heard. After reading the instructions, but before taking part in the interaction, participants again answered four control questions concerning the structure of the game. Participants who failed any of these tests were screened out. Additionally, participants completed the IMC (8) to generate a control measure for careful reading of the instructions.

B Additional Analyses

B1 Pilot Study Results

To address our research questions, we investigate the effect of the between-subjects factor “receiver nationality” on the expectation and transfer levels (as an indicator for cooperation) in our sample of 504 participants. Descriptively, there were differences in expectations (Figure S1) and transfers (Figure S2) depending on receiver nationality.

To analyze the effects statistically, we ran two ordinary least square (OLS) regressions, predicting expectations and transfers by receiver nationality. We found no significant effects regarding transfers (16). However, we did find systematic differences in expectations (Table S2, Column 1). Individuals stated significantly higher expectations in the interaction partner’s transfer when this partner was from Japan (as compared to the mean) and significantly lower expectations when the interaction partner was from Israel or Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that the effects were small in magnitude. Participants, for example, expected 0.76 of 10 US dollars more than average if the interaction partner was from Japan.

We find positive net-transfers (contribution minus expectation, Table S2, Column 3) towards people from Afghanistan, Mexico, and Israel and negative net-transfers towards people from Japan. Again, effects are small in that, for example, the difference between contribution and expectation was 0.71 US dollars higher for interactions with individuals from Afghanistan as compared to the grand mean (of this difference score).

B2 Additional Results from Study 1

The core analyses for Study 1 are presented in the main text. Here, we report sender-receiver interactions for expectations, transfers and net-transfers as well as results from tobit regressions and additional results concerning attribute ratings for persons from different receiver countries as well as additional measures.

Sender-receiver interactions

Table S3 is the continuation of Table 1 in the main text. It reports all two-way interactions from the overall OLS regressions predicting expectations, transfers, and net-transfers (simultaneously including main effects and interactions).

Reanalysis with tobit regressions

For all analyses of Study 1, we also conducted tobit regressions, taking into account the fact that ranges for transfers are artificially limited. Table S4 shows the respective results predicting expectations, transfers, and net-transfers by sender and receiver country of origin as well as all two-way interactions. Table S5 shows the tobit regression (with cluster corrected *SEs*) for Study 1 predicting net-transfers by interacting with the ingroup vs. the outgroup as well as spatial distance, difference in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and cultural distance measured as the euclidean distance between the sender and receiver nations. These analyses lead to the same conclusions as the OLS regressions reported in the main article except for minor and theoretically irrelevant changes in significance levels.

Additional Analyses of Expectations

Although our research mainly concerns aggregate level expectations across nations, we also investigated within-nation variances in expectations, which provide information concerning how tightly cooperation stereotypes for different receiver nations are held among a respective nation's population. Furthermore, a comparison of within-country variances across nations can shed more light on the question whether nations differ regarding their density of cooperation stereotypes for different receiver nations. Table S6 shows means and standard deviations for expectation from and towards different nations in Study 1 (and Study

2). As can be seen from the second row, Japan's expectations in Study 1 vary more for receivers from their own nation and Germany as compared to receivers from Mexico or Israel. This result is supported by a significant Levene's test for equal variances, $F(5, 1194) = 4.41, p < .001$, indicating that within-nation variances of expectations held by senders from Japan are significantly different for the different receiver nations. Specifically, results show that persons from Japan have more homogenous (tighter) stereotypes for Mexico and Israel than for the other nations. For senders from Mexico (first row), expectations (in Study 1) vary more for receivers from Japan and Germany and less for receivers from Israel and India, as indicated by a significant difference in variances, $F(5, 1200) = 2.80, p = .02$. None of the other sender nations shows significant differences concerning homogeneity of stereotypes for receiver nations.

In line with the phenomenon of a relatively heterogeneous perception of ingroups as compared to outgroups (i.e., outgroup homogeneity), most of the sender nations show increased variance when stating expectations for receivers from their own nation as compared to other nations (17).

Analyses across sender nations show that the variance of expectations differs significantly for Israel as receiver country, $F(5, 1221) = 5.53, p < .001$. In most of the included nations (Mexico, Japan, Germany, and India) participants agreed fairly well concerning the perceived cooperativeness of people from Israel. In contrast, people from Israel and the USA showed greater variability in this respect. For the other receiver countries, no significant differences in the respective analyses were obtained. All results reported in this section also held when applying a Bonferroni correction to account for multiple testing (i.e., 12 tests) except for the difference in variances regarding Mexico's expectations. Our results provide an interesting starting point for further research to explore within- and across- country variances in expectations and the factors driving them.

Additional Factors Driving Net-Transfers: Globalization Indices

Previous research identified additional drivers for cross-societal cooperation that remained unconsidered in our main article. More specifically, Buchan and colleagues found that a nation's level of globalization as measured by the country-level globalization index (CGI) is relevant to cooperation in the cross-societal context (18). Similar to their research, we find a strong rank correlation between nations mean net-transfer and CGI ($r = 0.89$, $p = .02$). Similarly, nations mean net-transfer showed a high rank correlation with the Social Globalization Index ($r = 0.94$, $p = .005$), which measures how people come into contact with other nations including measures of the number of foreigners and tourists in a nation, the number of films imported and exported, and outgoing international telephone traffic (a result in line with the contact hypothesis, 19).

Attribute Ratings and Stereotypes

Table S7 shows expectations, transfers, and net-transfers predicted by cooperation-related and non-cooperation-related attribute ratings. Table S8 summarizes the attribute ratings for interaction partners from different nations (20). We find shared assessments (i.e., stereotypes) for the different nations for cooperation-related and non-related attributes. In the prisoner's dilemma, as described in the main text, people held higher expectations concerning transfers for interaction partners from Japan, Germany, and the USA. Individuals from these three nations have in common that they are perceived to be significantly wealthier than average participants. Wealth ratings were increased by almost 10% (half a point on a five-point scale). This provides indirect evidence that expectations might be shaped by differences in perceived wealth.

Cooperation Partner of Choice

Figure S3 shows which partner individuals would choose to play the game with, if they were free to choose. Participants mainly indicated that they would select a fellow countryman, except for individuals from Mexico, who would choose persons from Japan. This finding again speaks for the hypothesis that there are crucial factors beyond expectations that

drive cooperation, probably due to ingroup favoritism or potentially also due to similarity or reduced uncertainty.

Confidence

For exploratory reasons, we asked participants to state their confidence with regard to their reporting of expectations for all interaction partners. Results revealed that when controlling for expectations and sender nationality, participants were less confident in their expectations when interacting with a person from Mexico, $b = -1.00$, $t(1226) = -2.56$, $p = .011$, as compared to the overall mean. In addition, we found no effects of receiver countries on confidence in expectations. Considering differences between senders, when controlling for expectations and receiver's nationality, we find that people from Japan ($b = -8.29$, $t(1226) = -6.08$, $p < .001$) and the USA ($b = -5.61$, $t(1226) = -4.01$, $p < .001$) stated less confidence in their expectations, whereas people from India ($b = 3.79$, $t(1226) = 2.58$, $p = .01$) and Mexico ($b = 8.41$, $t(1226) = 6.69$, $p < .001$) indicated more confidence (all on a scale from 0 to 100). Hence, confidence differences concerning expectations of cooperation are driven mainly by inter-societal differences between the senders.

Age and Gender Effects

For all regression analyses, we controlled for age and gender. In doing so, we observe that women cooperate less than men, $b = -5.31$, $t(1226) = -3.52$, $p < .001$. When additionally controlling for expectations, the effect size is smaller and no longer significant, $b = -1.35$, $t(1226) = -1.62$, $p = 0.11$, which speaks for the fact that the lower willingness to cooperate can be at least partially explained by women's lower expectations.

B3 Results Study 2

Study 2 mainly aimed to replicate Study 1 as well as test the generalizability of the findings to a broader set of nations.

Expectations

We first compare expectations for the six nations we focused on in Study 1. Figure S4 shows that we find similar consensus regarding expectations as in Study 1, supported by a significant inter-class correlation of expectations $ICC = 0.56$, $p < .001$, speaking for the existence of cooperation stereotypes for people from different nations. Expectations concerning the transfers of Japanese, American, and German interaction partners are comparatively high, whereas expectations concerning the transfers of people from India, Mexico, and Israel are comparatively low.

To test the assumption of shared expectations (i.e., stereotypes) statistically, we ran a regression analysis predicting expectations by and for the six previously used nationalities of interaction partners while controlling for differences stemming from the affiliation to different sender nations (see Table S9, Column 1). We find significantly higher expectations in the interaction partner's transfer (as compared to the mean overall expectations) when this partner is from Japan, Germany, or the USA and significantly lower expectations when the interaction partner is from Israel, India, or Mexico, thus replicating the results of our first study. There are several significant sender-receiver interactions that go beyond these main effects.

Adding Bangladesh, France, Spain, and Russia (and all new sender-receiver interactions) to the analysis still leads to the same conclusion concerning shared expectations of comparatively high transfers of Germany ($b = 6.27$, $t(476) = 6.49$, $p < .001$), Japan ($b = 8.75$, $t(476) = 9.24$, $p < .001$), and the USA ($b = 5.40$, $t(476) = 5.28$, $p < .001$), and comparatively low transfers of Mexico ($b = -3.47$, $t(476) = -3.93$, $p < .001$), India ($b = -3.93$, $t(476) = -4.10$, $p < .001$), and Israel ($b = -3.56$, $t(476) = -3.85$, $p < .001$). With regard to the new countries, we find that participants have comparatively low expectations when the interaction partner is from Russia ($b = -3.08$, $t(476) = -3.54$, $p < .001$) and Bangladesh ($b = -5.93$, $t(476) = -6.29$, $p < .001$).

Adding the new nations to the analysis reveals that the hierarchy regarding expectations for the previously used set of nations remains stable. This yields information that the cooperation related stereotypes we found in Study 1 are robust to adding additional nations to the composition of the interaction partners' nationalities.

As in Study 1, we also investigated within-nation and across-nation variances. As can be seen from Table S6, variances in Study 2 generally tend to be larger than in Study 1. However, none of the differences between variances of expectations were significant.

Transfers

As in Study 1, the differences in expectations are mirrored in differences in transfers to the respective receiver nations. It can be derived from Figure S5 that people give a higher share of their endowment to the interaction partner when he or she is from Japan, the USA, or Germany, which corresponds to our results regarding expectations. In contrast, participants transfer a comparatively small amount to nations for which we found a negative cooperation-stereotype (i.e., Israel, Mexico, or India).

For our statistical analysis, we ran a regression predicting transfers by nationality of the interaction partner (Table S9, Column 2). We again find that participants transfer more when they know that their partner is from Japan. In contrast, their willingness to transfer

money is lower when the interaction partner is from Israel or India. Adding the new nations to the analysis again does not change the conclusion in this respect. Also, for the new nations, we find that people transfer less when interacting with a person from Bangladesh ($b = -2.68$, $t(476) = -3.23$, $p = .001$) and Russia ($b = -2.98$, $t(476) = -3.92$, $p < .001$).

Net-Transfers

Next, we investigate the effects of nationality on cross-societal cooperation, which go beyond expectations. We analyzed these effects by again using the difference between cooperation and expectation. To provide comparability to Study 1, we limit our analyses, in a first step, to the nations that were included in Study 1. Averaged across the sender nationalities, persons give significantly more than they expect to receivers from Mexico and India and less to people from the USA (i.e., receiver main effects for net-transfers; Table S9, Column 3). We also see a main effect of sender on net-transfer in that people from Germany give significantly more overall than they expect, whereas people from India give less than they expect, which indicates possible systematic differences in social preferences depending on sender and receiver nationality.

We analyze the reasons for differing social preferences on top of expectations in the cross-societal context more generally by including ingroup cooperation, spatial distance, income equality (21), and cultural distance in a regression model predicting net-transfers by the sender's country of origin for the subsample of six nations used in the main study (Table S10, Column 1) as well as for the total sample of ten nations (Column 2). Results are similar to the findings in the main study (see Table 2); for the total sample, the findings concerning significant ingroup and wealth effects as well as the nonsignificant effect of spatial distance could be fully replicated. Also, the unexpected effect that an increasing Euclidian Distance in Hofstede's cultural dimensions leads to less negative net-transfers was replicated as a trend (22). In the reduced sample, however, some of the effects appeared to be different, potentially due to reduced statistical power. Additionally, there is a significant effect of spatial distance

in that more distant nations receive more negative net-transfers, which was only found as a trend in Study 1 and in the full sample.

As in Study 1, we analyzed the relation between a nation's level of globalization and net-transfers (i.e., social preferences). When including all 10 nations, we again found that nations mean net-transfers is (rank) correlated with the country-level globalization index ($r = 0.71, p = .02$) and, to a lesser degree, the social globalization index ($r = 0.55, p = .098$).

Attribute Ratings

As can be gathered from Table S11, participants expect higher transfers when they perceive their interaction partner to be trustworthy or generous and perceived trustworthiness and friendliness are predictors for their own transfers. These results indicate that – on top of a general effect of trustworthiness – other attributes influence expectations (i.e., generosity) and cooperation (i.e., friendliness). This also indicates that not all effects of receiver nationality on cooperation are conveyed by changes in expectations alone.

With regard to net-transfers, we gain evidence that people who are perceived to be very generous seem to be exploited, in that net-transfers become more negative with perceived generosity. This can also be interpreted as a sign of negative discrimination towards these nations as compared to other receiver nations.

Age and Gender Effects

Similar to Study 1 we find that women cooperate less than men, $b = -7.75, t(286) = -2.08, p = .04$. When additionally controlling for expectations, the effect size is smaller and no longer significant, $b = -4.12, t(286) = -1.61, p = .11$, which again speaks for the fact that the lower willingness to cooperate can be at least partially explained by women's lower expectations. Conclusions in this respect are the same when running the analyses with all ten nations. One should note, however, that for some subsamples gender asymmetry was rather high in Study 2 in that men outnumber women. If we assume the gender effect to be universal

across nations, some of the norm values for Study 2 reported below might be somewhat overestimated.

C Norm Values

Table S12 presents norm values for cooperation behavior (transfers) of the different nations (Table S12, Column 1) and cooperation towards different nations (Column 2); both resulted from an overall analysis of studies 1 and 2. Furthermore, expectations regarding transfers of interaction partners from different nations are depicted (Column 4) as well as general expectations of the nations that took part in the study (Column 3). Finally, the table includes self-ratings (how people evaluate their own nation) regarding cooperation-related and non-related attributes (Column 5) as well as how other nations rated them (Column 6) on these dimensions. It should be noted that these norm values are derived from a specific set of nations. Although the general picture for cooperation stereotypes does not change from Study 1 to Study 2 when adding additional nations, we observe some level differences between the studies. This could be due to differences in sampling procedure (representative samples in Study 1 vs. Mturk participants in Study 2) or the fact that the set of nations differed. Future studies should investigate different sets of nations to further validate and refine these initial values.

D Sample Instructions

In the following, the English instructions are provided. Instructions in the other languages can be provided on request.

1. Start

Thank you for participating in our survey!

For your participation, you will receive a fixed payment of 2 US dollars. On top of that, you will receive a variable amount that will be paid as a bonus payment. The amount of this bonus payment depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants during this survey. At the end of the survey, one other participant will be randomly selected and the amount of your bonus payment will be calculated. You will need approximately 15 minutes to answer this survey. The fixed and bonus payment will only be disbursed if you answered the survey completely and thoroughly.

2. Demographics

Gender

male
female

Age

Family status

single
in a relationship
married
widowed

Highest educational degree

Occupation

In which town do you live?

Do you live in a town with more than 100,000 citizens?

yes
no

In which country have you spent most of your life?

Nationality

Germany
India
Israel
Japan
Mexico
USA
Other

3. Instructions

In the following part of the survey we introduce you to some situations. Please work on these tasks very carefully and take sufficient time to answer these questions conscientiously. You play the following game with several other persons. For your decisions you receive some information about the specific interaction partner and this interaction partner receives the same information about you. Please read the following description of the game carefully. Subsequently, you will have to answer four comprehension questions which you have to answer correctly to participate in the survey.

Description of the game:

You will act as Person A, whereas the other person acts as Person B. You and Person B must make a similarly structured decision. For each decision, Person A and Person B receive an initial endowment of one US dollar. You have the opportunity to transfer any part of your endowment to Person B. You can only transfer amounts in steps of 10 cents - thus, you can only choose the following amounts [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 cents].

The amount you transfer to Person B is doubled. That means that Person B receives twice the amount you have transferred to Person B. The other person acting as Person B has exactly the same alternatives that you have. Person B can also transfer any amount to you. The amount Person B transfers to you is also doubled. That means you receive twice the amount Person B has transferred to you. Of the 6 decisions that you will have to make during this game, one will be randomly selected at the end of the survey and your partner for that particular decision will be randomly selected, as well. The amount of your bonus sum depends on your decision for a randomly selected question and the decision of your randomly selected partner for that question.

Your bonus payment will be calculated as follows:

Initial endowment

- amount you choose to transfer to Person B
- + twice the amount Person B transferred to you
- = your personal bonus payment

4. Control questions

In the following part of the study, you will be asked four comprehension questions to make sure you have understood the rules of the game.

For each question, you will have three chances to answer the question correctly. If you do not succeed in answering each question correctly within these three attempts, you will not be able to participate in this survey.

1) How much do you earn in one situation if you transfer 1 dollar to Person B and Person B also transfers 1 dollar to you?

- 0 Dollars
- 1 Dollar
- 2 Dollar
- 3 Dollar

2) How much do you earn in one situation if you transfer 0 dollars to Person B and Person B transfers 1 dollar to you?

- 0 Dollars

- 1 Dollar
- 2 Dollar
- 3 Dollar

3) How much do you earn in one situation if you transfer 1 dollar to Person B and Person B transfers 0 dollars to you?

- 0 Dollars
- 1 Dollar
- 2 Dollar
- 3 Dollar

4) How much do you earn in one situation if you transfer 0 dollars to Person B and Person B transfers 0 dollars to you?

- 0 Dollars
- 1 Dollar
- 2 Dollar
- 3 Dollar

5. *Game (one interaction with each country in randomized order)*

On the following screens, you will play the game described before with other persons. Each person is randomly selected. Additionally, we will ask you to evaluate the behavior of your interaction partner.

You play the game with a randomly chosen person from [Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, USA]. (23)

a) Which amount would you like to transfer to this randomly chosen person?

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

b) What do you believe, which amount will this randomly chosen person from [Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, USA] transfer to you?

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

How confident are you with your estimation?

6. *Partner*

When you reconsider the previous interactions: Who would you most like to interact with?

7. *IMC*

Most modern theories of decision making recognize the fact that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. Individual preferences and knowledge, along with situational variables can greatly impact the decision process. In order to facilitate our research on decision making we are interested in knowing certain facts about you, the decision maker. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take time to read the directions; if not, then some of our manipulations that rely on changes in the instructions will be inefficient. So, in order to

demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the question below. Instead, please check all answers and continue on the next page. Thank you very much!

Until now, have you had any contact with people from one or several of these countries?

Germany
India
Israel
Japan
Mexico
USA
No contact

8. Attribute ratings

How do you evaluate an average person from [Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, USA] concerning the following characteristics (24)?

trustworthy -- 5-point scale- - - untrustworthy
unfriendly -- 5-point scale- - - friendly
athletic -- 5-point scale- - - unathletic
introverted -- 5-point scale- - - extraverted
generous -- 5-point scale- - - stingy
unattractive -- 5-point scale- - - attractive
spirited -- 5-point scale- - - unspirited
unlikable -- 5-point scale- - - likable
wealthy -- 5-point scale- - - not wealthy

9. Comments

Finally, you have the opportunity to express any thoughts about this survey.

Furthermore, we are interested whether you have an idea of what the purpose of this survey was.

To get to the next page please click on the “>>” button.

10.End

You have answered all questions from the survey.

The fixed payment of 2 Dollars will be credited your account. Your bonus payment will be credited in the following days.

Thank you for your participation!

Notes and References

1. For a general validation concerning the successful use of a subject pool from *Mturk* for psychological studies, see Paolacci G, Chandler J, Ipeirotis PG (2010) Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. *Judgm Decis Mak* 5(5): 411–419.
2. The quality check contained two parts. For quality check 1, participants had to pick the letter “A” from a list of 12 letters. For quality check 2, we asked them which amount of money out of 1, 10, or 100 USD they would most like to have. With these questions, we aimed to ensure that participants had read the instructions carefully. None of the participants missed quality check 1, whereas 97 participants failed in check 2, all of whom were excluded from the analyses.
3. The pretest was run using Qualtrics software. Qualtrics and all other Qualtrics products or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of Qualtrics, Provo, UT, USA. <http://www.qualtrics.com>
4. We used three age categories (18-34; 35-49; 50-99) to ensure representativeness concerning age. For the Israeli subsample, it was not possible to recruit enough people for the age category older than 50.
5. For our analysis we calculated the spatial distances as the distances in kilometers between the geographic centers of two nations (<http://www.entfernungsrechner.net/en/distance/country/bd/country/in>; last accessed 21 August 2016): Bangladesh ↔ France: 7,995 km, Bangladesh ↔ Germany: 7,290 km, Bangladesh ↔ India: 1,222 km, Bangladesh ↔ Israel: 5,487 km, Bangladesh ↔ Japan: 4,768 km, Bangladesh ↔ Mexico: 14,571 km, Bangladesh ↔ Russia: 4,359 km, Bangladesh ↔ Spain: 8,654 km, Bangladesh ↔ USA: 13,227 km, France ↔ Germany: 816 km, France ↔ India: 7,369 km, France ↔ Israel: 3,265 km, France ↔ Japan: 9,850 km, France ↔ Mexico: 9,190 km, France ↔ Russia: 6,221 km, France ↔ Spain: 802 km, France ↔ USA: 7,665 km, Germany ↔ India: 6,752 km, Germany ↔ Israel: 3,002 km, Germany ↔ Japan: 9,048 km, Germany ↔ Mexico: 9,447 km, Germany ↔ Russia: 5,420 km, Germany ↔ Spain: 1,615 km, Germany ↔ USA: 7,861 km, India ↔ Israel: 4,534 km, India ↔ Japan: 5,960 km, India ↔ Mexico: 15,094 km, India ↔ Russia: 4,985 km, India ↔ Spain: 7,941 km, India ↔ USA: 13,576 km, Israel ↔ Japan: 9,084 km, Israel ↔ Mexico: 12,429 km, Israel ↔ Russia: 5,987 km, Israel ↔ Spain: 3,605 km, Israel ↔ USA: 10,860 km, Japan ↔ Mexico: 10,798 km, Japan ↔ Russia: 3,629 km, Japan ↔ Spain: 10,648 km, Japan ↔ USA: 10,150 km, Mexico ↔ Russia: 10,222 km, Mexico ↔ Spain: 9,025 km, Mexico ↔ USA: 1,632 km, Russia ↔ Spain: 7,020 km, Russia ↔ USA: 8,886 km, Spain ↔ USA: 7,589 km.
6. The strategy method allows us to obtain multiple observations with a given sample. A review reveals that most previous studies did not find differences between strategy method and direct-response (Brandts J, Charness G (2011). The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons. *Exp Econ* 14(3): 375–398). One could, however, argue that the strategy method increases the saliency of the manipulation of receiver nationality. Our pilot study – which employed a direct response format – shows that systematic differences in expectations for the interaction partners from various nations prevail for the direct response format, as well.
7. This payment structure took into account both the incentivized structure of the task and the average payment usually implemented in Toluna Online Surveys. See <http://www.toluna-group.com/de>
8. Oppenheimer DM, Meyvis T, Davidenko N (2009) Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. *J Exp Soc Psychol* 45: 867–872.
9. Yamagishi T, Makimura Y, Foddy M, Matsuda M, Kiyonari T, Platow MJ (2005) Comparisons of Australians and Japanese on group-based cooperation. *Asian J Soc Psycho* 8: 173–190.

10. Kay AC, Jost JT (2003) Complementary justice: Effects of "poor but happy" and "poor but honest" stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit activation of the justice motive. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 85(5): 823–837.
11. Brislin RW (1970) Back-translation for cross-cultural research. *J Cross Cult Psychol* 1(3): 185–216
12. Unipark, 2013. See www.unipark.de.
13. Although instructions were double-checked by native speakers, some participants left us the comment that the French instructions contained some minor errors, but that the instructions were still understandable. However, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that those errors made participants suspicious. When excluding the French subsample, the analyses lead to the same pattern of results.
14. People from the US and India could choose between a voucher and a payment in dollars due to Amazon Mechanical Turk regulations.
15. Von Ahn L, Blum M, Langford J (2004) Telling humans and computers apart automatically. *Commun ACM* 47(2): 56–60.
16. One limitation to the pilot study was that we did not incentivize the cooperation task. It is not totally clear whether people would behave altruistically to the same extent when this has an impact on their own payment. Furthermore, due to a programming mistake for the hypothetical interaction with a person from Germany, the choice for transferring 10 dollars was incorrectly declared as 11 dollars. For the analysis, we therefore replaced 11 dollars with 10 dollars.
17. Quattrone GA, Jones EE (1980) The perception of variability within in-groups and out-groups: Implications for the law of small numbers. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 38(1): 141–152.
18. Buchan NR, Grimalda G, Wilson R, Brewer M, Fatas E, Foddy M (2009). Globalization and human cooperation. *Proc Natl Acad Sci USA* 106(11): 4138–4142.
19. Allport G (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice* (Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, MA).
20. In both studies, some participants did not complete the attribute ratings, which were coded as missing values and lead to a reduced number of observations in analyses concerning attribute ratings. Due to a translation error in the Spanish instructions, we do not have interpretable values for the „likable“- dimension for senders from Mexico (who used these instructions). Therefore, we excluded Mexico as a sender nation from these analyses.
21. For our analysis, we used the gross domestic products from the year 2013 based on the per-capita purchasing power parity reported by the World Economic Outlook Database: Bangladesh: 2,080, France: 35,784, Germany: 40,007, India: 4,077, Israel: 34,770, Japan: 36,899, Mexico: 15,563, Russia: 17,885, Spain: 29,851, USA: 53,101.
22. For our analyses, we used the five common Hofstede dimensions (power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long term orientation). We did not include the sixth dimension “indulgence”, which was added later to the scale, as no data is available on this new dimension for some of the nations included in our study.
23. Additionally, participants made a choice for a random person (without information regarding nationality).
24. Participants also rated their own country and themselves in terms of the given adjectives.

Figures




Figure S1. Expectations concerning transfers for all receiver nations in the pilot study.

Expectation scores are presented as the difference from the grand mean (3.77 out of 10

Dollar). The bar colors and bar labels represent receivers' nationalities.




Figure S2. Transfers to all receiver nations in the pilot study. Transfer scores are presented as the difference from the grand mean (4.79 out of 10 Dollar). The bar colors and bar labels represent receivers' nationalities.




Figure S3. Partner of choice in Study 1 split by own nation.

IL= Israel, US= USA, DE = Germany, JP = Japan, IN = India, MX = Mexico.




Figure S4. Expectations concerning transfers for all combinations of sender and receiver nations in Study 2 (reported for the 6 out of 10 nations investigated in Study 1 only). Expectation scores are presented as the difference from the grand mean (51.99 out of 100 cent). The Y-axis depicts the nation of the sender, whereas the bar colors and bar labels represent receivers' nationalities. The numbers in parentheses indicate the mean expectation for each sender nation based on 6 out of 10 sender and receiver nations.




Figure S5. Transfers for all combinations of sender and receiver nations in Study 2 (reported for the 6 out of 10 nations investigated in Study 1 only). Transfer scores are presented as the difference from the grand mean (51.73 out of 100 cent). The Y-axis depicts the nation of the sender, whereas the bar colors and bar labels represent receivers' nationalities. The numbers in parentheses indicate the mean transfer for each sender nation based on 6 out of 10 sender and receiver nations.

Tables

Hofstede values split by participant nationality

Dimension	Nation									
	BD	FR	DE	IN	IL	JP	MX	ES	RU	US
Individualism	20	71	67	48	54	46	30	51	39	91
Long Term Orientation	47	63	83	51	38	88	24	48	81	26
Masculinity	55	43	66	56	47	95	69	42	36	62
Power Distance	80	68	35	77	13	54	81	57	93	40
Uncertainty Avoidance	60	86	65	40	81	92	82	86	95	46
Study	2	2	1,2	1,2	1,2	1,2	1,2	2	2	1,2

Table S1. Hofstede values split by participant nationality

BD = Bangladesh, FR = France, DE = Germany, IN = India, IL = Israel, JP = Japan, MX =

Mexico, ES = Spain, RU = Russia, US = USA

Expectations, transfers and net-transfers in the Pilot Study

Receiver nation	(1) Expectations	(2) Transfer	(3) Net-Transfer
USA	0.122 (0.38)	-0.292 (-0.88)	-0.432 ⁺ (-1.89)
Germany	0.396 (1.24)	-0.103 (-0.31)	-0.394 ⁺ (-1.74)
France	0.104 (0.33)	-0.195 (-0.60)	-0.316 (-1.42)
Mexico	0.065 (0.20)	0.602 ⁺ (1.81)	0.521 [*] (2.26)
Israel	-0.711 [*] (-2.21)	-0.223 (-0.67)	0.471 [*] (2.06)
Afghanistan	-0.737 [*] (-2.24)	-0.013 (-0.04)	0.707 ^{**} (3.02)
Japan	0.762 [*] (2.34)	0.222 (0.66)	-0.557 [*] (-2.41)
Constant	3.767 ^{***} (28.67)	4.792 ^{***} (35.44)	1.043 ^{***} (11.16)
Observations	504	504	504
Adjusted R^2	0.017	-0.003	0.042

Table S2. Regression models (OLS) predicting expectations, transfers, and net-transfers for the receiver's country of origin in the pilot study. t -statistics are in parentheses. Receiver nation variables are effect-coded.

⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$.

Continuation of Table 1 of the main article – sender x receiver interactions

		Receiver						
		Mexico	Japan	Germany	Israel	India	USA	
Sender	Mexico	(1) Expectation	1.258 (1.03)	1.032 (0.89)	3.383** (3.19)	-1.576 (-1.54)	-0.233 (-0.21)	-3.864*** (-3.35)
		(2) Transfer	2.806* (2.53)	0.025 (0.02)	2.598** (2.61)	-2.592** (-2.64)	0.017 (0.02)	-2.854** (-2.80)
		(3) Net-Transfer	1.548 (1.55)	-1.008 (-1.09)	-0.784 (-0.85)	-1.016 (-1.09)	0.250 (0.26)	1.010 (1.17)
	Japan	(1) Expectation	-0.300 (-0.28)	0.981 (0.87)	1.317 (1.25)	-2.651* (-2.36)	0.507 (0.52)	0.146 (0.13)
		(2) Transfer	-1.711 (-1.91)	3.077** (3.13)	2.397** (2.64)	-1.386 (-1.49)	-2.953*** (-3.87)	0.576 (0.67)
		(3) Net-Transfer	-1.411 (-1.64)	2.096* (2.56)	1.080 (1.31)	1.265 (1.56)	-3.460*** (-4.34)	0.430 (0.45)
	Germany	(1) Expectation	0.961 (0.90)	2.837* (2.48)	-2.599* (-2.29)	-1.116 (-0.95)	-2.001 (-1.79)	1.918 (1.56)
		(2) Transfer	1.853 (1.95)	-0.744 (-0.72)	0.756 (0.70)	-0.989 (-1.05)	-0.868 (-0.88)	-0.008 (-0.01)
		(3) Net-Transfer	0.892 (0.95)	-3.581*** (-3.51)	3.355*** (3.44)	0.127 (0.12)	1.133 (1.01)	-1.926 (-1.70)
	Israel	(1) Expectation	-1.655 (-1.39)	1.925 (1.46)	-0.909 (-0.70)	1.519 (1.01)	-4.927*** (-3.98)	4.046** (3.22)
		(2) Transfer	-1.145 (-1.15)	-0.333 (-0.31)	-6.617*** (-5.15)	7.246*** (5.58)	-1.061 (-0.89)	1.910 (1.83)
		(3) Net-Transfer	0.509 (0.48)	-2.258* (-2.02)	-5.708*** (-4.89)	5.727*** (4.36)	3.866** (3.21)	-2.137* (-2.04)
India	(1) Expectation	0.495 (0.50)	-4.098*** (-4.28)	-2.400* (-2.54)	-0.667 (-0.68)	7.305*** (6.05)	-0.635 (-0.62)	
	(2) Transfer	-1.350 (-1.45)	-0.760 (-0.80)	-0.141 (-0.15)	-3.551*** (-3.76)	5.710*** (4.59)	0.092 (0.09)	
	(3) Net-Transfer	-1.845** (-2.59)	3.338*** (5.07)	2.259*** (3.46)	-2.884*** (-3.80)	-1.595 (-1.74)	0.726 (0.93)	
USA	(1) Expectation	-0.758 (-0.66)	-2.677* (-2.31)	1.209 (1.08)	4.490*** (3.92)	-0.651 (-0.54)	-1.612 (-1.19)	
	(2) Transfer	-0.453 (-0.50)	-1.265 (-1.37)	1.006 (1.17)	1.272 (1.21)	-0.845 (-0.89)	0.285 (0.28)	
	(3) Net-Transfer	0.306 (0.27)	1.413 (1.47)	-0.203 (-0.20)	-3.219*** (-3.61)	-0.193 (-0.16)	1.897 (1.80)	
Constant	(1) 42.86*** (61.46) (2) 44.35*** (59.34) (3) 1.491*** (3.69)							

Observations	7362
Cluster / subjects	1227
Adjusted R ²	(1) 0.058 (2) 0.058 (3) 0.050

Table S3. Table 1 of the main article reports regression models (OLS with cluster corrected SEs) for Study 1 predicting expectations, transfers, and net-transfers by sender's and the receiver's country of origin as well as all two-way interactions which are reported here. Indicators for sender and receiver countries are effect-coded (centered variables) and represent comparisons against the grand mean (i.e., constant). To be able to report deviations for all countries, coefficients for the omitted category are estimated in a second run of the analysis in which a different country was omitted. All models control for an Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC, see S8 for details), as well as age and gender (all centered). *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Expectations, transfers, and net-transfers in Study 1 – Tobit regressions

	(1) Expectation	(2) Transfer	(3) Net-Transfer
Sender nationality			
Mexico	3.514 (1.75)	1.853 (0.85)	-1.157 (-1.37)
Japan	-11.00*** (-5.37)	-9.962*** (-4.26)	0.629 (0.70)
Germany	-0.636 (-0.33)	3.233 (1.52)	3.283*** (3.80)
Israel	6.181** (3.01)	6.629** (2.96)	0.275 (0.30)
India	3.770 (1.77)	-4.323* (-2.06)	-6.454*** (-5.17)
USA	-1.829 (-0.84)	2.571 (1.05)	3.424*** (3.42)
Receiver nationality			
Mexico	-5.612*** (-8.70)	-3.682*** (-6.64)	1.612*** (3.77)
Japan	8.728*** (13.18)	4.733*** (8.30)	-3.249*** (-7.81)
Germany	2.288*** (3.64)	0.748 (1.29)	-1.278** (-3.03)
Israel	-6.718*** (-9.73)	-3.872*** (-6.42)	2.195*** (4.96)
India	-4.171*** (-6.42)	-0.760 (-1.30)	2.737*** (5.83)
USA	5.485*** (7.98)	2.833*** (4.94)	-2.017*** (-4.60)

Table S4 continued

		Receiver						
		Mexico	Japan	Germany	Israel	India	USA	
(1) Expectation	Sender	Mexico	1.679	1.028	3.972**	-1.607	-0.208	-4.863**
			(1.08)	(0.68)	(3.08)	(-1.24)	(-0.16)	(-3.27)
			(2) Transfer	4.019**	0.159	2.925*	-2.621*	-0.468
			(2.87)	(0.12)	(2.30)	(-2.15)	(-0.38)	(-3.14)
(3) Net-Transfer			1.571	-0.998	-0.778	-1.035	0.235	1.006
			(1.57)	(-1.07)	(-0.84)	(-1.11)	(0.25)	(1.17)
(1) Expectation	Sender	Japan	-0.396	2.223	2.030	-4.602**	0.349	0.396
			(-0.28)	(1.52)	(1.50)	(-2.86)	(0.27)	(0.28)
			(2) Transfer	-2.371*	4.164**	3.353**	-2.154	-3.729***
			(-2.00)	(3.23)	(2.93)	(-1.72)	(-3.72)	(0.69)
(3) Net-Transfer			-1.406	2.109*	1.069	1.271	-3.492***	0.450
			(-1.63)	(2.57)	(1.29)	(1.55)	(-4.37)	(0.47)
(1) Expectation	Sender	Germany	1.199	2.971*	-3.053*	-1.594	-1.763	2.240
			(0.88)	(2.10)	(-2.12)	(-1.02)	(-1.26)	(1.43)
			(2) Transfer	2.354	-1.450	1.206	-1.241	-0.882
			(1.93)	(-1.14)	(0.86)	(-1.00)	(-0.73)	(0.01)
(3) Net-Transfer			0.887	-3.578***	3.375***	0.163	1.111	-1.958
			(0.95)	(-3.51)	(3.44)	(0.15)	(0.99)	(-1.72)
(1) Expectation	Sender	Israel	-1.838	3.005	-1.327	1.825	-6.606***	4.941**
			(-1.19)	(1.69)	(-0.77)	(0.92)	(-4.16)	(2.96)
			(2) Transfer	-1.407	0.107	-8.660***	8.831***	-1.298
			(-1.11)	(0.08)	(-5.14)	(5.09)	(-0.85)	(1.82)
(3) Net-Transfer			0.498	-2.304*	-5.759***	5.802***	3.899**	-2.136*
			(0.47)	(-2.04)	(-4.90)	(4.35)	(3.22)	(-2.02)
(1) Expectation	Sender	India	1.043	-5.768***	-3.080**	0.229	8.837***	-1.261
			(0.85)	(-4.96)	(-2.71)	(0.19)	(5.97)	(-0.99)
			(2) Transfer	-1.610	-1.258	-0.186	-4.157***	7.279***
			(-1.40)	(-1.12)	(-0.17)	(-3.51)	(4.76)	(-0.05)
(3) Net-Transfer			-1.849**	3.362***	2.260***	-2.929***	-1.578	0.735
			(-2.59)	(5.10)	(3.46)	(-3.84)	(-1.72)	(0.94)
(1) Expectation	Sender	USA	-1.686	-3.458*	1.458	5.748***	-0.609	-1.453
			(-1.09)	(-2.34)	(1.00)	(3.82)	(-0.38)	(-0.81)
			(2) Contribution	-0.985	-1.721	1.363	1.343	-0.902
			(-0.81)	(-1.44)	(1.21)	(0.95)	(-0.74)	(0.68)
(3) Net-Transfer			0.300	1.410	-0.168	-3.270***	-0.175	1.903
			(0.26)	(1.46)	(-0.16)	(-3.65)	(-0.14)	(1.79)
Constant	(1) 43.10*** (48.82)							
	(2) 45.17*** (46.74)							
	(3) 1.49*** (3.67)							

Observations	7362
Cluster / Subjects	1227
Pseudo R^2	(1) 0.0076 (2) 0.0074 (3) 0.0063

Table S4. Tobit regression models (with cluster corrected *SEs*) for predicting expectations, contribution, and discrimination by sender and receiver country of origin as well as all two-way interactions in Study 1. Indicators for sender and receiver countries are effect-coded (centered variables) and represent comparisons against the grand mean. To be able to report deviations for all countries, coefficients for the omitted category are estimated in a second run of the analysis in which a different country was omitted. All models control for age and gender effects as well as an Instructional Manipulation Check. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Net-transfers in Study 1 – Tobit regressions

	Net-Transfer
Ingroup (no=0; yes=1)	5.146 ^{**} (3.16)
Spatial Distance	-0.0000281 (-0.44)
GDP Difference	0.000106 ^{***} (7.59)
Cultural Distance (Hofstede)	0.0393 [*] (2.18)
Constant	-0.859 (-0.35)
Observations	7362
Cluster / Subjects	1227
Pseudo R^2	0.046

Table S5. Tobit regression (with cluster corrected *SEs*) for Study 1 predicting net-transfer by interacting with the ingroup vs. the outgroup as well as the spatial distance, the difference in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the cultural distance measured as the Euclidean Distance concerning the five dimensional model by Hofstede between the sender and receiver countries. The model controls for age and gender effects as well as an Instructional Manipulation Check and indicators of sender nationality (all not reported). *t*-statistics are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Means and Standard Deviations for Expectations in Studies 1 and 2

		Receiver							
		Mexico	Japan	Germany	Israel	India	USA	All Nations	
Study 1	Sender	Mexico	42.99 (30.55)	54.33 (32.87)	51.49 (31.46)	39.45 (28.74)	42.64 (28.06)	46.67 (31.05)	46.26 (30.88)
Study 2		Mexico	53.43 (34.27)	58.21 (34.59)	54.78 (34.04)	41.94 (32.86)	46.58 (35.53)	51.19 (34.36)	51.02 (34.49)
Study 1		Japan	28.25 (26.27)	41.10 (32.39)	36.25 (30.18)	25.20 (27.16)	30.20 (27.55)	37.50 (29.85)	33.08 (29.45)
Study 2		Japan	39.71 (34.42)	55.59 (32.49)	55.59 (32.95)	43.24 (33.28)	36.47 (33.74)	52.06 (33.01)	47.12 (33.79)
Study 1		Germany	38.90 (30.00)	52.34 (29.85)	41.72 (29.92)	36.12 (28.92)	37.08 (29.96)	48.66 (31.00)	42.47 (30.49)
Study 2		Germany	40.35 (32.35)	59.12 (32.14)	51.58 (36.34)	45.61 (34.38)	43.86 (32.61)	49.47 (34.46)	48.33 (34.04)
Study 1		Israel	42.52 (30.42)	57.67 (31.24)	49.65 (32.27)	45.00 (34.83)	40.40 (31.19)	57.03 (30.26)	48.71 (32.38)
Study 2		Israel	56.43 (31.41)	50.71 (35.69)	52.50 (38.16)	62.14 (31.31)	50.36 (36.16)	59.64 (35.64)	55.30 (34.59)
Study 1		India	39.86 (28.93)	46.84 (30.13)	43.35 (29.10)	38.00 (28.97)	47.81 (31.72)	47.53 (30.66)	43.90 (30.12)
Study 2		India	67.92 (31.28)	69.38 (33.35)	70.42 (29.46)	61.88 (34.80)	67.29 (35.89)	68.33 (32.44)	67.53 (32.77)
Study 1		USA	37.30 (31.14)	46.95 (32.24)	45.65 (30.94)	41.85 (32.95)	38.55 (30.31)	45.25 (32.25)	42.59 (31.80)
Study 2		USA	33.79 (34.43)	51.72 (36.47)	48.97 (37.50)	39.14 (36.53)	40.69 (36.41)	56.21 (37.69)	45.09 (37.09)
Study 1		All Nations	38.34 (29.93)	49.87 (31.86)	44.66 (31.00)	37.61 (30.92)	39.54 (30.29)	47.14 (31.31)	42.86 (31.23)
Study 2		All Nations	48.05 (34.97)	57.91 (34.40)	55.45 (35.21)	47.47 (34.99)	47.47 (36.07)	55.58 (35.04)	51.99 (35.34)

Table S6. The table shows mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) for

expectations from (sender) and towards (receiver) the different nations in Study 1 and 2.

Expectations, transfers and net-transfers by attribute ratings in study 1

	(1) Expectation	(2) Transfer	(3) Net-Transfer
Trustworthy	3.675*** (5.65)	3.287*** (5.06)	-0.389 (-0.84)
Friendly	0.885 (1.63)	1.296* (2.35)	0.412 (0.93)
Generous	2.777*** (4.32)	1.636* (2.56)	-1.141* (-2.32)
Likeable	1.133 (1.81)	0.858 (1.37)	-0.275 (-0.63)
Wealthy	1.642** (2.96)	-0.413 (-0.74)	-2.055*** (-5.22)
Attractive	0.879 (1.46)	1.438* (2.42)	0.559 (1.07)
Spirited	-1.163* (-2.08)	-0.741 (-1.30)	0.422 (1.04)
Extraverted	0.313 (0.57)	0.595 (1.12)	0.281 (0.76)
Athletic	0.0172 (0.03)	-0.233 (-0.41)	-0.289 (-0.73)
Constant	9.00*** (2.35)	18.16*** (4.76)	9.164*** (3.62)
Observations	6144	6144	6144
Cluster / Subjects	1025	1025	1025
Adjusted R^2	0.096	0.086	0.054

Table S7. Regression models (OLS with cluster corrected *SEs*) for Study 1 predicting expectations, transfers, and net-transfers by cooperation-related and non-cooperation-related attribute ratings for the respective receiver countries. All models control for age and gender effects as well as an Instructional Manipulation Check and sender nationality (all not reported), *t*-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. Due to a translation error in the Spanish instruction, senders from Mexico were excluded from the analyses concerning attribute ratings.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Attribute ratings predicted by receiver nation in Study 1

	Cooperation-Related				Non-Cooperation Related				
	(1) Trustworthy	(2) Friendly	(3) Generous	(4) Likeable	(5) Wealthy	(6) Attractive	(7) Spirited	(8) Extraverted	(9) Athletic
Mexico	-0.386*** (-17.08)	0.097*** (4.09)	0.034 (1.50)	0.032 (1.56)	-0.547*** (-24.93)	-0.007 (-0.36)	0.276*** (11.24)	0.380*** (16.40)	-0.113*** (-5.24)
Japan	0.504*** (23.23)	0.119*** (4.66)	0.125*** (5.91)	-0.007 (-0.27)	0.407*** (19.64)	-0.062** (-3.02)	-0.232*** (-9.26)	-0.566*** (-22.06)	-0.026 (-1.12)
Germany	0.309*** (13.53)	-0.234*** (-10.33)	-0.108*** (-5.13)	0.010 (0.46)	0.437*** (22.50)	0.195*** (9.31)	-0.087*** (-3.90)	-0.097*** (-4.37)	0.293*** (13.37)
Israel	-0.284*** (-12.45)	-0.105*** (-4.16)	-0.211*** (-9.72)	-0.302*** (-13.42)	-0.157*** (-6.89)	-0.031 (-1.54)	-0.068** (-3.22)	-0.044 (-1.77)	-0.102*** (-4.77)
India	-0.122*** (-5.37)	0.082*** (3.65)	0.030 (1.38)	0.077*** (3.69)	-0.567*** (-23.47)	-0.368*** (-14.69)	-0.046* (-2.21)	-0.197*** (-8.23)	-0.198*** (-8.77)
USA	-0.023 (-1.06)	0.041 (1.81)	0.130*** (5.76)	0.191*** (8.63)	0.427*** (20.34)	0.273*** (13.36)	0.156*** (6.81)	0.523*** (21.83)	0.145*** (5.59)
Constant	3.481*** (211.55)	3.491*** (211.08)	3.177*** (227.50)	3.362*** (220.10)	3.083*** (230.43)	3.278*** (232.44)	3.379*** (234.82)	3.147*** (231.11)	3.231*** (233.04)
Observations	7350	7350	7350	6144	7350	7350	7350	7350	7350
Adjusted R^2	0.144	0.049	0.059	0.093	0.235	0.064	0.055	0.128	0.066

Table S8: All models control for age, gender, and an Instructional Manipulation Check (all centered) as well as indicators of sender nationality (all not reported). The nation indicators are effect-coded. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Due to a translation error in the Spanish

instructions, the likeable dimension was excluded for senders from Mexico. *t*-statistics are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Expectations, transfers and net-transfers in Study 2

	(1) Expectation	(2) Transfer	(3) Net-Transfer
Sender nationality			
Mexico	-1.529 (-0.47)	0.178 (0.05)	1.708 (0.60)
Japan	-1.105 (-0.23)	-1.326 (-0.28)	-0.221 (-0.09)
Germany	-3.872 (-1.20)	6.731 (1.92)	10.60*** (4.44)
Israel	1.737 (0.37)	1.330 (0.28)	-0.407 (-0.17)
India	13.35*** (3.50)	-0.807 (-0.19)	-14.16*** (-4.34)
USA	-8.580* (-2.23)	-6.106 (-1.47)	2.474 (0.89)
Receiver nationality			
Mexico	-3.819*** (-3.40)	-0.993 (-0.94)	2.826* (2.47)
Japan	5.921*** (5.38)	3.779*** (3.57)	-2.142 (-1.85)
Germany	3.535** (2.84)	2.739** (2.67)	-0.797 (-0.69)
Israel	-4.491*** (-3.98)	-4.416*** (-4.88)	0.075 (0.08)
India	-4.547*** (-4.09)	-2.449* (-2.48)	2.098* (1.98)
USA	3.401** (2.77)	1.341 (1.44)	-2.060* (-2.22)
Constant	52.35*** (31.59)	51.94*** (29.29)	-0.408 (-0.33)

Table S9
continued

		Receiver						
		Mexico	Japan	Germany	Israel	India	USA	
(1) Expectation	Sender	Mexico	6.034*	2.135	0.406	-5.716*	0.442	-3.302
			(2.38)	(0.94)	(0.16)	(-2.41)	(0.19)	(-1.37)
			(2) Transfer	9.856***	-0.253	-0.525	-6.464**	-0.0691
			(3.74)	(-0.13)	(-0.22)	(-2.94)	(-0.03)	(-1.29)
(3) Net-Transfer			3.822	-2.389	-0.931	-0.748	-0.511	0.757
			(1.52)	(-0.97)	(-0.36)	(-0.47)	(-0.24)	(0.43)
(1) Expectation	Sender	Japan	-2.758	3.395	5.787*	-0.257	-5.967	-0.200
			(-0.85)	(1.17)	(2.07)	(-0.09)	(-1.91)	(-0.08)
			(2) Transfer	-2.934	2.423	0.587	1.024	-3.147
			(-1.27)	(0.96)	(0.24)	(0.43)	(-1.28)	(1.26)
(3) Net-Transfer			-0.176	-0.971	-5.201*	1.281	2.820	2.246
			(-0.06)	(-0.33)	(-2.47)	(0.67)	(1.05)	(0.94)
(1) Expectation	Sender	Germany	-4.361*	5.736*	-0.105	0.644	0.421	-2.335
			(-2.01)	(2.33)	(-0.03)	(0.24)	(0.19)	(-0.82)
			(2) Transfer	-4.039	2.032	4.358	0.833	-0.586
			(-1.87)	(0.84)	(1.71)	(0.44)	(-0.28)	(-1.30)
(3) Net-Transfer			0.322	-3.704	4.463	0.188	-1.007	-0.262
			(0.13)	(-1.54)	(1.65)	(0.08)	(-0.42)	(-0.13)
(1) Expectation	Sender	Israel	4.752	-9.637***	-6.148	10.21***	-0.0457	0.869
			(1.46)	(-3.37)	(-1.71)	(4.12)	(-0.02)	(0.23)
			(2) Transfer	-2.147	-3.195	-0.487	5.813*	-0.969
			(-0.73)	(-1.33)	(-0.15)	(2.38)	(-0.42)	(0.34)
(3) Net-Transfer			-6.900	6.442**	5.662*	-4.396	-0.923	0.116
			(-1.67)	(2.74)	(2.55)	(-1.81)	(-0.39)	(0.05)
(1) Expectation	Sender	India	4.003*	-3.213	-0.469	-2.296	4.652	-2.677
			(2.01)	(-1.45)	(-0.20)	(-1.04)	(1.84)	(-1.00)
			(2) Transfer	1.479	-1.563	-2.307	-2.258	7.716**
			(0.81)	(-0.72)	(-1.28)	(-1.29)	(3.22)	(-1.62)
(3) Net-Transfer			-2.525	1.651	-1.838	0.0382	3.065	-0.390
			(-1.36)	(0.79)	(-0.80)	(0.02)	(1.13)	(-0.18)
(1) Expectation	Sender	USA	-7.672**	1.584	0.529	-2.585	0.498	7.645**
			(-3.21)	(0.68)	(0.21)	(-1.17)	(0.22)	(2.92)
			(2) Transfer	-2.215	0.555	-1.626	1.053	-2.946
			(-1.14)	(0.22)	(-1.03)	(0.70)	(-1.40)	(2.44)
(3) Net-Transfer			5.456*	-1.029	-2.155	3.637	-3.444	-2.466
			(2.25)	(-0.38)	(-0.89)	(1.68)	(-1.79)	(-1.28)
Constant	52.35*** (31.59)							
	51.94*** (29.29)							
	-0.408 (-0.33)							

Observations	1722
Cluster / Subjects	287
Adjusted R^2	(1) 0.062 (2) 0.040 (3) 0.073

Table S9. Regression models (OLS with cluster corrected *SEs*) for predicting expectations, transfers, and net-transfers by sender and receiver country of origin as well as all two-way interactions in Study 2. The analysis concerns the 6 (out of a total of 10) nations investigated in Study 1 to enhance between-study comparisons. Indicators for sender and receiver nations are effect-coded (centered variables) and represent comparisons against the grand mean (constant slightly deviates from grand mean due to varying sample sizes). To be able to report deviations for all nations, coefficients for the omitted category are estimated in a second run of the analysis in which a different country was omitted. All models control for an Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC, see 8 for details) as well as age and gender (all centered). Five participants with missing age information were excluded from the analyses. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Net-transfers in study 2 for six and 10 countries

	(1) Net-Transfer (6 countries)	(2) Net-Transfer (10 countries)
Ingroup (no=0; yes=1)	1.934 (0.47)	3.996* (2.37)
Spatial Distance	-0.000313* (-2.12)	-0.000104 (-1.21)
GDP Difference	0.000120*** (3.69)	0.000119*** (5.55)
Cultural Distance (Hofstede)	0.0432 (0.92)	0.0389+ (1.69)
Constant	-7.708 (-1.08)	-4.301 (-0.93)
Observations	1722	4770
Cluster / Subjects	287	477
Adjusted R^2	0.079	0.069

Table S10. Regression model (OLS with cluster corrected *SEs*) for Study 2 predicting net-transfer by interacting with ingroup vs. the outgroup, spatial distance, difference in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and cultural distance according to the five-dimensional model by Hofstede (euclidean distance) between the sender and receiver countries. Model 1 shows the analysis for the six countries that were also included in Study 1. In Model 2, all 10 countries are included. Both models control for age and gender effects as well as indicators of sender nationality (all not reported). Five (6 nations) or 8 (10 nations) participants with missing age information were excluded from the analyses. *t*-statistics are in parentheses.

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Expectations, transfers and net-transfers by attribute ratings in Study 2

	(2) Expectation	(1) Transfer	(3) Net-Transfer
Trustworthy	3.177** (2.77)	4.462*** (3.73)	1.285 (1.13)
Friendly	2.284 (1.89)	4.777*** (3.88)	2.493* (2.16)
Generous	4.735*** (4.22)	1.730 (1.40)	-3.005** (-2.97)
Likeable	1.730 (1.36)	0.311 (0.24)	-1.419 (-1.00)
Wealthy	0.083 (0.08)	0.895 (0.79)	0.813 (0.98)
Attractive	1.311 (1.12)	1.149 (0.95)	-0.162 (-0.15)
Spirited	-0.630 (-0.67)	-0.221 (-0.23)	0.409 (0.53)
Extraverted	-0.380 (-0.37)	1.413 (1.44)	1.793* (2.22)
Athletic	-0.128 (-0.12)	-1.353 (-1.36)	-1.225 (-1.21)
Constant	12.41 (1.64)	7.347 (0.94)	-5.066 (-0.94)
Observations	1722	1722	1722
Cluster / Subjects	287	287	287
Adjusted R^2	0.133	0.118	0.091

Table S11. Regression model (OLS) predicting expectations, transfers, and net-transfers in Study 2 by attribute ratings for the respective receiver nations (6 out of 10 nations included). All models control for age and gender effects as well as indicators of sender nationality (all not reported). *t*-statistics are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Norm values for transfers, expectations and attribute ratings

Country	(1) Average transfer given to interaction partner	(2) Average transfer received from interaction partner	(3) Average expectation concerning transfer of interaction partner	(4) Average expectation of interaction partner concerning the transfers of this nation	(5) Self-perception	(6) Outside-perception
Bangladesh	<i>M</i> = 49.87 <i>SD</i> = 24.19 <i>N</i> = 15 (150 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 46.89 <i>SD</i> = 34.23 <i>N</i> = 485 (485 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 56.2 <i>SD</i> = 28.37 <i>N</i> = 15 (150 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 42.39 <i>SD</i> = 34.70 <i>N</i> = 485 (485 obs.)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.93 (0.83) Friendly: <i>M</i> = 4.07 (0.83) Generous: <i>M</i> = 3.36 (1.28) Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.71 (0.99) Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 2.21 (0.97) Attractive: <i>M</i> = 3.79 (0.89) Spirited: <i>M</i> = 3.21 (1.25) Extraverted: <i>M</i> = 3.71 (1.20) Athletic: <i>M</i> = 2.71 (1.14) <i>N</i> = 14 (14 obs.)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.04 (1.01) Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.35 (0.98) Generous: <i>M</i> = 2.98 (0.92) Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.20 (0.89) Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 2.36 (1.06) Attractive: <i>M</i> = 2.74 (0.89) Spirited: <i>M</i> = 3.12 (0.88) Extraverted: <i>M</i> = 3.01 (0.87) Athletic: <i>M</i> = 2.90 (0.91) <i>N</i> = 469 (469 obs.)
France	<i>M</i> = 46.96 <i>SD</i> = 33.19 <i>N</i> = 53 (530 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 48.85 <i>SD</i> = 34.03 <i>N</i> = 485 (485 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 45.92 <i>SD</i> = 32.89 <i>N</i> = 53 (530 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 48.97 <i>SD</i> = 33.34 <i>N</i> = 485 (485 obs.)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.19 (0.88) Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.06 (1.01)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.35 (0.98) Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.07 (1.14)

					Generous: $M = 2.91 (0.81)$ Likeable: $M = 3.19 (0.96)$ Wealthy: $M = 3.19 (0.79)$ Attractive: $M = 3.38 (0.88)$ Spirited: $M = 3.15 (0.95)$ Extraverted: $M = 3.40 (0.77)$ Athletic: $M = 3.00 (0.88)$ $N = 53 (53 \text{ obs.})$	Generous: $M = 3.01 (0.96)$ Likeable: $M = 3.25 (1.03)$ Wealthy: $M = 3.48 (0.84)$ Attractive: $M = 3.54 (0.94)$ Spirited: $M = 3.48 (0.93)$ Extraverted: $M = 3.38 (0.97)$ Athletic: $M = 3.25 (0.93)$ $N = 431 (431 \text{ obs.})$
Germany	$M = 49.97$ $SD = 32.67$ $N = 266$ (1824 obs.)	$M = 47.39$ $SD = 32.61$ $N = 1712$ (1712 obs.)	$M = 43.34$ $SD = 31.38$ $N = 266$ (1824 obs.)	$M = 47.45$ $SD = 32.33$ $N = 1712$ (1712 obs.)	Trustworthy: $M = 3.67 (0.84)$ Friendly: $M = 3.24 (0.86)$ Generous: $M = 2.71 (0.81)$ Likeable: $M = 3.37 (0.78)$ Wealthy: $M = 3.38 (0.68)$ Attractive: $M = 3.29 (0.67)$ Spirited: $M = 2.83 (0.74)$ Extraverted: $M = 3.00 (0.67)$ Athletic: $M = 3.17 (0.75)$	Trustworthy: $M = 3.79 (1.00)$ Friendly: $M = 3.20 (1.08)$ Generous: $M = 3.13 (0.95)$ Likeable: $M = 3.30 (0.93)^*$ Wealthy: $M = 3.61 (0.87)$ Attractive: $M = 3.48 (0.94)$ Spirited: $M = 3.33 (1.00)$ Extraverted: $M = 3.05 (1.00)$ Athletic: $M = 3.57 (0.92)$

					<i>N</i> = 266 (266 obs.)	<i>N</i> = 1443 (1443 obs.)
India	<i>M</i> = 42.07 <i>SD</i> = 31.45 <i>N</i> = 263 (1770 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 44.85 <i>SD</i> = 32.36 <i>N</i> = 1712 (1712 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 50.28 <i>SD</i> = 32.59 <i>N</i> = 263 (1770 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 40.92 <i>SD</i> = 31.78 <i>N</i> = 1712 (1712 obs.)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 4.05 (1.11)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.19 (1.02)
					Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.94 (1.18)	Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.49 (1.00)
					Generous: <i>M</i> = 3.82 (1.09)	Generous: <i>M</i> = 3.06 (0.91)
					Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.83 (1.01)	Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.32 (0.84)*
					Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 3.23 (1.03)	Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 2.40 (0.97)
					Attractive: <i>M</i> = 2.53 (1.28)	Attractive: <i>M</i> = 2.98 (0.94)
					Spirited: <i>M</i> = 3.87 (1.07)	Spirited: <i>M</i> = 3.19 (0.89)
					Extraverted: <i>M</i> = 3.14 (1.24)	Extraverted: <i>M</i> = 2.94 (0.94)
					Athletic: <i>M</i> = 3.79 (1.01)	Athletic: <i>M</i> = 2.85 (0.90)
Israel	<i>M</i> = 51.26 <i>SD</i> = 32.57 <i>N</i> = 230 (1492 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 42.60 <i>SD</i> = 32.30 <i>N</i> = 1712 (1712 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 49.46 <i>SD</i> = 32.87 <i>N</i> = 230 (1492 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 39.63 <i>SD</i> = 32.14 <i>N</i> = 1712 (1712 obs.)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.08 (0.99)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.20 (1.08)
					Friendly: <i>M</i> = 4.08 (0.92)	Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.23 (0.98)
					Generous: <i>M</i> = 3.04 (0.91)	Generous: <i>M</i> = 2.90 (0.98)
					Likeable: <i>M</i> = 2.47 (1.02)	Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.21 (0.89)*
					Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 2.80 (0.70)	Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 3.08 (1.00)
					Attractive: <i>M</i> = 3.50 (0.84)	Attractive: <i>M</i> = 3.17 (0.91)

					Spirited: $M = 3.50 (0.92)$ Extraverted: $M = 3.90 (0.90)$ Athletic: $M = 3.14 (0.93)$ $N = 230 (230 \text{ obs.})$	Spirited: $M = 3.27 (0.90)$ Extraverted: $M = 2.96 (0.88)$ Athletic: $M = 3.12 (0.89)$ $N = 1479 (1419 \text{ obs.})$
Japan	$M = 37.14$ $SD = 30.86$ $N = 234$ (1540 obs.)	$M = 50.22$ $SD = 33.02$ $N = 1712$ (1712 obs.)	$M = 35.75$ $SD = 30.74$ $N = 234$ (1540 obs.)	$M = 51.89$ $SD = 32.70$ $N = 1712$ (1712 obs.)	Trustworthy: $M = 3.80 (0.77)$ Friendly: $M = 3.58 (0.97)$ Generous: $M = 2.82 (0.77)$ Likeable: $M = 3.49 (0.78)$ Wealthy: $M = 3.39 (0.77)$ Attractive: $M = 3.18 (0.76)$ Spirited: $M = 2.64 (0.85)$ Extraverted: $M = 2.35 (0.73)$ Athletic: $M = 2.71 (0.74)$ $N = 234 (234 \text{ obs.})$	Trustworthy: $M = 4.01 (0.96)$ Friendly: $M = 3.60 (1.14)$ Generous: $M = 3.40 (0.94)$ Likeable: $M = 3.37 (0.99)^*$ Wealthy: $M = 3.57 (0.90)$ Attractive: $M = 3.18 (0.94)$ Spirited: $M = 3.14 (1.11)$ Extraverted: $M = 2.57 (1.11)$ Athletic: $M = 3.26 (1.02)$ $N = 1477 (1477 \text{ obs.})$
Mexico	$M = 47.83$ $SD = 32.36$ $N = 268$ (1876 obs.)	$M = 43.41$ $SD = 32.30$ $N = 1712$ (1712 obs.)	$M = 47.51$ $SD = 32.02$ $N = 268$ (1876 obs.)	$M = 40.16$ $SD = 31.30$ $N = 1712$ (1712 obs.)	Trustworthy: $M = 3.49 (1.15)$ Friendly: $M = 4.13 (0.97)$ Generous: $M = 3.54 (1.15)$	Trustworthy: $M = 3.04 (1.01)$ Friendly: $M = 3.54 (0.95)$ Generous: $M = 3.16 (0.90)$

					Likeable: $M = 3.91$ (0.90)** Wealthy: $M = 2.53$ (0.91) Attractive: $M = 3.28$ (0.95) Spirited: $M = 3.57$ (1.00) Extraverted: $M = 3.79$ (1.05) Athletic: $M = 2.68$ (1.00) $N = 268$ (268 obs.)	Likeable: $M = 3.42$ (0.85) Wealthy: $M = 2.55$ (0.97) Attractive: $M = 3.23$ (0.89) Spirited: $M = 3.65$ (0.96) Extraverted: $M = 3.53$ (0.89) Athletic: $M = 3.19$ (0.88) $N = 1440$ (1440 obs.)
Spain	$M = 51.70$ $SD = 34.74$ $N = 74$ (740 obs.)	$M = 49.30$ $SD = 33.98$ $N = 485$ (485 obs.)	$M = 45.93$ $SD = 34.03$ $N = 74$ (740 obs.)	$M = 47.11$ $SD = 33.48$ $N = 485$ (485 obs.)	Trustworthy: $M = 3.35$ (1.13) Friendly: $M = 3.76$ (1.03) Generous: $M = 3.42$ (0.97) Likeable: $M = 3.81$ (0.99) Wealthy: $M = 2.93$ (0.90) Attractive: $M = 3.55$ (0.91) Spirited: $M = 3.39$ (1.11) Extraverted: $M = 3.96$ (0.93) Athletic: $M = 3.20$ (0.95) $N = 74$ (74 obs.)	Trustworthy: $M = 3.41$ (0.91) Friendly: $M = 3.67$ (0.95) Generous: $M = 3.27$ (0.84) Likeable: $M = 3.60$ (0.87) Wealthy: $M = 3.09$ (0.88) Attractive: $M = 3.59$ (0.87) Spirited: $M = 3.72$ (0.95) Extraverted: $M = 3.65$ (0.92) Athletic: $M = 3.51$ (0.90) $N = 411$ (411 obs.)

Russia	<i>M</i> = 46.27 <i>SD</i> = 35.13 <i>N</i> = 51 (510 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 46.68 <i>SD</i> = 33.93 <i>N</i> = 485 (485 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 41.20 <i>SD</i> = 34.88 <i>N</i> = 51 (510 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 45.46 <i>SD</i> = 34.05 <i>N</i> = 485 (485 obs.)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.02 (1.26)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.06 (1.14)
					Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.14 (1.33)	Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.02 (1.09)
					Generous: <i>M</i> = 3.18 (1.21)	Generous: <i>M</i> = 2.95 (0.97)
					Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.43 (1.10)	Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.13 (0.98)
					Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 2.78 (0.88)	Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 3.00 (0.90)
					Attractive: <i>M</i> = 3.73 (0.94)	Attractive: <i>M</i> = 3.33 (0.99)
					Spirited: <i>M</i> = 3.27 (0.85)	Spirited: <i>M</i> = 3.43 (1.02)
					Extraverted: <i>M</i> = 3.16 (0.97)	Extraverted: <i>M</i> = 3.12 (1.00)
Athletic: <i>M</i> = 3.31 (1.05)	Athletic: <i>M</i> = 3.37 (1.02)					
					<i>N</i> = 51 (51 obs.)	<i>N</i> = 433 (433 obs.)
USA	<i>M</i> = 47.13 <i>SD</i> = 33.81 <i>N</i> = 258 (1780 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 48.49 <i>SD</i> = 32.47 <i>N</i> = 1712 (1712 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 42.78 <i>SD</i> = 33.37 <i>N</i> = 258 (1780 obs.)	<i>M</i> = 49.07 <i>SD</i> = 32.48 <i>N</i> = 1712 (1712 obs.)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.34 (0.99)	Trustworthy: <i>M</i> = 3.47 (1.01)
					Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.59 (0.89)	Friendly: <i>M</i> = 3.55 (1.03)
					Generous: <i>M</i> = 3.17 (0.92)	Generous: <i>M</i> = 3.31 (0.94)
					Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.52 (0.87)	Likeable: <i>M</i> = 3.53 (0.89)*
					Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 3.04 (0.78)	Wealthy: <i>M</i> = 3.63 (0.93)
					Attractive: <i>M</i> = 3.41 (0.75)	Attractive: <i>M</i> = 3.55 (0.89)
					Spirited: <i>M</i> = 3.55 (0.78)	Spirited: <i>M</i> = 3.51 (0.97)

					Extraverted: $M = 3.50 (0.79)$ Athletic: $M = 3.19 (0.93)$ $N = 258 (258 \text{ obs.})$	Extraverted: $M = 3.71 (1.02)$ Athletic: $M = 3.37 (1.13)$ $N = 1452 (1452 \text{ obs.})$
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Table S12: The table shows mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) for transfer to and from and expectations towards and of the different nations as well as self- and outside perception regarding cooperation-related and non-related attributes. The norm values are based on an overall analysis of Studies 1 and 2. *For this value, the sample size is reduced by 201 data points. Participants from Mexico were excluded for this rating due to a translation error in study 1. **For the same reason, this value was reduced to 67 data points.