

1 **Supplementary Material**

2 **Supplementary Table 1: Model Selection for dynamic factor analysis models evaluating**
3 **common patterns in time series of commercial fisheries catches in 60 stocks around Alaska**

4 Stocks are delineated by species or species group and area harvested. We tested up to two trend
5 models. We considered two error structures; where all stocks share a single observation error
6 (DE), where all stocks have individual observation error (DUE). A one-trend model indicates the
7 most commonly shared trend among the 60 time series of commercial fisheries catches.

Number of trends	Error structure	Num. parameters	AIC	Δ AIC
1	DE	61	5643	0
1	DUE	120	5732	89
2	DE	120	5678	35
2	DUE	179	5720	77

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10 **Supplementary Table 2: Model Selection for dynamic factor analysis models evaluating**
 11 **common patterns in time series of commercial fisheries revenue from 105 Alaskan**
 12 **communities** We tested up to two trend models. We considered two error structures; where all
 13 stocks share a single observation error (DE), where all stocks have individual observation error
 14 (DUE). A two-trend model indicates the two most commonly shared trends among the 105 time
 15 series of commercial fisheries revenue.

Number of trends	Error structure	Num. parameters	AIC	Δ AIC
1	DE	106	6972	1316
1	DUE	210	6361	884
2	DE	210	6257	599
2	DUE	314	5658	0

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18 **Supplementary Table 3: Regression results explaining changes in community revenues**
 19 **against changes in catch and changes in price** Changes in revenue are measured as the percent
 20 change in revenue from commercial fishing for each community from before (1980-1989) and
 21 after (1990-1999) the regime shifts. Changes in catch are measured as the percent change in
 22 catch (pounds harvested) from commercial fishing for these same years. Percent changes in price
 23 are computed from prices weighted by the proportion of commercial harvest by weight. To
 24 assess relative strength of covariates, effect sizes were computed using a separate regression of
 25 z-score standardized variables. Best model includes full main effects and interaction terms. The
 26 full model explains 93% of the variation in in change in revenue ($R^2=0.9268$, $p < 0.001$).
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Covariate	Coefficient	Std. Error	P-value	Effect Size
Intercept	-6.790	2.295	<0.0001	
Change in catch	0.913	0.040	<0.0001	1.19
Change in price	0.801	0.060	<0.0001	0.84
Interaction between change in catch and change in price	0.008	0.001	<0.0001	0.43

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31 **Supplementary Table 4: Model selection for regression analysis of changes in revenue in**
 32 **response to different types of diversification** We tested richness (the number of fisheries) and
 33 diversity (a combination of richness and evenness as measured by the Reciprocal Simpson's
 34 Index). Both variables are \log_{10} transformed. To assess relative strength of covariates, effect
 35 sizes were computed using a separate regression of z-score standardized variables.

Model Covariates	Number of parameters	AIC	Δ AIC	Effect Size
Number of fisheries (richness)	2	735.9	6.0	9.9
Diversity	2	729.9	0	13.7

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37 **Supplementary Table 5: Regression model selection for changes in revenue as a function of**
 38 **diversification and turnover** Changes in revenue are measured as the percent change in revenue
 39 from commercial fishing for each community from before (1980-1989) and after (1990-1999) the
 40 regime shifts. Diversification is measured as Reciprocal Simpson's Diversity (\log_{10}) and
 41 turnover is measured using Jaccard's Dissimilarity index (\log_{10}).

Model covariates	Number of parameters	AIC	Δ AIC
Diversification	2	1001.7	5.66
Turnover	2	1001.6	5.65
Diversification + Turnover	3	999.58	3.54
Diversification + Diversification*Turnover	3	996.04	0
Diversification + Turnover + Diversification*Turnover	4	997.66	1.62

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44 **Supplementary Table 6: Regression parameters for the best linear model fit for changes in**
 45 **community commercial fishing revenues as a function of diversification and turnover**

46 Changes in revenue are measured as the percent change in revenue from commercial fishing for
 47 each community from before (1980-1989) and after (1990-1999) the regime shifts.

48 Diversification is measured as Reciprocal Simpson’s Diversity (\log_{10}) and turnover is measured
 49 using Jaccard’s Dissimilarity index (\log_{10}). To assess relative strength of covariates, effect sizes
 50 were computed using a separate regression of z-score standardized variables. The best model
 51 includes main effects on diversification and interaction terms. The full model explains 26% of
 52 the variation in in change in revenue ($R^2=0.26$, $p < 0.00001$).


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Covariate	Coefficient	Std. error	P-value	Effect size
Intercept	-41.43	3.965	<0.0001	
Diversification	123.5	21.78	<0.0001	0.307
Diversification*Turnover	71.52	25.81	<0.01	0.187

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58 **Supplementary Figure 1: Diversification and turnover of fishing opportunities buffer**

59 **against abrupt shifts** Observed changes in revenues from before (1980-1989) and after (1990-

60 1999) are plotted against diversity and turnover of fishing opportunities for 105 Alaskan fishing

61 communities. Diversity, as measured by the reciprocal of Simpson diversity (log scale), indicates

62 total portfolio size and distribution among component stocks (often referred to as alpha

63 diversity). Turnover (often referred to as beta diversity) is Jaccard's dissimilarity index
64 measuring changes in the in the relative contribution of stocks to a communities overall portfolio
65 (by catch). Regression analysis indicates the best linear model between changes in revenue as
66 explained by Simpson's diversity and turnover includes a significant interaction ($R^2=0.26$,
67 $p<0.0001$, Supplementary Table 5, Supplementary Table 6).
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