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Psychometric properties of the German Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture and cross-national comparison of the instrument's dimensionality

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Manuscripts

Title: Psychometric properties of the German Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture and cross-national comparison of the instrument's dimensionality

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Abstract

Objective: To study the psychometric characteristics of German version of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture, and to compare its dimensionality to other language versions in order to understand the instrument's potential for cross-national studies.

Design: Cross-sectional multicenter study to establish psychometric properties of German version of the survey instrument.

Setting: 73 units from 37 departments of two German university hospitals.

Participants: Clinical personnel (n=995 responses, response rate 39.6%).

Primary and secondary outcome measures: Psychometric properties (e.g. Model fit, internal consistency) of the instrument, and comparison of dimensionality across different language translations.

Results: The instrument demonstrated acceptable to good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.64-0.88). Confirmatory factor analysis of the original 12-factor model resulted in marginally satisfactory model fit (RMSEA= 0.05; SRMR; CFI=0.90; GFI=0.88; TLI=0.88). Exploratory factor analysis resulted in an alternative 8-factor model with good model fit (RMSEA= 0.05; SRMR; CFI=0.95; GFI=0.91; TLI=0.94) and internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.73-0.87). Analysis of the dimensionality compared to models from 10 other language versions revealed eight dimensions with relatively stable composition and appearance across different versions and four requiring further improvement.

Conclusions: The German version of Hospital survey on Patient Safety Culture demonstrated satisfactory psychometric properties for use in German hospitals. However, our comparison of instrument dimensionality across different language versions indicates limitations concerning cross-national studies. Results of this study can be considered in interpreting findings across national contexts, in further refinement of the instrument for cross-national studies, and to better understand various facets and dimensions of patient safety culture.

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Keywords: Quality in health care; Health & safety; International health services; statistics & research methods.

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Article Summary

Strengths and limitations of this study

- Our study supports the development of a more uniform factor structure for the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture across language versions in order to facilitate its use in cross-national research.
- By evaluating commonalities and variations in different language versions of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture we identify relatively stable factors, as well as those in need for improvement.
- First study to validate the German version of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture for clinical personnel.
- The considerable diversity in study methodology and reporting of studies with different language versions of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture presents an obstacle for cross-national use of the instrument that has yet to be overcome.

Introduction

All healthcare organizations face specific sets of risks and challenges regarding patient safety. These challenges change dynamically over time, reflecting developments within the organization as well as in its operating environment such as changes in demographics and epidemiology or in patient behavior. To effectively manage these challenges, it is recommended for healthcare organizations to develop a culture of safety that prioritizes safety and organizational learning among other organizational goals [1]. Safety culture is generally considered to be a relatively stable construct, rooted in organizational culture [2].

A number of instruments for measuring safety culture in healthcare organizations have been developed. These instruments enable researchers and decision-makers to evaluate and compare results on different levels of the healthcare system [3]. Comparing results across units and hospitals and establishing benchmarks can drive continuous patient safety improvement. One of the most widely used instruments for evaluating healthcare providers' perception of safety culture in hospital setting is the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC) [4]. The instrument has been translated into many languages and used in different countries around the world [5–16].

There are two gaps that this study aims to address. Firstly, so far no German version of HSPSC has been validated for healthcare personnel in Germany. Secondly, despite some attempts at comparing safety culture at the international level [17, 18], the comparability of the different language versions of the instrument has not been studied systematically. While satisfactory psychometric properties were reported for the original North-American version [4] with 12 dimensions of patient safety culture, alternative factor structures have been reported for other language versions, with the number of dimensions ranging from 8 to 12 [6–15]. Because an instrument's dimensionality determines the interpretation of results, similarities and differences in dimensionality across different language versions should be considered for cross-national studies of patient safety culture.

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3 Therefore, the aim of this study is two-fold: (1) validation of German version of HSPSC
4 (HSPSC-D) by evaluation of its psychometric properties and (2) evaluation of the
5 instrument's potential for cross-national studies, by comparative analysis of instrument's
6 dimensionality as reported for different language versions.
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11 **Methods**

12 Setting

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14 This study was based on data from the cross-sectional, multicenter, mixed methods study
15 *Working conditions, safety culture and patient safety in hospitals – what predicts the safety of*
16 *the medication process* (WorkSafeMed), conducted between 2014 and 2017. In this article,
17 we focus on HSPSC-D data to evaluate its psychometric properties. The WorkSafeMed study
18 with all its components has been approved by the responsible ethics committees of the
19 medical faculties of the project partners in Bonn (#350/14) and Tübingen (#547/2014BO1).
20 Each partner complied with confidentiality requirements according to German law.
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34 Sample

35 Safety culture data were collected in two German university hospitals April to July 2015. We
36 included staff from inpatient units with ≥ 500 patients a year. Intensive care and psychiatric
37 units were excluded. Across the two hospitals a total of 73 units from 37 departments
38 participated in the study. The HSPSC-D questionnaire was distributed to 2512 healthcare
39 professionals.
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47 Measure

48 In order to develop a version of the HSPSC for German healthcare professionals (HSPSC-D),
49 we used two previous German language versions as a starting point. A first translation of the
50 HSPSC for hospital staff in the German speaking part of Switzerland [11] had been culturally
51 and linguistically adapted for use in Swiss hospitals. Hammer et al. [19] used the Swiss
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3 version as a starting point for developing a management version of HSPSC to study
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5 perceptions of safety culture among medical directors in German hospitals. In our study, the
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7 instrument was adapted to be used with healthcare personnel in German hospitals.
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10 The resulting HSPSC-D questionnaire follows the structure of the original North-American
11
12 version [4] and includes 44 items, 42 of which compose 12 dimensions (10 safety culture
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14 dimensions and 2 outcome dimensions). These 42 items use a five-point Likert scale to
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16 measure agreement ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5), or frequency
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18 ranging from “never” (1) to “always” (5). The remaining two single item measures are
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20 *Number of events reported* (measured on six frequency groups from “No event reports” to “21
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22 event reports or more”) and *Patient safety grade* (measured on five-point scale from “Failing”
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24 to “Excellent”).
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26 27 Analysis

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29 ***Data processing and preliminary analysis.*** After excluding responses with more than 30%
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31 missing values in HSPSC-D items, we conducted multiple imputations based on the
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33 expectation maximization (EM) algorithm using the statistical software NORM 2.03 [20, 21]
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35 to replace remaining missing values. Negatively worded items were reverse coded before
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37 further analysis.
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40 Several indices were taken into account to ensure that our study sample, as well as every
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42 subset used in further analysis was appropriate for factor analysis. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
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44 (KMO) indicates if the sample of items is adequate for factor analysis, while Measure of
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46 Sampling Adequacy (MSA) indicates if an individual item is adequate for factor analysis. For
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48 both indices the value >0.7 is desired, and the value of >0.9 is considered perfect [22]. A
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50 significant p-value (<0.05) of Bartlett’s test of sampling adequacy indicates that it is possible
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52 to extract more than one factor [22]. The analyses were performed using SAS 9.4.
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56 ***Descriptive statistics.*** We calculated composite scores for each dimension suggested by Sorra
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58 and Nieva [4] by calculating the average of corresponding items. We also calculated
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3 percentages of positive responses for each dimension by dividing the number of positive
4 responses on corresponding items by the number of non-missing answers in the dimension.
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7 Descriptive statistics for each item and dimension were evaluated, including range, mean, and
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10 standard deviation.

11 **Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).** We used EFA to evaluate the factor structure emerging
12 from the study data. In general, EFA and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) should be
13 performed using different subsets [23]. Thus, we performed the split-half cross validation, by
14 randomly splitting our sample in two: “Exploring” (for EFA) and “Testing” subsets (for
15 subsequent CFA). EFA using maximum likelihood was conducted using the “Exploring”
16 subset. We used Varimax orthogonal pre-rotation, and Promax oblique rotation to aid with
17 interpretation of factor model [23]. We used scree plot and Kaiser Criterion (Eigenvalues >1)
18 for factor extraction. Factor loadings ≥ 0.4 were considered significant, and factor cross
19 loading < 0.4 was considered acceptable [22, 23]. Applying these criteria, we gradually
20 eliminated problematic items until EFA resulted in a satisfactory factor structure.
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33 **Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).** We evaluated the model fit of the factor structure
34 resulting from the EFA by conducting CFA using the “Testing” subset. By conducting a
35 series of CFA using the complete dataset, we evaluated model fit of original 12-factor model
36 [4], as well as other factor models reported by studies of different language versions of
37 HSPSC. From the official website of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
38 (AHRQ) [24] we retrieved a list of studies including psychometric evaluation of the
39 instrument and identified those reporting a different factor structure. Indices evaluated in CFA
40 are presented in table 4.
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51 **Internal consistency.** Internal consistency was evaluated by calculating Cronbach’s alpha as
52 an indicator of correlation between each item and the factor. As described by Sorra and Nieva
53 [4], we considered Cronbach’s alpha ≥ 0.6 as acceptable. Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7 was
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considered to be good [22]. Cronbach's alphas were calculated for all factor models considered in the CFA, including the factor model that emerged from EFA.

Evaluation of common dimensionality. In order to evaluate the potential of the instrument for cross-national studies, we evaluated its dimensionality as reported for different language versions. We evaluated appearance and composition of each of the 12 dimensions proposed by Sorra and Nieva [4] and of the 42 corresponding items in all factor models identified from AHRQ web-page [24].

Results

Study sample and descriptive statistics.

Out of 2512 distributed questionnaires 995 were completed, resulting in a response rate of 39.6%. Sample characteristics are presented in table 1.

Table 1: Characteristics of study sample.

| Variables | N | % |
|------------------------------|------------|---------------|
| Study site | 995 | 100.0% |
| Hospital A | 575 | 57.8% |
| Hospital B | 420 | 42.2% |
| Gender | 995 | 100.0% |
| Female | 656 | 65.9% |
| Male | 291 | 29.2% |
| missing | 48 | 4.8% |
| Professional Groups | 995 | 100.0% |
| Physician | 183 | 18.4% |
| Physicians' assistant | 198 | 19.9% |
| Nurse | 552 | 55.5% |
| other | 34 | 3.4% |
| missing | 28 | 2.8% |
| Managerial functions | 995 | 100.0% |
| Yes | 195 | 19.6% |
| No | 759 | 76.3% |
| missing | 41 | 4.1% |
| Contact with patients | 995 | 100.0% |
| Yes | 965 | 97.0% |

| | | |
|--------------------|------------|---------------|
| No | 7 | 0.7% |
| missing | 23 | 2.3% |
| Age (years) | 995 | 100.0% |
| <25 | 61 | 6,1% |
| 25-34 | 360 | 36,2% |
| 35-44 | 230 | 23,1% |
| 45-54 | 170 | 17,1% |
| >54 | 84 | 8,4% |
| missing | 90 | 9,0% |

21 responses contained more than 30% missing values and were not included in the analysis.

Descriptive statistics of HSPSC-D items and dimensions after imputing remaining missing answers and reverse coding of the negatively worded items are presented in the Table 2.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of HSPSC-D items and dimensions.

| Dimension / Item ^{1,2,3} | Percent of positive responses ⁴ | Mean | St.d. |
|--|--|-------------|-------------|
| 01. Teamwork Within Hospital Units | 42,3% | 3,32 | 0,61 |
| A1. People support one another in this unit. | 58,3% | 3,65 | 0,78 |
| A3. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done. | 51,2% | 3,50 | 0,84 |
| A4. In this unit, people treat each other with respect. | 40,9% | 3,36 | 0,78 |
| A11. When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out. | 18,8% | 2,79 | 0,91 |
| 02. Organizational Learning—Continuous improvement | 32,7% | 3,06 | 0,70 |
| A6. We are actively doing things to improve patient safety. | 50,1% | 3,40 | 0,91 |
| A9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here. | 23,5% | 2,88 | 0,89 |
| A13. After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness. | 24,4% | 2,90 | 0,89 |
| 03. Non-punitive Response To Error | 50,2% | 3,38 | 0,80 |
| A8. (R) ^b Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them. | 40,1% | 3,19 | 0,96 |
| A12. (R) When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem. | 48,3% | 3,33 | 0,99 |
| A16. (R) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. | 62,1% | 3,62 | 0,99 |
| 04. Staffing | 24,9% | 2,57 | 0,79 |
| A2. We have enough staff to handle the workload. | 7,5% | 2,01 | 0,97 |
| A5. (R) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care | 23,1% | 2,57 | 1,18 |
| A7. (R) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. | 58,2% | 3,57 | 1,20 |
| A14. (R) We work in “crisis mode,” trying to do too much, too quickly. | 10,9% | 2,13 | 1,02 |
| 05. Overall Perceptions of Safety | 34,4% | 3,03 | 0,79 |
| A10. (R) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here. | 41,1% | 3,08 | 1,20 |
| A15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done. | 25,4% | 2,75 | 1,04 |
| A17. (R) We have patient safety problems in this unit. | 43,9% | 3,29 | 0,97 |
| A18. Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening. | 27,2% | 3,00 | 0,89 |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety | 48,5% | 3,34 | 0,71 |
| B1. My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient safety procedures. | 33,7% | 3,03 | 1,02 |
| B2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety. | 55,9% | 3,51 | 0,87 |
| B3. (R) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts. | 42,8% | 3,19 | 0,98 |
| B4. (R) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and over. | 61,7% | 3,61 | 0,89 |
| 07. Frequency of Event Reporting | 38,0% | 3,00 | 1,03 |
| D1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? | 39,0% | 3,03 | 1,17 |
| D2. When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? | 30,1% | 2,77 | 1,14 |
| D3. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? | 45,0% | 3,19 | 1,13 |
| 08. Feedback and Communication About Error | 48,0% | 3,36 | 0,85 |
| C1. We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports. | 40,0% | 3,18 | 1,04 |

| | | | |
|---|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| C3. We are informed about errors that happen in this unit. | 50,1% | 3,41 | 0,99 |
| C5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again. | 53,9% | 3,50 | 0,95 |
| 09. Communication Openness | 58,6% | 3,60 | 0,68 |
| C2. Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care. | 66,2% | 3,74 | 0,87 |
| C4. Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority. | 45,4% | 3,35 | 0,89 |
| C6. (R) Staff are afraid to ask questions, when something does not seem right. | 64,1% | 3,71 | 0,91 |
| 10. Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety | 23,4% | 2,79 | 0,86 |
| F1. Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety. | 22,4% | 2,83 | 0,94 |
| F8. The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority. | 21,1% | 2,74 | 0,97 |
| F9. (R) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens. | 26,8% | 2,79 | 1,04 |
| 11. Teamwork Across Hospital Units | 29,0% | 3,03 | 0,61 |
| F2. (R) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. | 14,7% | 2,57 | 0,91 |
| F4. There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together. | 22,6% | 3,03 | 0,73 |
| F6. (R) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. | 49,1% | 3,39 | 0,82 |
| F10. Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients. | 29,7% | 3,14 | 0,77 |
| 12. Hospital Handoffs & Transitions | 35,3% | 3,07 | 0,64 |
| F3. (R) Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring patients from one unit to another. | 13,2% | 2,50 | 0,88 |
| F5. (R) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. | 37,1% | 3,16 | 0,89 |
| F7. (R) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. | 29,3% | 3,04 | 0,81 |
| F11. (R) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. | 61,5% | 3,59 | 0,82 |
| E1. Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. | 14,2% | 2,78 | 0,76 |
| E2. In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out and submitted? | 17,4% | 2,90 | 0,76 |
| Note: Answers 4 and 5 (“Agree” and “Strongly agree” or “Most of the time” and “Always”) were considered as positive. Prior to analysis, negatively worded items were reverse coded. | | | |
| ¹ 01-12 – corresponding dimension according to original North-American 12-factor model. | | | |
| ² A1-A18; B1-B4; C1-C6; D1-D3; E1-E2; F1-F11: Codes of questionnaire items. | | | |
| ³ (R) – negatively worded items, which were reverse coded prior to the analysis. | | | |
| ⁴ N=974. | | | |

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3 KMO for the complete sample was 0.93, and MSA for individual items ranged between 0.87
4
5 and 0.96. For “Exploring” and “Testing” subsets, KMO was 0.91 and 0.92 respectively, and
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7 MSA of individual items in both subsets ranged between 0.84 and 0.96. Bartlett’s test was
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9 highly significant ($p < 0.001$) for the dataset, as well as for both subsets. Preliminary analyses
10
11 indicated that our sample and the subsets were adequate for factor analysis.
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14 ***Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).*** We conducted EFA using the “Exploring” subset. 14
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16 items not meeting the criteria (factor loading > 0.4 , cross loading < 0.4) were excluded from
17
18 the model, resulting in an 8-factor model with 28 items. The dimension *Organizational*
19
20 *learning – continuous improvement* was completely removed. The dimensions *Staffing* and
21
22 *Overall perceptions of safety* were merged together, as were the dimensions *Feedback and*
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24 *communication about error* with *Communication openness*, and *Teamwork across hospital*
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26 *units* with *Handoffs and transitions*. The resulting 8-factor model is presented in table 3.
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Table 3: Appearance of HSPSC items in 12 analyzed factor models (8-factor EFA model, original 12-factor model, and 10 different versions).

| HSPSC items ^{1,2} | Germany (Exploratory Factor Analysis) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) (Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Ocelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Pemeget, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 01. Teamwork within units | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A11 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 02. Organizational learning | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A6 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| A9 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | (N) | 8 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| A13 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 8 | (N) | 2 | 2 |
| 03. Nonpunitive response to error | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A8 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| A12 | 3 | 3 | (N) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| A16 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 04. Staffing | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| A5 | 4 | 4 | (N) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| A7 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | (N) |
| A14 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 05. Overall perceptions of safety | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A10 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | (N) |
| A15 | (N) | 5 | (N) | 4 | 5 | 5 | (N) | (N) | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| A17 | (N) | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| A18 | (N) | 5 | (N) | (N) | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations/actions | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| B1 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B2 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B3 | (N) | 6 | (N) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B4 | 6 | 6 | (N) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| 07. Frequency of event reporting | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| D1 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| D2 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| D3 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| 08. Feedback and communication about error | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C1 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | (N) |
| C3 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C5 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 09. Communication openness | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C2 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C4 | (N) | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C6 | (N) | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | (N) | 9 | 3 | (N) | 8 | (N) |
| 10. Hospital management support for patient safety | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F1 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| F8 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| F9 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |

| 11. Teamwork across hospital units | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|-----------|-----|-----|-----------|----|-----|-----|----|------------|-----------|-----------|----|
| F2 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| F4 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| F6 | 11 | 11 | (N) | (N) | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 11 |
| F10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| 12. Hospital handoffs and transitions | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F3 | (N) | 12 | 12 | (N) | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| F5 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| F7 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| F11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 12 | (N) | 11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| <p>Note:</p> <p>The uncolored cells represent “No change” compared to original 12-factor model.</p> <p>Colored boxes indicate items that were deleted (N) or moved to different dimension (Dimension number 1-12);</p> <p>(N): items removed from factor model.</p> <p>¹01-12 – corresponding dimension according to original North-American 12-factor model.</p> <p>²A1-A18; B1-B4; C1-C6; D1-D3; E1-E2; F1-F11: Codes of the questionnaire items.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). CFA using the „Testing” subset demonstrated a satisfactory model fit of the factor structure that emerged from EFA (see table 4). The model satisfied desired thresholds of most analyzed indices (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.90; CFI=0.93; TLI/NNFT=0.91).

Table 4. Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of all 12 factor models analyzed.

| Variables / Indices analyzed in CFA | Criteria | Germany (EFA) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Ocelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Peneger, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|----------|---------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Number of Observations | NA | 487 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 |
| Number of Variables | NA | 28 | 42 | 27 | 39 | 39 | 42 | 35 | 38 | 42 | 39 | 42 | 38 |
| Number of Factors | NA | 8 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) | <0.07 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,06 | 0,05 |
| Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) | <0.08 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,08 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,05 |
| Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR / RMR) | NA | 0,04 | 0,05 | 0,04 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,07 | 0,05 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,06 | 0,04 |
| Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) | >0.90 | 0,91 | 0,88 | 0,92 | 0,88 | 0,87 | 0,86 | 0,86 | 0,89 | 0,83 | 0,87 | 0,84 | 0,90 |
| Adjusted GFI (AGFI) | >0.90 | 0,90 | 0,86 | 0,90 | 0,86 | 0,85 | 0,84 | 0,84 | 0,86 | 0,81 | 0,85 | 0,81 | 0,87 |
| Normed Fit Index (NFI) | >0.95 | 0,90 | 0,86 | 0,90 | 0,86 | 0,85 | 0,84 | 0,84 | 0,86 | 0,80 | 0,85 | 0,81 | 0,88 |
| Comparative Fit Index (CFI) | ≥0.90 | 0,95 | 0,90 | 0,93 | 0,89 | 0,88 | 0,88 | 0,87 | 0,90 | 0,84 | 0,89 | 0,85 | 0,91 |
| Tucker-Lewis Index / Non-normed Fit Index (TLI / NNFI) | ≥0.90 | 0,94 | 0,88 | 0,91 | 0,88 | 0,87 | 0,87 | 0,85 | 0,88 | 0,83 | 0,87 | 0,83 | 0,90 |
| Note: Colored cells contain values that do not meet requirements. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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3 From the official website of AHRQ [24] we retrieved the list of 23 articles reporting
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5 psychometric analyses on international level. From these articles we extracted 10 factor
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7 models that differed from the original North-American version. These factor models were
8
9 from the following countries: England (UK) [15], Scotland (UK) [13], France [9],
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11 Switzerland (French [10] and German [11]), Netherland [14], Sweden [7], Slovenia [12],
12
13 Turkey [6] and Palestine [8]. The eleventh factor model considered in the analysis was the
14
15 original 12-factor model [4].
16

17
18 Subsequent series of CFA revealed satisfactory fit of the models from England (UK) [15]
19
20 (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.92; CFI=0.93; TLI/NNFT=0.91) and Palestine [8]
21
22 (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.90; CFI=0.91; TLI/NNFT=0.90) to our data. The
23
24 original 12-factor model resulted in marginally satisfactory model fit (RMSEA=0.05;
25
26 SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.88; CFI=0.90; TLI/NNFT=0.88). The models from Scotland (UK),
27
28 France, Switzerland, Netherland and Slovenia, resulted in suboptimal values of CFA indices
29
30 (table 4). Models from Sweden and Turkey demonstrated unsatisfactory model fit in CFA.
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36 ***Internal consistency.*** Cronbach's alpha was acceptable (0.6-0.7) or good (>0.7) for all
37
38 dimensions of most models proposed for the various language versions, with the exception of
39
40 *Organizational learning* in the Slovenian (0.51) and Turkish (0.53) models, and *Staffing* in
41
42 the Dutch model (0.53) (see table 5). Five dimensions, namely *Teamwork within units*, *Non-*
43
44 *punitive response to error*, *Supervisor expectations & actions promoting patient safety*,
45
46 *Frequency of events reported*, and *Feedback & communication about error*, were present in
47
48 all models and demonstrated acceptable (>0.6) or good (>0.7) Cronbach's alphas.
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Table 5: Internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of all 12 factor models analyzed.

| Dimensions (from original 12-factor model) | Germany (EFA) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Occelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Perneger, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|------------------|------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 01. Teamwork Within Units | 0,78 | 0,74 | 0,79 | 0,74 | 0,79 | 0,74 | 0,75 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 0,74 |
| 02. Organizational Learning - Continuous Improvement | | 0,68 | | 0,68 | | 0,68 | | | | 0,51 | 0,53 | 0,68 |
| 03. Nonpunitive Response to Error | 0,73 | 0,74 | 0,61 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 0,72 | 0,74 | 0,72 | 0,74 |
| 04. Staffing | 0,79 | 0,70 | 0,80 | 0,80 | 0,73 | 0,70 | 0,80 | 0,53 | 0,80 | 0,82 | 0,65 | 0,73 |
| 05. Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety | | 0,77 | | | 0,77 | 0,77 | | 0,79 | | | 0,77 | 0,71 |
| 06. Supervisor Expectations & Actions Promoting Patient Safety | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,72 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,74 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,75 |
| 07. Frequency of Events Reported | 0,87 | 0,88 | 0,88 | 0,88 | 0,88 | 0,88 | 0,80 | 0,88 | 0,88 | 0,88 | 0,88 | 0,88 |
| 08. Feedback & Communication About Error | 0,83 | 0,81 | 0,81 | 0,82 | 0,83 | 0,82 | 0,83 | 0,83 | 0,86 | 0,83 | 0,82 | 0,80 |
| 09. Communication Openness | | 0,64 | 0,64 | | 0,64 | | | 0,64 | | | | |
| 10. Management Support for Patient Safety | 0,83 | 0,84 | | 0,84 | 0,82 | 0,84 | 0,84 | 0,84 | 0,84 | 0,84 | 0,84 | 0,84 |
| 11. Teamwork Across Units | 0,79 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,79 | 0,83 | 0,82 | 0,75 | | 0,82 | | 0,75 |
| 12. Handoffs & Transitions | | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,68 | | | | 0,66 | 0,76 | | 0,76 | 0,75 |
| <0,6 – Not satisfactory (cells colored in dark grey) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 0,6-0,7 – Acceptable | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| >0,7 – Good | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Empty cell (colored in light grey) – Dimension is not present in the model. | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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3 ***Evaluation of common dimensionality.*** We analyzed the appearance and role of each
4 individual item and dimension from the original 12-factor model in factor model from EFA,
5 and in 10 models reported by studies from different language versions. Table 3 presents 42
6 items of the original 12-factor model and their appearance in all 12 analyzed models. The
7 uncolored cells represent no change, where the item retains its original role in the factor
8 model. Changes are represented by colored boxes, which indicate elimination of the
9 questionnaire item (N), or moving it to a different dimension (labeled from 1 to 12).
10
11 14 items were eliminated from analysis in EFA. 11 of these 14 items demonstrated significant
12 inconsistency since in at least half of 10 analyzed factor models they were also eliminated,
13 moved or merged with another dimension. All of the remaining 28 items of our 8-factor factor
14 model demonstrated relative stability by retaining a similar role in at least 50% of the 10
15 analyzed factor models; 23 items maintained their role in 80% or more of the models.
16
17 Eight dimensions, including *Teamwork within units*, *Non-punitive response to error*,
18 *Supervisor expectations & actions promoting patient safety*, *Frequency of events reported*,
19 *Staffing*, *Feedback & communication about error*, *Management support for patient safety* and
20 *Teamwork across hospital units* demonstrated relative stability over the different language
21 models, appearing in 80% or more of the 10 analyzed models. The dimension *Communication*
22 *openness* was merged with the dimension *Feedback and communication about error* in 7
23 models [6–8, 10–13]. Similarly, the dimension *Hospital handoffs and transitions* was merged
24 with the dimension *Teamwork across hospital units* in 5 models [9–12, 14], and the
25 dimension *Overall perceptions of safety* with the dimension *Staffing* in 5 models [7, 11–13,
26 15]. The items from the dimension *Organizational learning - continuous improvement* were
27 shown to be highly inconsistent across various models. In five models, the items from this
28 dimension were either removed from the model [15] or merged with other dimensions [7, 9,
29 11, 14] (e.g. with *Feedback and communication about error*).

Discussion

The aim of this study was to evaluate the psychometric properties of the HSPSC-D and compare its dimensionality with factor structures derived for different language versions of the HSPSC. Our split-half validation resulted in an alternative 8-factor model with good psychometric properties. Most parts of the instrument demonstrate relative stability over different language versions and appear suitable for cross-national studies. However, items of four safety culture dimensions require further improvement to support a common structure for comparison across language versions.

In our study HSPSC-D demonstrated marginally satisfactory psychometric properties, allowing for its use in German hospitals. HSPSC-D demonstrated a somewhat unsatisfactory model fit in CFA with the original 12-factor model. EFA resulted in an alternative 8-factor model, with good model fit. Nevertheless, the instrument demonstrated satisfactory to good internal consistency in both models. Studies with other language versions of the HSPSC have repeatedly reported similar results – good model fit of different factor structure and mostly good internal consistency [6, 7, 9–13, 15]. These findings indicate that the HSPSC is a useful instrument for measuring and comparing patient safety culture within a healthcare system for which the particular HSPSC version has previously been validated.

Our analysis of instrument dimensionality across language versions revealed that whilst some dimensions maintain relative stability of appearance and composition across language versions, others vary significantly. When analyzing 12 different factor models, including the original North American 12-factor model and the 8-factor model resulting from our EFA, we found that items from eight dimensions can be considered in international studies. The remaining four dimensions, namely *Organizational Learning—Continuous improvement*, *Overall Perceptions of Safety*, *Communication Openness* and *Hospital Handoffs & Transitions*, appeared in only $\leq 50\%$ of analyzed models since corresponding items were

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3 either removed, migrated to or merged with other dimensions. These dimensions require
4
5 further refinement before use in cross-national studies.
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7 Evaluation of psychometric properties of a translated version of the instrument is important,
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9 as results of validated instruments can be interpreted and used for comparison in local
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11 contexts. A number of studies reported that the original 12-factor model did not fit the data
12
13 well, and alternative factor models were suggested. For example, Hedskoeld [7] revealed a 9-
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15 factor model but argues against removing items and dimensions from the instrument, stating
16
17 that they can still be used to understand and improve patient safety.
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20 Concerning the international use of the instrument, several articles highlight the importance of
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22 a common factor structure. For example, Occelli [9] underlines the need to adapt the tool to
23
24 each country's environment while stating that "for international comparison purposes, a core
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26 set of dimensions consistently assessed as valid should be defined and measured in all
27
28 countries." Perneger [10] further argues that local improvements to a translated version can be
29
30 ineffective, due to several unresolved issues inherent in the instrument, such as limited
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32 internal consistency of some dimensions, different dimensionality found in various language
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34 versions and the lack of external validation of study results.
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40 *Limitations*

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42 The data analysis and results in the study were limited to two German university hospitals.
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44 Also, our findings shouldn't be generalized to all hospital employees, as the study sample
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46 mainly consists of nurses and physicians. However, our findings regarding psychometric
47
48 properties of the instrument, as well as its dimensionality are in line with those of similar
49
50 studies from other countries. While exploring the common dimensionality of various
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52 language versions our analysis was limited to research articles retrieved from the official web-
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54 page of AHRQ [24]. Taking into account more studies that report a different factor structure
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56 based on a systematic review could improve the analysis. Lastly, the diversity of study
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3 methodology and reporting of studies with different language versions of HSPSC, may be
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5 considered an additional obstacle for cross-national use of the instrument.
6

7 ***Conclusions***

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9 Overall the German version of the HSPSC demonstrated acceptable psychometric properties
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11 for surveying clinical personnel in German hospitals. We found that most safety culture
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13 dimensions were relatively stable across different language models. However, other
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15 dimensions demonstrate high variability and inconsistency. Such inconsistencies need to be
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17 refined in order to support a more uniform factor structure across language versions in order
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19 to facilitate the use of HSPSC at the cross-national level.
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Contributors.

Data were collected by the WorkSafeMed Consortium. Data analysis was carried out by NG under the supervision of TM and AH. NG and AH wrote the manuscript that was then revised by MB, TM. The final version of the manuscript has been approved by all authors.

Competing interests: None.

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Data Sharing Statement

Because of data security aspects, data from the WorkSafeMed study will not be made available in the public domain. However, data will be used by students of both project

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3 partners for their theses. Data will be stored in accordance with national and regional data
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5 security standards.
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STROBE 2007 (v4) Statement—Checklist of items that should be included in reports of cross-sectional studies

| Section/Topic | Item # | Recommendation | Reported on page # |
|---------------------------|--------|--|--------------------|
| Title and abstract | 1 | (a) Indicate the study’s design with a commonly used term in the title or the abstract | 1,2 |
| | | (b) Provide in the abstract an informative and balanced summary of what was done and what was found | 2 |
| Introduction | | | 5-6 |
| Background/rationale | 2 | Explain the scientific background and rationale for the investigation being reported | 5 |
| Objectives | 3 | State specific objectives, including any prespecified hypotheses | 6 |
| Methods | | | 6-9 |
| Study design | 4 | Present key elements of study design early in the paper | 6 |
| Setting | 5 | Describe the setting, locations, and relevant dates, including periods of recruitment, exposure, follow-up, and data collection | 6 |
| Participants | 6 | (a) Give the eligibility criteria, and the sources and methods of selection of participants | 6 |
| Variables | 7 | Clearly define all outcomes, exposures, predictors, potential confounders, and effect modifiers. Give diagnostic criteria, if applicable | 6, 7 |
| Data sources/ measurement | 8* | For each variable of interest, give sources of data and details of methods of assessment (measurement). Describe comparability of assessment methods if there is more than one group | 6,7 |
| Bias | 9 | Describe any efforts to address potential sources of bias | NA |
| Study size | 10 | Explain how the study size was arrived at | NA |
| Quantitative variables | 11 | Explain how quantitative variables were handled in the analyses. If applicable, describe which groupings were chosen and why | 7 |
| Statistical methods | 12 | (a) Describe all statistical methods, including those used to control for confounding | 8,9 |
| | | (b) Describe any methods used to examine subgroups and interactions | NA |
| | | (c) Explain how missing data were addressed | 7 |
| | | (d) If applicable, describe analytical methods taking account of sampling strategy | NA |
| | | (e) Describe any sensitivity analyses | NA |
| Results | | | 9-19 |

| | | | |
|--------------------------|-----|--|-------|
| Participants | 13* | (a) Report numbers of individuals at each stage of study—eg numbers potentially eligible, examined for eligibility, confirmed eligible, included in the study, completing follow-up, and analysed | 9 |
| | | (b) Give reasons for non-participation at each stage | - |
| | | (c) Consider use of a flow diagram | - |
| Descriptive data | 14* | (a) Give characteristics of study participants (eg demographic, clinical, social) and information on exposures and potential confounders | 9-10 |
| | | (b) Indicate number of participants with missing data for each variable of interest | 9-10 |
| Outcome data | 15* | Report numbers of outcome events or summary measures | 9-12 |
| Main results | 16 | (a) Give unadjusted estimates and, if applicable, confounder-adjusted estimates and their precision (eg, 95% confidence interval). Make clear which confounders were adjusted for and why they were included | NA |
| | | (b) Report category boundaries when continuous variables were categorized | 10 |
| | | (c) If relevant, consider translating estimates of relative risk into absolute risk for a meaningful time period | NA |
| Other analyses | 17 | Report other analyses done—eg analyses of subgroups and interactions, and sensitivity analyses | 13-19 |
| Discussion | | | 20-21 |
| Key results | 18 | Summarise key results with reference to study objectives | 20 |
| Limitations | 19 | Discuss limitations of the study, taking into account sources of potential bias or imprecision. Discuss both direction and magnitude of any potential bias | 21 |
| Interpretation | 20 | Give a cautious overall interpretation of results considering objectives, limitations, multiplicity of analyses, results from similar studies, and other relevant evidence | 20 |
| Generalisability | 21 | Discuss the generalisability (external validity) of the study results | 21-22 |
| Other information | | | 23 |
| Funding | 22 | Give the source of funding and the role of the funders for the present study and, if applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based | 23 |

*Give information separately for cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposed groups in cohort and cross-sectional studies.

Note: An Explanation and Elaboration article discusses each checklist item and gives methodological background and published examples of transparent reporting. The STROBE checklist is best used in conjunction with this article (freely available on the Web sites of PLoS Medicine at <http://www.plosmedicine.org/>, Annals of Internal Medicine at <http://www.annals.org/>, and Epidemiology at <http://www.epidem.com/>). Information on the STROBE Initiative is available at www.strobe-statement.org.

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Manuscripts

Title: Evaluation of psychometric properties of the German Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture and its potential for cross-cultural comparisons: A cross-sectional study.

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Abstract

Objective: To study the psychometric characteristics of German version of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture, and to compare its dimensionality to other language versions in order to understand the instrument's potential for cross-national studies.

Design: Cross-sectional multicenter study to establish psychometric properties of German version of the survey instrument.

Setting: 73 units from 37 departments of two German university hospitals.

Participants: Clinical personnel (n=995 responses, response rate 39.6%).

Primary and secondary outcome measures: Psychometric properties (e.g. Model fit, internal consistency, construct validity) of the instrument, and comparison of dimensionality across different language translations.

Results: The instrument demonstrated acceptable to good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.64-0.88). Confirmatory factor analysis of the original 12-factor model resulted in marginally satisfactory model fit (RMSEA= 0.05; SRMR; CFI=0.90; GFI=0.88; TLI=0.88). Exploratory factor analysis resulted in an alternative 8-factor model with good model fit (RMSEA= 0.05; SRMR; CFI=0.95; GFI=0.91; TLI=0.94) and good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.73-0.87) and construct validity. Analysis of the dimensionality compared to models from 10 other language versions revealed eight dimensions with relatively stable composition and appearance across different versions and four dimensions requiring further improvement.

Conclusions: The German version of Hospital survey on Patient Safety Culture demonstrated satisfactory psychometric properties for use in German hospitals. However, our comparison of instrument dimensionality across different language versions indicates limitations concerning cross-national studies. Results of this study can be considered in interpreting

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findings across national contexts, in further refinement of the instrument for cross-national studies, and to better understand various facets and dimensions of patient safety culture.

Keywords: Quality in health care; Health & safety; International health services; statistics & research methods.

For peer review only

Article Summary

Strengths and limitations of this study

- Our study supports the development of a more uniform factor structure for the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture across language versions in order to facilitate its use in cross-national research.
- By evaluating commonalities and variations in different language versions of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture we identify relatively stable factors, as well as those in need for improvement.
- First study to validate the German version of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture for clinical personnel.
- The considerable diversity in study methodology and reporting of studies with different language versions of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture presents an obstacle for cross-national use of the instrument that has yet to be overcome.

Introduction

All healthcare organizations face specific sets of risks and challenges regarding patient safety. These challenges change dynamically over time, reflecting developments within the organization as well as in its operating environment such as changes in demographics and epidemiology or in patient behavior. To effectively manage these challenges, it is recommended for healthcare organizations to develop a culture of safety that prioritizes safety and organizational learning among other organizational goals [1]. Safety culture is generally considered to be a relatively stable construct, rooted in organizational culture [2].

A number of instruments for measuring safety culture in healthcare organizations have been developed. These instruments enable researchers and decision-makers to evaluate and compare results on different levels of the healthcare system [3]. Comparing results across units and hospitals and establishing benchmarks can drive continuous patient safety improvement. One of the most widely used instruments for evaluating healthcare providers' perception of safety culture in hospital setting is the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC) [4]. The instrument has been translated into many languages and used in different countries around the world [5–16].

There are two gaps that this study aims to address. Firstly, so far no German version of HSPSC has been validated for healthcare personnel in Germany. Secondly, despite some attempts at comparing safety culture at the international level [17, 18], the comparability of the different language versions of the instrument has not been studied systematically. While satisfactory psychometric properties were reported for the original North-American version [4] with 12 dimensions of patient safety culture, alternative factor structures have been reported for other language versions, with the number of dimensions ranging from 8 to 12 [5–7, 9–12, 14–16]. Because an instrument's dimensionality determines the interpretation of results, similarities and differences in dimensionality across different language versions should be considered for cross-national studies of patient safety culture.

Therefore, the aim of this study is two-fold: (1) validation of German version of HSPSC (HSPSC-D) by evaluation of its psychometric properties and (2) evaluation of the instrument's potential for cross-national studies, by comparative analysis of instrument's dimensionality as reported for different language versions.

Methods

Setting

This study was based on data from the cross-sectional, multicenter, mixed methods study *Working conditions, safety culture and patient safety in hospitals – what predicts the safety of the medication process* (WorkSafeMed), conducted between 2014 and 2017. In this article, we focus on HSPSC-D data to evaluate its psychometric properties. The WorkSafeMed study with all its components has been approved by the responsible ethics committees of the medical faculties of the project partners in Bonn (#350/14) and Tübingen (#547/2014BO1). Each partner complied with confidentiality requirements according to German law.

Sample

Safety culture data were collected in two German university hospitals April to July 2015. We included staff from inpatient units with ≥ 500 patients a year. Intensive care and psychiatric units were excluded. Across the two hospitals a total of 73 units from 37 departments participated in the study. The HSPSC-D questionnaire was distributed to 2512 healthcare professionals. All participants received an initial invitation to participate in the study, followed by two reminders. Study material included all required information regarding the study and data handling. Participation in the study was anonymous and participants' consent was implied by returning completed questionnaires. Non-responder analysis was not performed.

Measure

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3 In order to develop a version of the HSPSC for German healthcare professionals (HSPSC-D),
4 we used two previous German language versions as a starting point. A first translation of the
5 HSPSC for hospital staff in the German speaking part of Switzerland [7] had been culturally
6 and linguistically adapted for use in Swiss hospitals. Hammer et al. [19] used the Swiss
7 version as a starting point for developing a management version of HSPSC to study
8 perceptions of safety culture among medical directors in German hospitals. In our study, the
9 instrument was adapted to be used with healthcare personnel in German hospitals.

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11
12 The resulting HSPSC-D questionnaire follows the structure of the original North-American
13 version [4] and includes 44 items, 42 of which compose 12 dimensions (10 safety culture
14 dimensions and 2 outcome dimensions). These 42 items use a five-point Likert scale to
15 measure agreement ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5), or frequency
16 ranging from “never” (1) to “always” (5). The remaining two single item measures are
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18 *Number of events reported* (measured on six frequency groups from “No event reports” to “21
19 event reports or more”) and *Patient safety grade* (measured on five-point scale from “Failing”
20 to “Excellent”).

21 Analysis

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23 **Data processing and preliminary analysis.** After excluding responses with more than 30%
24 missing values in HSPSC-D items, we conducted multiple imputations based on the
25 expectation maximization (EM) algorithm using the statistical software NORM 2.03 [20, 21]
26 to replace remaining missing values. Negatively worded items were reverse coded before
27 further analysis.

28
29 Several indices were taken into account to ensure that our study sample, as well as every
30 subset used in further analysis was appropriate for factor analysis. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
31 (KMO) indicates if the sample of items is adequate for factor analysis, while Measure of
32 Sampling Adequacy (MSA) indicates if an individual item is adequate for factor analysis. For
33 both indices the value >0.7 is desired, and the value of >0.9 is considered perfect [22]. A
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3 significant p-value (<0.05) of Bartlett's test of sampling adequacy indicates that it is possible
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5 to extract more than one factor [22]. The analyses were performed using SAS 9.4.

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7 **Descriptive statistics.** We calculated composite scores for each dimension suggested by Sorra
8
9 and Nieva [4] by calculating the average of corresponding items. We also calculated
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11 percentages of positive responses for each dimension by dividing the number of positive
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13 responses on corresponding items by the number of non-missing answers in the dimension.
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15 Descriptive statistics for each item and dimension were evaluated, including range, mean, and
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17 standard deviation.
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21 **Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).** We used EFA to evaluate the factor structure emerging
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23 from the study data. In general, EFA and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) should be
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25 performed using different subsets [23]. Thus, we performed the split-half cross validation, by
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27 randomly splitting our sample in two: "Exploring" (for EFA) and "Testing" subsets (for
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29 subsequent CFA). EFA using maximum likelihood was conducted using the "Exploring"
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31 subset. We used Varimax orthogonal pre-rotation, and Promax oblique rotation to aid with
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33 interpretation of factor model [23]. We used scree plot and Kaiser Criterion (Eigenvalues >1)
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35 for factor extraction. Factor loadings ≥ 0.4 were considered significant, and factor cross
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37 loading <0.4 was considered acceptable [22, 23]. Applying these criteria, we gradually
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39 eliminated problematic items until EFA resulted in a satisfactory factor structure.
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43 **Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).** We evaluated the model fit of the factor structure
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45 resulting from the EFA by conducting CFA using the "Testing" subset. By conducting a
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47 series of CFA using the complete dataset, we evaluated model fit of original 12-factor model
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49 [4], as well as other factor models reported by studies of different language versions of
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51 HSPSC. From the official website of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
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53 (AHRQ) [24] we retrieved a list of studies including psychometric evaluation of the
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55 instrument and identified those reporting a different factor structure.
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3 **Internal consistency.** Internal consistency was evaluated by calculating Cronbach's alpha as
4 an indicator of correlation between each item and the factor. In their exploratory study Sorra
5 and Nieva [4] considered Cronbach's alpha ≥ 0.6 as acceptable. We used Cronbach's alpha
6 ≥ 0.7 , as it is typically used in later studies using the HSPSC [5, 6, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19], and is
7 well supported by the literature [22, 23]. Cronbach's alphas were calculated for all factor
8 models considered in the CFA, including the factor model that emerged from EFA.
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16 **Construct validity.** By calculating average of corresponding non-missing items we calculated
17 mean values for each dimension for the original 12-factor model and for the new model that
18 emerged from EFA. Pearson's correlations were evaluated between dimensions in each
19 model. We expected low to moderate correlations between dimensions. However, correlations
20 > 0.85 would indicate possible multicollinearity [4, 22]. We also evaluated the correlations
21 between dimensions of both models with two single item outcome variables – *Patient safety*
22 *grade* and *Number of incidents reported*.
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32 **Evaluation of common dimensionality.** In order to evaluate the potential of the instrument for
33 cross-national studies, we evaluated its dimensionality as reported for different language
34 versions. We evaluated appearance and composition of each of the 12 dimensions proposed
35 by Sorra and Nieva [4] and of the 42 corresponding items in all factor models identified from
36 AHRQ web-page [24].
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43 44 **Results**

45 46 **Study sample and descriptive statistics.**

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48 Out of 2512 distributed questionnaires 995 were completed, resulting in a response rate of
49 39.6%. Sample characteristics are presented in table 1.
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Table 1: Characteristics of study sample.

| Variables | N | % |
|------------------------------|------------|---------------|
| Study site | 995 | 100.0% |
| Hospital A | 575 | 57.8% |
| Hospital B | 420 | 42.2% |
| Gender | 995 | 100.0% |
| Female | 656 | 65.9% |
| Male | 291 | 29.2% |
| missing | 48 | 4.8% |
| Professional Groups | 995 | 100.0% |
| Physician | 183 | 18.4% |
| Physicians' assistant | 198 | 19.9% |
| Nurse | 552 | 55.5% |
| other | 34 | 3.4% |
| missing | 28 | 2.8% |
| Managerial functions | 995 | 100.0% |
| Yes | 195 | 19.6% |
| No | 759 | 76.3% |
| missing | 41 | 4.1% |
| Contact with patients | 995 | 100.0% |
| Yes | 965 | 97.0% |
| No | 7 | 0.7% |
| missing | 23 | 2.3% |
| Age (years) | 995 | 100.0% |
| <25 | 61 | 6.1% |
| 25-34 | 360 | 36.2% |
| 35-44 | 230 | 23.1% |
| 45-54 | 170 | 17.1% |
| >54 | 84 | 8.4% |
| missing | 90 | 9.0% |

21 responses contained more than 30% missing values and were not included in the analysis.

Descriptive statistics of HSPSC-D items and dimensions after imputing remaining missing answers and reverse coding of the negatively worded items are presented in the Table 2.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of HSPSC-D items and dimensions.

| Dimension / Item ^{1,2,3} | Percent of positive responses ⁴ | Mean | SD ⁵ |
|--|--|-------------|-----------------|
| 01. Teamwork Within Hospital Units | 42.3% | 3.32 | 0.61 |
| A1. People support one another in this unit. | 58.3% | 3.65 | 0.78 |
| A3. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done. | 51.2% | 3.50 | 0.84 |
| A4. In this unit, people treat each other with respect. | 40.9% | 3.36 | 0.78 |
| A11. When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out. | 18.8% | 2.79 | 0.91 |
| 02. Organizational Learning—Continuous improvement | 32.7% | 3.06 | 0.70 |
| A6. We are actively doing things to improve patient safety. | 50.1% | 3.40 | 0.91 |
| A9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here. | 23.5% | 2.88 | 0.89 |
| A13. After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness. | 24.4% | 2.90 | 0.89 |
| 03. Non-punitive Response To Error | 50.2% | 3.38 | 0.80 |
| A8. (R) Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them. | 40.1% | 3.19 | 0.96 |
| A12. (R) When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem. | 48.3% | 3.33 | 0.99 |
| A16. (R) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. | 62.1% | 3.62 | 0.99 |
| 04. Staffing | 24.9% | 2.57 | 0.79 |
| A2. We have enough staff to handle the workload. | 7.5% | 2.01 | 0.97 |
| A5. (R) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care | 23.1% | 2.57 | 1.18 |
| A7. (R) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. | 58.2% | 3.57 | 1.20 |
| A14. (R) We work in “crisis mode,” trying to do too much, too quickly. | 10.9% | 2.13 | 1.02 |
| 05. Overall Perceptions of Safety | 34.4% | 3.03 | 0.79 |
| A10. (R) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here. | 41.1% | 3.08 | 1.20 |
| A15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done. | 25.4% | 2.75 | 1.04 |
| A17. (R) We have patient safety problems in this unit. | 43.9% | 3.29 | 0.97 |
| A18. Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening. | 27.2% | 3.00 | 0.89 |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety | 48.5% | 3.34 | 0.71 |
| B1. My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient safety procedures. | 33.7% | 3.03 | 1.02 |
| B2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety. | 55.9% | 3.51 | 0.87 |
| B3. (R) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts. | 42.8% | 3.19 | 0.98 |
| B4. (R) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and over. | 61.7% | 3.61 | 0.89 |
| 07. Frequency of Event Reporting | 38.0% | 3.00 | 1.03 |
| D1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? | 39.0% | 3.03 | 1.17 |
| D2. When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? | 30.1% | 2.77 | 1.14 |
| D3. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this reported? | 45.0% | 3.19 | 1.13 |
| 08. Feedback and Communication About Error | 48.0% | 3.36 | 0.85 |
| C1. We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports. | 40.0% | 3.18 | 1.04 |

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|---|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| C3. We are informed about errors that happen in this unit. | 50.1% | 3.41 | 0.99 |
| C5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again. | 53.9% | 3.50 | 0.95 |
| 09. Communication Openness | 58.6% | 3.60 | 0.68 |
| C2. Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care. | 66.2% | 3.74 | 0.87 |
| C4. Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority. | 45.4% | 3.35 | 0.89 |
| C6. (R) Staff are afraid to ask questions, when something does not seem right. | 64.1% | 3.71 | 0.91 |
| 10. Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety | 23.4% | 2.79 | 0.86 |
| F1. Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety. | 22.4% | 2.83 | 0.94 |
| F8. The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority. | 21.1% | 2.74 | 0.97 |
| F9. (R) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens. | 26.8% | 2.79 | 1.04 |
| 11. Teamwork Across Hospital Units | 29.0% | 3.03 | 0.61 |
| F2. (R) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. | 14.7% | 2.57 | 0.91 |
| F4. There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together. | 22.6% | 3.03 | 0.73 |
| F6. (R) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. | 49.1% | 3.39 | 0.82 |
| F10. Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients. | 29.7% | 3.14 | 0.77 |
| 12. Hospital Handoffs & Transitions | 35.3% | 3.07 | 0.64 |
| F3. (R) Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring patients from one unit to another. | 13.2% | 2.50 | 0.88 |
| F5. (R) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. | 37.1% | 3.16 | 0.89 |
| F7. (R) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. | 29.3% | 3.04 | 0.81 |
| F11. (R) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. | 61.5% | 3.59 | 0.82 |
| E1. Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. | 32.9% | 3.22 | 0.76 |
| <p>Note: Answers 4 and 5 (“Agree” and “Strongly agree” or “Most of the time” and “Always”) were considered as positive. Prior to analysis, negatively worded items were reverse coded.</p> <p>¹01-12 – corresponding dimension according to original North-American 12-factor model.</p> <p>²A1-A18; B1-B4; C1-C6; D1-D3; E1; F1-F11: Codes of questionnaire items.</p> <p>³(R) – negatively worded items, which were reverse coded prior to the analysis.</p> <p>⁴n=974.</p> <p>⁵SD – standard deviation.</p> | | | |

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3 KMO for the complete sample was 0.93, and MSA for individual items ranged between 0.87
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5 and 0.96. For “Exploring” and “Testing” subsets, KMO was 0.91 and 0.92 respectively, and
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7 MSA of individual items in both subsets ranged between 0.84 and 0.96. Bartlett’s test was
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9 highly significant ($p < 0.001$) for the dataset, as well as for both subsets. Preliminary analyses
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11 indicated that our sample and the subsets were adequate for factor analysis.
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14 ***Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).*** We conducted EFA using the “Exploring” subset. We
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16 considered factor loadings ≥ 0.4 as significant, as this cut-off value was typically used in
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18 similar studies [4–6, 10–12, 14–16] and was supported by the literature [22, 23]. 14 items not
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20 meeting the criteria (factor loading ≥ 0.4 , cross loading < 0.4) were excluded from the model,
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22 resulting in an 8-factor model with 28 items. The dimension *Organizational learning –*
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24 *continuous improvement* was completely removed. The dimensions *Staffing* and *Overall*
25
26 *perceptions of safety* were merged together, as were the dimensions *Feedback and*
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28 *communication about error* with *Communication openness*, and *Teamwork across hospital*
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30 *units* with *Handoffs and transitions*. The resulting 8-factor model is presented in table 3.
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Table 3: Appearance of HSPSC items in 12 analyzed factor models (8-factor EFA model, original 12-factor model, and 10 different versions).

| HSPSC items ^{1,2} | Germany (Exploratory Factor Analysis) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) (Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Ocelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Pemeget, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 01. Teamwork within units | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A11 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 02. Organizational learning | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A6 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| A9 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | (N) | 8 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| A13 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 8 | (N) | 2 | 2 |
| 03. Nonpunitive response to error | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A8 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| A12 | 3 | 3 | (N) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| A16 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 04. Staffing | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| A5 | 4 | 4 | (N) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| A7 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | (N) |
| A14 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 05. Overall perceptions of safety | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A10 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | (N) |
| A15 | (N) | 5 | (N) | 4 | 5 | 5 | (N) | (N) | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| A17 | (N) | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| A18 | (N) | 5 | (N) | (N) | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations/actions | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| B1 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B2 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B3 | (N) | 6 | (N) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B4 | 6 | 6 | (N) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| 07. Frequency of event reporting | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| D1 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| D2 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| D3 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| 08. Feedback and communication about error | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C1 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | (N) |
| C3 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C5 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 09. Communication openness | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C2 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C4 | (N) | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C6 | (N) | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | (N) | 9 | 3 | (N) | 8 | (N) |
| 10. Hospital management support for patient safety | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F1 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| F8 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| F9 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |

| 11. Teamwork across hospital units | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----------|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|----|-----|----|----|----|
| F2 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| F4 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| F6 | 11 | 11 | (N) | (N) | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 11 | |
| F10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 | |
| 12. Hospital handoffs and transitions | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F3 | (N) | 12 | 12 | (N) | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | |
| F5 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | |
| F7 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | |
| F11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 12 | (N) | 11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | (N) | 12 | 12 | |

Note:
 The uncolored cells represent “No change” compared to original 12-factor model.
 Colored boxes indicate items that were deleted (N) or moved to different dimension (Dimension number 1-12);
 (N): items removed from factor model.
¹01-12 – corresponding dimension according to original North-American 12-factor model.
²A1-A18; B1-B4; C1-C6; D1-D3; F1-F11: Codes of the questionnaire items.

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). CFA using the „Testing” subset demonstrated a satisfactory model fit of the factor structure that emerged from EFA (see table 4). The model satisfied desired thresholds of most analyzed indices (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.90; CFI=0.93; TLI/NNFT=0.91).

Table 4. Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of all 12 factor models analyzed.

| Variables / Indices analyzed in CFA | Criteria [8, 23] | Germany (EFA) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Ocelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Peneger, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|------------------|---------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Number of Observations | NA | 487 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 |
| Number of Variables | NA | 28 | 42 | 27 | 39 | 39 | 42 | 35 | 38 | 42 | 39 | 42 | 38 |
| Number of Factors | NA | 8 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) | <0.07 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) | <0.08 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR / RMR) | NA | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.04 |
| Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) | >0.90 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 0.92 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.86 | 0.86 | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.90 |
| Adjusted GFI (AGFI) | >0.90 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 0.85 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.86 | 0.81 | 0.85 | 0.81 | 0.87 |
| Normed Fit Index (NFI) | >0.95 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 0.85 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.86 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.81 | 0.88 |
| Comparative Fit Index (CFI) | ≥0.90 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.90 | 0.84 | 0.89 | 0.85 | 0.91 |
| Tucker-Lewis Index / Non-normed Fit Index (TLI / NNFI) | ≥0.90 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 0.88 | 0.83 | 0.87 | 0.83 | 0.90 |
| Note: Colored cells contain values that do not meet requirements. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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3 From the official website of AHRQ [24] we retrieved the list of 23 articles reporting
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5 psychometric analyses on international level. From these articles we extracted 10 factor
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7 models that differed from the original North-American version. These factor models were
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9 from the following countries: England (UK) [9], Scotland (UK) [5], France [15], Switzerland
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11 (French [14] and German [7]), Netherland [10], Sweden [11], Slovenia [6], Turkey [12] and
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13 Palestine [16]. The eleventh factor model considered in the analysis was the original 12-factor
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15 model [4].
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18 Subsequent series of CFA revealed satisfactory fit of the models from England (UK) [9]
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20 (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.92; CFI=0.93; TLI/NNFT=0.91) and Palestine [16]
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22 (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.90; CFI=0.91; TLI/NNFT=0.90) to our data. The
23
24 original 12-factor model resulted in marginally satisfactory model fit (RMSEA=0.05;
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26 SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.88; CFI=0.90; TLI/NNFT=0.88). The models from Scotland (UK),
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28 France, Switzerland, Netherland and Slovenia, resulted in suboptimal values of CFA indices
29
30 (table 4). Models from Sweden and Turkey demonstrated unsatisfactory model fit in CFA.
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36 **Internal consistency.** The original 12-factor model demonstrated good Cronbach's alpha for
37
38 all dimensions except *Organizational learning – Continuous improvement* (0.68) and
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40 *Communication openness* (0.64). Cronbach's alpha for dimensions of 8-factor model were
41
42 between 0.73 and 0.87. Two dimensions, *Teamwork within units* and *Communication*
43
44 *openness*, demonstrated consistently low alphas in other factor models analyzed. Three
45
46 dimensions, *Nonpunitive response to error*, *Staffing* and *Handoffs & transitions*, had lower
47
48 than 0.7 values only in one or two of analyzed models. Cronbach's alpha for the remaining
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50 seven dimensions in all analyzed models was ≥ 0.7 , if present in the model (table 5).
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Table 5: Internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of all 12 factor models analyzed.

| Dimensions (from original 12-factor model) | Germany (EFA) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Occelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Perneger, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2013) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|------------------|------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 01. Teamwork Within Units | 0.78 | 0.74 | 0.79 | 0.74 | 0.79 | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 |
| 02. Organizational Learning - Continuous Improvement | | 0.68 | | 0.68 | | 0.68 | | | | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.68 |
| 03. Nonpunitive Response to Error | 0.73 | 0.74 | 0.61 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.74 |
| 04. Staffing | 0.79 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.73 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.53 | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.65 | 0.73 |
| 05. Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety | | 0.77 | | | 0.77 | 0.77 | | 0.79 | | | 0.77 | 0.71 |
| 06. Supervisor Expectations & Actions Promoting Patient Safety | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 |
| 07. Frequency of Events Reported | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.80 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| 08. Feedback & Communication About Error | 0.83 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.80 |
| 09. Communication Openness | | 0.64 | 0.64 | | 0.64 | | | 0.64 | | | | |
| 10. Management Support for Patient Safety | 0.83 | 0.84 | | 0.84 | 0.82 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 |
| 11. Teamwork Across Units | 0.79 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.79 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.75 | | 0.82 | | 0.75 |
| 12. Handoffs & Transitions | | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.68 | | | | 0.66 | 0.76 | | 0.76 | 0.75 |
| <0.7 – Not satisfactory (cells colored in dark grey) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ≥0.7 – Good [23] | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Empty cell (colored in light grey) – Dimension is not present in the model. | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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3 **Construct validity.** Correlation between dimensions of original 12-factor model were between
4
5 0.10 and 0.61 ($p<0.01$). All 12 dimensions were positively correlated with the outcome
6
7 variable *Patient safety grade* (correlations between 0.26 and 0.70, $p<0.01$). Dimensions of 8-
8
9 factor model from EFA were also positively inter-correlated (0.18-0.54, $p<0.01$) and
10
11 positively correlated with the outcome variable *Patient safety grade* (0.29-0.58, $p<0.01$). All
12
13 dimensions in both factor models resulted in no or weak correlation (<0.2) with outcome
14
15 variable *Number of events reported*. All correlations are presented in the online Appendix 1.”

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17 **Evaluation of common dimensionality.** We analyzed the appearance and role of each
18
19 individual item and dimension from the original 12-factor model in factor model from EFA,
20
21 and in 10 models reported by studies from different language versions. Table 3 presents 42
22
23 items of the original 12-factor model and their appearance in all 12 analyzed models. The
24
25 uncolored cells represent no change, where the item retains its original role in the factor
26
27 model. Changes are represented by colored boxes, which indicate elimination of the
28
29 questionnaire item (N), or moving it to a different dimension (labeled from 1 to 12).
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32 14 items were eliminated from analysis in EFA. 11 of these 14 items demonstrated significant
33
34 inconsistency since in at least half of 10 analyzed factor models they were also eliminated,
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36 moved or merged with another dimension. All of the remaining 28 items of our 8-factor factor
37
38 model demonstrated relative stability by retaining a similar role in at least 50% of the 10
39
40 analyzed factor models; 23 items maintained their role in 80% or more of the models.
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43 Eight dimensions, including *Teamwork within units*, *Non-punitive response to error*,
44
45 *Supervisor expectations & actions promoting patient safety*, *Frequency of events reported*,
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47 *Staffing*, *Feedback & communication about error*, *Management support for patient safety* and
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49 *Teamwork across hospital units* demonstrated relative stability over the different language
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51 models, appearing in 80% or more of the 10 analyzed models. The dimension *Communication*
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53 *openness* was merged with the dimension *Feedback and communication about error* in 7
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55 models [5–7, 11, 12, 14, 16]. Similarly, the dimension *Hospital handoffs and transitions* was
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3 merged with the dimension *Teamwork across hospital units* in 4 models [6, 7, 14, 15], and the
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5 dimension *Overall perceptions of safety* with the dimension *Staffing* in 5 models [5–7, 9, 11].
6
7 The items from the dimension *Organizational learning - continuous improvement* were
8
9 shown to be highly inconsistent across various models. In five models, the items from this
10
11 dimension were either removed from the model [9] or merged with other dimensions [7, 10,
12
13 11, 15] (e.g. with *Feedback and communication about error*).

18 Discussion

20 The aim of this study was to evaluate the psychometric properties of the HSPSC-D and
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22 compare its dimensionality with factor structures derived from different language versions of
23
24 the HSPSC. Our split-half validation resulted in an alternative 8-factor model with good
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26 psychometric properties. Most parts of the instrument demonstrate relative stability over
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28 different language versions and appear suitable for cross-national studies. However, items of
29
30 four safety culture dimensions require further improvement to support a common structure for
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32 comparison across language versions.

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35 In our study HSPSC-D demonstrated marginally satisfactory psychometric properties,
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37 allowing for its use in German hospitals. HSPSC-D demonstrated a somewhat unsatisfactory
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39 model fit in CFA with the original 12-factor model. EFA resulted in an alternative 8-factor
40
41 model, with good model fit. Nevertheless, the instrument demonstrated satisfactory to good
42
43 internal consistency in both models. Studies with other language versions of the HSPSC have
44
45 repeatedly reported similar results – good model fit of different factor structure and mostly
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47 good internal consistency [5–7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15]. These findings indicate that the HSPSC is a
48
49 useful instrument for measuring and comparing patient safety culture within a healthcare
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51 system for which the particular HSPSC version has previously been validated.

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54 Our analysis of instrument dimensionality across language versions revealed that whilst some
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56 dimensions maintain relative stability of appearance and composition across language
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3 versions, others vary significantly. When analyzing 12 different factor models, including the
4
5 original North American 12-factor model and the 8-factor model resulting from our EFA, we
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7 found that items from eight dimensions maintain relative stability in appearance and
8
9 composition over different cultural adaptations. These dimensions were *Teamwork within*
10
11 *units*, *Nonpunitive response to error*, *Staffing*, *Supervisor/manager expectations/actions*,
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13 *Frequency of event reporting*, *Feedback and communication about error*, *Hospital*
14
15 *management support for patient safety* and *Teamwork across hospital units*. The items from
16
17 these dimensions seem to maintain their coherence and measure one common factor in
18
19 different language adaptations and different healthcare systems. In contrast the remaining four
20
21 dimensions, namely *Organizational Learning—Continuous improvement*, *Overall*
22
23 *Perceptions of Safety*, *Communication Openness* and *Hospital Handoffs & Transitions*,
24
25 appeared in only $\leq 60\%$ of analyzed models since corresponding items were either removed,
26
27 or migrated to or merged with other dimensions. Similarly, Hedskoeld [7] revealed a 9-factor
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29 model but argues against removing items and dimensions from the instrument, stating that
30
31 they can still be used to understand and improve patient safety. Even though these dimensions
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33 and corresponding items may be very important in studies of patient safety culture, they need
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35 to be refined in order to support their stability over different cultural adaptations.
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38 Evaluation of psychometric properties of a translated version of the instrument is important,
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40 as only the results of validated instruments can be properly interpreted and used for
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42 comparison in local contexts. A number of studies reported that the original 12-factor model
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44 did not fit the data well, and alternative factor models were suggested [5–7, 9–12, 14–16].
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47 Variation in the factor structure may be partially attributed to the differences between study
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49 samples and study populations. These studies differ by setting, sample size, representation of
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51 different professional groups and other characteristics, which can have influence on the
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53 performance of the instrument, hence should be considered in analysis. Finally the specific
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55 characteristics of study population's culture, as well as of local healthcare system influences
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3 how the respondents perceive, understand and respond to each individual item in the
4 questionnaire, ultimately altering the factor structure and interpretation of the results.

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7 Concerning the international use of the instrument, several articles highlight the importance of
8 a common factor structure. For example, Occelli [15] underlines the need to adapt the tool to
9 each country's environment while stating that "for international comparison purposes, a core
10 set of dimensions consistently assessed as valid should be defined and measured in all
11 countries." Perneger [14] further argues that local improvements to a translated version can be
12 ineffective, due to several unresolved issues inherent in the instrument, such as limited
13 internal consistency of some dimensions, different dimensionality found in various language
14 versions and the lack of external validation of study results.
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16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ***Limitations***

26
27 The data analysis and results in the study were limited to two German university hospitals.
28 Also, our findings shouldn't be generalized to all hospital employees, as the study sample
29 mainly consists of nurses and physicians. However, our findings regarding psychometric
30 properties of the instrument, as well as its dimensionality are in line with those of similar
31 studies from other countries. While exploring the common dimensionality of various
32 language versions our analysis was limited to research articles retrieved from the official web-
33 page of AHRQ [24]. Taking into account more studies that report a different factor structure
34 based on a systematic review could improve the analysis. Lastly, the diversity of study
35 methodology and reporting of studies with different language versions of HSPSC, may be
36 considered an additional obstacle for cross-national use of the instrument.
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49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 ***Conclusions***

Overall the German version of the HSPSC demonstrated acceptable psychometric properties
for surveying clinical personnel in German hospitals. We found that most safety culture
dimensions were relatively stable across different language models. However, other
dimensions demonstrate high variability and inconsistency. Such inconsistencies need to be

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refined in order to support a more uniform factor structure across language versions in order to facilitate the use of HSPSC at the cross-national level.

For peer review only

Contributors.

Data were collected by the WorkSafeMed Consortium. Data analysis was carried out by NG under the supervision of TM and AH. NG and AH wrote the manuscript that was then revised by MB, TM. The final version of the manuscript has been approved by all authors.

Competing interests: None.

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Data Sharing Statement

Because of data security aspects, data from the WorkSafeMed study will not be made available in the public domain. However, data will be used by students of both project

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partners for their theses. Data will be stored in accordance with national and regional data security standards.

For peer review only

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Appendix 1

Pearson's correlations between single item outcome variables (*Patient safety grade (E1)* and *Number of events reported (G1)*) and HSPSC dimensions in two factor models.

| A. Original 12-factor model | | | | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 |
|---|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Number of items | E1 | G1 ⁺ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| E1. Patient Safety Grade | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| G1: Number of Events Reported | 1 | -0,04 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01. Teamwork within units | 4 | 0,32** | 0,08* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02. Organizational learning | 3 | 0,48** | 0,02 | 0,45** | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03. Nonpunitive response to error | 3 | 0,41** | -0,05 | 0,32** | 0,38** | | | | | | | | | |
| 04. Staffing | 4 | 0,46** | -0,08* | 0,26** | 0,30** | 0,42** | | | | | | | | |
| 05. Overall perceptions of safety | 4 | 0,70** | -0,06* | 0,37** | 0,57** | 0,46** | 0,61** | | | | | | | |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations/actions | 4 | 0,41** | 0,00 | 0,35** | 0,47** | 0,38** | 0,32** | 0,44** | | | | | | |
| 07. Frequency of event reporting | 3 | 0,34** | 0,14** | 0,22** | 0,39** | 0,18** | 0,14** | 0,34** | 0,28** | | | | | |
| 08. Feedback and communication about error | 3 | 0,43** | 0,01 | 0,40** | 0,61** | 0,32** | 0,22** | 0,44** | 0,50** | 0,50** | | | | |
| 09. Communication openness | 3 | 0,26** | 0,06 | 0,38** | 0,43** | 0,35** | 0,10** | 0,28** | 0,38** | 0,36** | 0,59** | | | |
| 10. Hospital management support for patient safety | 3 | 0,58** | -0,03 | 0,38** | 0,55** | 0,40** | 0,47** | 0,61** | 0,39** | 0,36** | 0,49** | 0,29** | | |
| 11. Teamwork across hospital units | 4 | 0,43** | 0,00 | 0,40** | 0,43** | 0,38** | 0,32** | 0,46** | 0,33** | 0,32** | 0,42** | 0,31** | 0,54** | |
| 12. Hospital handoffs and transitions | 4 | 0,37** | 0,03 | 0,32** | 0,33** | 0,31** | 0,25** | 0,36** | 0,29** | 0,25** | 0,36** | 0,35** | 0,41** | 0,60** |
| B. new 8-factor model | | | | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 |
| | Number of items | E1 | G1 ⁺ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| E1. Patient safety grade | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| G1: Number of events reported | 1 | -0,04 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01. Teamwork within units | 3 | 0,28** | 0,09** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02. Organizational learning [D] | - | - | - | - | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03. Nonpunitive response to error | 3 | 0,41** | -0,05 | 0,30** | - | | | | | | | | | |
| 04. Staffing | 4 | 0,54** | -0,09** | 0,24** | - | 0,42** | | | | | | | | |
| 05. Overall perceptions of safety [D] | - | - | - | - | | | | | | | | | | |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations/actions | 3 | 0,40** | 0,01 | 0,30** | - | 0,34** | 0,31** | - | | | | | | |
| 07. Frequency of event reporting | 3 | 0,34** | 0,14** | 0,20** | - | 0,18** | 0,19** | - | 0,29** | | | | | |
| 08. Feedback and communication about error | 4 | 0,41** | 0,03 | 0,38** | - | 0,33** | 0,24** | - | 0,52** | 0,50** | | | | |
| 09. Communication openness [D] | - | - | - | - | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10. Hospital management support for patient safety | 3 | 0,58** | -0,03 | 0,32** | - | 0,40** | 0,51** | - | 0,38** | 0,36** | 0,47** | - | | |
| 11. Teamwork across hospital units | 5 | 0,42** | 0,00 | 0,36** | - | 0,40** | 0,37** | - | 0,31** | 0,31** | 0,40** | - | 0,54** | |
| 12. Hospital handoffs and transitions [D] | - | - | - | - | | | | | | | | | | |
| n=974, except for G1. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| + n=952 for the variable G1: Number of Events Reported. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| [D] Dimension is removed from the model (colored in dark gray). | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

STROBE 2007 (v4) Statement—Checklist of items that should be included in reports of *cross-sectional studies*

| Section/Topic | Item # | Recommendation | Reported on page # |
|------------------------------|--------|--|--------------------|
| Title and abstract | 1 | (a) Indicate the study’s design with a commonly used term in the title or the abstract | 1,2 |
| | | (b) Provide in the abstract an informative and balanced summary of what was done and what was found | 2,3 |
| Introduction | | | 5-6 |
| Background/rationale | 2 | Explain the scientific background and rationale for the investigation being reported | 5 |
| Objectives | 3 | State specific objectives, including any prespecified hypotheses | 6 |
| Methods | | | 6-9 |
| Study design | 4 | Present key elements of study design early in the paper | 6 |
| Setting | 5 | Describe the setting, locations, and relevant dates, including periods of recruitment, exposure, follow-up, and data collection | 6 |
| Participants | 6 | (a) Give the eligibility criteria, and the sources and methods of selection of participants | 6 |
| Variables | 7 | Clearly define all outcomes, exposures, predictors, potential confounders, and effect modifiers. Give diagnostic criteria, if applicable | 6-7 |
| Data sources/ measurement | 8* | For each variable of interest, give sources of data and details of methods of assessment (measurement). Describe comparability of assessment methods if there is more than one group | 6-7 |
| Bias | 9 | Describe any efforts to address potential sources of bias | NA |
| Study size | 10 | Explain how the study size was arrived at | 6 |
| Quantitative variables | 11 | Explain how quantitative variables were handled in the analyses. If applicable, describe which groupings were chosen and why | 7 |
| Statistical methods | 12 | (a) Describe all statistical methods, including those used to control for confounding | 7-9 |
| | | (b) Describe any methods used to examine subgroups and interactions | NA |
| | | (c) Explain how missing data were addressed | 7 |
| | | (d) If applicable, describe analytical methods taking account of sampling strategy | NA |
| | | (e) Describe any sensitivity analyses | NA |
| Results | | | 9-20 |

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|--------------------------|-----|--|--------------|
| Participants | 13* | (a) Report numbers of individuals at each stage of study—eg numbers potentially eligible, examined for eligibility, confirmed eligible, included in the study, completing follow-up, and analysed | 9-10 |
| | | (b) Give reasons for non-participation at each stage | - |
| | | (c) Consider use of a flow diagram | - |
| Descriptive data | 14* | (a) Give characteristics of study participants (eg demographic, clinical, social) and information on exposures and potential confounders | 9-10 |
| | | (b) Indicate number of participants with missing data for each variable of interest | 9-10 |
| Outcome data | 15* | Report numbers of outcome events or summary measures | 9-12 |
| Main results | 16 | (a) Give unadjusted estimates and, if applicable, confounder-adjusted estimates and their precision (eg, 95% confidence interval). Make clear which confounders were adjusted for and why they were included | NA |
| | | (b) Report category boundaries when continuous variables were categorized | 10 |
| | | (c) If relevant, consider translating estimates of relative risk into absolute risk for a meaningful time period | NA |
| Other analyses | 17 | Report other analyses done—eg analyses of subgroups and interactions, and sensitivity analyses | 13-20 |
| Discussion | | | 20-23 |
| Key results | 18 | Summarise key results with reference to study objectives | 20-21 |
| Limitations | 19 | Discuss limitations of the study, taking into account sources of potential bias or imprecision. Discuss both direction and magnitude of any potential bias | 22 |
| Interpretation | 20 | Give a cautious overall interpretation of results considering objectives, limitations, multiplicity of analyses, results from similar studies, and other relevant evidence | 21-22 |
| Generalisability | 21 | Discuss the generalisability (external validity) of the study results | 21-22 |
| Other information | | | 24-25 |
| Funding | 22 | Give the source of funding and the role of the funders for the present study and, if applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based | 24-25 |

*Give information separately for cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposed groups in cohort and cross-sectional studies.

Note: An Explanation and Elaboration article discusses each checklist item and gives methodological background and published examples of transparent reporting. The STROBE checklist is best used in conjunction with this article (freely available on the Web sites of PLoS Medicine at <http://www.plosmedicine.org/>, Annals of Internal Medicine at <http://www.annals.org/>, and Epidemiology at <http://www.epidem.com/>). Information on the STROBE Initiative is available at www.strobe-statement.org.

BMJ Open

Evaluation of psychometric properties of the German Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture and its potential for cross-cultural comparisons: A cross-sectional study.

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| | |

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Manuscripts

Title: Evaluation of psychometric properties of the German Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture and its potential for cross-cultural comparisons: A cross-sectional study.

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On behalf of the WorkSafeMed Consortium **

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Running title: Psychometrics of German HSPSC

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Abstract

Objective: To study the psychometric characteristics of German version of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture, and to compare its dimensionality to other language versions in order to understand the instrument's potential for cross-national studies.

Design: Cross-sectional multicenter study to establish psychometric properties of German version of the survey instrument.

Setting: 73 units from 37 departments of two German university hospitals.

Participants: Clinical personnel (n=995 responses, response rate 39.6%).

Primary and secondary outcome measures: Psychometric properties (e.g. Model fit, internal consistency, construct validity) of the instrument, and comparison of dimensionality across different language translations.

Results: The instrument demonstrated acceptable to good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.64-0.88). Confirmatory factor analysis of the original 12-factor model resulted in marginally satisfactory model fit (RMSEA= 0.05; SRMR; CFI=0.90; GFI=0.88; TLI=0.88). Exploratory factor analysis resulted in an alternative 8-factor model with good model fit (RMSEA= 0.05; SRMR; CFI=0.95; GFI=0.91; TLI=0.94) and good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.73-0.87) and construct validity. Analysis of the dimensionality compared to models from 10 other language versions revealed eight dimensions with relatively stable composition and appearance across different versions and four dimensions requiring further improvement.

Conclusions: The German version of Hospital survey on Patient Safety Culture demonstrated satisfactory psychometric properties for use in German hospitals. However, our comparison of instrument dimensionality across different language versions indicates limitations concerning cross-national studies. Results of this study can be considered in interpreting

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findings across national contexts, in further refinement of the instrument for cross-national studies, and to better understand various facets and dimensions of patient safety culture.

Keywords: Quality in health care; Health & safety; International health services; statistics & research methods.

For peer review only

Article Summary

Strengths and limitations of this study

- Our study supports the development of a more uniform factor structure for the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture across language versions in order to facilitate its use in cross-national research.
- By evaluating commonalities and variations in different language versions of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture we identify relatively stable factors, as well as those in need for improvement.
- First study to validate the German version of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture for clinical personnel.
- The considerable diversity in study methodology and reporting of studies with different language versions of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture presents an obstacle for cross-national use of the instrument that has yet to be overcome.

Introduction

All healthcare organizations face specific sets of risks and challenges regarding patient safety. These challenges change dynamically over time, reflecting developments within the organization as well as in its operating environment such as changes in demographics and epidemiology or in patient behavior. To effectively manage these challenges, it is recommended for healthcare organizations to develop a culture of safety that prioritizes safety and organizational learning among other organizational goals [1]. Safety culture is generally considered to be a relatively stable construct, rooted in organizational culture [2].

A number of instruments for measuring safety culture in healthcare organizations have been developed. These instruments enable researchers and decision-makers to evaluate and compare results on different levels of the healthcare system [3]. Comparing results across units and hospitals and establishing benchmarks can drive continuous patient safety improvement. One of the most widely used instruments for evaluating healthcare providers' perception of safety culture in hospital setting is the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC) [4]. The instrument has been translated into many languages and used in different countries around the world [5–16].

There are two gaps that this study aims to address. Firstly, so far no German version of HSPSC has been validated for healthcare personnel in Germany. Secondly, despite some attempts at comparing safety culture at the international level [17, 18], the comparability of the different language versions of the instrument has not been studied systematically. While satisfactory psychometric properties were reported for the original North-American version [4] with 12 dimensions of patient safety culture, alternative factor structures have been reported for other language versions, with the number of dimensions ranging from 8 to 12 [5–7, 9–12, 14–16]. Because an instrument's dimensionality determines the interpretation of results, similarities and differences in dimensionality across different language versions should be considered for cross-national studies of patient safety culture.

Therefore, the aim of this study is two-fold: (1) validation of German version of HSPSC (HSPSC-D) by evaluation of its psychometric properties and (2) evaluation of the instrument's potential for cross-national studies, by comparative analysis of instrument's dimensionality as reported for different language versions.

Methods

Setting

This study was based on data from the cross-sectional, multicenter, mixed methods study *Working conditions, safety culture and patient safety in hospitals – what predicts the safety of the medication process* (WorkSafeMed), conducted between 2014 and 2017. In this article, we focus on HSPSC-D data to evaluate its psychometric properties. The WorkSafeMed study with all its components has been approved by the responsible ethics committees of the medical faculties of the project partners in Bonn (#350/14) and Tübingen (#547/2014BO1). Each partner complied with confidentiality requirements according to German law.

Sample

Safety culture data were collected in two German university hospitals April to July 2015. We included staff from inpatient units with ≥ 500 patients a year. Intensive care and psychiatric units were excluded. Across the two hospitals a total of 73 units from 37 departments participated in the study. The HSPSC-D questionnaire was distributed to 2512 healthcare professionals. All participants received an initial invitation to participate in the study, followed by two reminders. Study material included all required information regarding the study and data handling. Participation in the study was anonymous and participants' consent was implied by returning completed questionnaires. Non-responder analysis was not performed.

Measure

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3 In order to develop a version of the HSPSC for German healthcare professionals (HSPSC-D),
4 we used two previous German language versions as a starting point. A first translation of the
5 HSPSC for hospital staff in the German speaking part of Switzerland [7] had been culturally
6 and linguistically adapted for use in Swiss hospitals. Hammer et al. [19] used the Swiss
7 version as a starting point for developing a management version of HSPSC to study
8 perceptions of safety culture among medical directors in German hospitals. In our study, the
9 instrument was adapted to be used with healthcare personnel in German hospitals.

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11 The resulting HSPSC-D questionnaire follows the structure of the original North-American
12 version [4] and includes 44 items, 42 of which compose 12 dimensions (10 safety culture
13 dimensions and 2 outcome dimensions). These 42 items use a five-point Likert scale to
14 measure agreement ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5), or frequency
15 ranging from “never” (1) to “always” (5). The remaining two single item measures are
16 *Number of events reported* (measured on six frequency groups from “No event reports” to “21
17 event reports or more”) and *Patient safety grade* (measured on five-point scale from “Failing”
18 to “Excellent”).

35 Analysis

36
37 ***Data processing and preliminary analysis.*** After excluding responses with more than 30%
38 missing values in HSPSC-D items, we conducted multiple imputations based on the
39 expectation maximization (EM) algorithm using the statistical software NORM 2.03 [20, 21]
40 to replace remaining missing values. Negatively worded items were reverse coded before
41 further analysis.

42
43 Several indices were taken into account to ensure that our study sample, as well as every
44 subset used in further analysis was appropriate for factor analysis. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
45 (KMO) indicates if the sample of items is adequate for factor analysis, while Measure of
46 Sampling Adequacy (MSA) indicates if an individual item is adequate for factor analysis. For
47 both indices the value >0.7 is desired, and the value of >0.9 is considered perfect [22]. A
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3 significant p-value (<0.05) of Bartlett's test of sampling adequacy indicates that it is possible
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5 to extract more than one factor [22]. The analyses were performed using SAS 9.4.

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7 **Descriptive statistics.** We calculated composite scores for each dimension suggested by Sorra
8
9 and Nieva [4] by calculating the average of corresponding items. We also calculated
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11 percentages of positive responses for each dimension by dividing the number of positive
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13 responses on corresponding items by the number of non-missing answers in the dimension.
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15 Descriptive statistics for each item and dimension were evaluated, including range, mean, and
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17 standard deviation.
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21 **Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).** We used EFA to evaluate the factor structure emerging
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23 from the study data. In general, EFA and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) should be
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25 performed using different subsets [23]. Thus, we performed the split-half cross validation, by
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27 randomly splitting our sample in two: "Exploring" (for EFA) and "Testing" subsets (for
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29 subsequent CFA). EFA using maximum likelihood was conducted using the "Exploring"
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31 subset. We used Varimax orthogonal pre-rotation, and Promax oblique rotation to aid with
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33 interpretation of factor model [23]. We used scree plot and Kaiser Criterion (Eigenvalues >1)
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35 for factor extraction. Factor loadings ≥ 0.4 were considered significant, and factor cross
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37 loading < 0.4 was considered acceptable [22, 23]. Applying these criteria, we gradually
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39 eliminated problematic items until EFA resulted in a satisfactory factor structure.
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43 **Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).** We evaluated the model fit of the factor structure
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45 resulting from the EFA by conducting CFA using the "Testing" subset. By conducting a
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47 series of CFA using the complete dataset, we evaluated model fit of original 12-factor model
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49 [4], as well as other factor models reported by studies of different language versions of
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51 HSPSC. From the official website of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
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53 (AHRQ) [24] we retrieved a list of studies including psychometric evaluation of the
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55 instrument and identified those reporting a different factor structure.
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3 **Internal consistency.** Internal consistency was evaluated by calculating Cronbach's alpha as
4 an indicator of correlation between each item and the factor. In their exploratory study Sorra
5 and Nieva [4] considered Cronbach's alpha ≥ 0.6 as acceptable. We used Cronbach's alpha
6 ≥ 0.7 , as it is typically used in later studies using the HSPSC [5, 6, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19], and is
7 well supported by the literature [22, 23]. Cronbach's alphas were calculated for all factor
8 models considered in the CFA, including the factor model that emerged from EFA.
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16 **Construct validity.** By calculating average of corresponding non-missing items we calculated
17 mean values for each dimension for the original 12-factor model and for the new model that
18 emerged from EFA. Pearson's correlations were evaluated between dimensions in each
19 model. We expected low to moderate correlations between dimensions. However, correlations
20 > 0.85 would indicate possible multicollinearity [4, 22]. We also evaluated the correlations
21 between dimensions of both models with two single item outcome variables – *Patient safety*
22 *grade* and *Number of incidents reported*.
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32 **Evaluation of common dimensionality.** In order to evaluate the potential of the instrument for
33 cross-national studies, we evaluated its dimensionality as reported for different language
34 versions. We evaluated appearance and composition of each of the 12 dimensions proposed
35 by Sorra and Nieva [4] and of the 42 corresponding items in all factor models identified from
36 AHRQ web-page [24].
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43 44 **Results**

45 46 **Study sample and descriptive statistics.**

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48 Out of 2512 distributed questionnaires 995 were completed, resulting in a response rate of
49 39.6%. Sample characteristics are presented in table 1.
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Table 1: Characteristics of study sample.

| Variables | N | % |
|------------------------------|------------|---------------|
| Study site | 995 | 100.0% |
| Hospital A | 575 | 57.8% |
| Hospital B | 420 | 42.2% |
| Gender | 995 | 100.0% |
| Female | 656 | 65.9% |
| Male | 291 | 29.2% |
| missing | 48 | 4.8% |
| Professional Groups | 995 | 100.0% |
| Physician | 183 | 18.4% |
| Physicians' assistant | 198 | 19.9% |
| Nurse | 552 | 55.5% |
| other | 34 | 3.4% |
| missing | 28 | 2.8% |
| Managerial functions | 995 | 100.0% |
| Yes | 195 | 19.6% |
| No | 759 | 76.3% |
| missing | 41 | 4.1% |
| Contact with patients | 995 | 100.0% |
| Yes | 965 | 97.0% |
| No | 7 | 0.7% |
| missing | 23 | 2.3% |
| Age (years) | 995 | 100.0% |
| <25 | 61 | 6.1% |
| 25-34 | 360 | 36.2% |
| 35-44 | 230 | 23.1% |
| 45-54 | 170 | 17.1% |
| >54 | 84 | 8.4% |
| missing | 90 | 9.0% |

Out of our sample of n=995, 766 responses (76.98%) had no missing values on HSPSC items. 21 responses (2.1%) contained more than 30% missing values on HSPSC items and were thus not included in the analysis. Remaining missing values were imputed using multiple imputations based on the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm. As a result, n=974 cases were available for further analysis. Descriptive statistics of HSPSC-D items and dimensions

after imputing remaining missing answers and reverse coding of the negatively worded items are presented in the Table 2.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of HSPSC-D items and dimensions.

| Dimension / Item ^{1,2,3} | Percent of positive responses ⁴ | Mean | SD ⁵ |
|--|--|-------------|-----------------|
| 01. Teamwork Within Hospital Units | 42.3% | 3.32 | 0.61 |
| A1. People support one another in this unit. | 58.3% | 3.65 | 0.78 |
| A3. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done. | 51.2% | 3.50 | 0.84 |
| A4. In this unit, people treat each other with respect. | 40.9% | 3.36 | 0.78 |
| A11. When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out. | 18.8% | 2.79 | 0.91 |
| 02. Organizational Learning—Continuous improvement | 32.7% | 3.06 | 0.70 |
| A6. We are actively doing things to improve patient safety. | 50.1% | 3.40 | 0.91 |
| A9. Mistakes have led to positive changes here. | 23.5% | 2.88 | 0.89 |
| A13. After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness. | 24.4% | 2.90 | 0.89 |
| 03. Non-punitive Response To Error | 50.2% | 3.38 | 0.80 |
| A8. (R) Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them. | 40.1% | 3.19 | 0.96 |
| A12. (R) When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem. | 48.3% | 3.33 | 0.99 |
| A16. (R) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. | 62.1% | 3.62 | 0.99 |
| 04. Staffing | 24.9% | 2.57 | 0.79 |
| A2. We have enough staff to handle the workload. | 7.5% | 2.01 | 0.97 |
| A5. (R) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care | 23.1% | 2.57 | 1.18 |
| A7. (R) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. | 58.2% | 3.57 | 1.20 |
| A14. (R) We work in “crisis mode,” trying to do too much, too quickly. | 10.9% | 2.13 | 1.02 |
| 05. Overall Perceptions of Safety | 34.4% | 3.03 | 0.79 |
| A10. (R) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here. | 41.1% | 3.08 | 1.20 |
| A15. Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done. | 25.4% | 2.75 | 1.04 |
| A17. (R) We have patient safety problems in this unit. | 43.9% | 3.29 | 0.97 |
| A18. Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening. | 27.2% | 3.00 | 0.89 |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety | 48.5% | 3.34 | 0.71 |
| B1. My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient safety procedures. | 33.7% | 3.03 | 1.02 |
| B2. My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety. | 55.9% | 3.51 | 0.87 |
| B3. (R) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts. | 42.8% | 3.19 | 0.98 |
| B4. (R) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and over. | 61.7% | 3.61 | 0.89 |
| 07. Frequency of Event Reporting | 38.0% | 3.00 | 1.03 |
| D1. When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? | 39.0% | 3.03 | 1.17 |
| D2. When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? | 30.1% | 2.77 | 1.14 |
| D3. When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does | 45.0% | 3.19 | 1.13 |

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|---|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| not, how often is this reported? | | | |
| 08. Feedback and Communication About Error | 48.0% | 3.36 | 0.85 |
| C1. We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports. | 40.0% | 3.18 | 1.04 |
| C3. We are informed about errors that happen in this unit. | 50.1% | 3.41 | 0.99 |
| C5. In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again. | 53.9% | 3.50 | 0.95 |
| 09. Communication Openness | 58.6% | 3.60 | 0.68 |
| C2. Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care. | 66.2% | 3.74 | 0.87 |
| C4. Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority. | 45.4% | 3.35 | 0.89 |
| C6. (R) Staff are afraid to ask questions, when something does not seem right. | 64.1% | 3.71 | 0.91 |
| 10. Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety | 23.4% | 2.79 | 0.86 |
| F1. Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety. | 22.4% | 2.83 | 0.94 |
| F8. The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority. | 21.1% | 2.74 | 0.97 |
| F9. (R) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens. | 26.8% | 2.79 | 1.04 |
| 11. Teamwork Across Hospital Units | 29.0% | 3.03 | 0.61 |
| F2. (R) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. | 14.7% | 2.57 | 0.91 |
| F4. There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together. | 22.6% | 3.03 | 0.73 |
| F6. (R) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. | 49.1% | 3.39 | 0.82 |
| F10. Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients. | 29.7% | 3.14 | 0.77 |
| 12. Hospital Handoffs & Transitions | 35.3% | 3.07 | 0.64 |
| F3. (R) Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring patients from one unit to another. | 13.2% | 2.50 | 0.88 |
| F5. (R) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. | 37.1% | 3.16 | 0.89 |
| F7. (R) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. | 29.3% | 3.04 | 0.81 |
| F11. (R) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. | 61.5% | 3.59 | 0.82 |
| E1. Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety. | 35.5% | 3.22 | 0.76 |
| Note: Answers 4 and 5 (“Agree” and “Strongly agree” or “Most of the time” and “Always”) were considered as positive. Prior to analysis, negatively worded items were reverse coded. | | | |
| ¹ 01-12 – corresponding dimension according to original North-American 12-factor model. | | | |
| ² A1-A18; B1-B4; C1-C6; D1-D3; E1; F1-F11: Codes of questionnaire items. | | | |
| ³ (R) – negatively worded items, which were reverse coded prior to the analysis. | | | |
| ⁴ n=974. | | | |
| ⁵ SD – standard deviation. | | | |

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3 KMO for the complete sample was 0.93, and MSA for individual items ranged between 0.87
4
5 and 0.96. For “Exploring” and “Testing” subsets, KMO was 0.91 and 0.92 respectively, and
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7 MSA of individual items in both subsets ranged between 0.84 and 0.96. Bartlett’s test was
8
9 highly significant ($p < 0.001$) for the dataset, as well as for both subsets. Preliminary analyses
10
11 indicated that our sample and the subsets were adequate for factor analysis.
12

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14 ***Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA).*** We conducted EFA using the “Exploring” subset. We
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16 considered factor loadings ≥ 0.4 as significant, as this cut-off value was typically used in
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18 similar studies [4–6, 10–12, 14–16] and was supported by the literature [22, 23]. 14 items not
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20 meeting the criteria (factor loading ≥ 0.4 , cross loading < 0.4) were excluded from the model,
21
22 resulting in an 8-factor model with 28 items. The dimension *Organizational learning –*
23
24 *continuous improvement* was completely removed. The dimensions *Staffing* and *Overall*
25
26 *perceptions of safety* were merged together, as were the dimensions *Feedback and*
27
28 *communication about error* with *Communication openness*, and *Teamwork across hospital*
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30 *units* with *Handoffs and transitions*. The resulting 8-factor model is presented in table 3.
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Table 3: Appearance of HSPSC items in 12 analyzed factor models (8-factor EFA model, original 12-factor model, and 10 different versions).

| HSPSC items ^{1,2} | Germany (Exploratory Factor Analysis) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) (Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Ocelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Pemeget, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| 01. Teamwork within units | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| A11 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | (N) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 02. Organizational learning | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A6 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| A9 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | (N) | 8 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| A13 | (N) | 2 | (N) | 2 | 8 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 8 | (N) | 2 | 2 |
| 03. Nonpunitive response to error | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A8 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| A12 | 3 | 3 | (N) | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| A16 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 04. Staffing | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| A5 | 4 | 4 | (N) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| A7 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | (N) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | (N) |
| A14 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 05. Overall perceptions of safety | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A10 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | (N) |
| A15 | (N) | 5 | (N) | 4 | 5 | 5 | (N) | (N) | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| A17 | (N) | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| A18 | (N) | 5 | (N) | (N) | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations/actions | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| B1 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B2 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B3 | (N) | 6 | (N) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| B4 | 6 | 6 | (N) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| 07. Frequency of event reporting | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| D1 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| D2 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| D3 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| 08. Feedback and communication about error | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C1 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | (N) |
| C3 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C5 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 09. Communication openness | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C2 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C4 | (N) | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| C6 | (N) | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | (N) | 9 | 3 | (N) | 8 | (N) |
| 10. Hospital management support for patient safety | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F1 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| F8 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| F9 | 10 | 10 | (N) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |

| 11. Teamwork across hospital units | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----------|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|----|-----|----|----|----|
| F2 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| F4 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 |
| F6 | 11 | 11 | (N) | (N) | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 11 | |
| F10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 | |
| 12. Hospital handoffs and transitions | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F3 | (N) | 12 | 12 | (N) | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | |
| F5 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | |
| F7 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 11 | (N) | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | |
| F11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | 12 | (N) | 11 | (N) | 12 | 12 | (N) | 12 | 12 | |

Note:
 The uncolored cells represent “No change” compared to original 12-factor model.
 Colored boxes indicate items that were deleted (N) or moved to different dimension (Dimension number 1-12);
 (N): items removed from factor model.
¹01-12 – corresponding dimension according to original North-American 12-factor model.
²A1-A18; B1-B4; C1-C6; D1-D3; F1-F11: Codes of the questionnaire items.

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). CFA using the „Testing” subset demonstrated a satisfactory model fit of the factor structure that emerged from EFA (see table 4). The model satisfied desired thresholds of most analyzed indices (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.90; CFI=0.93; TLI/NNFT=0.91).

Table 4. Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of all 12 factor models analyzed.

| Variables / Indices analyzed in CFA | Criteria | Germany (EFA) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Ocelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Peneger, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|----------|---------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Number of Observations | NA | 487 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 | 974 |
| Number of Variables | NA | 28 | 42 | 27 | 39 | 39 | 42 | 35 | 38 | 42 | 39 | 42 | 38 |
| Number of Factors | NA | 8 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
| Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) | <0.07 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) | <0.08 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR / RMR) | NA | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.04 |
| Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) | >0.90 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 0.92 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.86 | 0.86 | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.90 |
| Adjusted GFI (AGFI) | >0.90 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 0.85 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.86 | 0.81 | 0.85 | 0.81 | 0.87 |
| Normed Fit Index (NFI) | >0.95 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.86 | 0.85 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.86 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.81 | 0.88 |
| Comparative Fit Index (CFI) | ≥0.90 | 0.95 | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.90 | 0.84 | 0.89 | 0.85 | 0.91 |
| Tucker-Lewis Index / Non-normed Fit Index (TLI / NNFI) | ≥0.90 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 0.88 | 0.83 | 0.87 | 0.83 | 0.90 |
| Note: Colored cells contain values that do not meet requirements. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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3 From the official website of AHRQ [24] we retrieved the list of 23 articles reporting
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5 psychometric analyses on international level. From these articles we extracted 10 factor
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7 models that differed from the original North-American version. These factor models were
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9 from the following countries: England (UK) [9], Scotland (UK) [5], France [15], Switzerland
10
11 (French [14] and German [7]), Netherland [10], Sweden [11], Slovenia [6], Turkey [12] and
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13 Palestine [16]. The eleventh factor model considered in the analysis was the original 12-factor
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15 model [4].
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18 Subsequent series of CFA revealed satisfactory fit of the models from England (UK) [9]
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20 (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.92; CFI=0.93; TLI/NNFT=0.91) and Palestine [16]
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22 (RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.90; CFI=0.91; TLI/NNFT=0.90) to our data. The
23
24 original 12-factor model resulted in marginally satisfactory model fit (RMSEA=0.05;
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26 SRMR=0.05; GFI=0.88; CFI=0.90; TLI/NNFT=0.88). The models from Scotland (UK),
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28 France, Switzerland, Netherland and Slovenia, resulted in suboptimal values of CFA indices
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30 (table 4). Models from Sweden and Turkey demonstrated unsatisfactory model fit in CFA.
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36 **Internal consistency.** The original 12-factor model demonstrated good Cronbach's alpha for
37
38 all dimensions except *Organizational learning – Continuous improvement* (0.68) and
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40 *Communication openness* (0.64). Cronbach's alpha for dimensions of 8-factor model were
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42 between 0.73 and 0.87. Two dimensions, *Teamwork within units* and *Communication*
43
44 *openness*, demonstrated consistently low alphas in other factor models analyzed. Three
45
46 dimensions, *Nonpunitive response to error*, *Staffing* and *Handoffs & transitions*, had lower
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48 than 0.7 values only in one or two of analyzed models. Cronbach's alpha for the remaining
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50 seven dimensions in all analyzed models was ≥ 0.7 , if present in the model (table 5).
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Table 5: Internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of all 12 factor models analyzed.

| Dimensions (from original 12-factor model) | Germany (EFA) | USA (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) | England (UK) (Waterson et al., 2010) | Scotland (UK) Sarac et al., 2011) | France (Occelli et al. 2013) | Switzerland (Perneger, 2013) | Switzerland (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2013) | Netherlands (Smits et al. 2008) | Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) | Slovenia (Robida, 2013) | Turkey (Bodur, 2010) | Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013) |
|---|------------------|------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 01. Teamwork Within Units | 0.78 | 0.74 | 0.79 | 0.74 | 0.79 | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 |
| 02. Organizational Learning - Continuous Improvement | | 0.68 | | 0.68 | | 0.68 | | | | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.68 |
| 03. Nonpunitive Response to Error | 0.73 | 0.74 | 0.61 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.74 |
| 04. Staffing | 0.79 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.73 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.53 | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.65 | 0.73 |
| 05. Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety | | 0.77 | | | 0.77 | 0.77 | | 0.79 | | | 0.77 | 0.71 |
| 06. Supervisor Expectations & Actions Promoting Patient Safety | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 |
| 07. Frequency of Events Reported | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.80 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| 08. Feedback & Communication About Error | 0.83 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.83 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.80 |
| 09. Communication Openness | | 0.64 | 0.64 | | 0.64 | | | 0.64 | | | | |
| 10. Management Support for Patient Safety | 0.83 | 0.84 | | 0.84 | 0.82 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 |
| 11. Teamwork Across Units | 0.79 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.79 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.75 | | 0.82 | | 0.75 |
| 12. Handoffs & Transitions | | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.68 | | | | 0.66 | 0.76 | | 0.76 | 0.75 |
| <0.7 – Not satisfactory (cells colored in dark grey) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ≥0.7 – Good [23] | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Empty cell (colored in light grey) – Dimension is not present in the model. | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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3 **Construct validity.** Correlation between dimensions of original 12-factor model were between
4 0.10 and 0.61 ($p<0.01$). All 12 dimensions were positively correlated with the outcome
5 variable *Patient safety grade* (correlations between 0.26 and 0.70, $p<0.01$). Dimensions of 8-
6 factor model from EFA were also positively inter-correlated (0.18-0.54, $p<0.01$) and
7 positively correlated with the outcome variable *Patient safety grade* (0.29-0.58, $p<0.01$). All
8 dimensions in both factor models resulted in no or weak correlation (<0.2) with outcome
9 variable *Number of events reported*. All correlations are presented in the online Appendix 1.”

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18 **Evaluation of common dimensionality.** We analyzed the appearance and role of each
19 individual item and dimension from the original 12-factor model in factor model from EFA,
20 and in 10 models reported by studies from different language versions. Table 3 presents 42
21 items of the original 12-factor model and their appearance in all 12 analyzed models. The
22 uncolored cells represent no change, where the item retains its original role in the factor
23 model. Changes are represented by colored boxes, which indicate elimination of the
24 questionnaire item (N), or moving it to a different dimension (labeled from 1 to 12).
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14 items were eliminated from analysis in EFA. 11 of these 14 items demonstrated significant
inconsistency since in at least half of 10 analyzed factor models they were also eliminated,
moved or merged with another dimension. All of the remaining 28 items of our 8-factor factor
model demonstrated relative stability by retaining a similar role in at least 50% of the 10
analyzed factor models; 23 items maintained their role in 80% or more of the models.
Eight dimensions, including *Teamwork within units*, *Non-punitive response to error*,
Supervisor expectations & actions promoting patient safety, *Frequency of events reported*,
Staffing, *Feedback & communication about error*, *Management support for patient safety* and
Teamwork across hospital units demonstrated relative stability over the different language
models, appearing in 80% or more of the 10 analyzed models. The dimension *Communication
openness* was merged with the dimension *Feedback and communication about error* in 7
models [5–7, 11, 12, 14, 16]. Similarly, the dimension *Hospital handoffs and transitions* was

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3 merged with the dimension *Teamwork across hospital units* in 4 models [6, 7, 14, 15], and the
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5 dimension *Overall perceptions of safety* with the dimension *Staffing* in 5 models [5–7, 9, 11].
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7 The items from the dimension *Organizational learning - continuous improvement* were
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9 shown to be highly inconsistent across various models. In five models, the items from this
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11 dimension were either removed from the model [9] or merged with other dimensions [7, 10,
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13 11, 15] (e.g. with *Feedback and communication about error*).

18 Discussion

20 The aim of this study was to evaluate the psychometric properties of the HSPSC-D and
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22 compare its dimensionality with factor structures derived from different language versions of
23
24 the HSPSC. Our split-half validation resulted in an alternative 8-factor model with good
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26 psychometric properties. Most parts of the instrument demonstrate relative stability over
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28 different language versions and appear suitable for cross-national studies. However, items of
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30 four safety culture dimensions require further improvement to support a common structure for
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32 comparison across language versions.
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36 In our study HSPSC-D demonstrated marginally satisfactory psychometric properties,
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38 allowing for its use in German hospitals. HSPSC-D demonstrated a somewhat unsatisfactory
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40 model fit in CFA with the original 12-factor model. EFA resulted in an alternative 8-factor
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42 model, with good model fit. Nevertheless, the instrument demonstrated satisfactory to good
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44 internal consistency in both models. Studies with other language versions of the HSPSC have
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46 repeatedly reported similar results – good model fit of different factor structure and mostly
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48 good internal consistency [5–7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15]. These findings indicate that the HSPSC is a
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50 useful instrument for measuring and comparing patient safety culture within a healthcare
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52 system for which the particular HSPSC version has previously been validated.
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56 Our analysis of instrument dimensionality across language versions revealed that whilst some
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58 dimensions maintain relative stability of appearance and composition across language
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3 versions, others vary significantly. When analyzing 12 different factor models, including the
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5 original North American 12-factor model and the 8-factor model resulting from our EFA, we
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7 found that items from eight dimensions maintain relative stability in appearance and
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9 composition over different cultural adaptations. These dimensions were *Teamwork within*
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11 *units*, *Nonpunitive response to error*, *Staffing*, *Supervisor/manager expectations/actions*,
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13 *Frequency of event reporting*, *Feedback and communication about error*, *Hospital*
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15 *management support for patient safety* and *Teamwork across hospital units*. The items from
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17 these dimensions seem to maintain their coherence and measure one common factor in
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19 different language adaptations and different healthcare systems. In contrast the remaining four
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21 dimensions, namely *Organizational Learning—Continuous improvement*, *Overall*
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23 *Perceptions of Safety*, *Communication Openness* and *Hospital Handoffs & Transitions*,
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25 appeared in only $\leq 60\%$ of analyzed models since corresponding items were either removed,
26
27 or migrated to or merged with other dimensions. Similarly, Hedskoeld [7] revealed a 9-factor
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29 model but argues against removing items and dimensions from the instrument, stating that
30
31 they can still be used to understand and improve patient safety. Even though these dimensions
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33 and corresponding items may be very important in studies of patient safety culture, they need
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35 to be refined in order to support their stability over different cultural adaptations.
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38 Evaluation of psychometric properties of a translated version of the instrument is important,
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40 as only the results of validated instruments can be properly interpreted and used for
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42 comparison in local contexts. A number of studies reported that the original 12-factor model
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44 did not fit the data well, and alternative factor models were suggested [5–7, 9–12, 14–16].
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47 Variation in the factor structure may be partially attributed to the differences between study
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49 samples and study populations. These studies differ by setting, sample size, representation of
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51 different professional groups and other characteristics, which can have influence on the
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53 performance of the instrument, hence should be considered in analysis. Finally the specific
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55 characteristics of study population's culture, as well as of local healthcare system influences
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3 how the respondents perceive, understand and respond to each individual item in the
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5 questionnaire, ultimately altering the factor structure and interpretation of the results.
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7 Concerning the international use of the instrument, several articles highlight the importance of
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9 a common factor structure. For example, Occelli [15] underlines the need to adapt the tool to
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11 each country's environment while stating that "for international comparison purposes, a core
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13 set of dimensions consistently assessed as valid should be defined and measured in all
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15 countries." Perneger [14] further argues that local improvements to a translated version can be
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17 ineffective, due to several unresolved issues inherent in the instrument, such as limited
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19 internal consistency of some dimensions, different dimensionality found in various language
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21 versions and the lack of external validation of study results.
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23

24 25 *Limitations*

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27 The data analysis and results in the study were limited to two German university hospitals.
28
29 Also, our findings shouldn't be generalized to all hospital employees, as the study sample
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31 mainly consists of nurses and physicians. However, our findings regarding psychometric
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33 properties of the instrument, as well as its dimensionality are in line with those of similar
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35 studies from other countries. While exploring the common dimensionality of various
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37 language versions our analysis was limited to research articles retrieved from the official web-
38
39 page of AHRQ [24]. Taking into account more studies that report a different factor structure
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41 based on a systematic review could improve the analysis. Lastly, the diversity of study
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43 methodology and reporting of studies with different language versions of HSPSC, may be
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45 considered an additional obstacle for cross-national use of the instrument.
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49 50 *Conclusions*

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52 Overall the German version of the HSPSC demonstrated acceptable psychometric properties
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54 for surveying clinical personnel in German hospitals. We found that most safety culture
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56 dimensions were relatively stable across different language models. However, other
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58 dimensions demonstrate high variability and inconsistency. Such inconsistencies need to be
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refined in order to support a more uniform factor structure across language versions in order to facilitate the use of HSPSC at the cross-national level.

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Contributors.

Data were collected by the WorkSafeMed Consortium. Data analysis was carried out by NG under the supervision of TM and AH. NG and AH wrote the manuscript that was then revised by MB, TM. The final version of the manuscript has been approved by all authors.

Competing interests: None.

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Data Sharing Statement

Because of data security aspects, data from the WorkSafeMed study will not be made available in the public domain. However, data will be used by students of both project

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partners for their theses. Data will be stored in accordance with national and regional data security standards.

For peer review only

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Appendix 1

Pearson’s correlations between single item outcome variables (*Patient safety grade (E1)* and *Number of events reported (G1)*) and HSPSC dimensions in two factor models.

| A. Original 12-factor model | | | | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 |
|---|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Number of items | E1 | G1 ⁺ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| E1. Patient Safety Grade | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| G1: Number of Events Reported | 1 | -0,04 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01. Teamwork within units | 4 | 0,32** | 0,08* | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02. Organizational learning | 3 | 0,48** | 0,02 | 0,45** | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03. Nonpunitive response to error | 3 | 0,41** | -0,05 | 0,32** | 0,38** | | | | | | | | | |
| 04. Staffing | 4 | 0,46** | -0,08* | 0,26** | 0,30** | 0,42** | | | | | | | | |
| 05. Overall perceptions of safety | 4 | 0,70** | -0,06* | 0,37** | 0,57** | 0,46** | 0,61** | | | | | | | |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations/actions | 4 | 0,41** | 0,00 | 0,35** | 0,47** | 0,38** | 0,32** | 0,44** | | | | | | |
| 07. Frequency of event reporting | 3 | 0,34** | 0,14** | 0,22** | 0,39** | 0,18** | 0,14** | 0,34** | 0,28** | | | | | |
| 08. Feedback and communication about error | 3 | 0,43** | 0,01 | 0,40** | 0,61** | 0,32** | 0,22** | 0,44** | 0,50** | 0,50** | | | | |
| 09. Communication openness | 3 | 0,26** | 0,06 | 0,38** | 0,43** | 0,35** | 0,10** | 0,28** | 0,38** | 0,36** | 0,59** | | | |
| 10. Hospital management support for patient safety | 3 | 0,58** | -0,03 | 0,38** | 0,55** | 0,40** | 0,47** | 0,61** | 0,39** | 0,36** | 0,49** | 0,29** | | |
| 11. Teamwork across hospital units | 4 | 0,43** | 0,00 | 0,40** | 0,43** | 0,38** | 0,32** | 0,46** | 0,33** | 0,32** | 0,42** | 0,31** | 0,54** | |
| 12. Hospital handoffs and transitions | 4 | 0,37** | 0,03 | 0,32** | 0,33** | 0,31** | 0,25** | 0,36** | 0,29** | 0,25** | 0,36** | 0,35** | 0,41** | 0,60** |
| B. new 8-factor model | | | | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 | 11 |
| | Number of items | E1 | G1 ⁺ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| E1. Patient safety grade | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| G1: Number of events reported | 1 | -0,04 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 01. Teamwork within units | 3 | 0,28** | 0,09** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02. Organizational learning [D] | - | - | - | - | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03. Nonpunitive response to error | 3 | 0,41** | -0,05 | 0,30** | - | | | | | | | | | |
| 04. Staffing | 4 | 0,54** | -0,09** | 0,24** | - | 0,42** | | | | | | | | |
| 05. Overall perceptions of safety [D] | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | | | | | |
| 06. Supervisor/manager expectations/actions | 3 | 0,40** | 0,01 | 0,30** | - | 0,34** | 0,31** | - | | | | | | |
| 07. Frequency of event reporting | 3 | 0,34** | 0,14** | 0,20** | - | 0,18** | 0,19** | - | 0,29** | | | | | |
| 08. Feedback and communication about error | 4 | 0,41** | 0,03 | 0,38** | - | 0,33** | 0,24** | - | 0,52** | 0,50** | | | | |
| 09. Communication openness [D] | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | |
| 10. Hospital management support for patient safety | 3 | 0,58** | -0,03 | 0,32** | - | 0,40** | 0,51** | - | 0,38** | 0,36** | 0,47** | - | | |
| 11. Teamwork across hospital units | 5 | 0,42** | 0,00 | 0,36** | - | 0,40** | 0,37** | - | 0,31** | 0,31** | 0,40** | - | 0,54** | |
| 12. Hospital handoffs and transitions [D] | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| n=974, except for G1. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| + n=952 for the variable G1: Number of Events Reported. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| [D] Dimension is removed from the model (colored in dark gray). | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

STROBE 2007 (v4) Statement—Checklist of items that should be included in reports of cross-sectional studies

| Section/Topic | Item # | Recommendation | Reported on page # |
|---------------------------|--------|--|--------------------|
| Title and abstract | 1 | (a) Indicate the study’s design with a commonly used term in the title or the abstract | 1,2 |
| | | (b) Provide in the abstract an informative and balanced summary of what was done and what was found | 2,3 |
| Introduction | | | 5-6 |
| Background/rationale | 2 | Explain the scientific background and rationale for the investigation being reported | 5 |
| Objectives | 3 | State specific objectives, including any prespecified hypotheses | 6 |
| Methods | | | 6-9 |
| Study design | 4 | Present key elements of study design early in the paper | 6 |
| Setting | 5 | Describe the setting, locations, and relevant dates, including periods of recruitment, exposure, follow-up, and data collection | 6 |
| Participants | 6 | (a) Give the eligibility criteria, and the sources and methods of selection of participants | 6 |
| Variables | 7 | Clearly define all outcomes, exposures, predictors, potential confounders, and effect modifiers. Give diagnostic criteria, if applicable | 6-7 |
| Data sources/ measurement | 8* | For each variable of interest, give sources of data and details of methods of assessment (measurement). Describe comparability of assessment methods if there is more than one group | 6-7 |
| Bias | 9 | Describe any efforts to address potential sources of bias | NA |
| Study size | 10 | Explain how the study size was arrived at | 6 |
| Quantitative variables | 11 | Explain how quantitative variables were handled in the analyses. If applicable, describe which groupings were chosen and why | 7 |
| Statistical methods | 12 | (a) Describe all statistical methods, including those used to control for confounding | 7-9 |
| | | (b) Describe any methods used to examine subgroups and interactions | NA |
| | | (c) Explain how missing data were addressed | 7 |
| | | (d) If applicable, describe analytical methods taking account of sampling strategy | NA |
| | | (e) Describe any sensitivity analyses | NA |
| Results | | | 9-20 |

| | | | |
|--------------------------|-----|--|--------------|
| Participants | 13* | (a) Report numbers of individuals at each stage of study—eg numbers potentially eligible, examined for eligibility, confirmed eligible, included in the study, completing follow-up, and analysed | 9-10 |
| | | (b) Give reasons for non-participation at each stage | - |
| | | (c) Consider use of a flow diagram | - |
| Descriptive data | 14* | (a) Give characteristics of study participants (eg demographic, clinical, social) and information on exposures and potential confounders | 9-10 |
| | | (b) Indicate number of participants with missing data for each variable of interest | 9-10 |
| Outcome data | 15* | Report numbers of outcome events or summary measures | 9-12 |
| Main results | 16 | (a) Give unadjusted estimates and, if applicable, confounder-adjusted estimates and their precision (eg, 95% confidence interval). Make clear which confounders were adjusted for and why they were included | NA |
| | | (b) Report category boundaries when continuous variables were categorized | 10 |
| | | (c) If relevant, consider translating estimates of relative risk into absolute risk for a meaningful time period | NA |
| Other analyses | 17 | Report other analyses done—eg analyses of subgroups and interactions, and sensitivity analyses | 13-20 |
| Discussion | | | 20-23 |
| Key results | 18 | Summarise key results with reference to study objectives | 20-21 |
| Limitations | 19 | Discuss limitations of the study, taking into account sources of potential bias or imprecision. Discuss both direction and magnitude of any potential bias | 22 |
| Interpretation | 20 | Give a cautious overall interpretation of results considering objectives, limitations, multiplicity of analyses, results from similar studies, and other relevant evidence | 21-22 |
| Generalisability | 21 | Discuss the generalisability (external validity) of the study results | 21-22 |
| Other information | | | 24-25 |
| Funding | 22 | Give the source of funding and the role of the funders for the present study and, if applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based | 24-25 |

*Give information separately for cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposed groups in cohort and cross-sectional studies.

Note: An Explanation and Elaboration article discusses each checklist item and gives methodological background and published examples of transparent reporting. The STROBE checklist is best used in conjunction with this article (freely available on the Web sites of PLoS Medicine at <http://www.plosmedicine.org/>, Annals of Internal Medicine at <http://www.annals.org/>, and Epidemiology at <http://www.epidem.com/>). Information on the STROBE Initiative is available at www.strobe-statement.org.