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Health providers' professional accounts of violations of the right to health in Syria – a right denied.

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Title: Health providers' professional accounts of violations of the right to health in Syria – a right denied.

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Abstract

Objectives: To explore the impact of the conflict in Syria on health care through the experiences of health care providers using a public health and human rights lens.

Design: A qualitative study using semistructured interviews using a thematic analysis approach.

Setting : Interviews were conducted at a medical relief organization in Gaziantep, Turkey

Participants: We examined data from 29 semi-structured in-depth interviews with qualified health professionals with current or recent work-related experience in opposition-controlled areas of Syria.

Results: Findings highlight the health worker experience of attacks on health infrastructure and services in Syria and consequences in terms of access and scarcity in availability of essential medicines and equipment. Quality of services is explored through physicians' accounts of the knock on effect of shortages of equipment, supplies, and personnel on the right to health and its ethical implications. Health workers themselves were found to be operating under extreme conditions, in particular responding to the most recent chemical attacks that occurred in 2017, with implications for their own health and mental wellbeing.

Conclusions: The study provides unique insight into the impact war has had on Syrian's right to health through the accounts of Syrian health professionals, with continuing relevance to the current conflict and professional issues facing health workers in conflict settings.

Strengths and Limitations of the Study

- This study uniquely explores the experiences of health care providers providing health care during the current conflict in Syria.
- The study revealed the ways in which the conflict has impacted health providers ability to provide health care in accordance with patients right health.
- The findings have implications for capacity building to counter the challenges faced by Syria's health professionals.

- Interviews were limited to the experiences of a small sample of health workers working in conflict affected regions of Syria.

1. Background

The ongoing civil war in Syria has created the direst humanitarian crisis of our time. Syria's health care system has been decimated and the healthcare community targeted as part of an ongoing military strategy by the Syrian government, now supported by Russian air power.¹ Although initiatives exist to assist health providers operate in insecure environments,^{2,3} little research has unpacked the operational, professional, and personal challenges health providers face when operating in such a violent setting.

Human rights organisations and UN agencies have placed a spotlight on the Syrian Government's assault on health care.⁴ Physicians for Human Rights documented 478 attacks on medical facilities and the killing of 830 medical personnel since the start of the conflict in 2011, the vast majority by the Assad regime.⁴ At the commencement of this research in 2014, nearly 75% of hospitals and one third of primary care facilities were either not functioning or were significantly restricted in their ability to provide services.⁵ The World Health Organization has reported severe shortages of medical supplies, spotty vaccination coverage, lack of capacity to address severe health needs and a critical shortage of health providers.⁵ In addition, medical providers have had to respond to the unprecedented use of toxic chemical agents used against civilians since the commencement of the war in December 2012, most recently a sarin gas attack in April 2017 in Syria's northern Idlib province.⁶⁻⁸

In Syria the health care context is currently made up of three separate health "systems": the first is run by the Syrian government and is restricted to areas it controls; a second system is comprised of an ad hoc collection of local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local committees, and relief agencies operating primarily within opposition-controlled areas; and a third system is maintained by the Islamic State (ISIS) in areas it controls.⁹

Health care workers operating within opposition-controlled areas have struggled to provide services in the midst of a multi-dimensional crisis.¹⁰ A protracted war on the public health infrastructure has led to inadequate access to basic necessities and a unprecedented humanitarian crisis.¹¹⁻¹⁵ It is in this setting that health providers must make daily decisions at the

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3 micro, meso, and macro-level of healthcare provision (e.g., who receives care, which hospital to
4 repair, where to target supplies).

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6 Obligations under international humanitarian law include requirements not to attack or
7 interfere with health care services.¹⁶ Obligations under the human right to health include
8 ensuring the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of health facilities, goods and
9 services.¹⁷ Drawing on the right to health as a key conceptual framework, this study explores the
10 complex challenges health workers face in providing care when health care services and
11 personnel are themselves subjected to violence and forced to operate in the midst of ongoing
12 human rights violations and war crimes.
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20 21 **2. Methods**

22 Qualitative research was conducted in October 2014 and July-August 2017 with health
23 care providers working in northwest Syria. The study sought to: 1) describe attacks and
24 interferences with healthcare occurring in opposition-controlled areas of Syria; and 2) explore
25 the challenges health workers face and the consequences for civilian's right to health.
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31 **2.1. Setting**

32 Qualitative fieldwork was collected in Gaziantep, Turkey, a city 97 kilometers north of
33 Aleppo, Syria, as well as by secure video link with health workers inside Syria. Gaziantep is host
34 to Syrian and international NGOs, and is a humanitarian hub for cross-border support. Among
35 the Syrian NGOs operating out of Gaziantep is the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS),
36 who partnered with the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health (JHSPH) on this
37 project.
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44 **2.2. Study Population**

45 Health professionals working in Syria in 2014 and 2017 were interviewed, either in
46 person while in Gaziantep to attend a SAMS medical training workshop (2014), or from within
47 Syria (2017) using Wire, an application that allows for secure/encrypted communication. All
48 participants were identified through purposive sampling methods, taking account of key
49 informants' specialized knowledge and unique perspectives. Eligibility criteria required
50 participants to be aged 18 years or older and a qualified health professional with current or recent
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3 work-related experience in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. Participants were told the
4 purpose of the study and how the information provided would be used and that participation was
5 voluntary. Permission was sought and in all but one case granted for audio recording; no names
6 or other identifiers were collected. With the exception of respondents who were fluent in
7 English, interviews were conducted in Arabic either through an Arabic translator or Arabic-
8 speaking interviewer. The 2014 interviewer (LR) concluded with a final sample of 27 when no
9 new themes emerged. Three of the interviews conducted were excluded from this analysis due to
10 poor audio quality, incomplete interview, or declining audio recording. An additional five
11 interviews were conducted in 2017 by an Arabic speaking interviewer (DR). Audio-recordings
12 were transcribed verbatim and triangulated with additional notes.
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22 2.3. Measurement and Analysis

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24 Interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide that was developed in accordance
25 with the aims of this study. This analysis reviews the challenges health care providers face and
26 the constraints on patient care when approached through a right to health lens of accessibility,
27 availability, and quality of care.
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31 Two independent reviewers (EC, KF) conducted the coding and analysis using an
32 inductive and deductive approach to coding that relied on a priori topics, while still allowing for
33 the emergence of new themes through a process of thematic analysis.¹⁸ First, researchers read
34 through the transcripts to familiarize themselves with the data, three transcripts were then open-
35 coded to delineate established and emergent categories. Coding categories were based on a priori
36 topics around the right to health, and new concepts that emerged from the data. The researchers
37 compared coded transcripts to identify discrepancies and further define the coding scheme. The
38 codes were reviewed by KF, EC, and LR. Clean transcripts were imported into Hyperresearch
39 3.7.2 and coded using the final scheme developed by the analysts.
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48 2.4. Ethical Approval

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50 The JHSPH Institutional Review Board and a local review board approved research protocols for
51 the 2014 and 2017 interviews. Study participants provided informed consent to be interviewed.
52 All participants in accordance with IRB procedures were explained the purpose of the research,
53 were free to decline to participate, and told of their liberty to withhold information they were
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uncomfortable to give. Finally, we assured and accorded them privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality.

3. Results

3.1. Sample characteristics

Of the 29 participants in this sample, all but two were Syrian male health professionals. The non-Syrian health professionals were female Americans who had recently worked in Syria, and were interviewed in 2014. The respondents had varied experience levels and medical professional backgrounds and had experience working in occupation-controlled areas of northwest Syria. (Table 1) Below we present key findings emerging from our analysis of accounts of medical professionals providing healthcare in Syria.

Table 1 – Participant Demographics

<i>Total Participants</i>		29
<i>Gender</i>		
	Male	27
	Female	2
<i>Nationality</i>		
	Syrian	27
	American	2
<i>Profession</i>		
	Surgeon	13
	Cardiologist	1
	Anesthesiologist	2
	Pediatrician	1
	Nurse	4
	Dentist	2
	Technician	4
	Health Co-ordinators	2
<i>Governate</i>		
	Idlib	13
	Aleppo	7
	Latakia	3
	Hama	4
	Rif Dimashq	2

3.2. Availability

The targeting of hospitals and ambulances in opposition-controlled and besieged areas has dramatically decreased availability of health care. Participant descriptions capture both indiscriminate and targeted attacks, including the use of mortar shells, TNT barrel bombs and nerve agents, often with multiple attacks on the same facility. A physician described constant bombardment of a hospital in Latakia:

“Interviewer: How many times has the hospital been hit in three months?”

Respondent: Almost 90 times. It's on a daily basis.... The furthest time was 100 meters. Sometimes it's 10 meters, 15 meters away from the hospital.” (Interview 8, 2014)

Health care workers have responded to the constant attacks and attempts to obliterate healthcare availability by developing methods to protect themselves, their patients, and their equipment. In response, nearly all participants described a common strategy of placing hospitals underground. However, doctors explained that even fortified hospitals underground or in a cave are vulnerable, in particular if exposed to a chemical attack, especially to heavy sarin gas:

“We operate in a fortified hospitals underground, but with chemical attacks all hospital are susceptible to the chemical attacks and getting destroyed.” (Interview 1, 2017)

The ongoing conflict has restricted movement and limited the availability of health supplies. Medicines and equipment for trauma cases and the management of chronic diseases, and treatable childhood diseases were highlighted as being in short supply:

“Because there are no vaccinations we now see polio and measles. All these diseases are different, some diseases need specific medication, and we haven't any.” (Interview 12, 2014)

In particular participants describing the medical response to the 2017 chemical attacks, highlighted that hospitals lacked sufficient supplies of appropriate antidotes to treat the nerve agents civilians were exposed to:

“Our hospital wasn't equipped to treat chemical attacks, since we thought that chemical weapons were eradicated since 2013. Back then we brought big amount of Atropine to treat chemical attack victims but the medication expired and we never used it.” (Interview 1, 2017)

The provision of medical supplies and medications, including protective equipment for chemical attacks, improved by 2017 through the work of humanitarian organisations, but all participants described the continued scarcity of life-saving, protective equipment and inadequate availability

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3 of specialist care. Given the high volume of serious traumatic injuries, availability of essential
4 equipment and qualified physicians is essential to protect the right to health of those injured by
5 conflict. However, in the absence of resources and training, physician accounts highlighted
6 altered standards of care implemented in order to preserve life:
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10 *“Lack of surgeons caused many cases to either be amputated after treatment, result in death or*
11 *face complications. A lack of instruments for orthopedic and neurosurgery have also caused*
12 *many complications. Despite this difficult reality, we are still doing 4,500 surgeries each*
13 *month.” (Interview 2, 2014)*
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16 With respect to the chemical attacks, healthcare workers were also placed at increased risk of
17 harm due to the lack of availability of appropriate safety equipment when treating patients
18 exposed to chemical agents:
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21 *“Honestly, we still haven’t received fully protective equipment. When the medical staff got*
22 *affected (and after we saw how people are getting affected even when they thought they were*
23 *protected) ..., this is when we started using masks but even masks weren’t good*
24 *enough,..” (Interview2, 2017)*
25

26 27 3.3. Accessibility

28
29 Attacks on hospitals during the 2017 sarin attacks limited patient access to hospitals at precisely
30 the moment that it was most critical:
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32 *“We witnessed the aircraft striking the city 6 times, firing exactly 11 missiles. Once the aircraft*
33 *was gone, we went to the hospital and we saw that the air strikes were targeting the hospital*
34 *where the chemical attack victims were transferred to get treatment. By the time we got to the*
35 *hospital, we found that the whole staff was gone from fear and a big part of the hospital was*
36 *destroyed. One patient was undergoing a surgery, his blood was still on the operating table.”*
37 *(Interview 3, 2017)*
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41 Even where hospitals are not completely destroyed, the impact of bombardments on health care
42 access is profound, with many participants describing regular interruptions and closures. Fear of
43 attacks on hospitals has an indirect but major impact on patient access to health services. As a
44 general practitioner explained:
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47 *“Lots of people don't dare to go to the hospital, because they know that the hospital has been*
48 *targeted by the bombardment – five, six times. It's only those who are in grave need who will go*
49 *to the hospital.” (Interview 11, 2014)*
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53 For civilians who have been injured in attacks or who are unable to travel to a hospital for other
54 reasons, medical care access is dependent on first responders or civilian transportation. However,
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3 ambulances are in short supply, in part due attacks on them, and the risk to first responders is
4 great, as they are easy targets for aerial attacks:

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6 *“There were many cases when ambulance drivers have been attacked, especially at night in the*
7 *dark. The aircraft see the lights of the ambulance and attack it.”* (Interview 2, 2014)
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10 At times of acute crisis, such as the recent chemical attacks, lack of prompt access to facilities
11 owing to long transport times and restricted capacity, has meant many additional civilian
12 fatalities:
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14
15 *“There is no clear strategy for the health system tactically or operationally to deal with the*
16 *number of injuries, and nerve injuries are a new topic for us. If there had been a medical point*
17 *nearby, maybe one or two kilometers away from our hospital, we would have saved a lot of*
18 *people.”* (Interview 5, 2017)
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20

21 Finally, the difficulties and dangers of transporting supplies and equipment into besieged areas
22 was highlighted as another access issue that poses severe risks for health workers. One
23 participant reported that 28 staff from their hospital had been arrested while attempting to carry
24 medicines and supplies to their hospital:
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28 *“Taking medicine into [town name], is a crime that is punished...they go to prison and nobody*
29 *knows after that, of course it’s torture.”* (Interview 7, 2014)
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32 3. 4. Quality

33 Make-shift hospitals (known as field hospitals) emerged in opposition-controlled areas as a result
34 of the assault on medical care in rebel held areas of Syria, replacing hospitals and clinics
35 formerly serving Syria’s population. These field hospitals are located in former factories, farms,
36 and schools. Although Syrian health workers and their supporters provide supplies and
37 equipment to these field hospitals, in many of them it is extremely difficult to maintain standards
38 of care, especially at times of mass casualties from attacks, as evidenced in health care workers’
39 descriptions:
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46 *“Everything is allowed in a field hospital. You can put the intravenous line in with alcohol - we*
47 *do it all the time. You can do operations without sterilized matters, without anesthesia*
48 *machines.”* (Interview 15, 2014)
49

50 During the 2017 chemical attacks, some hospitals that had been closed down for safety reasons
51 were reopened to deal with the overwhelming number of casualties:
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54 *Most of the hospital was destroyed [by an attack on April 2nd 2017] and it was out of service, but*
55 *the fact that the other hospital wasn’t capable of dealing with the big number of patients, they*
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3 *had to re-activate the emergency department even though it was very risky, so they can receive*
4 *some patients. (Interview 3, 2017)*
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7 Participants also reported that because of the high number of trauma cases, patients with other
8 medical conditions were often left untreated. During the chemical attacks triage decisions led to
9 a lack of attention to the the most vulnerable, including large numbers of affected children.
10
11 Participants' accounts highlight that medical personnel such as dentists and anesthesiology
12 technicians are acquiring new skills to meet the chronic shortage of surgeons and
13
14 anesthesiologists, because so many health workers have fled Syria. Here a dentist describes how
15 he undertook maxillofacial surgeries:
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17

18 *[Interviewer: Part of your dental training was in that kind of surgery?]* "No, it was just a
19 *minimal part of it, I was given just an overview of these types of surgeries, but out of necessity*
20 *I've had to do these surgeries."* (Interview 1, 2014)
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24 Participants involved in treating patients in the most recent chemical attacks were frank in
25 describing how ill prepared the medical sector were, with training and equipment inadequate to
26 meet the demands of the overwhelming crisis. This resulted in a highly variable quality of care
27 at medical facilities:
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30 *I think that medical providers barely saved 1-2% of the chemical attack victims, because the*
31 *situation is totally different, we have no prior training, medical staff or equipment to deal with it.*
32 *I believe what we were able to provide was too little. (Interview 1, 2017)*
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36 The continued outward migration of healthcare providers from Syria, and resulting shortage in
37 quality clinical care has also been exacerbated by the relentless targeting of healthcare services
38 and recent chemical attacks:
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41 *"Some of healthcare providers decided to stay in Turkey and not to go back to Syria until things*
42 *are clearer, others said that the use of chemical weapons is something that will never stop. We*
43 *won't be able to provide much and we might turn into patients ourselves with no treatment, so*
44 *medical staff were evaluating how beneficial they can be over there"* (Interview 3, 2017)
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47 3.5. Health Worker Demoralization

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49 The constant attacks to health infrastructure and the barriers to health care access, availability,
50 and quality that result, impact not only civilians who seek treatment but also the health workers
51 who provide care. Interviews highlighted a complex constellation of factors that impact health
52 workers' day to day working conditions. As this participant described:
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3 *“You are working with bad health supplies and instruments, and short of financial support. We*
4 *have also a great danger of being killed because of bombing all the time. All those factors make*
5 *a great pressure on doctors... Especially the doctors that work for health organisations and in*
6 *the opposition, they are under focus from the regime.” (Interview 2, 2014)*

7
8 Conditions remain violent, with participants interviewed following the 2017 chemical attacks
9
10 drawing attention to the rising death toll among doctors and enduring sense of fatalism among
11
12 those who remain:

13 *The past year Dr. [name omitted] passed away in April [exposed to chemical agents while*
14 *treating a patient] and another anesthesiologist passed away. There have been about 5-6 deaths*
15 *from our medical staff within the organization. The truth is that work in the northern countryside*
16 *is considered suicide. (Interview 5, 2017)*

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19 The stress of providing care during war is made worse because of the scarcity of health workers.
20
21 Many participants reported that they work 24-hour days because there are no other staff to
22
23 relieve them of their duties. Additionally participants described often feeling useless because of
24
25 the number of people they could not assist. A participant explained health worker’s relentless
26
27 workload, coupled with the extreme trauma related injuries they respond to:

28 *“Sometimes it takes them from 8:00 in the morning till 12:00 in the evening doing operations*
29 *only. And because of the lack of the staff they are obliged to stay in the hospital, and moving*
30 *from one operation to another one, and sometimes they don't find time to have their lunch or to*
31 *eat even. And this pressure they live under, and all the causalities they see, all the injuries, the*
32 *beheaded, the limbs and everything, puts them under very heavy pressure.” (Interview 20, 2014)*

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35 Participants described the most recent chemical attacks as having a major impact on morale
36
37 among health workers and their sense of isolation:

38 *“Every single life we saved in the last year ended up dead in the chemical attack. At the end,*
39 *death has become normal to the rest of the world, no one is reacting.” (Interview 1, 2017)*

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42 *“It had a big effect in creating a hopeless environment, feeling of hopelessness inside each*
43 *healthcare provider.” (Interview 3, 2017)*

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46 Participant accounts highlighted the mixed emotions generated by their work, as fear was offset
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48 only by a strong sense of professional commitment:

49 *“Sometimes we have depression. But all of us believe that we must do this job – but all of us are*
50 *afraid of some point where we're injured or killed...” (Interview 13, 2014)*

51 In the absence of external support health workers look to one another; here a participant
52
53 describes how they rejoice on days where their work does not bring with it the death of another
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55 colleague:

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3 *“After a barrel bomb falls down we start dancing, the Arabian dancing. We are not dead, and if*
4 *nobody is dead among us, we start dancing.” (Interview 23, 2014)*
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6 Finally, another participant pointed to the absence and futility of psychological support and
7 instead the role of their faith:
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10 *“What is good about psychological support after all what we have seen? In general, we don’t get*
11 *internal nor external psychological support. The staff that held up for 7 years have only God to*
12 *depend on.” (Interview 2, 2017)*
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14 15 **Discussion**

16
17 Participant accounts are consistent with other documentation, which together reveal that
18 attacks on hospitals and medical providers are targeted and deliberate, and likely constitute war
19 crimes.¹ The data illustrates how violence against health workers and facilities undermined their
20 ability to contribute to the realization of the right to health, which imposes on States a number of
21 core obligations to respect, protect and fulfill the health needs of the population, obligations that
22 are non-derogable, even in times of conflict.^{19,20} The attacks have had far reaching implications
23 beyond the observable violence of the destruction of and damage to health care facilities.
24

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26 As has been found in other conflicts,^{16,21-23} our findings show that in Syria violence
27 against health care has bred a climate of fear and insecurity, with devastating impacts on health-
28 seeking behaviors and access, as civilians face difficulties in accessing health facilities, or
29 choose to avoid them altogether. Participants described how their work to treat a suffering
30 population was severely impeded by a lack of availability of essential equipment, facilities and
31 treatments for chronic and infectious disease. Despite their often heroic efforts, they remain ill-
32 equipped to respond as they believe required to the use of chemical agents as a weapon of war
33 that endangered and killed patients and providers alike. The challenges of maintaining standards
34 of quality, interconnected to access and availability, was a central theme of the interviews and
35 constitutes a daily source of pressure and anxiety for those trying to provide care. Shortages in
36 staff and equipment, overwhelming numbers of patients, and the limited capacity of field
37 hospitals has made triage decisions impossibly hard, and coping with the large scale of chemical
38 weapons attacks in facilities already compromised by violence against them has overwhelmed
39 medical staffs. Participants reported severe difficulties in meeting their responsibilities to provide
40 patients with quality care while still maintaining their own safety, especially during the chemical
41 attacks of 2017. Despite efforts by many organisations to provide supplies, equipment and a safe
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3 environment, health workers have been forced to operate in conditions well below any standard
4 of quality that existed prior to the conflict. The chemical attacks in 2017 show the extent to
5 which the use of prohibited weapons and extreme resource limitations impair health worker
6 efforts to provide care.
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10 Research on the effects of the Syrian conflict has described the lasting impact the
11 migration of health workers on health systems and, ultimately, the civilian population remaining
12 in Syria.^{11,14,24} Accounts from both 2014 and 2017 highlight the continued outward migration of
13 health providers due to violence against them, fear and the psychological toll taken by working
14 in these circumstances . They also reveal how physician shortages have led to and self-training in
15 specializations for which doctors on the ground have no official certification. The need for
16 medical personnel to act beyond their training inevitably has implications for the quality of care
17 patients receive, and puts health providers not adequately trained under enormous pressure.
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24 Since we conducted interviews in 2014, attacks on hospitals and health care workers have
25 escalated further, leaving health infrastructure in much of opposition-held areas devastated,
26 forcing more health workers to flee and leaving those who remain subject to dangers of ongoing
27 violence while having inadequate resources to respond to patient needs despite the efforts of
28 humanitarian organisations to fill the gap. The augmented findings from the 2017 chemical
29 attacks illustrate the severity of conditions on the ground. The UN Security Council has called on
30 Syria to adhere to its legal obligation not to attack health facilities and health workers,²⁵ to no
31 avail, and efforts by members of the Council to refer gross violations of international
32 humanitarian law, including targeting of hospitals and health workers, to the International
33 Criminal Court, were blocked by Russia.
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41 This study shows how important it is both to protect health workers in war and to focus
42 on the needs of health workers who struggle to continue to fulfill the right to health through the
43 war, even while under attack. Those needs include: capacity building to respond to chemical
44 attacks, including provision of correct antidotes, removing barriers to accessing professional
45 training abroad, and research informed trainings to ensure the provision of appropriately
46 equipped psychologists and mental health supporters to provide care to healthcare workers.
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51 Finally, future research should continue to evaluate the staggering challenges faced by Syria's
52 health professionals, affording them the opportunity to share their experience and knowledge.
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Limitations

The findings are subject to a number of limitations. The majority of participants were in Gaziantep for SAMS trainings in October 2014, and therefore data are limited to the experiences of a sample of health workers, collected within a short five-day period. The potential for respondent bias is also acknowledged. Additionally, the situation in northwest Syria has changed and worsened since this data was collected. For this reason and to reflect more recent events the research team were able to include updated data from health workers currently working in Syria. Collectively these accounts provide an opportunity to learn more in-depth details of the experiences of health workers operating in the Syrian conflict, to understand challenges to health care provision, and to consider ways in which research can begin to support these providers.

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Author's contributions

KF and LR designed and conceptualized the study. LR, DR and ZS coordinated and carried out data collection. KF, EC and LR analyzed and interpreted the data and jointly contributed to writing the manuscript. All authors reviewed the final manuscript.

Competing Interest

The authors declare the following competing competing interests. Dr. Rubenstein reports grants from MacArthur Foundation for the conduct of the study; grants from Oak Foundation, grants from JK Kellogg Foundation, grants from Polak-Mainz Stichting, outside the submitted work; and Chair, Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition.

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Transparency declaration

The lead author* *Katherine Footer* affirms that this manuscript is an honest, accurate, and transparent account of the study being reported; that no important aspects of the study have been omitted; and that any discrepancies from the study as planned (and, if relevant, registered) have been explained.

Data Sharing Statement: All available data can be obtained from the corresponding author.

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Standards for Reporting Qualitative Research (SRQR)*

<http://www.equator-network.org/reporting-guidelines/srqr/>

Page/line no(s).

Title and abstract

<p>Title - Concise description of the nature and topic of the study Identifying the study as qualitative or indicating the approach (e.g., ethnography, grounded theory) or data collection methods (e.g., interview, focus group) is recommended</p>	Pg. 1
<p>Abstract - Summary of key elements of the study using the abstract format of the intended publication; typically includes background, purpose, methods, results, and conclusions</p>	Pg. 6

Introduction

<p>Problem formulation - Description and significance of the problem/phenomenon studied; review of relevant theory and empirical work; problem statement</p>	Pg. 7-8
<p>Purpose or research question - Purpose of the study and specific objectives or questions</p>	Pg. 4

Methods

<p>Qualitative approach and research paradigm - Qualitative approach (e.g., ethnography, grounded theory, case study, phenomenology, narrative research) and guiding theory if appropriate; identifying the research paradigm (e.g., postpositivist, constructivist/ interpretivist) is also recommended; rationale**</p>	Pg. 4
<p>Researcher characteristics and reflexivity - Researchers' characteristics that may influence the research, including personal attributes, qualifications/experience, relationship with participants, assumptions, and/or presuppositions; potential or actual interaction between researchers' characteristics and the research questions, approach, methods, results, and/or transferability</p>	Pg. 3-4
<p>Context - Setting/site and salient contextual factors; rationale**</p>	Pg. 3
<p>Sampling strategy - How and why research participants, documents, or events were selected; criteria for deciding when no further sampling was necessary (e.g., sampling saturation); rationale**</p>	Pg. 3-4
<p>Ethical issues pertaining to human subjects - Documentation of approval by an appropriate ethics review board and participant consent, or explanation for lack thereof; other confidentiality and data security issues</p>	Pg. 4-5
<p>Data collection methods - Types of data collected; details of data collection procedures including (as appropriate) start and stop dates of data collection and analysis, iterative process, triangulation of sources/methods, and modification of procedures in response to evolving study findings; rationale**</p>	Pg. 4

1 2 3 4 5	Data collection instruments and technologies - Description of instruments (e.g., interview guides, questionnaires) and devices (e.g., audio recorders) used for data collection; if/how the instrument(s) changed over the course of the study	Pg. 4
6 7 8	Units of study - Number and relevant characteristics of participants, documents, or events included in the study; level of participation (could be reported in results)	Pg. 5
9 10 11 12	Data processing - Methods for processing data prior to and during analysis, including transcription, data entry, data management and security, verification of data integrity, data coding, and anonymization/de-identification of excerpts	Pg. 4
13 14 15 16	Data analysis - Process by which inferences, themes, etc., were identified and developed, including the researchers involved in data analysis; usually references a specific paradigm or approach; rationale**	Pg. 4
17 18 19 20	Techniques to enhance trustworthiness - Techniques to enhance trustworthiness and credibility of data analysis (e.g., member checking, audit trail, triangulation); rationale**	Pg. 4

Results/findings

23 24 25 26	Synthesis and interpretation - Main findings (e.g., interpretations, inferences, and themes); might include development of a theory or model, or integration with prior research or theory	Pg. 16-18
27 28 29	Links to empirical data - Evidence (e.g., quotes, field notes, text excerpts, photographs) to substantiate analytic findings	N/A

Discussion

32 33 34 35 36 37	Integration with prior work, implications, transferability, and contribution(s) to the field - Short summary of main findings; explanation of how findings and conclusions connect to, support, elaborate on, or challenge conclusions of earlier scholarship; discussion of scope of application/generalizability; identification of unique contribution(s) to scholarship in a discipline or field	Pg. 17-18
38 39	Limitations - Trustworthiness and limitations of findings	Pg. 16-17

Other

42 43 44	Conflicts of interest - Potential sources of influence or perceived influence on study conduct and conclusions; how these were managed	Pg. 19
45 46	Funding - Sources of funding and other support; role of funders in data collection, interpretation, and reporting	Pg.19

*The authors created the SRQR by searching the literature to identify guidelines, reporting standards, and critical appraisal criteria for qualitative research; reviewing the reference lists of retrieved sources; and contacting experts to gain feedback. The SRQR aims to improve the transparency of all aspects of qualitative research by providing clear standards for reporting qualitative research.

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**The rationale should briefly discuss the justification for choosing that theory, approach, method, or technique rather than other options available, the assumptions and limitations implicit in those choices, and how those choices influence study conclusions and transferability. As appropriate, the rationale for several items might be discussed together.

Reference:

O'Brien BC, Harris IB, Beckman TJ, Reed DA, Cook DA. **Standards for reporting qualitative research: a synthesis of recommendations.** *Academic Medicine*, Vol. 89, No. 9 / Sept 2014
DOI: 10.1097/ACM.0000000000000388

For peer review only

BMJ Open

Qualitative accounts from Syrian health professionals regarding violations of the right to health, including the use of chemical weapons, in opposition-held Syria

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5 **Title: Qualitative accounts from Syrian health professionals regarding violations of the**
6 **right to health, including the use of chemical weapons, in opposition-held Syria**
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1 **Abstract**

2 Objectives: To explore the impact of the conflict, including the use of chemical weapons, in
3 Syria on health care through the experiences of health providers using a public health and human
4 rights lens.

5
6 Design: A qualitative study using semi-structured interviews conducted in-person or over Skype
7 using a thematic analysis approach.

8
9 Setting: Interviews were conducted with Syrian health workers operating in opposition-held
10 Syria in cooperation with a medical relief organization in Gaziantep, Turkey.

11
12 Participants: We examined data from 29 semi-structured in-depth interviews with a sample of
13 health professionals with current or recent work-related experience in opposition-controlled areas
14 of Syria, including respondents to chemical attacks.

15
16 Results: Findings highlight the health worker experience of attacks on health infrastructure and
17 services in Syria and consequences in terms of access and scarcity in availability of essential
18 medicines and equipment. Quality of services is explored through physicians' accounts of the
19 knock-on effect of shortages of equipment, supplies, and personnel on the right to health and its
20 ethical implications. Health workers themselves were found to be operating under extreme
21 conditions, in particular responding to the most recent chemical attacks that occurred in 2017,
22 with implications for their own health and mental wellbeing.

23
24 Conclusions: The study provides unique insight into the impact war has had on Syrian's right to
25 health through the accounts of a sample of Syrian health professionals, with continuing relevance
26 to the current conflict and professional issues facing health workers in conflict settings.

27 28 **Strengths and Limitations of the Study**

- 29
- 30 ● This study uniquely explores the experiences of health care providers providing health care during the current conflict in Syria.

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3 31 ● The study revealed the ways in which the conflict has impacted health providers' ability to
4 32 provide health care in accordance with patients' right health.
5
6 33 ● The findings have implications for capacity-building within humanitarian organizations to
7 34 counter the challenges faced by Syria's health professionals.
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9 35 ● Interviews were limited to the experiences of a small sample of health workers working in
10 36 opposition-held regions of Syria, including survivors of chemical attacks.
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- The study revealed the ways in which the conflict has impacted health providers' ability to provide health care in accordance with patients' right health.
 - The findings have implications for capacity-building within humanitarian organizations to counter the challenges faced by Syria's health professionals.
 - Interviews were limited to the experiences of a small sample of health workers working in opposition-held regions of Syria, including survivors of chemical attacks.

1. Background

The ongoing civil war in Syria has created one of the direst humanitarian crises of our time.^{1,2} Syria's health care system has been decimated and the healthcare community targeted as part of an ongoing military strategy by the Syrian government, now supported by Russian air power.² Initiatives exist to assist health providers operating in insecure environments,^{3,4} including intense advocacy against increasing attacks on healthcare in conflict settings. However, only a small body of research studies⁵ have unpacked the operational, professional, and personal challenges health providers face, and none in Syria. In light of the recent allegations of chemical weapon use throughout Syria and the intimidation of medics speaking out by the Syrian government, the perspectives of healthcare workers could not be more pressing.^{6,7}

Human rights organizations and UN agencies have placed a spotlight on the Syrian government's assault on health care.^{6,8-14} Physicians for Human Rights documented 478 attacks on medical facilities and the killing of 830 medical personnel since the start of the conflict in 2011, the vast majority by the Syrian government and allied forces.⁸ Through to December 2017 Syria has experienced 492 separate attacks on health facilities,¹⁵ while at the commencement of this research in 2014, 58% of hospitals throughout Syria were either not functioning or were restricted in their ability to provide services.¹⁶ This number reflects healthcare facilities in the Aleppo, rural Damascus, Homs, Dara'a, and Deir-el Zor governorates. The World Health Organization has reported severe shortages of medical supplies, scattered vaccination coverage, lack of capacity to address severe health needs and a critical shortage of health providers in Syria.¹⁵ In addition, medical providers have had to respond to the unprecedented use of toxic chemical agents used against civilians since the commencement of the war in December 2012, including a UN-confirmed sarin gas attack in April 2017 in Syria's northern Idlib province¹⁷ as well as persistent allegations of chlorine gas and sarine-use in Eastern Ghouta,^{18,19} Syria throughout 2017 and 2018.^{17,20,21}

In Syria the health care context is currently made up of three separate health 'systems': the first is run by the Syrian government and is restricted to areas it controls; a second system is comprised of an ad hoc collection of local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local committees, and relief agencies operating primarily within opposition-controlled areas; and a third system is maintained by the Islamic State (ISIS) in areas it controls.²² One of

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3 69 these organizations is the diaspora Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS),²³ a consortium of
4 70 Syrian-American health professionals founded in 1998 as a professional society for networking
5 71 for physicians of Syrian descent. In 2011, SAMS extended its capacity as a non-profit
6 72 organisation in response to the Syrian crisis to provide support to healthcare staff and facilities,
7 73 including providing aid and medical resources in hard-to-reach areas throughout Syria as well as
8 74 ongoing training for healthcare professionals throughout the conflict. SAMS' operations are
9 75 mainly in non-government controlled areas, including besieged areas, in northern and southern
10 76 Syria.

11 77 Health care workers operating within opposition-controlled areas have struggled to
12 78 provide services in the midst of a multi-dimensional crisis.²⁴ A protracted war on healthcare
13 79 infrastructure has led to inadequate access to basic necessities and a unprecedented humanitarian
14 80 crisis.²⁵⁻²⁹ It is in this setting that health providers must make daily decisions at the micro, meso,
15 81 and macro-level of healthcare provision (e.g., who receives care, which hospital to repair, where
16 82 to target supplies). Conversely, in government controlled areas the health care system has a
17 83 premium on servicing its forces, with few health resources available for the civilian population,
18 84 and coerced medical staff to remain and treat them.³⁰

19 85 Obligations under international humanitarian law include requirements not to attack or
20 86 interfere with health care services.³¹ According to the Geneva Conventions, parties to a conflict
21 87 are obligated to “respect and protect” wounded and sick people as well as medical facilities,
22 88 personnel and transports. They must not directly attack them and are required to take steps to
23 89 ensure that combat operations distinguish between military and civilian objects.³²⁻³⁴ Further,
24 90 health professionals may neither be punished for engaging in actions incompatible with medical
25 91 ethics, nor compelled to do so.³⁴ The bombing and use of chemical weapons against hospitals,
26 92 use of missiles and sniper attacks on ambulances, and arrest and torture of health workers for
27 93 impartial care, all violate these obligations and constitute war crimes.³⁰

28 94 Human rights obligations can be applied to health systems, including those in conflict, as
29 95 an analytical tool to help better articulate and understand the responsibilities of states to respect –
30 96 to refrain from directly interfering with a right; to protect – to prevent third-party interference
31 97 with the enjoyment of a right; and to fulfil – to take steps to ensure the fullest possible realisation
32 98 of a right.³¹ The right to health, as defined by Article 12 of the International Covenant of
33 99 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and further articulated by UN Committee on
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3 100 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment 14, presses upon states the
4 101 obligations under the right to ensure the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of
5 102 health facilities, goods and services.³⁵ This study explores the complex challenges health workers
6
7 103 face in providing care when health care services and personnel are themselves subjected to
8
9 104 violence and forced to operate in the midst of ongoing human rights violations and war crimes.
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13 106 **2. Methods**

15 107 Qualitative research was conducted in October 2014 in Gaziantep with Syrian health
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17 108 workers attending a SAMS training in Turkey and on a separate occasion in July-August 2017
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19 109 using secure online communication application with health care providers working in areas
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21 110 throughout Syria outside of government control. The study sought to: 1) describe attacks and
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23 111 interferences with healthcare occurring in opposition-controlled areas of Syria; and 2) explore
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25 112 the challenges health workers face and the consequences for civilians' right to health and 3) to
26
27 113 include the particular challenges faced by health workers who have responded to chemical
28
29 114 attacks in northern Syria.

30 115 31 116 2.1. Setting

32 117 The majority of the qualitative fieldwork was collected in Gaziantep, Turkey, a city 97
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34 118 kilometers north of Aleppo, Syria, Gaziantep is host to Syrian and international NGOs, and is a
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36 119 humanitarian hub for cross-border support. Among the Syrian NGOs operating out of Gaziantep
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38 120 is the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), who partnered with the Johns Hopkins
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40 121 Bloomberg School of Public Health (JHSPH) on this project. SAMS provides routine medical
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42 122 trainings in Gaziantep for health professionals operating inside Syria, providing researchers the
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44 123 unique opportunity to speak directly to field staff with cross-border access.³⁶ While the majority
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46 124 of the data was collected in-person in Gaziantep during the medical training in 2014 (N=24),
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48 125 separate interviews (N=5) were conducted with different sample of health professionals inside
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50 126 Syria via Wire, a secure online communication tool similar to Skype, in 2017 to understand the
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52 127 effect of the continuing violence inside Syria on healthcare; namely, the chemical attacks that
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54 128 occurred in early April of 2017 in Khan Sheikhoun, a province of Idlib in northwestern Syria.

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56 130 2.2. Study Population

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3 131 All participants were identified through purposive sampling methods, taking account of
4
5 132 key informants' specialized knowledge and unique perspectives. Eligibility criteria required
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7 133 participants to be aged 18 years or older and a qualified health professional (formally-trained
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9 134 doctors, nurses, dentists, and laboratory, anesthesiology and surgery technicians) with current or
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11 135 recent work-related experience in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. Participants were told the
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13 136 purpose of the study and how the information provided would be used and that participation was
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15 137 voluntary. Permission was sought and in all but one case granted for audio recording; no names
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17 138 or other identifiers were collected. With the exception of respondents who were fluent in
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19 139 English, interviews were conducted in Arabic either through an Arabic translator or Arabic-
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21 140 speaking interviewer. The 2014 interviewer (LR) concluded with a final sample of 27 when no
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23 141 new themes emerged. Three of the interviews conducted were excluded from this analysis due to
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25 142 poor audio quality, incomplete interview, or declining audio recording. The respondents included
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27 143 18 physicians (14 surgeons, one cardiologist, two anesthesiologists, and one pediatrician), three
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29 144 nurses, three dentists, and the remaining three were laboratory, anesthesiology, and surgery
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31 145 technicians. An additional 5 interviews with new participants were conducted in 2017 by an
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33 146 Arabic speaking interviewer (DR) to address experiences of medical staff (two surgeons, one
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35 147 pharmacist, one anesthesiology technician, and one nurse) inside Syria following a major
36
37 148 chemical attack in northwestern Syria. Audio-recordings were transcribed verbatim and
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39 149 triangulated with additional notes.
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42 151 2.3. Measurement and Analysis

43 152 Interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide that was developed in accordance
44
45 153 with the aims of this study. This analysis reviews the challenges health care providers face and
46
47 154 the constraints on patient care when approached through a right to health lens with a focus on:
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49 155 *Availability*, understood as a functioning public health and health care facilities, goods, and
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51 156 services, to include adequate hospitals and clinics, trained health care professionals, and essential
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53 157 medicines; *Accessibility*, the requirement that health facilities, goods, and services be within safe
54
55 158 physical reach for all sections of the population; and *Quality*, the entitlement that health
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57 159 facilities, goods, and services must also be scientifically appropriate and of good quality, to
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59 160 include skilled medical personnel, scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital
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161 equipment.³⁵

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3 162 Two independent reviewers (EC, KF) conducted the coding and analysis using an
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5 163 inductive and deductive approach to coding that relied on a priori topics, while still allowing for
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7 164 the emergence of new themes through a process of thematic analysis.¹⁸ First, researchers read
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9 165 through the transcripts to familiarize themselves with the data, three transcripts were then open-
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11 166 coded to delineate established and emergent categories. Coding categories were based on a priori
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13 167 topics around the right to health, and new concepts that emerged from the data. The researchers
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15 168 compared coded transcripts to identify discrepancies and further define the coding scheme. The
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17 169 codes were reviewed by KF, EC, and LR. Clean transcripts were imported into Hyperresearch
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19 170 3.7.2 and coded using the final scheme developed by the analysts.
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22 172 2.4. Ethical Approval
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24 173 The JHSPH Institutional Review Board and a local review board approved research protocols for
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26 174 the 2014 and 2017 interviews. Study participants provided informed consent to be interviewed.
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28 175 All participants in accordance with IRB procedures were explained the purpose of the research,
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30 176 were free to decline to participate, and told of their liberty to withhold information they were
31
32 177 uncomfortable to give. Finally, we assured and accorded them privacy, anonymity, and
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34 178 confidentiality.
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37 180 2.5 Patient and Public Involvement
38
39 181 No Patients or members of the public were involved in the conduct of this research.
40
41 182

42 183 **3. Results**
43
44 184 Findings from this study highlight major gaps in the availability, accessibility and quality of care
45
46 185 available in large areas of Syria most effected and besieged by the ongoing conflict. An emergent
47
48 186 theme related and connected to quality of care was the presence of acute mental health stressors
49
50 187 and demoralizing working conditions impacting on the well-being of health providers in this
51
52 188 setting. Despite this, results point to key ways in which health providers on the ground have
53
54 189 taken steps to fill these gaps so that civilians can continue to receive life-saving care.
55
56 190

57 191 3.1. Sample characteristics
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3 192 Of the 29 participants in this sample, all but two were Syrian male health professionals. This is
4
5 193 mainly due to the lack of female health professionals at the medical training in 2014, and the lack
6
7 194 of female participants volunteering information for the 2017 interviews. The non-Syrian health
8
9 195 professionals were female Americans who had recently worked in Syria, and were interviewed in
10
11 196 2014. The respondents had varied experience levels and medical professional backgrounds and
12
13 197 had experience working in occupation-controlled areas of northwest Syria (exact governorates
14
15 198 excluded). (Table 1) Below we present key findings emerging from our analysis of accounts of
16
17 199 medical professionals in Syria.
18

19 201 Table 1 – Participant Demographics

<i>Total Participants</i>	29
<i>Gender</i>	
Male	27
Female	2
<i>Nationality</i>	
Syrian	27
American	2
<i>Profession</i>	
Surgeon	13
Cardiologist	1
Anesthesiologist	2
Pediatrician	1
Nurse	4
Dentist	2
Technician	4
Health Co-ordinators	2

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43 204 3.2. Availability

44
45 205 The targeting of hospitals and ambulances in opposition-controlled and besieged areas has
46
47 206 dramatically decreased the availability of health care. Participant descriptions capture both
48
49 207 indiscriminate and targeted attacks, including the use of mortar shells, TNT barrel bombs and
50
51 208 nerve agents, often with multiple attacks on the same facility. A participant described constant
52
53 209 bombardment of a hospital in Latakia:

54 210 “Interviewer: How many times has the hospital been hit in three months?”
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3 211 *Respondent: Almost 90 times. It's on a daily basis.... The furthest time was 100 meters.*
4 212 *Sometimes it's 10 meters, 15 meters away from the hospital.” (Interview 8, 2014)*

5 213
6
7 214 Health care workers have responded to the constant attacks and attempts to obliterate healthcare
8
9 215 availability by developing methods to protect themselves, their patients, and their equipment. In
10
11 216 response, nearly all participants described a common strategy of placing hospitals underground.
12
13 217 However, doctors explained that even fortified hospitals underground or in a cave are vulnerable,
14
15 218 in particular if exposed to a chemical attack, especially to heavy sarin gas:

16 219 *“We operate in a fortified hospitals underground, but with chemical attacks all hospital are*
17 220 *susceptible to the chemical attacks and getting destroyed.” (Interview 1, 2017)*

18 221
19
20 222 The ongoing conflict has restricted movement and limited the availability of health supplies.
21
22 223 Medicines and equipment for trauma cases, the management of chronic diseases, and treatable
23
24 224 childhood diseases were highlighted as being in short supply:

25 225 *“Because there are no vaccinations we now see polio and measles. All these diseases are*
26 226 *different, some diseases need specific medication, and we haven't any.” (Interview 12, 2014)*

27 227
28 228 In particular participants describing the medical response to the 2017 chemical attacks,
29
30 229 highlighted that hospitals lacked sufficient supplies of appropriate antidotes to treat the nerve
31
32 230 agent(s) civilians were exposed to:

33 231 *“Our hospital wasn't equipped to treat chemical attacks, since we thought that chemical*
34 232 *weapons were eradicated since 2013. Back then we brought big amount of Atropine to treat*
35 233 *chemical attack victims but the medication expired and we never used it.” (Interview 1, 2017)*

36 234
37
38
39 235 The provision of medical supplies and medications, including protective equipment for chemical
40
41 236 attacks, improved by 2017 through the work of humanitarian organisations. However, all
42
43 237 participants described the continued scarcity of life-saving protective equipment and inadequate
44
45 238 availability of specialist care. Given the high volume of serious traumatic injuries, availability of
46
47 239 essential equipment and qualified physicians is essential to protect the right to health of those
48
49 240 injured by conflict. However, in the absence of resources and training participant accounts
50
51 241 highlighted altered standards of care implemented to preserve life:

51 242 *“Lack of surgeons caused many cases to either be amputated after treatment, resulting in death*
52 243 *or complications. A lack of instruments for orthopedic and neurosurgery have also caused many*
53 244 *complications. Despite this difficult reality, we are still doing 4,500 surgeries each month.”*
54 245 *(Interview 2, 2014)*

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3 247 With respect to the chemical attacks, healthcare workers were also placed at increased risk of
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5 248 harm due to the lack of availability of appropriate safety equipment when treating patients
6
7 249 exposed to chemical agents:

8 250 *“Honestly, we still haven’t received fully protective equipment. When the medical staff were*
9 251 *affected and we saw how people were getting affected even when they thought they were*
10 252 *protected ... this is when we started using masks. But even masks weren’t good enough...”*
11 253 (Interview 2, 2017)
12 254

14 255 3.3. Accessibility

15 256 Attacks on hospitals during the 2017 sarin attacks limited patient access to hospitals at precisely
16 257 the moment that it was most critical:

17 258 *“We witnessed the aircraft striking the city 6 times, firing exactly 11 missiles. Once the aircraft*
18 259 *were gone, we went to the hospital and we saw that the air strikes were targeting the hospital*
19 260 *where the chemical attack victims were transferred to get treatment. By the time we arrived at*
20 261 *the hospital, we found that all the staff had fled from fear, and a big part of the hospital was*
21 262 *destroyed. One patient was undergoing a surgery, his blood was still on the operating table.”*
22 263 (Interview 3, 2017)
23 264

24 265 Even in cases where hospitals are not completely destroyed the impact of bombardments on
25 266 health care access is profound, with many participants describing regular interruptions and
26 267 closures. Fear of attacks on hospitals has an indirect but major impact on patient access to health
27 268 services. As a participant explained:

28 269 *“Lots of people don't dare to go to the hospital, because they know that the hospital has been*
29 270 *targeted by the bombardment – five, six times. It's only those who are in grave need who will go*
30 271 *to the hospital.”* (Interview 11, 2014)
31 272

32 273 For civilians who have been injured in attacks or who are unable to travel to a hospital for other
33 274 reasons, medical care access is dependent on first responders or civilian transportation. However,
34 275 ambulances are in short supply, in part due attacks on them, and the risk to first responders is
35 276 great, as they are easy targets for aerial attacks:

36 277 *“There were many cases when ambulance drivers have been attacked, especially at night in the*
37 278 *dark. The aircraft see the lights of the ambulance and attack it.”* (Interview 2, 2014)
38 279

39 280 At times of acute crisis, such as the recent chemical attacks, lack of prompt access to facilities
40 281 owing to long transport times and restricted capacity, has meant many additional civilian
41 282 fatalities:
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3 283 *“There is no clear strategy for the health system tactically or operationally to deal with the*
4 284 *number of injuries, and nerve injuries are a new topic for us. If there had been a medical point*
5 285 *nearby, maybe one or two kilometers away from our hospital, we would have saved a lot of*
6 286 *people.”* (Interview 5, 2017)
7 287

8 288 Finally, the difficulties and dangers of transporting supplies and equipment into besieged areas
9 289 was highlighted as another access issue that poses severe risks for health workers. One
10 290 participant reported that 28 staff from their hospital had been arrested while attempting to carry
11 291 medicines and supplies to their hospital:

12 292 *“Taking medicine into [town name], is a crime that is punished...they go to prison and nobody*
13 293 *knows after that, of course it’s torture.”* (Interview 7, 2014)
14 294

15 295 3. 4. Quality

16 296 Makeshift hospitals (known as field hospitals) emerged in opposition-controlled areas as a result
17 297 of the assault on health infrastructure in rebel held areas of Syria, replacing hospitals and clinics
18 298 formerly serving Syria’s population. These field hospitals are located in former factories, farms,
19 299 and schools. Although Syrian health workers and their supporters provide supplies and
20 300 equipment to these field hospitals, in many of them it is extremely difficult to maintain standards
21 301 of care, especially at times of mass casualties from attacks, as evidenced in participant
22 302 descriptions:

23 303 *“Everything is allowed in a field hospital. You can put the intravenous line in with alcohol - we*
24 304 *do it all the time. You can do operations without sterilized matters, without anaesthesia*
25 305 *machines.”* (Interview 15, 2014)
26 306

27 307 During the 2017 chemical attacks, some hospitals that had been closed-down for safety reasons
28 308 were reopened to deal with the overwhelming number of casualties:

29 309 *Most of the hospital was destroyed by an attack on [date excluded] and it was out of service, but*
30 310 *because the other hospital couldn’t deal with the large number of patient, they reactivated the*
31 311 *emergency department. Even though it was very risky, just so they could receive some patients.*
32 312 (Interview 3, 2017)
33 313

34 314 Participants also reported that because of the high number of trauma cases, patients with other
35 315 medical conditions were often left untreated. During the chemical attacks, triage decisions led to
36 316 a lack of attention to the most vulnerable, including large numbers of affected children.

37 317 Participants’ accounts highlight that medical personnel such as dentists and anesthesiology
38 318 technicians are acquiring new skills to meet the chronic shortage of surgeons and
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3 319 anesthesiologists, because so many health workers have fled Syria. Here a participant describes
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5 320 how they performed a surgery without previous training:

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7 321 *[Interviewer: Part of your training was in that kind of surgery?]* “No, it was just a minimal part
8 322 *of it, I was given just an overview of these types of surgeries, but out of necessity I’ve had to do*
9 323 *these surgeries.”* (Interview 1, 2014)
10 324

11
12 325 Participants involved in treating patients in the most recent chemical attacks were frank in
13
14 326 describing how ill prepared the medical sector has been, with training and equipment inadequate
15 327 to meet the demands of the overwhelming crisis. This resulted in a highly variable quality of care
16
17 328 at medical facilities:

18
19 329 *I think that medical providers barely saved 1-2% of the chemical attack victims, because the*
20 330 *situation is totally different. We have no prior training, medical staff or equipment to deal with*
21 331 *it. I believe that what we were able to provide was too little.* (Interview 1, 2017)
22 332

23
24 333 The continued outward migration of healthcare providers from Syria, and resulting shortage in
25
26 334 quality clinical care has also been exacerbated by the relentless targeting of healthcare services
27 335 and recent chemical attacks:

28
29 336 *“Some healthcare providers decided to stay in Turkey and not to go back to Syria until things*
30 337 *are clearer, others said that the use of chemical weapons is something that will never stop. We*
31 338 *won’t be able to provide much and we might turn into patients ourselves, so medical staff were*
32 339 *evaluating how beneficial they can be over there.”* (Interview 3, 2017)
33 340

341 3.5. Health Worker Demoralization

342 The constant attacks to health infrastructure and the barriers to health care access, availability,
343 and quality that result, impact not only civilians who seek treatment but also the health workers
344 who provide care. Interviews highlighted a complex constellation of factors that impact health
345 workers’ day to day working conditions. As this participant described:

346 *“You are working with bad health supplies and instruments, and short of financial support. We*
347 *also have a great danger of being killed because of the constant bombings. All those factors put*
348 *a great pressure on doctors... Especially the doctors that work for health organisations and in*
349 *the opposition areas, they are under focus from the regime.”* (Interview 2, 2014)
350

351 Conditions remain violent, with participants interviewed following the 2017 chemical attacks
352 drawing attention to the rising death toll among doctors and enduring sense of fatalism among
353 those who remain:

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3 354 *The past year Dr. [name and date omitted] passed away [exposed to chemical agents while*
4 355 *treating a patient] and another anesthesiologist passed away. There have been about 5-6 deaths*
5 356 *from our medical staff within the organization. The truth is that work in the northern countryside*
6 357 *is considered suicide. (Interview 5, 2017)*
7
8 358

9 359 The stress of providing care during war is made worse because of the scarcity of health workers.
10
11 360 Many participants reported that they work 24-hour days because there are no other staff to
12
13 361 relieve them of their duties. Additionally, participants described often feeling helpless, because
14
15 362 of the number of people they could not assist. A participant explained health worker's relentless
16
17 363 workload, coupled with the extreme trauma related injuries they respond to:

18 364 *"Sometimes it takes them from 8:00 in the morning till 12:00 in the evening doing operations*
19 365 *only. And because of the lack of the staff they are obliged to stay in the hospital, moving from*
20 366 *one operation to another, and sometimes they don't find time to even eat. This pressure they live*
21 367 *under, and all the casualties they see, all the injuries, the beheaded, the limbs and everything,*
22 368 *puts them under very heavy pressure." (Interview 20, 2014)*
23
24 369

25
26 370 Participants described the most recent chemical attacks as having a major impact on morale
27
28 371 among health workers and their sense of isolation:

29 372 *"Every single life we saved in the last year ended up dead in the chemical attack. At the end,*
30 373 *death has become normal to the rest of the world, no one is reacting." (Interview 1, 2017)*
31
32 374

33 375 *"It had a big effect in creating a hopeless environment, feeling of hopelessness inside each*
34 376 *healthcare provider." (Interview 3, 2017)*
35
36 377

37 378 Participant accounts highlighted the mixed emotions generated by their work, as fear was offset
38
39 379 only by a strong sense of professional commitment:

40 380 *"Sometimes we have depression. But all of us believe that we must do this job – but all of us are*
41 381 *afraid of some point where we're injured or killed..." (Interview 13, 2014)*
42
43 382

44 383 In the absence of external support health workers look to one another; here a participant
45
46 384 describes how they rejoice on days where their work does not bring with it the death of another
47
48 385 colleague:

49 386 *"After a barrel bomb falls we start dancing, the Arabian dancing. We are not dead, and if*
50 387 *nobody is dead among us, we start dancing." (Interview 23, 2014)*
51
52 388

53 389 Finally, another participant pointed to the absence and futility of psychological support and
54
55 390 instead the role of their faith:

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2
3 391 *“What is good about psychological support after all what we have seen? In general, we don’t get*
4 392 *internal nor external psychological support. The staff that held up for 7 years have only God to*
5 393 *depend on.” (Interview 2, 2017)*
6
7 394

8 395 **Discussion**

9
10 396 To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research study to illuminate the experiences of
11 397 indigenous health workers in Syria seeking to provide health care to the local population, while
12 398 themselves under attack. Unlike international aid workers, whose experience have been
13 399 extensively studied, local doctors, nurses and other health workers who remain in their country to
14 400 try to relieve suffering have received far less attention in the context of research. This qualitative
15 401 study of 29 health workers subjected to bombing and chemical attacks provides new insights into
16 402 the overwhelming challenges they face, their persistence in trying to meet them, and the
17 403 psychological toll of carrying on. The bombing and chemical attacks have had far reaching
18 404 implications beyond the observable violence and destruction of health infrastructure. These
19 405 include the flight of health workers from Syria, even as population needs increase, reluctance of
20 406 patients to seek needed care in hospitals, and allocation of resources needed for care to protection
21 407 and security.

22 408 Attacks on hospitals, ambulances, health workers, and the wounded and sick are not
23 409 uncommon in armed conflict. In 2016, for example, such attacks took place in 23 countries, and
24 410 bombing and shelling took place in ten of them.⁹ Syria is unique, in part because of the number
25 411 of sustained attacks on hospitals now numbering over 500 over a period of seven years,
26 412 alongside the rising number of chemical attacks.³⁷ As has been found in other conflicts,^{31,38-40} our
27 413 findings show that in Syria violence against health care has bred a climate of fear and insecurity,
28 414 with devastating impacts on health-seeking behaviors and access including, civilian difficulties
29 415 in reaching medical aid or avoidance of health facilities altogether. Participants described how
30 416 their work to treat a suffering population was severely impeded by a lack of availability of
31 417 essential equipment, facilities, and treatments for chronic and infectious disease.

32 418 The challenges of maintaining standards of quality, interconnected to access and
33 419 availability, was a central theme of the interviews, and constitutes a daily source of pressure and
34 420 anxiety for those trying to provide care. Health care providers have had to cope with shortages in
35 421 staff and equipment and overwhelming numbers of patients, rendering triage decisions
36 422 impossibly hard. The large scale of chemical weapons attacks in facilities already compromised

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2
3 423 by violence against them has overwhelmed medical staffs. Despite efforts by many organisations
4
5 424 to provide supplies, equipment, and a safe environment, health workers have been forced to
6
7 425 operate in conditions well below any standard of quality that existed prior to the conflict. The
8
9 426 chemical attacks in 2017 in particular show the extent to which the use of prohibited weapons
10
11 427 and extreme resource limitations impair health worker efforts to provide basic life-saving
12
13 428 treatment, and the extreme threats posed to their own safety and wellbeing.

14 429 Organizations supporting medical care in Syria, such as SAMS, have responded to the
15
16 430 crisis by providing training to health professionals on trauma care and response to chemical
17
18 431 weapons attacks, offering protective equipment, antidotes for chemical attacks, and constructing
19
20 432 health facilities underground to protect them from bombs. These efforts, however, inevitably
21
22 433 have limited impact in the face of the level of violence inflicted on health facilities and health
23
24 434 workers. As one 2014 respondent said when asked what could be done to offer health workers in
25
26 435 Syria support, he replied, “*Stop the bombing.*” Only concerted action by the international
27
28 436 community through the UN Security Council or otherwise could achieve that, and it has not been
29
30 437 forthcoming over seven years of conflict. Research on the effects of the Syrian conflict has
31
32 438 described the lasting impact the migration of health workers on health systems and ultimately the
33
34 439 civilian population remaining in Syria.^{25,28} Accounts from both 2014 and 2017 highlight the
35
36 440 continued outward migration of health providers due to violence against them and the
37
38 441 psychological toll taken by working in such circumstances. They also reveal how physician
39
40 442 shortages have led to the self-training in specializations for which doctors on the ground have no
41
42 443 official certification. The need for medical personnel to act beyond their training inevitably has
43
44 444 implications for the quality of care patients receive, and puts health providers not adequately
45
46 445 trained under enormous pressure.

47 446 Participant accounts are consistent with other evidence, which together reveal that attacks
48
49 447 on hospitals and medical providers are targeted and deliberate, and likely constitute war crimes.
50
51 448 The data illustrates how violence against health workers and facilities undermined their ability to
52
53 449 contribute to the realization of the right to health, which imposes on States a number of core
54
55 450 obligations to respect, protect and fulfill the health needs of the population, obligations that are
56
57 451 non-derogable, even in times of conflict.^{41,42} Syria has ratified the International Covenant on
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59 452 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and even though Syria does not control all areas of the
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453 country, it has an obligation both to refrain from taking actions to infringe the right to health and

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2
3 454 take affirmative steps to protect health workers and individuals seeking health care in those
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5 455 regions.⁴² Instead, the government is attacking hospitals and health workers, with UN human
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7 456 rights agencies continuing to confirm the severity of its violations of these rights.

8 457 Since we conducted interviews in 2014, attacks on hospitals and health care workers have
9
10 458 escalated further with augmented findings from the 2017 chemical attacks illustrative of the
11
12 459 severity of conditions on the ground. Chemical weapons have continuously been used by the
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14 460 Syrian government and its allies throughout the conflict, as confirmed by the United Nations
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16 461 chemical weapons watchdog, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
17
18 462 (OPCW).¹⁷ The UN Security Council has repeatedly called on Syria and its allies to adhere to its
19
20 463 legal obligation not to attack health facilities and health workers,⁴³ to no avail, and efforts by
21
22 464 members of the Council to refer gross violations of international humanitarian law, including
23
24 465 targeting of hospitals and health workers and the use of chemical weapons on civilians, to the
25
26 466 International Criminal Court, were either blocked or denied by Russia.

27 467

28 468 **Conclusion**

29 469 This study shows the consequences for health practitioners who seek to provide medical
30
31 470 care for populations where health systems are subjected to bombings and other forms of
32
33 471 violence, including chemical attacks. It is remarkable that doctors and nurses continue to work
34
35 472 in conditions of such danger, and how they have carried on despite dire shortages of staff and
36
37 473 supplies. While they are resilient, they suffer enormously. The study underlines the
38
39 474 consequences to health workers of the failure by the international community to take effective
40
41 475 action to protect them from aerial assaults, chemical attacks, and other forms of violence. It
42
43 476 further underlines the imperative of taking strong steps to protect health workers in war and to
44
45 477 focus on the needs of health professionals who struggle to continue to fulfill the right to health,
46
47 478 even while under attack.

48 479 Those needs include: capacity building to respond to chemical attacks (including
49
50 480 provision of correct antidotes and protective gear); removing barriers to accessing professional
51
52 481 training (including continuing education abroad); and research informed trainings delivered
53
54 482 remotely to ensure the provision of appropriately equipped psychologists and mental health
55
56 483 supporters to provide care to healthcare workers. Finally, future research should continue to

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3 484 evaluate the staggering challenges faced by Syria's health professionals, affording them the
4 opportunity to share their experience and knowledge.
5 485
6 486

8 487 **Limitations**

10 488 The findings are subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, there is the potential for respondent
11 489 bias (e.g., specific geographic experience or gendered framing) due to a number of factors
12 490 constraining the pool of available participants. The majority of participants were in Gaziantep for
13 491 SAMS trainings in October 2014, and therefore data are limited to the experiences of a sample of
14 492 health workers, collected within a short five-day period, and then later in 2017 to those with
15 493 specific knowledge of the chemical attacks. Furthermore, most participants were male despite
16 494 outreach to both male and female health professionals currently inside Syria. This is mainly due
17 495 to the scarcity of female health professionals attending the 2014 trainings (which includes
18 496 cultural barriers and travel concerns for women from Syria into Turkey) and the lack of female
19 497 representatives recommended to interview after the chemical attacks in 2017. To address this
20 498 concern, future research on healthcare providers inside Syria should aim to include female health
21 499 workers as well as interview questions that address gender-specific challenges among healthcare
22 500 workers inside Syria. Additionally, the situation in northwest Syria has changed and worsened
23 501 since this data was collected. For this reason and to reflect more recent events the research team
24 502 were able to include updated data from health workers working in Syria in 2017. Finally, these
25 503 findings do not apply to areas of the country controlled by the Islamic State or to government-
26 504 controlled areas. In government-controlled areas, the health system is understood to be largely
27 505 intact, though capacity is variable, and the impact of the war can be felt through indiscriminate
28 506 mortar attacks, emigration of senior physicians, travel restrictions and inconsistent supplies.³⁰
29 507 However, access of information in these areas is extremely limited for researchers on-the-ground
30 508 and was beyond the scope of this study. Despite these limitations, collectively accounts provide
31 509 an opportunity to learn more in-depth details of the experiences of health workers operating in
32 510 the Syrian conflict, to understand challenges to health care provision, and to consider ways in
33 511 which research can begin to support these providers.
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12 519

13 520 *Author's contributions*

14
15 521 KF and LR designed and conceptualized the study. LR, DR and ZS coordinated and carried out
16
17 522 data collection. KF, EC and LR analyzed and interpreted the data. KF led manuscript writing
18
19 523 with contributions from LR and EC. All authors reviewed the final manuscript.

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24 541 “I *Katherine Footer* The Corresponding Author of this article contained within the original
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31 548 [access-and-permission-reuse.](http://www.bmj.com/about-bmj/resources-authors/forms-policies-and-checklists/copyright-open-access-and-permission-reuse)”

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33 54934
35 550 *Transparency declaration*

36 551 The lead author* *Katherine Footer* affirms that this manuscript is an honest, accurate, and
37 552 transparent account of the study being reported; that no important aspects of the study have been
38 553 omitted; and that any discrepancies from the study as planned (and, if relevant, registered) have
39 554 been explained.

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41 55542
43 556 *Data Sharing Statement:* All available data can be obtained from the corresponding author.

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Standards for Reporting Qualitative Research (SRQR)*

<http://www.equator-network.org/reporting-guidelines/srqr/>

Page/line no(s).

Title and abstract

<p>Title - Concise description of the nature and topic of the study Identifying the study as qualitative or indicating the approach (e.g., ethnography, grounded theory) or data collection methods (e.g., interview, focus group) is recommended</p>	Pg. 1
<p>Abstract - Summary of key elements of the study using the abstract format of the intended publication; typically includes background, purpose, methods, results, and conclusions</p>	Pg. 6

Introduction

<p>Problem formulation - Description and significance of the problem/phenomenon studied; review of relevant theory and empirical work; problem statement</p>	Pg. 7-8
<p>Purpose or research question - Purpose of the study and specific objectives or questions</p>	Pg. 4

Methods

<p>Qualitative approach and research paradigm - Qualitative approach (e.g., ethnography, grounded theory, case study, phenomenology, narrative research) and guiding theory if appropriate; identifying the research paradigm (e.g., postpositivist, constructivist/ interpretivist) is also recommended; rationale**</p>	Pg. 4
<p>Researcher characteristics and reflexivity - Researchers' characteristics that may influence the research, including personal attributes, qualifications/experience, relationship with participants, assumptions, and/or presuppositions; potential or actual interaction between researchers' characteristics and the research questions, approach, methods, results, and/or transferability</p>	Pg. 3-4
<p>Context - Setting/site and salient contextual factors; rationale**</p>	Pg. 3
<p>Sampling strategy - How and why research participants, documents, or events were selected; criteria for deciding when no further sampling was necessary (e.g., sampling saturation); rationale**</p>	Pg. 3-4
<p>Ethical issues pertaining to human subjects - Documentation of approval by an appropriate ethics review board and participant consent, or explanation for lack thereof; other confidentiality and data security issues</p>	Pg. 4-5
<p>Data collection methods - Types of data collected; details of data collection procedures including (as appropriate) start and stop dates of data collection and analysis, iterative process, triangulation of sources/methods, and modification of procedures in response to evolving study findings; rationale**</p>	Pg. 4

1 2 3 4 5	Data collection instruments and technologies - Description of instruments (e.g., interview guides, questionnaires) and devices (e.g., audio recorders) used for data collection; if/how the instrument(s) changed over the course of the study	Pg. 4
6 7 8	Units of study - Number and relevant characteristics of participants, documents, or events included in the study; level of participation (could be reported in results)	Pg. 5
9 10 11 12	Data processing - Methods for processing data prior to and during analysis, including transcription, data entry, data management and security, verification of data integrity, data coding, and anonymization/de-identification of excerpts	Pg. 4
13 14 15 16	Data analysis - Process by which inferences, themes, etc., were identified and developed, including the researchers involved in data analysis; usually references a specific paradigm or approach; rationale**	Pg. 4
17 18 19 20	Techniques to enhance trustworthiness - Techniques to enhance trustworthiness and credibility of data analysis (e.g., member checking, audit trail, triangulation); rationale**	Pg. 4

Results/findings

23 24 25 26	Synthesis and interpretation - Main findings (e.g., interpretations, inferences, and themes); might include development of a theory or model, or integration with prior research or theory	Pg. 16-18
27 28 29	Links to empirical data - Evidence (e.g., quotes, field notes, text excerpts, photographs) to substantiate analytic findings	N/A

Discussion

32 33 34 35 36 37	Integration with prior work, implications, transferability, and contribution(s) to the field - Short summary of main findings; explanation of how findings and conclusions connect to, support, elaborate on, or challenge conclusions of earlier scholarship; discussion of scope of application/generalizability; identification of unique contribution(s) to scholarship in a discipline or field	Pg. 17-18
38 39	Limitations - Trustworthiness and limitations of findings	Pg. 16-17

Other

42 43 44	Conflicts of interest - Potential sources of influence or perceived influence on study conduct and conclusions; how these were managed	Pg. 19
45 46	Funding - Sources of funding and other support; role of funders in data collection, interpretation, and reporting	Pg.19

*The authors created the SRQR by searching the literature to identify guidelines, reporting standards, and critical appraisal criteria for qualitative research; reviewing the reference lists of retrieved sources; and contacting experts to gain feedback. The SRQR aims to improve the transparency of all aspects of qualitative research by providing clear standards for reporting qualitative research.

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**The rationale should briefly discuss the justification for choosing that theory, approach, method, or technique rather than other options available, the assumptions and limitations implicit in those choices, and how those choices influence study conclusions and transferability. As appropriate, the rationale for several items might be discussed together.

Reference:

O'Brien BC, Harris IB, Beckman TJ, Reed DA, Cook DA. **Standards for reporting qualitative research: a synthesis of recommendations.** *Academic Medicine*, Vol. 89, No. 9 / Sept 2014
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