

1 **Supplementary Information for**

2 **“Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation”**

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5 **1. Supporting Statistical Analysis**

6 **2. Experimental procedure**

7 **3. Experimental instructions**

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10 **1. Supporting Statistical Analysis**

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12 **Table S1. The number of items of each type of data presented in Fig. 2c in the main text.**

	<i>What data were 'C'</i>	<i>What data were 'D'</i>
<i># disclosing whom data</i>	1,518	1,587
<i># not disclosing whom data</i>	4,005	3,929

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	<i>Whom data were 'G'</i>	<i>Whom data were 'B'</i>
<i># disclosing what data</i>	1,333	1,267
<i># not disclosing what data</i>	635	757

14 For example, when what data disclosed was 'C', the number of items of whom data that was  
15 disclosed was 1,518 for all pairs of all subjects.

16 **Table S2. VIF values of factors presented in Table 1 in the main text.**

<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
what data		<b>1.031</b>		<b>1.082</b>	<b>1.042</b>	<b>1.194</b>	<b>1.014</b>
whom data			<b>1.030</b>	<b>1.072</b>	<b>1.043</b>	<b>1.025</b>	<b>1.012</b>
recent decision	<b>1.014</b>	<b>1.130</b>	<b>1.186</b>	<b>1.199</b>	<b>1.182</b>	<b>1.193</b>	<b>1.129</b>
round	<b>1.485</b>	<b>1.356</b>	<b>1.318</b>	<b>1.309</b>	<b>1.574</b>	<b>1.657</b>	<b>1.885</b>
current total earnings	<b>1.627</b>	<b>1.596</b>	<b>1.632</b>	<b>1.580</b>	<b>2.005</b>	<b>1.929</b>	<b>2.078</b>
decision received	<b>1.156</b>	<b>1.225</b>	<b>1.355</b>	<b>1.164</b>	<b>1.318</b>	<b>1.256</b>	<b>1.138</b>

17 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is the ratio of the variance in a model with multiple terms to  
 18 the variance in a model with only one term. VIF values of all factors are sufficiently less than 10,  
 19 and thus multicollinearity can be ignored.

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21 **2. Experimental procedures**

22 We ran seven sessions in the computer laboratories of either Soka University or Rissho  
 23 University. Once the experiment had begun, the subjects were no longer allowed to communicate  
 24 with each other. Printed instructions in Japanese (see Subsection 3 for an English translation)  
 25 were distributed and read out loud by one of the experimenters. To promote the subjects’  
 26 understanding of the experiment, the experimenter also presented the instructions using  
 27 PowerPoint slides. Sessions finished with a questionnaire including items about subjects’  
 28 demographic background (omitted from the paper). Finally, subjects were paid.

29 **3. Experiment Instructions**

30 (1) Setting

31 During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to or communicate in any other way with the  
32 other participants. Hence, you will be seated apart from each other, not only to prevent  
33 communication but also to avoid the possibility of observing other participants' behavior, either  
34 intentionally or accidentally. The experiment lasts for about 60 to 90 minutes. It is recommended  
35 that you go to the bathroom before starting. You are allowed to take a break during the  
36 experiment. Please let one of the staff know if this is necessary.

### 37 (2) Your goal

38 You will be allocated 2,000 points as your initial earnings. Your aim is to gain as many points as  
39 possible during the experiment. The payment you receive will be determined by your final points  
40 total.

### 41 (3) Calculation of payment

42 At the end of the experiment, you will receive payment consisting of a participation fee and an  
43 additional fee. The participation fee is JPY 1,000, which you will be entitled to receive upon  
44 providing informed consent. The additional fee will be determined by your final points total. The  
45 formula used for calculation is as follows: [The additional fee] = [Your final points] \* 0.4, where  
46 all amounts are rounded up to the nearest JPY 100. For example, if you had accumulated 4,100  
47 points by the end of the experiment, you would receive JPY 2,700 because  $1,000 + 4,100 * 0.4 =$   
48 JPY 2,640, which is rounded up to JPY 2,700. If the final points total is a negative amount, the  
49 additional fee is zero.

### 50 (4) ID and password

51 You will access the experiment through a Web browser. To log in to the system, you will be  
52 given an ID and a password. The staff never record who has which ID.

### 53 (5) Details of the game

54 The game will involve human subjects and virtual participants created by a computer program.  
55 All participants are called 'players'. The experiment consists of multiple rounds. No player will  
56 know how many rounds they will play. The game will end suddenly at the end of a round. In  
57 each round, your recipient is assigned to you by the computer system. You never know who your

58 recipient is: instead, the recipient is always called 'Player X'. You will decide between two  
59 options by clicking on either the red or the blue button. The options are as follows:

60 Red: You will increase the earnings of Player X by 300 points and decrease your own earnings  
61 by 100 points.

62 Blue: Neither player's earnings will either increase or decrease.

63 Prior to making your choice, a screen on information disclosure for Player X will be displayed to  
64 you. On this screen, you can disclose two types of information: what Player X did, and to whom,  
65 in the previous five rounds. The disclosable information is as follows.

66 Information about who Player X's recipient was in the  $n$ th-last round, where  $n$  is an integer  
67 between 1 and 5: this is information about the recipient assigned to Player X by the system in the  
68  $n$ th-last round. If you click the button for this information, you will see how many times the  
69 recipient chose the red button in the five most recent rounds. The number is an integer between 0  
70 and 5.

71 Information about what Player X chose in the  $n$ th-last round: this is information about Player X's  
72 choice for the recipient assigned to Player X by the system in the  $n$ th-last round. If you click the  
73 button for this information, either a red or a blue symbol is displayed.

74 In each round, you can disclose at most four pieces of information without cost, and thus you  
75 should consider which information will be disclosed. During the first ten rounds, you can  
76 disclose any amount of information, and thus you should try to disclose as much information as  
77 possible in the first ten rounds. Note that the information disclosure screen has two versions,  
78 which will be displayed in alternate rounds. If you no longer wish to see the information  
79 disclosure screen, press the 'Finish disclosure' button. You can move to the next screen by  
80 choosing one of two options (clicking the red or the blue button). Any information you disclosed  
81 on the information disclosure screen will disappear, and thus you should only move to this screen  
82 after you have made your choice.

83 This is the end of a round. As well as assigning Player X, the system also assigns a donor to you.  
84 The assigned donor also has a choice of two options, and you will learn the donor's decision (by

85 clicking the red or the blue button and updating your earnings) at the end of each round. The  
86 donor makes their choice after referring to information about you, just as you did for your  
87 recipient. Therefore, you should make your choices carefully because they may influence the  
88 choices made by your future donors. Additionally, the first few rounds of the experiment have  
89 insufficient information on the past, and thus the system will provide past information randomly.

90 (6) Process after the game

91 When the game has finished, you should wait quietly for a staff member to give you a  
92 questionnaire and a receipt. When you have completed the questionnaire, give the form to a staff  
93 member and collect your payment. After receiving your payment, you should quietly leave the  
94 room.

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