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2 **Supplementary Information for**

3 **The Good, the Bad and the Conditional**

4 **Karen Evelyn Hauge, Kjell Arne Brekke, Karine Nyborg, Jo Thori Lind**

5 **Corresponding Author: Karine Nyborg**

6 **E-mail: karine.nyborg@econ.uio.no**

7 **This PDF file includes:**


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14 Overview of Tables and Figures

- 15 • Figure S1 supplements Figure 1 in the paper by showing trends for each study separately. Moreover, in Study 2 where
16 respondents both reported conditional and unconditional contributions, we report both the unconditional contributions
17 and the average realized contributions.
- 18 • Figure S2 shows total profits as well as the sum of individual profits and contributions to the Red Cross. We see that
19 individual profits are higher in Blue groups than in Red groups. If profits to the Red Cross are taken into account, this
20 exceeds Blue group profits.
- 21 • Figure S3 shows the significance of the difference in contribution levels between participants in red and blue groups
22 accounting for multiple hypothesis testing (1).
- 23 • Figure S4 shows an analogous figure to Figure 1 in the paper restricted to subjects defined as conditional cooperators by
24 the conditional contribution profile in Part II.
- 25 • Figure S5 and S6 illustrate characteristics of the conditional contribution profiles. The conditional contribution profile
26 is a subjects contribution to the public good given the average contribution level of the other group members, b_ℓ , to
27 each level $\ell \in \{0, 5, \dots, 60\}$. The average and slope is obtained as the regression parameters α and β from the regression
28 $b_\ell = \alpha + \beta(\ell - \bar{\ell})$ (where $\bar{\ell} = 30$ is the average value), scaled to be expressed in percentages.
29 Figure S5 shows the how the average level and slope in the conditional contribution profiles given in Part II evolves over
30 time. In Figure S5 we compute the average of the two characteristics by subjects in red and blue groups by period. As in
31 Figure 1, we see that the average level is higher in red groups than in blue groups, and these number remain stable over
32 time. The figure shows that sustained cooperation in red groups cannot be explained by changes in self-selection. Figure
33 S6 illustrates the average level of slope of individual Part II conditional contribution profiles. Figure S6 corresponds to
34 Figure 2 in Fischbacher and Gächter (2), but there are more subjects with high average level in our data.
- 35 • Figure S7 shows the share of subjects choosing red and blue groups in Parts III and IV, classified by their Period II
36 conditional contribution profile. The figure shows that sustained cooperation in red groups cannot be explained by
37 changes in self-selection.
- 38 • Figure S8 shows average (unconditional) contributions by period in Part III of Studies 3 and 4, broken down by group
39 composition. Note that groups with at least one altruist sustain cooperation (disregarding endgame effects). Groups with
40 some free-riders show the fastest decline in contribution.
- 41 • Figure S9 shows the average conditional contribution profile by Part III group type and profile categories. The figure
42 indicates little self-selection within types. Conditional cooperators in red group has a slightly higher level on their profile,
43 but similar slope.
- 44 • Table S1 shows the percentage of subjects in red groups by study and period.
- 45 • Table S2 shows the fraction of subjects by Period II conditional contribution profile and Period III group choice as in
46 Table 2, broken down by Study.
- 47 • Tables S3 and S4 show trends in contribution levels. There are significant negative trends in blue groups. In red groups
48 there are much weaker, if any, trends.
- 49 • Table S5 shows a formal analysis of the relationship between the classification of Period II conditional contribution
50 profiles and Period III and IV group choice.
- 51 • Table S6 shows the relationship between our preferred classification of conditional contribution profiles and the classification
52 suggested by Fischbacher et al. (3) (FGF). They classify subjects who never contribute as free-riders, conditional cooperators
53 as subjects with a significantly positive Spearman correlation at the 1% level between own and others' contribution
54 (with 13 choices this corresponds to $\rho \geq .703$). The remaining subjects are classified as others. In an addition to their
55 classification, we also add a fourth group of altruists defined as those always contributing everything.
- 56 • Table S7 shows the relationship between the FGF classification and Period III and IV group choices. We notice that
57 free-riders are more likely to choose blue groups, whereas altruists are more inclined to choose red.
- 58 • In Table S8 we explore the projection of conditional contribution profiles into average and slope as in Figure S5 more
59 formally. We provide averages by Part III group choices, formal tests of differences, and regressions of group choices and
60 the two measures.


- 61 • Table S9 uses data from the post experimental survey where we asked subject what qualities they consider important
62 for a future employer. 3 out of 9 questions were related to CSR. There was a huge variation in response style, that is:
63 variation between subjects on the average score on all questions. Some subjects considered everything important or very
64 important and other considered everything unimportant or very unimportant. There was relatively less variation within
65 subjects, between questions. We adjust for response style by computing both C , the average score on CSR questions and
66 S , the average score on all questions, and then we define a net CSR-score: $C_{net} = C - S$. Thus, e.g. a person who thinks
67 everything is very unimportant while CSR is only unimportant will have a positive net CSR score. This reduces the noise
68 generated by the variation in answering style. Subjects who chose red, scores significantly higher on this net CSR score.
- 69 • In Table S10 we study how individual contribution levels in Parts III and IV correlate with Period II conditional
70 contribution levels. Subjects with higher averages and higher slopes contribute more. Using the classification into profiles,
71 altruists contribute more and free-riders and others less than conditional cooperators.
- 72 • Table S11 provides descriptive statistics on background characteristics and opinions on the Red Cross and potential
73 future employers, broken down by Part II conditional contribution profiles. The opinions on the Red Cross and employers
74 if fairly homogeneous across profiles, but there are some differences in background characteristics.
- 75 • Table S12 shows the relationship between own Part III contributions and lagged contributions of the other group members,
76 broken down by Part II preference profile.
- 77 • Table S13 shows detailed contribution levels with standard errors, corresponding to the number plotted in Figure 1.

Fig. S1. Contributions by period and study




Notes: The graph shows average contributions in the four studies by period and group type. Red groups are shown with solid lines and circles, blue groups with dashed lines and diamonds. For Study 2, data from the Regular game is used in Panel (b) whereas realized contributions appear in Panel (c). The four sections show Part I-Part IV.

Fig. S2. Profits over time




Notes: The Figure shows the period profit by period in red and blue groups as well as the sum of profits accruing to the subject and the Red Cross in red groups. Red groups are shown as solid lines, blue groups as dashed lines, and total of individual and Red Cross profits are shown in dashed-dotted lines.

Fig. S3. Significance of differences in contributions




Notes: The Figure shows p-values from a test of significant differences between red and blue groups by period, using List et al.'s (1) approach to multiple hypothesis (12 periods) testing. Tests are run on both the full data set (n=324) and studies individually with 10 000 bootstrap replications.

Fig. S4. Average contributions by period and group type – Conditional cooperators




Notes: The graph shows average contributions in red and blue groups in Studies 2-4 by period for subjects defined as conditional cooperators from the conditional contribution profile in Part II. Red groups are shown with solid lines and filled symbols, blue groups with dashed lines and hollow symbols. For Study 2, Parts II-IV and Study 3, Part II, unconditional contributions from the Regular game are used. The four sections show Part I - Part IV. Part IV has varying number of periods across studies.

Fig. S5. Characteristics of conditional contribution profiles in red and blue groups by period




Notes: The figure shows the average level and slope of the conditional contribution profile by group type and period. Dots denote Part III and lines Part IV. Data from Study 4.

Fig. S6. Summary of conditional contribution profiles




Notes: The graph shows the average level and slope of individual Part II conditional contribution profiles. Subjects choosing blue groups in Part III show as blue squares, red groups as red triangles. The size of markers indicate the number of subjects. The solid symbols denotes the group averages ($N=324$).

Fig. S7. Group type by conditional contribution profile and period




Notes: The graph shows the share of subjects choosing red and blue groups by Part II conditional contribution profile. The left part is Part III group choices, the right part Part IV group choices by Period. Data from Study 4.

Fig. S8. Contributions by group composition



Notes: The graph shows average (unconditional) contributions by period in Part III of Studies 3 and 4, broken down by group composition. We consider groups with only conditional cooperators and others (c/o), groups with at least one free-rider but no altruists, groups with at least one altruist but no free-riders, and groups with all four types present, classified from Part II profiles. The frequency of each group type is given in parentheses.

Fig. S9. Conditional contribution profile by group type and profile categories



Notes: The figure shows conditional contribution profiles from the Strategy game (Question B) in Part II, and choice of group type from Part III. The reported individual contributions levels are shown on the y-axis against hypothetical contribution levels of the other group members on the x-axis. Data from Studies 2, 3, and 4 is included ($N = 324$).

Table S1. Group choice over time – details

Part	Period	Study			
		1	2	3	4
III		45	38	30	36
IV	1	38	32		32
	2	40	37		38
	3	36	37		36
	4	31	32		27
	5	34	27		33
	6	43			36
	7	38			29
	8	37			31
	9	31			37
	10	38			28
	11	33			25
	12	39			27
	13	37			32
	14	33			31
	15	33			30
	16	32			32
	17	33			26
	18	37			27
	19	37			22
	20	39			31

Notes: The table shows the percentage of subjects choosing red in Part III and each period in Part IV by Study.

Table S2. Group choices and preference categories

	Study 2		Study 3		Study 4		Study 2-4	
	% subjects	% red	% subjects	% red	% subjects	% red	% subjects	% red
Free-rider	13	7	13	25	12	21	13	17
Altruist	5	83	4	75	2	50	4	75
Conditional coop	74	39	76	26	79	38	77	35
Other	8	44	7	50	7	38	7	43
Total	100	38	100	30	100	36	100	35

Notes: The table shows the distribution of preference categories as well as Part III group choices for Studies 2, 3, and 4. All numbers are in percentages.

Table S3. Trends in contributions – Part III

	All	Blue	Red	Diff
A. Studies 1,3, and 4	-2.287*** (-8.08)	-2.967*** (-8.17)	-1.117*** (-2.92)	-1.850*** (-3.54)
<i>N</i>	2940	1860	1080	2940
B. Studies 1, 3, and 4, periods 1-9	-1.691*** (-5.32)	-2.335*** (-5.43)	-0.582 (-1.51)	-1.754*** (-3.07)
<i>N</i>	2646	1674	972	2646
C. Study 1	-2.465*** (-5.33)	-3.540*** (-5.60)	-1.143** (-2.38)	-2.396*** (-3.10)
<i>N</i>	870	480	390	870
D. Study 2	-0.467 (-1.24)	-0.685 (-1.27)	-0.117 (-0.25)	-0.568 (-0.81)
<i>N</i>	1170	720	450	1170
E. Study 3	-1.975*** (-3.58)	-2.622*** (-3.81)	-0.464 (-0.65)	-2.159** (-2.23)
<i>N</i>	900	630	270	900
F. Study 4	-2.395*** (-5.16)	-2.889*** (-5.04)	-1.512* (-1.99)	-1.377 (-1.47)
<i>N</i>	1170	750	420	1170

Notes: The table shows the coefficient of a regression of contributions as percentage of total endowment on a period trend in Part III of the experiment. 'Blue' and 'Red' are group specific trends and 'Diff' the difference between the two trends. All specifications include individual fixed effects.

*t-values based on standard errors clustered at the group level in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level*

Table S4. Trends in contributions – Part IV

	All	Blue	Red	Diff
A. Studies 1 and 4	-1.247*** (-10.67)	-1.515*** (-9.83)	-0.586*** (-4.44)	-0.847*** (-8.27)
<i>N</i>	4170	2737	1343	4080
B. Studies 1 and 4, periods 1-19	-1.240*** (-9.91)	-1.521*** (-9.24)	-0.497*** (-3.83)	-0.866*** (-8.16)
<i>N</i>	3966	2606	1270	3876
C. Study 1	-0.856*** (-5.47)	-1.112*** (-5.45)	-0.492*** (-3.01)	-1.008*** (-5.38)
<i>N</i>	1740	1114	626	1653
D. Study 2	0.104 (0.17)	0.107 (0.16)	1.397 (1.10)	-1.002*** (-3.01)
<i>N</i>	585	387	198	585
E. Study 4	-1.539*** (-9.44)	-1.788*** (-8.39)	-0.670*** (-3.31)	-0.740*** (-6.44)
<i>N</i>	2340	1623	717	2223

Notes: The table shows the coefficient of a regression of contribution as percentage of total endowment on a period trend in Part IV of the experiment. 'Blue' and 'Red' are group specific trends and 'Diff' the difference between the two trends. All specifications include individual fixed effects.

t-values based on standard errors clustered at the individual level in parenthesis, *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level

Table S5. Part III and IV group choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Type: Altruist	0.767*** (4.56)	0.500* (1.96)	0.286 (0.76)	0.581*** (4.14)	0.450** (2.08)	0.389 (1.31)
Type: Cond.	0.324*** (3.84)	0.0147 (0.11)	0.162 (1.32)	0.179*** (2.65)	0.0958 (1.04)	0.104 (1.09)
Type: Other	0.378** (2.09)	0.250 (1.02)	0.161 (0.78)	0.262** (2.16)	0.196 (1.23)	0.0768 (0.48)
Study 3				-0.0715 (-1.11)		
Study 4				-0.00415 (-0.07)	0.0672 (1.02)	
Constant	0.0667 (1.02)	0.250* (1.96)	0.214* (1.92)	0.193*** (2.92)	0.195** (2.12)	0.211** (2.37)
F	9.383	1.870	0.645	6.450	1.663	0.767
p-value	0.0000137	0.141	0.587	0.000299	0.176	0.515
Nonparametric	11.73	5.546	1.577	14.98	4.815	4.153
p-value	0.00484	0.125	0.624	0.00161	0.189	0.245
Obs	117	90	117	324	207	2340
R2	0.100	0.0616	0.0135	0.0505	0.0282	0.0125
Fraction red	0.376	0.300	0.359	0.349	0.333	0.306
Study	2	3	4	All	3 and 4	4 IV

Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy for choosing the Red group in Part III of the experiment.

The F-statistic is the joint test of all profiles having the same probability of choosing red groups. The non-parametric test is a Pearson χ^2 test with Fisher exact p-values in Columns (1) to (5) and a Kruskal-Wallis test on the share of periods spent in red groups in Column (6).

*Robust t-values in parentheses (clustered at the subject in (6), where , *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level.*

Table S6. Alternative classifications of conditional contribution profiles

Profile	FGF profile				Total
	Free-rider	Altruist	Condition	Other	
Free-rider	25	0	7	9	41
Altruist	0	8	3	1	12
Conditional coop	0	0	209	39	248
Other	0	0	13	10	23
Total	25	8	232	59	324

Notes: The table shows the number of individuals with conditional contribution profiles classified by our classification and Fischbacher et al.'s (FGF) classification(3).

Table S7. Part III and IV group choice – FGF definitions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. FGF with altruists</i>						
FGF: Free rider	-0.400*** (-7.40)	0.00213 (0.01)	-0.334*** (-3.19)	-0.256*** (-3.40)	-0.199** (-1.98)	-0.146 (-1.26)
FGF: Altruist	0.350 (1.54)	0.383 (1.35)	0.575*** (10.22)	0.382** (2.45)	0.413* (1.90)	0.654*** (16.71)
FGF: Other	-0.0667 (-0.57)	0.0241 (0.17)	-0.185* (-1.79)	-0.0923 (-1.35)	-0.106 (-1.27)	-0.152** (-2.51)
Study 3				-0.0744 (-1.13)		
Study 4				0.00462 (0.07)	0.0798 (1.20)	
Constant	0.400*** (7.40)	0.284*** (5.03)	0.425*** (7.56)	0.395*** (8.29)	0.317*** (6.15)	0.346*** (8.85)
F	25.49	0.610	95.74	6.558	3.014	211.5
p-value	1.15e-12	0.611	6.74e-31	0.000258	0.0311	7.42e-47
R2	0.0596	0.0224	0.0707	0.0456	0.0393	0.0422
<i>B. FGF strict classification</i>						
FGF: Free rider	-0.400*** (-7.43)	0.00213 (0.01)	-0.334*** (-3.21)	-0.255*** (-3.39)	-0.198** (-1.98)	-0.146 (-1.26)
FGF: Other	8.92e-17 (0.00)	0.0914 (0.68)	-0.156 (-1.49)	-0.0350 (-0.52)	-0.0559 (-0.67)	-0.121* (-1.82)
Study 3				-0.0728 (-1.10)		
Study 4				-0.00808 (-0.13)	0.0647 (0.97)	
Constant	0.400*** (7.43)	0.284*** (5.06)	0.425*** (7.59)	0.399*** (8.34)	0.325*** (6.30)	0.346*** (8.85)
F	35.73	0.231	5.321	5.784	2.007	2.072
p-value	9.00e-13	0.794	0.00618	0.00341	0.137	0.131
R2	0.0384	0.00579	0.0501	0.0242	0.0184	0.0171
Obs	117	90	117	324	207	2340
Fraction red	0.376	0.300	0.359	0.349	0.333	0.306
Study	2	3	4	All	3 and 4	4 IV

Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy for choosing the Red group in Part III of the experiment regressed on the alternative group definition based on Fischbacher et al. (FGF)(3).

Robust t-values in parentheses (clustered at the subject in (6)), *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level

Table S8. Conditional contribution profiles and group choice

<i>A. Average profile</i>				
Red	30.25 [13.20]	32.08 [12.59]	28.46 [15.63]	29.49 [12.20]
Blue	22.92 [12.95]	22.57 [12.63]	24.37 [12.48]	22.04 [13.69]
Difference	7.33*** (4.79)	9.50*** (3.95)	4.09 (1.20)	7.45*** (3.03)
Rank sum	4.38***	3.62***	0.80	2.79***
<i>B. Slope of profile</i>				
Red	0.72 [0.40]	0.74 [0.36]	0.61 [0.52]	0.76 [0.33]
Blue	0.67 [0.42]	0.64 [0.46]	0.74 [0.39]	0.63 [0.41]
Difference	0.05 (1.07)	0.10 (1.27)	-0.12 (-1.11)	0.13* (1.89)
Rank sum	0.89	0.72	-0.73	1.63
<i>C. Regression</i>				
Slope	-0.0468 (-0.71)	0.0216 (0.22)	-0.222* (-1.97)	0.0670 (0.53)
Average	0.00971*** (4.93)	0.0124*** (4.18)	0.00734* (1.84)	0.00847** (2.44)
Constant	0.134*** (2.61)	0.0380 (0.50)	0.268** (2.39)	0.104 (1.35)
R2	0.0688	0.120	0.0578	0.0719
N	324	117	90	117
Fraction red	0.349	0.376	0.300	0.359
Study	All	2	3	4

Notes: The Table shows the relationship between the average level and slope of the Part II conditional contribution profile and Part III group choice. Panels A and B shows average as well as a *t*-test and a rank sum test of differences between groups. Panel C shows a regression of group choice on the average and the slope. Standard errors are reported in square brackets and *t*-values in parentheses; *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level.

Table S9. Opinions on Corporate Social Responsibility and group choice

	C	S	C_{net}
Coefficient	0.0562 (1.64)	0.0226 (0.60)	0.188*** (2.94)
LSX p-value	.097	.472	.005
Obs	323	323	323
R2	0.0137	0.00571	0.0255

Notes: Preferences for Corporate Social Responsibility are measures as the average response to 4 point questions on the importance of different factors when choosing a prospective employer. C is the response to questions on “social responsibility”, “a socially beneficial firm”, and “high ethical standards”. S is the response to all questions: those included in C and “possibility to affect own work day”, “good work environment”, “predictability”, “meaningful work tasks”, “use knowledge from education”, and “salary”. We define the new weight on CSR as $C_{net} = C - S$.

*A test correcting for testing 3 hypotheses(1) is also provided. Regressions include Study dummies. Robust t-values are reported in parentheses, *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level*

Table S10. Contributions and conditional contribution profiles

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>A. Profile characteristics</i>					
Average	0.589*** (9.45)	0.712*** (8.73)	0.469*** (4.06)	0.526*** (4.22)	0.768*** (6.22)
Slope	11.63*** (3.59)	11.70** (2.53)	2.498 (0.45)	22.35*** (2.93)	7.252 (1.09)
R2	0.197	0.243	0.123	0.245	0.291
<i>B. Profile categories</i>					
Type: Altruist	22.74*** (4.24)	19.10* (1.92)	28.57*** (6.15)	22.22** (2.69)	36.67*** (4.51)
Type: Free-rider	-30.30*** (-5.70)	-41.98*** (-6.22)	-14.14 (-1.36)	-31.50*** (-3.06)	-32.33*** (-3.94)
Type: Other	-21.80*** (-3.73)	-20.07*** (-4.15)	-17.51 (-1.20)	-27.22** (-2.38)	-18.17* (-1.75)
R2	0.128	0.185	0.0930	0.138	0.157
N	3240	1170	900	1170	2340
Mean dep.	64.75	63.01	68.81	63.36	48.13
Study	All	2	3	4	4 Part IV

Notes: The Table shows contribution levels as percentage of total endowment regressed on Part II conditional contribution profile characteristics (Panel A) and profile categories (Panel B). In Panel B, the comparison group is conditional cooperators. All specifications control for period and study dummies. *t*-values from standard errors clustered at the group level (individual in Column (5)) are reported in parentheses, *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level

Table S11. Background information by profile categories

Variable	All	Free-rider	Altruist	Cond. coop.	Other	Different
<i>A. Background</i>						
Male	0.35	0.46	0.50	0.34	0.22	1.76
Age	22.91	23.05	24.75	22.79	23.00	0.42
Field: Other	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.23
Field: Humanities	0.21	0.15	0.33	0.21	0.26	0.82
Field: Not student	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.33*
Field: Law	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.85
Field: Social sciences	0.19	0.27	0.67	0.15	0.13	7.94***
Field: Sciences	0.38	0.29	0.00	0.43	0.26	4.24***
Field: Education	0.15	0.17	0.00	0.14	0.26	1.56
Studied economics	0.35	0.41	0.17	0.32	0.61	3.54**
Altruism (pc)	0.00	1.51	0.03	-0.22	-0.01	1.77
<i>B. The Red Cross</i>						
Know the Red Cross (0-3)	2.90	3.00	3.00	2.89	2.74	1.55
Trust the Red Cross (0-3)	2.14	2.20	2.67	2.12	2.05	1.66
Red Cross useful (0-3)	2.61	2.56	2.83	2.62	2.52	0.74
Has contributed to the Red Cross	0.71	0.68	0.67	0.70	0.87	1.06
Has been active in the Red Cross	0.16	0.02	0.17	0.18	0.22	2.26*
<i>C. Future employer</i>						
Influence work	0.89	0.78	0.83	0.91	0.91	0.27
Salary	0.95	0.93	1.17	0.94	0.91	0.30
Employer socially responsible	1.14	1.07	1.00	1.17	1.09	0.26
Work socially relevant	1.07	1.07	1.00	1.09	0.91	0.26
Good workplace	0.63	0.59	0.50	0.64	0.74	0.19
Predictability	1.21	0.95	1.25	1.25	1.27	1.25
Meaningful work	0.80	0.83	0.92	0.78	0.91	0.19
Use competence	1.02	1.05	1.36	0.98	1.17	0.85
Employer's ethical standards	0.88	0.80	0.67	0.91	0.83	0.37

Notes: The Table shows average values on a number of background variables broken down by Part II profile categories.

Panel A includes basic demographics, field of study, and the first principal component of answers to the Rushton altruism scale.

Panel B includes some questions about knowledge about and closeness to the Red Cross.

Panel C shows a number of criteria for evaluating a future employer, ranged on a Likert scale from 0 (Not important) to 3 (Important).

The column "Difference" is a F-test of the four categories being different which under H_0 has an $F(3,203)$ distribution and where *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level.

Table S12. Contributions and past group behavior

	(1) All	(2) Free-rider	(3) Altruist	(4) Conditional	(5) Other
<i>A. All periods</i>					
Lagged contrib. others	0.755*** (20.82)	0.866*** (12.90)	0.00908 (0.19)	0.717*** (18.47)	0.701*** (3.92)
Constant	13.98*** (4.75)	-6.782 (-1.35)	96.52*** (18.57)	19.19*** (6.22)	3.473 (0.54)
Obs	1863	234	54	1449	126
R2	0.401	0.488	0.000774	0.391	0.363
Average contribution	65.01	45.28	97.22	68.65	45.94
<i>B. Period 10</i>					
Lagged contrib. others	0.643*** (10.48)	0.263 (1.61)	-0.0339 (-0.76)	0.661*** (9.64)	0.891*** (6.29)
Constant	10.56*** (2.98)	3.281 (0.69)	101.0*** (53.41)	12.22*** (2.81)	-2.316 (-0.25)
Obs	207	26	6	161	14
R2	0.312	0.104	0.0779	0.333	0.670
Average contribution	49.38	16.47	98.61	53.69	39.88

The table shows the regression of contributions in percent of total endowment on the one period lagged average contribution of the other group members by conditional contribution profile. Data are from Part III of Studies 3 and 4. *t*-values clustered at the individual are reported in parentheses, *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level

78 **References**

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84 Instructions

85 **Instructions Study 1.** Welcome to this experiment in economics. The results from this experiment will be used in a research
86 project. Therefore, it is important that you follow certain rules. It is important that you do not talk or in other ways
87 communicate with any of the other participants during the experiment. Please turn off mobile phones, and use only pre-opened
88 software on the computer. In the experiment, there will be full anonymity, which means that no other participants in this room
89 will know which decisions you in particular make during the experiment. In addition, it is not possible to track the decisions
90 made during the experiments back to individuals. You will be notified when the experiment starts, and when you can start
91 entering your answers on the computer in front of you. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your
92 hand, and an experimenter will come to you and answer your question in private.

93 You will receive money in compensation for participating in this experiment. How much money you receive will depend on
94 the decisions you make during the experiment. After the experiment is over, you will be informed about your total payment.
95 The person who organizes the practical payments will not now the details of the experiment and can therefore not know which
96 decisions you have made.

97 **Instructions Part 1.** This experiment consists of three parts. Your choices in part 1 will not influence what happens, or what
98 payment you can receive from part 2 and 3.

99 In part 1 of the experiment, you will be part of a group consisting of 3 people (yourself and 2 others). All three members of
100 the group will receive an endowment of 60 NOK each. Your task is to decide how you want to allocate the money. You shall
101 choose how many NOK you want to keep, and how much you want to contribute to an account which belongs to your group.

102 Your compensation for participating in the experiment, depends on how much of the endowment you choose to keep, how
103 much you contribute to the group account, and how much the others in you group contribute to the group account. When all
104 members of your group have decided how they wish to contribute to the group account, the total amount contributed to your
105 group's account will be doubled and then divided equally between the three of you. For each NOK you keep, you (and only
106 you) will earn 1 NOK. For each NOK you contribute to the group account, you and all the others in your group will earn $2/3$
107 NOK. The same applies for the others in your group.

108 *Examples*

109 If for instance you contribute all your 60 NOK to the group account and the others in your group keep all for themselves, you
110 will be paid 40 NOK ($2/3 \times$ the 60 NOK you contributed to the group account =40), while the two others will be paid 100
111 NOK each (the 60 NOK they kept + $2/3 \times$ the 60 NOK you contributed to the group account). If all three group members
112 contribute the entire endowment to the group account, each group member will be paid 120 NOK each ($2/3 \times 3 \times 60 =120$
113 NOK). If all three group members contribute 30 NOK, each group member will be paid 90 kroner each (the 30 NOK kept, plus
114 $2/3 \times 3 \times 30$ NOK = 60 NOK to each from the group account). If all three contribute zero to the group account, all three are
115 paid the initial endowment of 60 kroner.

116 Notice that what happens in your group does not influence participants in other groups. Likewise, the decisions of participants
117 in other groups than your own, does not influence you.

118 It is important for the results of the experiment that there are no misunderstandings of the instructions. To ensure that the
119 instructions are clear, we ask you to fill in the question sheet on the desk in front of you. This is not a test of your knowledge,
120 but insurance for us that we have given you clear instructions. You now will get a couple of minutes to read through the
121 instructions and answer the questions on the sheet. Raise your hand when you are finished, or if you have any questions.

122 **Instructions Part 2.** The experiment will now continue. Your decisions in part 2 will not influence what happens or the payment
123 you can receive in part 3.

124 Part 2 of the experiment is quite similar to part 1. In difference from part 1, there now are two different types of groups; X
125 and Z. Before you decide how much to contribute to the group account, you first will choose the type of group you prefer being
126 a member of: X or Z.

127 When all participants you have chosen their preferred group type, the computer randomly will create groups of 3 according
128 to preferred group type. If the number of participants preferring one type is not dividable by three, there will be one mixed
129 group. The type of the mixed group will be decided by the majority wish of the mixed group. All participants in all groups
130 will be informed about what kind of group they are member of, and whether it is a homogenous or a mixed group.

131 Part 2 consists of 10 periods. Your actual payment from part 2 will consist of your average payoff across these 10 periods.

132 The group composition will be the same in all periods, and your group will NOT consist of the same individuals as in part 1
133 of the experiment. In each period each participant will receive an endowment of 60 NOK. Just as in part 1, your task is to
134 decide how many NOK to keep, and how many NOK to contribute to the group account. After each period, you will receive
135 feedback concerning how many units you yourself contributed to the group account, how many units the other two in your
136 group on average contributed to the group account, and your calculated payoff from that period. Just like before, the total
137 amount in the group account will be doubled, and then divided equally between the three group members. Your actual payoff
138 from part 2 will be the average of your calculated payoffs from the 10 periods of part 2.

139 *What is the difference between the group types?*

140 Group type X: Those organizing the experiment have inserted an extra amount of money into the group account in advance,
141 such that each participant in every X-group will receive an extra payoff of 50 NOK per period Group type Z: Here there is
142 no extra payoff to the participants. Instead, those that organize the experiment in each period for each participant in each
143

144 Z-group will reserve 50 kroner to Norwegian Red Cross. Just as your payoff is the average of your calculated payoff over the 10
145 periods, the actual payment to the Red Cross will be equal to the average of the reserved for the Red Cross over the 10 periods.

146 Again we ask you to fill in a sheet of questions. The sheet will be handed out, and you will get some minutes to read through
147 the instructions on your own, and answer the questions. Raise your hand when you are finished, or if you have any questions.

148 **Instructions Part 3.** In this last part of the experiment there are 20 periods. This time you will be able to choose group type
149 between every period. In each period you will be part of a new group. Otherwise the rules are as they were in part 2.

150 After every period you will receive feedback about you calculated payoff from the previous period, and how many units were
151 contributed to the group account on average in your group. You also will be told how many units on average was contributed
152 to the group account in one X- and one Z-group, and the average calculated payoff for the members of these two groups. The
153 rules for payoff are as before: Contributions from group members are doubled and then divided equally between the group
154 members. In X-groups each member in addition will receive a calculated payoff of 50 kroner each in each period. In Z-groups
155 50 kroner for each member in each period is reserved for the Red Cross. From part 3 your actual payoff is equal to the average
156 of your calculated payoff in the 20 periods. The Norwegian Red Cross will receive an amount equal to the average of what is
157 reserved over the 20 periods.

158 **Instructions Study 2.** Welcome to this experiment in economics. The results from this experiment will be used in a research
159 project. Therefore, it is important that you follow certain rules. It is important that you do not talk or in other ways
160 communicate with any of the other participants during the experiment. Please lay aside your mobile phone, and turn it off or
161 turn off the sound. Please use only pre-opened software on the computer.

162 In the experiment, there will be full anonymity, which means that no other participants in this room will know which
163 decisions you in particular make during the experiment. In addition, it is not possible to track the decisions made during
164 the experiments back to individuals. You will be notified when the experiment starts, and when you can start entering your
165 answers on the computer in front of you. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand, and an
166 experimenter will come to you and answer your question in private.

167 You will receive money in compensation for participating in this experiment. How much money you receive will depend on
168 the decisions you make during the experiment. After the experiment is over, you will be informed about your total payment.
169 The person who organizes the practical payments will not now the details of the experiment and can therefore not know which
170 decisions you have made.

171 During the experiment you will several times see a button with “OK” or “Continue”. Remember to click on this when you
172 are ready to continue to the next screen. If you forget, the other participants will have to wait for you.

173 **Instructions Part 1.** This experiment consists of four parts. Your choices in part 1 will not influence what happens, or what
174 payment you can receive from part 2, 3 or 4.

175 In part 1 of the experiment, you will be part of a group consisting of 3 people (yourself and 2 others). All three members of
176 the group will receive an endowment of 60 NOK each. Your task is to decide how you want to allocate the money. You shall
177 choose how many NOK you want to keep, and how much you want to contribute to an account which belongs to your group.

178 Your compensation for participating in the experiment, depends on how much of the endowment you choose to keep, how
179 much you contribute to the group account, and how much the others in you group contribute to the group account. When all
180 members of your group have decided how they wish to contribute to the group account, the total amount contributed to your
181 group’s account will be doubled and then divided equally between the three of you. For each NOK you keep, you (and only
182 you) will earn 1 NOK. For each NOK you contribute to the group account, you and all the others in your group will earn 2/3
183 NOK. The same applies for the others in your group.

184 *Examples*

186 If for instance you contribute all your 60 NOK to the group account and the others in your group keep all for themselves, you
187 will be paid 40 NOK ($2/3 \times$ the 60 NOK you contributed to the group account =40), while the two others will be paid 100
188 NOK each (the 60 NOK they kept + $2/3 \times$ the 60 NOK you contributed to the group account). If all three group members
189 contribute the entire endowment to the group account, each group member will be paid 120 NOK each ($2/3 \times 3 \times 60 =120$
190 NOK). If all three group members contribute 30 NOK, each group member will be paid 90 kroner each (the 30 NOK kept, plus
191 $2/3 \times 3 \times 30$ NOK = 60 NOK to each from the group account). If all three contribute zero to the group account, all three are
192 paid the initial endowment of 60 kroner.

193 Notice that what happens in your group does not influence participants in other groups. Likewise, the decisions of participants
194 in other groups than your own, does not influence you.

195 It is important for the results of the experiment that there are no misunderstandings of the instructions. To ensure that the
196 instructions are clear, we ask you to fill in the question sheet on the desk in front of you. This is not a test of your knowledge,
197 but insurance for us that we have given you clear instructions. You now will get a couple of minutes to read through the
198 instructions and answer the questions on the sheet. Raise your hand when you are finished, or if you have any questions. When
199 everyone is finished answering the questions and have clicked the “Continue”-button, the experiment will start.

200 **Instructions Part 2.** The experiment will now continue. Your decisions in part 2 will not influence what happens or the payment
201 you can receive in part 3 or 4.

202 Part 2 of the experiment is quite similar to part 1. As before, you will be part of a group of 3 people (yourself and two
 203 others). All will receive an endowment of 60 NOK each. Your task is to decide how you want to allocate the money. You will
 204 decide how many NOK you want to keep, and how much you want to contribute to an account which belongs to your group.
 205 Also now, the total amount given to your group's account will be doubled and shared equally among the three group members,
 206 just like in Part 1. For each NOK you keep, you (and only you) will earn 1 NOK. For each NOK you contribute to the group
 207 account, you and the others in your group will earn 2/3 NOK each. The same applies to the others in your group.

208 This time you however will get to different questions about how much you want to contribute to the group account. We will
 209 call these “question A” and “question B”. Only one of your answers will apply. When all have answered both question A and
 210 B, the computer will perform a random draw which decided which of your answers will apply. In each group the answer to
 211 question A will apply for two people, while the answer to question B will apply for the third person.

212 Question A will be exactly as the question you got in part 1: “How many NOK will you contribute to the group account?”

213 In question B, you will get the possibility to let your contribution to the group account depend on what the other two in
 214 your group do. More precisely: If you wish, you can now vary your contribution depending on the average contribution of the
 215 other two.

216 To answer question B, you must fill in thirteen numbers in a table. To the left in the table, thirteen different amounts are
 217 given. The amounts are all the possible average contributions from the other two in your group, if we round to the nearest 5
 218 NOK.

219 In the table you shall fill in how many NOK you want to contribute to the group account, for each of the possible average
 220 contributions from the other two in your group (rounded to five NOKs). The contribution table looks like this:

The screenshot shows a web interface titled "Spørsmål B". At the top, it says "DEL 2" and "Gjenstående tid (i sek.): 175". The main content area has two columns of text:

- Left column: "Deres gjennomsnittlig bidrag fra de to andre i min gruppe, avrundet til nærmeste femtoms, er som følger (nr):" followed by a list of numbers from 0 to 60 in increments of 5.
- Right column: "Da ønsker jeg selv å bidra med så mange kroner til gruppekontoen:" followed by a vertical list of 13 empty input boxes.

At the bottom right of the input boxes is a red "OK" button. At the bottom left, there is a small "Hjelp" link and a note: "Hjelp: Tabellen skal du fylle ut med mange kroner du ønsker å bidra med til gruppekontoen, for hvert av de mulige gjennomsnittsbidragene fra de to andre i din gruppe (avrundet til hele femtoms). Dataprogrammet vil velge tilfeldig om spørsmål A eller B skal gjelde for deg. Trykk OK når du har fyllt ut alle boksene."

221
 222 You are supposed to write in every box how many NOK you give to the group account if the average contribution from the
 223 other two group members (rounded) is equal to the number to the left. You must write one answer for every line in the table.
 224 You can write any integer you like between 0 and 60.

225 Your payment from part 2 of the experiment is calculated from the contributions of all three group members, in the same
 226 way as in part 1. But what counts as the contribution from each member is decided by the computer's random draw of which
 227 question applies for each person.

228 If question A is drawn to apply for you, your answer to question A will be used to calculate your actual payment from Part
 229 2.

230 If question B is drawn to apply for you, your answers in question B will be used to calculate your actual payment from Part
 231 2. Your contribution is then calculated like this: We take the average of what the other two have answered to question A, and
 232 round this to the nearest 5 NOK. Your contribution is the amount you have given to question B that you want to contribute if
 233 the average contribution from the other two is precisely that amount.

234 To be sure that the instructions are clear enough, we ask you again to answer some questions which will appear on the
 235 screen. You will get a couple of minutes to read through the instructions on your own now, and to answer the questions. Please
 236 raise your hand if you have any questions. When all have completed the questions, and have clicked the “Continue”-button,
 237 the experiment will continue.

238 **Instructions Part 3.** The experiment will now continue. Your choices in Part 3 will not influence what payment it is possible to
 239 get in Part 4.

240 Part 3 is quite similar to Part 2. In difference, there now are two different types of groups; X and Z. Before you decide how
 241 much to contribute to the group account, you first will choose the type of group you prefer being a member of: X or Z.

242 When all participants have chosen their preferred group type, the computer randomly will create groups of 3 according to
 243 preferred group type. If the number of participants preferring one type is not dividable by three, there will be one mixed group.

244 The type of the mixed group will be decided by the majority wish of the mixed group. All participants in all groups will be
245 informed about what kind of group they are member of, and whether it is a homogenous or a mixed group.

246 Part 3 consists of 10 periods. Your actual payment from part 2 will consist of your average payoff across these 10 periods.
247 You will choose group type only once, before the 10 periods start. The group composition will be the same in all periods, and
248 your group will NOT consist of the same individuals as in Part 1 or 2 of the experiment.

249 *What is the difference between the group types?*

250 Group type X: Those organizing the experiment have inserted an extra amount of money into the group account in advance,
251 such that each participant in every X-group will receive an extra payoff of 50 NOK per period.

252 Group type Z: Here there is no extra payoff to the participants. Instead, those that organize the experiment in each period
253 for each participant in each Z-group will reserve 50 kroner to Norwegian Red Cross. Just as your payoff is the average of your
254 calculated payoff over the 10 periods, the actual payment to the Red Cross will be equal to the average of the reserved for the
255 Red Cross over the 10 periods.

256 In each period, all will receive an endowment of 60 NOK each. Your task is, as before, to decide how to allocate the money.
257 Your task is to decide you many NOK to keep, and how much you will contribute to an account which belongs to your group.
258 Also now, the total amount given to your group's account will be doubled and divided equally between you three, just as in
259 Part 1 and 2. For each NOK you keep, you (and only you) will earn 1 NOK. For each NOK you contribute to the group
260 account, you and all the others in your group will earn 2/3 NOK each. The same applies to the others in your group.

261 In each period, you will get two different questions about how much you want to contribute to the group account, "question
262 A" and "question B". Just one of your answers will apply. After all have answered both question A and question B, the
263 computer will draw randomly which of your answer will apply to you in that period. In each group the answer to question A
264 will apply to two people, while the answer to question B will apply to the third person.

265 Question A will sound just like question A in Part 2: "How many NOK will you contribute to the group account?"

266 Question B will sound just as question B in Part 2. Here you will get the possibility to let your contribution to the group
267 account depend on the average of the contributions from the other two.

268 Your payment from part 3 will be calculated from contributions of all the group members, just as in Part 2. The computer's
269 random draw decides which answer will apply for each person. There will be a new random draw for every period.

270 If question A is drawn to apply for you, your answer to question A will be used to calculate the actual payment from this
271 period.

272 If question B is drawn to apply for you, your answers to question B will be used to calculate the actual payment from
273 this period. Your contribution will then be calculated like this: We take the average of what the other two have answered in
274 question A in that period, and round this average to the nearest five NOK. Your contribution is the amount you yourself gave
275 in question B that you want to contribute if the average contribution from the others is precisely so high.

276 Just as before, the amount given to your group will be doubled, and then divided equally between the three group members.
277 Your actual payment from Part 3 will be the average of your calculated payment over the 10 periods in Part 3.

278 Again we ask you to answer some questions which will appear on the screen. You will get some minutes to read through the
279 instructions on your own, and answer the questions. Raise your hand when you are finished, or if you have any questions.
280 When all have completed the questions and clicked the "Continue"-button, the experiment will continue.

281 **Instructions Part 4.** In this last part of the experiment there are 5 periods. This time you will be able to choose group type
282 between every period. In each period you will be part of a new group, and you are free to choose group type between each
283 period. Otherwise the rules are as they were in part 2.

284 Also in this part you will receive two different questions in each period, "question A" and "question B", about how much
285 you want to contribute to the group account.

286 Question A is precisely as before: "How many NOK will you contribute to the group account?" Question B is also precisely
287 as before: In the table you fill out how many NOK you want to contribute to the group account, for each of the possible
288 average contributions from the other two in your group (rounded to five NOKs).

289 The rules for payment are as before: Contributions from the group members are doubles and shared equally between the
290 group members. In X-groups each participant will in addition receive a payment of 50 NOK per period. In Z-groups 50 NOK
291 per period is set aside for each member to the Norwegian Red Cross. From part 4, your actual payment is equal to the average
292 of your calculated payoff in the 5 periods. The Norwegian Red Cross will get an amount equivalent to the average of what has
293 been set aside through the 5 periods.

294 The computer will perform a random draw that will decide whether question A or B will apply for you. As before question
295 A will apply for two members of each group, while question B will apply for one member of every group.

296 After every period you will be told whether question A or B applied to you in this period, how many NOK you yourself
297 gave to the group account, how large your calculated payment is from this period, how many NOK and how many units were
298 set aside to the Red Cross from you in this period, how many NOK was contributed to the group account on average in your
299 group, and the average payment in your group in this period. You also will be told how many units on average was contributed
300 to the group account in one X- and one Z-group, and the average calculated payoff for the members of these two groups.

301 **Instructions Study 3.**

303 **Instructions Part 1.** *Identical to the instructions in Study 2, Part 1.*

304 **Instructions Part 2.** *Identical to the instructions in Study 2, Part 2.*

305 **Instructions Part 3.** The experiment will now continue. Your choices in Part 3 will not influence what payment it is possible to
306 get in Part 4.

307 Part 3 is quite similar to Part 1. In difference, there now are two different types of groups; X and Z. Before you decide how
308 much to contribute to the group account, you first will choose the type of group you prefer being a member of: X or Z.

309 When all participants have chosen their preferred group type, the computer randomly will create groups of 3 according to
310 preferred group type. If the number of participants preferring one type is not dividable by three, there will be one mixed group.
311 The type of the mixed group will be decided by the majority wish of the mixed group. All participants in all groups will be
312 informed about what kind of group they are member of, and whether it is a homogenous or a mixed group.

313 Part 3 consists of 10 periods. Your actual payment from part 2 will consist of your average payoff across these 10 periods.
314 You will choose group type only once, before the 10 periods start. The group composition will be the same in all periods, and
315 your group will NOT consist of the same individuals as in Part 1 or 2 of the experiment.

316 In each period, all will receive an endowment of 60 NOK each. Your task is, as before, to decide how to allocate the money.
317 Your task is to decide you many NOK to keep, and how much you will contribute to an account which belongs to your group.
318 Also now, the total amount given to your group's account will be doubled and divided equally between you three, just as in
319 Part 1 (and identical to question A in Part 2).

320 After every period you will be told how many NOK you yourself gave to the group account, how many NOK was contributed
321 to the group account on average in your group and how large your calculated payment is from this period. Just as before the x
322 in your group account will be doubled, and then divided equally between the three group members. Your actual payment from
323 Part 3 will be as the average of your calculated payoff over the 10 periods in Part 3.

324 What is the difference between the group types? Group type X: Those organizing the experiment have inserted an extra
325 amount of money into the group account in advance, such that each participant in every X-group will receive an extra payoff of
326 50 NOK per period.

327 Group type Z: Here there is no extra payoff to the participants. Instead, those that organize the experiment in each period
328 for each participant in each Z-group will reserve 50 kroner to Norwegian Red Cross. Just as your payoff is the average of your
329 calculated payoff over the 10 periods, the actual payment to the Red Cross will be equal to the average of the reserved for the
330 Red Cross over the 10 periods.

331 To be sure the instructions are clear, we again ask you to answer some questions which will appear on the screen. You
332 will get some minutes to read through the instructions on your own, and answer the questions. Raise your hand when you
333 are finished, or if you have any questions. When all have completed the questions and clicked the "Continue"-button, the
334 experiment will continue.

335 **Instructions Part 4.** *Identical to instructions in Study 2, Part 2.*

336 **Instructions Study 4.**


337 **Instructions Part 1.** *Identical to the instructions in Study 2, Part 1.*

338 **Instructions Part 2.** *Identical to the instructions in Study 2, Part 2.*


339 **Instructions Part 3.** *Identical to the instructions in Study 3, Part 3.*

340 **Instructions Part 4.** *Identical to the instructions in Study 1, Part 4.*


Study 2 Screen 1




Study 2 Screen 2




Study 2 Screen 3




Study 2 Screen 4



Study 2 Screen 5




Study 2 Screen 6




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
Study 2 Screen 7




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
Study 2 Screen 9




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
Study 2 Screen 11




Study 2 Screen 12




Study 2 Screen 13




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
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
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
Study 2 Screen 17




Study 2 Screen 18



Study 2 Screen 19




Study 2 Screen 20




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
Study 3 Screen 1




Study 3 Screen 2



Study 3 Screen 3




Study 3 Screen 4



Study 3 Screen 5




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


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
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
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
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Study 3 Screen 10




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
Study 3 Screen 12



Study 3 Screen 13




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


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
Study 3 Screen 15



Study 3 Screen 16



Study 3 Screen 17



Study 3 Screen 18

