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Supplementary Information for

Veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good

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Detailed Description of Samples and Additional Results

Study 1

Sample. We recruited 402 participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in exchange for $2.00 per participant. All participants were U.S. residents. All exclusion criteria were determined *a priori*. We excluded 9 participants with duplicate MTurk IDs, 1 participant who didn't pass the attention check at the beginning of the study, and 128 participants who didn't pass the comprehension checks. These exclusions left a sample of 264 participants (146 male, 118 female; M_{age} = 35.10, SD_{age} = 10.79).

Analyses and Results. Consistent with our predictions, we found that participants in the VOI condition gave more utilitarian responses to the standard footbridge dilemma, as compared to those in the control condition. We estimated the effect of condition on utilitarian judgment (dichotomous response of yes vs. no) using logistic regression. The percentage of participants who made the utilitarian judgment was 37.84% in the VOI condition (*95% CI:* 29.32%, 47.18%) versus 24.18% in the control condition (*95% CI:* 18.05%, 31.59%), which constitutes a 90.83% increase in the odds of making the utilitarian judgment in the VOI condition compared to the control condition, *95% CI:* (12.15%, 226.40%), p = .018. (See Fig. 1A.) Likewise, participants rated the utilitarian response as more morally acceptable in the VOI condition (M = 3.32, SD = 2.05) as compared to the control condition (M = 2.70, SD = 1.65), β = .63, *95% CI:* (.18, 1.07), $t(262) = 2.74$, p = .007. (See Fig. 2A.)

As expected, participants in the VOI condition tended to give utilitarian responses to the VOI version of the footbridge dilemma: 63.96% preferred that the decision-maker push (*95% CI:* 54.79%, 72.50%), and participants tended to rate the utilitarian response as morally acceptable

(M = 4.46, SD = 2.33).

Study 2

Sample. We recruited 1,506 participants from MTurk in exchange for $2.00 per participant. All participants were U.S. residents. All exclusion criteria were determined *a priori*. We excluded 18 participants with duplicate MTurk IDs, 6 participants who did not pass the attention check, and 588 participants who did not pass the comprehension checks. The exclusions left a sample of 894 participants (420 male, 474 female; M_{age} = 35.44, SD_{age} = 11.01).

Analyses and Results. Consistent with our predictions, we found that participants who responded to the VOI dilemmas before responding to the standard dilemmas gave more utilitarian responses to the standard dilemmas, as compared to those who only responded to the standard dilemmas. We estimated the effect of condition on utilitarian judgment using logistic regression.

For the hospital dilemma, the percentage of participants who made the utilitarian judgment was 53.89% in the VOI condition (*95% CI:* 48.62%, 59.07%) versus 42.60% in the control condition (*95% CI:* 38.51%, 46.78%), which constitutes a 57.51% increase in the odds of making the utilitarian judgment in the VOI condition compared to the control condition, *95% CI:* (20.22%, 106.62%), p = .001. (See Fig. 1B.) For the scale measure, we detected an interaction between condition and order, and we therefore first report on the two orders separately. Among participants who saw the AV case first, participants in the VOI condition reported taking the patient off oxygen as more morally acceptable (M = 4.27, SD = 1.86) compared to participants in the control condition (M = 3.23, SD = 1.74), β = 1.05, *95% CI:* (.71, 1.39), $t(890) = 6.03$, $p <$ .001. Among participants who saw the hospital case first, participants in the VOI condition also

reported taking the patient off oxygen as more morally acceptable (M = 3.94, SD = 1.93) compared to participants in the control condition (M = 3.59, SD = 1.75), β = .35, *95% CI:* (.002, .699), $t(890) = 1.97$, $p = .049$. Second, we present the results combined across order: Participants in the VOI condition reported taking the patient off oxygen as more morally acceptable (M = 4.11, SD = 1.90) compared to participants in the control condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.75), β = .71, *95% CI:* (.47, .95), $t(892) = 5.71$, $p < .001$. (See Fig. 2B for presentation of combined results.)

For the AV dilemma, the percentage of participants who made the utilitarian judgment was 83.00% in the VOI condition (*95% CI:* 78.67%, 86.59%) versus 58.32% in the control condition (*95% CI:* 54.14%, 62.38%), which constitutes a 248.89% increase in the odds of making the utilitarian judgment in the VOI condition compared to the control condition, *95% CI:* (152.85%, 387.33%), $p < .001$. (See Fig. 1C.) For the scale measure, we detected an interaction between condition and order, and we therefore first report on the two orders separately. Among participants who saw the AV case first, participants in the VOI condition reported swerving as more morally acceptable (M = 5.39, SD = 1.64) compared to participants in the control condition (M = 4.05, SD = 1.83), β = 1.34, *95% CI:* (1.00, 1.68), $t(890) = 7.77$, $p < .001$. For participants who saw the hospital case first, participants in the VOI condition also reported swerving as more morally acceptable (M = 5.12, SD = 1.83) compared to participants in the control condition (M = 4.29, SD = 1.83), β = .83, *95% CI:* (.48, 1.18), $t(890) = 4.70$, $p < .001$. Second, we present the results combined across order: Participants in the VOI condition reported swerving as more morally acceptable (M = 5.25, SD = 1.74) compared to participants in the control condition (M = 4.16, SD = 1.83), β = 1.09, *95% CI:* (.85, 1.33), $t(892) = 8.86$, $p < .001$. (See Fig. 2C for presentation of combined results.)

As expected, participants tended to give utilitarian responses to the VOI versions of the dilemmas. For the VOI version of the AV case, 87.23% preferred to be in a state in which the AV is required to swerve to save more lives (*95% CI:* 83.55%, 90.54%), and participants tended to rate this policy requiring swerving as morally acceptable ($M = 5.47$, $SD = 1.63$). Likewise, for the VOI version of the hospital case, 79.83% preferred that the ethics committee use the oxygen for the nine surgeries rather than the single patient (*95% CI:* 75.39%, 83.82%), and participants tended to rate this decision as morally acceptable ($M = 4.77$, $SD = 1.86$).

Study 3

Sample. We recruited 1,409 participants from MTurk, in exchange for $1.00 per participant. All participants were U.S. residents. As in the previous studies, all exclusion criteria were determined *a priori*. We excluded 16 participants with duplicate MTurk IDs, 4 participants who didn't pass the attention check, and 556 participants who didn't pass the comprehension checks. This left a sample of 833 participants (378 male, 455 female; $M_{age} = 35.82$; $SD_{age} = 13.92$).

Analyses and Results. Consistent with our predictions, we found that participants who responded to the VOI charity dilemma before responding to the standard charity dilemma gave more utilitarian responses to the standard charity dilemma, as compared to those who only responded to the standard charity dilemma. Because we detected an effect of order of the charities shown, we estimated the effect of condition in a logistic regression that controls for order. The percentage of participants who made the utilitarian judgment was 62.78% in the VOI condition (*95% CI:* 57.24%, 68.00%), versus 53.87% in the control condition (*95% CI:* 49.55%, 58.12%). Testing for a difference between conditions, there was a 44.46% increase in the odds of

making the utilitarian choice in the VOI condition compared to the control condition, *95% CI:* (8.36%, 93.08%), $p = .013$. (See Fig. 1D.) Thus, we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning increases the likelihood of donating to the more effective charity.

As expected, participants in the VOI condition tended to give utilitarian responses to the VOI version of the charity dilemma, with 80.39% preferring that the decision-maker donate to the charity that would fund the cataract surgeries in India (*95% CI:* 75.73%, 84.54%).

Study 4

Sample. In Study 4, the sample size was determined *a priori* based on a power analysis for a logistic regression capable of detecting an effect size of odds ratio = 1.7 (estimated from Study 2), at power = .90 and using a two-tailed test. According to the power analysis, the targeted final sample size was 1,398. We also took into account an exclusion rate of approximately 33% of the recruitment sample size, determined by exclusion rates in Studies 1-3. Therefore, we aimed to recruit 2,097 participants in order to reach the targeted final sample size of 1,398.

We recruited 2,117 participants from MTurk. Participants completed the study in exchange for $2.00. All participants were U.S. residents. As in the previous studies, all exclusion criteria were determined *a priori*. We excluded 32 participants with duplicate MTurk IDs, 11 participants who did not pass the attention check, and 500 participants who did not pass the comprehension checks. This left a final sample size of 1,574 (676 male, 898 female; M_{age} = 35.31, SD_{age} = 11.24).

Analyses and Results. Consistent with our predictions, we found that participants in the VOI condition gave more utilitarian responses to the standard AV dilemma, as compared to

those who only responded to the standard AV dilemma, and compared to those who responded to the sculpture dilemma prior to the standard AV dilemma. We estimated the effect of condition on utilitarian judgment using logistic regression. The percentage of participants who made the utilitarian judgment was 74.70% in the VOI condition (*95% CI:* 70.32%, 78.63%), versus 50.43% in the simple control condition (*95% CI:* 46.37%, 54.48%), and versus 55.40% in the anchoring control condition (*95% CI:* 51.31%, 59.42%). This constitutes a 190.24% increase in the odds, compared to the simple control condition (*95% CI:* [121.26%, 283.71%], $p < .001$), and a 137.71% increase in the odds compared to the anchoring control condition (*95% CI:* [80.97%, 213.75%], $p < .001$). (See Fig. 1E.) Likewise, participants rated the utilitarian policy as more morally acceptable in the VOI condition ($M = 4.91$, $SD = 1.71$), as compared to those in the simple control condition ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 1.86$; $\beta = 1.09$, *95% CI:* [.87, 1.32], $t(1571) = 9.65$, $p < .001$), and as compared to those in the anchoring control condition ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.72$; $\beta = .81$, *95% CI:* [.59, 1.03], $t(1571) = 7.13$, $p < .001$). (See Fig. 2D.)

As expected, participants in the VOI condition tended to give utilitarian responses to the VOI version of the AV dilemma, with 84.45% preferring the utilitarian policy (*95% CI:* 80.70%, 87.65%). Also as expected, participants in the anchoring control condition tended to give utilitarian responses to the sculpture dilemma: 98.61% preferred that the decision-maker push the sculpture (*95% CI:* 97.24%, 99.30%). Testing between the VOI condition and anchoring control condition, participants were more likely to make the utilitarian judgment in the sculpture dilemma than in the VOI version of the AV dilemma (1199.08% increase in the odds, *95% CI:* [553.43%, 2864.81%], $p < .001$). Participants were also more likely to rate the utilitarian response in the sculpture dilemma as more morally acceptable ($M = 6.67$, $SD = .78$), compared to the VOI version of the AV dilemma ($M = 5.37$, $SD = 1.58$; $\beta = 1.30$, *95% CI:* [1.15, 1.45], $t(991)$

= 17.04, $p < .001$). Because the sculpture dilemma elicited an even higher utilitarian response than the VOI version of the AV dilemma, this served as a conservative test of the anchoring/generic consistency explanation for our primary results.

Study 5

Sample. In Study 5, the sample size was determined *a priori* by a power analysis as in Study 4, but adjusted for two conditions. According to the power analysis, the targeted final sample size was 932. We also took into account an exclusion rate of approximately 33% of the recruitment sample size, determined by exclusion rates in Studies 1-4. Therefore, we aimed to recruit 1,398 participants in order to reach the targeted final sample size of 932.

We recruited 1,400 participants from MTurk. Participants completed the study in exchange for $2.00. All participants were U.S. residents. As in the previous studies, all exclusion criteria were determined *a priori*. We excluded 31 participants with duplicate MTurk IDs, 35 participants who did not pass the attention check, and 599 participants who did not pass the comprehension checks. This left a final sample size of 735 (354 male, 381 female; M_{age} = 34.58, SD_{age} = 11.33).

Analyses and Results. Consistent with our predictions, we found that participants who responded to the VOI AV dilemma before responding to the standard AV dilemma gave more utilitarian responses to the standard AV dilemma, as compared to those who responded to the reversed-VOI AV dilemma before responding to the standard AV dilemma. We estimated the effect of condition on utilitarian judgment using logistic regression. The percentage of participants who made the utilitarian judgment was 73.43% in the VOI condition (*95% CI:* 68.88%, 77.54%), versus 63.99% in the reversed-VOI control condition (*95% CI:* 58.71%,

68.95%), which constitutes a 55.56% (*95% CI:* 13.64%, 113.29%) increase in the odds, $p = .006$. (See Fig. 1F.) Likewise, participants rated the utilitarian policy as more morally acceptable in the VOI condition ($M = 4.89$, $SD = 1.77$), as compared to those in the reversed-VOI control condition ($M = 4.49$, $SD = 1.80$, $\beta = .40$, *95% CI:* (.14, .66), $t(733) = 3.03$, $p = .003$). (See Fig. 2E.)

As expected, far more participants tended to give utilitarian responses to the VOI AV dilemma, with 91.48% (*95% CI*: 88.31%, 93.85%) preferring the utilitarian policy requiring swerving, compared to 48.81% (*95% CI:* 43.50%, 54.15%) favoring the utilitarian policy in the reversed-VOI AV dilemma (1025.90% increase in the odds, *95% CI:* [654.83%, 1622.16%], $p < .001$). Likewise, participants tended to rate the utilitarian policy as more morally acceptable in the VOI AV dilemma ($M = 5.60$, $SD = 1.40$), compared to in the reversed-VOI AV dilemma ($M = 4.44$, $SD = 1.91$; $\beta = 1.15$, *95% CI:* [.91, 1.39], $t(733) = 9.39$, $p < .001$).

In Study 5, participants who engaged in standard veil-of-ignorance reasoning, reflecting a principle of impartiality, were more likely to make subsequent utilitarian judgments, compared to those who engaged in a modified form of veil-of-ignorance reasoning bearing no special relation to impartiality. Critically, both conditions involved numerical/probabilistic reasoning and a limited kind of perspective-taking, indicating that these factors, among others, cannot explain the observed effect of the VOI exercise on subsequent moral judgment.

Study 6

Sample. Sample size was determined *a priori* by a (two-tailed) power analysis for a logistic regression to detect an estimated effect size of odds ratio = 1.9, with 24% probability in the control condition, at power = .90. We estimated to detect an effect size of odds ratio=1.9

since this study design was similar to the design of Study 1, where we found an effect size of odds ratio=1.9. We assumed a 24% probability in the control condition due to the 24.18% probability of a utilitarian response to the footbridge case from the simple control condition in Study 1. According to the power analysis, the targeted final sample size was 492 (or 246 per condition). We took into account an exclusion rate of approximately 34% of the recruitment sample size, determined by the exclusion rate of Study 1, which was similar in study design. Therefore, we aimed to recruit 749 participants in order to reach the targeted final sample size of 492.

We recruited 744 participants from MTurk. Participants completed the study in exchange for $2.00. All participants were U.S. residents. We excluded 8 participants with duplicate MTurk IDs, 3 participants who did not pass the first attention check, 16 participants who did not pass the second attention check, and 146 participants who did not pass at least one comprehension check. This left a final sample size of 571 (241 male, 324 female, 3 non-binary, 3 preferred not to answer; M_{age} = 34.15, SD_{age} = 10.97).

Analyses and Results. Consistent with our predictions, we found that participants who responded to the VOI footbridge dilemma before responding to the standard footbridge dilemma gave more utilitarian responses to the standard footbridge dilemma, as compared to those who responded to the utilitarian dilemma before responding to the standard footbridge dilemma. We estimated the effect of condition on utilitarian judgment using a logistic regression. The percentage of participants who made the utilitarian judgment in the standard footbridge dilemma was 36.74% in the VOI condition (*95% CI:* 31.11%, 42.73%), versus 20.52% in the utilitarian-perspective control condition (*95% CI:* 16.37%, 25.41%), which constitutes a 124.96% (*95% CI:* 55.27%, 227.85%) increase in the odds, $p < .001$. (See Fig. 1G.) Likewise, participants rated

pushing in the standard footbridge dilemma as more morally acceptable in the VOI condition (M = 3.33, SD = 1.86), as compared to those in the utilitarian-perspective control condition (M = 2.89, SD = 1.83, β = .44, *95% CI:* (.13, .74), $t(569) = 2.83$, $p = .005$). (See Fig. 2F.)

Far more participants tended to give utilitarian responses to the utilitarian dilemma, with 95.11% (*95% CI*: 92.05%, 97.03%) indicating that from a utilitarian perspective they would want the person to push, compared to 68.18% (*95% CI:* 62.32%, 73.52%) favoring pushing in the VOI footbridge dilemma (808.44% increase in the odds, *95% CI:* [423.17%, 1581.40%], $p < .001$). Likewise, participants instructed to adopt a utilitarian perspective tended to rate pushing as more morally acceptable in the utilitarian dilemma (M = 6.55, SD = 1.11), compared to in the VOI footbridge dilemma (M = 4.20, SD = 1.99; β = 2.35, *95% CI:* [2.09, 2.61], $t(569) = 17.76$, $p < .001$).*

* In the preregistration for Study 6 (#27268 on AsPredicted.org), we stated in the last section: "As secondary analyses, we will analyze the responses to the Utilitarian Footbridge case and to the VOI Footbridge case. We predict that participants are more likely to make the utilitarian judgment in the VOI Footbridge case, compared to the Utilitarian Footbridge case." The inclusion of the second sentence was a typo, resulting from a copying error using a preregistration from a prior study. In designing Study 6, our intention was that responses made from a utilitarian perspective in stage 1 of the control condition would be at least as utilitarian as responses made in response to the VOI version of the dilemma (stage 1 of the VOI condition). In the main section of the preregistration for Study 6 we accurately specified our secondary hypothesis about the responses during stage 1 of the control condition: "We predict that participants will tend to give utilitarian responses to the footbridge dilemma when asked to adopt

Thus, participants in the utilitarian-perspective control condition tended to give utilitarian responses to the footbridge dilemma when asked to adopt a utilitarian perspective, but did not tend to give utilitarian responses once they were simply responding to the footbridge dilemma in its standard form. These results provide evidence against the alternative explanation that participants in the VOI condition are simply giving a specific response to a specific dilemma in the first phase, and then giving the same response to the same dilemma in the second phase.

Study 7

Sample. In Study 7, the sample size was determined *a priori* by a power analysis, as in Studies 4-5, capable of detecting an effect size of odds ratio = 1.7. According to the power analysis, the targeted final sample size was 1398. We also took into account an exclusion rate of approximately 33% of the recruitment sample size. Therefore, we aimed to recruit 2,097 participants in order to reach the targeted final sample size of 1,398.

We recruited 2,141 participants from MTurk. Participants completed the study in exchange for $2.00. All participants were U.S. residents. As in the previous studies, all exclusion criteria were determined *a priori*. We excluded 34 participants with duplicate MTurk IDs, 6 participants who did not pass the attention check, and 711 participants who did not pass the comprehension checks. This left a final sample of 1390 (606 male, 784 female; M_{age} = 35.32, SD_{age} = 11.08).

Joe's utilitarian perspective, but we predict that participants will not tend to give utilitarian responses once they are no longer instructed to adopt Joe's perspective and are instead simply responding to the footbridge dilemma in its standard form.")

Analyses and Results. Contrary to our predictions, we found no significant differences in the percentages of participants who gave utilitarian responses to the AV case in the transfer-VOI condition, as compared to the simple control condition, and as compared to the anchoring control condition. We estimated the effect of condition on utilitarian judgment using logistic regression. The percentage of participants who made the utilitarian judgment was 57.38% in the transfer-VOI condition (*95% CI:* 51.70%, 62.88%), as compared to 53.33% in the simple control condition (*95% CI:* 49.38%, 57.25%), and as compared to 54.30% in the anchoring control condition (*95% CI:* 49.80%, 58.72%). This constitutes no detectable difference in the odds compared to the simple control condition (17.82% increase, *95% CI:* [-10.81%, 55.87%], p =.249), or to the anchoring control condition (13.33% increase*, 95% CI:* [-15.31%, 51.86%], p = .401). (See Fig. 1H.)

For the scale measure, we found that participants rated the utilitarian response as more morally acceptable in the transfer-VOI condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.80), as compared to those in the simple control condition (M = 3.94, SD = 1.86), β = .25, *95% CI:* (.003, .507), t(1387) = 1.98, p = .048. However, there were no significant differences in participants' scale responses between the transfer-VOI condition and the anchoring control condition (M = 4.05, SD = 1.78), β = .15, *95% CI:* (-.12, .41), t(1387)= 1.08, p = .280. (See Fig. 2G.)

As expected, participants in the transfer-VOI condition tended to give utilitarian responses in the VOI versions of the dilemmas. 83.89% preferred that the decision-maker donate to the more effective charity (*95% CI:* 79.44%, 87.77%), and participants tended to rate donating to the more effective charity as morally acceptable (M = 5.22, SD = 1.69). In the VOI hospital dilemma, we detected an effect of the presentation order of the dilemmas, and therefore we present the utilitarian responses for each order separately: Among participants who saw the VOI

hospital dilemma first, 72.96% preferred that the ethics committee use the oxygen for the nine surgeries rather than the single patient (*95% CI:* 65.72%, 79.46%), and among participants who saw the VOI hospital dilemma second, 87.77% preferred that the ethics committee use the oxygen for the nine surgeries rather than the single patient (*95% CI:* 82.65%, 92.51%). Participants also tended to rate using the oxygen for the nine surgeries rather than the single patient as morally acceptable ($M = 4.68$, $SD = 1.92$).

Furthermore, as expected, participants tended to give utilitarian responses in the prior dilemmas of the anchoring control condition. For the sculpture dilemma, 97.90% preferred that the decision-maker push the sculpture to save two lives (*95% CI:* 96.35%, 98.94%). Likewise, participants tended to rate pushing the sculpture as morally acceptable (we detected an effect of the presentation order of the dilemmas: for those who saw the sculpture dilemma first, $M = 6.61$, $SD = .82$; for those who saw the sculpture dilemma second, $M = 6.41$, $SD = 1.15$). For the speedboat dilemma, 89.73% preferred that the decision-maker borrow the speedboat to save nine lives (*95% CI:* 86.79%, 92.24%), Likewise, participants tended to rate borrowing the speedboat as morally acceptable (we detected an effect of the presentation order of the dilemmas: for those who saw the speedboat dilemma first, $M = 5.89$, $SD = 1.44$; for those who saw the speedboat dilemma second, $M = 6.15$, $SD = 1.27$).

We also compared participants' responses to the prior dilemmas in the transfer-VOI condition and the anchoring control condition. Since the order of the dilemmas in each condition was counterbalanced, we compared participants' responses to the first dilemma they saw, and responses to the second dilemma they saw. For the first dilemma, participants were more likely to make the utilitarian choice in the anchoring control condition (94.13%, *95% CI:* [91.63%, 95.92%]), compared to in the transfer-VOI condition (76.85%, *95% CI:* [71.72%, 81.29%];

383.17% increase, *95% CI:* [206.09%, 681.63%], $p < .001$). For the second dilemma, participants were also more likely to make the utilitarian choice in the anchoring control condition (93.50%, *95% CI:* [90.91%, 95.39%]), compared to in the VOI condition (86.91%, *95% CI:* [82.59%, 90.29%]; 116.64% increase, *95% CI:* [32.22%, 257.79%], $p < .001$). Likewise, for the first dilemma, participants were more likely to rate the utilitarian choice as more morally acceptable in the anchoring control condition ($M = 6.26$, $SD = 1.22$), compared to in the transfer-VOI condition ($M = 4.86$, $SD = 1.95$, $\beta = 1.40$, *95% CI:* (1.18, 1.63), $t(773) = 12.35$, $p < .001$). For the second dilemma, participants were also more likely to rate the utilitarian choice as more morally acceptable in the anchoring control condition ($M = 6.27$, $SD = 1.22$), compared to in the transfer-VOI condition ($M = 5.04$, $SD = 1.69$, $\beta = 1.24$, *95% CI:* (1.03, 1.44), $t(773) = 11.81$, $p < .001$). Thus, as in Study 4, because the prior dilemmas in the anchoring control condition elicited even more utilitarian responses than the prior dilemmas in the transfer-VOI condition, this served as a conservative test of our hypothesis.

These results suggest an important boundary condition of our hypothesized mechanism and thus of the main effect. Although veil-of-ignorance reasoning about a specific case can influence subsequent responses to the standard version of that same case, we find no strong evidence that people spontaneously transfer the effects of veil-of-ignorance reasoning across cases.

Table S1. Results for Studies 1-3, both including and excluding participants who failed attention and/or comprehension checks. All analyses employ logistic regression. Bracketed values show 95% CI.

	Study 1 Footbridge		**Study 2 Hospital**		**Study 2 AV**		**Study 3 Charity***	
Inclusion criteria	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All
Proportion of participants favoring the utilitarian response in VOI condition	37.84% [29.32%, 47.18%]	44.62% [37.79%, 51.65%]	53.89% [48.62%, 59.07%]	50.07% [46.46%, 53.68%]	83.00% [78.67%, 86.59%]	76.73% [73.54%, 79.65%]	62.78% [57.24%, 68.00%)	65.42% [61.77%, 68.89%]
Proportion of participants favoring the utilitarian response in control condition	24.18% [18.05%, 31.59%]	23.74% [18.32%, 30.16%]	42.60% [38.51%, 46.78%]	39.31% [35.88%, 42.85%]	58.32% [54.14%, 62.38%]	58.30% [54.74%, 61.77%]	53.87% [49.55%, 58.12%]	55.40% [51.70%, 59.05%]
Control condition type	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control
Effect size (odds ratio)	1.91 [1.12, 3.26]	2.59 [1.69, 4.01]	1.58 [1.20, 2.07]	1.55 [1.26, 1.90]	3.49 [2.53, 4.87]	2.36 [1.89, 2.96]	1.44 [1.08, 1.93]	1.52 [1.23, 1.89]
p-value	$p = .018$	$p < .001$	$p = .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p = .013$	$p < .001$
Dependent variable (dichotomous choice)	Standard Footbridge	Standard Footbridge	Standard Hospital	Standard Hospital	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard Charity	Standard Charity
Total sample size	264	393	894	1488	894	1488	833	1393
Sample size in VOI condition	111	195	347	735	347	735	311	689
Sample size in control condition	153	198	547	753	547	753	522	704
Inclusion rate in VOI condition	56.92%		47.21%		47.21%		45.14%	
Inclusion rate in control condition	77.27%		72.64%		72.64%		74.15%	

*Model controls for order of charities shown

Table S2. Results for Studies 4-7, both including and excluding participants who failed attention and/or comprehension checks. All analyses employ logistic regression. Bracketed values show 95% CI.

	Study 4 AV				**Study 5 AV**		**Study 6 Footbridge**		**Study 7 AV**			
Inclusion criteria	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All
Proportion of participants favoring the utilitarian response in VOI condition	74.70% [70.32%, 78.63%]	71.37% [67.87%, 74.62%]	74.70% [70.32%, 78.63%]	71.37% [67.87%, 74.62%]	73.43% [68.88%, 77.54%]	73.20% [69.78%, 76.36%]	36.74% [31.14%, 42.73%]	36.83% [32.08%, 41.85%]	57.38% [51.70%, 62.88%]	58.64% [54.97%, 62.22%]	57.38% [51.70%, 62.88%]	58.64% [54.97%, 62.22%]
Proportion of participants favoring the utilitarian response in control condition	50.43% [46.37%, 54.48%]	49.71% [46.02%, 53.41%]	55.4% [51.31%, 59.42%]	56.38% [52.67%, 60.02%]	63.99% [58.71%, 68.95%]	70.07% [66.51%, 73.41%]	20.52% [16.37%, 25.41%]	21.70% [17.77%, 26.23%]	53.33% [49.38%, 57.25%]	52.33% [48.65%, 56.00%]	54.30% [49.80%, 58.72%]	54.76% [51.03%, 58.43%]
Control condition type	Simple Control	Simple Control	Anch-oring Control	Anch-oring Control	Reversed-VOI Control	Reversed-VOI Control	Util. Persp. Control	Util. Persp. Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Anch-oring Control	Anch-oring Control
Effect size (odds ratio)	2.90 [2.21, 3.83]	2.52 [2.02, 3.15]	2.38 [1.81, 3.14]	1.93 [1.54, 2.41]	1.56 [1.14, 2.13]	1.17 [0.92, 1.48]	2.24 [1.55, 3.28]	2.10 [1.52, 2.92]	1.18 [0.89, 1.56]	1.29 [1.05, 1.59]	1.13 [0.85, 1.52]	1.17 [0.95, 1.45]
p-value	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p = .006$	$p = .200$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p = .249$	$p = .017$	$p = .401$	$p = .143$
Dependent variable (dichotomous choice)	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard Foot-bridge	Standard Foot-bridge	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV

Total sample size	1,574	2085	1,574	2085	735	1369	571	736	1390	2107	1390	2107
Sample size in VOI condition	419	688	419	688	399	694	264	372	298	706	298	706
Sample size in control condition	581	700	574	697	336	675	307	364	615	707	477	694
Inclusion rate in VOI condition	60.90%		60.90%		57.49%		70.97%		42.21%		42.21%	
Inclusion rate in control condition	83.00%		82.35%		49.78%		84.34%		86.99%		68.73%	

Table S3. Results for Studies 1-2, both including and excluding participants who failed attention and/or comprehension checks. All analyses employ linear regression. Bracketed values show 95% CI.

	Study 1 Footbridge		**Study 2 Hospital***		**Study 2 AV***	
Inclusion criteria	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All
Mean rating of moral acceptability of the utilitarian response in VOI condition	3.32 [2.98, 3.67]	3.51 [3.24, 3.77]	4.11 [3.92, 4.30]	3.92 [3.78, 4.06]	5.25 [5.06, 5.44]	5.09 [4.96, 5.23]
Mean rating of moral acceptability of the utilitarian response in control condition	2.70 [2.41, 2.99]	2.70 [2.44, 2.96]	3.40 [3.24, 3.55]	3.34 [3.21, 3.48]	4.16 [4.01, 4.31]	4.19 [4.06, 4.32]
Control condition type	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Simple Control
Effect size ß	.63 [.18, 1.07]	.81 [.44, 1.18]	.71 [.47, .95]	.58 [.39, .77]	1.09 [.85, 1.33]	.90 [.71, 1.09]
p-value	$p = .007$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
Dependent variable (scale response)	Standard Footbridge	Standard Footbridge	Standard Hospital	Standard Hospital	Standard AV	Standard AV
Total sample size	264	393	894	1488	894	1488
Sample size in VOI condition	111	195	347	735	347	735
Sample size in control condition	153	198	547	753	547	753
Inclusion rate in VOI condition	56.92%		47.21%		47.21%	
Inclusion rate in control condition	77.27%		72.64%		72.64%	

* Results from combined model. See Study 2 results in SI Appendix for model showing interaction between condition and order of cases presented.

Table S4. Results for Studies 4-7, both including and excluding participants who failed attention and/or comprehension checks. All analyses employ linear regression. Bracketed values show 95% CI.

	Study 4 AV				**Study 5 AV**		**Study 6 Footbridge**		**Study 7 AV**			
Inclusion criteria	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All	Passed attention & comp. checks	All
Mean rating of moral acceptability of the utilitarian response in VOI condition	4.91 [4.74, 5.08]	4.83 [4.69, 4.96]	4.91 [4.74, 5.08]	4.83 [4.69, 4.96]	4.89 [4.71, 5.06]	4.86 [4.73, 4.99]	3.33 [3.11, 3.55]	3.32 [3.12, 3.51]	4.19 [3.98, 4.40]	4.26 [4.12, 4.39]	4.19 [3.98, 4.40]	4.26 [4.12, 4.39]
Mean rating of moral acceptability of the utilitarian response in control condition	3.82 [3.68, 3.96]	3.80 [3.67, 3.93]	4.10 [3.96, 4.25]	4.14 [4.01, 4.27]	4.49 [4.30, 4.68]	4.70 [4.57, 4.83]	2.89 [2.69, 3.10]	2.95 [2.75, 3.14]	3.94 [3.79, 4.08]	3.90 [3.77, 4.04]	4.05 [3.88, 4.21]	4.11 [3.97, 4.25]
Control condition type	Simple Control	Simple Control	Anch-oring Control	Anch-oring Control	Reversed-VOI Control	Reversed-VOI Control	Util. Persp. Control	Util. Persp. Control	Simple Control	Simple Control	Anch-oring Control	Anch-oring Control
Effect size ß	1.09 [.87, 1.32]	1.03 [.84, 1.21]	.81 [.59, 1.03]	.68 [.50, .87]	.40 [.14, .66]	.16 [-.02, .35]	.44 [.13, .74]	.37 [.09, .65]	.25 [.003, .51]	.35 [.16, .55]	.15 [-.12, .41]	.15 [-.05, .34]
p-value	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p = .003$	$p = .089$	$p = .005$	$p = .009$	$p = .048$	$p < .001$	$p = .280$	$p = .140$
Dependent variable (scale response)	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard Foot-bridge	Standard Foot-bridge	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV	Standard AV
Total sample size	1,574	2085	1,574	2085	735	1369	571	736	1390	2107	1390	2107

Sample size in VOI condition	419	688	419	688	399	694	264	372	298	706	298	706
Sample size in control condition	581	700	574	697	336	675	307	364	615	707	477	694
Inclusion rate in VOI condition	60.90%		60.90%		57.49%		70.97%		42.21%		42.21%	
Inclusion rate in control condition	83.00%		82.35%		49.78%		84.34%		86.99%		68.73%	

Complete Testing Materials

Study 1

Simple Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to a moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course.

A person is on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to the person on this footbridge is another person. This person is wearing a large backpack.

The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is for the first person to push the second person off the footbridge and onto the tracks below. The combined weight of the second person's body and backpack will stop the trolley. The second person will die if pushed, but the five people on the tracks will be saved.

Note: The first person cannot save the five on the tracks by jumping onto the tracks because the first person is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. There is also not enough time for the first person to remove the backpack from the other person.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be the first person standing on the footbridge. Is it morally acceptable for you to push the second person on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable to push.
- No, it is not morally acceptable to push.

Screen 6:

To what extent is this action morally acceptable?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 7:

In the case you encountered, there were five people on the tracks and one person on the footbridge next to you. Of these six people, what proportion of them will die if you decide to push?

- 100%
- 83%
- 50%
- 17%
- 0%

Screen 8:

Have you encountered this kind of dilemma before?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 9:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 10:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 11:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

VOI Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to a moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five people who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course.

A decision-maker is on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five people. Next to the decision-maker on this footbridge is another person (person 6). This person is wearing a large backpack.

The only way to save the lives of the five people on the tracks is to push the 6th person off the footbridge and onto the tracks below. The combined weight of the 6th person's body and backpack will stop the trolley. The 6th person will die if pushed, but the five people on the tracks will be saved.

Note: The decision-maker cannot save the five on the tracks by jumping onto the tracks because the decision-maker is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. There is also not enough time for the decision-maker to remove the backpack from the 6th person.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of five people on the tracks or you will be the 6th person, standing on the footbridge. You don't know which of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 6 chance that you will be the 6th person on the footbridge, and there is a 5 out of 6 chance that you will be one of the five people on the tracks.

If the decision-maker decides to push the person off the footbridge, you have a 1 out of 6 chance of dying and a 5 out of 6 chance of living. If the decision-maker decides not to push, you have a 1 out of 6 chance of living and a 5 out of 6 chance of dying.

Do you want the decision-maker to push or not push?

- Yes, I want the decision-maker to push.
- No, I don't want the decision-maker to push.

Screen 6:

To what extent do you want the decision-maker to push?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 7:

Next you will consider a different version of this dilemma.

Screen 8:

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course.

A person is on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to the person on this footbridge is another person. This person is wearing a large backpack.

The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is for the first person to push the second person off the footbridge and onto the tracks below. The combined weight of the second person's body and backpack will stop the trolley. The second person will die if pushed, but the five people on the tracks will be saved.

Note: The first person cannot save the five on the tracks by jumping onto the tracks because the first person is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. There is also not enough time for the first person to remove the backpack from the other person.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be the first person standing on the footbridge. Is it morally acceptable for you to push the second person on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable to push.
- No, it is not morally acceptable to push.

Screen 9:

To what extent is this action morally acceptable?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 10:

In the first case you encountered, what was your probability of dying if the decision-maker decides to push?

- 100%
- 83%
- 50%
- 17%
- 0%

Screen 11:

In the second case you encountered there were five people on the tracks and one person on the footbridge next to you. Of these six people, what proportion of them will die if you decide to push?

- 100%
- 83%
- 50%
- 17%
- 0%

Screen 12:

Did your thinking about the first case influence the way you thought about the second case?

- Yes
- No

Screen 13:

[If yes] You answered "yes." Could you please explain how your thinking about the first case influenced the way you thought about the second case?
--Text box--

Screen 14:

Have you encountered this kind of dilemma before?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 15:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 16:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 17:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box—

Study 2

Simple Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to a moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation to save the 9 pedestrians?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 6:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 7:

In the case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the car. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 8:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 9:

A high-magnitude earthquake has just rocked the city. Many civilians are wounded from the earthquake. The city's network of hospitals, including Liberty Hospital, has prepared for such a natural disaster.

The city has lost electricity and Liberty is on reserve power. Many patients are expected to be arriving at any moment in the emergency room, many of whom were critically injured in the earthquake.

The anticipated influx of patients has put oxygen at a premium. Due to the lack of oxygen for performing life-saving surgeries, dozens of incoming patients from the earthquake will surely lose their lives.

The ethics committee of the hospital must make a decision about how to allocate the oxygen, which is currently a precious resource. There are a handful of patients with chronic breathing problems who regularly come to the hospital when they are having a serious attack. One such patient has been at the hospital since first thing in the morning, before the earthquake happened. Removing this patient from oxygen now and using it for the arriving injured will allow for 9 life-saving surgeries. However, this patient will definitely die from cardiac arrest if taken off the oxygen.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** are a member of the ethics committee at this hospital.

Is it morally acceptable for you to take the patient at the hospital off oxygen?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable to take this patient off oxygen.
- No, it is not morally acceptable to take this patient off oxygen.

Screen 10:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen? Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 11:

In the case you encountered, there were nine incoming patients and one patient already at the hospital. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the ethics committee decides to take the patient at the hospital off oxygen?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 12:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 13:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 14:

What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

Screen 15:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

VOI Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to a moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of the 9 pedestrians or you will be the 10th person in the autonomous vehicle. You don't know which one of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 10 chance that you will be the passenger in the car, and there is a 9 out of 10 chance that you will be one of the nine pedestrians.

In some states, the autonomous vehicles are required by law to SWERVE in such cases. In other states, they are required by law to STAY in such cases. If the law requires the autonomous vehicle to swerve in such a situation, you have a 1 out of 10 chance of dying and a 9 out of 10 chance of living. If the law forces the autonomous vehicle to stay on its current path, you have a 1 out of 10 chance of living and a 9 out of 10 chance of dying.

Please respond from a purely self-interested perspective: Would you want to be in a state where the law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, I want to be in a state where the law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, I don't want to be in a state where the law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 6:

To what extent do you want to be in a state where the law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1=Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 7:

Next you will consider a different version of this dilemma.

Screen 8:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation to save the 9 pedestrians?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 9:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 10:

In the first case you encountered, what was your probability of dying if the state law required the autonomous vehicle to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 11:

In the second case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the car. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 12:

Did your thinking about the first case influence the way you thought about the second case?

- Yes

- No

Screen 13:

[If yes] You answered "yes." Could you please explain how your thinking about the first case influenced the way you thought about the second case?
--Text box--

Screen 14:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 15:

A high-magnitude earthquake has just rocked the city. Many civilians are wounded from the earthquake. The city's network of hospitals, including Liberty Hospital, has prepared for such a natural disaster.

The city has lost electricity and Liberty is on reserve power. Many patients are expected to be arriving at any moment in the emergency room, many of whom were critically injured in the earthquake.

The anticipated influx of patients has put oxygen at a premium. Due to the lack of oxygen for performing life-saving surgeries, dozens of incoming patients from the earthquake will surely lose their lives.

The ethics committee of the hospital must make a decision about how to allocate the oxygen, which is currently a precious resource. There are a handful of patients with chronic breathing problems who regularly come to the hospital when they are having a serious attack. One such patient has been at the hospital since first thing in the morning, before the earthquake happened. Removing this patient from oxygen now and using it for the arriving injured will allow for 9 life-saving surgeries. However, this patient will definitely die from cardiac arrest if taken off the oxygen.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of the nine incoming patients or you will be the 10^{th} patient already at the hospital. You don't know which one of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 10 chance that you will be the patient already at the hospital, and there is a 9 out of 10 chance that you will be one of the nine incoming patients from the earthquake.

If the ethics committee decides to take the patient at the hospital off oxygen, you have a 1 out of 10 chance of dying and a 9 out of 10 chance of living. If the ethics committee decides to keep this patient on oxygen, you have a 1 out of 10 chance of living and a 9 out of 10 chance of dying.

Please respond from a purely self-interested perspective: Do you want the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen?

- Yes, I want the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen.
- No, I don't want the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen.

Screen 16:

To what extent do you want the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 17:

Next you will consider a different version of this dilemma.

Screen 18:

A high-magnitude earthquake has just rocked the city. Many civilians are wounded from the earthquake. The city's network of hospitals, including Liberty Hospital, has prepared for such a natural disaster.

The city has lost electricity and Liberty is on reserve power. Many patients are expected to be arriving at any moment in the emergency room, many of whom were critically injured in the earthquake.

The anticipated influx of patients has put oxygen at a premium. Due to the lack of oxygen for performing life-saving surgeries, dozens of incoming patients from the earthquake will surely lose their lives.

The ethics committee of the hospital must make a decision about how to allocate the oxygen, which is currently a precious resource. There are a handful of patients with chronic breathing problems who regularly come to the hospital when they are having a serious attack. One such patient has been at the hospital since first thing in the morning, before the earthquake happened. Removing this patient from oxygen now and using it for the arriving injured will allow for 9 life-saving surgeries. However, this patient will definitely die from cardiac arrest if taken off the oxygen.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** are a member of the ethics committee at this hospital.

Is it morally acceptable for you to take the patient at the hospital off oxygen?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable to take this patient off oxygen.
- No, it is not morally acceptable to take this patient off oxygen.

Screen 19:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen? Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 20:

In the first case you encountered, what was your probability of dying if the ethics committee decided to take the patient off oxygen?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 21:

In the second case you encountered, there were nine incoming patients and one patient already at the hospital. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the ethics committee decides to take the patient at the hospital off oxygen?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 22:

Did your thinking about the first case influence the way you thought about the second case?

- Yes

- No

Screen 23:

[If yes] You answered "yes." Could you please explain how your thinking about the first case influenced the way you thought about the second case?
--Text box--

Screen 24:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 25:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 26:

What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

Screen 27:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

Study 3

Simple Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to a moral dilemma. Please be sure to read very carefully.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

You have $200 to donate and can decide between two charities. The two real charities are described below.

Charity A
This fund is for a person living in the USA who is going blind from an eye disease called pars planitis. The exact underlying cause of pars planitis is unknown, and most cases occur sporadically without family history of the disease. Inflammation from the disease causes blurred vision and progressive vision loss. Over the last several years, this person's vision in the right eye has worsened and gotten fuzzier. An eye doctor says that this person will go permanently blind. A surgery can restore vision and prevent blindness, but the surgery will cost much more than the person's insurance will cover. This person has a low-paying job and very little financial resources, and does not have the capacity to take on this medical debt. Donating $200 would contribute to funding this person's surgery. Without the surgery, this person will go permanently blind in one eye.

Charity B
This charity funds cataract surgeries in developing countries such as India, where cataracts are one of the main causes of blindness. A cataract is the clouding of the lens of the eye, preventing light from passing to the eye. Adults commonly develop cataracts with age, and for those in developing countries like India, limited access to healthcare to treat cataracts results in permanent blindness. A simple surgery can restore vision by removing the affected lens and replacing it with an artificial lens. The surgery involves making a small incision, which requires no stitches, to insert the lens. In India, this surgery is cost-effective and prevents blindness for about $100 per eye per patient. Donating $200 would fund cataract surgeries for 2 people, who each need surgery in one eye. Without the surgery, each of these people will go permanently blind in one eye.

Please note: We will actually make a $200 donation and one randomly chosen participant's decision will determine where the $200 goes.

To which charity do you want to donate the $200? Please select one charity below:

- I want to donate the $200 to Charity A
- I want to donate the $200 to Charity B

Screen 6:

In the case with the two charities, there was 1 person going blind from the eye disease called pars planitis, and 2 people going blind from cataracts. Hypothetically, if you had decided to donate the $200 to Charity A, what proportion of these 3 people would go permanently blind in one eye?

- 3 out of 3 (100%)
- 2 out of 3 (67%)

- 1 out of 3 (33%)
- 0 out of 3 (0%)

Screen 7:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 8:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 9:

What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

Screen 10:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

VOI Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to a moral dilemma. Please be sure to read very carefully.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A decision-maker has $200 to donate and is deciding between two charities. The two real charities are described below:

Charity A
This fund is for a person living in the USA who is going blind from an eye disease called pars planitis. The exact underlying cause of pars planitis is unknown, and most cases occur sporadically without family history of the disease. Inflammation from the disease causes blurred vision and progressive vision loss. Over the last several years, this person's vision in the right eye has worsened and gotten fuzzier. An eye doctor says that this person will go permanently blind. A surgery can restore vision and prevent blindness, but the surgery will cost much more than the person's insurance will cover. This person has a low-paying job and very little financial resources, and does not have the capacity to take on this medical debt. Donating $200 would contribute to funding this person's surgery. Without the surgery, this person will go permanently blind in one eye.

Charity B
This charity funds cataract surgeries in developing countries such as India, where cataracts are one of the main causes of blindness. A cataract is the clouding of the lens of the eye, preventing light from passing to the eye. Adults commonly develop cataracts with age, and for those in developing countries like India, limited access to healthcare to treat cataracts results in permanent blindness. A simple surgery can restore vision by removing the affected lens and replacing it with an artificial lens. The surgery involves making a small incision, which requires no stitches, to insert the lens. In India, this surgery is cost-effective and prevents blindness for about $100 per eye per patient. Donating $200 would fund cataract surgeries for 2 people, who each need surgery in one eye. Without the surgery, each of these people will go permanently blind in one eye.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of the two people going blind from cataracts, or you will be the 3rd person, the person going blind from the eye disease called pars planitis. You don't know which one of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 3 chance that you will be the 3rd person going blind from the eye disease, and there is a 2 out of 3 chance that you will be one of the two people going blind from cataracts.

If the decision-maker donates $200 to Charity A, you have a 1 out of 3 chance of being cured of blindness, and a 2 out of 3 chance of going permanently blind in one eye.

If the decision-maker donates $200 to Charity B, you have a 1 out of 3 chance of going permanently blind in one eye, and you have a 2 out of 3 chance of being cured of blindness.

Please respond from a purely self-interested perspective: To which charity do you want the decision-maker to donate the $200? Please select one charity below:

- I want the decision-maker to donate the $200 to Charity A
- I want the decision-maker to donate the $200 to Charity B

Screen 6:

Next you will consider a different version of this dilemma.

Screen 7:

You have $200 to donate and can decide between two charities. The two real charities are described below.

Charity A
This fund is for a person living in the USA who is going blind from an eye disease called pars planitis. The exact underlying cause of pars planitis is unknown, and most cases occur sporadically without family history of the disease. Inflammation from the disease causes blurred vision and progressive vision loss. Over the last several years, this person's vision in the right eye has worsened and gotten fuzzier. An eye doctor says that this person will go permanently blind. A surgery can restore vision and prevent blindness, but the surgery will cost much more than the person's insurance will cover. This person has a low-paying job and very little financial resources, and does not have the capacity to take on this medical debt. Donating $200 would contribute to funding this person's surgery. Without the surgery, this person will go permanently blind in one eye.

Charity B
This charity funds cataract surgeries in developing countries such as India, where cataracts are one of the main causes of blindness. A cataract is the clouding of the lens of the eye, preventing light from passing to the eye. Adults commonly develop cataracts with age, and for those in developing countries like India, limited access to healthcare to treat cataracts results in permanent blindness. A simple surgery can restore vision by removing the affected lens and replacing it with an artificial lens. The surgery involves making a small incision, which requires no stitches, to insert the lens. In India, this surgery is cost-effective and prevents blindness for about $100 per eye per patient. Donating $200 would fund cataract surgeries for 2 people, who each need surgery in one eye. Without the surgery, each of these people will go permanently blind in one eye.

Please note: We will actually make a $200 donation and one randomly chosen participant's decision will determine where the $200 goes.

To which charity do you want to donate the $200? Please select one charity below:

- I want to donate the $200 to Charity A
- I want to donate the $200 to Charity B

Screen 8:

In the first case with the two charities, what was your probability of going permanently blind in one eye, if the decision-maker decides to donate the $200 to Charity A?

- 3 out of 3 (100%)
- 2 out of 3 (67%)
- 1 out of 3 (33%)
- 0 out of 3 (0%)

Screen 9:

In the second case with the two charities, there was 1 person going blind from the eye disease called pars planitis, and 2 people going blind from cataracts. Hypothetically, if you had decided to donate the $200 to Charity A, what proportion of these 3 people would go permanently blind in one eye?

- 3 out of 3 (100%)
- 2 out of 3 (67%)
- 1 out of 3 (33%)
- 0 out of 3 (0%)

Screen 10:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 11:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 12:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 13:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

Study 4

Simple Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to one or more moral dilemmas.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 6:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1= Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 7:

In the case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the autonomous vehicle. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 8:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 9:

What is your age?

--Text box--

Screen 10:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 11:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

Anchoring Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to one or more moral dilemmas.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

The sculpture garden of a wealthy art collector overlooks a valley containing a set of train tracks. Two railway workers are working on the tracks, and an empty runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward the 2 workers.

A decision-maker who is visiting the garden sees that the only way to save the lives of the 2

workers is to push one of the art collector's prized sculptures down into the valley so that it will roll onto the tracks and block the trolley's passage. Doing this will destroy the sculpture.

Do you want the decision-maker to push the sculpture onto the tracks?

- Yes, I want the decision-maker to push the sculpture onto the tracks.
- No, I don't want the decision-maker to push the sculpture onto the tracks.

Screen 6:

To what extent do you want the decision-maker to push the sculpture onto the tracks?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 7:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 8:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 9:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1= Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 10:

In the first case you encountered, how many lives would the decision-maker save by pushing the sculpture down into the valley?

- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
- 0

Screen 11:

In the second case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the autonomous vehicle. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 12:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 13:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 14:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 15:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

VOI Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to one or more moral dilemmas.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of the 9 pedestrians or you will be the 10th person in the autonomous vehicle. You don't know which one of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 10 chance that you will be the passenger in the car, and there is a 9 out of 10 chance that you will be one of the nine pedestrians.

In some states, the autonomous vehicles are required by law to SWERVE in such cases. In other states, they are required by law to STAY in such cases. If the law requires the autonomous vehicle to swerve in such a situation, you have a 1 out of 10 chance of dying and a 9 out of 10 chance of living. If the law requires the autonomous vehicle to stay on its current path, you have a 1 out of 10 chance of living and a 9 out of 10 chance of dying.

Please respond from a purely self-interested perspective: Would you want to be in a state where the law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, I want to be in a state where the law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, I don't want to be in a state where the law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 6:

To what extent do you want to be in a state where the law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 7:

You will now read about and respond to another dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 8:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 9:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1= Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 10:

In the first case you encountered, what was your probability of dying if the state law required the autonomous vehicle to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 11:

In the second case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the autonomous vehicle. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 12:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 13:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 14:

What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

Screen 15:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

Study 5

Reversed-VOI Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to one or more moral dilemmas.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of the 9 pedestrians or you will be the person in the autonomous vehicle. You don't know which one of these people you will be. There is a 90% chance that you will be the passenger in the car, and there is a 10% chance that you will be one of the nine pedestrians.

Please respond from a purely self-interested perspective: Would you want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to SWERVE, giving you a 10% chance of living, or would you want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to STAY, giving you a 90% chance of living?

- I would wat the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to SWERVE.
- I would want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to STAY.

Screen 6:

To what extent would you want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to SWERVE?

Please indicate one number:

(1= Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 7:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 8:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 9:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 10:

In the first case you encountered, what was your probability of living if the state law required the autonomous vehicle to stay?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 11:

In the second case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the autonomous vehicle. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 12:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 13:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 14:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 15:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

VOI Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to one or more moral dilemmas.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of the 9 pedestrians or you will be the 10th person in the autonomous vehicle. You don't know which one of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 10 chance that you will be the passenger in the car, and there is a 9 out of 10 chance that you will be one of the nine pedestrians.

Please respond from a purely self-interested perspective: Would you want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to SWERVE, giving you a 90% chance of living, or would you want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to STAY, giving you a 10% chance of living?

- I would want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to SWERVE.
- I would want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to STAY.

Screen 6:

To what extent would you want the state law to require the autonomous vehicle to SWERVE?

Please indicate one number:

(1= Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 7:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 8:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 9:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 10:

In the first case you encountered, what was your probability of living if the state law required the autonomous vehicle to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 11:

In the second case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the autonomous vehicle. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 12:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 13:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 14:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 15:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

Study 6

Utilitarian-Perspective Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write "I read the instructions" in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

How many fatal heart attacks have you had?

- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
- 0

Screen 5:

In this study, you will read about and respond to a moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 6:

There is a person named JOE. Joe is a UTILITARIAN. This means that Joe thinks that it is always right to sacrifice people and their interests for the greater good. For example, if one can save many lives by killing one person, then one should do it. Joe's motto is "The ends always justify the means". Joe thinks that everyone should think in this utilitarian way.

Imagine that you are JOE the UTILITARIAN reading the following dilemma:

> "A person is on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to the person on this footbridge is another person. This person is wearing a large backpack.
>
> The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is for the first person to push the second person off the footbridge and onto the tracks below. The combined weight of the second person's body and backpack will stop the trolley. The second person will die if pushed, but the five people on the tracks will be saved.
>
> Note: The first person cannot save the five on the tracks by jumping onto the tracks because the first person is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. There is also not enough time for the first person to remove the backpack from the other person.
>
> Is it morally acceptable for the first person to push the second person on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?"

Please respond from JOE's UTILITARIAN perspective:

"Do you want the first person to push or not push?"

- "Yes, I [as JOE the UTILITARIAN] want the first person to push."
- "No, I [as JOE the UTILITARIAN] do not want the first person to push."

Screen 7:

Again, please respond from JOE's UTILITARIAN perspective:

> "To what extent do you [as JOE the UTILITARIAN] want the first person to push?

Please indicate one number:

(1= “Do not want at all”, 7 = “Completely want”)

Screen 8:

Next you will consider a different version of this dilemma.

Screen 9:

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course.

A person is on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to the person on this footbridge is another person. This person is wearing a large backpack.

The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is for the first person to push the second person off the footbridge and onto the tracks below. The combined weight of the second person’s body and backpack will stop the trolley. The second person will die if pushed, but the five people on the tracks will be saved.

Note: The first person cannot save the five on the tracks by jumping onto the tracks because the first person is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. There is also not enough time for the first person to remove the backpack from the other person.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be the first person standing on the footbridge. Is it morally acceptable for you to push the second person on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable to push.
- No, it is not morally acceptable to push.

Screen 10:

To what extent is this action morally acceptable?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 11:

In the first case you encountered there was a person named Joe. Which of the following is most TRUE of Joe?

- Joe says that it's always wrong to sacrifice people
- Joe says that "The ends DON'T justify the means"
- Joe thinks that it's always right to promote the greater good
- Joe thinks that one should always obey the law
- Joe is against utilitarianism

Screen 12:

In the second case you encountered there were five people on the tracks and one person on the footbridge next to you. Of these six people, what proportion of them will die if you decide to push?

- 6 out of 6 (100%)
- 5 out of 6 (83%)
- 3 out of 6 (50%)
- 1 out of 6 (17%)
- 0 out of 6 (0%)

Screen 13:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 14:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 15:

What is your gender?

- Man
- Woman
- Non-binary

- Another gender not listed here --Text box--
- Prefer not to answer

Screen 16:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

VOI Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write "I read the instructions" in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

How many fatal heart attacks have you had?

- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
- 0

Screen 5:

In this study, you will read about and respond to a moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 6:

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five people who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course.

A decision-maker is on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five people. Next to the decision-maker on this footbridge is another person (person 6). This person is wearing a large backpack.

The only way to save the lives of the five people on the tracks is to push the 6th person off the footbridge and onto the tracks below. The combined weight of the 6th person's body and backpack will stop the trolley. The 6th person will die if pushed, but the five people on the tracks will be saved.

Note: The decision-maker cannot save the five on the tracks by jumping onto the tracks because the decision-maker is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. There is also not enough time for the decision-maker to remove the backpack from the 6th person.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of five people on the tracks or you will be the 6th person, standing on the footbridge. You don't know which of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 6 chance that you will be the 6th person on the footbridge, and there is a 5 out of 6 chance that you will be one of the five people on the tracks.

If the decision-maker decides to push the person off the footbridge, you have a 1 out of 6 chance of dying and a 5 out of 6 chance of living. If the decision-maker decides not to push, you have a 1 out of 6 chance of living and a 5 out of 6 chance of dying.

Do you want the decision-maker to push or not push?

- Yes, I want the decision-maker to push.
- No, I don't want the decision-maker to push.

Screen 7:

To what extent do you want the decision-maker to push?

Please indicate one number:

(1= Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 8:

Next you will consider a different version of this dilemma.

Screen 9:

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course.

A person is on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to the person on this footbridge is another person. This person is wearing a large backpack.

The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is for the first person to push the second person off the footbridge and onto the tracks below. The combined weight of the second person's body and backpack will stop the trolley. The second person will die if pushed, but the five people on the tracks will be saved.

Note: The first person cannot save the five on the tracks by jumping onto the tracks because the first person is not heavy enough to stop the trolley. There is also not enough time for the first person to remove the backpack from the other person.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be the first person standing on the footbridge. Is it morally acceptable for you to push the second person on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable to push.
- No, it is not morally acceptable to push.

Screen 10:

To what extent is this action morally acceptable?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 11:

In the first case you encountered, what was your probability of dying if the decision-maker decides to push?

- 6 out of 6 (100%)
- 5 out of 6 (83%)
- 3 out of 6 (50%)
- 1 out of 6 (17%)
- 0 out of 6 (0%)

Screen 12:

In the second case you encountered there were five people on the tracks and one person on the footbridge next to you. Of these six people, what proportion of them will die if you decide to push?

- 6 out of 6 (100%)
- 5 out of 6 (83%)
- 3 out of 6 (50%)
- 1 out of 6 (17%)
- 0 out of 6 (0%)

Screen 13:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 14:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 15:

What is your gender?

- Man
- Woman
- Non-binary
- Another gender not listed here --Text box--
- Prefer not to answer

Screen 16:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

Study 7

Simple Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to one or more moral dilemmas.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 6:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 7:

In the autonomous vehicle case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the autonomous vehicle. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 8:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 9:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 10:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 11:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

Anchoring Control Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to one or more moral dilemmas.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

The sculpture garden of a wealthy art collector overlooks a valley containing a set of train tracks. Two railway workers are working on the tracks, and an empty runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward the 2 workers.

A decision-maker who is visiting the garden sees that the only way to save the lives of the 2

workers is to push one of the art collector's prized sculptures down into the valley so that it will roll onto the tracks and block the trolley's passage. Doing this will destroy the sculpture.

Do you want the decision-maker to push the sculpture onto the tracks?

- Yes, I want the decision-maker to push the sculpture onto the tracks.
- No, I don't want the decision-maker to push the sculpture onto the tracks.

Screen 6:

To what extent do you want the decision-maker to push the sculpture onto the tracks?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 7:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 8:

While on vacation on a remote island, a person is fishing from a seaside dock. This person observes a group of 9 tourists board a small boat and set sail for a nearby island. Soon after their departure, this person hears over the radio that there is a violent storm brewing, a storm that is sure to intercept the 9 tourists.

The only way to ensure the safety of the 9 tourists is for this person to warn them by borrowing a nearby speedboat. The speedboat belongs to a miserly tycoon who would not take kindly to this person borrowing his property.

Do you want this person to borrow the speedboat?

- Yes, I want this person to borrow the speedboat.
- No, I don't want this person to borrow the speedboat.

Screen 9:

To what extent do you want this person to borrow the speedboat?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 10:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 11:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 12:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 13:

In the sculpture garden case you encountered, how many lives would the decision-maker save by pushing the sculpture down into the valley?

- 4
- 3
- 2

- 1
- 0

Screen 14:

In the speedboat case you encountered, how many tourists would the person warn about the storm, by borrowing the speedboat?

- 9
- 7
- 5
- 3
- 1

Screen 15:

In the autonomous vehicle case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the autonomous vehicle. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 16:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 17:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 18:

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

Screen 19:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--

VOI Condition

Screen 1:

Please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID number:
--Text box--

Screen 2:

--Consent Form--

Screen 3:

In order to facilitate our research, we are interested in knowing certain factors about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then the data we collect based on your responses will be invalid. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore the next question, and simply write “I read the instructions” in the box labeled "Any comments?" Thank you very much.

How difficult did you find this passage?

- Extremely difficult
- Very difficult
- Somewhat difficult
- Not very difficult
- Not difficult at all
- Any comments? --Text box--

Screen 4:

In this study, you will read about and respond to one or more moral dilemmas.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 5:

A high-magnitude earthquake has just rocked the city. Many civilians are wounded from the earthquake. The city’s network of hospitals, including Liberty Hospital, has prepared for such a natural disaster.

The city has lost electricity and Liberty is on reserve power. Many patients are expected to be arriving at any moment in the emergency room, many of whom were critically injured in the earthquake.

The anticipated influx of patients has put oxygen at a premium. Due to the lack of oxygen for performing life-saving surgeries, dozens of incoming patients from the earthquake will surely lose their lives.

The ethics committee of the hospital must make a decision about how to allocate the oxygen, which is currently a precious resource. There are a handful of patients with chronic breathing problems who regularly come to the hospital when they are having a serious attack. One such patient has been at the hospital since first thing in the morning, before the earthquake happened. Removing this patient from oxygen now and using it for the arriving injured will allow for 9 life-saving surgeries. However, this patient will definitely die from cardiac arrest if taken off the oxygen.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of the nine incoming patients or you will be the 10th patient already at the hospital. You don't know which one of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 10 chance that you will be the patient already at the hospital, and there is a 9 out of 10 chance that you will be one of the nine incoming patients from the earthquake.

If the ethics committee decides to take the patient at the hospital off oxygen, you have a 1 out of 10 chance of dying and a 9 out of 10 chance of living. If the ethics committee decides to keep this patient on oxygen, you have a 1 out of 10 chance of living and a 9 out of 10 chance of dying.

Please respond from a purely self-interested perspective: Do you want the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen?

- Yes, I want the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen.
- No, I don't want the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen.

Screen 6:

To what extent do you want the ethics committee to take the patient off oxygen?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Do not want at all, 7 = Completely want)

Screen 7:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 8:

A decision-maker has $200 to donate and is deciding between two charities. The two real charities are described below:

Charity A
This fund is for a person living in the USA who is going blind from an eye disease called pars planitis. The exact underlying cause of pars planitis is unknown, and most cases occur sporadically without family history of the disease. Inflammation from the disease causes blurred vision and progressive vision loss. Over the last several years, this person's vision in the right eye has worsened and gotten fuzzier. An eye doctor says that this person will go permanently blind. A surgery can restore vision and prevent blindness, but the surgery will cost much more than the person's insurance will cover. This person has a low-paying job and very little financial resources, and does not have the capacity to take on this medical debt. Donating $200 would contribute to funding this person's surgery. Without the surgery, this person will go permanently blind in one eye.

Charity B
This charity funds cataract surgeries in developing countries such as India, where cataracts are one of the main causes of blindness. A cataract is the clouding of the lens of the eye, preventing light from passing to the eye. Adults commonly develop cataracts with age, and for those in developing countries like India, limited access to healthcare to treat cataracts results in permanent blindness. A simple surgery can restore vision by removing the affected lens and replacing it with an artificial lens. The surgery involves making a small incision, which requires no stitches, to insert the lens. In India, this surgery is cost-effective and prevents blindness for about $100 per eye per patient. Donating $200 would fund cataract surgeries for 2 people, who each need surgery in one eye. Without the surgery, each of these people will go permanently blind in one eye.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** will be either one of the two people going blind from cataracts, or you will be the 3rd person, the person going blind from the eye disease called pars planitis. You don't know which one of these people you will be. There is a 1 out of 3 chance that you will be the 3rd person going blind from the eye disease pars planitis, and there is a 2 out of 3 chance that you will be one of the two people going blind from cataracts.

If the decision-maker donates $200 to Charity A, you have (at best) a 1 out of 3 chance of being cured of blindness, and you have a 2 out of 3 chance of going permanently blind in one eye.

If the decision-maker donates $200 to Charity B, you have a 1 out of 3 chance of going

permanently blind in one eye, and you have a 2 out of 3 chance of being cured of blindness.

Please respond from a purely self-interested perspective: To which charity do you want the decision-maker to donate the $200? Please select one charity below:

- I want the decision-maker to donate the $200 to Charity A.
- I want the decision-maker to donate the $200 to Charity B.

Screen 9:

To what extent do you want the decision-maker to donate the $200 to one charity or the other charity?

Please indicate one point along the scale:

(7-point unnumbered scale) Donate to Charity B (for Cataracts) ------- Donate to Charity A (for Pars Planitis)

Screen 10:

You will now read about and respond to another moral dilemma.

Please click "Next" to continue.

Screen 11:

A person is a sole passenger in an autonomous self-driving vehicle traveling at the speed limit down a main road. Suddenly, 9 people appear ahead, in the direct path of the car. The car could be programmed to: SWERVE off to the side of road, where it will impact a barrier, killing the passenger but leaving the 9 pedestrians unharmed, or STAY on its current path, where it will kill the 9 pedestrians, but the passenger will be unharmed.

Imagine that, at some point in the near future, **you** can support a state law that requires autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation.

Is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.
- No, it is not morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve.

Screen 12:

To what extent is it morally acceptable for a state law to require autonomous vehicles to swerve in such a situation?

Please indicate one number:

(1 = Completely unacceptable, 7 = Completely acceptable)

Screen 13:

In the hospital case you encountered, what was your probability of dying if the ethics committee decides to take the patient off oxygen?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 14:

In the charity case you encountered, what was your probability of going permanently blind in one eye, if the decision-maker decides to donate the $200 to Charity A (for Pars Planitis)?

- 3 out of 3 (100%)
- 2 out of 3 (67%)
- 1 out of 3 (33%)
- 0 out of 3 (0%)

Screen 15:

In the autonomous vehicle case you encountered, there were nine people in the direct path of the autonomous vehicle, and one person riding in the autonomous vehicle. Of these ten people, what proportion of them will die if the state law requires autonomous vehicles to swerve?

- 10 out of 10 (100%)
- 9 out of 10 (90%)
- 5 out of 10 (50%)
- 1 out of 10 (10%)
- 0 out of 10 (0%)

Screen 16:

Have you previously encountered a dilemma similar to these kinds of dilemmas?

(Please be honest. Your response will not affect your payment.)

- Yes
- No

Screen 17:

What is your age?
--Text box--

Screen 18:

What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

Screen 19:

Please provide any comments you may have about this study:
--Text box--