Kuehne A, Keating P, Polonsky J, Haskew C, Schenkel K, le Polain de Waroux O, Ratnayake R: Event-based surveillance in low- and middle-income countries: a systematic review

Supplementary file 4: Systematic literature review on event-based surveillance in the field: Usefulness of EBS systems and surveillance attributes evaluated (N=15)

	Publication	Events reported	Level of usefulness	Attributes of surveillance systems							
Setting											
Set	Title			Data quality	PPV	Sensitivity	Acceptability	Timeliness	Flexibility	Stability	Other
Outbreak setting	Ratnayake et al. (2016). [21] & ERC (2016). [22] Stone et al. (2016). [19] & ERC (2016). [22]	Overall: 12,126 CEBS alerts, 86% deaths, 14% sickness, <1% unsafe burial, <1% others. Event categories used: 205 >2 persons sick or dead in household, 59 sickness or death after burial, 70 sickness or death in HCW, 191 sickness or death in traveller, 36 sickness of death in contact of case-patient, 7 unsafe burial or washing of corpse, 11,558 others (among them mostly death in community). Overall 9,131 alerts generated: 87% deaths, 13% illnesses. 94% were reported as trigger event 7: other.	Overall: In addition to identification of EVD cases: identification of 3 measles clusters that lead to implementation of control measures and 2 chicken pox clusters.		Overall, 12,126. 287 (2%) alerts met the EVD case definition. 16 alerts were confirmed EVD cases. PPV 0.06 (16/287).		Proportion of CHM reporting 1/week increased (69% April, 89% May, 83% June, 90% July, 93% August 2015). Of 31 district stakeholders, 74% stated CEBS increased case detection and benefited their district through increased linkage with communities.	Kambia, among 6 cases without epi links: onset to detection: 1-3 days for 4 CEBS identified cases; 5-7 days for 2 non-CEBS identified cases.	-	-	Implementation: - steps of implementation were outlined in SOP and included formation of a CEBS management team and endorsement by district and community stakeholders - CHM training completed in 9 districts 03/2015 - telecommunication closed-used- groups not established in 3/9 districts 08/2015 - motorbikes operational in 9 districts 07/2015 - average household to CMH ratio = 118:1 - average CHM to supervisors ratio = 52:1 - most common challenge reported was malfunction of communication tool or lack of motorbike - 13/31 district stakeholders mentioned the need for improved coordination between CEBS and other EVD response - 8/31 district stakeholders were
	Lee et al. (2016). [20]	a) 11/2014-08/2015: 185,437 calls received. 22,660 of these were Ebola alerts. b) 04/2015-08/2015 in Conakry, Coyah, Debreka, Forecariah: 8,667 calls received. Comparison data: Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (VHF) data base of all Ebola cases in Guinea.	-	-	-	a) 71/ 1,838 (3.9%) of confirmed cases were identified by National Call centre alerts. b) 120/221 (54%) of confirmed cases were identified by	-	-	-	-	concerned about sustainability of CEBS when DERCs scale down.

Miller et al. (2015). [23]	a) + b) were matched to VHF by probabilistic record linkage in the absence of unique identifiers. As VHF case numbers decreased, calls to a) + b) increased. 3,299 calls received. 1,296 deaths reported. 1,202 suspect cases reported.	-	-	-	Local Alert Numbers.	-	-	-	-	Response: Convenience sample of 191 notifying lay peopled called again
Miller et al. 3 (2015). [23]	absence of unique identifiers. As VHF case numbers decreased, calls to a) + b) increased. 3,299 calls received. 1,296 deaths reported. 1,202 suspect cases reported.	-	-	-	Numbers.	-	-	-	-	191 notifying lay peopled called again
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(2015). [23]	reported. 1,202 suspect cases reported.		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	191 notifying lay peopled called again
Santa-Olalla et al. (2013).	reported.									
Santa-Olalla 8 et al. (2013).										
et al. (2013).										from call-centre 1 week after their
et al. (2013).										notification if their notification was
et al. (2013).										followed by any response from
et al. (2013).										district Ebola response teams: 81% of
et al. (2013).										91 deaths alerts were responded to
et al. (2013).	000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1									within the next day. 45% of 95 case
et al. (2013).	000 -1									alerts were responded to within the
et al. (2013).	062									next day.
et al. (2013).		Actions taken included: field	EBS peaks matched	-	-	Near real-time information and	-	Scope of the	-	Exit strategy: A&R system set-up to
, ,	alerts (89.6%) were related to	investigation of outbreaks	observed increase in IBS			response increased acceptance		system		establish the basis for an EBS
[20]	cholera." "Cholera alerts	and alerts, rapid set-up of a	cholera numbers.			by local authorities and		successfully		component in the national
	described increases in cases,	CTC/CTU or ORP, WASH	cholera hambers.			willingness to keep the system		expanded to a		surveillance system in accordance
	deaths, lack of supplies (medical	response, provision of				after Who/PAHO left the		broader range of		with IHR requirements. A&R
	and/or WASH), lack of human	supplies (medical and non-				country.		events after initial		coordinator built local capacity for
	resources,	medical) and equipment,				country.		outbreak phase.		early detection, investigation &
	and/or prevention activities."	provision of human resources						outbreak priase.		response. System still operating, nov
	Also detected 76 non-cholera	for health facilities and								text-message-based, but operations
	alerts, including rabies (canine	community mobilization								remains a challenge for lack of
	and human), AFP, diphtheria,	activities, training on case								resource.
		_								resource.
	varicella, suspected cases of	management, cholera								
	measles, anthrax, intoxications,	prevention, and control,								
	other hazards (riots, strikes, and	training for community								
	others). "The investigation that	workers								
	followed each alert identified									
	major gaps in prevention and									
	response, such as the lack of									
	WASH partners in several									
	departments, and highlighted the									
	need to improve the									
	implementation of prevention									
	and control strategies at the									
	community level."									
	370 true events. Type of event	Reported in previous report.	-	Overall PPV 0.08: 370	-	Reported in previous report.	-	-	-	Determinants associated with
. ,	known for 253: 24% hand, foot			events/ 4,854 signals.						increase in event incidence rate:
	and mouth disease; 21% suspect			PPV increased over						linear regression MVA with outcome
	dengue, 21% chickenpox, 8.3%			time, marked						incidence rate, adjusted for "total
	suspect mumps, 5.9% ARI, 5.5%			temporary increased						population, population density, VHV
f	foodborne disease, 4.7% avian			after monitoring &						density, and the percentage of
į	influenza in poultry; <10 reports			evaluation visits						communities in the districts with
Į,	of suspect rabies, poultry die-off,			&implementation of						community members and teachers a
-	toxin-related illness etc.			new event definitions.						active informants": VHW density (b
ļ,	Signal incidence rate (~0.1-0.2			PPV significantly higher						0.199, p = 0.015) and % of
	signals /100,000 person days)			after revision of event						communities with teachers as active
,	decreased over time.			definition, when						informants (b = 0.008, p = 0.024)
				compared to the first 5						significantly increase incidence rate.
				months of EBS (mean						
				0.12 vs 0.06,						1
				respectively; p < 0.03).						

Clara et al. (2018). [16]	176 true events reported: "Reported events included multiple suspected avian influenza poultry die-offs and human outbreaks of chickenpox, mumps, and foodborne disease."	Total: 2,100 questionnaires:82%–88% of VHW, CHS, and district respondents reported that EBS helps to detect public health events earlier than before.	-	Overall PPV 0.07: 176 events/2,520 signals. Noise:Event = 14:1.		Total: 2,100 questionnaires. 85% of VHW and CHS and 77% of district respondents said they were willing to continue participating in EBS. "Key motivating factors for participation expressed by the VHWs were a sense of service to the community, opportunities to increase community ties, and improvement in community trust."	Data from 43 districts (56%): Mean time: detection to notification (district level) = 24 hours; detection to response = 48 hours.	-	-	Sustainability: Total: 2,100 questionnaires: 85% of VHW and CHS and 77% of district respondents said they were willing to continue participating in EBS. Event definition were simplified, see Table 3.
Merali et al. (2018)	Kassena Nankara West: 769 signals, most common: unexpected increase in animal deaths, foodborne illnesses, animal bites. Ketu South: 104 signals, most common: unexpected increase in animal deaths, suspect measles, animal bites.			Kassana Nankana West: 769 signals, 499 events, 217 responses: PPV (event/signal): 0.65. Noise:event = 1.54:1. Ketu South: 104 signals, 78 events, 78 responses: PPV (event/signal): 0.75. Noise:event = 1.33:1.						Lessons learned: training and understanding of community volunteers increased detection and reporting; strengthened reporting mechanisms facilitated immediate reporting. CEBS worked best in settings with strong social cohesion and community engagement where volunteers are the gateway to the health system. Challenges remain balancing sensitivity of signals and poor response.
Larsen et al. (2017) & (2016). [17,18]		-	-		-	22 interviews with CBVs, 2 FGD with CBVs &2 FGD with VSSs: - community members accepted CBVs and had high expectations. CBVs were well appreciated - most volunteers wanted CEBS to continue despite the lack of incentives	-			Volunteer experiences: 22 interviews with CBVs, 2 FGD with CBVs &2 FGD with VSSs: Motivation was to help their communities, some were expecting some kind of incentives. Some CBVs had too many communities to look for. Training that provided them with new knowledge on diseases was well perceived but refresher training would have been needed. Limited understanding of case definitions. Lack of mobile network as biggest challenge.
Toyama et al. (2015). [24]	126 rumours reported: 71% measles, 11% suspect rabies, 4% Anthrax, 3% whooping cough, 3% AFP, 2% neonatal tetanus, single rumours of meningitis, AWD, floods, malnutrition.	57/81 (67%) verified alerts resulted in responses: case management (n=45), active case finding (n=8), vaccination (n=2), patient referral to hospital (n=2)	05/2014: 41/59 (69%) HC have log books available 11/2014: 54/59 (91%) HC have log books available. 29/126 (23%) rumours have no records of assessment. 37/126 (29%) rumours have complete data on reporting & response time	events/126 rumours, PPV measles 0.63	Verified rumours of suspect rabies, anthrax, AFP & neonatal tetanus outnumbered cases reported by IBS.	38/126 (30%) of rumours were reported from the community.	Median time: onset to reporting: 3.8 days. Median time: reporting to response: 0.6 days, Total delay from onset to response 4.4 days.	-	-	-
Oum et al. (2005). [30]	Outbreaks reported: 21 total; 2 outbreaks of malaria, 7 AWD, 10 measles, 2 VHF. All outbreaks but one measles outbreak were confirmed true.	-	-	Overall PPV 0.95: 21 outbreaks reported, 20 proved to be true outbreaks. 1 measles outbreak was not confirmed true. Noise:event = 1.05:1	-		-			Costs: annual cost of CBSS about US\$0.5 per capita including training, supervision, and evaluation. Time: VHV spend 3-4 half days/months collecting information + ad hoc reporting and meeting participation
Naser et al. (2015) [26]	5,887 meningo-encephalitis cases in 10 surveillance hospitals, 62	-	-	Overall PPV 0.17 as 10/62 clusters were	Sensitivity: 176/5,887 (3%)	-	-	-	-	-

Sharma et al. (2009). [29]	identified encephalitis clusters, of which 10 clusters included Nipah cases. 44,484 calls. Among these 1,185 health related calls and 112 outbreak alert calls. In August 2009 remit extended to providing information and advice on Influenza A (H1N1) and received 16,357 calls in August 2009.	-	-	Nipah clusters. Among 176 suspect cases in 62 clusters, 62 Nipah cases were confirmed (PPV 0.36)). Among 982 suspect cases identified in case-based surveillance, 23 Nipah cases were confirmed (PPV 0.03) 112 outbreak alert calls lead to the detection of 9 outbreaks.	encephalitis cases were identified with cluster surveillance.	-	-	-	-	-
Tante et al. (2015). [25]	-		-		-	-	-		(6/11) units had no interruption in ESR operation. 3/11 units had <1 week interruption. 2 hardest hit units had limited operationality for 7 weeks. Functionality: 73% (8/11) surveillance units after by typhoon considered ESR functional post-typhoon. 91% (10/11) rated PIDSR functional & 27% (2/11) ated SPEED as functional.	Complementariness: 64% (7/11) rated the 3 surveillance systems as complementary to each other. But no events were reported through ESR, even though it was functional, because SPEED had a similar function.
Dagina et al. (2013). [15]	61 events reported: 26% AWD, 15% Ill, 11% acute gastroint. syndromes, 10% acute fever and rash, 8% acute neurological syndromes, 5% acute febrile illness, 5% other respiratory disease. Source of reporting: PHO (24/61), HCW (15/61), media (7/61), NGO (4/61), community (4/61). The system also identified a chemical event and a nutritional emergency.	For 11% (7/61) unclear if any steps were taken for verification. 56% (34/61) events were investigated by the PHO, a minority with additional support from NDOH or WHO. 18% (11/61) were investigated by NDOH or WHO without the PHO.		Overall PPV: 0.84: 51 events verified/61 events reported. 3/61 discarded as untrue. 7/61 not verified. Noise:event = 1.20:1	-	-	Median time: onset to reporting (n=36): 10 days. Median time: reporting to response (n=14): same day. For 10 events onset- report: > 30d.			Laboratory confirmation: 31% (16/51) had confirmed or probable aetiology.