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The implications of large-scale containments policies on global maritime trade during the COVID-19 pandemic --Manuscript Draft--

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1 The implications of large-scale containments policies on global maritime trade during
2 the COVID-19 pandemic

3

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27 **Abstract**

28 **The implementation of large-scale containment measures by governments to**
29 **contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus has resulted in a large supply and**
30 **demand shock throughout the global economy. Here, we use empirical vessel**
31 **tracking data and a newly developed algorithm to estimate the global maritime**
32 **trade losses during the first eight months of the pandemic. Our results show**
33 **widespread trade losses on a port level with the largest absolute losses found**
34 **for ports in China, the Middle-East and Western Europe, associated with the**
35 **collapse of specific supply-chains (e.g. oil, vehicle manufacturing). In total, we**
36 **estimate that global maritime trade reduced by -7.0% to -9.6% during the first**
37 **eight months of 2020, which is equal to around 206-286 million tonnes in volume**
38 **losses and up to 225-412 billion USD in value losses. The fishery, mining and**
39 **quarrying, electrical equipment and machinery manufacturing, and transport**
40 **equipment manufacturing sectors are hit hardest, with losses up to 11.8%.**
41 **Moreover, we find a large geographical disparity in losses, with some small**
42 **islands developing states and low-income economies suffering the largest**
43 **relative trade losses. We find a clear negative impact of COVID-19 related**
44 **business and public transport closures on country-wide exports. Overall, we**
45 **show how real-time indicators of economic activity can support governments**
46 **and international organisations in economic recovery efforts and allocate funds**
47 **to the hardest hit economies and sectors.**

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52 Introduction

53 The emergence and spread of COVID-19, caused by the severe acute respiratory
54 syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), has forced countries worldwide to implement
55 large-scale containment measures to reduce the spread of the virus [1–4]. These
56 measures, which include among others international travel restrictions, business
57 closures, prohibition of large-scale private and public gatherings, and mandatory
58 quarantines, have shown to effectively reduce the rate of transmission of the virus
59 [1,3,5]. As a consequence, however, such policies have had large economic
60 repercussions, both in terms of domestic industry output and international trade, due
61 to diminishing production and reduced demand for some products. The resulting
62 demand and supply shocks has further cascaded through complex supply-chains
63 networks, causing spill-over effects to downstream and upstream suppliers,
64 domestically and internationally [6–8].

65

66 Previous research has intended to estimate the global macroeconomic impacts of
67 enforcement measures worldwide using model-based approaches, in particular input-
68 output (I-O) analysis and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models [6–9]. For
69 instance, Inoue and Todo [8] estimate that an one month lockdown of Tokyo may lead
70 to a 5.2% contraction of the annual gross domestic production (GDP) of Japan. Lenzen
71 *et al.* [7] estimate the global macroeconomic losses to be around 4.2% of GDP,
72 whereas Guan *et al.* [6] estimate the losses in global value-added to be between 25-
73 40.3%, depending on the modelling scenario adopted. In addition, the World Trade
74 Organisation (WTO) projects that global international trade will contract by 13-32% in
75 2020 under a number of scenarios of disruptions to economic activity [10]. However,
76 the accuracy of these model-based estimates critically hinge on setting realistic

77 scenarios of the economic impacts and understanding how supply-chain dynamics
78 disrupt or buffer shocks. This includes making assumptions how enforcement policies
79 impact economies and predicting how countries recover from their economic downturn.
80 Given the large heterogeneity in containment policies implemented, in terms of
81 severity, duration and enforcements [1,11], alongside the complexity of shock
82 propagation through interconnected networks [12,13], the extent to which such model-
83 based approaches can predict the nature and scale of the economic impact currently
84 remains to be seen. Moreover, there is a lack of real-time global observational data to
85 validate and steer model projections, which may cause ill-informed decision-making or
86 misallocation of funds [5]. For instance, trade statistics, published by national statistical
87 agencies, are usually produced with some delay and are more comprehensive for
88 OECD countries. Hence, alternative data sources are needed to provide real-time
89 indicators of economic activity in order to fill existing data gaps and identify trends. For
90 instance, a report by UNCTAD [14] estimated that in the first half of 2020, global port
91 calls have declined by 8.7%, with the largest drop estimated to be in Europe, Australia
92 and Oceania.

93

94 Here, we use a novel dataset derived from empirical vessel tracking data in
95 combination with a newly developed algorithm to estimates the changes in
96 international maritime trade flows during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
97 Maritime trade flows cover around 80% of the world's trade in terms of volume [15],
98 and can hence be used as a first-order indicator of the status of economic activity in a
99 country. The newly derived dataset has a high spatial (166 countries) and temporal
100 (daily) resolution, which helps to track the impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak the global
101 economy, and the geographical disparity of impacts. To assess the impacts, we first

102 quantify the total trade losses and gains for ports and countries for the period January-
103 August by comparing the 2020 data to the same period in 2019. Second, we provide a
104 sector-level disaggregation to show how certain sectors have been disproportionately
105 affected by supply and demand changes. Third, we use a panel regression model with
106 fixed effects to estimate the impacts of specific containment policies on exports by
107 making use of the heterogeneity in the diversity, timing and severity of containment
108 measures across countries. Overall, we provide evidence how the impacts to global
109 trade are complex and dependent on the trade-dependencies, sector-composition and
110 policies implemented. The results provide timely information about which economies
111 are hit hardest, thereby helping decision-makers effectively target and prioritize
112 international aid and economic stimulus.

113

114 **Method**

115 **Data and trade estimation**

116 We derive estimates of port-level trade flows (imports and exports) for 1153 ports
117 across 166 countries worldwide using the geospatial location and attributes of maritime
118 vessels (from January 2019 - August 2020). To do this, we use Automatic Identification
119 System (AIS) data, which provides detailed data on the location, speed, direction and
120 vessel characteristics of all trade-carrying vessels with an AIS transponder (that send
121 information to terrestrial or satellite receivers every few seconds-minutes) [16]. This
122 data was obtained through a partnership with the UN Global Platform AIS Task Team
123 initiative (<https://unstats.un.org/wiki/display/AIS/>), which aims to develop algorithms
124 and methodologies to make AIS data useful for a variety of fields and applications
125 (traffic, economic trade, fisheries, CO2 emissions).

126 We develop an algorithm (S1 Appendix) that estimates the trade flows based on the
127 ingoing and outgoing movements of maritime vessels (~3.2 million port calls across
128 100,000 unique vessels) and their characteristics (e.g. dimensions, utilisation rate,
129 vessel type), going on to disaggregate these trade flows into specific sectors (11 sector
130 classification adopted here). We end up with daily sector-specific trade flow estimates
131 on a port-level, which we aggregate to a country-scale to perform the country-wide
132 impact analysis. This new algorithm significantly advances previous work [17–19] by
133 providing a global scale analysis and being able to provide a sector decomposition.
134 We validate the results (S1 Appendix) by comparing the derived trade estimates to
135 detailed port-level trade data obtained for five countries (Japan, United Kingdom,
136 United States, New Zealand, Brazil). Moreover, we compare our estimates to country-
137 wide maritime trade flows obtained from UN Comtrade [20] mode of transport data for
138 27 countries.

139

140 **Econometric model**

141 The variation in trade losses among countries are driven by the differences in
142 containment measures introduced by countries (in terms of timing, duration, and
143 severity) [5], and due to supply shortages to domestic supply-chains and demand
144 reductions in trade-dependent economies [6]. Large-scale containment measures can
145 directly negatively influence industry output by affecting business operations (e.g.
146 workplace closure, mobility restrictions), or indirectly positively affect industry output
147 through effectively containing the virus outbreak and thereby allowing industrial
148 production processes and transportation of goods to continue. To study the
149 implications of large-scale containment measures on exports (which we use as a proxy
150 of industrial output), we match our daily, country-wide, estimates with data from the

151 Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) [21]. Within OxCGRT,
152 data is collected on the implementation and stringency of containment measures
153 across 160 countries. We utilise reduced-form econometric techniques [22] to estimate
154 the effect of different containment policies on exports across a balanced sample of 122
155 countries. We express export change as the percentage change in detrended exports
156 in 2020 compared to 2019 (S2 Appendix), which therefore controls for potential
157 seasonality and trends in the data. The time series is first smoothed using a 10-day
158 moving average in order to remove the daily noise and better capture the underlying
159 signal. We further control (see S2 Appendix for discussion) for several factors on a
160 daily-scale, including the number of confirmed cases as a fraction of the population,
161 reduction in demand in trade-dependent countries, the potential reduction in exports
162 due to supply-shortages (through imports that are used for exports, see Hummels et
163 al. [23]), and other endogenous factors that are likely to be serially correlated with
164 exports (which we control for by adding a lag of the export change).

165 From the OxCGRT [21], we obtained information on nine measures that potentially
166 affect business operations: C1 - School closing; C2 - Workplace closing; C3 - cancel
167 public events; C4 - Restrictions on gatherings; C5 - Close public transport; C6 - Stay
168 at home; C7 - Restrictions on internal movement; C8 - International travel controls; H2
169 - Testing policy. We scale the severity of the policies on a scale between 0 and 1,
170 thereby assuming a linear relationship between maritime exports and the severity of
171 policies. Moreover, we create a composite stringency index (Stringency) of all policies
172 (C1-C8) by adding all individual policies together and rescaling the index between 0
173 and 1. We performed multiple robustness checks to evaluate the influence of different
174 model specifications (see S2 Appendix).

175

176 **Results**

177 **Model validation**

178 We find a good fit between the values predicted by our algorithm and the reported trade
179 flows on a port-level (correlation coefficient between 0.52-0.96) and a country-level
180 (correlation coefficient between 0.79-0.98), with a general overestimation for smaller
181 ports, and ports and countries with large trade imbalances (e.g. small islands). For the
182 external validation data, we find correlation coefficients of 0.84-0.86 for the aggregated
183 trade data and 0.73-0.73 for the sector-specific trade data (on a country level). Again,
184 smaller trade flows are harder to predict. The accuracy of the method is also found to
185 be dependent on the coverage of information in the AIS data (some attributes are
186 manually put in), especially information on the vessel draft, which is less frequently
187 reported in developing countries.

188

189 **Port-level trade flows**

190 In the first eight months of 2020, the number of port calls across all ports reduced by
191 4.4% compared to same months in 2019. Fig 1a shows the average change in total
192 trade (imports + exports) in terms of volume (in million tonnes, MT) over the months
193 January-August. The vast majority of ports have experienced a decline in total trade,
194 although a number of ports in Brazil, the Gulf of Mexico region, the Middle-East,
195 Australia, and parts of South-Korea and the Philippines have seen an increase in trade
196 in 2020 relative to 2019. The top 20 port with the largest changes in volume in terms
197 of total trade, imports and exports are included in Table 1. The ports with the largest
198 absolute changes in volume are the ports of Ningbo (China, -68.5 MT), Rotterdam
199 (Netherlands, -43.2 MT), Shanghai (China, -32.5 MT), Wuhan (China, -21.6 MT) and

200 Tubarao (Brazil, -20.7 MT). The largest changes in imports are found for the ports of
201 Ningbo (China, -43.5 MT), Rotterdam (Netherlands, -40.1 MT), Shanghai (-22.4 MT),
202 Zhoushan (China, -22.4 MT) and Amsterdam (Netherlands, -12.2 MT). These ports,
203 and the other ports in the list, function as major gateway ports for a country to import
204 final products (New York-New Jersey, Rotterdam), or are essential for specific supply-
205 chains, such as textiles and electronics manufacturing (Shanghai, Ningbo, Zhoushan),
206 steel and paper manufacturing (Ghent, Amsterdam, Rizhou), car manufacturing
207 (Yokohama) and raw materials (coal imports for Krishnapatnam). The largest export
208 changes are found for the ports of Ningbo (China, -25.0 MT), Tubarao (Brazil, -17.1
209 MT), Novorossiysk (Russia, -11.5 MT), Wuhan (China, -10.8 MT), Beaumont (USA, -
210 10.6 MT) and Dampier (Australia, -10.2 MT). These ports, and the other top 20 ports
211 with largest export losses, are all important export ports for global supply-chains,
212 including the exports of iron ore (Dampier, Tubarao), coal (Haypoint), oil and refined
213 petroleum products (Puerto Bolivar, Fujairah, Beaumont and Novorossiysk) and
214 manufacturing products (Ningbo, Wuhan and Shanghai).

215 Fig 1b-m show the changes in total trade per month for all ports and the cumulative
216 changes in trade over latitude and longitude. In January, losses are predominantly
217 pronounced in China that extended their Lunar New Year holiday [24], among other
218 measures, resulting in output losses to the Chinese industry. This resulted in a direct
219 demand shock, in particular for the export of raw materials (e.g. iron ore, copper, nickel)
220 that China predominantly imports [25]. This can be observed from the large negative
221 losses found in the large export ports of Brazil. In February, ports in Europe
222 experienced their first drop in imports (blue line top plot), while export losses are still
223 concentrated in Asia. This import drop in Europe coincided with the transit time from
224 China to Europe, which is around three weeks. The export drop is, alongside Brazil,

225 also visible in the main iron ore exporting ports in Australia (Port Hedland and Port
226 Walcott) and South Africa (Port of Richards Bay) that both supply iron ore to the
227 Chinese industry. In March, exports temporally recovered, while imports dropped in
228 many parts of the world, mainly to due to initiation of lockdowns in economies outside
229 Asia. In particular, India, Malaysia, Singapore, USA West Coast and Mexico have seen
230 a large drop in trade in this month. In April, trade partly recovers in the Northern
231 Hemisphere, while in May the second drop in global trade hits the global economy, as
232 a widespread reduction in demand and supply ripple through the economy. Losses are
233 again pronounced in China and Western Europe, leading to the lowest total import and
234 exports changes on a global scale. In June, July and August, a partial recovery is
235 visible for some ports, while the Middle-East, Eastern Australia, Japan and Western
236 Europe (in particular Belgium and the Netherlands) show large losses. For the Middle-
237 Eastern countries, the collapse of the oil market has contributed to the large trade
238 losses (which are predominantly exports losses). In August, signs of recovery
239 (especially imports) are visible for the Philippines, India, South Africa, Brazil and
240 Argentina, and parts of the Mediterranean, while other countries are still experiencing
241 large losses.

242

243 **Fig 1. Port-level trade losses over time.** The geographical location and magnitude
244 of trade losses for Jan-Aug 2020 compared to 2019, including the average over the
245 eight months and the losses per month. Green = positive change, red = negative
246 change. The subplots show the cumulative change over latitude and longitude for
247 imports (dark blue) and exports (dark red).

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251 **Table 1. Largest absolute trade losses on a port-level.** The top 20 total trade,

252 imports and export losses on a port-level expressed in million tonnes (MT). The losses

253 cover the period Jan-Aug 2020 compared to Jan-Aug 2019.

Rank	Total trade			Imports			Exports		
	Port	iso3	Change (MT)	Port	iso3	Change (MT)	Port	iso3	Change (MT)
1	Ningbo	CHN	-68.5	Ningbo	CHN	-43.5	Ningbo	CHN	-25.0
2	Rotterdam	NLD	-43.2	Rotterdam	NLD	-40.1	Tubarao	BRA	-17.1
3	Shanghai	CHN	-32.5	Shanghai	CHN	-22.4	Novorossiysk	RUS	-11.5
4	Wuhan	CHN	-21.6	Zhoushan	CHN	-13.8	Wuhan	CHN	-10.9
5	Tubarao	BRA	-20.7	Amsterdam	NLD	-12.2	Beaumont	USA	-10.6
6	Zhoushan	CHN	-18.8	Rizhao	CHN	-11.3	Dampier	AUS	-10.2
7	Amsterdam	NLD	-17.4	Wuhan	CHN	-10.7	Shanghai	CHN	-10.1
8	Shekou	CHN	-14.2	Mina Al Ahmadi	KWT	-9.5	Haypoint	AUS	-9.2
9	Hong Kong	HKG	-12.3	Vlissingen	NLD	-8.5	Lumut	MYS	-7.6
10	Vlissingen	NLD	-12.2	Zhanjiang	CHN	-7.6	Shekou	CHN	-7.5
11	Singapore	SGP	-12.1	Umm Said	QAT	-7.4	Tianjin	CHN	-7.3
12	Rizhao	CHN	-11.7	Yokohama	JPN	-7.3	Fujairah	ARE	-7.2
13	Novorossiysk	RUS	-11.7	Ghent	BEL	-7.1	Tangshan	CHN	-6.3
14	Lumut	MYS	-11.6	Singapore	SGP	-6.8	Xiamen	CHN	-6.1
15	Dampier	AUS	-10.8	Hong Kong	HKG	-6.7	Itaqui	BRA	-5.8
16	Yokohama	JPN	-9.9	Shekou	CHN	-6.7	Bohai Bay	CHN	-5.7
17	Haypoint	AUS	-9.7	Krishnapatnam	IND	-6.7	Puerto Bolivar	COL	-5.7
18	Beaumont	USA	-9.5	Magdalla	IND	-6.6	Hong Kong	HKG	-5.6
19	Ghent	BEL	-9.4	Port of Le Havre	FRA	-6.4	Primorsk	RUS	-5.5
20	Zhanjiang	CHN	-9.1	New York-New Jersey	USA	-6.0	Richards Bay	ZAF	-5.4

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263 **Geographical disparity**

264 Fig 2a-b show the country-aggregated relative changes in imports and exports, with
265 the top 20 largest negative (relative) changes included in Table 2 and largest negative
266 absolute changes in S1 Table. The top 20 largest total trade losses range between 17-
267 36%. The largest percentage change in imports are associated with small economies
268 such as Turks and Caicos Islands, the Caribbean Netherlands, Bahrain, Anguilla,
269 Federated States of Micronesia and Madagascar (all between 28-37% reduction). Most
270 of the countries with the largest import losses are Small Island Developing States,
271 which are characterised by having large import-dependencies due to their small
272 domestic economies, being reliant on maritime trade flows for trade, and importing
273 large amount of goods to support the tourism sector that constitutes a large share of
274 the country's GDP [26]. With the tourist industry collapsing due to the COVID-19
275 outbreak [27], the imports are expected to drop further significantly, explaining the
276 widespread reductions observed. Other countries, like a number of countries in Africa,
277 Myanmar, Oman, Philippines, the Baltic States and Sweden have increased their
278 imports, likely due to the increased need for food and medical supplies in developing
279 nations or increased household consumption in some developed countries. In terms of
280 exports, the largest relative losses are found for Libya, New Caledonia, Guinea-Bissau,
281 Northern Mariana Islands, Cape Verde and Sudan (all between 50-78% reduction).
282 These countries include many raw materials exporting countries that have suffered
283 from the demand shock across the world, in particular through trade dependencies with
284 Europe, China and the United States [28]. Moreover, many low income countries had
285 to pro-actively lockdown economies to protect their health care system, or are engaged
286 in economic activities that are less able to be done remotely [28,29]. Some countries

287 have increased their exports, such as India, Myanmar, Vietnam and Philippines,
288 potentially because of production shifts of manufacturing goods to these countries
289 when factory shut down in China [30]. Moreover, exports grew in Argentina, mainly due
290 to booming exports of food products (e.g. soybeans, beef) to the United States and
291 China [31], and in Tanzania, which increased its exports of gold and food (e.g. nuts)
292 and textile products (e.g. cotton) [32].

293 Using the World Bank income classification, we test whether high and upper middle
294 income countries have experienced more severe impacts than low and lower middle
295 income countries. Without excluding outliers from the data, we find a significant
296 difference (two-sided t-test with $p > 0.05$) between both income groups for exports and
297 imports, with high and upper middle income countries having higher export losses.
298 Hence, although the high and upper middle income countries have higher mean export
299 losses, the most extreme export losses and gains are found for low and lower middle
300 income countries.

301

302 **Fig 2. Country-level relative trade losses.** The relative trade losses for Jan-Aug 2020
303 compared to 2019 expressed in percentage change. Grey countries indicate no data
304 available.

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311 **Table 2. Largest relative trade losses on a country-level.** The total trade, imports
312 and export losses on a country-level expressed in million tonnes (MT). The losses
313 cover the period Jan-Aug 2020 compared to Jan-Aug 2019.

Rank	Total trade		Imports		Exports	
	Country	Change (%)	Country	Change (%)	Country	Change (%)
1	Anguilla	-35.6	Turks and Caicos Islands	-36.9	Libya	-77.8
2	Libya	-34.3	Bonaire, Saint Eustatius and Saba	-35.9	New Caledonia	-64.9
3	Federated States of Micronesia	-33.5	Bahrain	-31.3	Guinea-Bissau	-55.6
4	Cape Verde	-30.6	Anguilla	-30.7	Northern Mariana Islands	-54.9
5	Peru	-28.3	Federated States of Micronesia	-29.8	Cape Verde	-53.7
6	Bonaire, Saint Eustatius and Saba	-26.8	Madagascar	-28.4	Sudan	-49.4
7	Malta	-26.2	Timor-Leste	-26.0	Montenegro	-45.1
8	Eritrea	-26.1	Malta	-25.7	Eritrea	-44.6
9	Madagascar	-25.1	Grenada	-22.4	Dem. Republic Congo	-44.3
10	Montenegro	-24.9	Belize	-22.3	Vanuatu	-40.0
11	Turks and Caicos Islands	-24.8	Iran	-21.8	Kenya	-39.6
12	Vanuatu	-24.4	Seychelles	-21.5	Peru	-39.2
13	Seychelles	-23.7	French Polynesia	-21.1	Federated States of Micronesia	-38.4
14	Timor-Leste	-23.3	Aruba	-19.8	American Samoa	-34.9
15	Northern Mariana Islands	-22.2	Vanuatu	-19.4	Albania	-32.6
16	French Polynesia	-21.1	Iraq	-19.3	Seychelles	-28.0
17	Iraq	-20.1	Kuwait	-19.0	Malta	-27.2
18	New Caledonia	-19.3	Macau	-18.3	Yemen	-25.8
19	Bulgaria	-19.1	Bulgaria	-17.4	Romania	-25.6
20	Romania	-17.6	Cape Verde	-17.2	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	-23.7

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319 **Time series of total and sector-specific trade changes**

320 The total trade losses are not uniform across sectors. Fig 3 shows the estimated total
321 trade losses over time (Fig 3a) together with the trade losses for the 11 sector
322 classification considered. The total trade losses are found to be between -7.0% and -
323 9.6% (mean -8.3%), which is equal to around 206-286 MT in volume losses and up to
324 225-412 billion USD in trade value (uncertainty due to differences in total import and
325 export losses and due to the volume to value conversion). The time series show (Fig
326 3a) a clear initial drop in trade in the first three months, after which trade partly
327 recovers, followed by a second, more pronounced, drop in trade. In late August 2020,
328 a sign of economic recovery is not yet visible.

329 Some supply-chains have been more resilient than others. The most resilient sectors
330 are found to be Textiles and wearing apparel (-4.1%), Food and beverages (-5.8%),
331 Other manufacturing (-6.0%) and Wood and paper (-6.3%). The times series of Textiles
332 and wearing apparel and Other manufacturing show, however, a large drop in exports
333 in the early stages of the pandemic, mainly associated with production in China and
334 other Asian economies (e.g. Bangladesh, Malaysia), followed by a gradual recovery
335 and a less steep second drop. The Wood and paper and Food and beverages sectors
336 have been more stable throughout pandemic outbreak, as supply-chains were not
337 significantly disrupted, and demand for products only gradually declined, followed by
338 signs of a recovery at the end of August. The largest relative changes are found for the
339 Fishing sector (-9.5%), Mining and quarrying (-9.0%), Manufacturing of electronics and
340 machinery (-8.8%), and Manufacturing of transport equipment (-11.8%). The drop in
341 fishing products peaked late in the pandemic with a clear recovery in July and August.
342 The time series of the mining and quarrying sector shows a more complex picture with
343 a sharp drop in the beginning of the pandemic, as demand for raw materials decreased

344 in Asia, followed by a steep increase in trade to restock inventories, after which a total
345 collapse of the market can be observed, mainly associated with reduced demand for
346 oil. For the two manufacturing sectors, the large losses are the result of significant
347 supply-chain disruptions that caused upstream production processes to halt due to a
348 shortage in supplies [8]. In particular the Transport manufacturing industry,
349 characterised by just-in-time logistic services and highly specialised production
350 processes, experienced a gradual disruption throughout the first few months, after
351 which trade declined more than 20% in May, June and July.

352

353 **Fig 3. Sector-specific losses over time.** The change in daily global total trade as a
354 fraction of the average daily trade (over 2019). The dark blue line represent imports,
355 the dark red line represent exports, whereas the grey line indicate total trade (import +
356 exports). Sector 1: Agriculture; Sector 2: Fishing; Sector 3: Mining and quarrying;
357 Sector 4: Food and beverages; Sector 5: Textiles and wearing apparel; Sector 6: Wood
358 and paper; Sector 7: Petroleum, chemical and non-metallic mineral products; Sector
359 8: Metal products; Sector 9: Electrical and machinery; Sector 10: Transport equipment;
360 Sector 11: Other manufacturing.

361

362 **Impact of large-scale containment measures**

363 The results of the panel regression model are included in [Table 1](#). After testing various
364 model specifications (S1 Appendix), we find the most robust results for the model that
365 includes daily control variables for the number of confirmed cases as a fraction of the
366 population (Cases), demand reduction in trade dependent countries (Demand), the
367 potential supply disruptions through changes in import that are used for exports

368 (Supply), and potential other factors that are autocorrelated with the changes in export
369 (Export lag).

370 The effect of the composite index on daily export change is strong, and statistically
371 significant ($p < 0.01$), with a 10% increase of the index resulting in a -0.45% change in
372 exports (Model 1).

373 The influence of containment measures on exports is mixed with some measures
374 showing a negative impact while others showing a positive impact (Model 2). Negative
375 impacts are found for school closing (C1, ~~-2.63%~~, significant at $p < 0.05$), workplace
376 closure (C2, ~~-4.76%~~, significant at $p < 0.01$) and closing of public transport (C5, ~~-3.59%~~
377 significant at $p < 0.01$). Surprisingly, a positive effect is found for stay at home
378 requirements (C6, ~~+2.74%~~, significant at $p < 0.10$), restrictions on internal movement
379 (C7, ~~+2.17%~~, significant at $p < 0.10$). Hence, implementing some policies has enabled
380 countries to continue producing export goods and transport them to their ports,
381 although the signal is generally not strong.

382 The results are potentially biased because of the fact that containment measures may
383 affect domestic production in a lagged manner. In S2 Appendix, we perform additional
384 robustness tests by introducing a 4/8/12/16 day lag of the containment policies. This
385 increases the negative effect of school closures, which varies between -3.36% and -
386 6.87% depending on the lag (all significant at $p < 0.01$), while it increases the positive
387 effect of international travel bans for lags of 8 – 16 days (between +2.85% and 6.03%,
388 significant at $p < 0.01$).

389 Additionally, we run a model (Model 3 and 4 that includes daily dummy variables to
390 account for economy-wide factors that affect maritime exports) and a model (Model 5
391 and 6) which include only the days where the outbreak become significant in a country
392 (which we define as having at least 50 confirmed cases). This coefficient of the

393 composite index is stable across models (-4.53% versus -4.94% and -4.72%, Model 3
394 and 5). For the individual containment measures, the effect of school closures is larger
395 in Model 4 (-2.63%, significant at $p < 0.05$) and Model 6 (-6.53%, significant at $p <$
396 0.01). The positive effect of testing is enhanced in Model 6 (+2.83%, significant at p
397 < 0.05), whereas the positive effect of stay at home policies becomes larger and
398 statistically significant in Model 4 and 6 (+2.74%, significant at $p < 0.10$; +6.53%,
399 significant at $p < 0.01$). The results change little when performing additional robust
400 checks by modifying the number of days of the lag of the export and adding week
401 dummies (instead of day dummies) to the model (see S2 Appendix).

402 Across all model specifications, we find a consistent negative relationship between the
403 overall stringency index and maritime exports, and business and public transport
404 closures and maritime exports, whereas all other policies are either not significant, or
405 not consistently significant across different model specifications.

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417 **Table 3. The results of the various regression models.** The table shows the
 418 estimated beta coefficients and goodness of fit statistics for the six model specifications
 419 discussed. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
Parameter	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta	Beta
Composite	-4.527***		-4.939***		-4.717***	
C1		-1.969		-2.630**		-6.531***
C2		-4.703***		-4.755***		-3.006*
C3		0.557		0.381		1.298
C4		-0.613		-0.822		-2.114
C5		-3.588***		-3.500***		-5.429***
C6		2.049		2.740*		6.525***
C7		2.173**		2.191*		1.377
C8		1.825		1.995		3.771
H2		0.890		0.728		2.833**
Demand	-0.015	-0.033	-0.016	-0.014	0.005	-0.022
Cases	-0.129**	-0.113*	-0.130*	-0.124*	-0.393***	-0.427***
Supply	0.018***	0.018***	0.018***	0.018***	-0.003	-0.002
Export lag	0.350***	0.349***	0.351***	0.350***	0.402***	0.399***
R2	0.320	0.321	0.329	0.330	0.359	0.361
R2-adjusted	0.316	0.316	0.318	0.319	0.353	0.355
F-statistic	73.67	69.23	29.84	29.20	64.74	61.18

420

421

422 **Discussion and conclusion**

423 We present a near-global analysis of maritime trade indicators based on empirical
 424 vessel tracking data. We illustrate how the implementation of large-scale containment
 425 measures have resulted in large trade losses, and hence domestic output, with a strong
 426 geographical and sectoral heterogeneity.

427 Our estimate of a 4.4% reduction in global ports calls for the first eight months of 2020
 428 is lower than the 8.7% predicted by UNCTAD for the first six months [14]. The main
 429 reason for this difference is associated with the inclusion of different vessel types.

430 Whereas we include only the main trade-carrying vessels, the UNCTAD analysis also

431 included passengers vessels (66% of total port calls), which have seen the largest drop
432 in port calls (-17% for passenger vessels). Moreover, the sector-level trends we found
433 are in line with the sector-level impacts (based observed trade data of China, the
434 European Union and the United States) for the first quarter (Q1) of 2020 as presented
435 in the UNCTAD analysis [14], that stated that in particular the automotive industry (-
436 8%), machinery (-8%), office machinery (-8%) and textiles and apparel (-11%) are
437 particularly hit. Our analysis, which differs by only including maritime trade (instead of
438 total trade) and having a global scale (instead of three countries), found the average
439 losses in Q1 for the textiles and apparel (Sector 5), electrical equipment and machinery
440 manufacturing (Sector 9), transport equipment (Sector 10) and other manufacturing
441 (Sector 11) to be respectively 6.2%, 9.2%, 6.5% and 8.4%. The trade losses we
442 estimate (225-412 billion USD for the first eight months) are considerably lower than
443 reported in the modelling framework of Lenzen et al. [7], who estimated the trade
444 losses for the first five months of 2020 to be 536 billion USD. Again, part of this
445 difference is due to the coverage of countries (they provide a full global analysis) and
446 modes of transport (all modes compared to maritime only). Still, input-output based
447 analysis, as done in Lenzen et al. [7], often fail to consider adaptative behaviour in the
448 global economic system, which can dampen economic impacts [33]. The -8.6% trade
449 losses we found are also lower than the 26.8%, and up to 31%, value-added losses
450 (although not being directly comparable) reported in the global pandemic scenarios of
451 Guan et al. [6]. We expect the percentage change in trade losses to increase going
452 further in 2020, as daily trade losses are above 10% at the end of August. This is in
453 line with projections of the UNCTAD [14] and the WTO [10] that estimate a further
454 contraction of merchandise trade in the second half of 2020.

455 The results of the econometric model provide an alternative view to the studies that
456 have evaluated the effect of large-scaled containment measures on the spread of the
457 virus [1,2,4,34]. We find clear evidence of the negative impacts of large-scale
458 containment measures on changes in daily exports, with a 10% increase in the overall
459 stringency value resulting in a 0.45%-0.50% decrease in daily maritime exports. In
460 particular, introducing required closing of all public transport and all-but-essential
461 businesses resulted in large maritime export losses of up to 5.4-6.5% of daily export.
462 This is in agreement with Deb et al. [5], who used nitrogen emissions as an indicator
463 of industrial output and found that workplace closures had the largest influence on the
464 drop in emissions. Results should, however, be interpreted with caution, as many
465 factors could potentially influence these causal relationships. For instance, temporal
466 increases in maritime transport during some periods of the pandemic could be driven
467 by the large increase in trade of medical supplies (e.g. PPE) and mode substitution
468 from air to maritime [35], irrespective if policies were imposed during these periods.
469 Therefore, testing alternative economic indicators, such as data on retail sales,
470 mobility, flight, energy consumption and nitrogen emissions, as done in Deb et al. [5]
471 can help support these findings. Overall, our analysis of the economic implications of
472 introducing containment policies into society can help evaluating the cost-benefit of the
473 different containments measures, which may help governments construct effective
474 portfolios of policies as many countries enter a second-wave of COVID-19 cases [36].
475 Future work can refine our estimates by adding more trade data when it becomes
476 available, including extending the analysis to indicators of air, road and rail transport.
477 Moreover, the empirical estimates derived here can be used to constrain and validate
478 macro-economic impact models in order to improve the quantification of the total losses
479 to industrial output as the pandemic unfolds.

480 Overall, real-time indicators of economic activity, such as maritime trade, can help
481 identify trends in supply-chains networks and support governments and international
482 organisations in their economic recovery efforts by allocating funds to the hardest hit
483 economies and sectors.

484

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486 All derived datasets used for this analysis are made publicly available at Zenodo:
487 10.5281/zenodo.4146993 and will be published upon acceptance. The policy
488 indicators are obtained from the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker
489 ([https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-
490 response-tracker](https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker)).

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494

495 **Supporting information**

496 **S1 Appendix: Methodology maritime trade estimates**

497 **S2 Appendix: Econometric model**

498 **S1 Table. The top 20 largest negative maritime trade losses on a country-level.**

499 The total trade, imports and exports losses expressed in million tonnes (MT). The
500 losses cover the period Jan-Aug 2020 compared to Jan-Aug 2019.

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
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
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
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