A veil of ignorance can promote fairness in a mammal society Marshall et al

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Contents

A. Model Details

As stated in the main text, we suppose that two unrelated but cooperatively-breeding mothers have each given birth to a single offspring. As a result of differences in pre-natal parental 5 investment, the two young may differ in initial size, denoted *xi* for offspring *i* (we are concerned here with the impact of post-natal care on pre-existing inequalities among young, so we treat the initial sizes of the offspring as given). After birth, each mother must take on the post-natal care of one or other of the two young, leading either to an outcome in which each raises her own offspring, or to an outcome in which each raises the other's offspring. A mother may choose to 10 invest any non-negative level of effort, denoted *yj* for mother *j*, in caring for the offspring that she ends up raising. The survival of offspring *i*, when raised by mother *j*, is equal to *b(xi* + *yj)*, a smoothly increasing but decelerating function of the total investment it receives pre- and postnatally, while the mother incurs a cost to her future reproductive success $c(k_i; y_i)$ that is a smoothly increasing and accelerating function of *yj*. The parameter *kj* determines how steeply the 15 cost of care increases with investment for mother *j*. For the results shown in Figure 1 and discussed in the main text we assume $b(x) = x (1 - x/2)$ (for $x \le 1$) and $c(k; y) = k y^2$.

No veil

Consider, first, the situation in which the maternity of each offspring is known (i.e. there is no 20 veil of ignorance). If each mother cares for her own offspring, then the payoff to mother *i* is given by

$$
W_i = b(x_i + y_i) - c(k_i; y_i)
$$

25 and the equilibrium level of post-natal investment by mother i , y_i^* , which maximises this payoff, satisfies

$$
\left. \frac{\partial w_i}{\partial y_i} = 0 \right|_{y_i = y_i^*}
$$

30 For the case considered in Figure 1 and the main text, in which b(x) = *x* (1 – *x*/2) (where we assume that $x_1, x_2 \leq 1$) and $c(k; y) = k y^2$, this gives

$$
y_i^* = \frac{1 - x_i}{1 + 2k_i}
$$

35 yielding an equilibrium payoff W_i^* of

$$
W_i^* = \frac{1 + 2k_i x_i (2 - x_i)}{2 + 4k_i} \tag{S1}
$$

By contrast, if each mother cares for the other's offspring, then the payoff to mother *i* is given by

40

 $W_i = b(x_i + y_i) - c(k_i; y_i)$

where y_i denotes the investment in post-natal care by the non-focal mother). The equilibrium level of post-natal investment y_i* by mother *i*, is then given by

$$
5 \qquad \qquad y_i^* = 0
$$

(since her own offspring does not benefit from her investment), yielding an equilibrium payoff *Wi ** of

$$
10 \t W_i^* = 0 \t (S2)
$$

Comparing (S1) and (S2), we see that both mothers obtain a higher payoff if each cares for her own offspring rather than the other's offspring (since in the latter case, both do best to refrain from investing any effort in care, leading to the death of both young).

15

Behind the veil

Now consider the situation in which the maternity of the young is concealed behind a veil of ignorance. Under these circumstances, the two offspring can be distinguished only by their initial sizes, and we will write x_{hi} and x_{lo} (< x_{hi}) for the sizes of the larger and of the smaller young, 20 respectively (where we assume that *x*hi ≠ *x*lo and that each offspring is equally likely to be derived from either mother). If mother 1 cares for the larger offspring and mother 2 for the smaller, they obtain payoffs

$$
W_1 = \frac{1}{2}b(x_{hi} + y_1) + \frac{1}{2}b(x_{lo} + y_2) - c(k_1; y_1)
$$

25

$$
W_2 = \frac{1}{2}b(x_{hi} + y_1) + \frac{1}{2}b(x_{lo} + y_2) - c(k_2; y_2)
$$

and the equilibrium levels of post-natal investment by the two mothers, y_1^* and y_2^* , satisfy

$$
30 \qquad \frac{\partial W_i}{\partial y_i} = 0 \Big|_{y_i = y_i^*}
$$

For the case considered in Figure 1 and the main text, in which $b(x) = x(1 - x/2)$ (where we assume that x_{hi} , $x_{lo} \leq 1$) and $c(y; k) = k y^2$, this gives

35
$$
y_1^* = \frac{1 - x_{hi}}{1 + 4k_1}, y_2^* = \frac{1 - x_{lo}}{1 + 4k_2}
$$

yielding payoffs

40
$$
W_1^* = \frac{1+4k_1x_{\text{hi}}(2-x_{\text{hi}})}{4+16k_1} + \frac{(1+4k_2(2-x_{\text{lo}}))(1+4k_2x_{\text{lo}})}{4(1+4k_2)^2}
$$
(S3a)

$$
W_2^* = \frac{1 + 4k_2 x_{10}(2 - x_{10})}{4 + 16k_2} + \frac{(1 + 4k_1(2 - x_{11})) (1 + 4k_1 x_{11})}{4(1 + 4k_1)^2}
$$
(S3b)

An equivalent calculation for the alternative scenario in which mother 1 cares for the smaller 5 offspring and mother 2 for the larger, gives

 $y_1^* = \frac{1 - x_{10}}{1 + 4k_1}$, $y_2^* = \frac{1 - x_{hi}}{1 + 4k_2}$

yielding payoffs

$$
10\:
$$

$$
W_1^* = \frac{1 + 4k_1x_{10}(2 - x_{10})}{4 + 16k_1} + \frac{(1 + 4k_2(2 - x_{11})) (1 + 4k_2x_{11})}{4(1 + 4k_2)^2}
$$
(54a)

$$
W_2^* = \frac{1 + 4k_2 x_{\text{hi}} (2 - x_{\text{hi}})}{4 + 16k_2} + \frac{(1 + 4k_1 (2 - x_{\text{lo}})) (1 + 4k_1 x_{\text{lo}})}{4(1 + 4k_1)^2}
$$
(54b)

15 Comparing (S3) and (S4), we find that if

$$
k_1 < \frac{4k_2^2}{1 + 8k_2} \tag{S5}
$$

then both mothers obtain a greater payoff when mother 1 (who under these circumstances 20 enjoys lower costs of care) cares for the smaller offspring, while if

$$
k_2 < \frac{4k_1^2}{1+8k_1} \tag{S6}
$$

then both mothers obtain a greater payoff when mother 2 (who under these circumstances 25 enjoys lower costs of care) cares for the smaller offspring. These are the shaded zones of agreement in Figure 1 in the main text. Note that since each offspring is equally likely to be derived from either mother, the mutually preferred outcome in these zones is as likely to result in each mother caring for the other's offspring as it is to result in each caring for her own. Hence, in the main text, we refer to the outcome as 'care according to need' rather than 'care according 30 to parentage'. If neither (S5) nor (S6) is met, then each mother obtains a greater payoff when the other cares for the smaller offspring; this is the unshaded zone of disagreement in Figure 1 in the main text.

Can relatedness between mothers lead to offspring exchange?

35 We have seen, above, that a veil of ignorance over parentage can lead (within the zones of agreement) to 'care according to need', with mothers mutually preferring an outcome in which each is as likely to care for the other's offspring as for her own. Here, we consider whether

relatedness between mothers might also lead to a mutually preferable outcome in which each cares for the other's offspring, i.e. to exchange of young, even when parentage is known.

Let *r* denote the coefficient of relatedness between the two mothers. We assume that each 5 behaves (at evolutionary equilibrium) so as to maximise the sum of her own direct fitness payoff from current and future young, plus *r* times the direct fitness payoff to the other mother (a 'simplified' application of Hamilton's rule; see e.g. $ref¹$ p120).

If each mother cares for her own offspring, then the relevant sum for mother 1 is given by

$$
10\:
$$

$$
W_1 = b(x_1 + y_1) - c(k_1; y_1) + rb(x_2 + y_2) - rc(k_2; y_2)
$$

and for mother 2 by

15
$$
W_2 = b(x_2 + y_2) - c(k_2; y_2) + rb(x_1 + y_1) - rc(k_1; y_1)
$$

and the equilibrium levels of post-natal investment y_1^* and y_2^* , which satisfy

$$
\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial y_i} = 0\Big|_{y_i = y_i^*} \text{ for } i = 1, 2,
$$

20

are given by

$$
y_i^* = \frac{1 - x_i}{1 + 2k_i},
$$

25 leading to equilibrium payoff sums of

$$
W_1^* = \frac{1 + 2k_1x_1(2 - x_1)}{2 + 4k_1} + r \frac{1 + 2k_2x_2(2 - x_2)}{2 + 4k_2}
$$
 (S7a)

$$
W_2^* = \frac{1 + 2k_2x_2(2 - x_2)}{2 + 4k_2} + r \frac{1 + 2k_1x_1(2 - x_1)}{2 + 4k_1}
$$
(57b)

30

By contrast, if each mother cares for the other's offspring, then the relevant payoff sum for mother 1 is given by

$$
W_1 = b(x_1 + y_2) - c(k_1; y_1) + rb(x_2 + y_1) - rc(k_2; y_2)
$$

35

and for mother 2 by

$$
W_2 = b(x_2 + y_1) - c(k_2; y_2) + rb(x_1 + y_2) - rc(k_1; y_1),
$$

40 and the equilibrium levels of post-natal investment y_1^* and y_2^* , which satisfy

$$
\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial y_i} = 0\Big|_{y_i = y_i^*} \text{ for } i = 1, 2,
$$

are given by

$$
5 \t y_1^* = \frac{r(1-x_2)}{1+2k_1}, \ y_2^* = \frac{r(1-x_1)}{1+2k_2},
$$

leading to equilibrium payoff sums of

$$
W_1^* = \frac{r(r+4k_2) + 4k_2^2s_1(2-s_1)}{2(r+2k_2)^2} - \frac{rk_1(1-s_2)^2}{(r+2k_1)^2} + r\left(\frac{r(r+4k_1) + 4k_1^2s_1(2-s_1)}{2(r+2k_1)^2} - \frac{rk_2(1-s_1)^2}{(r+2k_2)^2}\right)
$$
(S8a)

$$
W_2^* = \frac{r(r+4k_1) + 4k_1^2s_1(2-s_1)}{2(r+2k_1)^2} - \frac{rk_1(1-s_2)^2}{(r+2k_1)^2} + r\left(\frac{r(r+4k_2) + 4k_2^2s_1(2-s_1)}{2(r+2k_2)^2} - \frac{rk_1(1-s_2)^2}{(r+2k_1)^2}\right)
$$
(S8b)

Comparing (S7) and (S8) we can then determine whether, and under what circumstances, both parents favour exchange of young (assuming that exchange will occur only if it is in the favour of 15 both).

Whereas the outcome of the model behind the veil depended only on the costs of care to each mother, i.e. on the parameters k_1 and k_2 , in this case, the outcome depends also on the relatedness between mothers r, and on the initial sizes of the offspring, x_1 and x_2 . In general, a 20 mutual preference for exchange of young is more likely when the costs of care differ markedly between the two mothers, when relatedness is high, and when the two offspring differ markedly in size. In each of the Supplementary Figures 1 to 4 below, we show the combinations of k_1 and *k*² for which both mothers favour exchange (as in Figure 1 in the main text), for *r* = 0.125, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (note that, as shown above, when *r* = 0 and the mothers are unrelated, each always 25 prefers to care for her own offspring regardless of other parameter values). The four figures show results for increasing degrees of initial size asymmetry between the offspring (assuming in all cases that $x_2 > x_1$, i.e. that the larger offspring is born to parent 2; results when $x_1 > x_2$ are simply a mirror image of those shown). Supplementary Figure 1 assumes the smallest degree of asymmetry, equivalent to that assumed at point A in Figure 1 in the main text ($x_1 = 0.15$, $x_2 =$ 30 0.25). Supplementary Figure 2 assumes a three-fold asymmetry equivalent to that assumed at point B in Figure 1 in the main text $(x_1 = 0.1, x_2 = 0.3)$, which is already quite large compared to the asymmetries observed in our experimental study. In Supplementary Figure 3 the asymmetry is still larger, at five-fold $(x_1 = 0.1, x_2 = 0.5)$; and in Supplementary Figure 4 seven-fold $(x_1 = 0.1, x_2)$ $= 0.7$).

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Our results suggest that exchange of young is only likely for higher levels of relatedness and greater size asymmetries than are plausible for the mongoose study system, where relatedness between mothers is typically 0.24 (median, IQR = 0.05-0.37, n = 1,134 dyads across 49 breeding attempts) and size asymmetries typically 1.44 ± 0.29 (mean ± s.d. largest/smallest pup weight 40 under 50 days old, n = 52 litters). For instance, even assuming a three-fold difference in initial size between offspring, exchange is only feasible for relatedness values of ~0.7 and above (and

then is only likely if parents differ markedly in the costs of care). For exchange of young to prove mutually beneficial given a more plausible relatedness of 0.25 requires around a seven-fold difference in initial size between young (and again a marked difference between parents in the costs of care).

Supplementary Figure 1

5 Supplementary Figure 1. Combinations of *k*¹ and *k*² (costs of care for mothers 1 and 2) for which both mothers favour exchange (as in figure 1 in the main text), for $r = 0.125$, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, assuming initial offspring sizes of $x_1 = 0.15$ and *x*² = 0.25 (as at point A of Figure 1 in the main text). Note that, as shown above, when *r* = 0 and the mothers are unrelated, each always prefers to care for her own offspring regardless of other parameter values. The unshaded region (labelled 'yes') in each panel corresponds to the zone within which both mothers stand to gain by exchanging 10 young; in the shaded region (labelled 'no'), one or both of the mothers stands to gain if each cares for its own offspring (the numbers in parentheses following the 'no' indicating for which parent(s) this is the case).

Supplementary Figure 2

Supplementary Figure 2. Combinations of *k*¹ and *k*² (costs of care for mothers 1 and 2) for which both mothers favour exchange (as in Figure 1 in the main text), for $r = 0.125$, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, assuming initial offspring sizes of $x_1 = 0.1$ and *x*² = 0.3 (as at point B of Figure 1 in the main text). Note that, as shown above, when *r* = 0 and the mothers are unrelated, each always prefers to care for her own offspring regardless of other parameter values. The unshaded 10 region (labelled 'yes') in each panel corresponds to the zone within which both mothers stand to gain by exchanging young; in the shaded region (labelled 'no'), one or both of the mothers stands to gain if each cares for its own offspring (the numbers in parentheses following the 'no' indicating for which parent(s) this is the case).

Supplementary Figure 3

5 Supplementary Figure 3. Combinations of *k*¹ and *k*² (costs of care for mothers 1 and 2) for which both mothers favour exchange (as in Figure 1 in the main text), for $r = 0.125$, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, assuming initial offspring sizes of $x_1 = 0.1$ and *x*² = 0.5. (note that, as shown above, when *r* = 0 and the mothers are unrelated, each always prefers to care for her own offspring regardless of other parameter values). The unshaded region (labelled 'yes') in each panel corresponds to the zone within which both mothers stand to gain by exchanging young; in the shaded region 10 (labelled 'no'), one or both of the mothers stands to gain if each cares for its own offspring (the numbers in parentheses following the 'no' indicating for which parent(s) this is the case).

Supplementary Figure 4

Supplementary Figure 4. Combinations of *k*¹ and *k*² (costs of care for mothers 1 and 2) for which both mothers favour exchange (as in Figure 1 in the main text), for $r = 0.125$, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, assuming initial offspring sizes of $x_1 = 0.1$ and *x*² = 0.7. (note that, as shown above, when *r* = 0 and the mothers are unrelated, each always prefers to care for her own offspring regardless of other parameter values). The unshaded region (labelled 'yes') in each panel 10 corresponds to the zone within which both mothers stand to gain by exchanging young; in the shaded region (labelled 'no'), one or both of the mothers stands to gain if each cares for its own offspring (the numbers in parentheses following the 'no' indicating for which parent(s) this is the case).

B. Supplementary results and tables

Maternal weight change

Experimental category (fed, non-fed) predicted variation in maternal weight change from prepregnancy baseline during pregnancy and post-pregnancy periods, but not during the escorting 5 period (Supplementary Table 2). During pregnancy, fed females proportionally gained more weight than non-fed females and females in unmanipulated breeding attempts (post-hoc Tukey's test, PHT. fed vs non-fed: $z = 2.42$, $p = 0.039$; fed vs unmanipulated: $z = 2.71$, $p = 0.017$), but nonfed and unmanipulated females gained similar amounts of weight (PHT. $z = 1.19$, $p = 0.45$). Fed females remained heavier than non-fed females in the post-pregnancy period (PHT. z = 2.68, p = 10 0.019), but there was no significant difference between fed and unmanipulated females at this stage, nor between non-fed and unmanipulated females compared to their pre-pregnancy baselines (PHT. fed vs unmanipulated: $z = 1.90$, $p = 0.13$; non-fed vs unmanipulated: $z = 0.51$, $p =$ 0.86). By the escorting period fed, non-fed and unmanipulated females all had similar weight changes compared to pre-pregnancy (PHT. fed vs non-fed: $z = 1.11$, $p = 0.51$; fed vs 15 unmanipulated: $z = 0.03$, $p = 1.00$; non-fed vs unmanipulated: $z = 0.96$, $p = 0.60$).

Adult escorting effort

Experimental category (females) and breeding attempt type (males) explained a significant proportion of the variation in individuals' total escorting effort within each breeding attempt 20 (Supplementary Table 3). Fed females escorted pups more than non-fed and unmanipulated females (PHT. fed vs non-fed: $z = 3.39$, $p = 0.002$; fed vs unmanipulated: $z = 5.11$, $p = 6.33 \times 10^{-7}$), but the non-fed females and females in unmanipulated breeding attempts did not differ in their escorting effort (PHT, $z = 1.43$, $p = 0.32$). Males escorted pups more in experimentally manipulated breeding attempts than in unmanipulated breeding attempts (PHT. $z = 2.76$, $p =$ 25 0.006). Both males and females escorted pups less when there were more adults per pup in the group, but age did not affect escorting effort in either case (Supplementary Table 3).

Female escorting allocation depended on both their and the pup's experimental category (Supplementary Table 4). Fed females invested more escorting effort in control pups than

treatment pups (PHT, $z = 2.33$, $p = 0.02$), but the amount of escorting effort provided by non-fed females did not differ between control and treatment pups (PHT, $z = 0.16$, $p = 0.88$). Males' escorting effort did not differ between treatment and control pups (PHT, $z = 1.65$, $p = 0.10$; Supplementary Table 4). Relatedness between escorts and pups was lower in experimentally 5 manipulated litters compared to unmanipulated litters(experimental: median = 0.11, IQR = -0.04- 0.30, $n = 100$ dyads across 10 litters; unmanipulated: median = 0.22, IQR = 0.06-0.36, $n = 109$ dyads across 11 litters; Mann-Whitney U = 6,599, $p = 0.009$). There was no difference in the relatedness of non-escort adults and pups in experimental and unmanipulated litters (experimental: median = 0.18, IQR = 0.003-0.32, n = 843 dyads across 10 litters; unmanipulated: 10 median = 0.20, IQR = 0.04-0.34, n = 865 dyads across 11 litters; Mann-Whitney U = 381647, p = 0.09)

Pup weight and growth

Our growth models estimated differences in birth weight between treatment and control pups 15 (mean \pm s.d. predicted birth weights: treatment = 164.9 \pm 3.5g, control = 142.0 \pm 3.2g; β \pm s.e. = 0.15 \pm 0.071, z = 2.13, p = 0.033, Supplementary Table 5), but not between pups from unmanipulated litters (143.5 \pm 6.5g) and treatment or control pups (treatment vs unmanipulated: $z = 1.26$, $p = 0.21$; control vs unmanipulated: $z = 0.41$, $p = 0.68$). Pup growth across the escorting period also depended on experimental category (age x experimental category in Supplementary 20 Table 5). Control pups grew faster than treatment pups (PHT. β ± s.e. = 0.0022 ± 0.0008, z = 2.68, $p = 0.020$), but growth rates did not differ between control and unmanipulated pups (PHT. $\beta \pm$ s.e. = 0.0003 \pm 0.0010, z = 0.34, p = 0.94) and treatment and unmanipulated pups (PHT. β \pm s.e. = 0.0019 ± 0.0011 , $z = 1.81$, $p = 0.17$). Pup weights in manipulated litters were more variable than in unmanipulated litters at the start of the escorting period but there was no difference by the 25 end of escorting (relative within-litter variance in manipulated versus unmanipulated litters in: pups aged 30-60 days, $U = 16$, $p = 0.029$; pups aged 60-90 days, $U = 13$, $p = 0.38$).

Escorting received by pups

Pup experimental category predicted the total amount of escorting that a pup received across the escorting period as well as the rate they were fed by their escort (Supplementary Table 6). Control pups received more escorting than treatment pups and pups born in unmanipulated 5 litters (PHT. control vs treatment: $\beta \pm$ s.e. = 0.81 \pm 0.23, z = 3.59, p = 9.13x10⁻⁴; control vs unmanipulated: β ± s.e. = 1.34 ± 0.42, z = 3.19, p = 0.0038), but the amount of escorting received by treatment and unmanipulated pups did not differ (PHT. β ± s.e. = 0.53 ± 0.41, z = 1.28, p = 0.39). Control pups were also fed more often by their escorts than treatment pups (PHT. $β ± s.e.$ $= 0.85 \pm 0.28$, $z = 3.09$, $p = 0.005$). Pups born in unmanipulated litters were fed more often by 10 their escorts than treatment pups (PHT. β ± s.e. = 0.58 ± 0.23, z = 2.49, p = 0.032), but were fed at the same rate as control pups (PHT. $β ± s.e. = 0.27 ± 0.19$, $z = 1.42$, $p = 0.33$).

Pup survival

Pups from the different experimental categories did not differ significantly in their survival to 90, 15 180 or 365 days old (Supplementary Table 7).

5 **Supplementary Figure 5.** An example schematic of the experimental design within each banded mongoose group. Breeding attempt 1: three females are pregnant and females 1 and 3 are assigned as 'fed' females, whilst female 2 is left as the 'non-fed' control. Breeding attempt 2: unmanipulated breeding attempt with no females fed to allow the effects of the provisioning in breeding attempt 1 to dissipate. During this period female 1 leaves the group (through death or dispersal) and female 4 becomes sexually mature. Breeding attempt 3: Females 2 and 3 are paired 10 and assigned the opposite groups to the groups they were assigned in breeding attempt 1. Female 4 is unpaired and is randomly assigned to the fed category (though she could just as easily have been assigned to the non-fed category). Breeding attempt 4: unmanipulated breeding attempt with no females fed to allow the effects of the provisioning in breeding attempt 3 to dissipate.

Supplementary Table 1. Sample sizes used in the statistical models.

Supplementary Table 2. Linear mixed effects models predicting the effect of prenatal provisioning on maternal percentage weight change since conception. β and standard error (s.e.) denote the parameter estimates, and uncertainty, for each variable. χ^2 and p values are from likelihood ratio tests and r^2 values are the conditional values for each model².

^areference category = females in unmanipulated breeding attempts

Supplementary Table 3. Binomial mixed effects models predicting the effect of prenatal provisioning on female and male escorting effort per breeding attempt. β and standard error (s.e.) denote the parameter estimates, and uncertainty, for each variable. χ^2 and p values are from likelihood ratio tests and r^2 values are the conditional values for each model².

areference category = unmanipulated litters

Supplementary Table 4. Binomial mixed effects models predicting the effect of prenatal provisioning on female and male escorting allocation between control and treatment pups. β and standard error (s.e.) denote the parameter estimates, and uncertainty, for each variable. χ^2 and p values are from likelihood ratio tests and r^2 values are the conditional values for each model².

reference categories = ^anon-fed females, ^bcontrol pups, ^cfemale

Supplementary Table 5. Poisson log-normal mixed effects model predicting the effect of prenatal provisioning on pup weight and growth during the escorting period (age 30-90 days). β and standard error (s.e.) denote the parameter estimates, and uncertainty, for each variable. χ^2 and p values are from likelihood ratio tests and r^2 values are the conditional values for the model².

reference categories = ^acontrol pups, ^bfemale

Supplementary Table 6. Mixed effects model predicting the effect of prenatal provisioning on the total escorting received by pup (binomial model) and the rate they were fed by escorts (Poisson log-normal model). β and standard error (s.e.) denote the parameter estimates, and uncertainty, for each variable. χ^2 and p values are from likelihood ratio tests and r^2 values are the 5 conditional values for each model²

reference category = ^acontrol pups

Supplementary Table 7. Cox proportional hazards mixed-effects models predicting the effect of prenatal provisioning on pup survival to 90, 180 and 365 days old. β and standard error (s.e.) denote the parameter estimates, and uncertainty, for each variable. χ^2 and p values are from likelihood ratio tests and r^2 values are the likelihood-ratio pseudo values for each model³.

reference category = ^acontrol pups

Supplementary references

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