

reference No.	parties' composition				opponent perceived type			interaction flow type				instructions		opponents	rounds	strategy						reward matrix	comments			
	group	multiplayer	individual		algorithm,predefined		real	simultaneous		sequential		narration/rules	options			tft ^[1]	wsls ^[2]	ac ^[3]	ad ^[4]	random /half ^[5]	other					
			neighbours (links)	individual	non-human/pc	human		one-shot	iterated	one-shot	iterated															
					unknown, told non-human/pc	told human																		[1]Tft: tit-for-tat [2]wsls: win-stay-lose-swift [3]ac: Always Cooperate [4]ad: Always Defect [5]random: 50% of cooperation or defection, half: cooperate or defect in half of the rounds		
Kumar et al., 2021				x			x		x			matrix	transfer/keep	4	1									6/4/2/0		
Zhang et al., 2020				x		x			x				red/black	1	60	x									10/7/0/0/, 10/3/0/0	
Cervantes Constantino et al., 2021				x			x		x			matrix	coop/not coop	1	200							x ^[1]			3/2/1/0	[1]c in round 1, reciprocation with 80%possibility, change of decision after 3 cosequives same mutual decisions
Maeda and Hashimoto, 2020							x	x				Give doubled	give 3-5	1	1										depends on the amount given by each player	
Horita, 2020				x			x		x			Give doubled	give/retain	1	42										60/40/20/0	
Behrens et al., 2020				x			x		x			matrix	A,B,C,D,E,F	1	60										6x6 matrix	
Hobbs et al., 2020				x	x				x			matrix	coop/def	2	26	x ^[1]									75/50/25/0	[1]one of two opponents defected in the first round
de Melo and Terada, 2020				x		x			x			Investment story	project Green/Blue	1	20							x ^[1]			7/5/3/2	[1]extortionate/generous 2D strategy (Press and Dyson [ref.no 228])
Rostovtseva et al., 2020				x			x	x					coop/def	4	1											
Grujić and Lenaerts, 2020				x(4)			x		x			matrix	blue/yellow		50(unknown)										6/5/1/0	
Prétôt and McAuliffe, 2020				x			x		x			Tray and beans	blue/green or red/yellow	1	6										4/3/1/0	
Mieth et al., 2021				x	x					pA		Joint invest (factor:4/3)	coop/no coop	40	1										20/10/0/-10,10/5/0/-5	
Samu et al., 2020				x			x	x				matrix	L/D	20	1										2500/1500/500/0	
Prétôt et al., 2020				x			x	x				Tray and beans	blue/green or red/yellow	7	1										4/3/1/0	
Koch et al., 2020				x		x		x				Give doubled	give 0-1 (step 0.1)	30	1										depends on the amount given by each player	
Neto et al., 2020				x	x	x				pA,pB			coop/def	2	30						x ^[1]				3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]
Lin et al., 2020				x		x		x				matrix	A/B	30	1										15/10/5/0	
Cigarini et al., 2020				x			x	x				matrix (sharing resources)	coop/def	2	1										15/10/5/0,3/2/1/0	
Gallotti and Grujić, 2019				x(8)			x		x			matrix	blue/yellow	fixed - reshuffled type(multiplayer), 1(vs individual)	random-unknown(47,60,58) (multiplayer),100(vs individual)										10/7/0/0	
V.Capraro, 2019				x			x	x				Give doubled	transfer/not transfer	1	1										30/20/10/0	
Chen et al., 2019		X(3)					x	x					Strategy A,B	12 ^[1,2]	1										22/20/18/16/14/12 based on the combination of choices ^[3]	[1]random regroup after each round [2]opponents decisions are anonymously presented [3]possibility of punishment after each round for a player of own or other group
Huang et al., 2019				x		x		x					coop/no coop	32	1										1.4/1/0.6/0.2, 1.4/1/0.6/0.5, 1.1/1/0.6/0.2, 1.1/1/0.6/0.5	
Javor et al., 2019				x		x			x				coop/no coop	4	32(unknown)							x ^[1]			50/30/10/0	[1]Rilling 2002 [ref.no 200]
Yang and Yue, 2019				x	x		x	x	x				A/B	<=5,<=15 ^[1]	1,<=25										12/8/3/1	[1] possible opponent change in each round based on the previous 5 choices
Heuer and Orland, 2019				x(10)			x	x				matrix	A/B		1										85/75/30/25	
Eimontaite et al., 2019				x					x			Prisoner's story	keep silent/tell on	9	12										6 matrices: 5*n/3*n/-1*n/-5*n	
Thompson et al., 2019				x		x			x				coop/no coop	3	20							x ^[1]			3/2/1/0	[1]McClure 2007 [ref.no 183]
Viola et al., 2019				x				x				Prisoner's story													3/2/1/0	
Zhang et al., 2019				x		x			x				coop/def	1	240										3/2/1/0 ^[1]	[1]changing matrix with stable mean reward values
Testori et al., 2019				x(<=2)			x		x				coop/nothing		50(unknown)										coop: costs of 10 per neighbor while neighbors gain 60 each	
Mienaltowski and Wichman, 2020				x		x			x			Doors-keys	select door	1	32	x						x ^[1]				[1]self-interest on 25% of rounds
Baas et al., 2019				x								matrix	C/NC		5										6/4/3/2, 6/4/3/0	
Rodriguez-Ruiz et al., 2019				x		x	x	x						1	1										160/90/30/10	
Chu et al., 2019				x			x					matrix	split/steal	1											10/5/1/0	[1]d in round 1
Testori et al., 2019				x	x	x			x			Product offer story	standard price/sale price	1	30	tft ^[1]									40/30/20/10	[1]d in 2 last rounds
Schaper et al., 2019				x	x			x				Joint invest (factor:4/3)	coop/no coop	60	1										20/10/0/-10	
Belaus et al., 2018				x			x		x				A/B	1	1											
Savulich et al., 2018				x		x			x			Split or steal	split/steal	3		x,tft									2*n/n/0/0 2*n:points gathered	
Acosta et al., 2019				x		x			x				left/right	2	60							x ^[1]			20/20/0/10	[1]Rilling ,2004a [ref.no 195]
Galbiati et al., 2018				x			x	x	x			matrix	A/B	until 15min concluded	75% possibility for next round										60/40/35/12, 50/40/25/12	
Gabay et al., 2018				x		x			x				compete/coop	6	15										120/90/60/30	[1]c in 13/15 rounds [2]c in 3/15 rounds
Zhang et al., 2018				x	x								red/black card	1		x									10/7/3/0	
Taheri et al., 2018				x	x		x		x				collaborate/betray	2	13-17										0.5/0.3/0.1/0 ^[2]	[1]Tft with random choice at 20% of rounds [2]possible loss or gain of 0.2 after a round
Dorough and Glöckner, 2018				x			x	x				Give doubled	transfer 0-200 (step 10)	1	6										30/20/10/0	
Bitsch et al., 2018a				x		x			x				C/D	3	6										20/20/0/10	[1]c in 5 rounds [2]c in 3rounds [3]d in 5 rounds
Deutchman and Sullivan, 2018				x		x			x			Prisoner's story, matrix	coop/betray, A/B	1	1										20/10/15/0, 0/-10/-15/-20	
Wang et al., 2018				x			x		x			matrix	1/2/3	~20(until 75min)	~4(25% possibility next round)										3/1/0/-2 ^[1]	[1]reward option costs 2 for player and gains 3 for the opponent

Acedo-Carmona and Gomila, 2018				x		x		x			matrix	share/get	2	3	x		x			6/3/1/0					
Vives and FeldmanHall, 2018				x				x												5/4/1/0					
Arechar et al., 2018				x				x	x		matrix	A/B	many	7/8,1/8 next round						5/4/1/0					
Levine et al., 2018				x						pA,pB	Give doubled	transfer/not transfer	1	1						90/60/30/0					
Colman et al., 2018				x							matrix	J/K	1	300						5/3/1/0,5/4/1/0					
Bruno et al., 2018	x							x					1	11											
Antonioni et al., 2018				x							matrix	X/Y	1	10(unknown)						4*n/3*n/2*n/1*n ^[1]	[1]asymmetric PD, n based on hierarchy for each player				
Bitsch et al., 2018b				x							matrix	coop/def	21	6					x ^[1,2,3]	20/20/0/10	[1]c in 5 rounds [2]c in 3rounds [3]d in 5 rounds				
Li et al., 2018				x							matrix	triangle/circle shape ^[1]	1	10					x	4/3/2/1	[1]punishment option for the cooperator after round				
Rilling et al., 2018				x	x	x					pA,pB	coop/def	4	30						x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]			
Hu et al., 2018				x							x ^[1]		1	120							6/5/1/0,7/4/1-1	[1]half told opponent is the computer			
Menshikov et al., 2017				x							x	x	x	3	18						10/5/1/0				
Kaartinen et al., 2017				x							pB		2	1							3/2/1/0				
Bell et al., 2017				x	x						pA	Joint invest (factor:4/3)	coop/no coop	48	1						20/10/0/-10,10/5/0/-5				
Bland et al., 2017				x	x							Split or steal	split/steal	3	9						2*n/n/0/0, 2*n:points gathered				
Jahng et al., 2017				x							x(live)		x	1	30(unknown)						10/5/3/0				
Barreda-Tarrazona et al., 2017				x							x	x	x	10(one-shot),2(iterated)	1(one-shot),10(iterated)						28/20/10/0,2.8/2/1/0				
Peshkovskaya et al., 2017				x							x	x	x	up/down,left/right	<=11(one-shot),1(iterated)	1(one-shot),15(iterated)					10/5/1/0				
Melamed et al., 2017				x							x	x	x	matrix	contribute/not contribute	>=3	12(unknown)				7/4/1/-1				
Chen et al., 2017				x	x	x					pA,pB	coop/def	2	30						x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]			
Lambert et al., 2017				x							pA		K/L	25	120(randomly distributed among opps)					x ^[1]	25 different matrices with standard T-R=1	[1]60% c after c, 100% d after d			
Mieth et al., 2016a				x	x							x		Joint invest (factor:4/3)	coop/not coop ^[1]	20					20/10/0/-10	[1]punishment option for the cooperator after round			
Pansini et al., 2016				x							x		x	coop/def/punish	many	75% next round					3/1/0/-2 ^[1]	[1]punishment option costs 1 for player and 6 for the opponent			
Sorgi and Wout, 2016				x									x	coop/def	3	12					10/6/2/0,5/3/1/0	[1]c in 25% of rounds [2]c in 50% of rounds [3]c in 75% of rounds			
Rawolle et al., 2016				x									x	coop/no-coop	1	10					65/60/20/15	[1]c in 2 rounds			
Mieth et al., 2016b				x	x						pA	Joint invest (factor:4/3)	invest 15/30	20	1						15/10/5/0				
Sun et al., 2016				x									x	C/D	80	1					30/20/10/0,0/-10/-20/-30				
Lukinova and Myagkov, 2016				x									x	up/down	?	30trials					x ^[1]	6/4/2/1	[1]d in 85% of rounds and c in 15%		
Matsumoto et al., 2016				x							x	x	pA,pB	Give doubled	amount to give	9	1					depends on the amount given by each player			
Yao and Yu, 2016				x									x	C/D	1	12					x ^[1]	8/4/-1/-5	[1]d in rounds 1,5 and 9		
Antonioni et al., 2016				x(2,3,4)							x	x		matrix	A/B	30(unknown)						10/7/0/0			
Bone et al., 2016				x							x	x		matrix	interact time(0-5) ^[1]	2	50(unknown)					5x5 matrix	[1]punishment option after round with different cost per player type		
Schneider-Hassloff et al., 2016				x							?		x	?	2	1						6/5/1/0			
Wang et al., 2016				x	x	x							x	matrix	C/D	2	60,500(unknown)					x ^[1]	5/3/1/0	[1]extortionate/generous 2D strategy (Press and Dyson [ref.no 228])	
Bell et al., 2016				x							pA	Joint invest (factor:4/3)	invest 15/30	18	1							10/5/-5/-10			
Collins et al., 2016				x							x		x	matrix	A/B	1-2	50				x ^[1]	Pavlov -tft	4/1/-1/-4	[1]random choice in two rounds	
Fermin et al., 2016				x							pA	Give doubled	provide/not provide (100/200/400)	15	1							3*n/2*n/n/0, n{100.200.400}			
Luo et al., 2016				x	x								x	Prisoner's story	coop/def	1	136					x	0/-3/-8/-10		
Etzel et al., 2016				x							x		x	matrix	C/D	2	3					x ^[1,2]	3/2/1/0, 4/2/0/-1, 5/3/-1/-3 ^[3]	[1]cooperating strategy [2]competing strategy [3]one matrix per round	
Gradin et al., 2016				x									x	coop/no coop	1	76						x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]McClure 2007 [ref.no 183]	
Wildschut et al., 2015											pA	pA	Joint invest (factor:4/3)	invest 15/30	150	1,4							15/10/5/0		
Bell et al., 2015				x							pA	pA	Joint invest (factor:4/3)	invest 15/30	150	1,4							15/10/5/0		
Weisel and Böhm, 2015	x ^[1]										x												[1]Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma-Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD)		
Ciaro et al., 2015				x									x	Students' copy story	coop/compete	8	1						0/-1/-6/-7		
Soutschek et al., 2015				x	x								x	coop yes/no	4	12						x ^[1]	3/2/0/-1	[1]Tft with 20% possibility of changing decision	
Ng and Au, 2015				x									x	A/B	28	1							28 matrices ^[1]	[1]different coop [ref.no 229] and risk [ref.no 230] index values	
C. Feng et al., 2015				x	x	x					pA,pB	cop/def	2	30(pA),30(pB)								x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]	
Schneider-Hassloff et al., 2015				x							pA	left/right	2	10								x ^[1]	20/20/10/0	[1]Rilling 2004a [ref.no 195]	
Capraro and Cococcioni, 2015				x									x	Give doubled	transfer (0-20)	1	1							depends on the amount given by each player	
Reimers and Diekhof, 2015				x									x	matrix	coop/def	40	1						60/40/20/0		
Chen et al., 2015				x	x	x					pA,pB	matrix	coop/def	2	30(pA),30(pB)							x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]	
Dreu et al., 2015	x ^[1]																						[1]IPD-MD		
Chunliang Feng et al., 2015											pA,pB	coop/def	2	30(pA),30(pB)									x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]
Dorrough et al., 2015				x									x	Give doubled	transfer (0-10)	20	1								
Safin et al., 2015				x	x								x	blue/green	2	40								x	10/9/2/1,4/3/2/1

Pinel et al., 2015				x				x			A/B	10			x				4/3/1/0	
Saunders et al., 2015				x				x			coop/def	1	40(20x2)	x,stf t				x ^[1]	70/40/20/0	
Soutschek et al., 2015				x	x			x			coop yes/no	1	98,140,195					x ^[1]	3/2/0/-1	[1]Tft with 20% possibility of changing decision
Bone et al., 2015				x				x			matrix	A/B/not participate ^[1]	2	50(unknown)					3/1/0/-2	[1]punishment option after round with different cost per player type
V.Capraro, 2014				x				x	x		Give [2,3,4,5,10]fold	transfer (0-10)	1	1					depends on the number the transferred amount is multiplied and the amount transferred by each player	
Edmiston et al., 2014				x				x			coop/compete	1	20					x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2002 [ref.no 200]
Christensen et al., 2014								x			Sharing Secrets story	interviewer correct/incorrect	1						0/-45/-30/-60	
Capraro and Marcelletti, 2014				x				x			Give doubled	hand over/do not	1	1					0.6/0.4/0.2/0	
Feng et al., 2014				x	x	x				pA,pB	coop/def	2	30(pA),30(pB)						3/2/1/0	[1] Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]
Johnstone et al., 2015				x	x			x					2	15					6/5/1/0	
Pulcu et al., 2014				x	x			x			Water shortage story		1	31	tf2t				8/5/1/0	
Bednarik et al., 2014				x				x			orange/blue	3+	30(unknown)						0.4/0.25/0/-0.1	
Yamagishi et al., 2014				x				x	x	pA,pB	Give doubled		9	1					3*n/2*n/n/0	
Clark et al., 2014				x				x			coop/def	1	10	x					5/3/1/0	
Mengel, 2014				x				x			matrix	A/B	10	1					450/400/200/100,450/400/120/100	
Carolyn Henriette Declerck et al., 2013				x				x		pB	L/S	2	1						12/8/4/1	
Cárdenas et al., 2014				x				x			Balls in baskets	private/public basket	1	10					5/4/3/2	
Li et al., 2014				x				x			matrix	circle/triangular	1	10	x				4/3/2/1	
Aksoy and Weesie, 2014				x						pA,pB	Joint invest	invest/not invest	4(pA),4(pB)	1					8 different reward matrices ^[1]	[1]Asymmetric PD
Kjell and Thompson, 2013				x				x			A/B	1	10	x					3/2/1/0	
Sakaiya et al., 2013				x	x	x		x			coop/def	4	20-23(unknown)	x				x	50/30/10/0	
Emonds et al., 2013				x				x			K/L	25	1					x ^[1]	25 different matrices	[1]Rilling 2004b [ref.no 227]
Rilling et al., 2014				x	x	x				pA,pB	coop/def	2	30(pA),30(pB)					x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]
Kovács-Bálint et al., 2012				x	x			x			Prisoner's story	coop/no coop	1	1						
Acedo and Gomila, 2013				x				x			C/D	1	3						6/3/1/0	
Eimontaite et al., 2013				x				x			Prisoner's story	tell on/keep silent	1	3					50000/30000/-10000/-5000	
Safin et al., 2013				x				x			matrix	green/blue circles	1	40					4/3/2/1, 10/9/2/1	
Papageorgiou et al., 2013				x	x			x			coop/def	1	90(unknown)					x ^[1]	5/3/1/0	[1]Tft with predefined C in rounds 5,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90
Gerbası and Prentice, 2013				x				x			A/B	1	10						p:400/200/100/0 opp:200/100/50/0 ^[1]	[1]Asymmetric PD
Clark et al., 2013				x				x					1	10	x				5/3/1/0	
Carolyn H. Declerck et al., 2013				x				x		pB	L/S	2	1						12/8/4/1	
Tabak et al., 2013				x	x			x			C/D	1	20-40					x ^[1]	3/2/1/0	[1]50%ftt for the 1-12 rounds, D for 7 rounds after 12 consecutive rounds of cooperation
Gervais et al., 2013				x				x	x		Give doubled	give/keep 3	2	1					9/6/3/0	
Storey and Workman, 2013				x				x			coop/def	1	5							
Locey et al., 2012	x(5,10,20)			x				x	x		matrix	X/Y	1	1					10/9/2/1, 4/3/2/1, rewards based on how many players chose Y (Y:nY*100, X:nY*100+300)	
Rodebaugh et al., 2013				x	x			x			Give doubled - keep tripled	keep/share (1-10) ^[2]	2	40	x			x ^[1]	depends on the amount given by each player	[1]Raise the Stakes [ref.no 161] [2]change of player's decision (adding or subtracting 3) in 10% of rounds
Yamagishi et al., 2012				x				x												
Tayama et al., 2012				x				x			Card 1/2	1	<=100 ^[1]					x ^[2]	5/4/-4/-5	[1]End of game determined by difference in combination of DD and CC (Punishment-score), [2]Tft with increasing cooperation after eight D of player
Yang et al., 2013				x	x			x						1					5/3/1/0	
Fehl et al., 2012				x				x	x		Joint invest (factor:1.6)	contribute/not 1E ^[1]	5	1					0.8/0.6/0/-0.2	[1]punishment option after round
Grujić et al., 2012		x(<=5)						x			matrix	A/B ^[1]							rewards based on how many players chose A (A:(nA-1)*7, B:nA*10)	[1]random change of player's decision
Wang et al., 2012				x(<24)				x			matrix	A/B		12					7/4/1/-1	
Locey and Rachlin, 2012					x			x			blue/red	1	100	x					30/25/15/10	
Martin et al., 2013	x			x	x			x			matrix	action A/B	1	200	x	x	x	x	10/1/-1/-10	
Gracia-Lazaro et al., 2012								x			matrix	brown/green		51,59					10/7/0/0	
Locey and Rachlin, 2011				x	x			x			matrix	X/Y	1	100	x				5/4/2/1,2/1/-1/-2	
Ellett et al., 2013				x	x	x		x			X/Y	1	1(unknown)						120/90/60/30	
Pfeiffer et al., 2012				x				x			A/B	1,many	29(unknown),4						30/20/0/-10	
Locey et al., 2011					x						Chests-keys	select chest	0	40	x				4/3/2/1,6/5/2/1	
Ewoldsen et al., 2012				x				x			Give doubled	give dimes 0-4	1	10					depends on the amount given by each player	
McClure et al., 2013				x				x			strategy A/B	4	1						6/4/2/0	
Glöckner and Hilbig, 2012				x				x			1/2	many	20						300/200/100/50,300/varied/varied/50	
Emonds et al., 2012				x				x			invest/not	28	1						3/2/1/0,6/5/1/0,2/1/-1/-2,8/5/2/0	

Balliet et al., 2011				x		x			x			matrix	option A/B	1	2(unknown)			x			100/60/40/0	
Rilling et al., 2012				x	x	x	x				pA,pB		coop/def	2	30(pA),30(pB)				x ^[1]		3/2/1/0	[1]Rilling 2012 [ref.no 155]
Volstorf et al., 2011				x	x							Boss-colleagues story	coop/refuse	20	10(unknown)	x		x			5/3/1/0	
McClure-Tone et al., 2011				x		x							coop/no-coop	4	20				x ^[1]		3/2/1/0	[1]McClure 2007 [ref.no 183]
Dijk et al., 2011				x	x								coop/def	1	2				x		5/3/1/0	
Tabak et al., 2012				x		x							?	1	34	50% ftt		x	x		3/2/1/0	
Fallani et al., 2010				x					x				coop/def	1	200						3/2/1/0	
Rodebaugh et al., 2011				x	x							Give doubled - keep tripled	keep/share (1-10)	1	40				x ^[1]		depends on the amount given by each player	[1]FickleFriend: Raise the stakes with D in the 20% of last rounds [2]change of player's decision (adding or subtracting 3) in 10% of rounds. required prediction.
Grujić et al., 2010			x(8)						x				blue/yellow		47,58,60						10/7/0/0	
Astolfi et al., 2010				x				x	x				coop/def	1	1							
Suzuki et al., 2010				x	x	x							coop/def	6	18					x ^[1]	25/20/0/-5	[1]C decision based on previous opponents decisions such as P(c)=0.1+0.8*(nC/(nC+nD))
Declerck et al., 2010				x		x			x				L/S	1	1						12/8/4/1	
Stevens et al., 2011				x	x							Waitress tip story	coop/no coop	5,10,15	5,10,15						5/3/1/0	
Lane and Gowin, 2009				x	x								A/C	4	100				x		0.5/0.25/-0.25/0	
Fischer, 2009				x				x	x				&/#	1	1						20/14/2/0,20/10/5/0	
Kircher et al., 2009				x	x	x							?	3					x		20/10/0/0	
Haruno and Kawato, 2009				x	x	x							coop/def	2	18	x			x ^[1]		50/30/-20/-30	[1]70% probability of C
Krach et al., 2009				x	x	x							coop/def	2	90				x		20/10/0/0	
Lount et al., 2008				x		x						Tutorial of cooperation ^[1]	X/Y	1	30			x ^[2]			30/24/12/6	[1]Murnighan, 1991, pp. 13-27 [2]All C except for D in two rounds
Furlong and Opfer, 2009				x				x					coop/def	1	80	x					5/3/1/0\$,500/300/100/0c,5/3/1/0c,500/300/100/0\$,5/3/1/0,1005/1003/1001/1000,105/103/101/100,0.05/0.03/0.01/0,0.005/0.003/0.001/0	depends on the amount given by each player
Lönnqvist et al., 2009				x				x	x			Give doubled, Leave doubled	transfer to other 1-10, transfer to me 1-10	2	1							
Chater et al., 2008				x		x							1/2	19	1						21/20/2/1, 0/-31/-34/-35, 36/5/2/1, 11/10/1/0, 0/-5/-6/-11	
Krach et al., 2008				x	x			x				Prisoner's story	coop/def	4	10				x		20/20/10/0	
Mokros et al., 2008				x	x							Water shortage story	coop/def	1	40	ft2t					8/5/1/0	
Halevy et al., 2008	x ^[1]							x					keep/A/B									[1]IPD-MD
Wolf et al., 2008	x			x				x				matrix	X/Y	1	5						10/90/60/30	
Rilling et al., 2004a				x		x							coop/def	2	20	33% ftt ^[1]			x ^[2]		3/2/1/0	[1]D in first round, [2]Rilling 2002 [ref.no 200]
Kümmerli et al., 2007				x				x					C/D	1	12						400/300/0/-100	
Hopthrow et al., 2007	x			x				x					J/P	1	4	x					60/50/15/10	
McClure et al., 2007				x		x							coop/no coop	4	20				x ^[1]		3/2/1/0	[1]McClure 2007 [ref.no 183]
Takemura and Yuki, 2007	x			x				x					X/Y	1	10						11 matrices: 4*n/3*n/2*n/n	
Rilling et al., 2007				x	x								coop/def	2	20	33% ftt					3/2/1/0	
Yi et al., 2007				x	x								coop/def	1	60	x					25/20/10/5	
Johnson et al., 2004				x				x					X/Y	1	6						10/8/3/0,0/-2/-7/-10	
Eek and Gärling, 2006				x				x				matrix	A/B	1	1						400/200/100/50	
West et al., 2006				x				x					coop/def	2	7(unknown)						5/3/2/1	
Wood et al., 2006				x		x						pB	coop/def	2	20	x,sft f					30/20/10/0	
Yi et al., 2005				x	x								coop/def	2	60	x			x		25/20/10/5	
Wong and Hong, 2005				x				x	x				Strategy A/B	5	1							
Insko et al., 2005	x				x				x				X/Y/Z	1	1						360/270/180/90 ^[1]	[1]withdrawal option with ensured reward of 225 for both players
Yi and Rachlin, 2004		x(5)				x						matrix	X/Y					x		x	rewards based on how many players chose Y (X:nY*3+7, Y: nY*3)	
Rilling et al., 2004b				x	x	x						pA	coop/def	28	1						6/5/1/0	
Rotenberg et al., 2004				x					x				green/red light	<=62							15/10/7/5	
Liberman et al., 2004				x					x				C/D		5,7						80/40/0/-20,8/6/-6/-8	
Singer et al., 2004				x		x						pA	Give tripled	>22	4							
Ketelaar and Au, 2003				x		x							A/B	8	10	x			x ^[1,2]		5/3/1/0	[1]C in first five rounds and tft afterwards [2]D in first five rounds and tft afterwards
Rilling et al., 2002				x	x	x			x				coop/def	3	20-23(known, unknown)	stft			x ^[1,2]		3/2/1/0	[1]C in first five rounds and tft afterwards [2]Rilling 2002 [ref.no 200]
Wildschut et al., 2002	x					x							X/Y		1						500/500/200/200,500/490/110/100,500/400/200/100	
Baker and Rachlin, 2002				x								pB	left/right	1	100				x ^[1,2]		6/5/2/1	[1]Tft with changing probability of C based on the cooperational behavior of the player [2]Wsls with changing probability of C based on the cooperational behavior of the player
Kiyonari et al., 2000				x				x				pA,pB	K/P	3	1				x		188/1200/600/0	
Sheldon et al., 2000		x(2,3,4)						x	x				coop/get ahead		1						rewards based on how many players chose C (C:nC*2, G:nC*2+5)	
Houston et al., 2000				x		x						Arms race	0-6 missiles	1	5				x ^[1,2,3]		7x7matrix	[1]competitive strategy [2]deescalating strategy [3]noncompetitive strategy
Knez and Camerer, 2000				x					x				1/2/3/4/5/6/7	1	5						3x3,7x7 matrix	required prediction

