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Sunshine on KOL : a retrospective study about financial ties between medical key opinion leaders and pharmaceutical industry in France.

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Sunshine on KOL : a retrospective study about financial ties between medical key opinion leaders and pharmaceutical industry in France.

9 Marie CLINCKEMAILLIE, MD (ORCID: 0000-0001-6643-001X)¹, Alexandre SCANFF, MD (ORCID: 0000-0001-5419-817X)², Florian NAUDET, PhD (ORCID: 0000-0003-3760-3801)², Adriaan BARBAROUX, MD (ORCID: 0000-0002-9243-6922)³.

13
14 ¹Université Cote d'Azur, Département d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Médecine Générale, RETINES, HEALTHY, France

15
16 ²Univ Rennes, CHU Rennes, Inserm, CIC 1414 [(Centre d'Investigation Clinique de Rennes)], F- 35000 Rennes, France

17
18
19 ³ Université Cote d'Azur, Département d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Médecine Générale, RETINES, LAPCOS, HEALTHY, France

20
21
22 Corresponding author : A. Barbaroux

23 Adriaan.barbaroux@univ-cotedazur.fr; 2bis Avenue Durante, 06000 Nice

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ABSTRACT

Objective

To investigate the nature, extent and evolution of financial relationships between key opinion leaders (KOL) or non-KOL physicians and pharmaceutical and device companies in France.

Design

Retrospective and descriptive study

Setting

All doctors practicing in France, with a focus on 548 KOL defined as board members of all the professional medical associations having published clinical practice guidelines in 2018 or 2019. These 99 associations were identified by the cross-checking of 3 databases.

Main outcome measures

The number and the amount of gifts (year by year since 2014), remunerations and agreements (year by year since 2017).

Results

Physicians had 818m€ (\$936m, £741m) of gifts declared from 2014 to 2019. 83% of KOL had such links of interest. The 548 identified KOL represented 0.24% of physicians in France but received 1.5% of the total amount of gifts, i.e. €12.3m (\$14m, £11m or €3 700 per capita per year).

Physicians had 125m€ (\$143m and 114m£) of agreements declared from 2017 to 2019. The 548 KOL received 0.72% of the agreements and 2.5% of the value of the agreements, i.e. 3.1m€ (\$3.6m, £2.8m) or €1 900 per capita per year (\$2200, £1700).

Physicians had 156m€ (\$178m and 141m£) of remunerations declared from 2017 to 2019. The 548 identified KOL received 4.4% of the total value of remunerations to physicians, i.e. 6.8m€ (\$7.8m, £6.2m) or 4 100€ per capita per year (\$4 800, £3 700).

Almost every professional medical associations (99%) had in their board at least one KOL with a financial tie.

Conclusion

Financial relationships between KOL and the industry in France are extensive, KOL have much more financial ties than non-KOL practitioners. The main limit of this study arises from the quality of information provided on the French Transparency in Healthcare database.

Pre-registration: osf.io/m8syh

Strengths and limitations of this study

This is the first attempt to provide data on the extent of the links of interest between opinion leaders and pharmaceutical industry in France.

Author crossed the nationwide databases of financial ties with three databases of professional medical associations.

All medical doctors practicing in France were included, with a focus on 548 KOL defined as board members of all the professional medical associations having published clinical practice guidelines in 2018 or 2019.

These 99 associations were identified by the cross-checking of 3 different catalogs of French professional associations.

The major links between key opinion leaders and industry ask the question of the independence of the experts, and raises concern that guidelines can be influenced by industry.

Keywords :

Conflict Of Interests – Key Opinion Leaders – public health – quality in health care – medical ethics

INTRODUCTION

Financial ties between healthcare workers and pharmaceutical industry may affect every aspects of medical activity, from research to clinical practice. Clinical trials and meta-analyses sponsored by the pharmaceutical industry are more likely to conclude that drugs are effective than non-sponsored trials.¹ Industry's transfers of value to physicians have been shown to be associated with more expensive, more frequent and of lower quality prescriptions²⁻⁵. Recommendations for clinical practice, which define the diagnostic criteria and treatment of the diseases, can also be under influence, since their authors often have ties with the industry.⁶⁻¹¹

Following the example of the USA with the US Physician Payments Sunshine Act, France created the Transparency in Healthcare public database (transparence.santé.gouv.fr) in 2014.¹²⁻¹⁴ Pharmaceutical and medical device industries are required by law to disclose gifts, agreements and remunerations they transfer to healthcare professionals in France.

The term "Key Opinion Leaders" (KOL) refers to physicians who influence their peers' medical practice, including but not limited to prescribing behaviour. It was coined by sociologists who demonstrated that people changed their opinions more because of some individuals in their networks than because of media or advertising: the influence of the physicians' social networks is major to make them adopt a new drug.^{15,16} Pharmaceutical companies hire KOLs at different stages of the drug development process, from clinical trials to promotion.^{17,18} Typically, KOLs are physicians or researchers who are respected in their field and recognized for their work, such as broad members of professional medical associations.¹⁸⁻²²

Major ties between leaders of professional medical associations and the pharmaceutical industry have recently been described in North America.^{10,11} In France, these links had never been studied yet.

In this study we described the nature and evolution of gifts, agreements and remunerations perceived by key opinion leaders (KOL) and other physicians using the data from the Transparency in Healthcare database. We also grouped gifts, agreements and remunerations perceived by these KOL for each professional medical association they belong to.

METHODS

As per our protocol (registration number: osf.io/m8syh), we conducted a retrospective study of the financial relationships between industry and board members of the national professional medical associations publishing clinical practice guidelines.

Identifying professional medical associations

Professional medical associations were defined as any group of physicians who published clinical practice guidelines in France. One author (MC) built the list of eligible associations by cross-checking three different databases: the "Catalogue et index des sites médicaux de langue française" (CISMEF)²³, "Le Parisien" review professional medical associations catalogue²⁴) and the "Bibliothèque Médicale AF Lemanissier" (BMLweb)²⁵). We included only national associations and excluded association titled as concerning "rare disease". Then, MC searched for those who had published at least one clinical practice recommendation in 2018 or 2019 using Google scholar, academic medical library of the general hospital of Le Mans and CISMEF.

Identifying Key Opinion Leaders

Using each professional medical association's website, MC identified between October 2018 and May 2020 all physicians who were board members.

KOL were defined as members of the association's board or governing council but not of sub-committees. KOL were identified by their name, medical specialty and city of practice, on the medical association website then if missing on google. Discrepancies and uncertainties were resolved by discussion with a second author (AB).

The Transparency in Healthcare database was downloaded on may 18, 2020 from the website EurosForDocs²⁶. EurosForDocs is a tool inspired by the American website DollarsForDocs. EurosForDocs aims to help querying and understanding the Transparency in Healthcare database by cleaning and grouping payments by categories and beneficiaries. It also harmonizes the identification of doctors using their unique identification number in the National Healthcare Professional Registry : the "RPPS" (Répertoire Partagé des Professionnels de Santé). RPPS of the KOL were identified by AS from Health-Directory database and Transparency in Healthcare database. Uncertainties were resolved by manual inspection (MC).

Identifying and extracting payment details

By using the RPPS unique identification number, data on payments for the identified leaders²⁷ were extracted, using categories within the database: gifts, agreements and remunerations. We took into consideration the data from the date they were obligatory to declare: gifts from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2019 and agreements and remunerations from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2019.

"Gifts" include anything that is granted without consideration, in kind or in cash, directly or indirectly, of an amount greater than or equal to 10€ (\$11,4) including taxes. "Remunerations" represent the payment by companies for work or services, of an amount greater than or equal to 10€. "Conventions" are agreements involving obligations on both sides: participation in a congress, research or clinical trial activity, training action, etc. The characteristics and date from where the payments were mandatory to declare are presented in **table 1**.

< PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE >

Outcome measures and descriptive analyses

The primary outcome was the total amount of gifts received by all the medical physicians and by the identified KOL, year by year since 2014.

A secondary outcome was the number and amount of the 2 additional categories of payments available after 2017 (i.e. agreements and remunerations), year by year since 2017.

Distribution of individual results of KOL pooled for each professional medical association is also presented. Quantitative data were described using median (inter-quartile range, IQR) rather than mean to be less biased by the influence of extreme observations. Binary outcomes were described using n (percentage). All analyses were performed using R.²⁸

Changes to protocol

The secondary outcome including agreements and remunerations was not part of the protocol as these declarations were not mandatory before 2017. However, after having noted that remunerations represented more than 3 times the yearly amount of gifts, it was decided to include agreements and remunerations because we might have missed an important part of physicians-industry ties.

Then, as we identified some outliers with implausible amounts, it was likely that the database contained some errors (e.g. some gifts may have been reported in cents by the company

[outliers typically ending in two zeros]). It was therefore decided a posteriori to exclude amounts exceeding 100 000€ (\$118 000) for a single payment. It corresponds to 35 extreme observations (34 in 2019, 1 in 2018, i.e. 0.0005% of the gifts) and 32m€ (4% of the total and 13% of 2019).

Patient and public involvement

Patients and public were involved throughout the French FORMINDEP association that aims to improve the independence of physicians' medical education. FORMINDEP's members (patients and physicians) kindly accepted to participate to the manuscript reviewing and editing. French CI3P organization (Patient and Public Partnership Innovation Center of the Faculty of Medicine of Nice) also accepted to participate to the manuscript reviewing and editing. Their comments enhanced the manuscript's quality, especially the discussion.

RESULTS

Participants

We identified 238 professional medical associations. 101 of them had produced clinical practice guidelines in 2018 and/or 2019 and two of them had no website or no board on their website. We identified 605 KOL, 548 of them were found on the Transparency in Healthcare database. The number of KOL in each professional medical association ranged from 1 to 12, with a median of 6. 12 KOL belonged to more than one professional medical association. The way KOL were identified is described by the figure 1 : Flowchart.

< PLEASE INSERT HERE FIG.1 : FLOWCHART >

Transparency in Healthcare public database

The database contained 6b€ (\$7.1b) of ties over 8 years. Gifts represented 1.7b€, agreements represented 1.3b€ and remunerations represented 3b€. ²⁶ Gifts, agreements and remuneration are presented below from the year in which they were consistently declared, that is respectively since 2014, 2017 and 2017.

Gifts (2014-2019)

For all physicians 7 354 492 gifts were declared for a total amount of 818m€ (\$936m) from 2014 to 2019. The median amount for a gift was 46€ (IQR= 25-60, \$54). Most KOL (83%) had at least one gift declared from 2014 to 2019. KOL's gifts represented 0.68% of the number of all physicians' gifts and 1.5% of the total amount of gifts, i.e. 12.3m€ (\$14m). It represents a median of €3 700 of gifts per KOL per year. The median amount for a KOL's gift was 60€ (IQR = 30–214).

Overall, the gifts declared to all physicians decreased in number and value from 1.3m gifts (151m€) to 923 000 gifts (108m€).

The number, value and proportion of gifts declared to KOL decreased from 9 687 gifts (0.70% of the total number of gifts to physicians) / 2.2m€ (1.5% of the total value of gifts to physicians) to 6044 gifts (0.65% of the total number of gifts to physicians) / 1.5m€ (1.4% of the total value of gifts to physicians).

The evolution year by year for each specific category of gift from 2014 to 2019 is presented in **Table 2**.

< PLEASE INSERT HERE TABLE 2 >

1
2
3 Almost all (99%) associations had at least one member of its board who had at least one
4 declared gift since 2014. The median amount of gifts declared for all the corresponding KOL
5 of a professional medical association was 61 000€ (IQR= 14 000-143 000 ; \$70 000) but varied
6 widely between associations. 1% of the associations had no gift declared for their KOL, 16%
7 had less than 1 000€ gifts per year for their KOL. 39% had between 10 000€ and 50 000€ gifts
8 and 11% had more than 50 000 € gifts declared for their KOL each year.
9

10 11 **Agreements (2017-2019)**

12 Concerning non-KOL physicians, 1.67 millions agreements were declared for a total of
13 125m€ (\$143m) from 2017 to 2019. There were 1.28 millions agreements (77%) for which the
14 reported amount was null. A null amount can be explained either by a report in one of the two
15 other categories (when the agreement is linked with a gift or remuneration), or by a wrong
16 declaration.
17

18 KOL's agreements represented 0.72% of all agreements declared to physicians and
19 2.5% of the value of these agreements, i.e. 3m€ (\$3,6m). It represents a median of €1 900 of
20 declared agreements per KOL per year. There were 9 496 KOLs' agreements (79%) for which
21 the reported amount was null.
22

23 Overall, agreements declared to all physicians were increasing from 42m€ in 2017 to
24 43m€ in 2019.

25 The evolution year by year of the total amount, and median amount of agreements is
26 presented in **table 3**.
27

28 < PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE >
29

30
31 The number, the value and the proportion of agreements declared to KOL decreased
32 each year, from 4 400 agreements (0.78% of the number of agreements to physicians) / 1.1m€
33 (2.6% of the value of agreements to physicians) in 2017 to 3 500 agreements (0.64% of the
34 number of agreements to physicians) / 1m€ (2.3% of the value of agreements to physicians) in
35 2019. This evolution is depicted in **Figure 2**.
36

37 < PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE >
38

39
40 The median amount of agreements declared to all the corresponding KOL of an
41 association was 15 900€ per year (IQR= 390 to 35 617).
42

43 **Remunerations (2017-2019)**

44 For all physicians, 250 873 remunerations were declared totaling 156m€ (\$178m) from
45 2017 to 2019. The median amount for a remuneration was 250€ (IQR 55-742) (\$296). KOLs'
46 perceived 2.3% of physicians' remunerations, i.e. 6.8m€ (\$7.8m) or 4.4% of the total value of
47 remunerations to physicians. Overall, KOLs received 4 times more remunerations than other
48 physicians, which represents a median of €4 100 of remunerations per KOL per year.
49

50 Regarding all physicians, remunerations increased in number and total value but the
51 median amount decreased sharply. The evolution of the total amount of remunerations is
52 presented in **table 3**. Physicians' remunerations increased from 77 277 remunerations / 49m€
53 in 2017 to 96 160 remunerations / 54m€ in 2019.
54

55 The number, value and proportion of remunerations declared to KOL decreased each
56 year from 2017 (1 900 remunerations, 2.5% of the number of remunerations to physicians,
57 accounting for 2.3m€ and 4.8% of the value of remunerations to physicians) to 2019 (1 800
58 remunerations, 1.9% of the number of remunerations to physicians, accounting for 2.1m€ and
59 4% of the value of remunerations to physicians in 2019).
60

1
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3 The median amount of remunerations declared for all the corresponding KOL of an
4 association was 21 000€ per year (IQR 1012 - 68 977, \$25 000).
5
6

7 **DISCUSSION**

8 **Principle findings**

9
10 During this period, 818m€ of gifts, 125m€ of agreements and 156m€ of remunerations
11 were declared to physicians in France. The amount of gifts decreased and the total amount of
12 declared agreements and remunerations increased. Gifts represented the largest amount
13 declared.
14

15 Almost every professional medical association included at least one KOL who received
16 one or more gifts since 2014 (99%) or 2017 (97%). Over the whole period, the median amount
17 of gifts per association was €61 000 (\$70 000). From 2017 to 2019, the median cumulative
18 amount for each professional medical association was 15 900€ of agreements and 21 900€ of
19 remunerations. The number and amount of gifts varied widely from one association to another,
20 ranging from €0 to 160 000€ (\$189 000) for all the members of one association on the studied
21 period.
22

23 The number, value and proportion of gifts, agreements and remunerations for KOLs
24 were slightly decreasing over time. Remunerations represented the largest amount declared to
25 KOLs with a median amount per capita 4 times higher than for other physicians. KOLs
26 represented 0.24% of the physicians but were associated to 1.5% of the gifts, 2.4% of the
27 agreements and 4.4% of the remunerations in value. It represents €3 700 of gifts, €1 900 of
28 agreements and €4 100 of remunerations per capita per year. This amount of agreements is
29 probably underestimated since 79% of KOLs' agreements amount was declared null in the
30 database (see above).
31
32

33 **Strengths and Limitations**

34 This study is exhaustive of all ties declared on the French Transparency in Healthcare
35 database. All physicians practicing in France were included since ties are mandatory to declare.
36

37 However, the statements may be underestimated since many agreement's amounts were
38 not available. Indeed, when a physician signs an agreement conferring an advantage, the amount
39 can be declared either nil, in agreement, in gift or both in agreement and gift. There is no
40 government control at this level.
41

42 The effect of this bias is difficult to predict : on the one hand, firms did not declare the
43 amounts of thousands of agreements, thus underestimating the amounts received by physicians.
44 On the other hand, the amount of an agreement could be double counted. The entire Eurofordocs
45 database (with all beneficiaries, without time limitations) contains 5.5 million agreements, 3.3
46 million of which have a nil amount. 2.2 million gifts claim to be linked to an agreement, but
47 have an invalid textual link. There are therefore at least 1.1 million agreements with a nil
48 amount despite the legal obligation to declare it.
49

50 Another limitation lies in the fact that the data comes from the declarations of the
51 pharmaceutical industry itself with typos. Moreover, there may be a delay in data reporting, and
52 remunerations may have been misclassified as it was possible to declare them as gifts or as
53 remunerations until October, 2017.
54

55 Finally, in the absence of an official definition, we choose an objective but restrictive
56 definition of KOL which lead us to rule out many individuals of great leverage that could also
57 be called KOL .
58

59 **Comparison with other studies**

1
2
3 Our results are in line with those observed worldwide but adds new data regarding the
4 French context. Very recent U.S. study showed that nearly three-quarters of the executives of
5 the 10 most influential professional medical associations in the U.S. had ties with the
6 pharmaceutical industry, with wide variations in the amount of payments reported between the
7 professional medical associations.¹⁰ Total general payments of \$24.8m (20.8m€, £18.9m) were
8 linked to the 235 KOL of the 10 most influential professional medical associations in 3 years.
9 The total median general payment was \$6 000 (IQR \$309 to \$54 000) (5000€, £4 500).

10
11 In this study, KOLs received 10 times more per capita per year in total amount than the
12 French KOLs, and more than 83 times more in terms of median amount.

13
14 The amount of money involved in this American study seems to be much more
15 important. This difference could be explained by societal differences but also by the fact that
16 we included professional medical associations regardless of their size, cost or influence. On the
17 other hand, this difference can be explained by the fact that USA represents a population 5 times
18 larger and 4 times more physicians, which may constitutes an important return on investments.
19 Finally, in the US, there are more mandatory payments to report, and there are enforcement
20 measures and effective penalties.²⁹

21 22 23 **Implications of this study**

24 Despite multiple calls for more distance,^{10,30-33} KOL have still privileged relationships
25 with pharmaceutical industry. This phenomenon can lead to lower guidelines' quality and to a
26 general loss of confidence in both KOL and physicians. Indeed, several guidelines were
27 abrogated since there have been doubts about the independence of the experts involved in their
28 writing.³⁴⁻³⁷ In turn, Chakroun et al. have shown that conflict of interests disclosure reduces
29 public and physicians' trust in KOL.³⁸ Experience shows that financial ties can also be
30 instrumentalized to discredit any expert position, the link being used as an argument to call into
31 question the scientific opinion.³⁹⁻⁴¹

32
33 Our study's finding of remaining concealment of the agreements amounts, despite the
34 legal obligation to declare them, shows that transparency is still in progress and that both
35 researchers and citizens do not yet have access to all data. For us, the main area for improvement
36 would be to make it mandatory to report the amount of benefits and remunerations conferred
37 by the agreement in the agreement section. Moreover, the declarations should be checked by
38 the public authorities, which is the only guarantee of the reliability of the information provided.

39
40 Future research might focus on the correlation between the amount of gifts and the
41 medical specialty or the cost of the concerned diseases. Further research is needed to identify
42 other kinds of KOL such as the department heads of the teaching hospitals, and the medical
43 university lecturers. Financial ties could be tracked over time, acting as a nudge to help chart
44 moves towards independence.
45
46
47

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50 understand the database and use properly EuroForDocs.

51
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53 aims to improve the independence of physicians' medical education. FORMINDEP's members
54 (patients and physicians) kindly accepted to participate to the manuscript reviewing and editing.
55 French CI3P organization (Patient and Public Partnership Innovation Center of the Faculty of
56 Medicine of Nice) also accepted to participate to the manuscript reviewing and editing. Their
57 comments enhanced the manuscript's quality, especially the discussion.
58
59
60

Footnotes

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Author Contributions : MC and AB initiated and designed the study, searched the literature, interpreted the results and wrote the manuscript. AS performed the analysis, contributed to the study design and interpreted results. FN contributed to the study design and interpreted the results. AB is the guarantor. All authors have critically revised the manuscript and approved the manuscript. The corresponding author attests that all listed authors meet authorship criteria and that no others meeting the criteria have been omitted.

Ethical approval : the French Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés approved this study.

Data sharing statement : Data from EurosForDocs are available on <https://www.eurosfordocs.fr/data#donn-es>. Analytic code from the study is available on https://osf.io/4756p/?view_only=df16d649d87847e5aa9478960620bf81

The guarantor (AB) affirms that the manuscript is an honest, accurate, and transparent account of the study being reported; that no important aspect of the study was omitted; and that any discrepancies from the study as originally planned have been explained.

Figures legend/Caption :

Figure 1. Flowchart, representing how KOL were identified by crossing three databases.

Figure 2. Evolution of the 3 kinds of financial ties for KOL and all physicians. The gifts declared to all physicians were decreasing in number and value over time; the number, the value and the proportion of gifts declared to KOL were decreasing. The agreements declared to all physicians were increasing; the number, the value and the proportion of agreements declared to KOL were decreasing. The remunerations declared to all physicians were increasing; the number, the value and the proportion of remunerations declared to KOL were decreasing.

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14 [s-inquieter-des-liens-entre-labos-et](https://www.marianne.net/societe/118000-euros-de-msd-116000-euros-de-roche-faut-il-s-inquieter-des-liens-entre-labos-et)
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Table 1 presents the 3 categories of links of interest and the date from where they had to be declared on the Transparency in Healthcare database (base Transparence Santé). The Transparency in Healthcare database was laid down in the "Strengthening the safety of medicines and health products" law of December, 2011, and launched in July, 2014.


<i>Type of ties</i>	Definition	Information mandatory to declare
<i>Gifts</i>	Anything that is allocated or paid without consideration by a company to a health actor, with a value of more than 10 euros including taxes. Available categories on the website = gifts, contribution to the cost of promotional, scientific or professional events, accommodation, hospitality, catering, transport, transport and hospitality, in-kind donations, donations, donations of money, grants, training, expenditures for services and advice, fees, failed category association, empty, other.	Identity of the parties concerned, amount, nature and date of each benefit. Mandatory since the law of 2013; actual website availability in 2014.
<i>Agreements</i>	Contracts involving obligations on the part of the physician and the industry. For example, participation in a congress as a speaker (obligation fulfilled by the professional), with payment for transport and accommodation (obligation fulfilled by the company). The conventions concern research activities, clinical trials, participation in a scientific congress, training activities, etc.	Identity of the parties concerned, the organizer, the name, date and place of the event, date of the agreement, its precise purpose (mandatory since the law of 2013 ; actual website availability 2014) and the amount (mandatory since the law of 2016, actual website availability in 2017). If the agreements give rise to payments in benefits or remuneration, the payments can be indicated in the category agreements or in benefits or remuneration, with a numerical link to the agreement.
<i>Remunerations</i>	Payment for work or services with a value of more than 10 euros including taxes.	Identity of the parties, final beneficiary, date of payment, amount if it is greater than or equal to 10euros (available since 2015 but mandatory since the law of 2016, actual website availability in the remuneration section in 2017).


Table 2. Median (IQR) amount of gifts to KOL and non-KOL physicians in euros (€).

<i>Gifts category</i>	<i>Physicians category</i>	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<i>Accommodation</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	210(165-314)	215 (165-341)	215 (170-314)	215 (164-323)	221 (170-349)	218 (173-328)
	<i>KOL</i>	218 (172-305)	220 (170-330)	218 (179-296)	226 (176-313)	221 (175-323)	229 (180-344)
<i>Hospitality</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	50 (27-118)	45 (25-60)	46 (24-60)	55 (30-60)	53 (28-60)	52 (28-60)
	<i>KOL</i>	70 (30-448)	58 (28.2-258)	60 (30-258)	80.5 (40-362)	60 (29-319)	60 (30-329)
<i>Catering</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	40 (24-55)	40 (24-56)	38 (23-55)	38 (23-56)	38 (23-56)	38 (24-57)
	<i>KOL</i>	40 (23-59)	40 (23-59)	40 (23-58)	40 (23-58)	40 (24-59)	40 (24-59)
<i>Transport</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	208 (91-420)	200 (88-398)	191 (85-380)	189 (79-357)	182 (81-344)	177 (77-332)
	<i>KOL</i>	202 (70-471)	206 (74.2-461)	244 (96-477)	207 (77-445)	198 (79.8-414)	187 (71-395)
<i>Contributions to the cost of promotional events</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	60 (50-400)	60 (50-404)	60 (44-400)	200 (55-455)	400 (250-590)	440 (260-650)
	<i>KOL</i>	320 (60-591)	350 (60-600)	390 (87-650)	450 (186-729)	470 (290-740)	538 (290-796)
<i>Donations-Grants-Training</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	21 (17-30)	23 (17-50)	36 (23-94)	62 (30-171)	55 (29-171)	55 (25-144)
	<i>KOL</i>	83 (60-275)	68 (27.5-1578)	96 (63.5-138)	76 (45-192)	155 (42-225)	80 (42-180)
<i>Service and consulting</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	26 (22-30)	30 (22-45)	30 (24-50)	30 (25-40)	50 (25-80)	116 (40-362)
	<i>KOL</i>	30 (24-120)	47 (29-325)	65 (30-600)	32 (25-83)	130 (74-309)	158 (69-506)
<i>Other</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	100 (30-350)	140 (30-496)	100 (19-375)	22 (16-84)	25 (16-104)	49 (16-220)
	<i>KOL</i>	337 (34.8-1000)	800 (195-1188)	700 (100-1000)	310 (23-915)	40 (12-153)	79.5 (12-500)
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	45 (25-60)	45 (25-60)	45 (25-60)	46 (25-60)	48 (25-60)	49 (26-60)
	<i>KOL</i>	59 (29-198)	60 (30-224)	60 (30-217)	60 (30-213)	60 (31-214)	60 (31-210)

Table 3. Total amount, and median (IQR) amount of agreements, total and median (IQR) amount of remunerations to KOL and non-KOL physicians, year by year since they are consistently declared.

Payment category	Physicians category	Amount	2017	2018	2019	Total	
<u>Agreements</u>	<i>All physicians</i>	Number of agreements for which the amount could not be found in the agreement section (percentage of the number of agreements)	446 204 (79%)	443 687 (79%)	394 393 (72%)	1 284 284	
		Total value of agreements for which an amount could be found in the agreement section in €	42 905 877	39 962 079	43 098 150	125 966 106	
		Number of agreements with a declared amount in the agreement section	118 860	119 844	150 987	389 691	
	<i>KOL</i>	Number of agreements for which the amount could not be found in the agreement section (percentage of the number of agreements)	3 514 (80%)	3 319 (80%)	2 663 (76%)	9496	
		Total value of agreements for which an amount could be found in the agreement section in €	1 123 947	1 040 295	1 000 651	3 164 893	
		Number of agreements with a declared amount in the agreement section	903	837	843	2583	
	<u>Remunerations</u>	<i>All physicians</i>	Total amount in €	49 152 264	53 142 546	54 254 342	156 549 152
			Median (IQR)	300 (65-750)	350 (65-800)	130 (50-613)	250
			Number of remunerations	77 277	77 436	96 160	250 573
<i>KOL</i>		Total amount in €	2 355 894	2 346 293	2 172 827	6 875 014	
		Median (IQR)	946 (527-1440)	1000 (600-1497)	998 (538-1375)	1000	
		Number of remunerations	1950	1901	1876	5718	





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Reporting checklist for cross sectional study.

Based on the STROBE cross sectional guidelines.

Instructions to authors

Complete this checklist by entering the page numbers from your manuscript where readers will find each of the items listed below.

Your article may not currently address all the items on the checklist. Please modify your text to include the missing information. If you are certain that an item does not apply, please write "n/a" and provide a short explanation.

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In your methods section, say that you used the STROBE cross sectional reporting guidelines, and cite them as:

von Elm E, Altman DG, Egger M, Pocock SJ, Gotsche PC, Vandenbroucke JP. The Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) Statement: guidelines for reporting observational studies.

		Reporting Item	Page Number
Title and abstract			
Title	#1a	Indicate the study's design with a commonly used term in the title or the abstract	1
Abstract	#1b	Provide in the abstract an informative and balanced summary of what was done and what was found	2
Introduction			
Background / rationale	#2	Explain the scientific background and rationale for the investigation being reported	3
Objectives	#3	State specific objectives, including any prespecified hypotheses	3
Methods			
Study design	#4	Present key elements of study design early in the paper	3
Setting	#5	Describe the setting, locations, and relevant dates, including periods of	3

recruitment, exposure, follow-up, and data collection

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3	Eligibility criteria	#6a	Give the eligibility criteria, and the sources and methods of selection of participants. 4
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6		#7	Clearly define all outcomes, exposures, predictors, potential 4
7			confounders, and effect modifiers. Give diagnostic criteria, if applicable
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10	Data sources /	#8	For each variable of interest give sources of data and details of methods 4
11	measurement		of assessment (measurement). Describe comparability of assessment
12			methods if there is more than one group. Give information separately
13			for for exposed and unexposed groups if applicable.
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17	Bias	#9	Describe any efforts to address potential sources of bias 4
18			
19	Study size	#10	Explain how the study size was arrived at 4
20			
21	Quantitative	#11	Explain how quantitative variables were handled in the analyses. If 4
22	variables		applicable, describe which groupings were chosen, and why
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25	Statistical	#12a	Describe all statistical methods, including those used to control for 4
26	methods		confounding
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28			
29	Statistical	#12b	Describe any methods used to examine subgroups and interactions 4
30	methods		
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33	Statistical	#12c	Explain how missing data were addressed 4
34	methods		
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37	Statistical	#12d	If applicable, describe analytical methods taking account of sampling 4
38	methods		strategy
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41	Statistical	#12e	Describe any sensitivity analyses 4
42	methods		
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45	Results		
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47	Participants	#13a	Report numbers of individuals at each stage of study—eg numbers 5
48			potentially eligible, examined for eligibility, confirmed eligible,
49			included in the study, completing follow-up, and analysed. Give
50			information separately for for exposed and unexposed groups if
51			applicable.
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55	Participants	#13b	Give reasons for non-participation at each stage 5
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57	Participants	#13c	Consider use of a flow diagram 5
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1	Descriptive data	#14a	Give characteristics of study participants (eg demographic, clinical, social) and information on exposures and potential confounders. Give information separately for exposed and unexposed groups if applicable.	5
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6	Descriptive data	#14b	Indicate number of participants with missing data for each variable of interest	5
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10	Outcome data	#15	Report numbers of outcome events or summary measures. Give information separately for exposed and unexposed groups if applicable.	5
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14	Main results	#16a	Give unadjusted estimates and, if applicable, confounder-adjusted estimates and their precision (eg, 95% confidence interval). Make clear which confounders were adjusted for and why they were included	5
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19	Main results	#16b	Report category boundaries when continuous variables were categorized	5
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21	Main results	#16c	If relevant, consider translating estimates of relative risk into absolute risk for a meaningful time period	5
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25	Other analyses	#17	Report other analyses done—e.g., analyses of subgroups and interactions, and sensitivity analyses	5
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29	Discussion			
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31	Key results	#18	Summarise key results with reference to study objectives	7
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34	Limitations	#19	Discuss limitations of the study, taking into account sources of potential bias or imprecision. Discuss both direction and magnitude of any potential bias.	7
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39	Interpretation	#20	Give a cautious overall interpretation considering objectives, limitations, multiplicity of analyses, results from similar studies, and other relevant evidence.	7
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44	Generalisability	#21	Discuss the generalisability (external validity) of the study results	7
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47	Other			
48	Information			
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51	Funding	#22	Give the source of funding and the role of the funders for the present study and, if applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based	9
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BMJ Open

Sunshine on KOLs: Assessment of the nature, extent and evolution of financial ties between the leaders of professional medical associations and the pharmaceutical industry in France from 2014 to 2019: a retrospective study.

Journal:	<i>BMJ Open</i>
Manuscript ID	bmjopen-2021-051042.R1
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Date Submitted by the Author:	25-Aug-2021
Complete List of Authors:	CLINCKEMAILLIE, Marie; Universite Cote d'Azur Faculte de Medecine, Département d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Médecine Générale, RETINES, HEALTHY SCANFF, Alexandre; Rennes 1 University Naudet, Florian; Rennes 1 University, Clinical Investigation Center (INSERM 1414) and Adult Psychiatry Department, Rennes University Hospital, Rennes, France BARBAROUX, Adriaan; Universite Cote d'Azur Faculte de Medecine, Département d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Médecine Générale, RETINES, LAPCOS, HEALTHY
Primary Subject Heading:	Health economics
Secondary Subject Heading:	Ethics
Keywords:	ETHICS (see Medical Ethics), HEALTH ECONOMICS, Quality in health care < HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT, Public health < INFECTIOUS DISEASES

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3 **Sunshine on KOLs:**
4 **Assessment of the nature, extent and evolution of financial ties**
5 **between the leaders of professional medical associations and the**
6 **pharmaceutical industry in France from 2014 to 2019: a**
7 **retrospective study.**
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12 Marie CLINCKEMAILLIE, MD (ORCID: 0000-0001-6643-001X)¹, Alexandre SCANFF,
13 MD (ORCID: 0000-0001-5419-817X)², Florian NAUDET, PhD (ORCID: 0000-0003-3760-
14 3801)², Adriaan BARBAROUX, MD (ORCID: 0000-0002-9243-6922)³.
15

16
17 ¹*Université Cote d'Azur, Département d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Médecine*
18 *Générale, RETINES, HEALTHY, France*

19 ²*Univ Rennes, CHU Rennes, Inserm, CIC 1414 [(Centre d'Investigation Clinique de*
20 *Rennes)], F- 35000 Rennes, France*

21 ³ *Université Cote d'Azur, Département d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Médecine*
22 *Générale, RETINES, LAPCOS, HEALTHY, France*
23

24
25 *Corresponding author: A. Barbaroux*

26 Adriaan.barbaroux@univ-cotedazur.fr; 2bis Avenue Durante, 06000 Nice
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ABSTRACT

Objective

To investigate the financial relationships between key opinion leader (KOL) or non-KOL physicians and pharmaceutical and device companies in France.

Design

Retrospective and descriptive study

Setting

All doctors practicing in France, with a focus on 548 KOLs (board members of the professional medical associations that published guidelines in 2018-2019, identified on the associations' websites between 2018 and 2020). Ties were collected from the "Transparency in Healthcare" database.

Main outcome measures

The number and the value of gifts from 2014 to 2019, and of remunerations and contractual agreements from 2017 to 2019.

Results

KOLs represented 0.24% of the total number of physicians in France. The total value of gifts declared in the French database for all physicians amounted to €818M (\$936M, £741M). At least one gift was declared for 83% of KOLs. KOLs' gifts represented 0.68% of the total number of gifts to physicians and 1.5% of the total value of gifts, with a mean of €3,700 per capita per year.

The total value of contractual agreements declared for all physicians amounted to €125M. Contractual agreements involving the KOLs represented 0.72% of the number of contractual agreements with physicians and 2.5% of the value of the agreements, with a mean of €1,900 per capita per year.

A total of €156M in remunerations was declared for all physicians. KOL remunerations represented 2.3% of the number of physician remunerations and 4.4% of the total value of the remunerations paid to physicians, with a mean of €4,100 per capita per year.

Almost all professional medical associations (99%) had at least one KOL in their board with a financial tie to the industry, but the amount varied widely among the associations.

Conclusion

Financial relationships between KOLs and the industry in France are extensive. KOLs have much more financial ties than non-KOL practitioners.

Strengths and limitations of this study

- This is the first time the Transparency in Healthcare database was used to analyze the links between KOLs and the industry.
- The authors cross-checked the nationwide database of financial ties with three databases of professional medical associations.
- All medical doctors practicing in France were included, with a focus on 548 KOLs defined as board members of all the professional medical associations that published clinical practice guidelines in 2018 or 2019.
- The main limitation of this study arises from the quality of information provided by the French Transparency in Healthcare database.
- The definition of KOLs used here is somewhat restrictive and further research is needed to better understand the links between KOLs and the industry.

Keywords :

Conflict Of Interest – Key Opinion Leaders – public health – quality in health care – medical ethics

INTRODUCTION

Financial ties between healthcare workers and the pharmaceutical industry may affect every aspect of medical activity, from research to clinical practice.¹ Clinical trials and meta-analyses sponsored by the pharmaceutical industry are more likely to conclude that drugs are effective than non-sponsored trials.² Industry transfers of value to physicians have been shown to be associated with more expensive, more frequent and lower quality prescriptions.³⁻⁶ Recommendations for clinical practice, which define diagnostic criteria and disease treatment, can also be influenced, since their authors often have ties with the industry.⁷⁻¹³

Following the example of the USA with the US Physician Payments Sunshine Act, France created the Transparency in Healthcare public database (transparence.santé.gouv.fr) in 2014.¹⁴⁻¹⁶ Pharmaceutical and medical device industries are required by law to disclose the value of gifts, contractual agreements and remunerations they transfer to healthcare professionals in France. In this database, “Gifts” include anything that is granted without consideration, in kind or in cash, directly or indirectly, with a value greater than or equal to €10 (\$11.4) including taxes. “Remunerations” represent the payment by companies for work or services with a value greater than or equal to €10. “Contractual agreements” involve obligations on both sides: participation in a congress, research or clinical trial activity, training action, etc. For more convenience, this paper will gather both pharmaceutical and medical device industries under the term “pharmaceutical industry”.

The term “Key Opinion Leaders” (KOLs) refers to physicians who influence their peers' medical practice, which includes but is not limited to prescribing behavior. It was coined by sociologists who demonstrated that people were more likely to change their opinions under the influence of individuals in their network than because of the media or advertising: physician social networks hold a major influence in making physicians adopt a new drug.^{17,18} Pharmaceutical companies hire KOLs at different stages of the drug development process, from clinical trials to promotion.^{19,20} Typically, KOLs are physicians or researchers who are respected in their field and recognized for their work, such as board members of professional medical associations.²⁰⁻²⁴

Major ties between the leaders of professional medical associations and the pharmaceutical industry have recently been described in North America.^{11,12} In France, these financial ties had never been studied.

This paper uses the data from the Transparency in Healthcare database to describe the nature, the extent and the evolution of the financial ties of all physicians in France, with a focus on key opinion leaders (KOLs). The ties of professional medical associations were assessed by grouping the gifts, contractual agreements and remunerations received by the KOLs of each professional medical association.

METHODS

We conducted a retrospective study of the financial relationships between industry and the board members of national professional medical associations that publish clinical practice guidelines. As per our protocol (registration number: osf.io/m8syh), we took into consideration the financial ties of each KOL from 2014 to 2019. KOLs were defined as board members of an association from 2018 to 2020.

Identifying professional medical associations

Professional medical associations were defined as any group of physicians who publish clinical practice guidelines in France. One author (MC) built the list of eligible associations by

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3 cross-checking three different databases: the “Bibliothèque Médicale AF Lemanissier”
4 (BMLweb),²⁵ the “Catalogue et index des sites médicaux de langue française” (CISMEF),²⁶ and
5 the “Le Parisien” catalogue of professional medical associations.²⁷ We included only national
6 associations and excluded association titled as concerning a “rare disease”. The BML website
7 is an academic medical library that lists month by month all the consensus statements,
8 guidelines and recommendations published in French. MC conducted a search through it from
9 January 2018 to December 2019 and selected all the national professional medical associations
10 regardless of the nature of the publications they were listed for. The next step was to examine
11 the Cismef website, which has a “learned society” section that lists French speaking
12 professional medical associations. MC selected all the professional medical associations in
13 France from that list. Finally, MC used the “Le Parisien” database that lists French learned
14 societies, and selected all the professional medical associations in the “medical science” section.
15 Duplicates were then eliminated and MC examined the associations one by one to determine
16 whether they had published guidelines in 2018 or 2019. To do so, BMLweb was used first and
17 then the search engine for clinical practice guidelines of the Cismef website if there was no
18 match on BMLweb, and finally Google Scholar and the association website.

22 Identifying Key Opinion Leaders

23 Using each professional medical association’s website, MC identified between October
24 2018 and May 2020 all the physicians who were board members.

25 KOLs were defined as members of the association’s board or governing council but not of sub-
26 committees. KOLs were identified by name, medical specialty and city of practice via the
27 medical association website and if missing on Google. Discrepancies and uncertainties were
28 resolved by discussion with a second author (AB).

29 The Transparency in Healthcare database was downloaded on May 18, 2020 from the
30 EurosForDocs²⁸ website. EurosForDocs is a tool inspired by the American website
31 DollarsForDocs. EurosForDocs aims to help browsers find and understand information in the
32 Transparency in Healthcare database by cleaning and grouping payments by categories and
33 beneficiaries. It also harmonizes the identification of doctors using their unique identification
34 number in the National Healthcare Professional Registry: the “RPPS” (*Répertoire Partagé des*
35 *Professionnels de Santé*). The RPPS of KOLs were identified by AS in the Health-Directory
36 database and the Transparency in Healthcare database. Uncertainties were resolved by manual
37 inspection (MC).

42 Identifying and extracting payment details

43 By using the RPPS unique identification number, data regarding payments to the
44 identified leaders²⁹ were extracted using the database categories: gifts, contractual agreements
45 and remunerations. We took the data into consideration starting from the date on which their
46 declaration became mandatory: gifts from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2019 and
47 contractual agreements and remunerations from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2019.

48 The characteristics and date on which declaration of the payments became mandatory
49 are presented in **table 1**.

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53 < PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE >

55 Outcome measures and descriptive analyses

56 The primary outcome was the total number and value of gifts received by all physicians
57 and by the identified KOLs year by year since 2014.

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3 A secondary outcome was the number and value of payments in the 2 additional
4 categories available after 2017 (i.e. contractual agreements and remunerations) year by year
5 since 2017.

6 The distribution of payments to individual KOLs grouped by professional medical
7 association is also presented. Quantitative data were described using the median (inter-quartile
8 range, IQR) rather than the mean to be less biased by extreme observations. Binary outcomes
9 were described using n (percentage). All analyses were performed using R.³⁰

12 **Changes to protocol**

13 The secondary outcome concerning contractual agreements and remunerations was not
14 part of the protocol as these declarations were not mandatory before 2017. However, after
15 having observed that the value of remunerations represented more than 3 times the yearly value
16 of gifts, it was decided to include contractual agreements and remunerations because without
17 them, an important part of physician-industry ties would have been missed.

18 We identified some outliers with implausible amounts which seemed to indicate that
19 some of the information in the database contained errors (e.g. some gifts may have been
20 reported in cents by the company [outliers typically ending in two zeros]). It was therefore
21 decided a posteriori to exclude amounts exceeding €100,000 (\$118,000) for a single payment.
22 This corresponds to 35 extreme observations (34 in 2019, 1 in 2018, i.e. 0.0005% of the gifts)
23 for an amount of €32M (4% of the total and 13% of 2019).

27 **Patient and public involvement**

28 Patients and public were involved through the French FORMINDEP association which
29 aims to improve the independence of physicians' medical education. FORMINDEP members
30 (patients and physicians) kindly accepted to participate by reviewing and editing the
31 manuscript. The French CI3P organization (Patient and Public Partnership Innovation Center
32 of the Faculty of Medicine of Nice) also accepted to participate in the manuscript's revision
33 and editing. Their comments improved the manuscript's quality, especially the discussion.

37 **RESULTS**

40 **Participants**

41 We identified 238 professional medical associations. 101 of them had produced clinical
42 practice guidelines in 2018 and/or 2019 and two of them had no website or did not describe
43 their board on their website. We identified 605 KOLs. 548 of them were found on the
44 Transparency in Healthcare database. The number of KOLs in each professional medical
45 association ranged from 1 to 12, with a median of 6. 12 KOLs belonged to more than one
46 professional medical association. The way KOLs were identified is described in the figure 1:
47 Flowchart.

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49 < PLEASE INSERT HERE FIG.1: FLOWCHART >

52 **Transparency in Healthcare public database**

53 The database reported financial ties totaling €6B (\$7.1B) over 8 years. Gifts accounted
54 for €1.7B, contractual agreements for €1.3B and remunerations for €3B.²⁸ Gifts, contractual
55 agreements and remunerations are presented below starting from the year in which they were
56 consistently declared, that is since 2014, 2017 and 2017 respectively.

59 **Gifts (2014-2019)**

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3 When considering all physicians, 7,354,492 gifts were declared for a total value of
4 €818M (\$936M) from 2014 to 2019. The median value of a gift was €46 (IQR= 25-60, \$54).
5 For most KOLs (83%), at least one gift was declared from 2014 to 2019. Gifts to KOLs
6 represented 0.68% of the total number of physician gifts and 1.5% of the total value of gifts,
7 i.e. €12.3M (\$14M). This corresponds to a mean of €3,700 in gifts per KOL per year. The
8 median value of a KOL gift was €60 (IQR = 30–214, \$71).

9
10 Overall, the gifts declared for all physicians decreased in number and value from 1.3M
11 gifts (€151M) to 923,000 gifts (€108M).

12 The number, value and proportion of gifts declared for KOLs decreased from 9,687 gifts
13 (0.70% of the total number of gifts to physicians) / €2.2M (1.5% of the total value of gifts to
14 physicians) to 6,044 gifts (0.65% of the total number of gifts to physicians) / €1.5M (1.4% of
15 the total value of gifts to physicians).

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17 The evolution year by year for each specific category of gift from 2014 to 2019 is
18 presented in **Table 2**.

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20 < PLEASE INSERT HERE TABLE 2 >
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23 Almost all (99%) associations had at least one board member for whom at least one gift
24 had been declared since 2014. The median value of gifts declared for all the corresponding
25 KOLs of a professional medical association was €61,000 (IQR= 14,000-143,000; \$70,000) but
26 varied widely between associations. For 1% of the associations, no gift had been declared for
27 their KOLs. For 16%, gifts to their KOLs represented less than €1,000 per year. For 39%, the
28 value of gifts ranged between €10,000 and €50,000 and for 11%, more than €50,000 had been
29 declared in gifts to their KOLs each year.

30 31 32 **Contractual agreements (2017-2019)**

33 For all physicians, 1.67 million contractual agreements were declared from 2017 to 2019
34 for a total of €125M (\$143M). For 1.28 million of these agreements (77%), the reported amount
35 was null. A null amount can be explained either by a joint report in one of the two other
36 categories (when the agreement is linked with a gift or remuneration) or by a wrong declaration.

37 Contractual agreements with KOLs represented 0.72% of all agreements declared for
38 physicians and 2.5% of the value of these agreements, i.e. €3M (\$3,6M). This corresponds to a
39 mean of €1,900 in declared agreements per KOL per year. For 9,496 KOL agreements (79%),
40 the reported amount was null.

41
42 Overall, contractual agreements declared for all physicians increased from €42M in
43 2017 to €43M in 2019.

44 The evolution year by year of the total value and median value of agreements is
45 presented in **table 3**.

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47 < PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE >
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50 The number, the value and the proportion of contractual agreements declared for KOLs
51 decreased each year, from 4,400 agreements (0.78% of the number of agreements with
52 physicians) / €1.1M (2.6% of the value of agreements with physicians) in 2017 to 3,500
53 agreements (0.64% of the number of agreements with physicians) / €1M (2.3% of the value of
54 agreements with physicians) in 2019. This evolution is depicted in **Figure 2**.

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56 < PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE >
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3 The median value of contractual agreements declared for all the corresponding KOLs
4 of an association was €15,900 per year and also varied widely between associations (IQR= 390
5 – 35,617).
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8 **Remunerations (2017-2019)**

9 For all physicians, 250,873 remunerations were declared totaling €156M (\$178M) from
10 2017 to 2019. The median amount of a remuneration was €250 (IQR 55-742) (\$296). KOLs
11 received 2.3% of physician remunerations, i.e. €6.8M (\$7.8M) or 4.4% of the total value of
12 remunerations to physicians. Overall, KOLs received 4 times more remunerations than other
13 physicians, which represents a mean of €4,100 in remunerations per KOL per year.
14

15 Regarding all physicians, remunerations increased in number and total value but the
16 median amount decreased sharply. The evolution of the total amount of remunerations is
17 presented in **table 3**. Physician remunerations increased from 77,277 remunerations / €49M in
18 2017 to 96,160 remunerations / €54M in 2019.
19

20 The number, value and proportion of remunerations declared for KOLs decreased each
21 year from 2017 (1,900 remunerations, 2.5% of the number of remunerations to physicians,
22 accounting for €2.3M and 4.8% of the value of remunerations to physicians) to 2019 (1,800
23 remunerations, 1.9% of the number of remunerations to physicians, accounting for €2.1M and
24 4% of the value of remunerations to physicians in 2019).
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26 The median amount of remunerations declared for all the corresponding KOLs of an
27 association was €21,000 per year and also varied widely between associations (IQR 1012 - 68
28 977, \$25,000).
29

30 **DISCUSSION**

31 **Principle findings**

32 From 2014 to 2019, €818M in gifts were declared for physicians in France. From 2017
33 to 2019, €125M in contractual agreements and €156M in remunerations were declared for
34 physicians in France. The amount of gifts decreased while the total amount of declared
35 contractual agreements and remunerations increased. Gifts represented the largest amount
36 declared. 83% of the KOLs received at least one gift from the pharmaceutical industry from
37 2014 to 2019 for a total amount of €12.3M.
38

39 Almost every professional medical association included at least one KOL who had
40 received one or more gifts since 2014 (99%) or 2017 (97%). Over the whole period, the median
41 value of gifts per association was €61,000 (\$70,000). From 2017 to 2019, the median
42 cumulative value for each professional medical association was €15,900 in contractual
43 agreements and €21,900 in remunerations. The number and value of gifts, contractual
44 agreements and remunerations for all the members of a single association varied widely from
45 one association to another.
46

47 The number, value and proportion of gifts, contractual agreements and remunerations
48 for KOLs slightly decreased over time. Remunerations represented the largest amount declared
49 for KOLs with a median amount per capita 4 times higher than for other physicians. KOLs
50 represented 0.24% of the physicians but were associated with 1.5% of the gifts, 2.4% of the
51 contractual agreements and 4.4% of the remunerations in value. This represents €3,700 in gifts,
52 €1,900 in agreements and €4,100 in remunerations per capita per year. The amount for
53 contractual agreements is probably underestimated since 79% of KOL agreement amounts were
54 declared null in the database (see above).
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60 **Strengths and Limitations**

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3 This study is exhaustive of all ties declared in the French Transparency in Healthcare
4 database. All physicians practicing in France were included since declaration of industry ties is
5 mandatory.

6 However, the results may be underestimated since many amounts for contractual
7 agreements were not available. One reason for this is that when a physician signs an agreement
8 conferring an advantage, the amount can be declared nil as a contractual agreement or a gift, or
9 declared as both an agreement and a gift. There is no government control at this level.

10 The effect of this bias is difficult to predict. Either firms did not declare the amount of
11 thousands of contractual agreements, thus underestimating the amounts received by physicians
12 or the amount of an agreement could have been counted twice. The entire Eurofordocs database
13 (with all beneficiaries, without time limitation) contains 5.5 million contractual agreements, 3.3
14 million of which have a nil amount. 2.2 million gifts are reported to be linked to an agreement
15 but have an invalid textual link. There are therefore at least 1.1 million contractual agreements
16 with a nil amount despite the legal obligation to declare them.

17 Another limitation lies in the fact that the data comes from the declarations of the
18 pharmaceutical industry itself with typos. Moreover, there may be a delay in data reporting,
19 and remunerations may have been misclassified as it was possible to declare them as gifts or
20 as remunerations until October, 2017.

21 Finally, in the absence of an official definition, we chose an objective but restrictive
22 definition of a KOL which led us to rule out many individuals with great leverage who could
23 also have been included as KOLs.

24 25 26 27 28 **Comparison with other studies**

29 Our results are in line with those observed worldwide but add new data regarding the
30 French context. A very recent US study showed that nearly three-quarters of the leaders of the
31 10 most influential professional medical associations in the USA had ties with the
32 pharmaceutical industry, with wide variations in the amount of payments reported between the
33 professional medical associations.¹¹ Total general payments of \$24.8M (€20.8M, £18.9M) were
34 linked to the 235 KOLs of the 10 most influential professional medical associations over 3
35 years. The total median general payment was \$6,000 (IQR \$309 to \$54 000) (€5,000, £4,500).

36 In the American study, KOLs received 10 times more per capita per year in total amount
37 than the French KOLs, and more than 83 times more in terms of median amount.

38 The amounts involved in the American study seems to be much greater. This difference
39 could be explained by societal differences but also by the fact that we included professional
40 medical associations regardless of their size, cost or influence. The difference could also be
41 explained by the fact that the USA has a population 5 times larger than France and has 4 times
42 more physicians, which may represent an important return on investment. Finally, in the USA,
43 there are more mandatory payments to report, and there are enforcement measures and effective
44 penalties that do not exist in France.³¹

45 46 47 48 49 **Implications of this study**

50 Despite multiple calls for more distance,^{1,11,32-34} KOLs still have privileged relationships
51 with the pharmaceutical industry. This phenomenon can lead to lower quality in guidelines and
52 to a general loss of confidence in both KOLs and physicians. In recent years, several guidelines
53 have been abrogated due to doubts about the independence of the experts involved in writing
54 them.³⁵⁻³⁸ In turn, Chakroun et al. have shown that disclosure of conflicts of interest reduces
55 public and physician trust in KOLs.³⁹ Experience shows that financial ties can also be
56 instrumentalized to discredit any expert position, the link being used as an argument to call into
57 question the scientific opinion.⁴⁰⁻⁴²

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3 Our study's finding of remaining concealments in the amounts of contractual
4 agreements, despite the legal obligation to declare them, shows that transparency is still in
5 progress and that both researchers and citizens do not yet have access to all the data. For us, the
6 main area for improvement would be to make it mandatory to report the amount of gifts and
7 remunerations conferred by a contractual agreement in the contractual agreement section. In
8 addition, the declarations should be checked by the public authorities, which is the only way to
9 guarantee the reliability of the information provided.

10
11 Future research might focus on the correlation between the amount of gifts and the
12 medical specialty or the cost of the relevant diseases. Further research is needed to identify
13 other kinds of KOLs such as the department heads of teaching hospitals, and medical university
14 lecturers. Financial ties could be tracked over time, acting as a nudge to help chart moves
15 towards independence.
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19 **Acknowledgments**

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21 understand the database and properly use EuroForDocs.
22

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24 aims to improve the independence of physicians' medical education. FORMINDEP members
25 (patients and physicians) kindly accepted to participate by reviewing and editing the
26 manuscript. The French CI3P organization (Patient and Public Partnership Innovation Center
27 of the Faculty of Medicine of Nice) also accepted to participate in the manuscript's revision
28 and editing. Their comments improved the manuscript's quality, especially the discussion.
29

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37

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45 work.
46
47

48 Author contributions: MC and AB initiated and designed the study, searched the literature,
49 interpreted the results and wrote the manuscript. AS performed the analysis, contributed to the
50 study design and interpreted results. FN contributed to the study design and interpreted the
51 results. AB is the guarantor. All authors have critically revised the manuscript and approved
52 the manuscript. The corresponding author attests that all listed authors meet authorship
53 criteria and that no others meeting the criteria have been omitted.
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56 Ethical approval: Ethics approval was unnecessary because of the non-pharmaceutical bio-
57 medical nature of this research. Ethical aspects nevertheless respect the French legislation.
58 The data protection officer of the general and teaching hospital of Nice approved this study.
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3 Data sharing statement: Data from EurosForDocs are available on
4 <https://www.eurosfordocs.fr/data#donn-es>. Analytic code from the study is available on
5 https://osf.io/4756p/?view_only=df16d649d87847e5aa9478960620bf81
6

7
8 The guarantor (AB) affirms that the manuscript is an honest, accurate, and transparent account
9 of the study being reported; that no important aspect of the study was omitted; and that any
10 discrepancies from the study as originally planned have been explained.
11

12 Figures legend/Caption:

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14 **Figure 1.** Flowchart representing how KOLs were identified by cross-checking three databases.

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17 **Figure 2.** Evolution of the 3 kinds of financial ties for KOLs and all physicians. The gifts
18 declared for all physicians decreased in number and value over time; the number, the value and
19 the proportion of gifts declared for KOLs decreased. The contractual agreements declared for
20 all physicians increased; the number, the value and the proportion of contractual agreements
21 declared for KOLs decreased. The remunerations declared for all physicians increased; the
22 number, the value and the proportion of remunerations declared for KOLs decreased.
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Table 1 presents the 3 categories of financial ties and the date from which they had to be declared in the Transparency in Healthcare database (Transparence-Santé). The Transparency in Healthcare database was laid down in the "Strengthening the safety of medicines and health products" law of December, 2011, and launched in July, 2014.

<i>Type of ties</i>	Definition	Mandatory information to declare
<i>Gifts</i>	Anything that is allocated or paid without consideration by a company to a health actor, with a value greater than or equal to 10 euros including taxes. Available categories on the website = gifts, contribution to the cost of promotional, scientific or professional events, accommodation, hospitality, catering, transport, transport and hospitality, in-kind donations, donations, donations of money, grants, training, expenditures for services and advice, fees, failed category association, empty, other.	Identity of the parties concerned, amount, nature and date of each gift. Mandatory since the law of 2013; actual website availability in 2014.
<i>Contractual Agreements</i>	Contracts involving obligations on the part of the physician and the industry. For example, participation in a congress as a speaker by the physician with payment for the lecture by the company, or participation at the presentation of a new medical device by the physician with payment for transport and accommodation by the company. The agreements concern research activities, clinical trials, participation in a scientific congress or training activities.	Identity of the parties concerned, the organizer, the name, date and place of the event, date of the agreement, its precise purpose (mandatory since the law of 2013; actual availability on the website since 2014) and the amount (mandatory since the law of 2016, actual availability on the website since 2017). If the agreements give rise to payments in gifts or remuneration, the payments can be reported in the agreements category or the gifts or remunerations categories, with a numerical link to the agreement.
<i>Remunerations</i>	Payment for work or services with a value of more than 10 euros including taxes.	Identity of the parties, final beneficiary, date of payment, amount if it is greater than or equal to 10 euros (available since 2015 but mandatory since the law of 2016, actual website availability in the remuneration section in 2017).

Table 2. Median (IQR) amount of gifts to KOL and non-KOL physicians in euros (€).

<i>Gift category</i>	<i>Physician category</i>	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<i>Accommodation</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	210 (165-314)	215 (165-341)	215 (170-314)	215 (164-323)	221 (170-349)	218 (173-328)
	<i>KOL</i>	218 (172-305)	220 (170-330)	218 (179-296)	226 (176-313)	221 (175-323)	229 (180-344)
<i>Hospitality</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	50 (27-118)	45 (25-60)	46 (24-60)	55 (30-60)	53 (28-60)	52 (28-60)
	<i>KOL</i>	70 (30-448)	58 (28.2-258)	60 (30-258)	80.5 (40-362)	60 (29-319)	60 (30-329)
<i>Catering</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	40 (24-55)	40 (24-56)	38 (23-55)	38 (23-56)	38 (23-56)	38 (24-57)
	<i>KOL</i>	40 (23-59)	40 (23-59)	40 (23-58)	40 (23-58)	40 (24-59)	40 (24-59)
<i>Transport</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	208 (91-420)	200 (88-398)	191 (85-380)	189 (79-357)	182 (81-344)	177 (77-332)
	<i>KOL</i>	202 (70-471)	206 (74.2-461)	244 (96-477)	207 (77-445)	198 (79.8-414)	187 (71-395)
<i>Contributions to the cost of promotional events</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	60 (50-400)	60 (50-404)	60 (44-400)	200 (55-455)	400 (250-590)	440 (260-650)
	<i>KOL</i>	320 (60-591)	350 (60-600)	390 (87-650)	450 (186-729)	470 (290-740)	538 (290-796)
<i>Donations-Grants-Training</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	21 (17-30)	23 (17-50)	36 (23-94)	62 (30-171)	55 (29-171)	55 (25-144)
	<i>KOL</i>	83 (60-275)	68 (27.5-1578)	96 (63.5-138)	76 (45-192)	155 (42-225)	80 (42-180)
<i>Service and consulting</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	26 (22-30)	30 (22-45)	30 (24-50)	30 (25-40)	50 (25-80)	116 (40-362)
	<i>KOL</i>	30 (24-120)	47 (29-325)	65 (30-600)	32 (25-83)	130 (74-309)	158 (69-506)
<i>Other</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	100 (30-350)	140 (30-496)	100 (19-375)	22 (16-84)	25 (16-104)	49 (16-220)
	<i>KOL</i>	337 (34.8-1000)	800 (195-1188)	700 (100-1000)	310 (23-915)	40 (12-153)	79.5 (12-500)
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	45 (25-60)	45 (25-60)	45 (25-60)	46 (25-60)	48 (25-60)	49 (26-60)
	<i>KOL</i>	59 (29-198)	60 (30-224)	60 (30-217)	60 (30-213)	60 (31-214)	60 (31-210)

Table 3. Number of contractual agreements with no amount, total value of agreements for which an amount could be found and number of agreements with a declared amount in the contractual agreement section, total and median (IQR) amount of remunerations to KOL and non-KOL physicians, year by year since they are consistently declared.

Payment category	Physicians category	Amount	2017	2018	2019	Total	
<i>Contractual agreements</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	Number of agreements for which the amount could not be found in the agreement section (percentage of the number of agreements)	446,204 (79%)	443,687 (79%)	394,393 (72%)	1,284,284	
		Total value of agreements for which an amount could be found in the agreement section in €	42,905,877	39,962,079	43,098,150	125,966,106	
		Number of agreements with a declared amount in the agreement section	118,860	119,844	150,987	389,691	
	<i>KOL</i>	Number of agreements for which the amount could not be found in the agreement section (percentage of the number of agreements)	3,514 (80%)	3,319 (80%)	2,663 (76%)	9,496	
		Total value of agreements for which an amount could be found in the agreement section in €	1,123,947	1,040,295	1,000,651	3,164,893	
		Number of agreements with a declared amount in the agreement section	903	837	843	2,583	
	<i>Remunerations</i>	<i>All physicians</i>	Total amount in €	49,152,264	53,142,546	54,254,342	156,549 152
			Median (IQR)	300 (65-750)	350 (65-800)	130 (50-613)	250
			Number of remunerations	77,277	77,436	96,160	250,573
<i>KOL</i>		Total amount in €	2,355,894	2,346,293	2,172,827	6,875,014	
		Median (IQR)	946 (527-1440)	1,000 (600-1497)	998 (538-1375)	1,000	
		Number of remunerations	1,950	1,901	1,876	5,718	

Page 17 of 20
144 professional
medical associations
on BML website

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92 professional
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
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238 duplicate-free associations

101 associations having published clinical
practice guidelines in 2018 or 2019

99 associations with a board or governing
council on a website

605 OL identified

548 OL on the database



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— OL — Total

Reporting checklist for cross sectional study.

Based on the STROBE cross sectional guidelines.

Instructions to authors

Complete this checklist by entering the page numbers from your manuscript where readers will find each of the items listed below.

Your article may not currently address all the items on the checklist. Please modify your text to include the missing information. If you are certain that an item does not apply, please write "n/a" and provide a short explanation.

Upload your completed checklist as an extra file when you submit to a journal.

In your methods section, say that you used the STROBE cross sectional reporting guidelines, and cite them as:

von Elm E, Altman DG, Egger M, Pocock SJ, Gøtzsche PC, Vandenbroucke JP. The Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) Statement: guidelines for reporting observational studies.

		Reporting Item	Page Number
Title and abstract			
Title	#1a	Indicate the study's design with a commonly used term in the title or the abstract	1
Abstract	#1b	Provide in the abstract an informative and balanced summary of what was done and what was found	2
Introduction			
Background / rationale	#2	Explain the scientific background and rationale for the investigation being reported	3
Objectives	#3	State specific objectives, including any prespecified hypotheses	3
Methods			
Study design	#4	Present key elements of study design early in the paper	3
Setting	#5	Describe the setting, locations, and relevant dates, including periods of	3

recruitment, exposure, follow-up, and data collection

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3	Eligibility criteria	#6a	Give the eligibility criteria, and the sources and methods of selection of participants. 4
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6		#7	Clearly define all outcomes, exposures, predictors, potential confounders, and effect modifiers. Give diagnostic criteria, if applicable 4
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10	Data sources /	#8	For each variable of interest give sources of data and details of methods of assessment (measurement). Describe comparability of assessment methods if there is more than one group. Give information separately for for exposed and unexposed groups if applicable. 4
11	measurement		
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17	Bias	#9	Describe any efforts to address potential sources of bias 4
18			
19	Study size	#10	Explain how the study size was arrived at 4
20			
21	Quantitative	#11	Explain how quantitative variables were handled in the analyses. If applicable, describe which groupings were chosen, and why 4
22	variables		
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25	Statistical	#12a	Describe all statistical methods, including those used to control for confounding 4
26	methods		
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28			
29	Statistical	#12b	Describe any methods used to examine subgroups and interactions 4
30	methods		
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32			
33	Statistical	#12c	Explain how missing data were addressed 4
34	methods		
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37	Statistical	#12d	If applicable, describe analytical methods taking account of sampling strategy 4
38	methods		
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41	Statistical	#12e	Describe any sensitivity analyses 4
42	methods		
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44	Results		
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47	Participants	#13a	Report numbers of individuals at each stage of study—eg numbers potentially eligible, examined for eligibility, confirmed eligible, included in the study, completing follow-up, and analysed. Give information separately for for exposed and unexposed groups if applicable. 5
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55	Participants	#13b	Give reasons for non-participation at each stage 5
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57	Participants	#13c	Consider use of a flow diagram 5
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1	Descriptive data	#14a	Give characteristics of study participants (eg demographic, clinical, social) and information on exposures and potential confounders. Give information separately for exposed and unexposed groups if applicable.	5
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6	Descriptive data	#14b	Indicate number of participants with missing data for each variable of interest	5
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10	Outcome data	#15	Report numbers of outcome events or summary measures. Give information separately for exposed and unexposed groups if applicable.	5
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14	Main results	#16a	Give unadjusted estimates and, if applicable, confounder-adjusted estimates and their precision (eg, 95% confidence interval). Make clear which confounders were adjusted for and why they were included	5
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19	Main results	#16b	Report category boundaries when continuous variables were categorized	5
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21	Main results	#16c	If relevant, consider translating estimates of relative risk into absolute risk for a meaningful time period	5
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25	Other analyses	#17	Report other analyses done—e.g., analyses of subgroups and interactions, and sensitivity analyses	5
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29	Discussion			
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31	Key results	#18	Summarise key results with reference to study objectives	7
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34	Limitations	#19	Discuss limitations of the study, taking into account sources of potential bias or imprecision. Discuss both direction and magnitude of any potential bias.	7
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39	Interpretation	#20	Give a cautious overall interpretation considering objectives, limitations, multiplicity of analyses, results from similar studies, and other relevant evidence.	7
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44	Generalisability	#21	Discuss the generalisability (external validity) of the study results	7
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47	Other			
48	Information			
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51	Funding	#22	Give the source of funding and the role of the funders for the present study and, if applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based	9
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