

Appendix A. Military presence in pandemic relief

Cases	No. of military responding to covid	Total Military Size	% of military responding to covid	Level of military presence
Colombia	13000	293200	4.43	Low
Mexico	47864	277150	17.7	Low
Brazil	34000	334500	10.16	Low
Uruguay	9676	56050	17.26	Low
Paraguay	3000	11900	25.21	Low
Honduras	4000	14950	26.76	Low
Guatemala	2000	18050	11.08	Low
Chile	33476	77200	43.36	Medium
El Salvador	13023	24500	53.16	Medium
Dominican Republic	32000	56050	57.09	High
Ecuador	31426	40250	78.08	High
Peru	54500 ¹	81000	67.28	High
Argentina	60000	74200	80.86	High
Bolivia	50000 ¹	34100	100	High
Regional Average Percentage			42.3	

Note:¹ Reservists were called out in Bolivia and Peru.
Sources: See Appendix D.

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Appendix B. Military political autonomy, qualitative assessments

Argentina – Autonomy is low since the move back to democracy in 1984. The military must answer to a MOD heavily controlled by civilians; defense plans, and policy receive military input, but final decisions are made by civilians. The military's primary mission has been confined to external defense and has an internal security role only in exceptional circumstances; its budgets have been cut severely, and its educational system has been transformed on orders of civilians, resulting in more integration with the university system and democratic values.

Chile- Autonomy is moderately low. Military has lost considerable autonomy since the Pinochet days and the transition to democratic rule. It has lost clout on the National Security Council, cannot interfere in public policy, answers to civilian courts when human rights abuses have been committed, has lost its institutional control over the police, and is under the authority of a defense ministry that is headed by civilians. Laws now distinguish between defense-which is the military's purview, and internal security-which is the responsibility of the police. Some areas of autonomy remain. The Chilean armed forces retain control over the ownership and management of defense enterprises. It also weighs in heavily in the formulation of defense plans and policy within the defense ministry and is by law granted considerable powers during states of catastrophe.

Brazil-Autonomy is high: Advances were made since the country became a democracy. In 1999 it established a civilian-led defense ministry and defense reforms were enacted in the 2010 decade that granted to civilians in defense policymaking. Yet, since 2017, civilian control has been seriously backsliding and not only generals have the leadership over the defense ministry, but also occupy a considerable share of the cabinet since 2019. There is an unprecedented number of active-duty officers in ministries with the consent of the branch commanders. Generals have publicly displayed support to the president in political gatherings. The military's decision-making latitude extends beyond defense. The constitution authorizes military involvement in law-and-order operations, has contested public policies—outside of the defense realm-- it does not like, has increasingly dominated key positions within the defense ministry and has sway over the management of state-owned defense firms.

El Salvador-Autonomy is high. Following the 1992 Peace Accords, certain reforms strengthened civilian control. The armed forces were separated from the police, and their internal intelligence gathering powers, used previously for repression of Salvadoran citizens, were stripped away. To reform professional norms there were efforts to incorporate civilian educators and curriculum into the academies. That having been said, while laws and regulations have been passed, there was a general failure on the part of both the ARENA (Nationalist Republican Alliance) and FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) governments and now the Bukele administration, to actualize them. Instead, they have delegated powers to the El Salvador armed forces. The military dominates the defense ministry, and defense planning; officers were appointed to head up the Ministry of Justice and Public Security as well as the Civilian National Police; and without any strategic guidance from the political authorities, the military and police

have been left to autonomously respond to the organized crime threat, with substantial evidence of human rights violations. Without civilian leadership, interagency planning and coordination has been deficient.

Appendix. C. Scoring of the Cases

Table C1. Scoring of the cases at the first stage of our research

Cases/Variables	Presence Score	Military in Pandemic Public Security?	Military Operational Autonomy in the Covid Response	Expected Military Human Rights Violations	Actual Level of Military Human Rights Violations	Typical or Unexpected ?
Argentina	3	0	0	Low	Low	Typical (selected)
Bolivia	3	1	3	High	Medium	Unexpected
Brazil	1	0	3	Medium	Low	Unexpected (selected)
Chile	2	1	2	High	Low	Unexpected (selected)
Colombia	1	0	1	Low	Low	Typical
Dominican Republic	3	1	3	High	High	Typical
Ecuador	3	1	3	High	High	Typical
El Salvador	2	1	3	High	High	Typical (selected)
Guatemala	1	1	2	Medium	Medium	Typical
Honduras	1	0	3	Medium	Medium	Typical
Mexico	1	0	1	Low	Low	Typical
Paraguay	1	1	2	Medium	High	Unexpected
Peru	3	1	3	High	Medium	Unexpected
Uruguay	1	0	0	Low	Low	Typical

Note: Presence is coded is scaled 1-3 with 3 representing higher levels, based on the information on table A1. Military Operational autonomy is scaled 0-3 with 3 representing higher levels.

Operational autonomy was measured by answering the following five questions: Are states of emergency enacted to grant more autonomy to the military? Do policing substantially involve the military? Must the military coordinate with non-military agencies? Does the chain of command begin and end with the military or is it civilian controlled or mediated? Is there civilian oversight on military operations? Our framework predicted 9/14 cases (64%).