



## **Supplementary Information for**

### **Correcting Inaccurate Metaperceptions Reduces Americans' Support for Partisan Violence**

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Figs. S1 to S3

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## Studies 1-4: Measures of partisan violence

*Note:* For participants who identify as Democrats, “inpartisans” refers to “Democrats” and “outpartisans” refers to “Republicans,” and vice-versa for participants who identify as Republicans.

### Support for Partisan Violence (SPV). - Study 1, Study 2, Study 3

Please share **your views** on the following questions.

- When, if ever, is it OK for [inpartisans] to send threatening and intimidating messages to [outparty] party leaders? Please choose a point on the scale below that best describes your view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Never) to 100 (Always)]
- When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [inpartisan] in the public to harass an ordinary [outpartisan] on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened? Please choose a point on the scale below that best describes your view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Never) to 100 (Always)]
- How much do you feel it is justified for [inpartisans] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days? Please choose a point on the scale below that best describes your view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]
- How much do you feel it is justified for [inpartisans] to use violence if the [outparty] party wins the next presidential election? Please choose a point on the scale below that best describes your view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]

### Metaperceptions of Support for Partisan Violence. - Study 1, Study 2, Study 3

We’d like you to guess how an average [outpartisan] would respond to the following questions. Please give your best guess.

- How do you think an average [outpartisan] would respond to the following question? When, if ever, is it OK for [outpartisans] to send threatening and intimidating messages to [inparty] party leaders? Please choose a point on the scale below that you think best describes an average [outpartisan’s] view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Never) to 100 (Always)]
- How do you think an average [outpartisan] would respond to the following question? When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [outpartisan] in the public to harass an ordinary [inpartisan] on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened? Please choose a point on the scale below that you think best describes an average [outpartisan’s] view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Never) to 100 (Always)]
- How do you think an average [outpartisan] would respond to the following question? How much do you feel it is justified for [outpartisans] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days? Please choose a point on the scale below that you think best describes an average [outpartisan’s] view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]
- How do you think an average [outpartisan] would respond to the following question? How much do you feel it is justified for [outpartisans] to use violence if the [inparty] party wins the next presidential election? Please choose a point on the scale below that you think best describes an average [outpartisan’s] view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]

### Willingness to Engage in Violence (WEV). - Study 2 (October wave)

If [an outpartisan] is declared the winner of a contested election, how likely would you be to engage in violence? [4-point scale from Not at all likely to Very likely]

### Willingness to Engage in Violence (WEV). - Study 2 (March wave), Study 4

Think about the next presidential election in 2024. If [an outpartisan] is declared the winner of a contested election, how likely would you be to engage in violence? [4-point scale from Not at all likely to Very likely]

### Metaperceptions of Willingness to Engage in Violence. - Study 2 (October wave)

If [an inpartisan] is declared the winner of a contested election, how likely do you think [outparty] voters would be to engage in violence? [4-point scale from Not at all likely to Very likely]

### Metaperceptions of Willingness to Engage in Violence. - Study 2 (March wave), Study 4

Think about the next presidential election in 2024. If [an inpartisan] is declared the winner of a contested election, how likely do you think [outparty] voters would be to engage in violence? [4-point scale from Not at all likely to Very likely]

### Support for Defensive Partisan Violence. - Study 2

If [outpartisans] engage in violence to achieve their political goals, how justified do you think it is for [inpartisans] to use violence in response? [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]

### **Support for Offensive Partisan Violence.** - Study 2

How justified do you think it is for [inpartisans] to use violence to achieve political goals, even if [outpartisans] do not engage in violence first? [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]

### **Metaperceptions of Support for Defensive Partisan Violence.** - Study 2

How justified do you think the average [outpartisan] would say it is to use defensive violence to achieve [outparty's] political goals? [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]

### **Metaperceptions of Support for Offensive Partisan Violence.** - Study 2

How justified do you think the average [outpartisan] would say it is to use offensive violence to achieve [outparty's] political goals? [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]

### **Support for Partisan Violence (single item).** - Study 4b

How much do you feel it is justified for [inpartisans] to use violence if the [outparty] party wins the next presidential election? Please choose a point on the scale below that best describes your view. [Sliding scale from 0 (Not justified at all) to 100 (Extremely justified)]

## **Studies 1-3: Additional variables**

### **Party Feeling Thermometers.** - Study 3

We'd like you to rate how you feel towards both Democrats and Republicans on a scale of 0 to 100, which we call a "feeling thermometer." On this feeling thermometer scale, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable/coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable/warmest). A rating of 50 means you have no feelings one way or the other.

- How would you rate your feelings toward Republicans? [sliding scale from 0 (Very cold) to 100 (Very warm)]
- How would you rate your feelings toward Democrats? [sliding scale from 0 (Very cold) to 100 (Very warm)]

### **Social Distance from Outpartisans.** - Studies 1 and 3

- How would you feel if you had a son or daughter who married a [Outparty] supporter? [sliding scale from 0 (Not at all upset) to 100 (Very upset)]
- How would you feel if you had a very close friend who started seriously dating a [Outparty] supporter? [sliding scale from 0 (Not at all upset) to 100 (Very upset)]
- How would you feel if you were put on a project that required you to work with someone who was a [Outparty] supporter? [sliding scale from 0 (Not at all upset) to 100 (Very upset)]
- How would you feel if you had to carpool, and make casual conversation, somewhat regularly with an individual who was a [Outparty] supporter? [sliding scale from 0 (Not at all upset) to 100 (Very upset)]

### **Party as a Social Identity - Studies 1-3.**

- How important is being a [inparty] to you? [5-point scale from Not at all important to Extremely important]
- How well does the term [inparty] describe you? [5-point scale from Not well at all to Extremely well]

**Trait Aggression - Study 2.** For each of the following statements, indicate whether the statement is true or false for you. [All True/False]

- There are people who have pushed me so far that we have come to blows.
- Given enough provocation, I may hit a person.
- I have threatened people I know.

A number of additional measures from studies 1-4 are available in survey and/or pre-registration documents that are available on our OSF page (<https://osf.io/rsyeh/>) for this project.

## **Studies 1-4: Participant demographics and exclusion criteria**

**Study 1.** Participants were recruited from Bovitz Inc.'s Forthright panel. Participants who selected "Other" or "Independent" (including independent leaners) as their partisan identity, did not pass an attention check (see below), identified as a different gender as on a pre-screen survey, or did not respond to all of the support for partisan violence questions were removed from the survey. 31 participants were excluded due to party identification, 301 because they failed the attention check, 27 because of the discrepancy between self-reported gender, and 9 because they did not complete all of the support for violence items. The final sample size was 702 participants (49.6% Republicans, 50.4% Democrats) which was representative in terms of age ( $M_{\text{age}} = 49.4$ ,  $SD_{\text{age}} = 16.31$ ), gender (54% female, 45% male, 1% non-binary), and educational attainment (58% less than bachelors degree, 42% bachelors degree or more), race (66% White, 13% Black, 11% Hispanic, 6% Asian, and 3% Other).

**Study 2.** Participants were recruited from a panel of ForthRight participants from Bovitz, Inc. We excluded participants who did not identify as a Democrat or Republican, or who had switched political parties between the October 2020 wave and the March 2021 wave. 680 participants were excluded due to these criteria. The final sample size was 1,679 participants (68% Democrat, 32% Republican, 47% female,  $M_{age} = 42.5$ , 71% White, 26% Black, 4% Asian, 9% Hispanic, and 3% Other).


**Study 3.** Participants were recruited from a Mechanical Turk panel. All had previously identified as “Strong Democrats” or “Strong Republicans.” We excluded participants who failed a simple attention check or no longer identified as strong partisans. We excluded 134 participants for not identifying as "strong" Republicans or Democrats, and 23 for failing the attention check. The final sample size was 557 participants (50.6% Democrat, 49.4% Republican, 65.5% female,  $M_{age} = 38$ , 83% White, 8% Black, 3% Asian, 4% Hispanic, and 2% Other).

**Study 4a.** Participants were recruited from the same panel as in Study 2. We excluded participants who identified as true independents or did not complete our main dependent variable (WEV). 548 participants were excluded because they identified as true independents or did not complete the WEV measure. The final sample size was 1803 participants (68% Democrat, 32% Republican, 46% female,  $M_{age} = 42.5$ , 71% White, 13% Black, 4% Asian, 9% Hispanic, and 2% Other)

**Study 4b.** Participants who completed study 4a were re-contacted. The final sample size was 1447 participants (69% Democrat, 31% Republican, 45% female,  $M_{age} = 42.5$ , 70% White, 14% Black, 4% Asian, 9% Hispanic, and 2% Other)

### Attention checks

**Studies 1 and 3.** Only participants who selected a value between 20 and 30 on the following question were allowed to participate in the full survey. The default starting value was 50 meaning participants had to read the question and demonstrate that they could answer questions that used a slider response scale.



### Study 3: Experimental stimuli

Examples of treatment (Fig. S1 and S2) and control (Fig. S3) conditions for Study 3 are included below.

### Study 4: Experimental stimuli

*Simulated stimuli for a participant who identified as a Democrat and was assigned to the treatment condition. The words “Democrat(ic)” and “Republican” changed based on participants’ party affiliation.*

On the previous page, you answered a question about how likely you think Republican voters would be to engage in violence if a Democratic candidate was declared the winner of a contested election in 2024. This question was asked on a scale from 1 (Not at all likely) to 4 (Very likely).

We asked the same question to a nationally representative sample of Republicans. The Republicans who took the survey had the same distribution of gender, age, region, race and education as the full Republican party. The survey was conducted from March 17-29, 2021.

Below we provide the response you gave about how likely Republican voters would be to engage in violence alongside the actual answer that the representative sample of Republican’s gave to this question.

**Your guess for how Republican voters would respond to this question was: 3 - Somewhat likely**

**The actual average Republican voter’s response to this question was: 1.28**

*Simulated stimuli for a participant who identified as a Democrat and was assigned to the control condition. The words “Democrat(ic)” and “Republican” changed based on participants’ party affiliation.*

On the previous page, you answered a question about how likely you think Republican voters would be to engage in violence if a Democratic candidate was declared the winner of a contested election in 2024. This question was asked on a scale from 1 (Not at all likely) to 4 (Very likely).

Below we provide the response you gave about how likely Republican voters would be to engage in violence.

**Your guess for how Republican voters would respond to this question was: 3 - Somewhat likely**

On the previous pages, you answered 4 questions about how much you think the average Republican supports various forms of violence on a scale from 0 (do not support) to 100 (fully support).

We also asked these same questions to a nationally representative sample of **Republicans**. The Republicans who took the survey had the same distribution of gender, age, region, race and education as the full Republican party. The survey was conducted from October 14-20, 2020.

In the table below, we have included **the responses you gave** about how you think an average Republican would respond to these questions alongside the **actual answers** that a representative sample of Republican's gave to these questions.

Question	Your guess	Actual average Republican's response
When, if ever, is it OK for Republicans to send threatening and intimidating messages to Democratic party leaders?	48	10.4
When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary Republican in the public to harass an ordinary Democrat on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened?	46	10.8
How much do you feel it is justified for Republicans to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?	44	10.1
How much do you feel it is justified for Republicans to use violence if the Democratic party wins the next presidential election?	53	10.6
<b>Average support for violence</b>	<b><u>47.75</u></b>	<b><u>10.5</u></b>

**Your guess for how the average Republican would respond to these 4 items was: 47.75**

**The actual average Republican's response to these 4 items was: 10.5**

**Fig. S1.** Study 3 stimuli simulated for a participant who identified as a strong Democrat and was assigned to the treatment condition. The words “Democrat(ic)” and “Republican” in description and table changed based on participants’ party affiliation.

On the previous pages, you answered 4 questions about how much you think the average Democrat supports various forms of violence on a scale from 0 (do not support) to 100 (fully support).

We also asked these same questions to a nationally representative sample of **Democrats**. The Democrats who took the survey had the same distribution of gender, age, region, race and education as the full Democratic party. The survey was conducted from October 14-20, 2020.

In the table below, we have included **the responses you gave** about how you think an average Democrat would respond to these questions alongside the **actual answers** that a representative sample of Democrat's gave to these questions.

Question	Your guess	Actual average Democrat's response
When, if ever, is it OK for Democrats to send threatening and intimidating messages to Republican party leaders?	41	9.0
When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary Democrat in the public to harass an ordinary Republican on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened?	41	8.5
How much do you feel it is justified for Democrats to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?	47	9.1
How much do you feel it is justified for Democrats to use violence if the Republican party wins the next presidential election?	44	10.3
<b>Average support for violence</b>	<b><u>43.25</u></b>	<b><u>9.3</u></b>

**Your guess for how the average Democrat would respond to these 4 items**

**was: 43.25**

**The actual average Democrat's response to these 4 items was: 9.3**

**Fig. S2.** Study 3 stimuli simulated for a participant who identified as a strong Republican and was assigned to the treatment condition. The words "Democrat(ic)" and "Republican" in description and table changed based on participants' party affiliation.

On the previous pages, you answered 4 questions about how much you think the average Republican supports various forms of violence on a scale from 0 (do not support) to 100 (fully support).

In the table below, we have included **the responses you gave** about how you think an average Republican would respond to these questions.

<b>Question</b>	<b>Your guess</b>
When, if ever, is it OK for Republicans to send threatening and intimidating messages to Democratic party leaders?	<b>54</b>
When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary Republican in the public to harass an ordinary Democrat on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened?	<b>46</b>
How much do you feel it is justified for Republicans to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?	<b>46</b>
How much do you feel it is justified for Republicans to use violence if the Democratic party wins the next presidential election?	<b>47</b>
<b>Average support for violence</b>	<b>48.25</b>

**Your guess for how the average Republican would respond to these 4 items was: 48.25**

**Fig. S3.** Study 3 stimuli simulated for a participant who identified as a strong Democrat and was assigned to the control condition. The words “Democrat(ic)” and “Republican” in description and table changed based on participants’ party affiliation.

### Calculating percent overestimates of SPV and WEV

To calculate percent overestimates of SPV, we used the following formula:  $(\text{Out-party's meta SPV} / \text{true SPV}) * 100 - 100$ . We use this formula so that if, for example, there is a metaperception of 40 and a true value of 10, we report a 300% overestimate.

The scale for WEV ranged from 1-4. To calculate percent overestimate for WEV, we first re-scaled the values to be from 0-3. We then calculated percent overestimate using the formula:  $(\text{out-party's meta WEV} / \text{true values}) * 100 - 100$ .

### Results of regression analyses and other tables

All regression tables include unstandardized coefficients, unless otherwise noted.

**Table S1. Comparison between Study 1 and Study 2 demographics and benchmarks (American National Election Survey, 2016)**

	Study 1	Study 2	ANES 2016 (Partisans only)
<b>Gender (%)</b>			
Male	45.3%	52.1%	45.8%
Female	54.1%	47.0%	54.0%
Nonbinary/NA	0.6%	0.9%	0.2%
<b>Age (%)</b>			
18-34	23.5%	23.1%	26.8%
51-65	30.4%	29.5%	30.5%
35-50	25.1%	34.3%	23.8%
65+	20.8%	13.1%	18.9%
<b>Race (%)</b>			
Non-Hispanic White	66.2%	71.2%	68.7%
Non-Hispanic Black	13.4%	13.9%	13.2%
Hispanic	11.1%	8.6%	12.2%
Non-Hispanic Other	9.3%	6.3%	5.9%
<b>Educational Attainment (%)</b>			
Less than Bachelor's degree	58.1%	59.6%	66.8%
Bachelor's degree or more	41.9%	40.4%	33.2%



**Table S2. Outparty metaperceptions of support for violence predict individuals' support for violence, Study 1**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	SPV
Meta SPV	0.097*** (0.022)
Gender: Male	6.616*** (1.481)
Gender: Nonbinary	3.450 (9.554)
Race: Black	3.214 (2.394)
Race: Hispanic	2.480 (2.366)
Race: Asian	9.531*** (3.089)
Race: Other	-4.242 (4.085)
Education: HS or less	0.718 (2.172)
Education: Some college	-2.568 (2.121)
Education: Postgraduate	0.130 (2.272)
Income	0.202 (0.230)
Party: Republican	1.136 (1.578)
Constant	0.735 (2.787)
Observations	701
R <sup>2</sup>	0.079
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.063
Residual Std. Error	18.954 (df = 688)
F Statistic	4.891*** (df = 12; 688)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Table S3. Inparty metaperceptions of SPV predict individuals' SPV, Study 1**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	SPV
Inparty metaperceptions of SPV	0.692*** (0.025)
Gender: Male	3.468*** (1.031)
Gender: Nonbinary	3.327 (6.604)
Race: Black	1.911 (1.652)
Race: Hispanic	-1.119 (1.642)
Race: Asian	3.309 (2.148)
Race: Other	-1.428 (2.827)
Education: HS or less	0.591 (1.495)
Education: Some college	-0.873 (1.468)
Education: Postgraduate	0.958 (1.568)
Income	-0.026 (0.159)
Party: Republican	-0.018 (1.093)
Constant	-1.125 (1.826)
Observations	700
R <sup>2</sup>	0.560
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.552
Residual Std. Error	13.111 (df = 687)
F Statistic	72.792*** (df = 12; 687)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Table S4. Predicting overestimates of outparty metaperceptions of SPV in Study 1, without control for own SPV (1) and with control for own SPV (2)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Overestimates of outparty metaperceptions of SPV	
	(1)	(2)
SPV		0.295*** (0.066)
Gender: Male	-0.300 (2.622)	-2.243 (2.622)
Gender: Nonbinary	17.661 (16.904)	16.139 (16.676)
Race: Black	-7.848* (4.229)	-8.572** (4.174)
Race: Hispanic	2.033 (4.189)	1.243 (4.135)
Race: Asian	-0.972 (5.471)	-3.757 (5.431)
Race: Other	2.904 (7.232)	4.073 (7.138)
Education: HS or less	-10.309*** (3.826)	-10.227*** (3.774)
Education: Some college	-3.343 (3.753)	-2.490 (3.707)
Education: Postgraduate	-10.099** (4.005)	-9.849** (3.950)
Income	-0.092 (0.408)	-0.149 (0.402)
Party: Republican	0.663 (2.794)	0.337 (2.757)
Constant	33.749*** (4.641)	32.274*** (4.590)
Observations	701	701
R <sup>2</sup>	0.024	0.052
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.036
Residual Std. Error	33.563 (df = 689)	33.104 (df = 688)
F Statistic	1.554 (df = 11; 689)	3.149*** (df = 12; 688)

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S5. Comparing weighted and unweighted estimates of SPV, WEV, and corresponding metaperceptions in Study 2. Weights were based on ANES quotas in Table S1.**

	Unweighted	Weighted
<b>SPV</b>		
Democrats	10.7	10.2
Republicans	9.8	9.3
Republicans' metaperceptions of Democrats	39.2	38.8
Democrats' metaperceptions of Republicans	40.9	40.9
<b>WEV 2020</b>		
Democrats	1.28	1.27
Republicans	1.24	1.23
Republicans' metaperceptions of Democrats	2.45	2.50
Democrats' metaperceptions of Republicans	2.30	2.33
<b>WEV 2024</b>		
Democrats	1.31	1.30
Republicans	1.28	1.28
Republicans' metaperceptions of Democrats	2.45	2.49
Democrats' metaperceptions of Republicans	2.37	2.37

**Table S6. Outgroup metaperceptions predict individuals' support for and willingness to engage in violence in Study 2.**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	SPV (1)	WEV 2020 (2)	WEV 2024 (3)	Offensive viol. (4)	Defensive viol. (5)	WEV diff (6)
Metaperception	0.171*** (0.015)	0.085*** (0.014)	0.218*** (0.014)	0.174*** (0.015)	0.554*** (0.023)	0.127*** (0.012)
Affective polarization	-0.122*** (0.017)	0.0003 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.133*** (0.020)	-0.073** (0.030)	-0.0003 (0.001)
Party as a soc. ID	2.090*** (0.566)	0.042** (0.018)	0.045** (0.020)	2.438*** (0.638)	1.708* (0.980)	-0.034 (0.021)
Trait aggression	5.562*** (1.614)	0.321*** (0.057)	0.276*** (0.056)	5.494*** (1.813)	8.845*** (2.792)	-0.013 (0.064)
Self monitoring	-7.910*** (0.639)	-0.188*** (0.023)	-0.120*** (0.023)	-6.155*** (0.719)	-3.817*** (1.106)	0.035 (0.025)
Political knowledge	-2.914*** (0.434)	-0.076*** (0.015)	-0.112*** (0.015)	-2.698*** (0.487)	1.037 (0.757)	-0.024 (0.017)
Gender: Female	-0.980 (0.987)	-0.049 (0.035)	-0.023 (0.035)	-1.419 (1.111)	-2.904* (1.713)	0.057 (0.039)
Gender: Other	7.671 (5.163)	0.461** (0.203)	0.411** (0.182)	2.571 (5.819)	-2.921 (8.882)	-0.077 (0.228)
Age	-0.087** (0.034)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.075* (0.039)	0.078 (0.059)	-0.001 (0.001)
Race: Black	1.806 (1.475)	-0.018 (0.053)	0.011 (0.052)	1.660 (1.661)	3.818 (2.556)	0.011 (0.060)
Race: Asian	5.087** (2.490)	0.075 (0.087)	0.071 (0.088)	4.521 (2.805)	7.782* (4.284)	-0.068 (0.097)
Race: Hispanic	2.308 (1.727)	0.152** (0.060)	0.069 (0.061)	5.061*** (1.945)	1.087 (2.996)	-0.122* (0.068)
Race: Other	-3.730 (3.288)	-0.094 (0.113)	-0.103 (0.114)	-1.987 (3.650)	0.523 (5.566)	0.021 (0.126)
Education: HS or less	-1.828 (1.523)	-0.050 (0.054)	0.015 (0.054)	-2.731 (1.714)	-1.386 (2.630)	0.097 (0.061)
Education: Some college	-3.289*** (1.188)	-0.077* (0.042)	-0.061 (0.042)	-3.279** (1.337)	3.209 (2.058)	0.024 (0.047)
Education: Graduate	-2.125 (1.614)	-0.059 (0.056)	-0.053 (0.057)	-2.242 (1.816)	1.186 (2.772)	0.008 (0.063)
Income	-0.00003*** (0.00001)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00001 (0.00001)	-0.00003 (0.00002)	0.00000 (0.00000)
Party ID	0.492** (0.226)	0.009 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.500** (0.254)	0.128 (0.391)	-0.008 (0.009)
Constant	47.705*** (3.907)	1.888*** (0.137)	1.672*** (0.138)	39.969*** (4.395)	15.583** (6.799)	0.123 (0.152)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.314	0.178	0.263	0.244	0.341	0.090
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.305	0.167	0.254	0.234	0.333	0.077

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Notes for Table S6:

Note 1: Metaperceptions are for corresponding variables – e.g. in the model with SPV as outcome variable, we use meta SPV; in the model with WEV 2020 as outcome variable, we use meta WEV 2020.

Note 2: Models (2) and (6) use affective polarization measures from October 2020. All other models use affective polarization measures from March 2021. The measure is the same, but the date the data was collected is different.

**Table S7. Sensitivity analysis for Studies 1 and 2: Outparty metaperceptions of SPV/WEV predict SPV/WEV, without demographic controls**

	<i>Dependent variable</i>			
	SPV Study 1 (1)	SPV Study 2 (2)	WEV 2020 Study 2 (3)	WEV 2024 Study 2 (4)
Outparty metaperceptions of SPV	0.094*** (0.022)	0.169*** (0.015)		
Outparty metaperceptions of WEV			0.078*** (0.013)	0.206*** (0.013)
Constant	6.393*** (1.073)	3.584*** (0.798)	1.084*** (0.034)	0.811*** (0.036)
Observations	702	1,661	1,558	1,673
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.068	0.024	0.126
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.067	0.023	0.126
Residual Std. Error	19.323 (df = 700)	20.414 (df = 1659)	0.637 (df = 1556)	0.675 (df = 1671)
F Statistic	18.672*** (df = 1; 700)	120.914*** (df = 1; 1659)	37.765*** (df = 1; 1556)	241.897*** (df = 1; 1671)

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S8. Predicting overestimates of outparty metaperceptions of SPV in Study 2, without control for own SPV (1) and with control for own SPV (2), Predicting overestimates of outparty metaperceptions of WEV in Study 2, without control for own WEV (1) and with control for own WEV (2)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Overestimates of outparty metaperceptions of SPV		Overestimates of outparty metaperceptions of WEV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SPV		0.499*** (0.044)		
WEV				0.719*** (0.045)
Affective polarization	0.234*** (0.031)	0.275*** (0.029)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Party as a social identity	0.291 (1.010)	-0.777 (0.971)	0.037 (0.039)	-0.001 (0.036)
Aggression	14.551*** (2.851)	10.533*** (2.751)	0.261** (0.111)	0.021 (0.103)
Self-monitoring	-1.489 (1.139)	2.583** (1.147)	-0.096** (0.044)	0.006 (0.041)
Political knowledge	2.442*** (0.771)	3.687*** (0.746)	0.150*** (0.030)	0.207*** (0.028)
Gender: Female	1.529 (1.761)	1.888 (1.685)	0.178*** (0.069)	0.170*** (0.063)
Gender: Other	20.690** (9.192)	15.099* (8.807)	0.827** (0.359)	0.401 (0.331)
Age	-0.130** (0.061)	-0.076 (0.059)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Race: Black	-4.146 (2.629)	-4.692* (2.516)	0.014 (0.103)	0.010 (0.094)
Race: Asian	3.005 (4.441)	0.213 (4.256)	-0.253 (0.173)	-0.265* (0.159)
Race: Hispanic	-0.258 (3.079)	-1.387 (2.948)	-0.198* (0.120)	-0.217** (0.110)
Race: Other	8.301 (5.859)	9.451* (5.606)	0.179 (0.225)	0.226 (0.207)
Education: HS or less	-3.033 (2.716)	-1.862 (2.600)	0.048 (0.106)	0.032 (0.098)
Education: Some college	-0.041 (2.120)	1.602 (2.033)	0.030 (0.083)	0.069 (0.076)
Education: Graduate	-6.512** (2.874)	-4.896* (2.753)	-0.168 (0.112)	-0.104 (0.103)
Income	0.00002 (0.00002)	0.00004** (0.00002)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)
Party ID	-0.030 (0.403)	-0.288 (0.386)	0.018 (0.016)	0.015 (0.014)
Constant	17.904*** (6.928)	-8.229 (7.016)	0.267 (0.270)	-1.177*** (0.264)
Observations	1,398	1,398	1,402	1,400
R <sup>2</sup>	0.098	0.175	0.064	0.210
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.087	0.164	0.052	0.200
Residual Std. Error	31.271 (df = 1380)	29.916 (df = 1379)	1.221 (df = 1384)	1.122 (df = 1381)
F Statistic	8.812*** (df = 17; 1380)	16.251*** (df = 18; 1379)	5.523*** (df = 17; 1384)	20.371*** (df = 18; 1381)

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S9. Results of multiple regression analysis of effect of condition on SPV (1) among strong partisans, and (2) in the full sample for Study 3. Beta values are unstandardized.**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	SPV	
	Strong partisans (pre-registered)	Full sample
	(1)	(2)
Condition: Correction	-2.825** (1.140)	-3.231*** (1.062)
Gender: Male	5.058*** (1.238)	3.733*** (1.127)
Age	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.014)
Party: Republican	-0.033 (1.200)	-0.620 (1.118)
Income	-0.00001 (0.00001)	-0.00001 (0.00001)
Race: Black	4.545** (2.095)	3.801* (1.997)
Race: Hispanic	2.416 (3.021)	3.387 (2.779)
Race: Asian	2.186 (3.458)	2.158 (3.061)
Race: Other	12.571** (5.078)	10.087** (4.542)
Education: Some college	-3.218 (2.252)	-3.910* (2.073)
Education: Bachelors	-2.865 (2.239)	-3.054 (2.066)
Education: Graduate	-5.348** (2.524)	-5.680** (2.325)
Constant	10.293*** (2.395)	11.735*** (2.234)
Observations	554	649
R <sup>2</sup>	0.079	0.067
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.059	0.049
Residual Std. Error	13.273 (df = 541)	13.432 (df = 636)
F Statistic	3.866*** (df = 12; 541)	3.788*** (df = 12; 636)

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



**Table S10. Multiple regression analysis of effect of correction condition on two measures of affective polarization in Study 3. Outcome variables are difference in feelings towards inpartisans and outpartisans (1) and measure of social distancing from outpartisans (2).**

	<i>Dependent variable: Affective polarization</i>	
	Feeling thermometer difference	Social distance from outparty
	(1)	(2)
Condition: Correction	-1.532 (2.349)	0.921 (2.268)
Gender: Male	-4.464* (2.550)	2.920 (2.462)
Age	0.003 (0.029)	-0.030 (0.028)
Party: Republican	-4.507* (2.472)	-10.303*** (2.388)
Income	-0.00001 (0.00003)	-0.00005** (0.00003)
Race: Black	-1.684 (4.316)	7.655* (4.166)
Race: Hispanic	-14.555** (6.225)	-6.291 (6.009)
Race: Asian	-3.626 (7.125)	5.137 (6.877)
Race: Other	-6.895 (10.462)	-3.186 (10.098)
Education: Some college	10.938** (4.641)	7.147 (4.479)
Education: Bachelors	7.171 (4.614)	8.507* (4.453)
Education: Graduate	6.999 (5.200)	5.651 (5.026)
Constant	58.573*** (4.934)	35.369*** (4.764)
Observations	554	553
R <sup>2</sup>	0.035	0.077
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.056
Residual Std. Error	27.349 (df = 541)	26.397 (df = 540)
F Statistic	1.646* (df = 12; 541)	3.752*** (df = 12; 540)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

**Table S11. Testing for moderation of effect of correction condition by political party in Study 3. Effect size of correction among Republicans (1) is larger than effect among Democrats (2), but interaction between condition and party is not significant (3)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	(1) Republicans	(2) Democrats	(3) Interaction
Condition: Correction	-3.762*** (1.347)	-2.649 (1.669)	-2.691* (1.510)
Gender: Male	4.887*** (1.472)	2.039 (1.753)	3.735*** (1.128)
Age	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.075 (0.069)	-0.013 (0.014)
Income	-0.00002 (0.00002)	-0.00001 (0.00002)	-0.00001 (0.00001)
Race: Black	14.951*** (4.365)	1.485 (2.421)	3.770* (1.999)
Race: Hispanic	3.691 (4.637)	3.234 (3.639)	3.481 (2.787)
Race: Asian	3.010 (5.542)	1.220 (3.912)	2.122 (3.064)
Race: Other	2.168 (6.126)	16.086** (6.712)	10.224** (4.553)
Education: Some college	-2.991 (2.297)	-4.423 (3.946)	-3.898* (2.075)
Education: Bachelors	-2.287 (2.339)	-3.518 (3.854)	-3.046 (2.068)
Education: Graduate	-4.953* (2.745)	-6.667 (4.198)	-5.701** (2.326)
Party: Republican			-0.088 (1.540)
Correction:Republican			-1.068 (2.124)
Constant	10.488*** (2.344)	14.923*** (4.775)	11.472*** (2.295)
Observations	327	322	649
R <sup>2</sup>	0.114	0.059	0.067
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.083	0.026	0.048
Residual Std. Error	12.013 (df = 315)	14.709 (df = 310)	13.439 (df = 635)
F Statistic	3.699*** (df = 11; 315)	1.772* (df = 11; 310)	3.512*** (df = 13; 635)

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01  
Includes participants who did not identify as strong partisans to increase power

**Table S12. Sensitivity analysis for Studies 3, 4a, and 4b: Main regression without demographic controls**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	SPV, Study 3 (1)	WEV, Study 4a (2)	WEV, Study 4b
Condition: Correction	-3.043*** (1.150)	-0.152*** (0.032)	-0.065* (0.035)
Constant	8.202*** (0.817)	1.370*** (0.023)	1.320*** (0.025)
Observations	557	1,803	1,447
R <sup>2</sup>	0.012	0.012	0.002
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.012	0.002
Residual Std. Error	13.575 (df = 555)	0.685 (df = 1801)	0.666 (df = 1445)
F Statistic	6.995*** (df = 1; 555)	22.283*** (df = 1; 1801)	3.393* (df = 1; 1445)

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S13. Results of multiple regression analysis of effect of correction condition on WEV in Study 4a, (1) including respondents who switched parties between waves, and (2) excluding them.**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	WEV	
	Including party-switchers (1)	Excluding party switchers (2)
Condition: Correction	-0.164*** (0.028)	-0.158*** (0.029)
Pre-treatment WEV	0.439*** (0.020)	0.431*** (0.021)
Gender: Female	-0.067** (0.029)	-0.082*** (0.029)
Gender: Other	0.163 (0.149)	0.061 (0.162)
Race: Black	0.070 (0.044)	0.061 (0.044)
Race: Asian	-0.030 (0.074)	-0.019 (0.076)
Race: Hispanic	0.027 (0.051)	0.035 (0.052)
Race: Other	-0.125 (0.098)	-0.155 (0.099)
Age	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Education: HS or less	0.045 (0.044)	0.018 (0.045)
Education: Some college	0.027 (0.036)	0.019 (0.037)
Education: Graduate	0.011 (0.051)	-0.008 (0.051)
Income	0.000 (0.00000)	0.000 (0.00000)
Party: Republican	0.019 (0.032)	0.017 (0.033)
Constant	0.958*** (0.074)	0.968*** (0.075)
Observations	1,799	1,692
R <sup>2</sup>	0.248	0.243
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.242	0.236
Residual Std. Error	0.601 (df = 1784)	0.592 (df = 1677)
F Statistic	41.980*** (df = 14; 1784)	38.371*** (df = 14; 1677)
<i>Note:</i>	r*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

In Table S13, we include results of two regression models analyzing the effect of condition on reported WEV. In the first model (1) (which is referenced in the main text of the paper), we do not exclude participants from the survey if switched their party identification between Study 2 and Study 4a. In the second model (2), we do exclude these participants.

In Table S14, we include two models. In the first model (1) (which is referenced in the main text of the paper), we do not exclude participants from the survey if they identified with different political parties across Studies 2, 4a, and 4b. This was our pre-registered model. After collecting the data, we realized a better model would exclude participants who switched parties, as the questions referring “outpartisans” would differ across waves. In the second model (2), we exclude participants who self-identified with a different political party across the three waves.

Table S15 includes regression models showing the effect of condition on WEV, but with an additional control variable for self-monitoring. The models are the same as in Table S5 (1) and Table S6 (2), but with an additional control variable.

**Table S14. Results of multiple regression analysis of effect of correction condition in Study 4b, (1) on WEV, including respondents who switched parties between waves, (2) on WEV, excluding party-switchers, and (3) on Meta WEV, including party-switchers.**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	WEV		Meta WEV
	Including party-switchers	Excluding party-switchers	Including party-switchers
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Condition: Correct	-0.071** (0.033)	-0.076** (0.033)	-0.308*** (0.052)
Pre-treatment WEV	0.331*** (0.023)	0.321*** (0.024)	
Pre-treatment meta WEV			0.171*** (0.021)
Gender: Female	-0.043 (0.034)	-0.064* (0.034)	-0.024 (0.053)
Gender: Other	-0.098 (0.165)	-0.178 (0.179)	-0.088 (0.260)
Race: Black	0.077 (0.050)	0.090* (0.050)	0.029 (0.079)
Race: Asian	0.088 (0.084)	0.114 (0.084)	0.072 (0.132)
Race: Hispanic	0.021 (0.059)	0.041 (0.058)	0.175* (0.093)
Race: Other	0.003 (0.116)	-0.072 (0.117)	0.242 (0.184)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Education: HS or less	0.029 (0.051)	0.019 (0.051)	0.033 (0.081)
Education: Some college	0.024 (0.042)	0.005 (0.042)	0.138** (0.066)
Education: Graduate	-0.069 (0.058)	-0.057 (0.058)	0.189** (0.092)
Income	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)
Party: Republican	0.057 (0.037)	0.057 (0.038)	0.078 (0.059)
Constant	0.944*** (0.086)	0.952*** (0.087)	2.271*** (0.130)
Observations	1,444	1,359	1,442
R <sup>2</sup>	0.143	0.140	0.076
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.134	0.131	0.067
Residual Std. Error	0.621 (df = 1429)	0.605 (df = 1344)	0.982 (df = 1427)
F Statistic	16.997*** (df = 14; 1429)	15.627*** (df = 14; 1344)	8.430*** (df = 14; 1427)

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S15. Results of multiple regression analysis of effect of condition on WEV, with control for self-monitoring in Study 4a (1) and Study 4b (2).**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	WEV Study 4a (1)	WEV Study 4b (2)
Condition: Correction	-0.166*** (0.028)	-0.073** (0.033)
Pre-treatment WEV	0.409*** (0.021)	0.307*** (0.024)
Gender: Female	-0.049* (0.029)	-0.032 (0.034)
Gender: Other	0.161 (0.148)	-0.093 (0.164)
Race: Black	0.048 (0.044)	0.058 (0.050)
Race: Asian	-0.021 (0.074)	0.090 (0.083)
Race: Hispanic	0.026 (0.051)	0.012 (0.059)
Race: Other	-0.129 (0.097)	0.001 (0.116)
Age	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Education: HS or less	0.064 (0.044)	0.044 (0.051)
Education: Some college	0.034 (0.036)	0.028 (0.042)
Education: Graduate	0.008 (0.051)	-0.072 (0.058)
Income	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)
Party: Republican	0.028 (0.032)	0.066* (0.037)
Self-monitoring	-0.099*** (0.019)	-0.080*** (0.022)
Constant	1.325*** (0.101)	1.241*** (0.118)
Observations	1,791	1,440
R <sup>2</sup>	0.256	0.151
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.249	0.142
Residual Std. Error	0.596 (df = 1775)	0.619 (df = 1424)
F Statistic	40.617*** (df = 15; 1775)	16.901*** (df = 15; 1424)

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S16. Party identity strength does not moderate the effect of condition on WEV in Study 4a**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	WEV self
Condition: Correction	-0.101 (0.088)
Pre-treatment WEV	0.437*** (0.020)
Gender: Female	-0.075** (0.029)
Gender: Other	0.177 (0.149)
Race: Black	0.061 (0.044)
Race: Asian	-0.034 (0.074)
Race: Hispanic	0.023 (0.051)
Race: other	-0.129 (0.098)
Age	-0.004*** (0.001)
Education: HS or less	0.043 (0.044)
Education: Some college	0.029 (0.036)
Education: Graduate	0.014 (0.051)
income	-0.000 (0.00000)
Party: Republican	0.055 (0.034)
Party Identity Strength	0.073*** (0.025)
Correction:Party Identity Strength	-0.026 (0.034)
Constant	0.790*** (0.094)
Observations	1,799
R <sup>2</sup>	0.253
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.246
Residual Std. Error	0.599 (df = 1782)
F Statistic	37.634*** (df = 16; 1782)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



**Table S17. Testing for moderation of effect of correction condition by political party in Study 4a. Effect size of correction among Republicans (1) is slightly larger than effect among Democrats (2), but interaction between condition and party is not significant (3).**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	WEV		
	(1) Republicans	(2) Democrats	(3) Interaction Effect
Condition: Correction	-0.214*** (0.051)	-0.146*** (0.034)	-0.143*** (0.034)
Pre-treatment WEV	0.363*** (0.038)	0.470*** (0.024)	0.439*** (0.020)
Gender: female	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.071** (0.035)	-0.066** (0.029)
Gender: Other	1.322*** (0.453)	0.011 (0.158)	0.164 (0.149)
Race: Black	0.392** (0.186)	0.044 (0.046)	0.070 (0.044)
Race: Asian	-0.017 (0.154)	-0.071 (0.085)	-0.030 (0.074)
Race: Hispanic	-0.043 (0.113)	0.046 (0.057)	0.026 (0.051)
Race: other	-0.173 (0.227)	-0.162 (0.109)	-0.123 (0.098)
Age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Education: HS or less	0.067 (0.079)	0.029 (0.053)	0.046 (0.044)
Education: Some college	-0.003 (0.065)	0.031 (0.044)	0.026 (0.036)
Education: Graduate	0.167* (0.098)	-0.045 (0.060)	0.012 (0.051)
Income	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.000 (0.00000)
Party: Republican			0.052 (0.044)
Correction:Republican			-0.065 (0.061)
Constant	1.003*** (0.133)	0.967*** (0.088)	0.949*** (0.074)
Observations	578	1,221	1,799
R <sup>2</sup>	0.200	0.284	0.248
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.182	0.276	0.242
Residual Std. Error	0.604 (df = 564)	0.596 (df = 1207)	0.601 (df = 1783)
F Statistic	10.849*** (df = 13; 564)	36.858*** (df = 13; 1207)	39.260*** (df = 15; 1783)

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table S18. Condition does not predict retention from Study 4a to Study 4b**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Remained in study	
	(1)	(2)
Condition: Correct	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.014)
Pre-treatment WEV		-0.017 <sup>!</sup> (0.010)
Gender: Female		-0.026 <sup>!</sup> (0.014)
Gender: Other		0.0004 (0.073)
Race: Black		0.028 (0.022)
Race: Asian		0.008 (0.036)
Race: Hispanic		0.014 (0.025)
Race: Other		-0.036 (0.048)
Age		0.002*** (0.0005)
Education: HS or less		0.005 (0.021)
Education: Some college		-0.002 (0.018)
Education: Graduate		0.020 (0.025)
Income		-0.00000 (0.00000)
Party: Republican		-0.008 (0.016)
Constant	0.913*** (0.010)	0.861*** (0.036)
Observations	1,803	1,799
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.014
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.007
Residual Std. Error	0.293 (df = 1801)	0.292 (df = 1784)
F Statistic	1.239 (df = 1; 1801)	1.842** (df = 14; 1784)

Note: !p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The only significant predictor of retention in Study 4a was age. There was a small but significant negative correlation between age and our main dependent variable, WEV ( $r = -0.145$ ). However, there was no significant interaction effect between condition and age on retention, which suggests that differential attrition by age did not affect the experimental results.