Abstract
The UK is one of the first countries in the world to have set up a statutory system of national climate risk assessments followed by a national adaptation programme. Having this legal framework has been essential for enabling adaptation at the government level in a challenging political environment. However, using this framework to create an improvement in resilience to climate change across the country requires more than publishing a set of documents; it requires careful thought about what interventions work, how they can be enabled and what level of risk acceptability individuals, organizations and the country should be aiming for.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Advances in risk assessment for climate change adaptation policy'.
Keywords: climate, adaptation, risk, climate policy
1. Introduction
The UK Government is required by the Climate Change Act (2008) to set objectives in relation to climate change adaptation and present Parliament with a programme of proposals and policies to achieve them. To facilitate this, the Act requires a process of producing a risk assessment, and a programme of adaptation policies, to be repeated every 5 years. Such a cycle of reporting is important given the potential for the evidence base to develop over time. The second cycle under the Act began in 2017, with the publication of a second UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA2) in January 2017 [1], informed by an independent evidence report [2]. Similar processes exist in other countries and are reviewed in this issue by Warren [3].
At its heart, each climate change risk assessment aims to inform decisions about the UK's future, and influence those making them in, and working for, the Government. Like any policy initiative, ministers need to balance competing priorities, make the most of limited resources (financial or otherwise), and be convinced that doing something now is better than ‘let's wait and see'. Officials working on long-term issues like climate change, the effects of which will span many parliaments, may struggle for ministerial attention when other, more immediate issues loom large. Furthermore, the uncertainty inherent within even the best climate projections, and impact studies, provide space for potentially costly and disruptive action to be postponed even if it is necessary and beneficial over time.
With the 10-year anniversary of the Act approaching, what have we learned about the effectiveness of the adaptation policy cycle contained in the Climate Change Act? To what extent did the first CCRA, published in 2012, lead to a meaningful programme of activity to address the risks it highlighted? How did this influence the authors' approach to CCRA2? And what are the priorities going forward?
The first UK CCRA Evidence Report [4] provided a comprehensive assessment of the major direct risks and opportunities for the UK from climate change. The assessment used a science-led approach to analyse the magnitude of various impacts under low, medium and high climate change projections. In a series of sector-specific reports, a dose–response function approach (based upon conventional risk analysis to quantify cause–effect relations) was applied to a set of prioritized impact metrics, using the 2009 UK Climate Projections and available literature or expert judgement to estimate the scale of impact for different degrees of warming. The resulting magnitude scores were novel and based on a consistent set of assumptions of climate and socioeconomic change. The first CCRA focused on assessing impacts, and largely did not take account of current adaptation plans and activity. The scope of the assessment was also limited to risks arising in the UK, rather than both domestic and international risks that could lead to UK impacts, as these were covered in other projects funded by the Government at the time.
The process of undertaking CCRA1 provided a learning opportunity for conducting risk assessments at the national level, and various reviews by the project team itself and independent reviewers produced a series of recommendations for future assessments [4–6]. These reviews highlighted two major improvements that could be made in future assessments to enhance the utility of the CCRA.
The first issue is that CCRA1 did not provide the Government with a robust series of recommendations on where further action to reduce the risks was most urgent. A review of the first CCRA found that the long list of 100 risks resulting from the assessment was comprehensive, but not sufficiently prioritized to provide usable advice to the Government [5]. Because CCRA1 did not in most instances take account of current and planned adaptation, it was also unable to report on where action by the Government was either sufficient or insufficient to deal with the risks. (The exception to this was the analysis for flooding and water scarcity, where policies at the time were included in the assessment of future magnitude). While a set of urgency scores was included in the evidence report to give a sense of priorities for the next 5 years, the main headlines of CCRA1 published by the Government were focused on the magnitude of climate risks, thus these short-term priorities were somewhat lost. The concept of urgency was not picked up and addressed by the Government in the resulting National Adaptation Programme.
The second issue is that the first CCRA did not include an assessment of the costs and benefits of adaptation options and while this was assessed later, the delay led to a disconnect between the assessment of risk and response. CCRA1 outlined the magnitude of impact of various risks and opportunities, but did not take the further step needed for policy making of assessing the costs and benefits of adaptation actions to manage the risks. This subsequent step was explored in a follow-on study, the Economics of Climate Resilience (ECR) report [7]. This report investigated current and likely adaptation actions and identified the key barriers to actions being widely implemented, effective, timely and proportionate to the challenges facing the UK. Difficulties in the Government's commissioning of the study meant it was only completed six months before the Government's National Adaptation Programme was published, leaving little time for the findings to influence the resulting policy priorities.
The first National Adaptation Programme itself was developed using a bottom-up approach. In other words, the creation of the Programme relied on a stakeholder-led ‘co-creation' process whereby actions and objectives were defined through a series of consultations (figure 1). The resulting 370 actions were largely based on what decision makers inside and outside of Government were willing to undertake, rather than a top-down process of assessing desirable outcomes informed by the results of the CCRA and ECR, and the resulting actions that were needed to achieve these outcomes. It can be argued that while the first CCRA was too ‘top-down' (i.e. projections-led rather than vulnerability-led), the resulting National Adaptation Programme was too ‘bottom-up' and as a result lacked a coherent set of prioritized goals and corresponding actions to achieve them [10].
Figure 1.
Comparative differences between processes and outputs for CCRA1/NAP1 and CCRA2/NAP2. Notes: These diagrams show the differences in the flow between different components of CCRA1/NAP1 and CCRA2/NAP2. Arrows denote the flow of information from one stage of the process to the next. The width of the arrows illustrates the degree of influence from one stage to the next (see text). Note that at the time of writing, the NAP2 stakeholder consultation, and assessment of priorities is ongoing for NAP2, and the content of the boxes is based on the ASC's recommendations for how NAP2 should be approached. (Online version in colour.)
The second UK CCRA Evidence Report was led by the Adaptation Sub-Committee (ASC) [2] and built on the lessons learned from the first report, in consultation with the Government users, to ensure that the outputs were policy relevant (figure 1) [3]. It was also conducted with a much smaller budget than CCRA1, and because of this the method relied much more heavily on a review of the available literature, rather than (expensive) new modelling. The assumptions of climate and socioeconomic change across all of the risks and opportunities were not standardized, and the method used to assign priorities had to take this into account. The ASC developed a method focused on assigning a degree of urgency for which actions should be taken to manage each of the CCRA2 risks. Although it was out of scope for the report to provide any recommendations on specific actions for the Government to take, these assessments of urgency and the evidence supporting them could be used as the basis for potential policy options. The assessment of urgency was carried out in three parts [3].
— An assessment of the current and future magnitude of the risk (using whatever evidence was available), including information on the uncertainty range.
— The effect of planned and autonomous adaptation on the size of the risk in the present and future.
— An assessment of the net benefits of further action, above those planned, in the next 5 years to manage the risk.
Risks were defined as ‘urgent' where planned and autonomous actions were unlikely to reduce the size of the risk to a low magnitude by 2100 (under any ‘likely' scenario included in the evidence—definitions are provided in the CCRA Evidence Report), and where there were net benefits to further action. This analysis resulted in a set of 20 risks for which urgent action was deemed to be needed most, providing a stronger steer to the Government for strategic goals for the next National Adaptation Programme. The cross-cutting assessment of these risks showed that many of them were interlinked and could be further grouped [11]. The ASC identified five priority areas for action.
— Risks from flooding and coastal change risks to communities, businesses and infrastructure
— Risks to natural capital including terrestrial, coastal, marine and freshwater ecosystems, soils and biodiversity
— Risks to domestic and international food production and trade
— Risks to health, well-being and productivity from high temperatures
— Risks of shortages in the public water supply, and for agriculture, energy generation and industry, with impacts on freshwater ecology
The application of this method required expert judgement to assess the impact of current and planned policies and actions on risk and the benefits of action in the next 5 years. In place of a Delphic-panel type consultation exercise (which was deemed to be too resource-intensive), the urgency scores were reviewed by an international peer-review panel, around 100 stakeholder organizations from the Government and its arm's length bodies and around 50 non-Governmental organizations that applied through an open call to be external reviewers. Although CCRA2 relied on available literature rather than novel modelling, the degree of expert judgement involved was similar to CCRA1. The latter used expert judgement primarily in creating the dose–response functions, the former in assigning and then checking urgency scores.
Where possible, the assessment of the effectiveness of policy in reducing the risks in CCRA2 was based on quantitative information, as was the case for flooding and water availability [12,13]. In other cases, assumptions were made to determine the likelihood of the Government objectives being met, based on current trends of vulnerability and future changes in climate change exposure. For example, the assessment concluded that risks to species and habitats are not being sufficiently managed [14]. This is because while the Government has set ambitious policy aspirations, many of the short-term targets to improve the condition of habitats and abundance of species are not on track to be met, suggesting that additional effort in the next 5 years is very likely to be needed to reduce risks and meet objectives [9].
In January 2017, the Government formally presented to Parliament its official CCRA2 report [1], drawing on and agreeing with the findings of the ASC's Evidence Report. The report to Parliament provides a summary of each of the six priority risk areas and the Government's general approach to adaptation for each. The second National Adaptation Programme, due in summer 2018, will respond in more detail to the risks by setting out relevant plans, programmes and policies. Alongside the CCRA and National Adaptation Programme, the Climate Change Act also allows the Government to use an Adaptation Reporting Power. Organizations responsible for essential services and infrastructure can be required or invited to report on the current and future projected impacts of climate change on their organization and their proposals for managing these risks. The reports helped to inform CCRA2 and will inform the second National Adaptation Programme. In turn, CCRA2 could help to update and corroborate organizations' own risk assessments in a third round of adaptation reporting by providing sector and national-level evidence and background information on climate change risks.
2. Aligning risk management and adaptation policy
What we have described above is a set of processes that have been set up through the Climate Change Act, moving from evidence collection, to policy development, to reporting and evaluation. The UK is one of the first countries in the world to have a legislated approached for climate change adaptation, and this has been instrumental in enabling at least some Government resources to be put into adaptation, when they might otherwise have been prioritized elsewhere. However, undertaking a process alone does not necessarily lead to improved resilience. In the CCRA2 Evidence Report, Street et al. [11] considered a range of issues and barriers to effective adaptation planning, including institutional frameworks, adaptive capacity, access to knowledge, information and data, and understanding the unintended consequences of decisions. One of the significant evidence gaps identified from CCRA2 is a comprehensive knowledge of ‘what works' in adaptation. What are the examples of effective action, why are they effective and how can this effectiveness be measured? Perhaps of equal importance, case studies of interventions that did not work should also be reported and reviewed so that practitioners can learn from ineffective, as well as effective, strategies. The ASC has defined aspects of good adaptation planning that should underpin any future national policy, in order to create meaningful interventions and governance processes [10].
— Clear priorities that ensure the most important issues are addressed.
— Specific, outcome-focused and measurable objectives that describe outcomes rather than processes and activities.
— A focus on a core set of policies and actions that will achieve the biggest benefit compared to cost.
— Reflection of regional differences in climate change impacts, allowing local organizations to play a role in adaptation action.
— Underpinned by effective evaluation and monitoring of progress.
The ASC made a series of recommendations for how the second National Adaptation Programme should be delivered in its 2017 progress report to the UK Parliament. These recommendations relate to the need for a more top-down approach, delivering a programme that is more outcome-focused, specific, and measurable than the first programme (box 1).
Box 1. Overarching recommendations from the Adaptation Sub-Committee for an updated National Adaptation Programme (NAP).
Recommendation 1: To ensure that activity and investments have a significant, cost-effective impact on reducing vulnerabilities, the second NAP should set clear priorities for adaptation; ensure objectives are outcome-focused, measurable, time-bound and have clear ownership; prioritize the core set of policies and actions that will have the biggest impact; build on the breadth of community and business engagement in the first NAP; and include effective monitoring and evaluation.
Recommendation 2: The second NAP should address the important interdependencies between climate change risks and policy responses which fall within and across the remits of different government departments, and national, local and devolved governments, to ensure relevant policies and activity are coordinated across the programme.
Recommendation 3: To ensure continuous improvement in the approach to reducing climate change risks, the second NAP should have a strong focus on evidence and evaluation: there is the need and opportunity to work through UK Research and Innovation and the individual research councils to develop the evidence base in time to inform the third UK Climate Change Risk Assessment in 2022, making full use of the new UK Climate Projections in 2018; more attention needs to be paid to the evaluation of existing policies and approaches in order to learn lessons for future initiatives; and the costs and benefits of more ambitious policy options need to be considered and appraised.
Recommendation 4: The Government should explore cost-effective ways to communicate the risks from climate change, and the actions that can be taken to reduce vulnerabilities. Priorities include engaging vulnerable groups and communities exposed to specific risks such as higher temperatures, coastal change and increases in flood risk; challenging the relevant professional bodies (such as the Landscape Institute, the Royal Town Planning Institute and the Institution of Civil Engineers), and trade associations (for example, the National Federation of Builders), to increase their level of engagement with members regarding climate change, and to improve the training, guidance and professional accreditation they offer; and raising awareness amongst the general public including through community groups and national membership organizations such as the National Trust, the Royal Horticultural Society and the RSPB.
Take the first recommendation above. In order to define ‘what works', decision makers need to think of the desired outcome they want to achieve, so as to be able to assess their progress against a goal. And following from that, their level of risk acceptability, which should be consistent with the desired outcome. Defining desired outcomes in adaptation is more difficult than for climate change mitigation for several reasons. There is no single overarching international or national goal. There is no single unit of measurement (such as carbon) upon which to judge progress; what is being adapted to is uncertain. Actions that should be undertaken to adapt in a 2°C world might be very different to those chosen for a 4°C world. Adaptation is affected substantially by local conditions that affect vulnerability and exposure to particular risks. And socio-political and economic priorities change over time.
In some isolated cases, there is clearly zero acceptability placed on the risk, and the desired outcome is clear. Flood risk to the City of London is a well-used example. The Thames Estuary 2100 programme is using a pathways approach to determine the best set of adaptation options to ensure flood risk to the City essentially stays at zero as the climate changes [15]. It is not feasible to protect every part of the country to this level, however. In England, the Environment Agency has a role to consider the level of risk for different parts of the country under different scenarios, work out the costs and benefits of protecting different areas, and define the economically optimal level of spend [16]. In managing flood risk, pinpointing the level of acceptable risk can be scientifically, politically and morally challenging, but it is fairly straightforward to define the outcome measure, which is protecting people and property. For other sectors, even articulating these metrics is challenging. When thinking about land use, for example, there are a multitude of different, and sometimes conflicting, outcome measures; protecting biodiversity, conserving soil and water, managing the land for food production and forestry, and ensuring enough space is available for new housing and infrastructure. The Government's 25-year environment plan, published in January 2018, could act as a vehicle to define a more focused set of outcomes, and, therefore, help identify the risks and opportunities associated with these outcomes.
The ASC will be using the experience of the second CCRA to consider long-term adaptation outcomes and how to assess ‘what works' in more detail over the coming years, consistent with its rationale for effective interventions. The publication of the second National Adaptation Programme, as well as parallel strategies by the Devolved Governments in Scotland and Northern Ireland (Wales will be following a different process) that are due in 2018 and 2019, will reveal the extent to which the findings of CCRA2 will be translated into meaningful governance processes and interventions. The next CCRA, due in 2022, also needs to do more to articulate implicit or explicit outcomes in current policy design, and assess how adaptation actions can be made more effective. This is a challenging aim but the research landscape now exists to directly engage a wider range of researchers in addressing the problem. Climate change adaptation is maturing as a discipline in its own right; the importance of research impact is more embedded in the research culture, which drives more investigators to consider the applications or policy implications of their work; and funding opportunities for the cross-disciplinary work that is needed to span the adaptation science-policy-implementation nexus are growing. The ASC, following a successful research conference held at the Royal Society in 2016, is also working to define long-term research funding priorities for the CCRA beyond 2022. Despite the challenging nature, this level of in-depth work will help to provide the evidence and clarity that is needed for enabling effective adaptation decisions.
Acknowledgements
The following CCRA2 Evidence Report authors commented on this paper: Rachel Warren, Rob Wilby, Paul Watkiss, Neil Adger, Richard Dawson, Andy Challinor, Roger Street, Dan Osborn, Sari Kovats, Iain Brown and Swenja Surminski. The authors also acknowledge the contribution of all of the CCRA2 authors and research contributors and funders, and the Adaptation Sub-Committee for their input to the CCRA2 Evidence Report.
Data accessibility
This article has no additional data.
Competing interests
The ASC of the Committee on Climate Change was responsible for producing the Evidence Report for the second UK Climate Change Risk Assessment, and reports biannually to Parliament on progress in adapting to climate change in England.
Funding
The Adaptation Sub-Committee is part of the Committee on Climate Change, a non-departmental public body, sponsored by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
Disclaimer
The views represented here reflect those of the individual authors and not the organizations for which they currently or have previously worked.
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