Correction

Article title: The Impact of Powerful Authorities and Trustful Taxpayers: Evidence for the Extended Slippery Slope Framework from Austria, Finland, and Hungary

Authors: Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., Hartl, B., & Berkics, M.

Journal: Policy Studies

Bibliometrics: in press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2019.1577375

In the first analyses in the results section, past tax compliance was used as dependent variable instead of intended tax compliance.

1. We corrected the first analysis in the result section by using the correct variable:

   Results showed a full mediation (95% CI [−0.0985; −0.0300], R2 =.04). However, coercive power was only related to implicit trust (b = −.15, SE = .05, p = .002), which in turn influenced tax compliance intentions (b = .12, SE = .03, p < .001; 95% CI [−0.0309; −0.0029]). Country controls (p = .001) showed that in Austria, coercive power was positively related to implicit trust (b = .19, SE = .37, p = .024) whereas it was negatively related to implicit trust in Finland (b = −.38, SE = .08, p <.001) and Hungary (b = −.37, SE = .09, p <.001). However, in the final model, concerning the relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance, the country controls were not significant (all p’s > .22).

2. For consistency reasons, we also specified the values for the country controls in the other two analysis:

   Analysis 2:

   Country controls (p =.001) showed that the positive relationship between legitimate power and reason-based trust varied in strength but not direction (Austria: b = .67, SE = .06, p <.001; Finland: b = .90, SE = .06, p <.001; Hungary: b = .90, SE = .08, p <.001). In the final model, concerning the relationship between reason-based trust and tax compliance country controls were not significant (all p’s > .25).

   Analysis 3:

   Country controls (p <.001) showed that in Finland and Hungary, the relationship between implicit trust and tax compliance is only mediated via committed cooperation (Finland: b = .31, SE = .06, p < .001, Hungary: b = .24, SE = .06, p < .001) but not via the confidence climate (min. p = .24). However, in the final overall mediation model, country controls were not significant (all p’s > .25).

3. We revised the discussion section by summarizing and discussing the new results:

   First and second paragraph page 15:

   Survey results from taxpayers confirm assumptions of the extended framework and show that based on data from countries with different tax cultures, general patterns of how tax instruments influence tax compliance can be found. Even if these general patterns vary in a single country such that in one country trust, climates or motivations are more or less affected by tax instruments, the overall relationship and effect on citizens’ perceptions and behaviors is likely very similar among different countries.

   Overall counties, coercive power was negatively related to implicit trust and in turn to intended tax compliance. Specifically, this result confirms that coercive powers’ positive impact on tax compliance is undermined if coercive power reduces implicit trust (Gangl et al., 2015). This outcome also might explain previous studies showing weak or no relationship between coercive power and compliance (Ariel, 2012; Hofmann et al., 2014). However, in one country (i.e., Austria) coercive power was positively related to implicit trust. This result indicates as previous studies did, that the negative relationship between coercive power and implicit trust is not stable (c.f. Hofmann et al., 2014, 2017) and may depend on the cultural background and related to that, to the perception of coercive power as safeguard or threat.

   Second paragraph page 15:

   We deleted “Again” and changed the sentence to: Country characteristics are only marginally relevant for this relationship.

   Last paragraph page 16:

   Since general assumptions of the eSSF received support among all countries, they can be seen as relatively robust.

4. We revised the abstract (by deleting some words) to reflect the new results:

   Across all countries, the relation of coercive power and tax compliance was mediated by implicit trust.