US Policy towards Southeast Asia: from Barack Obama to Joe Biden

Abstract

The Southeast Asia region is of great geopolitical, economic, and strategic importance for both the Asia–Pacific region and worldwide. It also plays a part in the confrontation between the United States and China, where each power seeks to strengthen its influence. The People’s Republic of China, being geographically close to and having deep historical and cultural ties with the Southeast Asian countries, actively interacts with Southeast Asia in trade and investment. The United States is also actively investing and maintaining close security ties with the region. Understanding the importance of building partnerships with Southeast Asian countries, each American administration in the 21st century has sought to offer its own approach to interaction with this region. The policies of three administrations, B. Obama, D. Trump, and J. Biden, are examined. It is concluded that, over time, the United States is increasingly focusing on confrontation with China and does not consider interaction with Southeast Asia as an end in itself. Countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines have the potential to strengthen their relationship with the United States significantly.

INTRODUCTION

The rivalry between the United States and China is gaining momentum around the world, but the center of this rivalry is the Western Pacific and, to a large extent, Southeast Asia (SEA). Despite the geographical proximity of the region to China and the ever-strengthening economic ties between the Peopl’s Republic of China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United States still has a number of serious advantages that allow it to exert significant influence on Southeast Asia. Each US presidential administration in the 21st century has tried to formulate its own approach to this region. The peak of attention of the United States to Southeast Asia fell on the administration of B. Obama. With D. Trump, there has been some distance from the United States, despite the fact that Southeast Asia is an important part of the new concept of the Indo-Pacific region, as it is located between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The administration of J. Biden expressed a renewed interest in Southeast Asia, which provides an opportunity to try to find solutions to old problems and seize new opportunities.

CHINA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Southeast Asia, there is great interest in developing cooperation with China. This idea is being promoted on social networks, through the media, by government discourse, and in the expert community of countries in the region. Currently, under the auspices of the One Belt, One Road initiative, China is implementing a number of large-scale economic projects in Southeast Asia, including the construction of hydroelectric power plants, oil and gas pipelines, and railways. In addition, it is actively promoting projects in the field of maritime security and law enforcement. The largest recipients of Chinese investment in infrastructure development in Southeast Asia are Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.1 Thus, a major infrastructure project is “Cooperation Lancang–Mekong”, aimed at infrastructure development of the countries of the basin of the very large Mekong River (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Thailand). Between these states and China there has long been controversy over the use of the river. This is primarily due to the construction of dams upstream in China, which negatively affects the agriculture of downstream countries. The main goals of the project are the technological and industrial development of the region, the development of trade and agriculture, and the fight against poverty.

Cambodia and Laos are countries that are in investment and, thus, political dependence on China. So far, these are the only countries that have signed bilateral “action plans” with it, based on the Chinese “concept of a common destiny.”2 There is intensive interaction between China and the formal structures of Southeast Asia, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), where by 2017 China had initiated the largest number of projects in the field of regional cooperation.3 For all ASEAN countries, China is the largest trading partner (Table 1). In 2020, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations became China’s second largest trading partner after the European Union (EU). A significant place among the items of both imports and exports of the ASEAN countries is occupied by manufactured goods.

Table 1.

Trade in goods of ASEAN countries with China and the United States, billion dollars

	2018			2019			2020
	1	2	Total	1	2	Total	1	2	Total
China	197.7	280.9	478.5	202.5	305.4	508.0	218.7	299.5	518.1
United States	160.3	101.9	262.1	183.8	111.0	294.8	211.5	97.4	308.9
European Union	141.2	111.0	252.2	134.5	110.6	245.1	130.2	96.5	226.7
Japan	114.8	115.3	230.1	109.9	116.1	226.0	102.5	102.1	204.6
South Korea	60.5	100.2	160.7	59.4	97.1	156.5	58.5	96.2	154.7
World	1436.0	1372.1	2808.1	1423.8	1392.6	2816.4	1395.9	1272.1	2668.0

(1) Export; (2) Import.

Source: ASEANStatsDataPortal. https://data.aseanstats.org/trade-annually

China is promoting its influence, including through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as opposed to international institutions in which the United States plays a leading role (such as the Asian Development Bank). In addition, China provides aid to countries with fewer preconditions. For example, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are also receiving assistance, including military aid, despite the situation with human rights. The countries of Southeast Asia that are located in Eurasia but do not have borders with it are closest to China. For example, in Thailand, despite the existing contradictions related to the use of the Mekong River, the presence of a security treaty with the United States, and the imbalance in trade relations, the country’s elite highly appreciates relations with China thanks to projects related to technological and infrastructural development. Thailand and China have significant military cooperation, including, among other things, the training of officers. Cambodia, as already mentioned, has a strong debt dependence on China and, at the same time, close ties in the economic, cultural, and military spheres. The country actively participates in projects within the framework of the One Belt, One Road initiative and provides China with diplomatic support in the international arena, including at ASEAN platforms when discussing such an important topic for the region as territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Vietnam is a country bordering China that has a rich history of interaction with it. However, there is also hostility and mutual distrust in bilateral relations, despite many similarities in the nature of the political regimes and the course of development of countries. Of all the states in the region, Vietnam has taken the toughest stance on disputes in the South China Sea, especially after the stabilization of Sino-Philippine relations. Vietnam has the greatest potential for increasing cooperation both with the United States and with other centers of power in the Indo-Pacific region: with India, Japan, and Australia. Myanmar, which also has a common border with China, is developing close cooperation with China in trade and investment, and is involved in a large number of projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, including the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and the construction of hydropower plants, railway, and port infrastructure facilities. Before R. Duterte came to power in 2016, the Philippines, along with other countries of the South China Sea, had expressed significant concern about China’s actions in its waters. However, the Philippine military, many members of the government, and a significant part of the population still share concerns about the rise of the People’s Republic of China.

As far as Malaysia is concerned, a movement towards China can be noted based on the existing close trade and investment relations. For this reason, Malaysia, being a Muslim country, does not comment on the situation with the rights of the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. This country actively cooperates with China in the field of security: there is an agreement on the exchange of intelligence between the two countries, and the country also purchases Chinese military equipment. At the same time, Malaysia does not recognize the legitimacy of China’s claims in the South China Sea.

Indonesia remains one of the countries striving to maintain a balance in relations with both China and the United States under the concept of “pragmatic equidistance.” The country has close trade and investment cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, and in trade the countries perform transactions in their national currencies. Despite this, territorial disputes between the two countries in the South China Sea (SCS) remain a problem. Singapore adheres to a similar strategy of equidistance, officially declaring its unwillingness to choose a side in the US–China confrontation. The only country in Southeast Asia that has settled territorial disputes in the South China Sea with China is Brunei.

THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Under President D. Trump, the United States somewhat moved away from the Southeast Asian region compared to the period of B. Obama’s presidency, which prompted some countries to strengthen their relations with China. However, in fact, the involvement of the United States in the affairs of Southeast Asia remains high. In terms of total foreign direct investment in the region, the United States consistently remains a leader. This value is approximately equal to the combined indicators of the European Union, China, Japan, and South Korea taken together (Table 2). US trade with ASEAN countries remains significant: The United States is the second largest trading partner of Southeast Asia in terms of mutual trade. A large number of American companies are registered in ASEAN countries. In terms of security cooperation, the United States is the absolute leader thanks to allied relations with a number of countries and close military-to-military contacts. Washington’s positions are also strong in the field of “soft power.”

Table 2.

Foreign direct investment of China and the United States in ASEAN countries, billion dollars

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
United States	13.6	30.9	–25.4	34.6	35.0
European Union	25.7	14.3	22.3	10.0	10.0
Japan	15.0	15.6	26.7	23.8	8.5
China	10.5	17.5	12.8	8.8	7.7
South Korea	6.6	5.6	5.2	7.5	6.8

Source: ASEANStatsDataPortal. https://data.aseanstats.org/fdi-by-hosts-and-sources

The most radical change in the 21st century has taken place in the US relations with the Philippines. Although the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2014 between the two countries, when R. Duterte came to power in the Philippines in 2016, he began to show a sharp rejection of the US leadership and of President Barack Obama personally. The Philippines began to pursue foreign policy rapprochement with China, but without significant military cooperation. Under D. Trump, the situation improved somewhat, except for the threat to ban American warships from entering the ports of the Philippines. With J. Biden, the importance of promoting democracy was again on the agenda, which at one time pushed the United States away from the government of R. Duterte. Considering that a significant part of the country’s elite adheres to pro-American positions, it is likely that the president who will replace R. Duterte in office will return to the course of rapprochement with the United States. However, Duterte’s popularity is still great, and he may retain his influence even after leaving the presidency. It should be noted that there is a nationalist faction in the Philippines that opposes, among other things, the American military presence in the country.

Vietnam, in turn, is one of the potential allies of the United States. The country’s leadership has a deep distrust of China, which is unlikely to be eliminated even in the long term. Under B. Obama, the reconciliation of the US leadership with the Communist Party of Vietnam began.

Indonesia has long sought strategic autonomy and reacts negatively to conflicts between the great powers in the region. When J. Widodo came to power in that country in 2014, he put forward an infrastructure development program for Indonesia, including remote regions, which fits well with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, in order to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy, Indonesia is interested in stable relations with the United States and, therefore, in a predictable administration in power in Washington.

Engagement with Thailand has previously been one of the central elements of US policy in Southeast Asia in terms of military cooperation. Thailand has taken part in US operations in Somalia and Sudan. However, after the coup d’état in 2006 and then in 2014, relations between the United States and the Thai military deteriorated seriously. However, Thailand is still involved in patrolling the waters of the region and is part of the Malacca Strait Patrol Group.

Singapore, while not a formal US ally, unlike Thailand and the Philippines, has strong security ties to Washington. Currently, the United States has the least engagement with countries like Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar.

It cannot be said that Southeast Asia is a region with which it is easy to interact. There are many problems there, such as religious conflicts and divisions, especially in countries such as Myanmar, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In addition, there are problems of crime, terrorism, and income inequality. Each US administration has tried to formulate its own unique approach to Southeast Asia.

ADMINISTRATION OF B. OBAMA

Under the Obama administration, the Southeast Asian region received unprecedented diplomatic attention. At the same time, one of the main priorities of the administration was interaction with international organizations, which was also reflected in relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. In 2009, the US and ASEAN signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. In addition, the United States sent an ambassador to that organization and a number of summits dedicated to relations between the United States and ASEAN states were held in the United States. In addition, the United States joined the East Asia Summit and also began to take part in ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meetings Plus (ADMM-Plus). An action plan was adopted for the period from 2011 to 2015 on cooperation in the field of security, in particular maritime security, and in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and other issues. As for relations with individual countries, attempts to improve relations with new partners have become a feature of the American administration. Thus, for the first time in the history of US foreign policy, the administration was very actively trying to establish ties with Laos. B. Obama was the first of the recent US presidents to visit this country, and during the visit the presidents of the two countries announced the creation of a comprehensive partnership. Hillary Clinton’s visit to Myanmar in 2011 was the first of its kind in over 50 years. The President of the United States himself has also repeatedly visited the region (only 13 visits in two presidential terms). In 2016, under President Obama, the arms embargo against Vietnam, which had existed since 1984, was lifted. However, serious financial constraints prevented the administration from implementing all the planned initiatives.

Southeast Asia was the centerpiece of the US Asia Pivot policy. The economic foundation of this course was supposed to be the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a large project of the administration, which, among other things, made it possible, among other things, to create de facto free trade zones with Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam. However, at the same time, Indonesia and Thailand were not included in the TPP, which created a feeling of division of ASEAN on the basis of membership in this agreement.

The “pivot” policy largely contributed to the fact that other countries outside the Asia–Pacific region also began to become more actively interested in the region and focus on it. But during the second term of B. Obama’s presidency, the countries of Southeast Asia began to have doubts about the seriousness of the US intentions in the framework of the Pivot policy. In particular, when China carried out aggressive actions against the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea, the United States did not interfere. As a result, Southeast Asian countries began to behave more cautiously in relations with China.

ADMINISTRATION OF D. TRUMP

Under the administration of D. Trump, there was the following logic of interaction with the region: if the countries of Southeast Asia were ready to cooperate with the United States on certain issues, this interaction would continue. However, ASEAN ceased to be one of the central elements of the American strategy in the Asia–Pacific region. The administration focused on building a model of relations with friendly countries, “tailored” for geopolitical confrontation with China.

In this regard, there has been a cooling of relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, for which the paradigm of great power rivalry is not attractive. During this period, American doctrinal documents continued to express support for the countries of Southeast Asia, but in fact key officials were not always present at the meetings of regional forums, and cooperation with the countries of the region was sporadic. Unlike the administration of B. Obama, the entourage of President D. Trump was skeptical of multilateral economic and political associations and more sympathetic to the development of bilateral rather than multilateral relations. Elements of protectionism intensified in economic policy.

Some countries, for example, Singapore, under D. Trump never had a US ambassador. At the same time, regional security initiatives such as the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative and the Asia–Pacific Security Initiative were developed.

The concept of “America first” caused concern among states of Southeast Asia. However, it should be noted that it contains the idea of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, which is consistent with the principles that the ASEAN countries adhere to.

Under D. Trump the concept of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which was officially proclaimed during the visit of the American president to Da Nang in 2017, was developed. In many ways, this concept can be interpreted as meeting the goal of containing China and does not involve paying special attention to Southeast Asia.

Together with the rhetoric about the confrontation with China, voiced, among other things, in doctrinal documents such as the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, the concept of Free and Open Indo-Pacific began to be perceived as an attempt to force the countries of the Asia–Pacific region to take sides in the conflict.

The very confrontation between the United States and China was perceived not only as the fault of China, but also as a consequence of the inconsistent policy of D. Trump. None of the participants in this confrontation was unambiguously perceived in the countries of Southeast Asia as an as a protagonist.

During the presidency of D. Trump, many countries in Southeast Asia had a feeling that US involvement in the affairs of the region continued to decline. According to the polls in 2019, 68% of the respondents in ASEAN countries believed that under the administration of D. Trump, U.S. involvement in regional affairs had declined.4

ADMINISTRATION OF J. BIDEN

Joe Biden’s coming to power in the United States caused concern in some ASEAN countries, especially those that are wary of China, as they believed that Biden’s policy towards China would be softer and more active interaction between the two countries would begin. These countries primarily include Vietnam or the military elite in the Philippines, as well as some other countries that have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. The rest of the states took the change of administration positively, counting on a more predictable and rational approach.

In its Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Biden administration has paid a lot of attention to ASEAN. Many countries of the region are directly mentioned in the document. The Philippines and Thailand as military treaty allies of the United States. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were named as the leading regional partners. At the same time, the central role of ASEAN is noted, and support is expressed for “its efforts to deliver sustainable solutions to the region’s most pressing challenges.”5 In addition, the document states the intention to increase the volume of foreign direct investment and take measures that will allow these countries “to promote and facilitate high-standards trade, govern the digital economy, ... catalyze investment in transparent, high-standards infrastructure, and build digital connectivity.”6

Vietnam is given special attention in all American doctrinal documents, including the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance of J. Biden. Singapore and Vietnam served as the targets of one of the first foreign policy visits by US Vice President Kamala Harris, which was designed to strengthen relations with Southeast Asia as a whole. During the visit, agreements were reached in the field of cybersecurity and combating climate change. At the end of 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Indonesia and Malaysia.

In the doctrinal documents of the administration of J. Biden, one of the features is the depiction of the current geopolitical situation through the prism of the ideological conflict between authoritarianism and democracy and the interpretation in this vein of the confrontation between the United States and China. All the more remarkable is the fact that in the political landscape of a region like Southeast Asia one can see both authoritarian (including US allies like Thailand and the Philippines) and democratic features.

Despite the appointment of many figures from the times of B. Obama to key posts in the administration, a return to the policy of his administration is impossible due to the changed balance of power, China’s aggressive actions, new priorities of both the ASEAN countries and the United States itself, where the task of restoring the damage has come to the fore, inflicted on relations with the main allies in the Asia–Pacific region under D. Trump. The administration of J. Biden also does not show a pronounced interest in participating in any multilateral economic agreements, which suggests that the United States could lose its former positions in the economic structure of the Asia–Pacific region. In all likelihood, the administration of J. Biden, like the previous administration, is focused on rivalry with China. Many experts predicted increased pressure on Myanmar and Cambodia under J. Biden, but so far this has not been observed.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the main challenges for the countries of Southeast Asia remains the growing diplomatic, economic, technological, and military influence of China. The Covid-19 pandemic . The withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership has also caused concern among the countries of the region.

The main goal of US policy in Southeast Asia remains the maintenance of an international order favorable to it, often called the “rules-based order,” which includes both protection of human rights and support of democratic institutions. This is one of the main dimensions of the US–China confrontation in the Asia–Pacific region.

In general, it can be said that Washington’s policy towards Southeast Asia was the more successful the more it met the interests of the countries of the region. At present, these include economic development, the inflow of investments for regional needs, the maintenance of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a balance in relations with China and the United States. The countries of the region have expressed their desire for greater involvement within the Indo-Pacific region, especially with regard to US involvement. The main source of concern for the countries of the region remains the growing influence of China and its aggressive behavior in the South China Sea. The United States is expected to contain Chinese expansion in such a way that the Southeast Asian countries themselves do not sacrifice their security. At the same time, the countries of Southeast Asia are not interested in the US–Chinese confrontation serving as a pretext for building up Chinese military power.

The foreign policy flexibility of the ASEAN countries makes interaction with this bloc one of the key elements in maintaining regional stability.

Despite the reluctance of the current leadership of the Philippines to strengthen cooperation with the United States, this country remains one of the key allies, given that the country’s top military leadership continues to work closely with the United States. Vietnam continues to play a significant role in the developing US–China confrontation, which has serious prospects for strengthening cooperation not only in a bilateral format, but also within the framework of multilateral structures under the auspices of the United States, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—(the QUAD).

The countries of this region are in no hurry to enter into close allied relations with the United States, despite their awareness of the risks of interaction with China, because they do not see a comprehensive American strategy that would suit them as an alternative. Furthermore, the countries of the region are not ready to enter into conflict with China, as they depend on it for trade and investment, and also do not want the rivalry of the great powers to spread to their region. the naval power of members of such alliances as the QUAD, put together, will markedly exceed that of China. However, is it possible to bring them together? The ASEAN countries do not want to be at the center of the confrontation between the two great powers, but want to strike a balance and involve other states, such as Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and the EU countries, in cooperation. This is the American interest.

The rise of new regional cooperation forums such as the Quad and AUKUS diminishes ASEAN's significance as a core Asia-Pacific cooperation platform and makes ASEAN countries feel that the United States has prioritized relations with other centers of power, such as Japan, India, and South Korea, over developing relations with ASEAN. The increasingly rare visits by senior US officials reinforce this impression.