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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2023 Mar 30.
Published in final edited form as: J Appl Juv Justice Serv. 2022 Oct;2022:27–41. doi: 10.52935/22.9147.10

Juvenile Probation Officers’ Perceptions of Sanctions and Incentives as Compliance Strategies

Sydney N Ingel a, Tess K Drazdowski b, Danielle S Rudes a, Michael R McCart b, Jason E Chapman b, Faye S Taxman a, Ashli J Sheidow b
PMCID: PMC10061776  NIHMSID: NIHMS1863534  PMID: 37007431

Abstract

In juvenile probation, noncompliance with probation conditions is a common occurrence. To deal with this, juvenile probation officers (JPOs) may use different strategies, such as sanctions and incentives. This study uses survey and focus group data from 19 JPOs to evaluate their perceptions of the effectiveness of sanctions and incentives in reducing youth noncompliance, specifically in the form of substance use. Results show that there are two distinct groups of JPOs: those who believe sanctions are an effective deterrent strategy and those who do not. Perceptually and demographically these two groups contain significant differences. Notably, both groups have similar views of social incentives, but JPOs who believe sanctions are ineffective are significantly more likely to have positive views of tangible incentives. This study has implications for how the field of juvenile probation can target JPO perceptions to move toward incentive-based strategies rather than sanction-based strategies for reducing youth substance use.

Keywords: Juvenile Probation, Juvenile Probation Officers, Probation Strategies, Sanctions, Incentives

INTRODUCTION

Probation is the most common response to delinquent behavior by youth (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2019; Sickmund et al., 2020). As such, juvenile probation officers (JPOs) are charged with rehabilitating youth and ensuring they will not cause further harm to the community (Mulvey & Iselin, 2008; Rudes et al., 2011; Schwalbe, 2012; Ward & Kupchik, 2010). To accomplish these goals, “juvenile probation case management typically emphasizes monitoring of youths’ adherence with court orders, reporting noncompliance to the court, and imposing sanctions for technical violations of probation” (Goldstein et al., 2019, p. 2). While on probation, youth are subjected to a multitude of court ordered requirements, including: regularly reporting to their probation officer, abstaining from drug and alcohol use, frequent drug testing, avoiding contact with delinquent peers, participating in programs/treatment, paying fines and fees, and avoiding new arrests (Phelps, 2018).

Conditions related to drug and alcohol use are common, even if the youth did not commit a drug-related offense, because more than 50% of youth entering probation have a substance use1 problem (Dennis et al., 2019; Scott et al., 2019). Specifically, one analysis of juvenile records found that approximately 67% of the youth on probation were required to submit mandatory drug tests and 23% were required to attend drug and alcohol counseling (NeMoyer et al., 2014). However, youth often fail to meet their court-ordered conditions and non-compliance with probation conditions is fairly common (NeMoyer et al., 2014; Phelps, 2018). In a two-year study of youth on probation, approximately 52% of youth violated the terms of their probation, with failing a drug test, skipping school, and garnering a new arrest as the three most common probation violations (NeMoyer et al., 2014). Receiving conditions related to drug and alcohol testing were associated with an increased likelihood of having failed to comply with probation when investigated both independently and combined (NeMoyer et al., 2014).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Although getting youth to comply with probation conditions is difficult, JPOs have a few strategies at their disposal to enhance compliance. On the Probation Practices Assessment Survey (PPAS) developed by Schwalbe and Maschi (2009), compliance strategies are categorized into three groups: confrontation tactics (e.g., “how often did you threaten consequences like violation of probation or detention placement”), counseling tactics (e.g., how often did you ask the youth about how their current behavior is related to their long-term goals”), and behavioral tactics (e.g., “how often did you offer incentives for completing tasks”). Confrontation tactics—which have their basis in deterrence theory—appear to be the most frequently used by JPOs in comparison to counseling and behavioral tactics (Schwartz et al., 2017). Research documents JPOs’ reliance on confrontation tactics to enhance probation compliance. According to Sickmund and Puzzanchera’s report (2014), 16% of youth in residential placements in 2010 were incarcerated for probation violations and in 12 states, the percentage of youth incarcerated for probation violations was equal to or greater than the percentage of those incarcerated for violent person offenses. In their study on probation noncompliance, NeMoyer and colleagues (2014) found that for almost half of the youth who violated probation, the violation resulted in sanctions and placement in a secure facility.

Although the use of sanctions is a common deterrence tactic in the United States’ criminal legal system, such a philosophy in juvenile probation can have a negative effect on youth. In theory, the use of sanctions is only effective when it is immediate, consistent, and proportional to the noncompliant behavior (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001), and over time, youth may become habituated to the sanctions and threat of sanctions thereby decreasing their effectiveness (Phillips et al., 1971). In practice, instead of enhancing compliance and rehabilitation, sanctions for probation noncompliance commonly lead to deepened involvement in the criminal legal system (e.g., detention/incarceration, extended time on probation) and increased recidivism rates (Gatti et al., 2009; Mendel, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2017). Besides deepened involvement in the criminal legal system and increased recidivism rates, frequent use of detention/incarceration as a sanction may have other detrimental effects. For example, it can exacerbate mental health symptoms, increase trauma exposure, decrease access to education, and negatively impact psychosocial development (Hjalmarsson, 2008; Mendel, 2011; NeMoyer et al., 2014).

Due to the problems generated by using confrontation/sanction tactics to enhance compliance with probation, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ, 2017) passed a resolution calling for juvenile probation reforms. Using psychological evidence that suggests operant conditioning techniques like reinforcing positive behavior with incentives (Skinner, 1969) may lead to positive behavioral changes in youth, the NCJFCJ advocates the “use of incentives—rather than sanctions—to modify youth behavior” (NCJFCJ, 2017, p. 2). Further, the NCJFCJ encourages juvenile probation departments to “emphasize short-term, positive outcomes for probation-compliant behaviors” and “ensure that detention or incarceration is never used as a sanction for youth who fail to meet their expectations or goals” (2017, p. 2). Some juvenile probation departments are already embracing interventions utilizing incentives, such as contingency management (CM) programs, which have been shown to be effective and able to be delivered by JPOs (Godley et al., 2014; Higgins et al., 2007; Sheidow et al., 2020; Stanger et al., 2009). Other juvenile probation departments are slower to adopt these types of reforms due to skepticism and/or resource constraints (Rudes et al., 2012; Sloas et al., 2019). However, it is critical to find and utilize effective compliance strategies that do not deepen criminal legal system involvement or result in increased recidivism. This is particularly important for substance using youth because substance use uniquely contributes to recidivism (Hoeve et al., 2013; McReynolds et al., 2010; Schubert et al., 2011; Van Der Put et al., 2014), and among the youth population on probation, more than 50% have a substance use problem (Dennis et al., 2019; Scott et al., 2019) and approximately 17% have a diagnosable substance use disorder (Wasserman et al., 2010).

CURRENT STUDY

Although the field of juvenile probation is attempting to move away from the use of sanctions and toward incentives (NCJFCJ, 2017), sanctions are still commonly used by JPOs as a compliance strategy in juvenile probation. However, we do not know how JPOs actually perceive the effectiveness of sanctions. We also do not know if there are any differences in JPOs who perceive sanctions as an effective compliance strategy versus those who do not. Finally, we do not know if valuing sanctions is mutually exclusive from valuing incentives, or if JPOs may perceive value in both. Our study attempts to answer these questions. Using a sample of JPOs with caseloads of substance using youth, our research questions are as follows: (1) How do JPOs perceive the effectiveness of sanctions in gaining compliance with drug/alcohol abstinence? (2) Do JPOs who perceive sanctions as an effective compliance strategy differ in any way from those who do not?, and (3) Do JPOs who perceive sanctions as effective versus those who perceive them as ineffective also differ in their perceptions of incentives?

METHODS

Data Collection & Procedures

Participants in the current study come from a larger, ongoing project regarding contingency management in juvenile probation that began in 2017 in the Western region of the United States. Researchers recruited JPOs from 10 counties in three states (Nevada, Idaho, and Oregon) by delivering information about the study to each JPO and inviting them to participate in the study. The participation rate was approximately 98%. The study was longitudinal and mixed methods in nature with JPOs participating in focus groups and surveys at baseline and during two subsequent follow-up years. Between 2017 to 2020, researchers conducted baseline surveys (n=86) and focus groups (n=63)2 with JPOs. Baseline surveys consisted of the Personnel Data Inventory (Schoenwald & Sheidow, 2003), the Provider Survey of Incentives (Kirby et al., 2006), and the Organizational Readiness for Change: Criminal Justice Professional Version (Lehman et al., 2002). Baseline focus groups were semi-structured, lasted approximately one hour each, and contained between three to 11 JPOs in each session. The focus group questions explored various topics, including, JPO perceptions of work roles, working with parents and youth, evidence-based practices, substance use triggers, and effective and ineffective strategies to helping youth who use substances. Specifically, regarding strategies to help youth, JPOs were asked: (1) “What are effective strategies for working with substance using juvenile clients?” and (2) “What are the least effective strategies for working with substance using juvenile clients?” The current paper relies solely on baseline focus group data, baseline demographic data from the Personnel Data Inventory, and baseline answers to the Provider Survey of Incentives.

Participants

Using the demographic information from the Personnel Data Inventory, JPO focus group participants were predominantly men (54%), White3 (89%), not Hispanic or Latinx (71%), and held a Bachelor’s degree or higher (70%) as their highest level of education. JPOs ranged in age from 26 to 65 years old, but on average, they were 40 years old. Additionally, JPOs had spent approximately 12 years (with a range of less than one year to 26 years) working in the juvenile criminal legal system. The demographics of our sample are roughly similar to other recent samples of JPOs (see Holloway et al., 2017; Miller & Palmer, 2020). Demographics for the entire sample and the subsample used in this paper are reported in Table 1, with the subsample differing slightly on some of the demographic variables. The subsample consists of the 19 JPOs who listed “sanctions” as a response to the questions about effective and ineffective strategies for working with youth who use substances.

Table 1.

Baseline Demographics for JPO Focus Group Participantsa

All Focus Group JPOs
(N=63)		 Subsample (N=19)
# % # %
Ruralness
Metropolitan 36 57% 12 63%
Non-Metropolitan 27 43% 7 37%
Gender
Woman 29 46% 11 58%
Man 34 54% 8 42%
Ethnicity
Hispanic/Latinx 18 29% 6 32%
Non-Hispanic/Latinx 45 71% 13 68%
Race b
White 56 89% 15 79%
BIPOC 3 5% 1 5%
Multiracial 4 6% 3 16%
Education
High School 13 21% 3 16%
Associate’s 6 10% 0 0%
Bachelor’s or Higher 44 70% 16 84%
Age
20s 11 17% 2 11%
30s 18 29% 7 37%
40s 22 35% 5 26%
50+ 12 19% 5 26%
Years of Experience
<10 26 41% 10 53%
10-19 25 40% 6 32%
20+ 12 19% 3 16%
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a

Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

b

BIPOC stands for Black, Indigenous, and People of Color. Multiracial indicates that the JPO checked off more than one racial category when they completed the survey.

Survey Instrument

In addition to the Personnel Data Inventory, questions from the Provider Survey of Incentives instrument were included in this study. The Provider Survey of Incentives contains 78 questions adapted from Kirby and colleagues (2006). This instrument assesses perceptions of social and tangible incentives. Social incentives involve social recognition or special activities (e.g., praise, printed certificates) and tangible incentives involve tangible goods or services (e.g., gift cards, retail items). All of the questions used a 5-point Likert scale and participants could choose options ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (5). Some of the questions had to be reverse coded, so that higher scores corresponded with more positive opinions of social/tangible incentives.

Of the 78 questions, we used 52 to create four separate subscales—individual social incentives, individual tangible incentives, parallel social incentives, and parallel tangible incentives—for analysis.4 The individual social incentives subscale contained the summation of four questions pertaining only to social incentives (e.g., “Giving social praise and social reinforcement in a structured way may become ingenuine over time, making the incentive program ineffective.”). The individual tangible incentives subscale contained the summation of four questions pertaining only to tangible incentives (e.g., “Most clients would sell the tangible incentives they receive.”). The parallel social and tangible incentives subscales each contain the summation of 22 questions (e.g., “Incentives are more likely to have positive effects on the client than they are to have negative effects”) that Kirby and colleagues (2006) determined had good internal consistency with a factor analysis. JPOs responded to these 22 questions twice, once in regards to social incentives and once in regards to tangible incentives.

Qualitative Coding & Analysis

Researchers video/audio-recorded the focus groups and these recordings were then transcribed verbatim for coding. We removed any identifiable information (e.g., names, gender pronouns) from the transcripts to ensure participant confidentiality5. The focus group transcripts were then uploaded to the qualitative data management software program ATLAS.ti. In ATLAS.ti, three coders used an open coding, line-by-line, inductive strategy to code the transcripts so that as new themes emerged, new codes were added to the code list (Charmaz, 2005). The three coders coded 28 focus group transcripts and the code list was mostly developed after coding the first five transcripts. To maintain inter-coder reliability, coders frequently discussed discrepancies and came to a consensus on how to resolve them. Once the coding was complete, one of the coders went through the code list and merged overlapping codes and grouped the codes by theme to maintain consistency. The final code list contained over 1,000 codes. One theme that emerged was perceptions by JPOs of effective and ineffective strategies for dealing with youth who use substances. Within this theme, which became the basis for the current paper, JPOs cited “sanctions” as both an effective and ineffective strategy for dealing with youth who use substances.

FINDINGS

Perceptions of Sanction (In)Effectiveness

When JPOs were asked about effective strategies for working with youth who use substances, 11 JPOs listed sanctions or threat of sanctions as an effective strategy. One of the sanctions JPOs have at their disposal is jail/detention, which can serve as a deterrent. JPO Monica explains, “Putting them in detention has helped. Sometimes longer term because then they go, ‘Oh, I don’t want to come back to this.’” Several other JPOs agree that jail/detention is a deterrent that helps youth stop their substance use and comply with probation. JPO Lorenzo says:

Being locked up is, you’re right, that’s really good motivation. “I don’t want to be locked up again.” Some of them, especially [those] who come from good families, and then they get thrown into the camp or thrust in that situation, they realize, “Wow, I’ve taken a lot for granted.”

JPO Steve believes that just the threat of sending youth to jail/detention is enough to deter them, “Just the thought of going to detention scares [them]—yes.” Other sanctions JPOs have available to them is extending the length of probation terms. JPO Mike explains, “If there’s discretionary time, utilize that or probation violations, too, telling [youth] about the extended probation after that as well.” Rather than using threats of jail/detention, JPO Mike uses discretionary time and probation violations to extend probation if youth are not compliant at desisting from substance use.

While these 11 JPOs believe sanctions (or threats of sanctions) are effective strategies for dealing with youth who have substance use problems, other JPOs disagree. When asked what strategies they view as ineffective, a separate group of eight JPOs list sanctions as an ineffective strategy. For example, JPO Andrea states, “I don’t know that detention really works…as a consequence, I don’t see that it’s super effective.” JPO Lanie agrees that sanctions are not a successful deterrent, “Sometimes, just the way our department is structured, it takes a while to get to a sanction that gets significant enough for the youth. It doesn’t really deter their substance use.” In one focus group, JPOs had a conversation about how detention keeps youth from using substances in the short-term, but it is not a long-term solution:

JPO Chris: Yes, [detention] doesn’t usually work for me.

JPO Andrea: I have the same experience, yes.

JPO Hailey: My kids, yes, same thing. Some of my kids like going to detention. They’ve said it.

JPO Andrea: It doesn’t solve the problem. It doesn’t seem to address it.

JPO Hailey: Right, it doesn’t address the issue.

JPO Chris: Short-term, it might. [Laughter] Physically keep them from not using but, yes, doesn’t address in the long-term.

According to these JPOs, detention does not solve the problem of youth substance use, and in fact, some youth “like” going to detention. JPO Paul holds a similar opinion,

I personally don’t think detention is necessary, it’s very, very short-term, and especially the kids that have been back there times before, it doesn’t even faze them, or they enjoy it. So, it’s definitely not going to make a difference as far as once they get back out.

Overall, this group of JPOs perceives that sanctions, such as detention, are not a long-term solution to substance use (or other noncompliance behaviors) and do not actually deter youth.

Demographic Characteristic Similarities & Differences

In accordance with our second research question, we explored whether JPOs with opposing perceptions of the value of sanctions differed in any way. To do this, we created a crosstabulation chart with JPOs’ demographic characteristics. As can be seen in Table 2, these two groups of JPOs differed substantially on some characteristics. For example, location of the juvenile probation agency mattered greatly. JPOs who perceive sanctions as effective were much more likely to work in a non-metropolitan county (64%). Comparatively, JPOs who perceive sanctions as ineffective were more likely to work in a metropolitan county (100%). Additionally, the two groups had substantial differences in both age and number of years of experience. JPOs who perceive sanctions as ineffective were much more likely to be young (75%) and have less than 10 years of experience (75%) compared to those who perceive sanctions as effective (27% and 36%, respectively). The average age of JPOs who were pro-sanctions was 45 years old; the average age of JPOs who do not believe in sanctions was 36 years old. The average number of years of experience in the juvenile criminal legal system was doubled (M=12 years) for pro-sanction JPOs compared to those who believe sanctions are ineffective (M=6 years).

Table 2.

JPO Characteristics and Perceptions of Sanctions Crosstabulation (N=19)a

Sanctions are
Effective
(N=11)		 Sanctions are
Ineffective
(N=8)
# % # %
Ruralness
Metropolitan 4 36% 8 100%
Non-Metropolitan 7 64% 0 0%
Gender
Woman 7 64% 4 50%
Man 4 36% 4 50%
Ethnicity
Hispanic/Latinx 2 18% 4 50%
Non-Hispanic/Latinx 9 82% 4 50%
Race
White 9 82% 6 75%
BIPOC/Multiracial b 2 18% 2 25%
Education
High School 3 27% 0 0%
Bachelor’s or Higher 8 73% 8 100%
Age
20s 0 0% 2 25%
30s 3 27% 4 50%
40s 4 36% 1 13%
50+ 4 36% 1 13%
Years of Experience
<10 4 36% 6 75%
10-19 5 45% 1 13%
20+ 2 18% 1 13%
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a

Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

b

The BIPOC and Multiracial race categories were combined due to confidentiality concerns.

Differences & Similarities in Perceptions of Social & Tangible Incentives

Furthermore, to address our third research question, we examined whether JPO perceptions of sanctions were related to their perceptions of social and tangible incentives. We used four separate independent samples t-tests to assess the relationship between perceptions of sanctions and the individual social incentives, individual tangible incentives, parallel social incentives, and parallel tangible incentives scales from the Provider Survey of Incentives (Kirby et al., 2006). Our data met the assumptions of an independent samples t-test for each of the four scales: (1) ordinal/continuous data; (2) simple random sample; (3) normal distribution6, and (4) homogeneity of variance. Results from these four t-tests are presented in Table 3. The two groups, JPOs who perceive sanctions as effective versus ineffective, did not have significantly different perceptions of social incentives. For both the individual social incentives scale (t = −.290, p = .775) and the parallel social incentives scale (t = −1.905, p = .074), the results were not significant. However, JPOs did have significantly different perceptions of tangible incentives. JPOs who perceived sanctions as ineffective had significantly more positive views of tangible incentives, on both the individual tangible incentives scale (t = −2.995, p = .008) and the parallel tangible incentives scale (t = −2.758, p = .013), compared to those who perceived sanctions as effective. Thus, the two groups of JPOs did not have significantly different perceptions of social incentives, but they did have significantly different perceptions of tangible incentives.

Table 3.

Perceptions of Social and Tangible Incentives

Sanctions are
Effective (N=11)		 Sanctions are
Ineffective (N=9)
M SD M SD Mean
Difference 		t-value p-value
Individual Tangible Incentives 12.18 1.89 15.38 2.77 −3.193 −2.995 .008**
Individual Social Incentives 14.55 1.97 14.88 2.00 −.330 −.290 .775
Parallel Tangible Incentives 79.55 9.88 91.13 7.66 −11.580 −2.758 .013*
Parallel Social Incentives 82.64 10.09 91.38 9.55 −8.739 −1.905 .074
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*

Significant difference <.05

**

Significant difference <.01

DISCUSSION

Our results show that there are two distinct groups of JPOs: those who believe sanctions or the threat of sanctions is an effective deterrent strategy for youth who use substances and those who do not believe it is an effective strategy. Perceptually and demographically these two groups are significantly different. Notably, JPOs who believe sanctions are ineffective are significantly more likely to have positive views of tangible incentives, work in a metropolitan county, have fewer years of experience as a JPO, and be younger in age than JPOs who believe in the effectiveness of sanctions. Although these are significant differences, the two groups of JPOs also shared some similarities. Despite opposing views of sanctions, both groups of JPOs had similar educational backgrounds, racial demographics, and opinions of social incentives.

Limitations

These findings are somewhat limited, in that, only 19 JPOs (32%) in our sample expressed an opinion about the effectiveness of sanctions in youth substance use desistance. Due to the structure of focus groups, conversations move fast and individuals do not respond to every question the way they would in a one-on-one interview. Similarly, the structure of focus groups resulted in short responses that did not contain nuance, such as, whether JPOs believe sanctions work for certain types of youth and not others. In addition, these focus groups only captured JPOs’ perceptions and beliefs. We do not have the youths’ perspectives on how they think sanctions affect their behavior nor do we have an objective measure of how sanctions affect youth behavior.

Implications

However, in this case, we argue that it does not matter objectively whether sanctions lead to youth behavior changes. It only matters how JPOs perceive the effectiveness of sanctions because their perceptions then shape their own behavior and their willingness to rely on certain probation strategies. For example, despite previous research that sanctions are associated with negative outcomes (Gatti et al., 2009; Hjalmarsson, 2008; Mendel, 2011; NeMoyer et al., 2014; Schwartz et al., 2017), there are JPOs in the current study who perceive sanctions as an effective substance use deterrent and therefore will keep using it as a probation strategy. So, even if the field of juvenile probation wants to move toward incentive-style strategies and away from sanctions (NCJFCJ, 2017), our results show that JPOs may impede this change as some still find value in sanctions. This barrier to implementation is known as “relative advantage” (i.e., implementors’ perception of the value or advantage of an intervention; Damschroder et al., 2009). When implementors do not find the new intervention has a relative advantage over the old strategy, it may lead to resistance and unsustainable implementation (Damschroder et al., 2009; Rudes et al., 2021). In this case, if JPOs do not believe incentives have a relative advantage over sanctions—and our results show that some do not—then JPOs will resist this change and implementation is likely to fail. Probation officers are more willing to implement new practices/interventions when they are perceived to have value or are appealing (Belenko et al., 2018; Taxman & Belenko, 2011).

To increase the chances of successful implementation of an incentives-style program, such as CM, trainers/purveyors should target the populations who might be most skeptical of tangible incentives (e.g., older JPOs with more years of experience). Agencies and offices can also tailor their training to these populations to better combat JPO skepticism and negative perceptions. One option includes using a Quality Improvement (QI) framework (Kaplan et al., 2010), such as the plan-do-study-act (PDSA) model (Deming, 1986), to facilitate and later sustain incentive-based reform within youth probation. Our findings suggest certain groups of JPOs (i.e., non-metropolitan, non-Hispanic/Latinx, and with more years on the job) may require extra attention, training, and capacity building to learn to fully embrace an incentive-, rather than sanctions-based, style of probation. Of the many benefits of QI frameworks, perhaps the focus on iterative learning within specific organizational contexts is most salient here. This framework allows agencies to specifically tailor reforms to their culture and climate to ensure staff understand the nature of the change and both why and how it is valuable for the outcomes of their work.

Within the PDSA model specifically, the process affords staff an opportunity to choose a measurable goal (like increased youth compliance with abstinence or attendance of mandated alcohol and drug counseling) and determine the practices and strategies (i.e., CM/incentives) necessary (and doable) to achieve that goal. Solutions are measured and analyzed throughout the change process so practices may be modified as needed and so successes are rapidly visible and understood by staff. PDSA allows some variation in processes based on local office contexts (Cox et al., 1999) so it is well-suited for youth probation. Including these types of models has the possibility to improve youth’s compliance with court orders of submitting negative drug screens and attending alcohol and drug counseling, potentially positively altering the youths’ trajectory through both achieving and maintaining abstinence, as well as reducing the likelihood for more severe sanctions from violating these requirements (NeMoyer et al., 2014). Also, given that up to 70% of youth in the juvenile justice system have a mental health diagnosis (Vincent et al., 2008; Wasserman et al., 2010), if these strategies are found to be effective they could be trialed for other related conditions for services like mental health counseling.

Future Directions

If the field of juvenile probation truly wants to successfully move toward incentives and away from sanctions, then future research will need to expand our findings and replicate this study on a larger scale. Future research should do more to connect JPOs perceptions of sanctions/incentives to their willingness to use certain types of strategies. In conjunction, researchers need to get youth’s perspectives of incentives versus sanctions and get objective measures of which strategies prove to be most effective and for whom. Getting answers to these questions could provide trainers/purveyors with the information they need to convince JPOs of the relative advantage of incentives programs. Finally, future researchers should longitudinally track JPOs and their perceptions of incentives and sanctions. It is important to know whether younger JPOs with less experience stay consistent in their pro-incentives beliefs or if as they get older and gain more experience their perspective shifts to become more pro-sanction.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors extend their appreciation to participating juvenile probation officers, to the participating Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon counties' juvenile justice agencies, and to Jane Wilson and Larisa Lilies for assistance in implementing the study.

FUNDING

This article was supported by funding from the National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health (NIH) (R01DA041434, PI: Sheidow; K23DA048161, PI: Drazdowski). The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the NIH.

ABBREVIATIONS

CM

Contingency Management

JPO

Juvenile Probation Officer

NCJFCJ

National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges

PDSA

Plan-Do-Study-Act

PPAS

Probation Practices Assessment Survey

QI

Quality Improvement

Biographies

Sydney N. Ingel, M.A.

Sydney N. Ingel, M.A., is a doctoral student in Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason University. She earned her master’s degree at George Mason University and works as a graduate research assistant at the Center for Advancing Correctional Excellence (ACE!). Her research interests include corrections, re-entry, and qualitative methods.

Tess K. Drazdowski, Ph.D.

Tess K. Drazdowski, Ph.D., is a Research Scientist and licensed clinical psychologist who joined the Oregon Social Learning Center after completing her postdoctoral fellowship at UCLA’s Integrated Substance Use Programs in the Semel Institute and her clinical internship at the University of Miami Miller School of Medicine Mailman Child Development Center. She holds a dual Ph.D. in clinical/developmental psychology from Virginia Commonwealth University.

Danielle S. Rudes, Ph.D.

Danielle S. Rudes, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Criminology, Law and Society and the Deputy Director of the Center for Advancing Correctional Excellence (ACE!) at George Mason University. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Irvine. She is a qualitative researcher whose methods include ethnographic observation, interviews, and focus groups with over 19 years of experience working with corrections agencies at the federal, state and local county levels including prisons, jails, probation/parole agencies and problem-solving courts.

Michael R. McCart, Ph.D.

Michael R. McCart, Ph.D., is a licensed clinical psychologist with specialized training in cognitive, behavioral, and family systems approaches to treating serious problems in adolescents and emerging adults. He earned his Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and has been a Senior Research Scientist at the Oregon Social Learning Center (OSLC) since 2014.

Jason E. Chapman, Ph.D.

Jason E. Chapman, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Scientist at the Oregon Social Learning Center who specializes in research design, measurement development and evaluation, and advanced statistical methods. His research includes studies evaluating the efficacy, effectiveness, dissemination, and implementation of evidence-based practices across mental health, child welfare, and justice settings. Additionally, Dr. Chapman focuses on IRT-based development and evaluation of instruments for measuring intervention and implementation fidelity.

Faye S. Taxman, Ph.D.

Faye S. Taxman, Ph.D., is a University Professor at George Mason University and the Director of the Center for Advancing Correctional Excellence (ACE!). Dr. Taxman is recognized for her work in the development of the seamless systems of care models that link the criminal justice system with other service delivery systems, as well as reengineering probation and parole supervision services, and organizational change models.

Ashli J. Sheidow, Ph.D.

Ashli J. Sheidow, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Scientist and Science Director at the Oregon Social Learning Center (OSLC). Prior to joining OSLC, she was Professor in the Family Services Research Center of the Medical University of South Carolina. She earned her Ph.D. in 2001 in clinical psychology from the University of Illinois at Chicago, where she trained at the Institute for Juvenile Research and Cook County Hospital.

Footnotes

DECLARATION OF INTEREST

The authors report no conflict of interest.

Data is available from Dr. Ashli J. Sheidow upon individual request and the approved data sharing agreement.

1

For the purposes of this article, substance use shall be defined as a pattern of using a substance (whether drugs or alcohol) for mood-altering purposes that is harmful or causes significant problems or distress.

2

Some JPOs did not participate in baseline focus groups due to (1) dropping out of the study prior to the focus group, (2) only agreeing to participate in the survey portion of the project, or (3) they had a schedule conflict that prevented them from being there (e.g., doctor appointment, vacation).

3

We chose to capitalize White to be consistent stylistically with capitalizing other racial and ethnic groups (e.g., BIPOC, Hispanic/Latinx). See the blog post by Nguyen and Pendleton (2020) for further explanation of capitalizing White.

4

18 questions were discarded because Kirby and colleagues (2006) determined they did not load into factor analyses for the parallel social and tangible incentives subscales. Another six questions were discarded because they referred to specific dollar amounts for tangible incentives (e.g., “Tangible incentive programs that cost $50 per client per month are worth it considering how effective they are.”) rather than general perceptions (e.g., “Tangible incentives are worthwhile because they can get clients in the door for supervision”). The final two questions were removed because they were not specific to either social or tangible incentives (e.g., The incentives approach is inappropriate because it is inconsistent with a 12-step approach.”).

5

Any names mentioned in the findings are pseudonyms. All identifying information was removed, so sex, race, ethnicity or other characteristics should not be interpreted from these names.

6

Shapiro-Wilk tests were performed and did not show evidence of non-normality for the individual social incentives (W = 0.94, p = 0.304) scale, parallel social incentives scale (W = 0.96, p = 0.570), individual tangible incentives scale (W = 0.95, p = 0.415), or parallel tangible incentives scale (W = 0.99, p = 0.994).

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