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. 2023 May 3;9:100112. doi: 10.1016/j.eastsj.2023.100112

Violations of mobility restrictions during COVID-19 in five Indonesian cities: A reflection of transport policy-practice gap

Isti Hidayati 1,, Yori Herwangi 1, Bambang Hari Wibisono 1, Daniel Harjuna Satriawan 1, Muhammad Alfi Hilman 1
PMCID: PMC10154541

Abstract

Since the detection of the first COVID-19 case in March 2020, the Indonesian government has implemented various mobility restrictions as a policy response to address the pandemic. To date, violations of mobility restrictions have been discussed in relation to public health risk, but rarely analyzed in terms of understanding the transport policy-practice gap. Using content analysis of news media from March 2020 to May 2021, this article identifies individual actions and institutional factors enabling violations of mobility restrictions. Our findings infer a policy-practice gap regarding operationalization, institutional issues, and lack of consideration of target groups’ behavior. These findings provide insights for transport policy formulation in uncertain times, such as the post-pandemic, especially in the context of rapidly growing Asian cities.

Keywords: Mobility restrictions, Policy-practice gap, Transport policy, COVID-19, Content analysis

1. Introduction

Across the globe, mobility restrictions have been widely used to curb COVID-19 infection rates (Muley et al., 2020; also see Cooley et al., 2011 in the context of the influenza pandemic), although their effectiveness varies depending on the type of restriction, duration, and implementation capacity (Chinazzi et al., 2020; Linka et al., 2020). It has been argued that mobility restrictions are more effective when enforced at the early stage of the pandemic (Oh et al., 2021). The restrictions include encouraging people to work from home, limiting the number of people allowed to be outside, closing shops and workplaces, limiting the operating hours and capacity of public transport, and enforcing curfews and lockdowns. Such restrictions are deemed necessary to lessen the risk of virus transmission, which tends to occur when people talk or interact close to others (Mao et al., 2020; Morawska et al., 2020; Wilson et al., 2020). Additional measures, such as wearing a face mask in public, have become the new norm in many countries until recently (Akhtar et al., 2020; Chu et al., 2020; WHO, 2020; Bokemper et al., 2021).

Since the detection of the first COVID-19 in March 2020 in Jakarta, the Indonesian government has announced various mobility restrictions. In the early phase of the pandemic, the restrictions consisted of closing socioeconomic facilities (e.g., schools, workplaces, and religious places), limiting the service time and frequency of buses and trains, placing social distancing measures, and imposing mask-wearing in public. During the first month of its implementation (March 2020), the imposed mobility restriction has influenced public well-being both positively (as a collective action to fight the pandemic) and negatively (associated with boredom and financial concerns) (Aritenang, 2021). Following the increase in new cases and casualties, these restrictions were intensified, such as limiting and monitoring intercity travel. A health document indicating travelers’ negative COVID-19 status was mandatory for certain transport modes and for entering or leaving certain cities. In February 2021, the government introduced the role of the community to monitor the implementation of mobility restrictions at the neighborhood level. Overnight guests had to be reported to the head of the neighborhood (appointed as a community representative of around 100 houses) and provide proof of a negative COVID-19. A new COVID-19 case in the neighborhood must also be reported. In the case of a significant increase in new COVID-19 patients, a neighborhood can authorize a self-lockdown whereby movements to and from the infected neighborhood are strictly forbidden unless it is an emergency.

From a policy perspective, COVID-19 mobility restrictions presented an unprecedented case where a top-down, almost authoritarian, transport directive is enforced to ensure public health and well-being, which requires compliance from both individual and collective actions. Yet, violations of mobility restrictions have been constantly reported in news media, either as individual acts of non-compliance or institutional failures (e.g., lack of clarity and coordination, conflicting interests between different authorities). In Indonesia, it was suspected that these violations contributed to the increasing infection rate (Antara, 2021; Kompas, 2021a), although quantitative proof of such direct correlation is limited.

Reflecting on the violations of the mobility restrictions can indicate a transport policy-practice gap. At the individual level, the tendency to comply with or disregard mobility restrictions is influenced by individual risk perception and attitude towards the government as policymakers and enforcers of the restrictions (Oum and Wang, 2020; Ding and Zhang, 2021). At the institutional level, such violations may reflect institutional problems of operationalization (Manaugh et al., 2015; Boisjoly and El-Geneidy, 2017; Silva et al., 2017), inability to understand target groups (Blumenberg, 2004; Givoni and Banister, 2010; Aldred and Jungnickel, 2014), or conflicting interests between institutions of different sectors or scales (Hatzopoulou and Miller, 2008; van Geet et al., 2019). Against this background, this article seeks to answer the following research question: How does the understanding of violations of mobility restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic contribute to the identification of a transport policy-practice gap?

This article investigates violations of mobility restrictions in five Indonesian cities as a reflection on how to effectively translate transport policy into practice, especially in times of uncertainty. This is particularly important for rapidly growing Asian cities where transport policy has to cope with diverse mobility needs and a higher degree of unpredictability. This article draws from the studies of transport policy-practice gap (Smith, 1973; Salomon and Mokhtarian, 1997; Pojani, 2020; Tsoi et al., 2021) and policy-making during uncertain times (Shaw et al., 2020; van Bavel et al., 2020; Ding and Zhang, 2021). In doing so, we highlight the transport policy-practice gap at individual and institutional levels, thus providing insights to prevent policy mismatch. The identification of mobility restrictions and their violations also serves as an empirical database regarding COVID-19 policy response in the context of rapidly growing Asian cities, complementing previous studies in Southeast Asia (Djalante et al., 2020; Hapal, 2021; Nguyen and Pojani, 2021), Europe (Bohman et al., 2021; Eisenmann et al., 2021, Vickerman, 2021), Australia (Beck and Hensher, 2020; Hensher et al., 2021; Buckle et al., 2022; Martino et al., 2022). Although this article is not a methodological paper, the utilization of the content analysis of news media highlights the practical application of news media as data sources in times of uncertainty, such as COVID-19, when official database tends to be scarce.

2. Literature review

2.1. Translating transport policy into practice

Translating policy into practice is a “wicked problem”; it is a delicate, complex (intertwined causes and possible outcomes), and highly contextual process. Numerous literature has been set out to understand this process mainly from three aspects: the policy-making (Smith, 1973; Makinde, 2005; Hudson et al., 2019; Tsoi et al., 2021), the governing institutions (Ferman, 1989; Ménard et al., 2018), and users' or target’ behavior (Salomon and Mokhtarian, 1997; van Bavel et al., 2020). Reflecting on these aspects provides insights into the transport policy-practice gap. Transport policy-making is often challenged with operationalization issues. Keywords such as access-for-all, equity, and inclusiveness are difficult to operationalize, and policymakers often use perfunctory but easily measured indicators. Accessibility, for instance, is often measured by the provision and coverage of transport infrastructure, which do not directly define the actual ease of access (Boisjoly and El-Geneidy, 2017). This is despite policymakers’ improved understanding of accessibility (Silva et al., 2017). Likewise, social equity is often defined using vague terms such as providing “a wide range of options” without specifying what should be an acceptable range of options (Manaugh et al., 2015).

The governing institution aspect highlights how transport is multi-scalar (e.g., transport issues at the neighborhood scale influence those at the urban scale), intersectoral (e.g., access to transport affects access to socio-economic facilities), and operates across administrative boundaries. Hence, it requires coordination across different levels (e.g., national and local) and sectors (e.g., land use planning, tourism, and education). Discrepancies between intended policy goals and implementation usually result from the lack of coordination, including unclear distribution of responsibilities (Hatzopoulou and Miller, 2008; Busscher et al., 2014; van Geet et al., 2019). Coordination between different agencies across different levels and sectors is influenced by the institutional capacity, such as the ability to enforce rules and regulations (McTigue et al., 2018).

The behavioral aspect explains how the ability to understand target groups influence the transport policy-practice gap. Transport has long been regarded as a technical matter whereby users’ experience is relegated as unimportant if they can be transported as quickly as possible. Despite the shift from a positivist and top-down approach to a more plural and participatory means (Silva et al., 2017; Soria-Lara and Banister, 2017), the power structure in the policy making heavily remain on planners and transport operators instead of the affected users (Rajé, 2007). For example, the planning of public transport routes without considering the mobility needs of low-income women led to a spatial mismatch (Blumenberg, 2004). Another case is an underused cycling lane because the cycling culture of the local community was not considered (Aldred and Jungnickel, 2014). Here, the policy-practice gap also reflects the mismatch between transport provision and the actual need of transport users (Givoni and Banister, 2010).

A successful transport policy entails how a collective goal is achieved through individual actions. Misalignment of individual vs. societal values may result in a policy-practice gap. Sustainable transportation, for example, is challenged by individuals' choices to use private motorized vehicles, either due to forced car ownership or simply a driver's preference (Steg and Tertoolen, 1999; Steg and Gifford, 2005). Unfortunately, the conflict between individual versus collective values becomes more prominent in times of uncertainty, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic (van Bavel et al., 2020; Ding and Zhang, 2021).

Interestingly, the policy-practice gap, in general, is observed to be more pronounced in developing economies (Makinde, 2005). Factors such as corruption and limited resources (primarily financial and intellectual capacity) to formulate a sound policy were often mentioned (Smith, 1973; Makinde, 2005). Moreover, implementation of transport policy in developing economies tends to be superficial. In Southeast Asia, for instance, policy on sustainable transportation is mostly well written on paper but rarely achieves the intended goals (Pojani, 2020).

2.2. Policymaking in times of uncertainty

The COVID-19 pandemic presents policymaking with uncertainties. The policy must be enacted in a short time yet remain adaptive to abrupt changes, such as the sudden increase of new cases or a new virus strain (Lee et al., 2020; Manski, 2020). More importantly, the public policy during the COVID-19 pandemic requires a large-scale behavioral change to ensure public health and well-being (van Bavel et al., 2020). As public policy became pivotal in establishing reliable and trusted guidance during this uncertain time, it tended to be strict and top-down, allowing public compliance to be achieved in a shorter time and a clear chain of authority. However, competing interests between the individual and collective values and negative attitudes toward policymakers (i.e., government in general and health care institutions) may hinder such public compliance (Sibley et al., 2020; Ding and Zhang, 2021). Research on COVID-19 policy response suggested two factors to be considered: (1) behavioral changes contributing to individual compliance (e.g., framing and disclosure of information, consideration of socio-economic conditions and psychological issues, see van Bavel et al., 2020; Ding and Zhang, 2021) and (2) institutional capacity (e.g., leadership and trust, transparency of information, coordination across different levels of government, and enforcement, see Lee et al., 2020; Shaw et al., 2020; Hakim et al., 2021, Mattei and del Pino, 2021).

3. Methods and data

A qualitative content analysis of news articles is employed to investigate violations of mobility restrictions in five Indonesian cities, adapting the framework of Shorey et al. (2020). This approach aims to interpret and understand the latent meaning of media reporting through systematic coding and organization of themes (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). During the COVID-19 pandemic, content analysis of news articles is more practical because official reports are scarcely available (Gandasari and Dwidienawati, 2020; Mutua and Ong'ong'a 2020; Shorey et al., 2020). Similar data limitation is also found in other Asian countries such as Malaysia (Pang et al., 2021), Thailand (Mahikul et al., 2021), and Vietnam (Vuong et al., 2021). In Indonesia, official records of violations of mobility restrictions (i.e., by the police) were neither publicly available nor able to provide a complete picture. The police only record criminal offenses, while non-compliance with mobility restrictions is mainly counted as a public offense (e.g., not wearing a mask), which are supposedly recorded by the public order enforcers (Satpol PP). However, they often lack resources (Brillian, 2022), and only Jakarta's public order enforcer has detailed data on the number of individuals caught not wearing a mask in public. Other violations, such as vehicles exceeding its capacity during mobility restrictions, were not recorded and only reported in news media. This presents a limitation for this research as it heavily relies on news articles. Another shortcoming of using news as the data source is the difficulty to capture fine-grained information, such as temporal variations of violations of mobility restrictions. These limitations were imperative considering the uncertain nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, which affects data availability.

In this article, the content analysis is performed through four steps following Krippendorff (2018).

  • 1)

    Defining unit analysis. News articles were used as unit analysis because they are readily available and accessible, while there is limited official record regarding violations of mobility restrictions.

  • 2)

    Sampling. We employed convenience sampling to select news articles that contained keywords of: COVID-19, mobility restriction, and violation. Sources of news articles are limited to reliable major news media, i.e., The Jakarta Post, CNN Indonesia, Kompas, and Detik. News articles were collected from March 2020 to May 2021, which cover the early phase of the pandemic and several public holidays in a one-year period whereby mobility restrictions are revised to prevent mass traveling. After skimming and omitting redundancies (as similar news can appear more than once and in more than one media), we collected 256 news articles as our database. Redundancies were identified by grouping news with similar dates, areas, and keywords or hashtags and only selecting one news with the most complete information. This process was performed manually.

  • 3)

    Coding. We applied a deductive coding scheme following a directed content analysis whereby key concepts and keywords are derived from the literature review (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; see Fig. 1 ). As the coding tree is relatively simple, the coding was done manually and tabulated in Excel.

  • 4)

    Inferring or building analytical constructs. Here, the coded news articles were categorized and discussed with the literature on the policy-practice gap.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 1

Coding tree.

Although our database comprised news articles up to May 2021, the discussion of the findings is contemporized and updated with major events reported after that date, such as the widespread of COVID-19 vaccination in mid-2021.

4. Cases: mobility restrictions in five Indonesian cities

Five Indonesian cities representing typical rapidly growing Asian cities are selected as case studies: Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, Semarang, and Yogyakarta (Fig. 2 ). These cities are capital provinces, and each of them has an extended agglomeration area and is densely populated (Firman et al., 2007). During the COVID-19 pandemic, these five cities recorded the highest number of active cases (in addition to Bali; Indonesia Covid-19 Task Force, 2021).

Fig. 2.

Fig. 2

Five Indonesian cities as case studies.

These five cities are well connected in terms of transport infrastructure. A newly operated toll road (TransJawa) enables travel from Jakarta to Surabaya (759 km) in 10 h by car. There are also other transport modes, including long-distance trains, buses, and flights connecting these major cities. However, aside from highways, the road infrastructure has an unclear hierarchy as several residential streets are directly connected to highways, causing a roadside impedance that leads to local congestion. There are also numerous unpaved roads used by locals to travel. These paths are likely left unchecked under mobility restrictions (Kompas, 2020a). In terms of intracity transportation, each of these five cities is highly dependent on private transport, and the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated this dependency in fear for virus transmission when using public transport. For intercity travel, mobility restrictions required travelers to present a negative test result for COVID-19 (referring to the regulation stipulated by the Ministry of Transportation). The test result will be inspected upon boarding long-distance public transportation (i.e., planes, trains, buses), while private transport users will be checked randomly along the inter-city roads.

During COVID-19, mobility restrictions in Indonesia are enforced based on zones, which are defined according to the number of new COVID-19 cases and the risk of infection. Delineation of the zones follows the district administrative boundary. There are four color-coded zones: green zone indicates no new cases, yellow zone means low risk of infection (1–5 households reported a positive case), orange zone means a medium risk of infection (6–10 households reported a positive case), and red zone indicates a high infection rate marked by a high number of new cases (>10 households reported a positive case). Zones with a relatively high number of COVID-19 new cases apply strict restrictions for entry and exit. Nevertheless, a total lockdown in certain cities has never been enforced, regardless of the number of new COVID-19 cases.

The main aim of mobility restrictions is to limit nonessential travel (e.g., those that do not involve the acquiring of daily necessities) and noncritical travel (e.g., those that do not involve an emergency) by regulating travel times, routes, modes (i.e., vehicle capacity), trip purposes, and implementing health precautions (e.g., wearing a face mask, social distancing). The implementation of mobility restrictions is decentralized, except for the health precautions. Each city can make adjustments according to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and local socioeconomic conditions (Table 1 ).

Table 1.

Mobility restrictions in five Indonesian cities.

Restrictions in terms of Jakarta Surabaya Bandung Semarang Yogyakarta
Travel time curfew from 24:00–04:00 curfew from 22:00–05:00 economic activities (e.g., shopping malls, restaurants, street hawkers) must be closed at 22:00 economic activities (e.g., shopping malls, restaurants, street hawkers) must be closed at 20:00 economic activities (e.g., shopping malls, restaurants, street hawkers) must be closed at 19:00
Route road closure (in some major thoroughfares) road closure (in some major thoroughfares) road closure (in some major thoroughfares) Road closure during the new year holiday (in some major thoroughfares)
Mode
  • 1.

    Bus rapid transit stopped (September–October 2020)

  • 2.

    Vehicle capacity must adhere to social distancing

Vehicle capacity: 50% Vehicle capacity: 50% Vehicle capacity: 50%
Trip purpose
  • 1.

    Encouraging work from home and distance learning

  • 2.

    Travel permits for commuting

  • 1.

    Encouraging work from home and distance learning

  • 2.

    Travel permits for commuting

  • 1.

    Encouraging work from home and distance learning

  • 2.

    Travel permits for commuting

Encouraging work from home and distance learning Encouraging work from home and distance learning
Health precautions Wearing a mask, social distancing

Table 1 inferred that the stringency and scope of mobility restrictions differ in each city. Jakarta and Surabaya, the two most populated cities, implemented stricter restrictions to limit those traveling in and out of the city. Bandung, which is a 2.5-h drive from Jakarta, implemented similar restrictions. Semarang and Yogyakarta, however, were relatively relaxed. Travel permits for commuting were not necessary to enter or leave these two cities, which may be attributed to their smaller city size. In terms of scope, cities such as Surabaya, Bandung, and Semarang provide an explicit measurement, such as 50% vehicle capacity, which was controlled by limiting the number of available tickets and seats in public transport and random checking by the police for private cars (Kompas, 2021b). In addition, the period when a restriction is effective also differs in each city. Jakarta, where the first COVID-19 case was detected, initiated the mobility restrictions earlier than other cities in March 2020. Other cities enacted mobility restrictions starting in April 2020.

The increase in new COVID-19 cases generally resulted in stricter restrictions, while a low number of new cases was followed by relaxed restrictions. From March 2020 to May 2021, three major events were identified to have triggered stricter mobility restrictions: the Islamic celebration of Eid al-Fitr in May 2020, the Christmas and New Year holidays, and the potential mass homecoming for Eid al-Fitr in May 2021. Stricter mobility restrictions were enacted around two to four weeks before and after those events, and the additional measures included city border control, prolonged curfews, and closure of certain streets. It should be noted that throughout the pandemic, no explicit official rule has prohibited travel, as the government simply advises people to avoid traveling and adhering to mobility restrictions.

5. Findings and discussions

5.1. Violations against mobility restrictions

We identified violations of mobility restrictions from individual and institutional perspectives (Table 2 ). The reported violations of mobility restrictions in the news media include violations regarding travel time (breaking the curfew), route (using ‘informal’ paths to avoid road closures), mode (exceeding the number of passengers allowed), purpose (disregarding working from home recommendation, commuting without travel permit), and health precautions (not wearing a mask). It should be noted that emergency travels are exempted from mobility restrictions. For instance, emergency workers traveling during curfew were not considered a violation. Unfortunately, there were only a few (even none in some cities) official records publicly available to assess the extent of violation of mobility restrictions. This lack or absence of data reporting may indicate an institutional deficiency that often plagues developing countries (Satterthwaite, 2010).

Table 2.

Individual and institutional aspects leading to violations of mobility restrictions.

Types of violation Cases Individual non-compliance Institutional aspect
Time Breaking the curfew contestation between individual and collective values Lack of financial resources to compensate for economic losses from staying-at-home recommendation
Route Avoiding road closures (guarded checkpoints) by searching for alternate routes (i.e., unpaved roads, narrow alleys) Lack of human resources to guard checkpoints
Lack of enforcement (no/little penalty for those using alternate routes to avoid checkpoints)
Mode Exceeding the number of passengers allowed during the pandemic Lack of resources to ensure that certain vehicle capacity is met
Lack of enforcement (no/little penalty for overcapacity ridesharing services)
Trip purposes
  • 1.

    Ignoring work from home recommendation

  • 2.

    Traveling without a commuting permit

  • 1.

    Lack of financial resources to compensate economic losses from working-from-home policy

  • 2.

    Unclear procedure to obtain a commuting permit

Health precautions Not wearing a mask in public Lack of enforcement (no/little penalty for those refusing to wear mask in public)

Further, the violations are coded into (1) individual non-compliance and (2) institutional aspects that facilitate non-compliance with mobility restrictions. Individual non-compliance stems from the conflict between individual and collective values, while institutional aspects include the lack of enforcement, lack of resources (financial and number of staff), and unclear procedures.

Conflicting individual and collective interests can be inferred from the news report on all types of violations of mobility restrictions. Individual interests, mainly driven by economic and psychological needs, conflicted with mobility restrictions to protect public health concerns. For instance, curfew violators were mostly found in restaurants and nightclubs: restaurant owners argued that they have financial needs to fulfill while visitors blamed psychological stress due to long periods of limited mobility. Similar situations were reported across the globe, such as in cities in Latin America (Garcia et al., 2020), Africa (Lau et al., 2021), and Europe (Mironowicz et al., 2021). Economic rationale (e.g., working and earning livelihood) was constantly cited as the main reason for the insistence to travel amidst the restrictions (e.g., traveling without a commuting permit, exceeding the number of passengers in ridesharing services). In addition, the inability to afford to buy a new mask was mentioned by some offenders (Detik, 2021; Kompas, 2021c).

Institutional aspects contributed in creating a supportive environment for individual non-compliance with mobility restrictions. Three institutional aspects can be inferred from the news articles. First, the lack of enforcement as indicated by no or little penalty for most violations. For instance, those who did not wear masks in public were mostly scolded by the officers if caught, but no heavy financial penalties were imposed. In cases of a sharp increase in COVID-19 causalities, not wearing a mask in public was penalized with fines ranging from IDR 20,000 or around US$ 1.4 (in Semarang) to IDR 250,000 or around US$ 17 (in Jakarta) or they have to perform community service, such as cleaning public facilities. Another example was reported by Detik (2020a) that around 2900 vehicles without commuting permits in May 2020 were banned entry to Jakarta and forced to turn around by the Police without any financial penalties. This lack of enforcement is attributed to the fact that not all violations of mobility restrictions are considered a crime. Therefore, the enforcement was administered based on how the local government responded to COVID-19 severity in each city (or province).

Second, lack of financial and human resources to enforce mobility restrictions. The government does not have the financial capacity to compensate for economic losses from imposing the work from home policy. Consequently, the work from home recommendation was ignored by several companies (CNN Indonesia, 2020; Kompas, 2020b), resulting in an insignificant reduction in commuting trips and public transport queues (Antara, 2020; Detik, 2020b). Moreover, there were workers from informal sectors (around 57% of the workforce; see Pitoyo et al., 2020) who depend on day-to-day income and are not covered by any financial safety net (Narula, 2020). The government also has insufficient staff to monitor the implementation of mobility restrictions. Checking of commuting permit and vehicle capacity were only performed in major roads and public transit hubs, while commuters who use unguarded alternate routes (usually smaller streets) can enter or leave the city unchecked (Kompas, 2020a). There is not enough staff to guard all entry and exit points. Other resources, such as roadside cameras, were only available on major roads; thus, the enforcement mainly depended on random checking by the traffic police.

Third, unclear procedures about the implementation of mobility restrictions. For example, according to the Directive of Jakarta's Governor 47/2020, a commuting permit is required to enter or leave the city. However, where and how to obtain such permit is not clearly explained, neither how to monitor those entering and leaving the city nor what to do if they are unable to show the required permit. Moreover, it was often the case that (new) mobility restrictions were announced the night before their implementation. The next day, there were long queues and large crowds of commuters protesting at checkpoints as they claimed to have not been informed about the new mobility restriction. Similarly, field officers were neither well-informed nor well-versed in translating the recent restrictions set by mayors or governors, creating more confusion during implementation. These conditions allow for misinterpretation of how to implement mobility restrictions, indicating a policy-practice gap at the institutional level.

5.2. Policy-practice gap

We further discussed how the identification of individual and institutional aspects leading to violations of mobility restrictions contributes to the understanding of the policy-practice gap (Fig. 3 ). Individual non-compliance reflects the policy-practice gap that stems from the inability to understand the target group's behavior. It highlighted how individual economic and psychological needs could overturn the collective public health goal. Economic rationale appeared as a pressing issue with immediate effect on the livelihood of certain population groups, particularly the marginalized. For them, financial consequences are more appalling than any health risks from traveling. The pressure to earn a living also encouraged them to commute using whatever modes were available. Contestation between individual and collective values, as well as inconsideration of specific needs (or limitations) of certain individuals, is not uncommon in transport policy (see cases of spatial mismatch: Blumenberg, 2004; Givoni and Banister, 2010).

Fig. 3.

Fig. 3

Inference from cases of violations of mobility restrictions to policy-practice gap.

Further, the identification of institutional aspects that facilitate violations of mobility restrictions reflects policy-practice gaps in the policy-making process and its governing institutions. The lack of enforcement and numerous variations of mobility restrictions in different cities give the impression of an unclear policy. For instance, to what extent mobility restrictions must be implemented, are there any exceptions, and how to deal with the offenders. A notable example is the confusion regarding what kind of commuting permits documents are required to enter certain cities. This indicates problems of operationalization, which are quite common in transport policy (Boisjoly and El-Geneidy, 2017; Silva et al., 2017) and equity (Manaugh et al., 2015). During the pandemic, operationalization of transport policy is not limited to defining a concept, but extends to identifying the degree of conformity required for the policy implementation and mitigating the appropriate response for any non-compliance actions and behavior.

In addition, we noted a problem of institutional capacity exacerbating violations of mobility restrictions. Lack of financial resources and capable staff reduce the institutional capacity for policy implementation. This was clearly demonstrated by the violations of mobility restrictions in five Indonesian cities, as there was no financial compensation offered for adhering to the restrictions neither enough staff to monitor the implementation. The lack or absence of official reports regarding violations of mobility restrictions also reflects this lack of resources. This condition provides difficulties for the governing institution in making a well-informed policy (Satterthwaite, 2010).

Mobility restrictions that differ in each city added another layer of complexity in this situation as field officers who can interpret and effectively operationalize the restrictions across different cities were limited; thus, coordination was lacking or almost non-existent. It did not help that there was a noticeable conflicting interest among institutions. For instance, in Semarang and Yogyakarta, while citizens were asked to stay at home, tourists were encouraged to visit the cities. Tourists have been found to be less observant of health protocols (e.g., not wearing masks, breaking curfews), hence, they present a greater risk of transmitting COVID-19. From an institutional perspective, this conflicting interest indicated an institutional incongruence (Hatzopoulou and Miller, 2008; van Geet et al., 2019).

Comparing with other Asian cities, different institutional capacities and socioeconomic conditions can result in differing degrees of compliance with mobility restrictions (Djalante et al., 2020). In the Philippines, public compliance relies heavily on the criminalization of violators and punitive penalties enforced by the draconian regime (Hapal, 2021). In Vietnam, low numbers of violations resulted from compulsory measures coupled with strict enforcement, while loose measures (e.g., suggestions, awareness raising) tend to be ignored (Nguyen and Pojani, 2021). It is also apparent that cities dominated by informal economies and socioeconomic inequalities (e.g., cities in Indonesia and the Philippines) exhibit more violations of mobility restrictions (Djalante et al., 2020). There, violators perceived the pressing economic needs as more important than the risk of infection or even the penalties for non-compliance with mobility restrictions.

6. Conclusions

Using content analysis of 256 news articles from March 2020–May 2021, we highlighted three key aspects for addressing the transport policy-practice gap by reflecting on the violations of mobility restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic in five Indonesian cities. First, the policy must have a clear operationalization and mechanism for enforcement. A clear directive regarding commuting permits needs to be publicly defined, including which institution to check the permit, the penalty for those unable to show the required permit, and who should deliver the penalty. Second, there must be sufficient resources to implement and enforce the policy, including adequate institutional capacity for data reporting. Third, the understanding of target group behavior, specifically their needs and limitations, must be incorporated into the policy-making process.

It is particularly interesting to note how violations of mobility restrictions have clearly demonstrated the dilemma in transportation: whether to focus on the mobility needs of certain population groups or to ensure the safety and well-being of the general public. In our cases of five Indonesian cities, the first option is not feasible as official and reliable socioeconomic data were lacking; thus, the mobility restrictions were enacted, assuming that the bulk of the population can work from home without compromising their financial capacity. This dilemma, however, has long persisted in transport planning, for instance, in the discussion of transport justice (Martens, 2012, 2017) and mobility justice (Sheller, 2018). Hence, we advocate for a more inclusive approach in formulating transport policy. Although policy formulation in times of uncertainty will likely favor a top-down approach, the inclusion of target groups’ needs should not be overlooked as it can significantly lessen the policy-practice gap.

This article also offers reflection on the method of data collection and analysis that heavily relies on news media. This choice of method was attributed due to the lack of official data, hence fine-grained information such as temporal variations of violations of mobility restrictions could not be registered. Our data also only covers events during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020–May 2021) in five Indonesian cities, which made the findings may seem generalized as an initial study. Future research can be built upon these limitations, for instance, the use of social media to compensate for official data availability while complementing news media data. Temporal variations can be incorporated using data scrapping from social media by filtering out the time of events or posts. Further, future research can extend the analysis to cover the later period of COVID-19, including the ‘new normal’ condition where mobility restrictions have been much relaxed. Data on other cities and countries can complement these research findings and provide external validation. Future research can also be expanded to investigate other types of uncertainty (e.g., political unrest, economic crisis) that may require different treatments. Despite these limitations, this article is among the few studies that attempted to document and analyze violations of mobility restrictions in Asian developing cities.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Department of Architecture and Planning, Faculty of Engineering, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia, under P2M 2021 Grant.

Footnotes

This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0).

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