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. 2023 May 15:1–17. Online ahead of print. doi: 10.1007/s11191-023-00447-2

Exploring the Role of Multiplist Epistemic Beliefs on COVID-19 Conspiracies and Prevention Among Undergraduates

Danya Marie Serrano 1,✉, Travis Crone 1, Patrick S Williams 1
PMCID: PMC10184635  PMID: 37359260

Abstract

People who hold multiplicistic (multiplist) epistemic beliefs about science tend to believe that scientific knowledge is always subjective and that varying opinions on a scientific matter are equally valid. Research suggests that multiplist epistemic beliefs may be maladaptive and lead to a radically subjective view of science. Little is known about the association between such beliefs and mistrust in science/scientists and the tendency to believe in misinformation. The aims of this study were to examine: (a) the degree to which multiplist epistemic beliefs about science are associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and science-related conspiracy beliefs, (b) the degree to which trust in science mediates the association between multiplist epistemic beliefs about science and conspiracy beliefs, and (c) the extent to which COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and science-related conspiracy beliefs are associated with compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines. Participants were 210 undergraduate students attending a Hispanic-serving institution located in a large city in the southern U.S. Path analysis results indicated that multiplist epistemic beliefs about science were positively associated with science-related conspiracy beliefs after accounting for fundamentalism and conservatism. Moreover, trust in science mediated the positive association between multiplist epistemic beliefs about science and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. Finally, belief in COVID-19 conspiracies was negatively associated with COVID-19 prevention guideline compliance.

Keywords: Epistemic beliefs, COVID-19, Conspiracy beliefs

In our current sociopolitical environment, college students are bombarded with misinformation and “alternative facts” (Leeder, 2019). The recent magnitude of misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic and its politicization (Druckman et al., 2020; World Health Organization [WHO], 2020) intensifies the need to understand what makes people more susceptible to belief in misinformation, particularly young adults, who account for the largest number of COVID-19 cases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2022). During the COVID-19 pandemic, social media platforms such as Facebook contributed to the proliferation of anti-vaccine misinformation (Paul, 2021), leading many to believe in conspiracies such as that Bill Gates was responsible for spreading COVID-19 to expand his vaccination program (Agley & Xiao, 2021; Xiao et al., 2021). One of the dangers of belief in COVID-19 conspiracies is that individuals are less likely to take preventive measures to mitigate the spread of the virus (Freeman et al., 2020). This elevates the importance of identifying factors associated with believing misinformation and conspiracy theories.

The transmission of information to the public related to the COVID-19 pandemic involved complex, tentative, and evolving scientific knowledge. The manner in which individuals interpret this information and make judgments about scientific claims is filtered by their beliefs about the nature of scientific knowledge, that is, their epistemic beliefs about science (Scharrer et al., 2017). Thus, a person’s epistemic beliefs about science may play a role in their acceptance of conspiracy theories and misinformation. Epistemic beliefs about science exist on a continuum. Sophisticated epistemic beliefs (considered more adaptive) align with the epistemology of science and include the belief that scientific knowledge is both complex and evolving (Chevrier et al., 2019). On the opposite end of the continuum are absolutist epistemic beliefs, which consist of believing that scientific knowledge is certain and stable and that scientific knowledge comes from a source of authority.

Research on the sophistication of epistemic beliefs has focused on the maladaptive nature of absolutist beliefs. There has been little exploration of whether relativist views of scientific knowledge (e.g., multiplist epistemic beliefs) may also be problematic (Elby & Hammer, 2001; Peter et al., 2016). As an example of such research, during the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers discovered that people in Germany who held more tentative beliefs about scientific knowledge were less likely to trust experts and less likely to want scientists to heavily influence policies related to COVID-19 (Post et al., 2021). Thus, these researchers noted that holding more tentative/relativist views about scientific knowledge could be problematic during an extreme crisis (Post et al., 2021). Similarly, Cobern et al. (2022) conducted a study among teacher education undergraduate students in the U.S. and found that most reported scientific knowledge to be untrustworthy because it is tentative.

However, to our knowledge, researchers have yet to explore the effect of epistemic beliefs about science, particularly relativist beliefs, on the likelihood of believing in conspiracy theories related to COVID-19 and compliance with COVID-19 preventive measures. Therefore, in the current study we explored the degree to which the belief that scientific knowledge is tentative is associated with college students’ beliefs in conspiracies related to COVID-19, and the degree to which this association is explained by trust in scientific experts and science. In addition, we examined the extent to which acceptance of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs relates to college students’ compliance with preventive measures to reduce the spread of the virus.

Epistemic Beliefs

The degree to and the manner in which students engage in scientific reasoning is associated with their epistemic beliefs—beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing (e.g., Nussbaum et al., 2008). Theorists have proposed that epistemic beliefs may be classified in qualitatively different stages that vary in their level of sophistication (e.g., Kuhn 1991). In the first stage, typically labeled absolutism, a person perceives knowledge as certain, non-complex/non-evolving, and consisting of either right or wrong ideas. In the second stage, typically labeled multiplicism, people perceive different points of view as equally valid and interchangeable. Individuals who hold multiplist beliefs consider scientific knowledge to be radically subjective. Exposure to higher levels of education is thought to enable one to reach the final stage of epistemic sophistication, typically labeled evaluatism, where they begin to understand their active role in the acquisition of knowledge by evaluating and weighing the evidence between different points of view (Muis, 2007).

People progress through these stages as a result of experiences that are incongruent with their current conceptions of knowledge. Consistent with this notion, a person’s level of education is associated with the sophistication of their epistemic beliefs (King & Kitchener, 2002). Researchers have found that college students tend to display either multiplist or evaluatist levels of sophistication (King & Kitchener, 2002). Most researchers, however, have focused only on identifying individuals who hold absolutist beliefs. Few have taken a more nuanced approach which also distinguishes between multiplist and evaluatist beliefs (Schommer, 1990). For this reason, Peter et al. (2016) emphasized the importance of distinguishing between, and measuring, absolutist beliefs, multiplist beliefs, and evaluatist beliefs among college students.

Epistemic beliefs have also been conceptualized as multidimensional. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) proposed that absolutist epistemic beliefs have four dimensions (certainty of knowledge, complexity of knowledge, source of knowledge, and justification of knowing) and that one’s beliefs exist on a continuum within each dimension. Peter et al. (2016) created an instrument which assesses multiplist epistemic beliefs on these same four dimensions. The multiplist who scores high on certainty of knowledge believes that knowledge within a domain shifts regularly and is highly uncertain. Scoring high on complexity of knowledge represents believing that knowledge within a domain is so complex that different answers to questions are indistinguishable and equally valid. Scoring high on source of knowledge represents believing that one’s own thinking and personal experiences can determine the truthfulness of knowledge. Scoring high on justification of knowing represents believing that the methods of justifying knowledge are highly subjective and vary among scientists.

Though multiplist epistemic beliefs are considered more adaptive than absolutist epistemic beliefs (Kuhn, 1991), Peter et al., (2016) point out that holding multiplist epistemic beliefs about science may lead to thinking in radically subjective ways about scientific knowledge that are unsophisticated. Such views undermine the distinction between other intellectual endeavors and science as a process that relies on empirical evidence to reach objective truth (Romero-Matrana et al., 2019). Thus, it would not be surprising if such views also undermine trust in the scientific process and in scientific experts (see Bussmann & Kotter 2018). However, to our knowledge, the association between holding a tentative (multiplist) view of scientific knowledge and trust in science has not been empirically examined.

Multiplist Epistemic Beliefs and Trust in Science and Scientists

Trust in science and scientists (hereinafter, trust in science) may be conceptualized as beliefs, thoughts, and attitudes about the honesty, dependability, and credibility of domain-general scientific knowledge, the scientific process, and scientists (Nadelson et al., 2014). Nadelson et al. (2014) created a measure that assessed general misconceptions about the nature of science and level of mistrust for how science is communicated to the public. Some of the core reasons assessed for mistrusting science include the idea that scientists tend to withhold/falsify data or are influenced by confirmation bias.

The relation between multiplist epistemic beliefs and trust in science has not been directly explored, but previous research suggests that holding multiplist epistemic beliefs about science and viewing scientific knowledge as tentative may undermine a person’s trust in the scientific reasoning process (e.g., Cobern et al., 2022). For example, Nussbaum et al. (2008) examined the effects of science-specific epistemic beliefs on the quality of undergraduate students’ scientific arguments and found that multiplists were less likely to engage in scientific arguments compared to evaluatists. But when students who held multiplist epistemic beliefs did argue about a scientific phenomenon, they were more likely to be inconsistent in their reasoning and were less bothered by these inconsistencies compared to evaluatists (Nussbaum et al., 2008). Taken together, if college students who hold multiplist beliefs are less inclined to engage in scientific argumentation and reasoning and to expend effort to critically evaluate scientific ideas and develop sound scientific arguments, they are perhaps less likely to trust/value science and the scientific process. Therefore, we hypothesized that undergraduate students who hold multiplist epistemic beliefs about science would report less trust in science.

Trust in Science and Conspiracy Beliefs

Conspiracy theories are unjustified beliefs that events are premeditated and executed by clandestine and influential organizations with malicious intents (Alper et al., 2020). Why some people endorse conspiracy theories more than others is a burgeoning area of research with no overarching theoretical framework (Brotherton et al., 2018). Not surprisingly, recent research exploring correlates of conspiracy beliefs have focused on COVID-19 conspiracies (Agley & Xiao, 2021; Alper et al., 2020). Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 that have been examined include the beliefs that the rollout of 5G cellphone networks caused the spread of COVID-19; Bill Gates is responsible for spreading COVID-19 to expand his vaccination program; and COVID-19 was developed as a military weapon by the U.S., China, or some other country (Agley & Xiao, 2021). Researchers have found that trust in science is negatively associated with COVID-19 conspiracy theories as well as general conspiracy beliefs (Agley & Xiao, 2021; Plohl & Musil, 2020). For example, using latent profile analyses, Agley and Xiao (2021) found that trust in science was a strong indicator of whether individuals believed implausible or highly implausible explanations for the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic (Agley & Xiao, 2021). In this study, after accounting for religious and political affiliation, trust in science was the strongest factor that differentiated individuals based on the extent of belief in COVID-19 misinformation. These researchers further suggested that lack of trust in science may explain why those who are more religiously affiliated are more likely to believe in conspiracies and misinformation (Agley & Xiao, 2021).

Another recent study examined the association between trust in science and conspiracy ideation in general (e.g., malevolent global conspiracies, UFO cover-ups) aside from conspiracy beliefs specific to COVID-19. Plohl and Musil (2020) found a moderate negative association between trust in science and general conspiracy ideation. Moreover, consistent with Agley and Xiao (2021), general conspiracy ideation was positively associated with religious orthodoxy. In addition, political conservatism was positively associated with general conspiracy ideation.

In addition to the negative association between conspiracy beliefs (about COVID-19 and in general) and trust in science, previous research consistently indicates that political conservatism and religiosity are both significant positive correlates of conspiracy beliefs (about COVID-19 and in general) and negative correlates of trust in science (Agley & Xiao, 2021; Alper et al., 2020; Nadelson et al., 2014; Plohl & Musil, 2020). Therefore, the current study also investigated the role of conservatism and religiosity in predicting general and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. Given previous findings, we hypothesized that conservatism and fundamentalism would be negatively associated with trust in science and, in turn, trust in science would be negatively associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and general conspiracy beliefs about science.

Multiplist Epistemic Beliefs and Conspiracy Beliefs

Only one study identified to date has linked less sophisticated epistemic beliefs with a person’s willingness to endorse conspiracy theories. Garrett and Weeks (2017) examined three types of epistemic beliefs: (a) truth/facts are influenced by social and political processes, (b) truth/facts are based upon one’s intuition and emotions, and (c) truth/facts are determined by empirical evidence. Results indicated that people who relied more heavily on their intuition to judge factual claims are also more likely to endorse conspiracy theories, whereas those who rely on their reasoning skills to judge factual claims are less likely to believe in conspiracy theories. However, Garrett and Weeks (2017) did not conceptualize epistemic beliefs according to the multidimensional framework traditionally used in educational psychology research, which classifies epistemic beliefs as absolutist, multiplist, or evaluatist (e.g., Hofer & Pintrich 1997). In addition, conspiracy beliefs assessed by Garrett and Weeks (2017) were not specific to scientific phenomena or COVID-19. Therefore, we extended this work by examining the degree to which a direct link exists between multiplist epistemic beliefs about science and belief in science-related conspiracies and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. We hypothesized that multiplist epistemic beliefs about science would be associated with both science-related conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy beliefs related to COVID-19.

Trust in Science, COVID-19 Conspiracies, and Prevention

Plohl and Musil (2020) examined correlates of compliance with 11 COVID-19 preventive behaviors outlined by the CDC and the WHO, such as practicing social distancing by avoiding crowds in confined and poorly ventilated spaces. They found that compliance was negatively associated with political conservatism, religious orthodoxy, and general conspiracy ideation, but these associations were better explained by one’s level of trust in science. In other words, those who were more politically conservative and held more religiously orthodox beliefs and higher levels of general conspiracy ideation were less likely to trust science and, in turn, were less likely to take appropriate measures to prevent acquiring and/or spreading COVID-19. A study conducted in Turkey, however, did not find conservatism, religiosity, or beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracies to be directly associated with COVID-19 preventive measures (Alper et al., 2020). Thus, we hypothesized that trust in science would better explain the associations between political and religious orientations with conspiracy beliefs on the one hand and COVID-19 preventive measures on the other. We also hypothesized a direct negative association between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and compliance with COVID-19 preventive measures.

Current Study

Given that trust in science has a significant role in the degree to which people endorse COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and engage in preventive practices to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 (Agley & Xiao, 2021; Plohl & Musil, 2020), one’s epistemic beliefs about science may also play a role. Thus, we investigated the degree to which multiplist epistemic beliefs about science are associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and general science conspiracies (while accounting for religious fundamentalism and political conservatism). We also examined the degree to which conspiracy beliefs are associated with compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (see Fig. 1A). Finally, we examined the extent to which trust in science mediates the association between multiplist epistemic beliefs about science and COVID-19 and general science conspiracy beliefs on the one hand and compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines on the other, while accounting for religious fundamentalism and political conservatism (see Fig. 1B).

Fig. 1.

Fig. 1

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 A conceptual framework for examining the influence of the anti-science ideologies and multiplicistic epistemic beliefs on conspiracy beliefs directly (A) and indirectly (B) through trust in science and science

Method

Participants

Participants were 210 undergraduate college students (mean age = 23, 78% female) enrolled in psychology courses at a Hispanic-serving institution in the southern U.S. The institution resides in one of the U.S.’s most culturally diverse metropolitan areas. Racial/ethnic make-up was 13.6% African American/Black, 6.6% Asian, 62.1% Hispanic/Latinx, 15.7% Caucasian/White, and 2% other. Students were 24% freshman, 21% sophomore, 30% junior, 24% senior, and 0.5% post-baccalaureate. A majority of the students (73%) had taken at least two or more science courses in college.

At the time that data were collected, students were solely attending classes virtually for safety reasons as vaccines were not yet available to the U.S. public. Moreover, a large proportion of the student body at the institution belonged to racial/ethnic groups (e.g., Black and Hispanic) at higher risk for COVID-19 infection and death compared to their White counterparts and less likely to receive a vaccine during the initial vaccine rollout phase compared to their White counterparts (Hill et al., 2023).

Procedure

Students were recruited through the university’s online research participation system. Extra credit or credit toward a research requirement were awarded in exchange for participation in the study. Consenting students individually accessed an online survey on Qualtrics. The survey consisted of two sections: (1) demographics and (2) Likert-scaled items adapted from scales with adequate reliability and validity. Measures for this study included the epistemic sophistication multiplicistic scale (Peter et al., 2016), COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (Agley & Xiao, 2021), compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (Plohl & Musil, 2020), the Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004), political conservatism (Plohl & Musil, 2020), and the Trust in Science and Scientists Inventory (Nadelson et al., 2014). See Table 1 for sample items for all measures and for Cronbach’s alphas in the present sample.

Table 1.

Pearson product moment correlation among main variables

Variables α M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Conservatism 0.81 2.61 0.88 ---
2. Fundamentalism 0.92 2.68 0.91 0.36*** ---
3. Multiplicistic E.B.^ 0.71 3.25 0.48 0.13 0.12 ---
4. Trust in Science 0.88 3.55 0.54 − 0.43*** − 0.52*** − 0.27*** ---
5. COVID-19 Conspiracy 0.75 2.28 0.79 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.16* − 0.59*** ---
6. Science Conspiracy 0.85 2.97 0.82 0.18** 0.26*** 0.26*** − 0.52*** 0.63*** ---
7. COVID-19 Compliance 0.85 4.21 0.62 − 0.31*** − 0.18** − 0.03 0.24*** − 0.31*** − 0.06
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N = 210. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ^E.B. = Epistemic Beliefs

It is important to note that the current data were collected as the vaccine was being made available to the U.S. public at large. Therefore, information about having received the vaccine was not collected nor data related to conspiracy beliefs about the vaccine.

Measures

Multiplicistic Epistemic Beliefs

We used the multiplicistic scale that was developed by Peter et al. (2016) to assess the degree to which students believe that knowledge comes from one’s own thinking and experiences, justifications for scientific ideas are highly subjective, the validity of scientific knowledge is highly uncertain and can change at any time, and different scientific ideas weigh equally and one is no better than another. Multiplist epistemic beliefs, like absolutist epistemic beliefs, are considered less adaptive than evaluatist epistemic beliefs. The multiplicistic epistemic belief scale has been deemed valid and reliable (Peter et al., 2016). Higher scores on this scale indicated greater endorsement of multiplist epistemic beliefs. The scale anchors were 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

COVID-19 Conspiracy Beliefs

The COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs scale was adapted from Agley and Xiao’s (2021) study that assessed five specific conspiracy beliefs related to COVID-19 which were spread online early in the pandemic. Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 assessed by this scale included that the rollout of 5G cellphone networks caused the spread of COVID-19; Bill Gates was responsible for spreading COVID-19 to expand his vaccination program; and COVID-19 was developed as a military weapon by the U.S., China, or some other country. Responses for this scale ranged from 1 (definitely not true) to 5 (definitely true).

General Science Conspiracy Beliefs

Items from The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (Brotherton et al., 2013) were used to assess general conspiracy beliefs related to science. While this instrument has been used to assess general conspiracy beliefs more broadly, the current study focused on the eight items assessing scientifically-related conspiracies such as the belief that there is a concerted effort to suppress evidence of the existence of aliens, and the belief that some organizations are purposefully spreading viruses and diseases. Responses for this scale ranged from 1 (definitely not true) to 5 (definitely true).

Compliance with COVID-19 Prevention Guidelines (Plohl & Musil, 2020)

The COVID-19 prevention guidelines scale consists of 13 items assessing specific prevention guidelines from either the CDC or the WHO. Prevention measures included wearing a mask in public spaces, staying home when feeling sick, and frequently washing one’s hands with soap and water for at least 20 seconds. Responses for this scale ranged from 1 (never) to 5 (always).

Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004)

We adopted 12 items from the Revised Religious Fundamentalism scale, which assesses the belief that there exists only one canon of true religious teachings. Responses for this scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale has been found to have good construct validity (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004).

Political Conservatism (Plohl & Musil, 2020)

Political conservatism was measured by two items on which students indicated the degree to which they considered themselves to be very liberal (1) or very conservative (5) on social issues and on economic issues (Plohl & Musil, 2020; Talhelm et al., 2015).

Trust in Science & Scientists Inventory (Nadelson, 2014)

The Trust in Science & Scientists Inventory is a 21-item scale assessing a domain-general level of trust in science (Nadelson, 2014). This scale has been deemed both valid and reliable (Nadelson, 2014). Responses for this scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Results

Descriptive statistics and bivariate Pearson correlations among our main variables are presented in Table 1. Results from the correlation analyses indicated that holding greater multiplist epistemic beliefs was negatively associated with trust in science (r = − .27, p < .001), and positively associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (r = .16, p < .05) as well as science-related conspiracy beliefs (r = .26, p < .01). Multiplist epistemic beliefs, however, were not associated with greater compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines.

Having high levels of trust in science was negatively and moderately associated with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (r = − .59, p < .001) and science-related conspiracy beliefs (r = − .52, p < .001) and positively associated with greater compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (r = .24, p < .001). As expected, greater endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs was negatively associated with greater compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (r = − .31, p < .001). Greater endorsement of science-related conspiracy beliefs, however, was not significantly associated with greater endorsement of COVID − 19 prevention guidelines. Overall, the significant associations among multiplist epistemic beliefs about science, trust in science, the two forms of conspiracy beliefs, and compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines provided preliminary justification for testing the mediation paths in the conceptual models (Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Path Analyses

Path analysis models were estimated to examine the direct effects of multiplist epistemic beliefs on endorsement of conspiracy beliefs as well as the indirect effects of multiplist epistemic beliefs on conspiracy beliefs through trust in science. Moreover, we tested the direct effects of trust in science on compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines and the indirect effects of trust in science on compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines through the two forms of conspiracy beliefs. Separate models were tested for each level of conspiracy belief because endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and science-related conspiracy beliefs are highly correlated (r = .63) yet differ in their levels of contextual specificity. For both models, all possible paths were initially included given that all were justifiable based on prior research. Once these just-identified models were estimated, model trimming was performed to reach the most parsimonious model (Kline, 2011). Analyses were conducted using the AMOS (version 27.0) software package. Both path models were estimated using the maximum-likelihood estimation method (Kline, 2011).

To evaluate the proposed models, several model fit indices were used, including absolute fit indices such as the chi-square statistic and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger 1990). Statistically significant model chi-square values and RMSEA values less than 0.05 indicate a good fit. RMSEA 90% confidence interval criteria were also evaluated. In addition, two relative fit indices, the Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler 1990) and the Normed Fit Index (NFI; Bentler & Bonett 1980), were evaluated. CFI and NFI values above 0.95 indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).

The statistical significance of mediation effects was tested via a bootstrap procedure. We used the AMOS software to create 2,000 bootstrap samples from the proposed models. The bootstrap samples were run with the bias-corrected percentile method to estimate the path coefficients; a suggested method for testing mediation effects (Cheung & Lau, 2008).

Path Analysis: COVID-19 Conspiracy Beliefs

The original path analytic model including COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs represented a just-identified model where multiplist epistemic beliefs (along with conservatism and fundamentalism) were posited to have both direct effects and indirect effects through trust in science on COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. In addition, the direct effects of multiplist epistemic beliefs (along with conservatism and fundamentalism) and trust in science on COVID-19 prevention guidelines and their indirect effects through COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs were also tested. A significant negative path coefficient emerged between multiplist epistemic beliefs to trust in science (β = − 0.20). In addition, significant negative path coefficients between conservatism and trust in science (β = − 0.26), fundamentalism and trust in science (β = − 0.40), and trust in science and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (β = − 0.51) were found. Significant direct effects were also found between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (β = − 0.22), and conservatism with compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (β = − 0.22).

Results from the bootstrap method indicated that the indirect effect of multiplist epistemic beliefs on COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs via trust in science (standardized indirect effect = 0.10, SE = 0.034, p = .001) was statistically significant. The indirect effect of trust in science on compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines via COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (standardized indirect effect = 0.11, SE = 0.04, p = .004) was also statistically significant. The proposed model explained 37% of the total variance in COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and 14% of the variance in compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines. To create the trimmed model, the non-significant path coefficients were constrained to zero.

The fit indices for the trimmed model including COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (Fig. 2) indicated a good model fit, χ2(6, N = 210) = 5.951, p = .429, CFI = 1.00, NFI = 0.977, RMSEA = 0.000 (Lower C.I.=0.000; Upper C.I.=0.089). There were significant negative path coefficients between multiplist epistemic beliefs to trust in science (β = − 0.20), conservatism to trust in science (β = − 0.26), fundamentalism to trust in science (β = − 0.40), and between trust in science and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (β = − 0.59). We also found significant negative path coefficients between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs to compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (β = − 0.23), and between conservativism to compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (β = − 0.23).

Fig. 2.

Fig. 2

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Trimmed path model of anti-science ideologies, multiplicistic epistemic beliefs, COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, and compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (standardized coefficients displayed). *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Results from the bootstrap analysis indicated that the indirect effect of multiplist epistemic beliefs on COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs via trust in science (standardized indirect effect = 0.12, SE = 0.036, p = .001) was statistically significant. The indirect effect of trust in science on compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines via COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (indirect effect = 0.13, SE = 0.038, p = .001) was also statistically significant. The trimmed model explained 35% of the total variance in COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and 13% of the variance in compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines.

Path Analysis: General Science Conspiracy Beliefs

The original just-identified path analytic model including general conspiracy beliefs related to scientific phenomena represented a partially mediated model where multiplist epistemic beliefs were posited to have both direct effects and indirect effects through trust in science on general science conspiracy beliefs. In addition, the direct effects of multiplist epistemic beliefs (along with conservatism and fundamentalism) and trust in science on COVID-19 prevention guidelines and their indirect effects through general science conspiracy beliefs were also tested. A significant negative path coefficient emerged between multiplist epistemic beliefs to trust in science (β = − 0.20). In addition, significant negative path coefficients between conservatism and trust in science (β = − 0.26), fundamentalism and trust in science (β = − 0.40), and trust in science and general science conspiracy beliefs (β = − 0.51) were found. Significant direct effects were also found between multiplist epistemic beliefs and general science conspiracy beliefs (β = 0.12), and conservatism and compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (β = − 0.24). No other significant direct effects were found among the other variables tested in the model to COVID-19 prevention guidelines.

Results from the use of the bootstrap method indicated that the indirect effect of multiplist epistemic beliefs on general science conspiracy beliefs via trust in science (standardized indirect effect = 0.10, SE = 0.034, p = .001) was statistically significant. The indirect effect of trust in science on compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines via general science conspiracy beliefs was not statistically significant. The proposed model explained 29% of the total variance in general science conspiracy beliefs and 12% of the variance in compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines. To create the trimmed model, the non-significant path coefficients were constrained to zero.

The fit indices for the trimmed model including general science conspiracy beliefs (Fig. 3) indicated a good model fit, χ2(6, N = 210) = 5.382, p = .496, CFI = 1.00, NFI = 0.976, RMSEA = 0.000 (Lower C.I.=0.000; Upper C.I.=0.085). Significant negative path coefficients were found between multiplist epistemic beliefs to trust in science (β = − 0.20), conservatism to trust in science (β = − 0.26), fundamentalism to trust in science (β = − 0.40), and between trust in science to general science conspiracy beliefs (β = − 0.49). In addition, significant negative path coefficients between conservatism to compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (β = − 0.31) and a positive path coefficient between multiplist epistemic beliefs to general science conspiracy beliefs (β = 0.12) were found.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 3

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Trimmed path model of anti-science ideologies, multiplicistic epistemic beliefs, general science conspiracy beliefs, and compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines (standardized coefficients displayed). *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Results from the bootstrap analysis indicated that the indirect effect of multiplist epistemic beliefs on general science conspiracy beliefs via trust in science (standardized indirect effect = 0.10, SE = 0.030, p = .001) was statistically significant. Again, the indirect effect of trust in science on compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines via general science conspiracy beliefs was not statistically significant. The trimmed model explained 29% of the total variance in general science conspiracy beliefs and 10% of the variance in compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines.

Discussion

The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare the dangers of belief in misinformation and conspiracies perhaps like never before, as researchers have found that those believing in COVID-19 conspiracies are less likely to take preventive measures to mitigate the spread of the virus and more likely to endorse alternative remedies for the virus (Bertin et al., 2020; see Douglas 2021; Freeman et al., 2020). The current study provides further evidence that those who believed in COVID-19 conspiracies were less likely to comply with COVID-19 preventive measures. We have known less, however, about how a person’s thoughts about scientific knowledge contribute to their belief in conspiracy theories in the first place. The current study contributes to our understanding of the processes that may influence undergraduate college students, and perhaps the public more broadly, to believe in conspiracies related to scientific phenomena and conspiracies related to the COVID-19 pandemic by examining the role that multiplist epistemic beliefs about science have on belief in conspiracies and, in turn, on compliance with prevention guidelines.

Our findings supported our first hypothesis. Path analysis results indicated that undergraduate students who held higher levels of multiplist epistemic beliefs about science or more tentative views about science were also more likely to report having less trust in science. This is consistent with Nussbaum et al. (2008) who suggested that undergraduate students holding multiplist epistemic beliefs (compared to those holding evaluatist epistemic beliefs) were less likely to make the effort to evaluate scientific ideas or arguments. The COVID-19 pandemic was a situation in which scientific knowledge was evolving and changing in real time (Garrett, 2020). Knowledge about the effectiveness of preventive measures, such as mask wearing, changed throughout the pandemic (Fazio, 2021), creating a situation in which lay people may have questioned the truthfulness of the scientific community’s recommendations.

It is not surprising then that individuals with less sophisticated epistemic beliefs (e.g., those that do not evaluate or weigh the existing evidence) would have difficulty interpreting the change in preventive measure recommendations by the CDC as a change in the existing scientific knowledge that is based upon new empirical data becoming available—a crucial part of the scientific process. Instead, people with radically subjective ways of viewing scientific knowledge (multiplist epistemic beliefs) may have viewed the change as justification for dismissing the scientific process and questioning the competence of scientists.

Our results also support our second hypothesis and add to the mounting evidence that those who are more conservative in their political leanings and who hold more fundamentalist religious beliefs are less likely to trust science (Agley & Xiao, 2021; Alper et al., 2020; Nadelson et al., 2014; Plohl & Musil, 2020). This association between conservatism and distrust of science may also be understood within the context of COVID-19. For example, researchers found that supporters of President Trump (who tended to be politically conservative) were more likely to believe early in the pandemic that the COVID-19 threat was exaggerated by scientists (Uscinski et al., 2020). Moreover, in both of our models, conservatism was found to be directly and negatively associated with compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines. This finding is consistent with, and speaks to, the extremely polarized political climate in the U.S. at the onset of the pandemic as seen in the divergent views between conservatives and liberals related to their trust in scientific experts, the level of danger that COVID-19 presented, and the value placed upon complying with preventive measures recommended by the CDC and the WHO (Evans & Hargittai, 2020; Uscinski et al., 2020; see Weisel, 2021).

Our results also support our hypothesis that trust in science is negatively related to both COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and general science conspiracy beliefs. Again, this is consistent with previous research suggesting that individuals who have a tendency to reject information from experts are more likely to engage in conspiratorial thinking (Uscinski et al., 2020). Our study, however, extends previous findings by examining the association between trust in science and conspiracy beliefs by specifically looking at the relation between trust in science and conspiracy beliefs related to scientific phenomena. Moreover, we examined this association among college students—a population accounting for the most COVID-19 cases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2022) and that typically has not been the focus of previous research related to COVID-19 conspiracy theories (e.g., Plohl & Musil 2020).

Our third hypothesis pertaining to the association between multiplist epistemic beliefs about science being directly associated with both science-related conspiracy beliefs and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs was only partially supported. Multiplist epistemic beliefs were only significantly and positively associated with conspiracy beliefs related to scientific phenomena but not to conspiracy beliefs related to COVID-19 specifically. The link between multiplist epistemic beliefs about science and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs was better explained through trust in science. Perhaps the lack of a significant direct association between multiplist epistemic beliefs and COVID-19 conspiracies is explained by the fact that so much of the public messaging about COVID-19 at the onset and throughout the pandemic was very closely tied to the outright rejection of scientific expertise and scientific authority figures (Evans & Hargittai, 2020; Uscinski et al., 2020). This may account for why less variation in COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs was explained by a person’s epistemic beliefs.

Current findings support our fourth hypothesis as trust in science significantly mediated the association between political conservatism and religious fundamentalism with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. In other words, college students who were more politically conservative and more religiously fundamentalist were less likely to trust science, and in turn, more likely to believe in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. These findings are consistent with prior research conducted among U.S. adults indicating that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Republicans (compared to Democrats) were less likely to believe that scientists had the knowledge to understand the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, this research showed that both Catholics and conservative Protestants (compared to non-believers) were also less likely to believe that scientists understood the COVID-19 pandemic (Evans & Hargittai, 2020). Our findings extend this line of research by also indicating that holding multiplist epistemic beliefs about science is another antecedent of the degree to which people trust science and scientists.

Finally, and also aligned with prior research (Freeman et al., 2020), we found that college students who report believing in COVID-19 conspiracies to a greater degree also tend to be less likely to take measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The reduced likelihood of taking preventive measures is particularly concerning. As previously mentioned, the college-aged group (18–29 years old) shows the highest total of COVID-19 cases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2022). Any reduction in preventive measures could lead to an even larger case count. Although the risk of hospitalization and death is lower in this age group, this group has the potential to greatly increase the spread of the illness by continuing to have community contact when they show no symptoms or mild symptoms. This increased contact could have a cascading effect seen in more vulnerable populations.

Limitations and Future Directions

Despite the contributions of the current study, we would be remiss not to mention some of its limitations. First, causal and directional claims related to our main variables cannot be inferred given the cross-sectional nature of the data. Though each of the relationships is supported in the existing literature, firm claims cannot be made. Future longitudinal studies are needed to understand the directionality of these relationships. Preferably, attitudes related to science would be monitored prior to a public health event so that changes in beliefs related to science over time can be tracked with changes in current scientific understanding and advancing in medical science during the public health event. A second limitation of the current study concerns when attitudes were assessed. The current data were collected at the onset of the initial vaccine rollout. Particularly, the data were collected as the vaccine was being made available to the public at large and information about having received the vaccine was not collected. The vaccine, its development, and timescale were frequently mentioned and often reported about during this time. Whether to receive the vaccine or not was a topic of frequent debate at this time.

It is possible that more general attitudes about science could have been directly influenced by this particular issue. Future research should collect information about vaccination status to examine the degree to which epistemic beliefs about science played a role in people’s decision to get vaccinated. A third limitation of the current study is that data were collected only in the U.S. Across the world there were quite significant variations in official policies and practices, not to mention cultural differences, that limit the generalizability of our conclusions. Some of the areas of policy differences included the timing and enforcement of mask mandates, lockdowns, testing and contact tracing, and vaccine distribution.

Conclusion

Given the proliferation of misinformation and alternative facts that college students encounter regularly, the current study contributes to our understanding of the processes that may influence college students, and perhaps the general public, more broadly in believing in conspiracies in general and conspiracies about the COVID-19 pandemic more specifically. Given that current findings indicate that college students who hold multiplist epistemic beliefs about science are also more likely to believe in conspiracies, this highlights the need for higher education to focus on cultivating evaluatist epistemic beliefs about science among undergraduates. Our findings also suggest that holding a radically subjective view of science may potentially lead to a distrust of science and scientists. Although this does not indicate that we advocate for blindly trusting scientists, we do believe, however, that compared to other means used for the discovery and verification of new knowledge (i.e., intuition, prior experience, blind trust in authority), the scientific process is the most effective means.

Therefore, it becomes critical for science education to provide students with frameworks to evaluate the veracity of the information presented by experts and to present the scientific process as science in action whereby educators are transparent about the controversies and uncertainties that emerge in science theory building (see Lima & Nascimento 2022). In other words, and consistent with Cobern et al.’s (2022) point, it would be judicious for science educators to discuss with students that just because scientific knowledge may be subject to revision based on new/emerging evidence, this does not inherently make it untrustworthy or undermine its value for advancing scientific knowledge.

In closing, the ability to critically evaluate and assess information will be a crucial skill as we move forward. The targeted use of misinformation seems to be on the rise (e.g., interference in the 2016 U.S. election; the validity of the 2020 U.S. election), and we will need individuals willing to critically explore and accept scientific findings as we begin to tackle global crises such as climate change and future public health events. Moreover, as recently pointed out by other researchers (Lima & Nascimento, 2022), traditional science education may need to expand to not only include the skills to critically evaluate the quality of scientific information, but should also be guided by the psychology of persuasion to communicate scientific truths convincingly to the general public.

Acknowledgements

This study was supported by an Organized Research and Creative Activities (ORCA) grant from the University of Houston-Downtown.

Data Availability

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Declarations

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Footnotes

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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Associated Data

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Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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