A systematic reviews and meta-analyses of interruption of the statute of limitations for civil claims: A comparative study of Arab legislations

Abstract

Background

This study deals with interruption of statutory time limits for civil claims. It is based on the assumption that the reason for granting an interruption of the statutory time limit is the manifestation of an intention to claim one's right, instead of keeping silent about it.

Methods

The analytical-comparative method is used to analyse and compare the provisions on the interruption of prescription. This study also includes a review of the literature related to the phenomenon being investigated. Therefore, The selection of data complies with the Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). The research design includes an analysis of different legislations and a review of the most significant previous studies which afford a useful guide for discerning between straightforward cases (like the filing of a lawsuit or the initiation of an executive procedure by the creditor) and more difficult ones (like the initiation of merely precautionary proceedings, or the lodging of a lawsuit that is turned down for reasons of lack of jurisdiction or of outright inadmissibility).

Results

Interruption, unlike suspension, entails the start of a fresh statutory time limit. Moreover, pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction does not prevent the lawsuit from coming into being, since it is a rejection of the lawsuit on merely formal grounds, and it does not affect the basis of the claim.

Conclusions

The selected jurisdictions agree that claims that are merely precautionary, but that do not involve realization of the substantive entitlement, do not necessarily entail an interruptive effect.

1. Introduction

The statute of limitations (also known as “prescription”)is one of the most important legal institutes in contract and commercial law. It establishes a legal term within which a rights holder (typically, a creditor) is required to file a claim against the other party, on penalty of unenforceability of any claims filed after the expiry of the term. The focus is specifically made on the ideas of interruption. “Interruption” refers to all those instances when the statutory time limit is reset from scratch. It therefore implies that the rights holder can be allowed to file a claim beyond the duration of the original limitation period (strictly considered in chronological terms). Therefore, the main purpose behind this study is to examine interruption of statutory time limits for civil claims (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1.

PRISMA Flowchart presenting search results.

1.1. Significance of the research

1.1.1. Subjective significance

The present research gains its subjective significance from the significance of its topic. That is, the interruption of statutory time limits for civil claims is a modern subject that has not been fully investigated. Moreover, this topic has not been comparatively studied in the context of Jordan and Egypt. This is the first study to investigate the phenomenon in the context of Jordan and Egypt.

1.1.2. Objective significance

The objective significance of this research is represented in the importance of its findings. That is, its findings provide a clear image of interruption of statutory time limits for civil claims in the selected jurisdictions. Moreover, the findings increase the awareness of the importance of interruption of statutory time limits for civil claims as it entails the start of a fresh statutory time limit. Much importantly, other researchers interested in this field will also be enlightened by the findings of this research.

2. Methodology of the research

This is a qualitative study with ananalytical-comparative and descriptive design. The review analysis method is adopted. Moreover, it is ‘analytical’ since it begins with a textual analysis of the wording of different legislations. This is associated with close reading of relevant provisions that helps flesh out the import of different causes of interruption, contemplate limit cases, and offer commentary to address any gaps. Moreover, direct textual analysis is complemented by references to doctrinal opinions and applicable case law.

In addition, the method is described as ‘comparative’ because it compares between the provisions on the interruption of prescription in the Ottoman Mecelle (a codification of Islamic jurisprudence originally valid throughout the Ottoman Empire and—after the onset of national codifications—one that remains specifically applicable in Palestine) [1], the Civil Code promulgated by Law No. 131 of 1948 of Egypt (hereinafter Egyptian Civil Code) and the Civil Code promulgated by Law No. 43 of 1976 of Jordan (hereinafter Jordanian Civil Code), with occasional references to other Arab legislations.

2.1. Design

The analytical-comparative and descriptive design frames the whole study. It begins with outlining the concept of, and rationale for, interruption of the statutory time limit in the introduction. The same section states the objective of the research. It also includes a sub-section that establishes the significance, motivation, and novelty of the undertaken study. This section is followed with a literature review of the different reasons for interruption, both those resting with the creditor's initiative and those affected by the debtor's conduct. Analysis and comparison the selected provisions are then presented in a special section. The next section discusses the findings, while the conclusion provides a synoptic presentation of the main findings.

2.2. Limitation of the article

This study deals with interruption of statutory time limits for civil claims. It investigates the concept of interruption, causes of interruption, reasons for interruption related to the creditor, lawsuit to assert a right, initiation of other kinds of proceedings, reasons for interruption related to the debtor, the effect of interruption, final judgement on a debt, and acknowledgement of a debt. These points are investigated by referring to relevant codes in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, Murshid Al-Hayran (Hanafi), and Mecelle (Palestine).

2.3. Data selection

The selection of data complies with the Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). The Social Science Database, Scopus, JSTOR, SAGE, Google Scholar, ResearchGate, PsycINFO, and Web of Science research databases were searched in March 2023. The following PRISMA flowchart provides an insight into the process of data selection adopted in this article.

3. Literature review

It is worth noting that Arab jurisdictions mix elements drawn from the civil law tradition (through the intermediation of the Egyptian codification, influenced by the French Civil Code) [2], with an older “formant” [3]. This older formant is the jurisprudence of the “classical” schools (Maliki, Hanbali, Shafii, and Hanafi) of Islamic jurist-theologians, who were active between the seventh and the ninth century (AD) in the development of complex bodies of legal principles and norms rooted in the basic sources of Islamic law—including the Quran and the sayings (hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). This “mixed” makeup translates in a style of legal reasoning that is able to refer equally to classical works of Islamic jurisprudence and to the doctrine and jurisprudence of other civil law countries, particularly France [4].

4. Results analysis

4.1. The concept of interruption

It is useful to begin our analysis from certain common definitions of “interruption” that are current in Arab doctrine. Egyptian scholar, Anwar Sultan, offers the following one:

“[Interruption consists in the] erasure of time elapsed under the statutory period of limitation, as a result of an action taken by the creditor or debtor, and such that a fresh prescription period begins from the cessation of the cause of the interruption" [5].

Abdul Qadir al Far, a Jordanian scholar, further defines interruption as:

“ … cancellation of the elapsed period of prescription, due to an action taken by the creditor or as a result of an acknowledgement issued by the debtor. As a consequence, a fresh prescription period shall start from scratch at such time when the cause of interruption will have passed." [6].

Both of these definitions—in a manner not dissimilar to what has been observed with respect to suspension—lack something, because they privilege identification of the effects of interruption, over an enumeration of its causes.

Reversing this order of presentation would entail defining interruption as an act performed by the creditor or debtor, especially when the statutory limitation period is underway, such that it erases time elapsed prior to the said act and starts a fresh prescription term (as soon as the cause of interruption has ceased). This approach has the benefit of foregrounding the causes of interruption—to be found in conduct undertaken by the creditor or debtor—over the description of effects. The foregoing definition shows how interruption of the statutory time limit implies the occurrence of an event, to which the law attaches relevance for the purpose of stopping the prescription period and of making any time elapsed (up to the point of the event's occurrence) ineffective towards the right's prescription. Instead, a new time limit simply starts from scratch after the cessation of the interrupting event.

These considerations necessitate restating the difference between suspension and interruption. When suspension operates, the bygone period before the cause of suspension is not erased, but remains suspended and eventually gets added to the period following the cessation of the suspensive event. Interruption, instead, implies that any time already elapsed on an active statutory time limit is forever removed, so that after the cessation of the reason for interruption a fresh time limit takes effect, starting from scratch. Another difference is represented in the reasons justifying suspension and interruption, respectively. In the case of suspension, the trigger is typically a situation that prevents a (non-negligent) rights holder from claiming his/her due. Contrastingly, interruption is engendered by legal reasons that can pertain equally to the creditor or to the debtor [7].

The Court of Appeals in Ramallah explicitly upheld this basis for distinguishing between suspension and interruption, in a passage worth quoting at length:

“On the subject of statutory time limits, articles 1660, 1663 and 1666 of the [Mecelle] carve a distinction between two cases: the first is the interruption of prescription, while the second relates to its suspension. The basis of interruption is to be found in legal acts undertaken by a person against whom [interruption of] the statute of limitations would apply—like an acknowledgement [of liability]—or by a person who is set to benefit from [interruption of] the statute of limitations—like [the initiation of] a judicial claim—as stipulated in articles 1666 and 1664. In the case of interruption, the lawgiver has opted to eliminate any effects ensuing from the elapsed period, so that a new time limit shall commence. In such a case, the new period would not include time elapsed prior to the interruption, since the latter is permanently excluded from calculation of the effective prescription time. On the contrary, suspension of statutory time limits is a privilege granted by law to certain persons who are unable to file a court claim because of a legal excuse such as minority, madness, infirmity, absence from domicile and force majeure, as evidenced by the provisions of article 1663of the [Mecelle]. As a consequence, in case of suspension, the law pauses the passage of time towards prescription, which becomes effective again after the cessation of the cause of suspension. In this case, the total prescription period shall be calculated by adding any time elapsed prior to the cause of suspension to the period following it”.1

4.2. Causes of interruption

As we have just seen, interruption requires performance of a legal act, by the rights holder or by the other party, to which the law attaches special relevance. A cause of interruption operates de jure, in the sense that it does not require additional steps (like a judicial declaration to perfect it. Therefore, although a cause of interruption will still need to be proven in the manner prescribed by law, its effectiveness depends purely upon fulfilment of the legal precept that singles out a particular act—by the creditor or by the debtor—as productive of an interruption of prescription [8,9]. This does not eliminate the requirement for the creditor to have to raise, before the court, the existence of a reason for interruption of prescription [10,11], noting that this position has also been affirmed by Cass (Egypt), 7 June 1977, no. 350, and reported by Shaalah, 1996 [11]where the court has to examine the legal conditions relating to prescription, including suspension and interruption, only after the creditor has raised the matter first”.

Thus, in contrast to suspension, interruption can be triggered by conduct undertaken by the creditor, but also by the debtor. The sub-sections that follow tackle each group of causes separately.

4.3. Reasons for interruption related to the creditor

Article 1666 of the Mecelle stipulates that it is only a claim filed in court that interrupts the statutory time limit, whilst excluding any extra-judicial requests made by the creditor to the debtor:

“If any person brings an action in court against any other person in respect to some particular matter … without the case being finally decided, and in this way fifteen years pass by, the hearing of the action is not barred. But any claim made out of court does not cause the period of limitation to cease to run. Consequently, if any person makes a claim in respect to any particular matter elsewhere than in court, and in this way the period of limitation elapses, the hearing of an action by the plaintiff is barred".

Art. 460 of the Jordanian Civil Code takes a similar stance: “The statutory time limit shall be interrupted by a judicial claim or by any judicial action taken by the creditor to assert his right”. The Egyptian Civil Code, in Art. 383, contains perhaps the most detailed description of what should be deemed to be a “judicial claim” by the rights holder:

“Prescription is interrupted by legal proceedings, even if instituted in a court without jurisdiction, by a notification or by a seizure of assets, by the creditor’s application for the admission of his claim in a bankruptcy or in a distribution, or by any act of a creditor to claim his right in the course of legal proceedings” [2].

These articles of law, summarized in Table 1 above, suggest that the rationale for interruption—when it depends on the rights holder's conduct—lies in his/her intention actively to claim his/her due (rather than to remain passive), as manifested by the initiation of judicial proceedings, which may involve filing a claim or other forms of court-mediated intervention.

Table 1.

List of codes in different Arab countries that are compatible with both Egyptian and Jordanian ones.

Country	Local Civil Code No.	Year	Article No.
Egypt	131	1948	383
Jordan	43	1976	460
Syria	84	1949	30
Libya	–	1953	370
Iraq	40	1951	337
Lebanon	–	1932	357
Kuwait	67	1980	448
Murshid Al-Hayran(Hanafi) [12]		1890	260
Mecelle (Palestine)	–	–	1666

The Mecelles stipulates that a judicial claim will have an interruptive effect, which in principle includes any action before a court to assert the creditor's rights. Similarly, the Jordanian code speaks of “judicial claim” but appends to that the general clause “any other judicial action taken by the creditor to assert his right”. Here, too, any kind of legal action that might be considered a type of judicial proceedings shall interrupt the statutory time limit. In contrast to the Mecelle and the Jordanian Civil Code, the Egyptian Code provides specific examples of legal procedures that would interrupt prescription. These may include a notification, an asset seizure, an application for admission of the rights holder's claim to bankruptcy proceedings or to a distribution and, finally, “any act of a creditor to claim his right in the course of legal proceedings”. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Egyptian Court of Cassation deemed the list contained in Article 383 of the Egyptian Civil Code to be exhaustive: “the reasons for interrupting the statutory time limit are listed exclusively in Articles 383 and 384 of the Civil Code"2 reported by Al-Shawarbi and Othman 1996 [13]. This conclusion on the part of the course remains questionable, however, considering that Art. 383 contains the catchall clause” or any act of a creditor to claim his right in the course of legal proceedings”. The word “any” should make it clear that all of the items appearing earlier in the sentence should be taken as mere examples, and not as a closed list. Hence, on this reading, the three codes do not differ substantially when it comes to creditor-related reasons for interruption, so that legal proceedings (broadly construed) reset the statutory time limit to run from scratch.

It is not without comparative interest to contrast the wording of these Arab codifications to the provisions found in the French Civil Code. The latter distinguishes three main “triggers” for interruption (Arts. 2240 to 2246): the filing of a claim, including for a summary judgement, the start of execution proceedings, and the debtor's acknowledgement of the creditor's right (this being already a debtor-related reason). To these, one needs to add certain “special” reasons introduced by isolated pieces of legislation, like Art. L114-2 of French Decree no. 76/667 of July 16, 1976 (hereinafter French Insurance Code), which mentions, for instance, the appointment of an expert.3 The domain of application of this special reason for interruption has been subsequently extended, by the French Administrative Court of Appeals, to the case of a ten-year guarantee. The same court had already ascribed an interruptive effect to an urgent request for a judge to appoint an expert.4 The French Court of Cassation (civil section) additionally stated that causes of interruption can only operate, so long as the time limit hasn't already elapsed.5 Thus, the French case law has clarified that prescribed statutory time limits may not be shortened or lengthened, including by mutual agreement, and that contracting parties are not allowed no introduce any new grounds for suspension or interruption of prescription.6

In terms of legal procedure, the French legislation also awards validity—as causes for interruption—to precautionary measures, or to the initiation of enforcement proceedings based on an enforceable title.7 Always on the level of legal procedure, the French Court of Cassation has recognised, since 1977, that the interruption of prescription can no longer be raised as part of any cases it is asked to hear (as judge of third instance in civil matters),8 and also that, when interruption is caused by the initiation of legal proceedings, statutory time limits shall not start again until the conclusion of those same proceedings.9

In sum, it seems that all the legislations considered thus far distinguish two main types of creditor-related reasons for interruption: the filing of a claim (whereby a judge is asked to establish the creditor’s right against the other party) and the initiation of other kinds of proceedings, typically related to enforcement (of an already established right). It is to these two types of reasons that we turn in the sub-sections that follow.

4.4. Lawsuit to assert a right

A judicial claim, or lawsuit [14,15] 10, is a petition addressed to a court to issue a judgement that enforces, reaffirms or declares a right. It is the only means of activating judicial authorities, without which they would not have the power to proceed autonomously, even when judges privately witness an injustice. It is, according to a commentator, “the means by which the law confers access to the courts, upon the holder of a right, to protect his entitlements” [15,16]. Article 1613 of the Mecelle defines a lawsuit as “a claim made by one person against another in court”. The Egyptian Court of Cassation has been quite specific in stating what kind of judicial claim gives rise to an interruption, namely:

“The creditor's claim to his right vis-à-vis the debtor before the court, i.e. a lawsuit filed against the debtor in the absence of an enforceable title. Alternatively, when the creditor already possesses an enforceable title, there is no need of filing a claim." [8].

It is important to note that the kind of claim that produces an interruptive effect is a judicial one, i.e. one filed by the rights holder before a court. Other forms of claim, like an amicable request, or even a registered letter, will not be sufficient. According to some commentators, a simple warning served by the creditor via the court will also fail to interrupt prescription, since this effect would specifically require measures for enforcement of the right (or at least preparatory measures towards enforcement) and not mere warnings [5,17]. However, the Court of Appeals of Ramallah (criminal section) has clarified that the notification of a warning by the court's clerk is sufficient to interrupt the statutory time limit: “A warning to the appellant interrupts the passage of time [towards prescription] since it is a pre-trial procedure".11 The Jordanian Court of Cassation has adopted the same stance, stating as follows:

“The notification of a judicial warning by the court clerk is a preliminary judicial procedure for claiming a debt and is sufficient to interrupt the course of prescription, pursuant to Article 460 of the Civil Code".12

Indeed, reason appears to be on the side of the latter two decisions, since a judicial warning unequivocally manifests the right holder's willingness to claim his/her due and it does already involve a court official. It can therefore be considered a judicial procedure, for the purpose of interrupting the statutory time limit, given that it initiates protection of the creditor's right in a similar way as other court measures. This conclusion is further confirmed by the requirement that, for the creditor to interrupt prescription, his/her legal claim should amount to a reaffirmation of a right. This requirement has been made explicit by the Egyptian Court of Cassation: “A judicial claim interrupting the statutory time limit must consist of a procedure to reaffirm the right”. This is included in an Egyptian Cass on 2 January 1978, No. 142, as reported by Al-Shawarbi and Othman, 1996 [13]. A warning served by a court official already meets this threshold [9]. On the other hand, mere interim measures, like the placement of seals, are not sufficient for the interruption of prescription. The same applies to orders issued upon request of one party without the other, since these do not involve genuine litigation with the participation of the debtor, and therefore they do not imply an interruption of the statutory time limit [18,19].

In order for the statutory time limit to be interrupted, it is additionally necessary that the judicial claim be valid. Whenever one of its essential elements is lacking, this makes the claim invalid and therefore ineffective towards prescription. An element is essential if, in its absence, the procedure cannot come into existence. Examples of essential elements needed for a judicial claim to be deemed valid are: indication of the plaintiff's claim, mention of the competent court, the plaintiff's name and surname, and the defendant's name and surname [14,16,20]. Moreover, a lawsuit encompasses both an original claim and any counterclaims that the rights holder makes during the course of proceedings, so long as they manifest his/her intention to assert a right before the court. This follows from the understanding that what determines the interruptive effect is really a manifestation of the rights holder's intention to claim his/her due. Hence, any request for adjudication submitted before the court, regardless of whether it is submitted as primary claim or as counterclaim, will be deemed to interrupt prescription, paying attention to the essential action from the creditor to file the claim in person. This might be done through a representative, a guardian, or a custodian, or also by a creditor to whom the original credit has been passed on [9,13,21]. So, for example, a counterclaim for set-off (whereby a creditor opposes his/her credit to the debtor's claimed entitlement) should be considered akin to a judicial claim and thereby interrupt the time limit [7,20].

Doctrinal commentary has diverged widely as to whether the claim filed by the debtor—to request acquittal from his/her debt or to demand a declaration of nullity or of expiry of the creditor's debt—should interrupt statutory time limits. Some commentators have suggested that this should not be the case [17,22],a viewpoint that's also been adopted by the Egyptian Court of Cassation, on 17 November 1938: “If the debtor sues for a debt acquittal, this shall not be regarded as acknowledgement of the debt and thus the statutory time limit shall not be interrupted” [17]. However, an alternative opinion presupposes that rejection of the debtor's lawsuit would amount to a recognition of said debt and should therefore count as a court declaration of its existence, worth at least as much as the debtor's willing acknowledgement of his/her debt [21].13 Finally, a third position carves a distinction based on whether, when the court dismisses the debtor's claim, this occurs in the creditor's absence and without his/her intervention in the proceedings, or with the creditor's participation in those same proceedings. In the first case, the debtor's claim should not interrupt prescription. It is only in the second event that the creditor could really be deemed to assert his/her right, leading to an interruption of the statutory time limit [21]. Having considered these different options, we wish to submit that a claim filed by the debtor should not interrupt prescription, regardless of its outcome. This option better preserves the express wording of the law, whereby filing a claim interrupts prescription only when this is undertaken by the creditor, not by the debtor.14 Such explicit wording leaves no room for interpretation: if the lawgiver intended to ascribe interruptive effects also to the debtor's judicial claims, this would have been included in the list of reasons pertaining to the debtor's conduct.

Related to this, when a creditor files a counterclaim in a lawsuit started by the debtor (by, say, opposing his own credit with a view to setting off the debtor's alleged entitlement) the creditor's counterclaim will be a cause of interruption: while participation in proceedings instituted by the debtor, alone, would not be sufficient, a counterclaim is akin to the initiation of proceedings by the creditor. More precisely, a counterclaim is both an exception to the debtor's request and a charge against him/her, since it denies the latter's claim and requests another judgement in favour of the creditor. This helps clarify that the meaning of “judicial claim” should encompass the positive assertion of a right, and not merely the dismissal of a claim brought against the rights holder. This sort of action manifests the rights holder's unwavering intention to claim his/her due [8].

Article 383 of the Egyptian Civil Code ascribes interruptive effects also to the claim lodged before a court without jurisdiction. Jordanian legislation does not attain the same level of precision, even though the Jordanian Court of Cassation substantially aligns with the Egyptian position:

“Lodging a lawsuit before a court with no jurisdiction interrupts the statutory time limit, because the reason for barring a lawsuit on such grounds ought to be prolonged inactivity in enforcing the right—which does not apply in this case”.15

As a point of comparative interest, Article 437(1) of the Iraqi Civil Code states that “the statutory limitation period shall be interrupted by a judicial claim even if the case is brought, excusably, before a court without jurisdiction”. Therefore, in Iraqi law, a claim filed before a judge that lacks jurisdiction should interrupt prescription, only so long as this mistake could be deemed excusable. This condition, however, can quickly become impracticable, since it requires that each case be examined separately to find out whether the mistake of jurisdiction could, or not, be excused. Moreover, additional criteria would be needed to determine what should amount to an “excusable” mistake on jurisdictional matters. On these grounds, we deem it more straightforward simply to ascribe interruptive effect to a claim, even when filed before a court that lacks jurisdiction, because the basic reason for granting interruption—the rights holder's intention to claim his/her due and not refrain from doing so—is present even in this case.

There are some doctrinal differences, especially in relation to the case of a claim lodged before a regular court, when the court holding jurisdiction would in principle be a specialized one. An opinion in French legal doctrine resolves this case in the positive [23,24], as does also a section of Egyptian legal doctrine [21]. In Egypt, however, there exists an alternative opinion suggesting that—when the matter of jurisdiction is straightforward and unambiguous—a claim before a court that lacks jurisdiction should not lead to the interruption of the statutory time limit [17].16 In this respect, it is useful to go back to the explicit formulation of Article 383 of the Egyptian Civil Code. In that article, lack of jurisdiction is mentioned without qualification, so this wording should not warrant carving out exceptions to the general rule. Incidentally, the date of interruption should be deemed to be the date when the claim has been entered into the court registry, since the subsequent declaration of lack of jurisdiction does not deprive the lawsuit of all possible effects—such as those on the prescription term. As a final consideration, filing a claim before a court that lacks jurisdiction should be treated as an unequivocal manifestation of the desire to claim one's right, since matters of jurisdiction are often highly complex (even for specialists) to navigate. The Jordanian Court of Cassation has followed this reasoning when a plaintiff lodged a claim before a specialized court: “Filing a judicial claim before the Shari'ah [Islamic law] Court or an unspecialized court interrupts the statutory time limit, since what would prevent hearing a lawsuit should be an inexcusable failure to act".17 Finally, the statutory time limit should remain paused for the duration of the lawsuit before the (incompetent) court and a new prescription period should take effect on the day in which the court issues a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction.

A special case is that of a claim filed before a court for urgent matters. Since, in this case, the creditor is merely asking for precautionary measures—without asking for a pronouncement on the substantive existence of the right—this should not lead to an interruption of prescription. On this point, the Court of Appeals of Gaza has explicitly stated that “the court may not address the origin of the subject matter of the dispute when issuing a pronouncement on summary interim orders” [23], which means that summary judgements are not suitable to acquire the status of res judicata [18]. Conversely, whenever a court for urgent matters also hears the basis of the rights (all aspects relating to its existence, validity, or its effects) holder's entitlement, this should be treated like a claim filed with a court without jurisdiction and lead to the interruption of prescription [20,21,25].

Finally, when it comes to arbitration agreements, there is a distinction to be made between a post-dispute and a pre-dispute agreement. The first manifests an intention to treat arbitration as equivalent to judicial proceedings, so that it should receive the same treatment in terms of interruptive effect on the statutory time limit, because it manifests the creditor's serious intention to enforce his/her due [26]. The second, instead, only entails a suspension of prescription, effective from the moment the creditor takes action to lodge his/her claim via the arbitral route (typically, by appointing a member of the arbitral panel, and notifying the other party to do the same) [26]. The statutory time limit resumes at the end of the arbitrator's mandate, with interruption (i.e. the start of a new prescription period) not taking place in case the request for arbitral proceedings is rejected, relinquished, or invalidated [8,17].18

Another particular issue concerns lawsuits initiated by the rights holder, and established before a competent court, but which end prematurely on grounds of abandonment, forfeiture, non-existence, or inadmissibility. The question arises as to whether any of these lawsuits ought to have an interruptive effect on the statutory time limit. First, in relation to abandonment (plaintiff leaves any proceedings, while preserving his/her right intact), it deprives of effects the entire range of proceedings—including the act of filing the lawsuit—and obliges the plaintiff to make good any expenses incurred by the other parties [16,27], without prejudice to the substance of the right on which the lawsuit hinged. In other words, abandonment entails the re-establishment of the status quo ante, including the undoing of any effects that filing a lawsuit would otherwise have had on the statutory time limit. This solution is clearly supported both by case law, (Egyptian Cass on 31 January 1993, no. 4281 [27], and by legal opinion [28,29]. A similar outcome applies in the case of forfeiture of litigation [27,28].19 This entails the disappearance of all the effects of the lawsuit, including interruption of the statutory time limit. Again, forfeiture does not prejudice the basis of the right that's the object of litigation [30]. Finally, when both the plaintiff and the defendant fail to appear at the court hearing, the lawsuit is deemed not to have come into existence, thereby eliminating any effects it might have had—including the interruption of prescription—and without prejudice to the basis of the rights holder's entitlement [20].

Inadmissibility presents a more controversial picture, with a variety of opinions found in both French and Egyptian legal doctrine [14,20,21] 20. For example, French legal scholars, Aubry and Rau, have suggested that a pronouncement of inadmissibility for substantive reasons, such as a lack of legitimate interest giving the plaintiff a standing to sue, leaves no room for the survival of any effects, including those on prescription. On the other hand, a pronouncement of inadmissibility on grounds of form should leave intact the interruptive effect [23].21 There is, however, an alternative position that—both in France and in Egypt—suggests that inadmissibility invariably cancels all effects of the lawsuit (including its interruptive effect on the statutory time limit) without regard to the reasons for such inadmissibility [21]. It is submitted that the latter opinion seems preferable. That is: inadmissibility should leave intact no effect of the lawsuit, including the effect of interrupting the statutory time limit, without allowing for further scrutiny of the reasons underpinning inadmissibility. In fact, the distinction between formal and substantive grounds for inadmissibility has little traction on the rationale for interrupting prescription. One can imagine a case where the rights holder simply wishes opportunistically to interrupt prescription, but without the intention of proceeding further with the lawsuit: he/she might then prepare an inadmissible claim that would predictably be rejected for a formal defect. It would not make sense, in such a case, to preserve the interruptive effect, since a serious intention to claim the right cannot be unequivocally inferred from the rights holder's conduct. More generally, a judicial claim that is deemed inadmissible can betray vagueness or lack of a serious intention to claim. Hence, it makes sense to treat is as immaterial also for the purposes of prescription.

A few final remarks are in order, concerning the capacity to initiate a lawsuit that interrupts prescription. It is sufficient merely to have the capacity to undertake precautionary measures, without requiring the additional capacity to litigate on substantive matters—so that even a minor and his/her representative may file a claim that interrupts the statutory time Moreover, the claim needs to be addressed to the debtor (who would benefit from expiry of the statutory time limit for enforceability) or to his/her representative, whereas it has no effect against a debtor who requires a representative for lack of the requisite capacity, but does not have one yet [21].

4.5. Initiation of other kinds of proceedings

Filing a lawsuit is typically the only available course of action to a rights holder who possesses no enforceable title. However, this is different when one such title is available, which enables the initiation of proceedings directed at obtaining satisfaction of his/her right. These proceedings—though different from a lawsuit seeking to establish the basis of the right—also produce an interruptive effect [31].

A judicial procedure that is suitable to interrupt the statutory time limit refers to any legal course of action that the rights holder undertakes to assert his/her entitlements before a competent judicial body. Underlying this definition is the criterion that has also been used in order to determine which lawsuits do—and don't—count towards the interruption of prescription; namely, the fact that any proceedings need to be fit to demonstrate the creditor's serious intention and willingness to claim his/herdue before a court, or any competent authority with an affiliation to the court. Furthermore, any list of “additional procedures that interrupt prescription” is to be taken as a mere catalogue of examples, rather than as a closed group. Below, we focus specifically on some of the most important ones, like: notification, asset seizure, and the application for admission of the rights holder's claim to bankruptcy proceedings or to a distribution.

Let us begin with notification: this is a document, complete with specific pieces of information that is handed by a server of process either to the debtor in person or to his domicile. The notification states that the debtor is required to settle his/her outstanding debt towards the rights holder, on penalty of further legal action. For such a notification to be produced, all that is necessary is an enforceable title, such as a judgement or a contract drawn up according to certain standards of form [7]. A notification has the effect of interrupting the statutory time limit, even if it not followed by a seizure of assets or (if a seizure has in fact followed) in case the seizure is ruled invalid. At the same time, the notification itself needs to be valid and to include all the wording and information proper to such a document [32].

The second type of legal act that we shall consider is an asset seizure. This has been defined as: “entrusting assets to the tribunal, in order to prevent their owner from carrying out any legal or physical act that would subtract the assets themselves, or their fruits, from the creditor” [33]. Seizures interrupt the statutory time limit, both when they are undertaken for precautionary reasons and when they are undertaken as part of an executive procedure [7,21,33].

Finally, we consider the application for admission of one's credit to bankruptcy or distribution proceedings. This last case assumes that bankruptcy has already been declared and requires that the creditor present his/her promissory note for inclusion in the bankruptcy proceedings. A fortiori, an interruptive effect should also attach to the creditor's request that the debtor to be declared bankrupt or insolvent. Moreover, prescription is also interrupted when a creditor requests distribution of the debtor's assets—in the manner appropriate to the creditor's own “rank” in the proceedings [34].

4.6. Reasons for interruption related to the debtor

So far, we have focused only on the kinds of actions that the creditor might take, which would interrupt the statutory time limit. However, the same effect can also follow from conduct emanating from the debtor. For instance, Article 459 of the Jordanian Civil Code states that “the debtor's explicit or implicit acknowledgement of the right interrupts prescription”. Similarly, Article 384(1) of the Egyptian Civil Code reads as follows: “The statutory time limit shall be interrupted if the debtor expressly or implicitly acknowledges the creditor's right".22 What provisions, such as these, show is that an acknowledgement coming from the debtor can also produce the interruption of prescription. A similar conclusion holds for Palestine as well, on the basis of the following statement by the Court of Appeals in Ramallah: “if the debtor expressly or implicitly acknowledges the creditor's right, prescription shall be interrupted".23

An acknowledgement consists in a person's admission of a fact alleged by his/her opponent, and one that produces legal effects against the person doing the admission [5]. It is a legal and unilateral act that is not perfected by the consent of the beneficiary, and that cannot be revoked. Therefore, it implies the debtor's active concern for the creditor's right and manifests a willingness on the former's part to fulfil an outstanding obligation. It follows that all the legal systems considered above ascribe to this sort of conduct by the debtor the same effects linked to action that emanates from the creditor, so that, if the debtor acknowledges that the debt is still due, the acknowledgement will erase any time elapsed on the extant prescription term [17,20].

At the same time, effects such as these can only apply to the person issuing such a declaration. So, for instance, in the case of multiple heirs, the acknowledgement of a debt (of the ancestor) that is issued by only some of the heirs does not interrupt prescription also for those heirs that did not take part in the declaration. The same applies to obligations where multiple partners are involved [9,17].

In addition to the above, the acknowledgement has to be made by a person with the requisite capacity. This is the simple capacity to manage one's assets, since the acknowledgement of a debt is not the same as the waiver of a right—it is merely the relinquishment of the bygone period on an extant prescription term. Hence, even acknowledgement by an emancipated minor would be valid and interrupt the statutory time limit, as it would fall within the confines of the minor's capacity to manage his/her assets. The same goes for an acknowledgement coming from the guardian, trustee, or custodian and issued on behalf of the minor or the legally incapacitated person [9].

A further requirement is that the acknowledgement concerns specifically the credit, which the rights holder wishes to claim. If the wording of the acknowledgement suggests otherwise, then no effect on prescription should follow. For instance, a controversial pronouncement of the Jordanian Court of Cassation has deemed the declaration that it is one's signature that has been placed on a promissory note, to be equivalent to the acknowledgement of the creditor's entitlement, thereby giving rise to the interruption of the statutory time limit. Specifically, the court affirmed the following:

“Acknowledgement by signing the promissory note prohibits hearing the objection that the statutory time limit has lapsed, since the law makes no distinction based on whether the acknowledgement relates to the debt itself or to [having placed] the signature on the bond".24

Still, this solution appears questionable, precisely on the basis of the principle that an acknowledgement needs to contemplate precisely the debt concerned, for it to interrupt prescription. This would not apply to mere recognition of one's signature on a promissory note. After all, a promissory note is a mere means of proof, whereas the lawsuit itself does not concern the validity of the debtor's signature, as such, but seeks to ascertain the very basis of the right [8].

An acknowledgement that interrupts the statutory time limit may be explicit or implicit. For an explicit acknowledgement, no particular formality is required: any manifestation of the will that contains an acknowledgement of debt will suffice. Instead, an implicit acknowledgement consists of an action that is meant as acknowledgement. Examples would be partial payment, interest payments, provision of a mortgage or guarantee, and demanding a deadline for payment [35,36]. The question of what amounts to an acknowledgement is also a matter of fact for the first instance court to ascertain. The Egyptian Court of Cassation has explicitly stated that:

“Determining the meaning of the debtor's paperwork—as acknowledgement of debt with the consequent effect of interrupting the statutory time limit—falls amongst the substantive issues not susceptible of scrutiny by the Court of Cassation" Egyptian Cass on 19 November 1964(Abdel-Aziz, 2003).

Article 384(2) of the Egyptian Civil Code contains additional guidance on what might count as an implicit acknowledgement. Specifically, it stipulates as follows: “The debtor's deposit of money in the creditor's possession, subject to a possessory mortgage as guarantee for the debt, is deemed an implicit acknowledgement".25 According to this paragraph, when a debtor provides a guarantee, a distinction needs to be made between a possessory mortgage and other forms of guarantee in kind. A possessory mortgage has a more detrimental effect for the debtor, and therefore provides a continuous implicit acknowledgement that the debt exists. It follows from this that it interrupts prescription, irrespective of the length of time in which the mortgaged money has been in the creditor's possession. The case is different for a formal mortgage or for the guarantee attached to a franchising agreement, none of which amount to an enduring acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor, and therefore produce no effect on the statutory time limit. The same conclusion also holds for the registration or re-registration of these guarantees: these are merely actions undertaken by the creditor and cannot amount to an acknowledgement by the debtor [37,38].

4.7. The effect of interruption

The default effect of interruption is the erasure of time elapsed on an extant prescription term, and the beginning of a new term. This follows from the explicit formulation of Article 461 of the Jordanian Civil Code:

“1. If the statutory limitation period is interrupted … a fresh prescription term shall commence of the same length as the first period".

Similarly, Article 385 of the Egyptian Civil Code states that:

“1. When prescription is interrupted, a new prescription commences to run from the time that the effect of the act that gave rise to the interruption has ceased. The term of the new prescription will be of the same duration as that of the former one. 2. When the debt has been confirmed by a final judgment or when, in the case of a debt prescribed after one year, the prescription has been interrupted by the admission of the debtor, the term of the new prescription will be fifteen years unless the debt confirmed by the judgment involves periodical recurring obligations which will not become due until after the judgment".

Similar provisions on the effect of interruption are found in civil codes of other countries, summarized in Table 2, below.

Table 2.

Articles numbers of other Arab Civil Codes.

Country	Local Civil Code No.	Year	Article No.
Egypt	131	1948	385
Syria	84	1949	382
Libya	–	1953	372
Lebanon	–	1932	439
Kuwait	67	1980	450

Both provisions agree that interruption has the effect of starting the statutory time limit afresh, after the reason for interruption has passed [39]. Still, the Egyptian Civil Code is more precise because it states explicitly the point from which the statutory time limit will begin again (i.e. when the cause of interruption has ceased), whereas the Jordanian Civil Code does not. Nevertheless, the Jordanian Court of Cassation has effectively applied the position of the Egyptian Civil Code, when it stated that “invalidating a lawsuit for a reason of form interrupts the statutory time limit and [the interruption] continues, pending the decision on the lawsuit, since the reason for barring a claim from being heard is for it to have been neglected inexcusably".26

It remains nevertheless preferable to spell out clearly when the statutory time limit will begin running again, to avoid misunderstandings or uncertainty. In this respect, the following clarifications can be of help. If the reason for interruption is the filing of a claim, then prescription shall not run again for as long as the case is pending before the court and will only begin afresh after the court has ruled in favour of the creditor [40].27 If the reason for interruption is a notification, the new statutory time limit begins to run immediately after the notification has been issued and continues to run until a subsequent asset seizure interrupts prescription again. The time limit is set to remain paused throughout the proceedings for asset seizure, and a new statutory term shall begin at the end of such proceedings. Finally, if the reason for interruption is an application for admission to bankruptcy or distribution proceedings, prescription is interrupted until the bankruptcy procedure is closed or until the distribution list has been issued—after which point a new prescription term can begin again. Finally, turning to the reasons for interruption that emanate from the debtor, a new time limit begins to run immediately after the acknowledgement has been made by the debtor—with the exception of the possessory mortgage discussed earlier.

In other words, all these examples confirm that a fresh prescription term can begin when the reason for interruption has ceased [7,41]. Moreover, the new term will have the same duration as the original one that was interrupted, since the nature of the obligation remains unchanged by the reason for interruption, thereby warranting the same statutory time limit [5,42]. However, there are two exceptions to this rule, whereby the new time limit becomes fifteen years, regardless of the length of the original one. These exceptions are examined below.

4.8. Final judgement on a debt

Article 385 (2) of the Egyptian Civil Code states that when a final decision on the credit has acquired the force of res judicata, the new limitation period will be fifteen years from the date of the judgement being issued. Egyptian jurist, AlSanhuri, described the reason for this exception as follows: “A final ruling strengthens the obligation and supplies it with a new cause for continuation, hence the limitation period extends to fifteen years from the date of the ruling” [17]. The Jordanian Civil Code has adopted a different solution in this respect. Article 461(2) stipulates the following: “Rights, regardless of their kind, shall never be relinquished if the court hands down a decision that is not subject to appeal”. What this actually means is that a final decision precludes further litigation, and a new lawsuit on the same right will not be entertained, regardless of time elapsed. Res judicata will therefore be a sufficient defence in the event of a new lawsuit, without needing to argue about statutory time limits [43]. However, Article 8 of Jordanian Execution Law No. 25 of 2007(hereinafter Jordanian Execution Law) also states that the expiry of a fifteen-year term without any execution measures being taken bars the adoption of such measures beyond such term: “Applications for execution of the titles mentioned in Article 6 of this law shall not be entertained if fifteen years have passed since those titles were issued, or since the last procedural step was taken in connection to them”. In other words, this article is effectively enabling the creditor to relinquish the right to judicial enforcement, by allowing a fifteen-year term to pass without taking action. Clearly, the two provisions contradict each other, with the latter article explicitly allowing what Art. 461(2) of the Jordanian Civil Code forbids (namely: relinquishment of a right after res judicata). A more nuanced wording would have been the following: “A lawsuit shall never be deemed admissible, no matter how many years have passed, when a court hands down a decision not susceptible of appeal”. This alternative wording speaks more precisely of admissibility of the lawsuit, rather than using the confusing language of “relinquishment” of a right.

4.9. Acknowledgement of a debt

If the statutory time limit is interrupted by the debtor's acknowledgement of the debt, and the original term was between one and five years (Egyptian Civil Code) or between two and five years (Jordanian Civil Code) [39], the new prescription term becomes fifteen years (pursuant to both Art. 453(2) of the Jordanian Civil Code and Art. 379(2) of the Egyptian Civil Code). This provision is based upon an opinion in French legal doctrine, whereby the debtor's explicit acknowledgement supplies a new cause to the obligation [24]. This opinion has been subject to criticism, however, because it simply assumes that the debtor had the intention of renewing his/her obligation by means of the acknowledgement—which might be a bit of a stretch, depending on the circumstances of each case. Renewal cannot ordinarily be assumed, but needs an explicit agreement or to be implicit in the circumstances. An acknowledgement on the part of the debtor is not, per se, sufficient to manifest an intention to renew the cause of the obligation [22].

Other doctrinal opinions have suggested that it is the written nature of the acknowledgement that should justify a longer prescription term, because it eliminates the reason for the original (shorter) term, consisting in the lack of written title, and therefore brings the statutory time limit back to the standard term of fifteen years [20]. However, this position seems to identify too quickly the reason for a short prescription term with the lack of written title. Indeed, one can think of other reasons for short prescription periods, like the periodic accrual of the right. Moreover, the opinion appears to hold exclusively for Egyptian law, whereby the absence of written title can shorten the statutory limitation period (for instance, in the case of freelancers, merchants, manufacturers, hotel owners, restaurant owners, labourers, servants and daily workers, pursuant to Art. 379(2) of the Egyptian Civil Code). In contrast, Art. 453(2) of the Jordanian Civil Code establishes short prescription periods for certain rights mentioned in Arts. 450, 451, and 452 of the same code, but it does not draw any differences based on the written form of the attestation. The Jordanian Civil Code's position appears to us to be more reasonable: while it might well be the case that a written acknowledgement can lengthen the statutory time limit, this lengthening is less to ascribe to the choice of writing per se, and more to the very fact of acknowledgement—which justifies by itself an exception to the short prescription regime.

As an aside, it might seem that Art. 385 of the Egyptian Civil Code (which extends the statutory time limit, upon the acknowledgement of a debt with a one-year prescription term) should be unnecessary, given the presence of Art. 379 of the Egyptian Civil Code (corresponding to Art. 453 of the Jordanian Civil Code) [8]. Art. 379 requires the use of writing in order to lengthen the limitation period, thereby excluding verbal declarations. Instead, Art. 385 does not mention writing specifically. Therefore, it seems that the Egyptian lawgiver opted to carve a different treatment for rights with an extremely short prescription term of one year. In such case only, the acknowledgement of debt would not need to be in writing, different from the rule laid down by Art. 379 (which applies to the credits of freelancers, merchants, manufacturers, hotel and restaurant owners, workers, servants and labourers, and which requires a written title to interrupt the period of limitation and restart it with a longer horizon).

Last, but not least, interruption only operates between specific creditors and debtors, pursuant to the principle of relativity of legal actions. Hence, it only benefits the creditor who activates a reason for interruption, and can only be opposed to the debtor for whom a reason for interruption exists. In the event of joint creditors, however, the principle of mutual representation in matters that are neither beneficial nor harmful entails that the cause of interruption, operating with respect to one only of the creditors, nevertheless engenders an interruptive effect also for the other creditors. Another exception is an in severable obligation, where the introduction of a ground for interruption by one of the stakeholders affects the others as well—a natural consequence of the nature of this obligation [21]. Moreover, an interruptive event can have no effect on other entitlements, beyond those for which the period of limitation was interrupted, and does not extend to further legal relationships between the rights holder and the other party. However, when a claim would have its basis in an underlying legal relation, interrupting prescription with respect to the latter would also affect the former. For instance, filing an action for partition also interrupts the period for invalidating the finished partition [24].

5. Discussions

Through the above review analysis, it has become obvious that interruption requires performance of a legal act, by the rights holder or by the other party, to which the law attaches special relevance. Even if when a cause of interruption will still need to be proven in the manner prescribed by law, its effectiveness depends purely upon fulfilment of the legal precept that singles out a particular act—by the creditor or by the debtor—as productive of an interruption of prescription. This finding is consistent with Abdel-Jawad and Hasan [8,9] who highlighted this point.

The analysis has also shown that Article 1666 of the Mecelle stipulates that it is only a claim filed in court that interrupts the statutory time limit, whilst excluding any extra-judicial requests made by the creditor to the debtor. In this respect, Articlle 460 of the Jordanian Civil Code takes a similar stance. This point is emphasized by researchers like Al-Shawarbi and Othman 1996 [13].

It has also been revealed that a judicial claim, or lawsuit [14,15], is a petition addressed to a court to issue a judgement that enforces, reaffirms or declares a right. It is, according to studies conducted by Muslim and Saif, “the means by which the law confers access to the courts, upon the holder of a right, to protect his entitlements” [15,16]. In this context, the analysis has reflected that filing a lawsuit is typically the only available course of action to a rights holder who possesses no enforceable title. However, the case is different when one such title is available, which enables the initiation of proceedings directed at obtaining satisfaction of his/her right. These proceedings can also produce an interruptive effect, and this point is noted by Abdul-Tawwab [31]. But it should be noted that the statutory time limit is interrupted by seizures, both when they are undertaken for precautionary reasons and when they are undertaken as part of an executive procedure. This point is similar to what was stated by Abdul-Lateef, Ibrahim and Wali [7,21,33].

The debtor's acknowledgement of the right is highlighted by Article 459 of the Jordanian Civil Code which states that “the debtor's explicit or implicit acknowledgement of the right interrupts prescription”. This is also mentioned in Article 384(1) of the Egyptian Civil Code that stipulates: “The statutory time limit shall be interrupted if the debtor expressly or implicitly acknowledges the creditor's right”. Other jurisdictions, like the Palestinian Jurisdiction, hold the same stance. In this respect, the Court of Appeals in Ramallah states that “if the debtor expressly or implicitly acknowledges the creditor's right, prescription shall be interrupted.

An important point highlighted by the above analysis is represented in the effect of interruption. It has been noticed that default effect of interruption is the erasure of time elapsed on an extant prescription term, and the beginning of a new term. This is emphasized by Article 461 of the Jordanian Civil Code and Article 385 of the Egyptian Civil Code. Apart from this, the final judgement on a debt is highlighted by Article 385 (2) of the Egyptian Civil Code which states that when a final decision on the credit has acquired the force of res judicata, the new limitation period will be fifteen years from the date of the judgement being issued. This point is accounted for by AlSanhuri who described the reason for this exception as follows: “A final ruling strengthens the obligation and supplies it with a new cause for continuation, hence the limitation period extends to fifteen years from the date of the ruling” [17]. Contrastingly, Article 8 of Jordanian Execution Law No. 25 of 2007 states that the expiry of a fifteen-year term without any execution measures being taken bars the adoption of such measures beyond such term.

Another significant point highlighted by the above review analysis is the acknowledgement of a debt. It has been found that if the statutory time limit is interrupted by the debtor's acknowledgement of the debt, and the original term was between one and five years, as it is mentioned in the Egyptian Civil Code, or between two and five years, as is the case in the Jordanian Civil Code [39], the new prescription term becomes fifteen years (pursuant to both Art. 453(2) of the Jordanian Civil Code and Art. 379(2) of the Egyptian Civil Code).

6. Conclusion

This article, the second instalment of a two-part study, has focused on the interruption of prescription. Interruption, unlike suspension, entails the start of a fresh statutory time limit, such that any time already elapsed on an extant prescription period is reset from scratch. We have seen that underpinning this institute of law is the manifestation of intent to claim one's dues. This rationale applies both to explicit cases and to “limit cases”. Explicit cases would be the filing of a lawsuit, or the initiation of various kinds of execution proceedings. “Limit cases” include, for instance, a judicial warning that is served by a court clerk, which initiates protection of the creditor's right and can therefore be assimilated to a lawsuit. On the other hand, we have also seen that a lawsuit initiated by the debtor to invalidate or exclude the creditor's entitlement does not manifest the creditor's intention to claim his/her due, and therefore cannot warrant the interruption of prescription. Any legal course of action needs to be initiated by the creditor. Nevertheless, counterclaims filed in a lawsuit that's been initiated by the debtor also manifest initiative on the creditor's side, and once again activate the interruptive effect.

We have also seen that a claim filed before a court that lacks jurisdiction should ordinarily produce the interruption of prescription. Indeed, this would already be enough to manifest the creditor's intent not to keep silent about his or her rights. Particularly so, when one considers that jurisdictional competence can indeed be tricky to figure out, even for a specialist, and therefore mistakes can and do happen. The subsequent declaration of lack of jurisdictional competence does not invalidate the interruptive effect, which will run from the date of entry of the lawsuit on the court register. A pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction does not prevent the lawsuit from coming into being, since it is a rejection of the lawsuit on merely formal grounds, and it does not affect the basis of the claim.

Instead, claims that are merely precautionary but that do not involve realization of the substantive entitlement—like a lawsuit filed before a court of urgent matters—do not necessarily entail an interruptive effect. However, certain demands addressed to arbitral or conventional adjudicating bodies, like the Bar Association Council for it to determine professional fees in the absence of an explicit written agreement between the parties, should be deemed valid for the purposes of interruption, because they equally manifests a desire to claim one’s dues or to fulfil one’s obligations.

A declaration of inadmissibility of a lawsuit, unlike the lack of jurisdiction, should be ineligible to interrupt prescription, regardless of the reasons for such inadmissibility—i.e. on substantial or merely formal grounds. Doing otherwise would, in fact, invite opportunistic behaviour by creditors wishing to “keep alive” their entitlement, yet without really moving to realize it—such as by filing lawsuits that interrupt prescription but cannot move further on grounds of (deliberate) inadmissibility. Inadmissibility, including on formal grounds, always betrays vagueness in one’s claim, which can be an indication of a lack of serious intention on the creditor’s part. In sum, the underlying rationale for interruption based on the creditor’s conduct is the manifest will of the creditor to claim his or her due before a court of law. Thus, it is right to say that the greater the potential to manifest such will, the greater the reason for according an interruptive effect to the creditor’s initiative.

We have also considered debtor-related reasons for interruption, which have to do with the spontaneous acknowledgement of a debt. This is normally a prejudicial act for a debtor to undertake, and therefore shows serious concern on the latter's part in relation to the creditor's due. At the same time, our analysis has dwelt on controversial cases, like the acknowledgement that it is one's signature on a promissory note, and differentiated it from an outright acknowledgement of the underlying debt—which, alone, can produce interruptive effects on the statutory time limit.

The foregoing analysis has shown some criticalities, particularly in the Jordanian Civil Code. First, we have registered the ambiguous silence in the text of the Jordanian Civil Code concerning the time from which a fresh statutory time limit should start. Second, we have noted a contradiction between the wording of Article 461(2) of the Civil Code—whereby a right that has received the status of res judicata cannot be relinquished—and Art. 8 of the Jordanian Execution Law, which establishes a practical way to do exactly that, by refraining from initiating execution proceedings. To right this, we have suggested that a better formulation would clarify that the status of res judicata simply prevents a new lawsuit being filed to dispute the right, without implying that the right will forever remain actionable.

Last, but not least, the study has dwelt on cases where the interruption of prescription “lengthens” a short statutory time limit. We have noted the doctrinal opinion that putting a debt down in written form is responsible for such lengthening. However, we have suggested that a better explanation ought to be that putting down an obligation into writing amounts to an acknowledgement, and that this is what shifts the debt away from the “special” category with a short prescription term, and into the “standard” category with a fifteen-year time limit.

6.1. The practical, theoretical and societal implications

Based on the conclusion and discussions, this research has significant practical, theoretical and societal implications. Practically, the findings of this research are valuable for those working in financial institutions who will take them as real guides in their dealings with debt-related issues.

Researchers who are interested in investigating this phenomenon, in similar contexts, may greatly benefit from the findings of this research. They may also take the review analysis as an important source that enlightens their minds.

At the social level, this research will greatly help in organizing the relationship between the creditor and the debtor. These two parties will find this research a fountain source that tells them much about different provisions related to interruption and suspension.

Author contribution statement

Iyad Mohammad jadalhaq: Imad Eldin Abdulhay: Enas Alqodsi: Mohammed El Hadi El Maknouzi: Conceived and designed the experiments; Performed the experiments; Analyzed and interpreted the data; Contributed reagents, materials, analysis tools or data; Wrote the paper.

Data availability statement

Data included in article/supp. material/referenced in article.

Additional information

No additional information is available for this paper.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.