Social Verification Theory: A New Way to Conceptualize Validation, Dissonance, and Belonging

Abstract

Academic Abstract

In the present review, we propose a theory that seeks to recontextualize various existing theories as functions of people’s perceptions of their consistency with those around them. This theory posits that people seek social consistency for both epistemic and relational needs and that social inconsistency is both negative and aversive, similar to the experience of cognitive dissonance. We further posit that the aversive nature of perceiving social inconsistency leads people to engage in various behaviors to mitigate or avoid these inconsistencies. When these behaviors fail, however, people experience chronic social inconsistency, which, much like chronic rejection, is associated with physical and mental health and well-being outcomes. Finally, we describe how mitigation and avoidance of social inconsistency underlie many seemingly unrelated theories, and we provide directions for how future research may expand on this theory.

Public Abstract

In the present review, we propose that people find inconsistency with those around them to be an unpleasant experience, as it threatens people’s core need to belong. Because the threat of reduced belongingness evokes negative feelings, people are motivated to avoid inconsistency with others and to mitigate the negative feelings that are produced when it inevitably does arise. We outline several types of behaviors that can be implemented to avoid or mitigate these inconsistencies (e.g., validation, affirmation, distancing, etc.). When these behaviors cannot be implemented successfully, people experience chronic invalidation, which is associated with reduced physical and mental health and well-being outcomes. We discuss how invalidation may disproportionately affect individuals with minoritized identities. Furthermore, we discuss how belongingness could play a key role in radicalization into extremist groups.

In internet communities circa 2010, a fervent discourse raged regarding an unusual topic. It started with many individuals who recalled a popular series of books from their childhood named The Berenstein Bears. This memory could not have been true, however, because every physical book, every image, every shred of evidence, and even the names of the creators clearly indicated the books were called The Berenstain Bears. What these individuals were experiencing was an effect where large groups of people seem to share a false memory, colloquially referred to as the “Mandela Effect” (named for one such group-level false memory with regards to the date of death of Nelson Mandela).

Of course, the explanation for this unusual phenomenon is relatively simple. Last names ending in -stein are far more common than those ending in -stain, and the incubation of a false memory is a likely outcome of semantic availability (Brainerd et al., 2008). In the present article, we are not interested in the fact that group-level false memory exists but rather in how people reacted to it. In general, people found this experience distressing, and this distress motivated them to share it. Furthermore, finding others who agreed with their appraisal seemed to mitigate the distress, despite the fact that the memory was still incorrect. In a sense, this anecdote is one example of the notion: often, the convergence of an individual’s reality with the group’s reality is as important as discerning “true” reality. This state of alignment between people’s perception of reality and the perceptions of those around them is what we will be referring to as social verification. In the present article, we will propose a theory that provides an account of why people seek social verification and what behaviors arise from it.

Objective, Subjective, and Social Reality

Although people like to feel that their perception of reality is a direct model of what is real (i.e., naïve/direct realism), the experience of reality can be subject to a wide variety of flaws. These flaws can affect perceptions (Carbon, 2014), memories (Wilson & Ross, 2001), and even what people think they know (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Because perception and memory can, and often do, deviate sharply from what is objectively real, no one person holds a perfect internal representation of reality. For simplicity, we will refer to the amalgamation of an individual’s internal states (e.g., attitudes, affect, memories, experiences, identity, perceptions, etc.) as that individual’s “subjective reality.” Biases in individuals’ subjective realities can lead to situations where two different individuals perceive the same stimuli but give divergent accounts of what was real (e.g., Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Vallone et al., 1985).

An individual’s subjective reality is not the only framework for understanding the world. Groups can provide information to individuals in a variety of ways. For instance, descriptive norms (Cialdini et al., 1990) might provide information as to what behaviors are common or uncommon. Injunctive norms might influence what behaviors an individual feels are correct or incorrect. Similarly, knowing that one’s group generally endorses a belief makes that belief seem more valid (Crandall & Stangor, 2005). Cultural narratives might provide information about how one’s self and others will change over time (Hillman & Hauser, 2021). In a broader sense, culture itself can be understood as information, such as what values are good, what behavior is acceptable, and what information is true (e.g., Hofstede, 1984; Maio & Olson, 1998). We will refer to the amalgamation of these processes (norms, narratives, culture, etc.) for a given group as that group’s “social reality.” For instance, the idea that “people cry at funerals” is a descriptive norm that most people in North America believe is true and would be a component of the social reality in that region. Going forward we will refer to “social reality” frequently; as such, it is important to note that we will be talking about one’s perceptions of the social reality (what an individual thinks group members think, not what group members actually think). This is important because, in instances where an individual’s perceptions of the social reality and the actual socially shared reality are divergent, participants will still behave in accordance with their inaccurate perceptions.

While subjective and social reality might vary widely between different people in different places, much of “objective reality” is clear (e.g., ice is cold). Despite the clarity of objective reality, there are often situations where what is objectively “true” or “right” is difficult or impossible to ascertain (e.g., is correct to cry at a funeral?). In such circumstances, research suggests individuals use social reality as a substitute for objective reality (e.g., other people cry at funerals, so it must be correct; see Byrne & Clore, 1967 or Byrne et al., 1966). Because social and subjective reality are constructed differently, features of social reality may be inconsistent with subjective reality, (e.g., “everybody believes divorce is sad; yet I am happy to be free of my unhappy marriage”). These inconsistencies will be the focus of the present theory.

In the following sections, we will provide a theory of the role of verification from (and consistency with) one’s social group in developing and maintaining feelings of belonging. Social verification theory provides a framework through which a variety of existing but seemingly unrelated theories can be better understood. This review is divided into four major sections. First, we will explain the theory generally and discuss the changeability of some aspects of subjective reality. We will then outline the processes involved when subjective reality cannot be easily changed, and the processes involved when it can be. We will outline mitigation behaviors people use to rectify perceived inconsistencies or avoid potential inconsistencies. Finally, we will provide a series of potential implications and future directions which flow from the integration of these theories.

Social Verification

Because social reality is often used as an indicator of objective reality, inconsistency between subjective and social reality may suggest that one’s perceptions or experiences of reality are erroneous and/or that one does not belong in their group(s). Belongingness can be thought of as a homeostatic need, such as sleep (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). As with most homeostatic processes, people generally reach a state of optimal belongingness, where their belongingness needs are “satiated.” At an optimal level, extraneous gains in belongingness are not particularly rewarding, but losses in belongingness are particularly aversive. Therefore, threats to belonging are potent and distressing. This is similar to how sleeping when one is not tired confers little benefit but abstaining from sleep is generally quite harmful.

Social verification describes the process by which individuals recruit consistencies between subjective and social reality as evidence of belonging. Inversely, inconsistencies between subjective and social reality are evidence of non-belonging. When people are at optimal levels of belonging, non-belonging is more aversive than belonging is appealing; thus threats to belonging, such as inconsistency with one’s group, are strong motivating factors. While prominent theories concerning belongingness suggest that belongingness needs can be met with positive and reliable interactions (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), we suggest that people also need verification to feel they belong.

The convergence of perceptions of reality is a key component of the self-verification literature (Swann & Read, 1981). Self-verification theory posits generally that people want others’ perceptions of their self to converge with their own perceptions. This is most often demonstrated by showing that people with a negative self-concept would rather interact with another individual who shares the same negative perception than one who believes something positive. Although self-verification was met with debate because it seemed to conflict with people’s motivation to (at least in western countries) enhance their self, there was evidence that these processes could coexist (Swann et al., 1989). The present theory extends the idea that people want to be verified beyond the self, to all domains for which reality is not directly knowable. Furthermore, we propose a basic need from which the desire for verification arises and describe the behaviors people use to achieve verification, a desirable state of alignment between one’s subjective and social reality. We are not the first to suggest that people generally desire to have their perceptions of reality converge with others. The shared reality literature (see Echterhoff et al., 2009; Levine & Higgins, 2001) has made a compelling case that people desire and benefit from the convergence of reality with others (which we will discuss later in this article). In the present theory, we seek to explain the processes that precipitate this desired end state.

When people are made aware of subjective-social inconsistency, it will typically arouse a distressing negative affective state, which motivates two types of behaviors. To avoid potential inconsistencies (and thus an arousal of negative affect), people will undertake various strategies to align their beliefs with other, such as pre-emptive conformity, or selectively exposing themselves to information or people which is more likely to be consistent than inconsistent. If people cannot avoid inconsistency, though, they will attempt to rectify it. Mitigation behaviors take place following the perceptions of inconsistency and can take three forms: validation (the social reality changing to accommodate the individuals’ subjective reality; e.g., a close other telling the individual that they share similar feelings, or the individual convincing others they were right); alteration (the subjective reality changing to accommodate the social; e.g., a change in one’s attitudes to be more consistent with peers); or affirmation (addressing the negative affect without addressing the inconsistency directly; e.g., buoying one’s mood with esteem-boosting feedback). It is worth noting that many behaviors which fall under both avoidance and alteration can be considered conformity; however, we do not refer to either as conformity because avoidance and alteration are characterized by the absence or presence of arousal of negative affect in response to belongingness threat (i.e., avoidance occurs prior to negative affect arousal and alteration occurs in response to it), and this is a distinction which does not exist in present conformity research. In the event verification cannot be found, the last option people have to alleviate negative affect arousal is distancing (departing or creating distance from the inconsistent group and seeking a consistent group).

We suggest a great deal of the social psychological literature can be understood as avoidance, mitigation, or distancing behaviors. We demonstrate the described paths in Figure 1. While this model has not been tested as a whole, each path we propose has at least modest support in the literature, as we will discuss in the following sections. Finally, while some potential behaviors logically preclude others (if one is considering validation, they have already failed avoidance), both ease and preference of these steps will vary based on the individual, the situation, and the cultural context. As such, the order of behaviors in the following diagram is meant to provide a clear model but not to imply some hierarchy among behaviors.

Figure 1.

Five Processes by Which People Mitigate Subjective-Social Inconsistency.

Although we theorize that the observation of subjective-social inconsistency is a universally disquieting experience, it may vary culturally. In collectivist cultures, one’s membership to a group is a much more central concern than in individualistic cultures (Morling et al., 2002), and so evidence of rejection should be more threatening. Although cognitive inconsistency on the whole may be comparatively less troubling for individuals in collectivist cultures than individualistic cultures (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997), inconsistency in a social domain remains aversive across cultural contexts (Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Sakai, 1981). Similarly, when others violate cultural norms (i.e., those whose behavior is inconsistent with social expectations) they tend to be viewed much more negatively in collectivist cultures (Stamkou et al., 2019), suggesting that social inconsistency is also viewed much more negatively for collectivists. As such, we expect the core motivational process underlying the desire for verification to be as strong (if not stronger) in collectivist cultures. Indeed, social inconsistency is one domain in which both individualist and collectivist participants experience dissonance.

The Purpose of this Model

A considerable volume of social psychological findings can be summarized as “individuals avoid inconsistencies” or “inconsistencies are aversive.” However, as Fiedler and Schott (2017) point out a wealth of true positive results can sometimes lead to theory building that is over-specified. That is, a theory can be correct and supported by valid evidence, but only describe a specific case of a larger phenomenon. A true positive test of a hypothesis may only provide evidence of sufficient conditions, but not necessary conditions, for a given effect. Fiedler and Schott give the following example: While terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1997) suggests mortality salience causes a shift toward conservative values, this is a sufficient but not necessary cause. Fiedler and Schott point out that Wicklund and Braun (1987) found that incompleteness priming (of which mortality salience is one type) can induce a similar shift toward conservative values. As such, mortality salience is a cause of the conservative shift but not the cause.

We believe it is important to explicate that the present theory is neither a refutation nor a replacement for the existing theories we discuss. Rather, the purpose of this theory is to organize a wide variety of psychological findings which, despite being considered discrete unrelated theories, tend to share many key features. As such, social verification theory provides a novel framework for fitting together a variety of theories that were previously treated as unrelated in the social psychological literature. It is our hope that from this new framework and perspective, researchers can develop novel research questions and hypotheses.

Changeability of Subjective Reality

The perceived changeability of one’s subjective reality is a key determinant of how they might address inconsistencies. Among the simplest methods of reducing the distress of inconsistency between subjective and social reality is to simply change one’s subjective reality. For example, it is a mere trifle for one to attenuate their previously positive view of their colleague Tom because everyone around the water cooler agrees that Tom is cruel or rude. Not all internal states, however, are easily changed. First, some internal states, such as identity, tend to be more stable in nature. For example, physical characteristics of one’s identity (such as race or sexuality) cannot be willfully changed. Other aspects of identity (such as religion or moral values) can be changed willfully, but change is generally gradual and/or effortful. Second, some internal states, such as emotion, are difficult to access. While emotions can be thought of as a series of appraisals (Ellsworth, 2007), those appraisals are often done rapidly and automatically, beyond the awareness of the individual. As such, individuals can exert control of the expression of emotions, but it is considerably more difficult to exert control over the experience of a given emotion. For example, if one were to attend a friend’s funeral and the funeralgoers instructed them that they should not cry, that would be manageable. However, if one attended a friend’s funeral and the funeralgoers instructed them that they should be happy, this would be a comparatively more difficult feat.

When Changing Subjective Reality is Not Feasible

There are a variety of domains where one’s subjective experience of reality is not readily changeable. We discuss the relevant research in two domains of subjective reality: emotion/sensation and identity. Although the vast majority of invalidation research is on emotion, sensation (e.g., pain), or identity invalidation, we posit that the processes and outcomes elucidated by the previous empirical research are motivated by the same needs. While this underlying need is the same, there are likely differences in the experience of invalidation both between individuals and across domains.

Emotional Invalidation

Invalidation is an experience where one’s inner state (e.g., emotion) is communicated to be incorrect by another. Because the “correctness” of emotional experience is not knowable objectively, the only standard people have to gauge “correctness” is a relevant group’s social reality. As such, experiencing invalidation is one type of inconsistency between subjective reality (e.g., experienced emotion) and social reality (e.g., appropriate emotion) that people may encounter.

Emotional invalidation has received considerable attention in clinical and developmental literature (e.g., Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2006; Leahy, 2005; Linehan, 1993). However, emotional invalidation has received only minimal attention in social literature. For instance, Schachter (1959) found that individuals faced with potentially unclear emotions (told they would participate in a potentially painful experiment) are motivated to affiliate with others who may be able to clarify the emotions (participants who just finished the experiment). While this demonstrated a basis for validation-related motivations, subsequent research tended to focus less on etiology, and more on implications (Rofé, 1984) or boundaries (Sarnoff & Zimbardo, 1961; Teichman, 1973) of these effects. The less-substantiated research in social psychology is surprising, given Schachter and Singer’s (1962) seminal research on emotion has had a profound impact on the field of emotions. Schachter and Singer gave participants injections of epinephrine (a drug which typically causes physiological arousal, e.g., increase heart rate and trembling hands) preceding injections they either informed participants of the physiological effects of the drug or did not. A confederate in the same room as the participants then acted angry or euphoric. When participants were not informed about the effects of the drug, they reported experiencing an emotion similar to that of the confederate. Thus, when people experienced an unclear or unexplainable emotional experience, they used social reality to identify it. We argue that there are two main ideas that spring from Schachter and Singer’s findings. The first is that emotions can be attributed to things unrelated to the cause of their arousal, as cleverly used by Zanna and Cooper (1974) in their seminal cognitive dissonance research. The second revelation is that emotional experiences can be dictated entirely by what other people are experiencing. This notion reiterates that emotions are not objective. This non-objectivity is why emotions fall under the purview of social reality (they cannot be ascertained objectively) and by extension why emotions can be invalidated. Indeed, this subjectivity is why somebody can be distressed when they are told “you shouldn’t feel sad” after unfortunate news, but not if they’re told “that ice cube is warm.” The former is invalidating, and the latter is preposterous. We assert that because the experience of emotional invalidation is an inconsistency between subjective and social reality, it threatens belonging. As such, experiencing emotional invalidation should arouse negative affect consistent with a threat response. Furthermore, following the logic of homeostatic needs as described earlier, the affect arousal should be asymmetrical such that invalidation always produces a negative affect while validation should only be beneficial if an individual is feeling invalidated.

Negative Affect Arousal

An individual becoming aware of an inconsistency between subjective reality (e.g., “I am feeling sad”) and social reality (e.g., “Nobody else feels sad about things like this”) should arouse negative affect similar to threat or distress. Indeed, the research supports this proposition. Generally, research has demonstrated that recognizing this inconsistency arouses a negative affective response (Edmond & Keefe, 2015; Fruzzetti et al., 2005). In one experiment, Linton and Colleagues (2012) randomly assigned participants to either be validated or be invalidated by a research assistant while completing a pain-inducing task (holding a bucket at arm’s length). Their results indicated that individuals who were validated (e.g., “It is painful isn’t it?”) experienced a smaller decrease in positive affect across four trials than those who were invalidated (e.g., “I didn’t feel anything like that when I did it”). In a similar experimental design, Herr and Colleagues (2015) induced sadness in participants and then subsequently validated (“That task makes a lot of people really sad”) or invalidated (“That doesn’t usually make people so sad”) the sadness of participants. They found that participants who were invalidated behaved more aggressively in a subsequent task. Furthermore, they found the effect of subsequent aggression was dramatically larger for individuals with emotion regulation difficulties. Similar work by Bushman and Baumeister (1998) has found that feedback that invalidates an individual’s positive view of their self (i.e., insults) elicits subsequent aggression from individuals high in narcissism (i.e., those individuals for whom the subjective reality of their self is unrealistically positive).

Not all negative affect arousal must be threat-related. For instance, sadness, disgust, and envy are all potentially negative emotions that are not directly tied to a threat response. Work by Shenk and Fruzzetti (2011) sought to specify the qualities of negative affect aroused when individuals experienced invalidation. In their research, individuals who were invalidated (compared with those who were validated) had increased negative affect, heart rate, and skin conductance reactions, which are consistent with perceiving threat, danger, or social rejection (see Iffland et al., 2014; Kelly et al., 2012). In a comprehensive study, Greville-Harris and Colleagues (2016) measured both psychological and physiological reactions of participants who received validating feedback (e.g., “lots of people have said that they felt that way”), invalidating feedback (e.g., “I’m not sure why you are stressed; nobody else has said that they felt that way”), and no feedback during a stressful mental arithmetic task. Similar to previous research, Greville-Harris and colleagues found no differences between validating feedback and no feedback but found elevated psychological distress and physiological threat-related responses in individuals who received invalidating feedback.

If invalidation (and other subjective-social inconsistencies) acts as a threat to a homeostatic need (like belonging) then when an individual is at their belongingness baseline invalidation should be aversive while validation should confer little to no benefits. Consistent with this corollary (in addition to previously described research) validation has been shown to have little to no impact on improving mood (Benitez, 2014; Benitez et al., 2019; Linton et al., 2012; Stigen, 2011), yet invalidation negatively affects one’s mood by arousing negative affect or attenuating positive affect (Benitez, 2014; Benitez et al., 2019; Linton et al., 2012; Shenk & Fruzzetti, 2011; Stigen, 2011; Vangronsveld & Linton, 2012). We will point out, however, that this is assuming individuals are at a baseline, to begin with. If individuals are already experiencing a negative mood, validation does offer some benefit, buoying those individuals by reducing negative affect (Benitez et al., 2019). Simply put, like social inclusion, only when one needs validation is it beneficial, and, like social rejection, invalidation always impacts individuals negatively.

Chronic Invalidation and Belonging

For some, experiences of invalidation can become chronic and unavoidable. People often find themselves in a relationship that they cannot leave due to large investments (Rusbult, 1980) or a lack of autonomy. For instance, an individual married with children may not view leaving their spouse as practical; alternatively, children and adolescents may lack the autonomy required to leave their parents. While chronic invalidation in a relationship is associated with dissatisfaction (Cano et al., 2008), an invalidating relationship is not the same as a dissatisfying relationship. We suggest that while a dissatisfying relationship need not be invalidating, an invalidating relationship will always be somewhat dissatisfying (due to the frequent aversive threat response to invalidation).

Chronic invalidation of inner states which are difficult to change, like emotion, is associated with a wide variety of negative outcomes for individuals. As the need to belong is a fundamental motivation, deprivation of belonging should elicit effects more severe than frustration or emotional distress. We posit that because invalidation threatens to belong, health outcomes associated with chronic invalidation should parallel the outcomes of chronic isolation. While there are a host of negative outcomes of isolation (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995), they can be broadly categorized into three types: physical health, mental health, and well-being.

Physical Health

Much of the research on invalidating environments comes from clinical studies, particularly with individuals experiencing chronic illnesses. Chronic illness, like emotion, is an aspect of subjective reality one cannot willfully change. Ghavidel-Parsa and Colleagues (2015) found that individuals with fibromyalgia experienced greater symptom severity when experiencing invalidation, which was operationalized as discounting (e.g., “[close other] makes me feel like an exaggerator”) and lack of understanding (e.g., “[close other] gives me a chance to talk about what’s on my mind” reverse coded). Using a similar measure, Kool and Colleagues (2012) found that for individuals experiencing rheumatic disease, invalidation of their illness was associated with worse health outcomes. For patients experiencing chronic pain, Edlund and Colleagues (2017) found that perceived illness invalidation from one’s physician was associated with more pain interference.

Mental Health

While the research on physical health outcomes is limited, there is a much broader range of research assessing mental health outcomes. Parental invalidation of emotions in an individual’s childhood has been linked with the development of, and difficulty managing, eating disorders later in life (Ford et al., 2011; Haslam et al., 2012; Mountford et al., 2007). Furthermore, Linehan’s (1993) biosocial model of borderline personality disorder suggests that chronic parental invalidation of emotions plays a key role in the development of borderline personality disorder later in life, which has been observed in various cultural contexts (e.g., both individualist and collectivist cultures, Keng & Soh, 2018). These effects can be additionally serious: Aiken and Colleagues (2019) found in a longitudinal study that at-risk adolescents who experienced parental invalidation were more likely to commit suicide. In further research on young adults, qualitative work by Semb and Colleagues (2019) on “communal invalidation” (i.e., invalidation from a community more generally, rather than a specific relationship) of young adults experiencing co-occurring mental health and substance abuse provided a significant barrier to successful recovery by isolating individuals from the community and social support.

Well-Being

Even when there are no clear physical or mental health outcomes, chronic invalidation still predicts lower well-being. Leahy (2005) points out that childhood invalidation could contribute to the development of insecure attachment orientations, which could interfere with subsequent relationships throughout life. Parental invalidation has been associated with more external (but not internal) problem behavior from children (Shenk & Fruzzetti, 2014). Similarly, research has shown that invalidation predicts lowered social engagement behaviors (Greville-Harris et al., 2016) and marital satisfaction (Cano et al., 2008). Not all outcomes are social in nature; some research has found invalidation is associated with acute decreases in emotional self-efficacy (Witkowski, 2017) as well as downstream reductions in emotion awareness (Lambie & Lindberg, 2016). More generally, invalidation of pain has been associated with the reduced overall quality of life in fibromyalgia patients (Lobo et al., 2014). In individuals who experience chronic pain, invalidation of their pain from their spouse is associated with lower marital satisfaction (Cano et al., 2008). Likewise, parental emotional invalidation was associated with lower relationship satisfaction (Shenk & Fruzzetti, 2014).

While the correlation between invalidation and physical health, mental health, and well-being outcomes are consistent, it should be noted that the causality of health outcomes cannot be (ethically) ascertained. Nonetheless, chronic invalidation of emotions and illness is associated with a range of negative outcomes. We suggest that these parallels corroborate our postulation that invalidation (inconsistency between subjective and social reality) threatens belonging, and if experienced chronically, manifests similar outcomes to chronic deprivation of belonging. While Baumeister and Leary (1995) suggest that people need only positive and consistent interactions to satisfy their belongingness needs, we suggest the corollary that these interactions need also be at least as validating as they are invalidating and that if a person were to have reliable positive interactions, if they were also invalidating the need to belong would not be met.

While we suggest that validation is inherently belongingness-driven behavior, people may also seek validation solely because of a preference for being correct, (i.e., purely epistemic reasons), among other factors. At this time, little research has assessed what core motivations underlie people’s desire for validation and aversion to invalidation. We theorize here that belongingness is a core motivation, with other factors such as epistemic motivations layered upon it. This implies that validation will be sought and found to be beneficial following social rejection and that variables such as one’s sensitivity to rejection should moderate people’s desire to be validated. However, this presents an important condition for falsification of the present theory: evidence that people seek validation even when belongingness needs have been met, or perhaps at the cost of them (e.g., seeking validation when it will certainly result in rejection), would falsify the present theory.

Identity Invalidation

Invalidation should function similarly across various domains provided the domains are similarly difficult to change. Aside from emotion and illness invalidation, some research has explored the experiences and outcomes of identity invalidation. We posit the patterns of results of this research should parallel the previously discussed work. Individuals with minority identities should have a unique risk of experiencing invalidation from the majority group, because minority identities are, by definition, dissimilar from the prevailing group identities. This dissimilarity alone presents a potential for invalidation from the majority group. For instance, multiracial individuals might find themselves between two social realities, neither of which is entirely consistent with their own subjective reality. Research by Franco (see Franco et al., 2021; Franco & Franco, 2016; Franco & O’Brien, 2018) finds that multiracial individuals whose racial identity was invalidated experienced reduced feelings of connectedness, and reduced psychological well-being. Such findings are likely intertwined with cultural experiences of invalidation: Black youth might face cultural invalidation in the form of accusations of “acting White” (see Neal-Barnett et al., 2001), which has implications for the development of racial identities among Black youths later in life (Durkee et al., 2022).

LGBTQ+ individuals may also experience invalidation of their identity by majority groups. Non-binary individuals who experienced increased invalidation of their identity experienced reduced psycho-social well-being (Johnson et al., 2020). Qualitative research on bisexual individuals found identity invalidation was associated with decreased well-being (Feinstein et al., 2019). It is possible even for an invalidating environment to shape an individual such that they hold beliefs that their own identity is not correct (i.e., internalized heterosexism). In a study of LGB youth, Bourn and Colleagues (2018) found that internalized heterosexism was positively associated with psychache (a construct that has been previously associated with suicidal ideation; Pompili et al., 2008). In terms of gender, research assessing people’s gender traits have found that men might feel their masculinity is inconsistent with what is typical of their group (referred to as “gender role strain” see Levant & Powell, 2017), and this inconsistency elicits distress (e.g., Fields et al., 2015). Further research found that attempts to verify themselves in the face of this discrepancy can lead individuals to behave in ways harmful to themselves (Reidy et al., 2016) and others (Reidy et al., 2014). Invalidation of identity seems to be associated with similar negative outcomes of chronic emotional invalidation. This illustrates that it is not the emotion invalidated, but rather the experience of invalidation generally (feel subjective reality is inconsistent with social reality), which both elicits distress and is linked to a wide array of negative outcomes.

Summary

When an individual is made aware of an inconsistency between their subjective reality and the social reality, the experience is distressing and arouses negative affect. Furthermore, prolonged or chronic threats to verification (such as consistent invalidation) can have profound effects on one’s well-being later in life, similar to those individuals experience when deprived of belonging. However, what if the operative aspect of one’s subjective reality can be changed, such as an attitude or belief?

When Changing Subjective Reality is Feasible

While emotions and identity may be difficult or impossible to change, attitudes and beliefs can range anywhere from rigid (such as values or morals; e.g., “socialism is bad”) to flexible (such as appraisals of fleeting or unimportant stimuli; e.g., “that barista seemed nice”).

Cognitive Dissonance and Group Conformity

Not all cognitions are as rigid as identity-related attitudes. Indeed, one’s cognitions might be more flexible, as with classic cognitive dissonance paradigms. Although cognitive dissonance is not the only form of cognitive invalidation that one can experience, it is a key example of not only the process but also the consequences of invalidation. Cognitive dissonance was first conceptualized in Festinger's (1957) classic paradigm which induces an individual to lie to another participant. In this paradigm, individuals participate in a study that is very boring and mundane; after the completion of the study, they are instructed to tell the next person waiting outside that the study was enjoyable and fun. Participants then either receive 20 dollars as compensation for their lying, or they are given just one dollar for their lying. Although traditional understandings of conformity would not have predicted as such, Festinger found that those who were given a comparatively large sum of money to lie did not experience discomfort (dissonance arousal), nor did their attitudes toward the study change. In contrast, those who received only a small incentive to lie experienced greater dissonance arousal and changed their attitudes such that they felt more favorably about the study than they previously had. Over time, many theories emerged about the exact processes that may be at play to induce and mitigate cognitive dissonance. Although extant theories are indeed numerous, several perspectives have remained dominant in the literature, including self-consistency theory (Aronson, 1969; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992), and the New Look model (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), with self-affirmation theory (Steele & Liu, 1981, 1983) emerging as just one possible method of dissonance reduction.

While cognitive dissonance theory would predict internal attitude change in response to perceived cognitive inconsistencies, conformity may predict that a similar discomfort is aroused but when one’s behavior is inconsistent with those around them. In both instances, internal inconsistency precipitates behavioral outcomes, but the processes and outcomes are different. While dissonance typically results in attitudinal change, conformity refers to the changing of one’s affect, cognition, or behavior, to better align with the source of influence. The longevity of changes varies depending on the type of conformity. In private conformity, the change of behavior results in a change in the individual’s attitude (e.g., Sherif, 1936). In public conformity, the change of behavior is simply an illusion of changed beliefs (e.g., Asch, 1951). Despite these nuances, the same fundamental processes are at play: An individual perceives a difference between their internal state and the appropriate social reality and makes some modifications as a result. We suggest that cognitive dissonance and conformity therefore have a great deal in common, but, more specifically, that dissonance and conformity may be potential outcomes of inconsistency between subjective and social realities. We believe that insights from these theories collectively form the basis for how social verification theory operates through cognitions.

Current Cognitive Dissonance Theories

Self-Consistency Theory

Self-consistency theory posits that dissonance is aroused when individuals perceive that there is an inconsistency between their behavior and their perception of themselves (Aronson, 1969; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). Drawing on the Festinger’s (1957) study, people who saw themselves as rational, moral actors maintained this self-image by changing their attitude such that they believed that the study truly was enjoyable and fun. This shift in perception of the task as being enjoyable allowed the participants to maintain an image of themselves as rational, moral actors.

New Look Model

Another key theory of cognitive dissonance is the New Look Model of Dissonance Theory (New Look). New Look proposes that the key requirements for cognitive dissonance to be aroused and realized are aversive consequences and personal responsibility (Cooper & Fazio, 1984). In this theory, aversive consequences are assessed, personal responsibility is determined, and if the individual is personally responsible with no external justification, dissonance is aroused. While the New Look model has not received extensive cross-cultural testing, the key mechanism (feelings of guilt) appears to present to a similar degree across different cultures (Lutwak et al., 1998). While aversive consequences are one way for dissonance to be aroused, we note that aversive consequences may not always be a sufficient explanation. That is, in instances such as group and vicarious dissonance there may an absence of aversive consequences though dissonance still occurs. We discuss this in more detail in the next section.

Self-Affirmation Theory

Steele and Liu (1981, 1983) also propose a self-oriented model of cognitive dissonance, the self-affirmation theory of dissonance reduction. In this theory, the dissonance is aroused when individuals act in ways that are inconsistent with their views of themselves as rational and moral individuals. Here, however, individuals may be able to reduce their dissonance arousal by affirming other positive aspects of their self (e.g., as good, moral, fun, etc.) in an entirely unrelated context. For example, a reminder of one’s good prior actions such as their volunteer work might be enough to reduce their feelings of dissonance caused by lying in the original Festinger paradigm. By this logic, self-consistency is not a necessary condition for the arousal of cognitive dissonance. Here, the discrepancy leading to dissonance, and the process by which it may be mitigated, is unique from our conceptualization of dissonance arousal as a social verification process. Specifically, we posit that the discrepancy necessary for arousal is between the individual’s perception of themselves, and their perception of their group’s perception of them.

Vicarious Dissonance, Group Dissonance, and Conformity

Each of these models outlines scenarios under which they would predict cognitive dissonance and under which dissonance arousal and reduction should occur. Indeed, the aforementioned theories of cognitive dissonance do provide some explanations for cognitive dissonance. The goal of this article is not to refute existing dissonance theories. Rather, we note that there are some group-level dissonance effects, such as vicarious and group dissonance, that do not implicate the self in the ways required or implied by these prior theories. We propose that this is because underlying these theories are social verification processes and, consequently, they would benefit from being examined through a social verification theoretical lens.

Vicarious Dissonance

Vicarious dissonance, proposed by Norton et al. (2003), describes cognitive dissonance wherein an individual experiences dissonance arousal by observing members of their social group participating in an act that should be dissonance-inducing for the actor. In these cases where an in-group member behaves inconsistently with the group-level norms (social reality), the individual viewing this behavior is more likely to change their attitude (subjective reality), in light of this inconsistent behavior. This type of dissonance challenges typical dissonance approaches in that it does not appear to be related to aversive consequences and also seems unlikely to be related to the self, except perhaps by proxy.

The primary issue with explanations for vicarious dissonance inferred from present theories is that personal discomfort should be reduced when a participant is allowed to articulate their own attitude. Indeed, articulating one’s attitude should at minimum serve as a form of self-affirmation and should lead the participant to feel as though they are once again acting in a self-consistent manner. What occurs in vicarious dissonance paradigms, however, is that participants still experience vicarious discomfort. That is, they reduce a particular form of discomfort aroused by their perceived dissonant behavior—referred to as personal discomfort—but they do not mitigate all dissonance. This residual dissonance is what is referred to as vicarious dissonance and is the dissonance felt due to the actor’s dissonant behavior. In much the same way as theories falling under the “self” categorization (i.e., self-affirmation, self-consistency) cannot adequately explain vicarious dissonance, it is not clear that New Look can explain the findings either. Indeed, there is no personal responsibility for the participant who is watching a dissonant group member, nor is there an inherently aversive consequence for the viewing participant, both of which are fundamental to New Look’s mechanistic explanations.

What may be lacking, therefore, is a broader, group-level theory of dissonance to account for these findings. From the perspective of social verification theory, vicarious dissonance is aroused because the individual’s subjective reality (e.g., that senior comprehensive exams are bad) is at odds with the very statement that their in-group member had just espoused (e.g., that senior comprehensive exams are good). Thus, an adequate explanation for this type of cognitive dissonance must necessarily recognize that social verification is playing a fundamental role in inducing cognitive dissonance in the individual.

Group Dissonance and Conformity

In a very similar manner to that of vicarious dissonance, theorists have also identified group dissonance as a unique form of cognitive dissonance. In this phenomenon, documented by Matz and Wood (2005), individuals experience dissonance arousal when their attitude is discrepant with the shared attitude of the group. From a social verification perspective, this could be reconceptualized as approximating a discrepancy between subjective and social realities in instances where an attitude is held with sufficient conviction as to be a subjective reality. Matz and Wood (2005) informed individuals that they were members of a jury and that they were to choose the verdict for the accused. Individuals experienced dissonance when their attitude was deviant from the attitude of the other “jurors” (who were all said to have voted in the opposite direction of the individual). They found that leaving the group was an effective strategy for reducing dissonance, as was persuading the group and yielding to the group, with differing degrees of success.

Those familiar with conformity research (e.g., Asch, 1951) might notice the similarities between group dissonance and private conformity (e.g., Sherif, 1936). Indeed, yielding to the group is what we might consider conformity, while the other dominant strategies might be more appropriately referred to as dissonance reduction techniques. Although the outcome is the same—the individual experiencing discomfort wants to mitigate their discomfort by changing their discrepancy with the group—the strategies for doing so vary. Regardless of the strategies employed for reducing discomfort, the similarities between private conformity and group dissonance processes can be explained succinctly by social verification theory: The individual wants social verification and will employ any strategy necessary to align with the group, reducing the belongingness threat.

Considering the role of the group in inducing compliance or dissonance—situations where the group norms are made salient—it seems intuitive to wonder about the role of anonymity in conformity and dissonance. After all, does it really matter if one doesn’t agree with the group if nobody knows that they don’t agree? Indeed, this has been the topic of some discussion and research has found that conformity is differentially induced contingent on whether the individual is anonymous or identifiable to the group (see e.g., Diener et al., 1980; Postmes et al., 2001; but see Robertson, 2006). This is consistent with theories such as deindividuation theory (see Diener et al., 1980) which suggests that conformity should be more pronounced in the presence of a group, while anonymous conditions should reduce conformity. Social verification theory predicts that social reality (group norms, narratives, etc.) should be impactful in either anonymous or identifiable situations, however, and some conflicting research may elucidate why that could be true.

Research has suggested that there may be cases of anonymity under which conformity and/or cognitive dissonance effects may be enhanced or unchanged (see Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2000; Robertson, 2006). In Robertson (2006), for example, more attitude change occurred in a computer-mediated dissonance paradigm when participants were not identifiable; this was driven by the salient group norm of attitude-behavior consistency. Indeed, increased attitude change under anonymous conditions is consistent with Robertson’s reasoning that this is captured by the Social Identity model of De-Individuation Effects (SIDE). More specifically, they argue that the ratio of perceived differences between and within groups is higher when anonymity is present and group identity is high, which SIDE would suggest increases identity salience and, consequently, group norm adherence. Of course, these findings may also help to explain why vicarious dissonance may occur. In vicarious dissonance, the individual is anonymous to their group member as an outside observer, but group norms are highly salient which is presumed to drive the attitude change process.

Although dissonance reduction strategies, such as self-affirmation theory (Steele & Liu, 1981), provide some explanation for how one might reduce the negative arousal produced as a result of vicarious and group dissonance, social verification theory can contribute to mechanistic explanations for group dissonance. This is true for conformity as well. We posit that conformity is induced for much the same reason as leaving the group reduces group dissonance: the individual experiences a discrepancy between what they feel is correct (their subjective reality) and what is purported to be correct by their in-group (social reality). This is further bolstered by conformity’s apparent cross-cultural stability (see Bond, 2004 for a review), suggesting that conforming to reduce inconsistency is a tenable solution to inconsistencies for individuals from various cultures. Thus, one would be inclined to conform in situations where leaving the in-group is not possible due to psychological or physical barriers, such as in an experimental setting, or when one’s friends, fellow parishioners, or family members act discrepantly. Similarly, when leaving the group is comparatively easy, often when the group is arbitrary or temporary, the individual is more inclined to reduce their dissonance by simply leaving the in-group. While conforming and finding a new group are both tenable solutions to dissonance across cultures, the preference for these solutions may vary depending on both situational and environmental factors, which are likely to vary systematically with cultural context. In either situation, however, the negative affect induced is a direct result of a mismatch between the person’s subjective and social reality.

Social Verification Theory as an Explanation for Cognitive Invalidation

Although the literature we have reviewed here is not exhaustive, it highlights some key issues with current theories that implicate cognitive invalidation. None of the theories presented provide satisfactory explanations for the underlying mechanisms at play in vicarious dissonance, group dissonance, and conformity. Although each theory provides some insight into circumstances under which dissonance predictions could be made, they fail to capture the underlying processes in cognitive invalidation. Specifically, there is a discrepancy between the subjective and social reality. While the magnitude of a dissonance response is certainly affected by a wide range of factors, the present theory suggests that when it is socially contextual it occurs primarily for belongingness needs. More generally, we suggest that recognition of social inconsistency is the source of dissonance in these paradigms. As such, evidence suggesting that dissonance occurs in a manner inconsistent with belongingness needs (e.g., people recently rejected experience less group dissonance or vicarious dissonance than those not rejected) would demonstrate conditions for falsification of the present theory.

Our theory suggests that each of the findings outlined here can be explained by social verification theory, which posits that the desire to remain consistent with one’s group is a central driving factor in each of these behaviors. Social verification theory predicts that in situations of cognitive invalidation, individuals will turn to the group norms for verification of their behavior, even disregarding their own ideas about themselves and their beliefs in favor of being socially verified. Of course, there are paradigms in which dissonance occurs only within an individual in isolation which are well-explained by extant dissonance theories. However, when inconsistency is social, such as vicarious or group dissonance, social verification theory better predicts each of these findings than traditional dissonance paradigms.

Mitigation Behaviors

If an inconsistency with others has been perceived, negative affect is likely to be aroused in the individual. This negative affect is necessarily aversive, leading to a strong motivation to eliminate it. There are various strategies that one might undertake when doing so: One may seek validating feedback about the inconsistency in an effort to reduce the perception of inconsistency, or alternatively, one may accept the inconsistency and instead opt for affirmation to simply reduce negative affect, or perhaps one chooses simply to alter the inconsistent attitude, behavior, or cognition so as to no longer be inconsistent. An individual may choose any of the below mitigation behaviors, which may be differentially impactful and preferred based on the circumstances which gave rise to the inconsistency.

Validation

Validating feedback (i.e., direct or implied feedback that one’s subjective reality is consistent with a social reality) is effective in assuaging negative affect aroused from perceiving inconsistency. Similarly, validation has been shown to be effective in mitigating negative affect arousal even in cognitive dissonance paradigms. Performing a dissonance-arousing task with other individuals (Zanna & Sande, 1987), or simply hearing that others behaved similarly to oneself (Lepper et al., 1970; McKimmie et al., 2003), both effectively reduced dissonance arousal. Furthermore, seeing a confederate (posing as a fellow student) complete a dissonance-inducing action under high choice reduces the subsequent dissonance a participant experiences (Stroebe & Diehl, 1981).

Matz and Wood (2005) demonstrated that participants’ dissonance could be mitigated by convincing group members to adopt their position. Thus, while validation is typically achieved by another person changing one’s perception of the social reality (e.g., “I thought I was the only person who felt this way, but my friend told me they also feel this way”) validation can also be achieved by one actually changing the social reality to be consistent with their subjective reality (e.g., “I was the only one who felt this way, but I explained things to my family and now they feel the same way as me”). Notably, in Matz and Wood’s paradigm, the validation of changing the social reality was the only solution (compared with distancing and alteration), which resulted in a positive affect (in addition to the reduced negative affect) for participants.

Identity is one aspect of reality that an individual cannot easily change. As such, receiving identity-discrepant information is often inherently threatening. If an individual feels they are a fun person, then hears all of their close friends agree that they are an absolute bore they ought to feel a threat of their subjective reality (“I’m funny”) being inconsistent with the social reality (“you’re not funny”). This has been demonstrated to be the case by Swann et al. (1989), for example, found that participants preferred to receive more positive feedback about themselves, and that this feedback should be positive when it is about their positive ideas of themselves (e.g., I think I am funny, I prefer feedback suggesting that I am funny). While one might surmise this is simply a treat to an individual’s ego, the same findings apply to negative self-identity. That is, when looking for feedback about their negative self-concepts, participants again preferred to receive identity-consistent rather than inconsistent information, thereby preferring negative information about these traits (e.g., I think I could lose some weight, it bothers me when people tell me I’m fine how I am). Consistent with this research, it is important in relationships that an individual’s perceptions of their partner should, to some degree, mirror their partners’ self-perceptions (e.g., Kenny & DePaulo, 1993). Of course, these perceptions need not be perfectly accurate, for instance, one may perceive a neutral trait such as stubbornness positively (i.e., strong sense of integrity) or negatively (i.e., egotistical).

Indeed, validation is so important that people would often rather receive validating insults than invalidating compliments. This expectation then drives other behaviors. De La Ronde and Swann (1998) find that individuals spontaneously attempt to validate their partner after receiving discrepant (i.e., invalidating) feedback. This verification in turn fostered greater intimacy in the relationship. Again, this was not simply an effect of “feeling good” as these results were consistent when the partner validated overly negative or overly positive feedback and that they seek this verification of their identity from others (Swann, 2012).

While validation is generally a social process, in some cirucmstances validating feedback can be generated by one’s own behavior. Sherman and Gorkin (1980) aroused dissonance responses in pro-feminist participants with a gender-role logic puzzle. Failing to solve the puzzle would generate a response that was stereotypically sexist. As such, pro-feminist participants who failed the puzzle would experience dissonance as their subjective reality (“I am a feminist, thus anti-sexist”) would be inconsistent with the social reality (“people may have percieved me as being sexist”). These participants reduced dissonance in a subsequent court simulation task, by favoring a female plaintiff, allowing them to validate their identity by behaving in a way that highlights their values. This subsequent favoring behavior was particularly strong for individuals with stronger identities, which suggests more inflexible inner states may require stronger validation. While this behaviour is self-generated, it’s important to note that this feedback is performative. That is, one can validate their feminist views by behaving in a “feminist” way only if there are others around to behave for. In a sense, this behaviour is an attempt to change the social reality (“If I behave like a feminist those people will think I’m a feminist despite my sexist comment”). Social verification theory suggests that if an individual is isolated or anonymous, self-generated feedback would not be performative, thus making true self-validation difficult.

While validation can be achieved through changes to one’s behavior (e.g., Sherman & Gorkin, 1980), it can also be achieved through attempting to change others’ perspectives, thus validating oneself (e.g., Matz & Wood, 2005). It is notable that despite people desiring validation across cultures, how people achieve validation may vary to an extensive degree based on cultural context. For instance, research has demonstrated that, because of harmony concerns, people in collectivist cultures tend to seek social support to cope with stress less than those in individualistic cultures (Kim et al., 2006). That is, bringing a strong negative emotional experience or stressor to a close other could be seen as inconveniencing or burdening them, thus disrupting the harmony of the relationship. Explicit appeals to validate oneself or change an ingroup member may often be undesirable for collectivist individuals.

Both individualistic and collectivist cultures can be seen as either vertical (favoring social hierarchy) or horizontal (favoring social egalitarianism; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). The degree to which one’s culture is vertical or horizontal may interact with one’s preference for validation. For instance, imagine a supervisor and student who are inconsistent in their hypotheses for a study. In a horizontal individualistic culture, the student and supervisor may argue, attempting to change one another’s opinion, and thus validating themselves (validation being preferable). In a horizontal collectivist culture, both parties may view seeking validation as disrupting the harmony and thus may both move their beliefs toward a compromise, thus reducing the magnitude of the inconsistency (alteration being preferable). For both vertical collectivists and vertical individualists, however, these individuals may view it as the student’s duty to defer to their supervisor. In this case, validation is preferable for the supervisor, while alteration is preferable for the student.

Alteration

As previously discussed, some aspects of subjective reality (such as attitudes toward novel objects) are quite changeable. In these circumstances, simply changing one’s subjective reality is the easiest mode of mitigating threat-related affect. Indeed, the central focus of much of cognitive dissonance research has centered around the conditions under which individuals change their cognitions and to what extent (see e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Scher & Cooper, 1989). For example, in the earliest cognitive dissonance research, participants in Festinger’s (1957) research were found to have changed their attitudes to be in the direction of the dissonant cognition (e.g., claiming that the task was desirable, thus feeling that it truly was desirable).

This alteration in subjective reality is not exclusive to cognitive dissonance, of course, as individuals will also change their behavior or their attitudes in response to conformity pressures from a group. For example, Sherif (1936) provides the earliest example of this conformity. Sherif’s autokinetic effect research demonstrated that participants tend to vary in their own independent cognitions when judging ambiguous stimuli. Notably, in this paradigm, participants lack an objective reality of how far the light moved, and so they sought to reach consensus among their subjective realities and the social reality. Once participants converged on a single perspective (i.e., a shared reality), this remained their reality even outside the group (as the social reality was substituted for the lacking objective reality). These findings (often referred to as private conformity) are particularly interesting when contrasted with the findings of Asch (1951). Asch found that when the objective reality was not ambiguous, participants conformed, similar to those in Sherif’s research. However, this conformity did not result in a lasting change in one’s subjective reality outside the study (often referred to as public conformity). Simply put, when the objective reality was not clear, participants used their peers to reach a collective truth; however, when the objective reality was clear, individuals conform simply to avoid standing out but do not change their subjective of reality. Indeed, stronger group membership enhances the originally observed autokinetic effect (Abrams et al., 1990). Importantly, conformity-like effects do not require recognition of inconsistency, but people may conform to avoid future inconsistencies as well (see Avoidance section below). We suggest this is an important delineation that has not received a large degree of attention: conformity to mitigate a present inconsistency (e.g., Asch, 1951) and conformity to avoid future inconsistencies (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) are different processes.

Affirmation

Once a subjective-social inconsistency has been identified, this will generate a threat to the individual’s belonging. While mitigation can occur through the reduction of the inconsistency (validation or alteration), mitigation can also simply target the threat response itself, leaving the inconsistency unchallenged. Sociometer theory (Leary & Baumeister, 2000; see Leary, 2012 for a review) suggests that self-esteem exists as a measure of one’s value to their group(s). The sociometer should have the most value when relationships are comparatively transient and relational mobility is high (see Yuki & Schug, 2012). As such, for individuals in high relational mobility cultures (e.g., individualistic cultures) esteem needs should be more proximal, while for individuals in low relational mobility cultures (e.g., collectivist cultures) esteem needs should be more distal. Threats to belonging, then, should be easy to mitigate with self-esteem enhancement, but only for individuals in high relational mobility cultures.

In studying the classic cognitive dissonance paradigm, Steele and Liu (1981, 1983) found that the affirmation of even unrelated domains can mitigate the negative affect arousal of perceiving subjective-social inconsistencies. As such, bolstering one’s self-esteem in unrelated domains can serve to bolster one’s sociometer, thus making the threat of non-belonging less threatening (i.e., “I may not be consistent on this, but I have a lot of value and so I won’t be rejected”). However, if affirmation works because of increased self-esteem (thus bolstering the sociometer and dampening the threat of non-belonging), it should be largely ineffective for individuals in collectivist cultures (for whom self-esteem is a distal concern because of lower relational mobility). Indeed, the affirmation of unrelated domains does not assuage the negative affect arousal of subjective-social inconsistencies (Heine & Lehman, 1997). While affirmation as threat mitigation is serviceable, it is worth noting that affirmation, or other mood-buoying responses, have been found to be less preferred than direct means of addressing inconsistency through alteration or validation (Stone et al., 1997). Similarly, affirmation has shown some use in mitigating cross-sectional attitudinal conformity (Binning et al., 2015) but seems rather unreliable at mitigating long-term behavioral conformity (Reid et al., 2019).

Distancing

In the event that one cannot, or is unwilling to, alter their subjective reality or validate themselves in face of inconsistency, a final option is to distance themselves from that group. While distancing can take many forms, we are referring to specifically the act of disengaging and/or avoiding group members. While this response does not “solve” the acute threats to belonging, it can prevent those threats from becoming chronic (which is associated with a wide range of negative outcomes as previously described). Distancing can reduce the acute threats to belonging if one finds a new group which then provides validation (Matz & Wood, 2005). This could be considered a “risky” response as leaving the group does not guarantee one will find another group, and so it is often likely to be undesirable. Indeed, the dissolution of closer relationships also tends to be more distressing precisely because people feel it will be difficult to find another individual to fill that role (Simpson, 1987). While this evidence supports the idea that distancing via disengaging with the group is possible, there is little evidence for how effective other forms of distancing might be; future research might benefit from assessing how de-identifying with a given group while not explicitly disengaging may similarly help mitigate inconsistency.

While we assert that there is a consistency of the need for verification across cultures, preferences in paths to achieving this need may vary. For instance, individuals in individualistic cultures view many aspects of the self-concept as relatively difficult to change while individuals from collectivist cultures tend to view traits as generally less stable and more malleable (Church et al., 2005; Lockhart et al., 2008). The inverse is true of relationships, where people in individualistic cultures feel relationships are more malleable, and people in collectivist cultures see relationships as comparatively more fixed (see Yuki & Schug, 2012). As such, while individualistic individuals may find distancing to be a feasible or even convenient means of reducing invalidation (Swann et al., 1989), individuals in collectivist cultures may be less willing to distance from their groups and more willing to employ alteration.

Avoidance

At this point, we have established that inconsistencies with the self and with the group are aversive and that individuals will attempt to mitigate these when possible. Thus, it should come as no surprise that people make thorough attempts to avoid these subjective-social inconsistencies and the resultant aversive threat to belonging. Although we have reviewed research outlining internal strategies for mitigating these threats, perhaps the most obvious strategy would be to simply avoid those situations to begin with. In the following section, we therefore highlight a variety of research that is underpinned by the same motivation to avoid inconsistencies and build relationships by disclosing or sharing subjective reality with others.

Behavioral Mimicry

There are many ways one might augment themselves to reduce future inconsistency, they may change their attitudes, memories, perceptions, or even their behavior. In research on behavioral mimicry, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) found that people demonstrated a tendency to unintentionally augment their behavior to be more consistent with individuals with whom they were interacting. In subsequent research, Lakin and Chartrand (2003) found this tendency was heightened when affiliation goals were primed. That is, when people were motivated to establish a positive relationship with an individual or expected to interact with an individual, they mimicked that individual’s behavior more. This tendency is consistent with the predictions of the present theory, which suggests people modulate aspects of their social reality (e.g., behavioral tendencies) to be consistent with those around them, to minimize the potential of inconsistency.

Balance Theory

Around when Festinger (1957) first wrote about cognitive dissonance, Heider (1958) proposed a similar but distinct theory: In an interpersonal triad, people will be motivated for cognitive consistency among evaluations of members. That is, people want those they like to like their friends. Impressions of people cannot be held to an objective standard, and when forming impressions, every individual is often relying on at least slightly different information. So, if an individual’s subjective reality is “friend B is a good person,” yet another individual close to them suggests “friend B is a bad person,” this will constitute an inconsistency between subjective and social reality. As such, people avoid such circumstances when forming impressions of others. Gawronski and Colleagues (2005) demonstrated this tendency by showing that people use the opinions of liked others when forming an impression of a novel others. That is, participants augment their opinions of a novel individual of avoid inconsistency with those who they already like.

Shared Reality

Shared reality (see, Echterhoff et al., 2009; Levine & Higgins, 2001) describes a state where individuals have achieved commonality of inner states toward some target. As previously mentioned, this state can be understood to be the desired “equilibrium” or “goal” of verification processes. Echterhoff and colleagues point out that this process can be motivated by epistemic or relational factors. We suggest that the epistemic and relational factors are intertwined. That is, people are motivated to converge with their group to ascertain what is “true” (the epistemic goal), but the inconsistency with the group is universally threatening (the relational goal). As such, people are motivated toward consistency for epistemic purposes, and away from inconsistency for relational purposes.

A general sense of shared reality is an important goal in most relationships. That is, people want to minimize occurrences of inconsistency. If people are already in a relationship, sometimes maintaining harmony can better protect them from rejection than addressing inconsistencies. As such, people can and will accommodate inconsistencies within a relationship, provided they are fewer and less impactful than the consistencies. For instance, if one’s core values are consistent with a friend, it will be easy to accommodate their disagreement over food preferences. Domains that may be more self-relevant, less changeable, or more important, should, however, pose more threat in the presence of invalidation. Indeed, research on close relationships does suggest that people can tolerate minor inconsistencies, but for closer relationships and more central issues, attitudinal alignment becomes much more important (Davis & Rusbult, 2001). This gives rise to two notable hypotheses. First, there is some point of saturation where the invalidation due to the volume of small inconsistencies outweighs the potential validation of big consistencies. Generally, most people shouldn’t reach this point, as both parties will often accommodate trivial inconsistencies, such as adjusting attitudes, until both parties are similar. The second notable hypothesis is that not every person will view the same inconsistencies as trivial. For instance, imagine a devout Catholic (who strongly believes one should live in accordance with the moral doctrine of the Catholic church) and a morally relativistic atheist (who doesn’t have any strong opinions on the moral codes by which people live their lives). If these two individuals were friends, the Catholic will likely be much more distressed by the inconsistency of morality, to them it would be a major inconsistency on a core belief, but to our hypothetical atheist, it is a trivial inconsistency. As such, one might hypothesize that in this circumstance Catholic would be much more motivated to reduce the inconsistency and (because altering their own core values is not typically an option) would likely try to shift their friend toward consistency.

Intimacy

Relationships research has also demonstrated that while people are initially more attracted to those who they perceive to be similar (Klohnen & Luo, 2003; Tidwell et al., 2013), repeated interaction leads couples to grow more similar in domains such as emotional responses (Anderson et al., 2003) and attitudes (Davis & Rusbult, 2001). Furthermore, this convergence is associated with more satisfying relationships (Gonzaga et al., 2007), which we suggest reflects the general tendency of people to minimize social inconsistencies across their relationships. While we have laid out how invalidation from an in-group member can threaten belonging needs, the inverse can occur as well. That is, validation can be instrumental in the forming and strengthening of new relationships. Reis and Shaver’s (1988) theory of intimacy suggests that disclosure and subsequent validation are core behaviors in the building of intimacy. That is, by disclosing information to an individual, one affords that individual an opportunity to verify their belonging. In accordance with the present theory, validation should be particularly potent under conditions where objective reality is harder to ascertain. That is, the “correctness” of a piece of information (e.g., “I went on a trip last year”) would be relatively easy to ascertain in comparison to an emotional experience (e.g., “I feel lonely and homesick on my trip last year”); thus, validation of the latter would be much more desirable. Indeed, research supports this corollary, emotional disclosures are much more effective in building intimacy than disclosures of information or fact (Laurenceau et al., 1998). In a more specific setting, the process of “capitalization” demonstrates the social influence of validation further, showing that individuals seek out their close others to disclose positive affective experiences, and subsequent validation strengthens relationships, while invalidation deteriorates them (Gable et al., 2006).

Self-Verification Theory

While we addressed how self-verification theory describes some mitigation behaviors, it also demonstrates some avoidance behaviors. Specifically, in group preference/selection, Swann and Colleagues (1992) found that while individuals with a positive self-concept preferred partners in an experiment who viewed them positively, those with a negative self-concept preferred partners in an experiment who viewed them negatively. As previously mentioned, there is a tension in individualistic (high relational mobility) cultures between verification and enhancement needs. Both behaviors serve belonging needs (either through the sociometer or through validation), but they are occasionally achieved through contradictory means. For instance, consistent with self-enhancement people prefer feedback pertaining to their positive self-views rather than negative self-views (regardless of self-esteem). However, when seeking feedback pertaining to their negative self-views, people do prefer unfavorable (or “accurate”) feedback (Swann et al., 1989). Simply put, given a choice of feedback, one would prefer it be about their positive aspects (so both enhancement and verification can be achieved) but when feedback is about a negative aspect, it is preferable for it to be verifying.

Of course, this tension does not exist (at least to the same extent) in collectivist (low relational mobility) cultures. That is, because collectivist cultures don’t emphasize enhancement like individualistic cultures (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1995; Kitayama et al., 1997), individuals in these cultures should not show a preference in receiving feedback about positive or negative aspects of themselves (indeed, when receiving negative feedback regarding a failed task in private, Canadian participants tend to discount the feedback, while Japanese participants do not; Heine et al., 2001). However, we do posit that whether receiving positive or negative feedback, individuals in collectivist cultures should prefer it be verifying.

Self-Consistency

Prior theories have suggested people have a need to feel a sense of a consistent continuous self (Lecky, 1945). While some work has suggested that self-consistency is a peripheral concern outside of individualistic cultures (Cialdini et al., 1999), other research has demonstrated that self-consistency is important in collectivist cultures but emerges as a desire to be consistent in a given context, rather than with oneself generally (English & Chen, 2007). However, even within a given culture, the desire for self-consistency appears not to be universal, with many people expressing indifference toward consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995). This stands to reason as people seem to have no issues changing themselves to align with social forces, particularly in novel or ambiguous situations (e.g., Gawronski et al., 2005; Sherif, 1936). Indeed, people will forgo their desire to be consistent with their past selves if it means achieving consistency with those around them. This suggests that people’s desire for themselves and others to be self-consistent is in service of their need for social consistency, which also explains why self-inconsistency in others is also seen rather negatively (Allgeier et al., 1979; Feinberg et al., 2019). We posit that the preference for self-consistency is an injunctive norm that arises in part from the need for verification. People desire to establish a shared consistent perception of reality with those around them. An individual who behaves unpredictably or inconsistently both with their self and with social reality is a regular threat to the goal of consistency. Thus, we suggest that people’s preference for consistency in themselves, and in those around them, is another means of avoiding social inconsistency.

Selective Exposure

If people prefer to associate with those who believe the same things about themselves for the sake of minimizing future inconsistencies, does this tendency extend to more general domains? Selective exposure research shows that people so indeed prefer exposing themselves to information that is consistent with beliefs they already hold (Hart et al., 2009; Jonas et al., 2001). While many moderating factors have been explored, the prevalent explanation for the selective exposure effect is a “defense motivation” (Hart et al., 2009) which is suggested to function in a manner similar to cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). In other words, exposure to information or stimuli inconsistent with one’s perceptions or beliefs arouses an aversive negative affective response. Over time, people learn to avoid these negative stimuli by avoiding information which is inconsistent (or invalidating) and approaching information which is consistent (or validating). Social verification also predicts the same behaviors and gives the same explanation; however, a social verification framework suggests that the aversive negative affect aroused by invalidation is rooted in belongingness needs.

People may selectively expose themselves to stimuli besides beliefs. For instance, depressed patients prefer sad imagery or music when traditional views of emotion regulation would suggest people with a depressed mood should move toward more uplifting stimuli (Millgram et al., 2015). For people who have a chronically depressed mood, sad stimuli could be particularly validating while uplifting stimuli may be invalidating. Thus, the validation concerns of people with a chronically depressed mood may move them away from stimuli which could act to improve their mood.

Constraints on Generality and Citation Statement

The present theoretical framework comments on a wide range of experiences and so it is important to discuss research from a diverse range of voices. We have endeavored to do so, incorporating work from international universities and diverse authors. When we discussed topics of culture, race, or sexuality, we sought to, as much as possible, include research done by individuals who share aspects of these identities. However, while we cite many works by people of minority race, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender, the cited literature as a whole still skews toward the historical bias of the field.

Consistent with the historical bias of the field, the majority of cited literature in this theoretical review sampled populations that tend to be from university students residing in Western nations. While belongingness is undoubtedly a universal need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), people’s means of achieving and maintaining belongingness may vary to a large degree both between and within a given culture. As such, we have sought to provide accounts where we feel this theory will vary on a basis of the culture or position of individuals. While we have cited empirical work where relevant, there are many areas that have received little attention, and it is our hope that the present theory will raise questions for future research to explore.

As with cultural variation, we expect the core of our theory to generalize across time, as belongingness and verification should remain a fundamental human needs (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). However, it is important to note that as mediums of interaction change, new caveats or special cases may be introduced. For instance, the societal move toward social media brings several new considerations to interactions, such as regular anonymity, increased social mobility, or careful curation of one’s in-group. While we expect verification to remain an important goal, the means by which people achieve it may be expressed differently over time.

Implications

The goal of the present work is not to serve as a refutation of past research, but to posit a novel framework through which much prior research can be re-interpreted and contrasted. Understanding and re-interpreting past research in the framework of social verification theory allows for comparing and contrasting previously dissimilar research. Furthermore, this framework is important for generating novel understandings of mechanisms and motivations.

Re-Interpretation of Past Research

In terms of motivations, social verification theory posits that the ways in which relational motivation functions can be understood through a different lens, generating novel insights. Previous understanding of relational motivations hinges mostly on the social approval aspect of motivations (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) and thus implies that relational motivations of conformity and compliance function as avoidance of disapproval. That is, people conform when others are looking as if their fear is being perceived as different, not actually being different. As such, much of the literature has sought to demonstrate this by comparing public and private measures (e.g., Crutchfield, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955); however, this research typically finds social influence effects are lessened but not eliminated in private conditions.

Social verification, however, suggests that the threat of non-belonging can function at a purely internal level. That is, one recognizing that they are inconsistent with their group should be enough to arouse a belongingness threat. That is not to say that active social disapproval is not aversive (surely it is), but more that one can experience the pressures of social influence even when they are the only one who knows they are inconsistent. This is consistent with the tendency for research to find that privacy often reduces but does not eliminate conformity (e.g., Crutchfield, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Williams et al., 2000). The tendency to adhere to the social reality even when in private is also true in compliance paradigms. For instance, the impetus to reciprocate favors or gifts is a strongly held tendency across various cultures. Past research has found that the pressure people feel to reciprocate favors or gifts makes it a valuable compliance tool (e.g., Cialdini, 2001; Gouldner, 1960). However, this research suggests that people feel they need to reciprocate because of social–relational needs, and thus when in private that pressure should not be present. Much like conformity, however, compliance due to reciprocity is reduced but not eliminated when the response is private (Whatley et al., 1999). The fact that privacy does not eliminate these conformity and compliance effects is not adequately explained in prior accounts of social–relational motivations for conformity and compliance, which conceptualize the motivation as a desire to not be seen as inconsistent by one’s peers (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). As noted earlier, social verification would predict these results, as people would still recognize that by not conforming or by not reciprocating, they are making themselves inconsistent with their social reality, thus eliciting a potential belongingness threat.

Novel Predictions

To this point we have discussed how social verification theory can elicit alternative and parsimonious explanations of past research, relying on conformity and compliance research to illustrate this assertion. These novel insights and interpretations are important and contribute to the literature, but there is also the opportunity to generate novel predictions from social verification theory. We continue to discuss conformity research more broadly to make this point but, again, stress that we do not see this as the only domain where novel predictions could be generated.

Consider the principles of commitment and consistency in the context of the lowballing compliance technique. Lowballing involves an influencer securing an agreement to some deal, then revealing a hidden cost. Typically, people comply more once they have agreed to the initial request and had the hidden cost revealed than when they are met with the hidden cost alone. Traditionally, this technique has been thought to work because of individuals’ psychological commitment (Cialdini, 2001). Research finds support for this notion, showing that switching the influencer eliminates the effect, but switching the type of request does not (Burger & Petty, 1981). While this suggests that one’s commitment is to the influencer, no research has examined how or why people feel this obligation. Social verification suggests that when people are met with these hidden costs it creates an inconsistency between their perception of themselves (no longer interested in this agreement) and the influencer (perceiving them as still being interested). This inconsistency thus arouses a negative affective response, which can be mitigated by complying with the new request. Consistent with this notion, research has found when the participant agrees but the influencer does not perceive agreement to the initial request (e.g., the phone cuts out briefly), participants feel no pressure to comply with the hidden cost (Burger & Cornelius, 2003). Similarly, when there is no influencer (e.g., in online spaces), people have no issues abandoning their “shopping carts” after finding there is some hidden cost (e.g., shipping costs; Huang et al., 2018; Kukar-Kinney, & Close, 2010). As such, it is unlikely that an individual feels they need to commit due to some self-concept motivation but rather they are concerned about their consistency with others. This suggests that the lowballing effect can be guarded against in a variety of ways; for instance, a third party validating the individual’s original agreement should assuage the negative affect arousal. In this case, we would expect that even self-affirmation could help to reduce the potency of the lowballing effect.

Beyond providing a new means of understanding motivations, social verification also provides a framework that allows for predictions of when some types of behaviors (e.g., validating) may be more or less preferable than other behaviors (e.g., altering). These various predictions are based on two key variables: the flexibility of the subjective reality and the flexibility of one’s social reality. For instance, when one perceives their membership to a group to be less flexible (e.g., low relational mobility; Yuki & Schug, 2012) and themselves to be more flexible, altering their subjective reality (e.g., conformity) should be a preferable response to inconsistency. This is consistent with research which demonstrates that individuals in collectivist cultures (low relational mobility; Yuki & Schug, 2012, high personal flexibility; Church et al., 2005, Lockhart et al., 2008) tend to conform more (Kim & Markus, 1999). The interaction of these two factors could be applied to predict people’s behavior in a wide range of potential situations (e.g., responses to invalidation from parents vs. strangers, or invalidation of a novel attitude vs. a firmly held conviction).

This theory also makes a distinction in conformity which has yet (to the knowledge of the authors) to be drawn. Specifically, conformity can occur as a behavior motivated either to avoid or to mitigate a perceived inconsistency. This distinction is important as it implicates different processes. For example, consider an organization attempting to counter unhealthy conformity, such as university binge drinking. Mood-buoying (e.g., self-affirmation) could only work to reduce conformity when arousal of negative affect has occurred (i.e., after perceiving inconsistency). Thus, mood-buoying may help to prevent drinking in an isolated instance where an individual notices they are discrepant with their peers who are drinking. However, these methods cannot mitigate the general attitudinal shift an individual could feel as their friends and peers endorse a generally positive attitude toward binge drinking. In these instances, people may accommodate their beliefs a little at a time to reduce possibilities of future inconsistency but never experience a direct inconsistency with their peers. If avoidance is successful, people will align their attitudes with their group, thus removing isolated instances where people recognize an inconsistency. That is, successful implementation of inconsistency avoidance behaviors precludes the necessity of mood-buoying behaviors. Indeed, research has found that mood-buoying has little to no direct benefit in countering long-term conformity toward binge drinking in university students (Knight & Norman, 2016). Understanding the difference in these two processes of conformity is essential to properly intervene. Interventions that give students another force for which they should want to avoid inconsistency (such as publicly committing to specific behaviors) have been shown to reduce reported binge drinking behavior (Norman, & Wrona-Clarke, 2016).

Furthermore, the implication of relational needs as a motivation for validation/invalidation effects and dissonance effects provides new predictions in existing theories. For instance, selective exposure effects (i.e., the tendency to selectively expose oneself to validating information and avoid invalidating information, also known as congeniality bias) have been suggested to be motivated by dissonance-like defense motivations (Hart et al., 2009). Through a social verification lens, we would predict that these effects occur because invalidation (self-social inconsistency) poses an inherent belongingness threat. This generates novel predictions, such that people who are vulnerable to such threats (e.g., those high in loneliness, low self-esteem, high in attachment anxiety, etc.) are more likely to exhibit selective exposure bias, or that people will exhibit selective exposure bias even when the validating stimuli induce a negative mood or are otherwise aversive (as long as the aversion is weaker than a belongingness threat).

Practical Implications

Invalidation is often an issue faced by individuals with minoritized identities. For many individuals in minoritized groups, a sense of belonging can be harder to cultivate than for those in the majority groups (Hurtado & Carter, 1997; Stephens et al., 2012). Interventions to help cultivate belonging are particularly effective at helping racially minoritized individuals flourish in secondary education settings (Williams et al., 2020). Invalidation of identity, as well as associated memories, experiences, emotions, and beliefs, is likely to disproportionately affect individuals with minoritized identities negatively, by virtue of the fact that these inner states are often inconsistent with what is perceived to be typical in the majority group. As such, difficulties cultivating belonging can, in part, stem from the regular invalidation of people’s identity by the majority group. While prejudice and stigma have been shown to be associated with negative health outcomes (e.g., Meyer, 2003), our present theory suggests that even if an environment is free of prejudice and overt inequality, minoritized individuals may still face additional barriers in cultivating a sense of belonging because of the role verification plays in belonging. For instance, seemingly innocuous differences, such as food preference, maybe invalidating when one is inconsistent with the majority of their peers. While these differences might be minor individually, they may provide consistent invalidation which could undermine people’s sense of belonging.

Notably, for individuals with minoritized identities (particularly in majority contexts), the methods of achieving verification are not necessarily the same. For instance, one means to secure validation is to directly confront an individual who has been invalidating with the goal of changing their inner state to align with one’s own. However, people often resist attempts to change their existing beliefs and attitudes (Brehm & Brehm, 2013) and so this could be met with defensiveness, or even hostility, which further perpetuates the invalidation. As such, for individuals with minoritized identities, validation may be much less desirable for resolving inconsistencies pertaining to their identity. Alteration, however, would likely be impossible, as individuals who have minoritized identities are often not able to change these factors about themselves. At best, people may be able to “act white” or “act straight” to reduce inconsistencies among the majority group (Neal-Barnett et al., 2001), but doing so may lead to inconsistency in other contexts (Durkee et al., 2022). Furthermore, acting consistent with the group can prevent one from being explicitly rejected. However, if it is only acting, it doesn’t mitigate inconsistency, because the actor knows that their behavior is inconsistent with their actual identity. Social verification theory underscores the importance of efforts to provide sources of verification for people, such as minority representation in media or cultural competency in professional settings.

The role of validation could be particularly impactful in perpetuating beliefs that have little informational value. Research has provided evidence that people share stereotype-consistent information more for social belonging factors than informational factors (Clark & Kashima, 2007). This research suggests that sharing and reinforcing beliefs, even inaccurate and potentially harmful beliefs, offers verification and cohesion within the group. Such validation through repeated group discussion and expression has a well-documented history of leading to increasing polarization of one’s attitudes (Brauer et al., 1995). This suggests that when trying to counter beliefs such as negative or harmful stereotypes, it is important that people consider the role that validation and belongingness have in people’s tendency to propagate this information. If a belief is held and perpetuated because of people’s desire to be verified among their community, purely informational attempts to supplant that belief may fail. Not only might these informational attempts fail, but they could also be perceived as social inconsistencies themselves, leading people to distance themselves from the speaker. This distancing could thus reduce the credibility and trustworthiness of the message as it becomes more perceived as coming from an outgroup.

This consideration extends further beyond just singular beliefs. Take for example insular conspiracy groups (e.g., QAnon, Moskalenko & McCauley, 2021), who share a network of potentially harmful beliefs which hold little informational value. While these conspiracy groups often originate from harmful or xenophobic beliefs (Dugan & Fisher, 2022), conspiratorial thinking stems from, in part, feelings of vulnerability and ostracism (Poon et al., 2020). In line with this, research has shown that people who are externally motivated to achieve social interactions share more conspiracy news than those externally motivated to be accurate (Ren et al., 2023), suggesting that belongingness and verification are core factors contributing to endorsement of extremist conspiracy. A salient example of this is the online extremist community known as “incels” whose ideology has been linked to three separate terrorist attacks in the last few years (Cecco, 2020; Sky News, 2021; Villarreal, 2020). While the internal ideology is complex, many of those who endorse it believe that they are inconsistent with what society expects of men and that they have been ostracized by society (Daly & Reed, 2022).

It is notable that, because invalidation is a threat to belonging, attempts to counter the beliefs of those in these extreme communities may function only as a threat to belonging. Thus, attempts to reason without cultivating belongingness may only result in driving people further into an extremist community, which will in turn further validate them. Beliefs are not held in isolation of belonging; as such, it is important for future research to explore how harmful conspiratorial beliefs may reinforce a sense of belonging. Future research which seeks to reduce conspiratorial thinking or extremist beliefs should also consider the role which protecting and verifying those beliefs might play in achieving belongingness.

Positionality Statement

Throughout this article, we have suggested that many well-documented phenomena in the social psychological literature may benefit from a novel lens integrating and considering the role that validation may play in many of these effects, a theory that we developed through an extensive review of the literature. However, it is fundamental to position ourselves as researchers to understand the lens through which we arrived at these conclusions. Our perspective and interpretations of the cited works are informed and limited by our own experiences and identities, which are both minority (i.e., sexuality and gender) and majority (i.e., White and Western). We have sought to mitigate these limitations by including research and views of diverse authors. For example, when discussing racial identity, we were careful to seek the perspectives of researchers who are racially and culturally diverse. Because the hypotheses and theories people generate are shaped by their own experiences, it is our hope that others will build upon this framework, and that it will be informed by diverse perspectives and experiences of other researchers.

Summary

Social verification recontextualizes a variety of different theories under the lens of people’s perceptions of their consistency with those around them. This theory makes a case that epistemic motivations and relational motivations are inextricably linked and that threat of rejection is a key component in the experience of invalidation and dissonance. The aversion to threats of non-belonging results in various behaviors people use to maintain consistency with those around them, through avoidance, alteration, or validation. Finally, when inconsistency cannot be mitigated or avoided, people experience chronic negative physical, mental, and well-being outcomes.