Vision for a sustainable energy transition and decarbonization: A case study of students surveyed at a Chilean University

Abstract

This study analyzes public perception towards the energy transition and decarbonization in Chile, and how these preferences change with political ideology, as well as distance between power plant installations and people’s homes. Due to a lack of scientific research on civil society preferences for energy production in Chile, we used a convenience sample and conducted a survey among future decision makers (current university students) to identify which factors impact their acceptance or rejection of energy sources. In addition, we asked them about their vision for the future energy mix. In total, 164 valid questionnaires were collected. Results show that the level of acceptance and preference changes with political ideology, with social liberals being more willing to change their lifestyle and increase their willingness to pay for a faster inclusion of clean technologies in the energy mix. Higher levels of education increase this willingness to pay. The level of acceptance decreases up to 56% for solar and wind when the installation is located within a radius less than 5 km from the population’s homes. The level of rejection is 97% for hydroelectricity and 99% for non-renewable power plants if they are located at distances lower than 5 km. The decentralization of energy policy decisions and the consideration of local society would be relevant for an energy transition towards renewable sources.

Graphical abstract

Highlights

• •High acceptance of renewables and decarbonization processes.
• •Preferences for energy source change with political ideology.
• •Hydroelectric plants are the least accepted energy source among renewables.
• •High level of rejection towards fossil fuel power plants.

1. Introduction

Today, dependence on the energy system at a global level has brought about constant efforts in the search for, generation, and distribution of sustainable energy [1]. In addition, the growing demand for energy and the high rates of pollution encourage the search and extraction of other resources to guarantee the supply of ecologically sustainable sources and to allow for transversal access to them. As a result of this demand, there has been a big push for the development of renewable energies [2]. The concept of renewable energy systems is new, feasible, and economically viable; however, the technological, economic, and social aspects of its implementation remain open for debate [3]. The impacts of climate change are worse than expected [4], and rising CO₂ emissions worldwide show that, although the share of renewable energy (RE) in primary energy supply is growing, all countries must significantly increase their efforts to decarbonize the energy sector in the near future [5].

Even though socio-economic and technical concerns are relevant, resistance at the local level is an important impediment in increasing sustainable energy generation [[6], [7], [8], [9]]. While there is worldwide support for renewable energy projects [10,11], at times local environmental factors transform this support into opposition when local communities are involved as suppliers [12], and the power plants are located near people’s homes [6,13,14]. The relationship between this distance factor and the spatial changes in personal preferences is mainly explained by the NIMBY-Not In My Backyard-syndrome, not only for renewable power plants (RPP; solar, wind, tidal wave, geothermal) [9,[15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]] and hydroelectric projects [17,21], but also in the context of thermoelectric power generation [[22], [23], [24]]. This NIMBY syndrome may also have an additional layer of complexity related to the lack of trust in institutions [25,26] as well as justice and equity considerations [16]. In the Chilean context, the NIMBY effect relates to the disempowerment of the civil society and a “neoliberal” sustainability governance, in which market stakeholders and experts are deemed more relevant than local communities in the decision-making process for new projects [27].

A policy mix with strong incentives to simultaneously support low-carbon solutions and put an end to the use of conventional fossil fuels is essential for achieving sustainable development [28]. The implementation of such policies is multi-year process in which diverse civil society, political coalitions, and the public and private sectors emerge as key stakeholders who have the power to slow down or foster the movement towards renewable energies [29]. Current efforts to accelerate the decarbonization process include: adopting industrial and green innovation measures to help increase political support and reduce the costs of low carbon technologies, having set carbon and reforming pricing policies in order to increase environmental efficiency [30], establishing price-driven shifts from coal to natural gas in the U.S., and phasing out coal-fired generation [31]. Other policies have consisted of research and development support, implementation subsidies, tax rebates, loan guarantees, and government mandates [32], as well as a commitment from corporations to purchase renewable electricity [33].

Political, social, economic, and environmental aspects specific to different regions influence the development of renewable energy policies [30]. Political parties have differing views on energy transition within the framework of decarbonization, and they even influence the acceptance of technologies and policies [[34], [35], [36], [37]]. Conservatives tend to support extractive industries, such as coal and gas, while independent policymakers tend to be against these industries [36]. Examples of this kind of political partisanship in shaping energy policy are found in many nations. In the United States, the Republican Party has hampered policies, such as the improvement of efficiency in consumption and the renewable energy transition (RET) [37], which has the potential to bias societal perceptions on the contribution of pollutant sources in the energy mix [38]. In Germany, conservative partisanship has slowed down the adoption of the feed-in tariff mechanism and the development of renewable energy [39], while liberal parties are more often interested in accelerating RET and the protection of the environment [40]. In Canada, there is evidence that conservatives have opposed wind power while liberals have supported it [37]. In the Chilean case, there is no clear evidence on how political partisanship affects energy transition, since both conservative and liberal political ideologies have embraced the energy transition with economic growth and market-based sustainable development as main strategies [41].

Social factors, such as education, also help to understand the public acceptance of renewable energies; a higher level of education in the society correlates positively with higher levels of acceptance of these energies [13,14,17,42]. Society increases its environmental awareness through education and the influence of local communities and resident associations [43]. The dissemination of information and training within communities leads to more knowledge and awareness. This in turn leads to a change in community practices and a sense of urgency within the civil society about the need to move towards renewable energies and increase the acceptance of greener policies [13,14].

In addition, driven by the climate emergency, youth worldwide engage in fervent protests, advocate for intergenerational justice, and unite to demand equitable and prompt climate action and sustainable solutions for the long term [44,45]. Given this scenario, the perception, views, and knowledge level of our current university students is relevant, since they will become potential consumers, key stakeholders and leaders of the coming decades. They will face decision-making processes associated with RET and decarbonization [46,47]. Therefore, it is important to understand and nurture their current social capital, with the hope of guiding them in making informed decisions about energy transition in the future. However, there is a lack of published research regarding their knowledge and attitudes in the field of energy transition and decarbonization.

The general objective of the research is to evaluate the vision for a sustainable energy transition and decarbonization using a case study of students surveyed at a Chilean university, and to identify the factors that influence these processes so that decision makers in this area know what variables are relevant in their implementation.

Chile has a conducive socio-economic environment for a renewable energy transition. With market-oriented policies, declining renewable costs, and a commitment to sustainability, the power sector embraces innovation and investment opportunities. At the local level, very little work has been done on public perception of the current and future energy mix, as well as on local approval of technologies for electricity generation [[48], [49], [50], [51]]. This study contributes by offering a novel perspective on understanding public support and preferences for the RET and decarbonization process, and it is one of the first studies of its kind to be carried out in Chile. The paper receives input from university students in the context of a time in history in which global youth environmental movements have received a lot of public attention [52,53]. Within that context, the following research questions (RQ) were asked:

• 1)What is the university students’ level of acceptance and preference with respect to the RET process sector according to political ideology? (RQ1)
• 2)What is the university students’ level of acceptance and preference with respect to the decarbonization process according to political ideology? (RQ2)
• 3)What is the university students’ knowledge level of available sources of energy generation according to political ideology? (RQ3)
• 4)How does this acceptance vary at the national and local level based on political ideology? (RQ4)
• 5)To what extent do the above questions correlate with socio-demographic characteristics? (RQ5)

This study has sample limitations, since we used a convenience sample, which is limited to a group of students surveyed within one specific university. The expansion of the sample to other groups of university students and potentially to other cohorts would help to deepen the understanding of factors that influence the acceptance of renewables and the decarbonization process.

These results, and the methods used to obtain them, are described in six sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 “Literature review on RET and decarbonization in Chile” consists of the review of literature associated with the decarbonization of the electricity sector and energy transition, starting from the international background and then narrowing in focus to the case of Chile. Section 3 “Material and Methods” describes the methodology used in the study to meet the objectives. Section 4 “Results” shows the entire data collection process, from obtaining the results to the analysis. We used the methods previously described and then discussed the main conclusions from the results. Section 5 “Discussion” results are discussed and placed in the current literature, in order to frame the study and to identify potential overlap or differences with other research in the area. Finally, the results of the analysis and discussion of the literature on the energy transition and decarbonization in Chile are presented in Section 6 “Conclusions”.

2. Literature review on RET and decarbonization in Chile

Chile is a country with potential for RES (Fig. 1), such as solar and wind [[54], [55], [56]], and with stakeholders willing to move towards a local energy transition [57]. The current Chilean Long-Term Energy Planning (LTEP) establishes diverse scenarios (Fig. 6), with regional representation committed to progressing towards accelerated RET and decarbonization processes, with the goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [58]. Changes towards an RET involve actions in political, regulatory, and technological areas [58], as well as in the financial field to accurately measure costs associated with diverse energy sources [59]. Long-term sustainability is closely related to economic growth in Chile, since investments and economic development are mainly based on the exploitation of natural resources, often leaving aside environmental and social concerns [26]. Also, the lack of knowledge among stakeholders about environmental externalities associated with energy use and production [57], and the current mega-drought that directly affects hydroelectric generation in Chile [60] are additional factors influencing RET.

Fig. 1.

Chilean renewable energy potential, LTEP 2023–2027.

Fig. 6.

Comparison between energy mix views and scenarios projected by LTEP.6

In recent years, Chile has undertaken voluntary actions, such as communication campaigns, that hope to inform and raise awareness about the importance of the transition to renewable energy sources and the decarbonization of its energy matrix [61]. To address this challenge, the country has implemented ambitious public policies that seek to promote the use of clean sources, increase energy efficiency [62], and to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels [63]. One of the key strategies has been the enactment of the Renewable Energy Law that establishes clear goals to increase the share of renewable energy in electricity generation. This law also promotes the planning and diversification of solar, wind, and geothermal energy projects throughout the country, encouraging investment and technological development in the sector [61].

Another relevant aspect of public policies in Chile is the creation of incentives and subsidies for the adoption of clean energy at both the industrial and residential level. The government has implemented financing programs and tax benefits for those who invest in solar, wind, or other renewable technologies [64]. These measures not only contribute to the reduction of emissions, but also stimulate job creation in the renewable energy industry, strengthening the local and regional economy [65]. These policies reflect Chile’s commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050 [66], that will lead to sustainability for a cleaner and more resilient energy future in the country.

Chile joined the global commitment in the 2015 Paris agreement to reduce CO₂ emissions, particularly from the energy industry, which is its main polluter [67]. The current public-private agreement aims to either close or change fuel to reuse the existing infrastructure of the 28 coal-fired power plants in the country by 2040. Its first stage proposes ending the operation of the eight oldest thermoelectric plants by 2024, and the second stage addresses the remaining 20 [68]. In addition, the “Chao Coal Bill” processed by the Environmental Commission of the Chamber of Deputies seeks to accelerate the decarbonization process by prohibiting the installation and operation of coal-fired thermoelectric plants throughout the country by 2025 [69]. However, the plants scheduled to close before the end of the first stage have announced the addition of new units, and the expected 13,900 direct and indirect job losses derived from these closures [70] are important stumbling blocks in the process.

Despite the fact that Chile has attractive market conditions, grassroots opposition to hydroelectric and thermoelectric megaprojects (for example HidroAysén, Pangue/Ralco, Barracones, and Castilla) has negatively impacted investment in the energy sector [26]. Social activism in Chile has been mainly a consequence of the lack of institutional response and government transparency [26,71], and to the NGOs’ encouragement of citizen participation in the policy-making process ever since the projects were first proposed [72,73]. The government created a commission, “Citizen-Technical-Parliamentary Commission”, in an effort to transition towards clean, safe, sustainable, and fair electricity development. However, the commission proved insufficient [74], and it was not enough to stop social activism. In the last decade, Chilean society has challenged and prosecuted energy projects, mobilizing citizens from all over the country. The first case was Barrancones, a coal-fired plant project approved in 2010, and the second was the HidroAysén Project, which consisted of five hydroelectric plants in southern Chilean Patagonia. The environmental movement Patagonia Without Dams (in Spanish Patagonia Sin Represas) was a group of 80 stakeholders at the regional, national and international level debating on the proposed dams, and its relationship with markets, citizen participation and reforms. Patagonia Without Dams was able to mobilize the largest citizen demonstration since the return of democracy in 1989, (170,000 people marched in Santiago and most of the regional capitals) [72], and in the end they were able to halt the HidroAysén project [75]. This precedent established a democratization of the energy regime in the face of a more critical civil society [71].

3. Material and Methods

3.1. Study design

The main data were collected using a structured survey, whose questions and categories, outlined in Table 1, were grouped based on previous international questionnaires [6,13,38,47] and surveys conducted at the local level [[48], [49], [50], [51]].

Table 1.

Overview of research questions and survey question categories.

Research question	Survey question categories
1) What is the university students’ level of acceptance and preference with respect to the RET process sector according to political ideology? (RQ1)	Items in Category 1 analyzed by political ideology: -Perception of factors that may influence the participation of RES -Preference in the speed of energy transition to RES -Level of support for energy transition policies to RES
	-Perception of factors that may influence the participation of RES
2) What is the university students’ level of acceptance and preference with respect to the decarbonization process according to political ideology? (RQ2)	Items in Category 2 analyzed by political ideology: -Opinion about factors that may influence fossil fuel power plants -Preference in speed of decarbonization and conversion of coal- fired power plants -Level of support for decarbonization policies
3) What is the university students’ knowledge level of available sources of energy generation according to political ideology? (RQ3)	Items in Category 3 analyzed by political ideology: -Knowledge of energy sources -View of different energy source contributions to the energy mix -Preference of future types of energy participation in energy sources
4) How does this acceptance vary at the national and local level based on political ideology? (RQ4)	Items in Category 4 analyzed by political ideology: -Opinion on factors related to power generation plants -Perception of each energy source -Minimum distance of power plant from person’s home
5) To what extent do the above questions correlate with socio-demographic characteristics? (RQ5)	Category 5: -Respondent’s socio-demographic characteristics (age, education level, income, gender, residence) -Relationship to questions from different categories

Notes: The original questionnaire was formulated and conducted in Spanish.

The survey was formulated and reviewed by every author and additionally by two researchers from the Diego Portales University. Before conducting the survey, a pilot questionnaire was given to five students from different Chilean universities. At the beginning of each section of the survey, participants read a short paragraph with general and neutral information to guide the topic and its objectives, ensuring that there was no bias in their responses. Perceptions of RET and decarbonization were measured by the questionnaire using the 5-point Likert scale (either [1: Oppose, 2: I am inclined to oppose, 3: Neutral, 4: I am inclined to support, 5: Support] or from Scale 1: Very unimportant to 5: Very important), in addition to multiple-choice and drop-down list questions.

3.2. Participants and the data collection

A convenience sample of online respondents, with a semi-random selection of participants, was used for data collection. While this sample selection does not underestimate the relevance of this study, it is important to understand that the results need to be interpreted within this context. The empirical survey was conducted virtually on the Qualtrics platform for students at Diego Portales University (UDP) in Santiago, Metropolitan Region of Chile. The survey questions were sent by e-mail, and also published on the university websites and university social media (Instagram and mobile Whatsapp groups) to students from the Schools of Engineering, Economics and Administration, Social Sciences, Communication, Law, Medicine, Psychology, and Health Sciences, where online responses were accepted throughout the month of August 2021. We chose these schools since they have the highest number of students enrolled in the university, allowing us to obtain a reasonable representativeness. The survey questions were randomized to avoid order effects. The minimum amount of time required for questionnaire completion was 10 min, and a maximum of six screening questions were included in each category of the questionnaire.

UDP is a private university and has a diverse student body, which benefits from internal scholarships and governmental equity programs aimed at favoring the inclusion of students coming from households with socio-economic disadvantages. At UDP, this means that 54% of the student body does not have to pay tuition, since the state pays for them due to their family’s financial need [76], being the private university with the highest level of government aid among all private universities. This means that the student body makeup is both diverse and representative of the socio-economic characteristics of the country as a whole. The remaining students pay tuition, as many students in public and private universities do in Chile [77]. The socio-demographic aspects of the survey population and main questionnaire results, 164 valid questionnaires mainly coming from engineering (52%), economics and administration (12%), social science (15%), law (9%), and psychology students (7%), are shown in Tables A.1 and A.2). With regard to family income, 36% of the respondents came from socio-economic households made up of the poorest groups in the country (D and E in Table A.1). The middle income group (C1 and C2) was represented by 30% of the total respondents, while the highest family income status had the lowest representation within the sample (20%, AB and C1). Fifteen percent of respondents either did not know their household’s income or preferred not to answer. The respondents’ average age was 22.7 years, while the average age for residents of the Metropolitan Region is 35.5 years [78]. We note that the age intervals are not the same as the population percentage that starts at birth and ends at 65+; this survey starts at the age of 18 and ends at the age of 30, leading to some percentage discrepancies. UDP stands out for its participatory role in the country’s public policies and its commitment to a quality university education [76,79]. As such, its students continue on to work in the government, private companies, or continue with postgraduate studies after graduation. Therefore, their attitudes could indicate the development of the policy and decision-making regarding sustainability issues in the future.

3.3. Data analysis and statistical estimation method

Data processing was carried out from September to November 2021, using IBM SPSS Statistics 26 and Microsoft Excel. The analysis included initial descriptive statistics to understand the influence of political ideology on RET and decarbonization support. The political ideology variable was transformed into four categories to compare our results with previous research [38] based on ideological positions in the Chilean context [80]: the people who defined themselves as right and center right were identified as Conservatives, those who defined themselves as left and center left in terms of social integration were identified as Liberals, self-reported apolitical and independent voters were grouped as Independents, and those who defined themselves as in the center were identified as Moderates.

To understand how support for RET policies vary with political ideology, we created an RET score variable for each political ideology category i, with i = {Conservatives, Liberals, Independents, Moderates}, composed of the sum of support for the following statements: a) “The development of renewable energies in Chile has been scarce”, b) “Investment in renewable power plants must be accelerated”, c) “RPP must replace coal-fired plants”, d) “Renewable energies must be used to meet the increase in demand”, e) “Education plays an important role in the energy transition”, f) “I am willing to change my lifestyle to reduce my carbon footprint”, g) “I am willing to pay higher prices than at present to support renewable energies”, h) “The state must subsidize investments in renewable power plants”. Likewise, to understand how support for decarbonization policies vary with political ideology, we created a decarbonization score variable for each category i, composed of the sum of support for the following statements: i) “The plan to retire coal-fired power plants must be accelerated”, j) “The coal-fired power plant conversion plan must be accelerated”, k) “The disadvantages of coal burning outweigh its advantages”, l) “I am willing to pay a higher price than at present to support the retirement of coal-fired power plants”, m) “The state should impose a tax on investments in non-RPP”.

To study how the determinants of the RET vary with political ideology, multiple regressions were used. First, we estimated the effect of political ideology and the level of support to decarbonize on RET, as follows:

$$RET={\beta }_0+{\beta }_{1}D+d_{0}C+d_{1}L+{\epsilon }_1$$ (1)

where RET measures the level of support for RET, D measures the level of support for decarbonization, C is a binary variable if the person declares to be conservative, L is a binary variable if the person declares to be liberal, and ${\epsilon }_1$ corresponds to the estimated error. Dummy variables indicate the difference in support for RET between moderates with respect to conservative and liberal groups, respectively ($d_0$ and $d_1$).

To further analyze the effect of political ideology and specific decarbonization-induced statements on RET, we estimated this additional model:

$$RET={\alpha }_0+{\alpha }_1{D}_1+{\alpha }_2{D}_2+{\alpha }_3{D}_3+{\alpha }_4{D}_4+{\alpha }_5{D}_5+{\gamma }_{0}C+{\gamma }_{1}L+{\epsilon }_2$$ (2)

where RET, C and D are defined as in (1). Specific decarbonization-induced statements evaluated were: “Acceleration of the closure of coal-fired power plants” ($D_1$), “Acceleration of coal-fired power plant conversion” ($D_2$), “Coal-fired power plants have more disadvantages than advantages” (D₃), “The state should tax non-RPP” (D₄), “I am (willing to pay) WTP a higher price to support the retirement of coal-fired power plants” (D₅), and ${\epsilon }_2$ corresponds to the estimated error.

Finally, to assess the impact of political ideology on the minimum distance for accepting an energy source, the following statistical model was used:

$$MD={\delta }_0+d_{0}C+d_{1}L+{\epsilon }_3$$ (3)

where MD measured the minimum distance of the plant from the respondent’s home for accepting an energy source with five categories (<5 km, <10 km, <20 km, >20 km, opposed independent of the distance), C and D are defined as in (1), and ${\epsilon }_3$ corresponds to the estimated error of this regression. Estimates of equations (1), (2), (3) were based on 95% confidence intervals, used in p-values to measure significant differences with a limit of 0.05, and R² values adjusted for percentage explanation.

To assess people’s opinions on the participation of future technologies, answers to the question “What according to you should be the participation of each energy source in the Chilean electricity mix?” were measured through the questionnaire using the 7-point Likert scale (either [1: None, 2: Very little, 3: Little, 4: Moderate, 5: High, 6: Very high 7: Extremely High]), and then compared to LTEP scenarios: accelerated transition by 2030, carbon neutrality by 2035, and recovery by 2040 [81].

4. Results

4.1. Influence of political ideology on perceptions of RET and decarbonization policies

Results showed that the general trend across participants indicated a high level of support towards RET, reaching an overall average of 88% among respondents (Fig. 2a–h). To assess differences in responses between political ideology categories i, a disaggregated analysis was performed. Results presented some variations between political groups. The conservative group reported the lowest level of acceptance for developing renewable energy in Chile. Only 43% (33 + 10%, corresponding to the sum of Likert categories 4 and 5 of panel a) in Fig. 2) believed in the scarcity of renewable energy development, which is 37% lower than the maximum value reported by the independent group. Conservatives also reported the lowest level of support for investment subsidies in the RET (only 77%, while the average among all groups was 87%). In general, we observed that the liberal group tended to report a higher level of support for the RET than conservative and other groups. Examples of this phenomenon were found in relation to price and education. Eighty-eight percent of liberals stated that they are WTP a higher price than the current one to support renewable energies, compared to only 73% of conservatives, 72% of independents, and 80% of moderates. The liberal political ideology had a 13% higher tendency to agree with the idea that education is important in the RET than the conservative one, and overall, the importance of the role of education in the energy transition was found to be significant for all political tendencies. People from all groups stated a high willingness to change their lifestyles to reduce their carbon footprint (94% on average), and agreed with statements such as “Investment in renewable plants should be accelerated”, “Renewable plants should replace coal-fired power plants” and “Renewables should be used to meet the increase in demand” (average consensus of approval of 98%, 98%, and 87%, respectively).^,

Fig. 2.

a–h. Policy support responses according to political ideology across eight RET statements.1

Similarly, results showed that the general trend across participants indicated a level of support for decarbonization measures showed an overall average of 85% among respondents (Fig. 3a–e). When a disaggregated analysis across political tendencies was performed, results indicated some change (Table A.3)). In our sample, the approval for an accelerated retirement plan of coal-fired power plants was lowest for the conservatives (only 83% compared to 93% for moderates, 96% for independents, and 100% for liberals). Liberals tended to have a higher level of acceptance regarding financial and economic measures that support decarbonization. For example, for the statement “I am willing to pay a higher price than I currently do to support the withdrawal of coal-fired power plants”, liberals reported 84% of support, while conservatives, moderates, and independents 70%, 46%, and 62%, respectively. The moderate group reported the highest level of acceptance for the affirmation “The state must impose a tax on investments in non-RPP” (100%), followed by liberals (95%), independents (93%), and lastly by conservatives (83%). There is a certain level of consensus among ideological groups regarding conversion of coal plants and the overall notion of burning coal. Thus, an average rate of 82% was reached for the statement “The coal-fired power plant conversion plan must be accelerated”, while an average of 89% was obtained for “The disadvantages of burning coal are greater than its advantages”.

Fig. 3.

a–e. Policy support responses by political ideology across five decarbonization statements.2

To study how the relationship between RET and decarbonization varies, the political tendency equation (1) was first estimated. The decarbonization score and political ideology dummies were statistically significant variables for the RET estimation (Table 2). The base case composed of moderates, independents, and others reported a high level of acceptance. Conservative and liberal ideologies decreased their support for RET when compared to the base case. Conservatives decreased their support by even 115% more than liberals, considering that the robustness level of the conservative dummy variable was higher than the liberal one (p < 0,001 vs p < 0,05). Our results did not change when the income variable was included (Table A.4), despite the fact that 40% of the participants come from low socio-economic sectors. The regression with these variables has an Adjusted R² of 0.487, indicating that they have a relatively high explanatory variable. To assess the model robustness an ANOVA test was performed, indicating that independent variables have a significant influence on the dependent variable, both jointly and linearly. Also, the Durbin Watson test suggested that the errors are not auto correlated, while all corresponding VIF values indicated that the model does not have collinearity problems.

Table 2.

Multiple regression estimates for RET as a function of political ideology and decarbonization score.

Independent Variable	Variable Scale	RET Scorea
		Estimate	St.Error	VIF
Intercept		7064***	1043
Decarbonization Scoreb	[−10,10] scale	0,835***	0,149	1047
Conservative	1 = Conservative, 0 = Moderate, Independent, or other.	−1973**	0,688	1188
Liberal	1 = Liberal, 0 = Moderate, Independent, or other.	−0,917*	0.428	1227

Note: Adjusted R² = 0,487. ***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, *p < 0,05. Durbin-Watson test: 1.858.

^aThe RET score variable, calculated as the sum of the level of support for the eight RET affirmations shown in Fig. 2a–h, resulted in a scale of [−16.16]. A positive RET Score implies a higher level of acceptance for each statement, while a negative value means a higher level of opposition.

^bThe Decarbonization Score variable, calculated as the sum of the level of support for the five decarbonization affirmations shown in Fig. 3a–e, resulted in a scale of [−10,10]. A positive Decarbonization Score implies a higher level of acceptance for each statement, while a negative value means a higher level of opposition.

We then estimated equation (3) to further examine the effect of the political ideology on RET for five specific decarbonization-induced statements. We observed that four decarbonization scores and political ideology dummies were statistically significant variables for the RET estimation (Table 3). In this analysis, the base case composed of moderates, independents, and others also reported a high level of acceptance. Here, we observed that conservative and liberal ideologies decreased their support for RET when compared to the base case. Conservatives tended to decrease their support by even 97% more than liberals. Even though the difference among these groups decreased with respect to the previous estimates (Table 2), it was still relatively high. The policy that had the greatest impact on RET was the imposition of a state tax on non-RPP investments, followed by the WTP a higher price than at present to support the retirement of coal-fired power plants, and the acceleration of coal plant conversions. The lack of significance of the acceleration plan to retire coal plants might suggest that this closure does not necessarily lead to a faster RET. The estimation of this statistical model slightly improved its adjusted R² to 0.493.

Table 3.

Multiple regression estimates for RET as a function of political ideology and disaggregated decarbonization scores.3

Variable	Variable Scale	RET Score
		Estimate	St.Error	VIF
Intercept		7486***	1393
Conservative	1 = Conservative, 0 = Moderate, Independent, or other.	−2010***	0,648	1267
Liberal	1 = Liberal, 0 = Moderate, Independent, or other.	−1021*	0.421	1262
Plan to retire coal-fired power plants must be accelerated	-2-2 scale	0,533	0529	1336
The coal-fired power plant conversion plan must be accelerated	-2-2 scale	0,626***	0,245	1049
The disadvantages of coal burning outweigh its advantages	-2-2 scale	0,668**	0,248	1101
I am willing to pay a higher price than at present to support the retirement of coal-fired power plants.	-2-2 scale	0,968***	0,175	1333
The state should impose a tax on investments in non-RPP	-2-2 scale	1175***	0,350	1499

Adjusted R² = 0,493. St.Error is robust standard errors. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05). Durbin-Watson test: 1.844.

4.2. Perceptions of current and future energy mix according to political ideology

For all political tendency groups, the perception of the percentage of the current contribution of energy sources, except for natural gas, fell outside the range of the 95% confidence interval relative to the current makeup (Fig. 2a–h; Fig. 5a–h). Moderates’ perception of the contribution of solar and wind to the energy mix was the only one that fell inside the 95% confidence interval (Table A.5; Fig. 2a–h).

Fig. 5.

a–h. Current and future energy estimates by energy source and political ideology.5

For all groups, the current share of coal and hydroelectricity was underestimated by an average difference of −13.6% and −5.2%, respectively, while the current share of solar, wind, oil, biomass and geothermal were overestimated by an average difference of 3.2%, 3.8%, 18.8%, 5.1%, 7.7%, respectively (Fig. 4; Fig. 5a–h). There were subtle differences between the perceived current magnitude of technology sources in the energy mix based on political tendency. For instance, conservatives were the political group that underestimated the presence of coal the most and overestimated the contribution of renewable sources (solar, wind, biomass) the most to the energy mix (conservatives overestimated coal by 1.7% more, and on average underestimated renewables 1.0% more than liberals), which is in line with what has find found previously in the literature [38,82]. Natural gas was an interesting case, as conservatives underestimated its contribution by 2.4 % while liberals overestimated it by 0.2%.

Fig. 4.

Perceptions of current energy mix according to political ideology.4

Regarding respondents’ current knowledge about the classification of energy sources into renewable or non-renewable, wind and solar sources were the main sources identified correctly as renewable (98,5% and 99,5%, respectively in Table A.6), while coal, oil, and natural gas were quite accurately defined as nonrenewable (95%, 98%, and 75%, respectively in Table A.6). Hydroelectricity was recognized as renewable by 56.4% of respondents, while 36.4% said it was not renewable. Biomass was the source that demonstrated the greatest lack of knowledge (35.1% in Table A.6).

Subtle asymmetries were also observed with respect to people’s views on the future of the decarbonization process. Liberals were the political group that envisioned the lowest contribution of fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, and oil) to the future energy mix (a total of 17,7%), while conservatives were the group that expected its highest contribution (a total of 25,0%) (Fig. 5a–h). The expected contribution of RES such as wind, solar and biomass was higher among liberals than conservatives (+2.8%, +3.8%, and +2.6%, respectively) (Table A.7). On average across the whole sample, participants envisioned a decarbonized future and renewable energy system, as shown by the sharp drop (compared to the current share in terms of percentage points) in the future preference for fossil fuels across all political groups (coal: −17.3%, oil: −15.1%, natural gas: −5.7%) and an increase in RES (wind: +15.1%, solar: +15.0%, geothermal: 10.6%, biomass: +8.6%) except for hydroelectricity, which had a drop of 9.7% (Table A.8). In addition, a fast change in the current operation of coal-fired power plants was expected; within the next five years, 55% of respondents envisioned their closure, while 59% expected their conversion to cleaner sources of energy. When asked about the incorporation of additional renewable capacity to the system, people imagined an even faster process: around 82% indicated that RPP would be incorporated within the next five years and 99.4% in less than ten years (Table A.9).

For hydroelectricity, all groups underestimated its current contribution to the energy mix, and they expected a decrease in its use in the future. On this point, there are some differences in perception based on political ideology: liberals and conservatives underestimated current hydropower by 3.1% less than moderates, and conservatives expected a 7.7% higher increase in future hydropower generation than liberals (Fig. 5a–h). The classification of the hydroelectricity source in terms of its level of sustainability is controversial. Around 56% of respondents thought it was renewable, and 36% said it was not.

Respondents’ views on the future energy mix showed a higher inclusion of renewable sources than the accelerated transition by 2030 and the recovery by 2040 scenarios (Fig. 6), and they were slightly lower than the carbon neutrality projection by 2040. Hydroelectricity was envisioned to be lower than all LTEP forecasts, as well as the contribution of non-renewable sources (coal, natural gas, and oil). In general, solar and wind were perceived positively, coal and hydroelectric negatively, and the others neutral (Table A.11).

4.3. Local power plant acceptance

For distances less than 10 km, a 56% approval rating was reported for renewable power plants, while only 4% acceptance was reported for thermoelectric plants (Fig. 7a). Hydroelectricity, despite being a renewable source, had only a 10% level of support for being installed at distances less than 10 km from people’s homes, which showed an acceptance level more similar to that of fossil fuels than to renewable technologies. Within renewable sources, solar and wind were the most accepted technologies, with a minimum distance of acceptance less than 5 km for solar (55% approval rating), followed by wind with a minimum distance between 5 and 10 km (with a 62% approval rating). For fossil fuels, coal was the least accepted source, followed by natural gas and hydroelectricity (Fig. 7b).

Fig. 7.

a-b. Minimum distance for accepting a power plant by group (a), ungroup energy sources (b).7

The minimum distance of acceptance was negatively impacted by noise, landscape change, climate concerns, local economy, and local employment as reported by the Pearson and Spearman correlations (Table A.14 and Table A.15). For example, the noise impact of power plant operations slightly negatively affected the minimum distance for wind, hydroelectric, biomass and natural gas, while effects on local landscape changed with the minimum acceptance for wind, biomass, and natural gas. The coefficients of these correlations between minimum distance and climate concern were statistically significant, as specified by t-test, and indicated that there is an inversely proportional relationship for hydroelectric, biomass and natural gas power plants. There was a high positive perception for plant-induced changes of the landscape for wind and solar (64% and 59%, respectively), while for coal it was only 4% and for hydroelectricity it was 9% (Table A.16). Regardless of the energy source, there was a positive perception towards the effect of power plant installations, local economy, and local employment.

Eq. (3) was estimated to analyze whether political ideology influences the minimum distance to accept power plant installations near homes. Evidence showed that changes in the political ideology did not explain changes in this minimum distance (Table 4). In addition, minimum distance did not change with socio-demographic variables, such as income, age, sex, region of residence, or university major.

Table 4.

Estimation of the minimum distance required to accept power plants by political tendencies.

Variable	Scale of Variable	Minimum distance for accepting
		Beta (Wind)	Beta (Coal)	Beta (Solar)	Beta (Biomass)	Beta (Hydroelectric)	Beta (Natural Gas)
Intercept		2319*** (0,146)	4826*** (0,066)	1870*** (0,135)	4072*** (0,153)	4319*** (0,136)	4667*** (0,131)
Conservative	1 = Conservative 0 = Moderate, independent, or other.	0,336 (0,251)	−0,102 (0,130)	0,510 (0,292)	−0,555* (0,266)	−0,422 (0,270)	−0,874*** (0,243)
Liberal	1 = Liberal 0 = Moderate, independent, or other.	−0,165 (0,207)	0,082 (0,078)	−0,054 (0,221)	0,174 (0,256)	0,189 (0,192)	−0,097 (0,189)
Adjusted R2		0,010	0006	0,014	0021	0,023	0070

Robust standards errors in parenthesis. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05). Durbin-Watson test: 1.945.

5. Discussion

Table 5 shows the review of the literature related to this study, which is broken down by country to make a visual comparison and an analysis of the current situation of Chile with respect to other countries. Items included here are discussed in the following sections.

Table 5.

Comparison of findings with similar research in other nations.

Item	Chile		Chile-Argentina	Brazil	US	UK	Germany	Portugal
	This Study	[50]	[57]	[83]	[6,38]	[15,84,85]	[11,13]	[17,86,87]
High RES acceptance (RQ1)	Yes, expect for hydroelectricity	Yes	Yes, expect for geothermal, hydroelectricity, and biomass	Yes, particularly for solar and wind	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
High decarbonization acceptance (RQ2)	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Limited knowledge (RQ3)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes		Yes	Yes
Acceptance varies from national to local (RQ4)	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes, particularly for wind and power grids	Yes	No, except for biomass
Driving socio-demographic variables for accepting (RQ5)	Political tendency*	Education, household characteristics**	Education	Region of residence	Political tendency, age, education, income	Age, education, gender, length of residence, attachment to a region	Age, education	Age, education

Note: * It suggests a pattern but is not conclusive. ** Household characteristics include the following aspects: number of people in the household, activity of the head of household, monthly household income, possession of goods and services, health care, and type of housing.

5.1. Preferences, WTP, and knowledge

A high general preference of 90% among survey respondents for renewable sources stood out for the future energy mix, particularly for solar and wind energy (RQ3), which is similar to what has been found in the literature: an 85% preference in Chile and Argentina [57], 90% in Brazil [83], 83% for solar and 68% for wind in the United Kingdom [84], and 90% in Germany [13]. The 28% higher preference for solar and wind than geothermal perhaps can be accounted for by the greater knowledge Chileans have about these sources [50]. The preference towards RPP is not surprising, as the majority of respondents envisioned an energy mix which contains a larger percentage of RES technology as compared to LTEP forecasts (except for the carbon neutrality by 2035 scenario), and a smaller percentage of hydroelectricity and fossil fuels. This vision is consistent with the current government’s roadmap towards a fast coal phase-out and also with public support for renewables versus non-renewables that has increased by 66% since 2010 [51].

Regardless of political ideology, most respondents approved of RET within five years, where moderates and liberals tended to have higher levels of approval than conservatives and independents for policies related to this transition (RQ1). In addition, independents and liberals were the most supportive of policies related to decarbonization and reconversion within the next five years (RQ2). The 10% higher willingness to change personal lifestyle in favor of reducing the carbon footprint indicated by liberals as compared to conservatives might help to understand liberals’ underlying motivations of the support towards a fast RET, and has already been reported in a similar study [38]. These results are related to disaggregated approval ratings by political tendency, and are consistent with documented evidence, as the liberal political ideology has been estimated to support pro-environmental policies 13% more than that of the conservative ideology [88]. Conservative ideology has a greater preference for conventional energy sources and traditional infrastructure, which is probably related to skepticism and denial towards anthropogenic climate change [38,88,89].

Respondents were WTP a higher energy price to support RET and decarbonization. WTP had 12% higher support for RET than decarbonization, similar to the WTP for renewables studied in Australia [90]. Liberals were the group with the highest WTP to support renewables (15% more than conservatives and 8% more than moderates) and the highest WTP to accelerate the closure of coal-fired power plants (14% more than conservatives and 38% more than moderates). This high WTP may be related to the fact that respondents were university students without enough personal financial responsibilities yet, since 91% of people from diverse backgrounds have stated that electricity service is already too expensive [50]. We also observed a consensus across political tendencies for the establishment of both subsidies on RPP (87% approval, Fig. 2h) and governmental taxes on fossil fuel power plants (93% approval, Fig. 3d), which was consistent with efforts to encourage the use of renewables, for example, through the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action national and international funds [91]. Moreover, the overall perception of a need for accelerated RPP investments (98% approval, Fig. 2a, reinforces the fast rate at which the renewable industry is developing in Chile [92]. Additional incentives can help with the transition to a net-zero carbon electricity industry at even a faster rate [93,94]. Knowledge about green energy has a significant positive impact on WTP for green energy [95], being higher for people with higher levels of education and access to information [96,97]. Furthermore, formal education is a key predictor of climate change belief and support of energy transitions [89].

Lack of knowledge about technologies might help to explain why respondents overestimated the current contribution of oil, solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal sources to the energy mix, while underestimating hydroelectricity and coal. In the case of oil, the 18.8% overestimation can be associated with the 13.6% underestimation for coal, since these fossil fuels act as substitute inputs for each other. The overestimation for biomass can perhaps be explained by the lack of knowledge and experience with this type of energy source [38]. Many people may have the misconception that it is the same as firewood, having no experience or limited knowledge with this technology. The underestimation of coal and hydroelectricity could be explained by the negative popularity associated with these sources, due to the history of national controversies. The results coincide with survey results from the United States [38], in which people thought that the current energy mix was more decarbonized than it actually was, which can reduce the perception of urgency for decarbonization policies. According to the survey conducted by the Chilean Ministry of Energy, participants stated that the source of their knowledge came from television and acquaintances [50], which given our results might results suggests a lack of energy education in Chile. In another study, 89% indicated that the main obstacle to the promotion of renewables in Chile was the lack of information, followed by 75% responding that price increases were the main culprit [57]. Chileans point out that the best way to get communities to protect the environment is to make relevant information available and to educate people about the advantages of environmental protection [51].

5.2. Local acceptance

Despite having an overall high acceptance level for RPP installations, (except for hydroelectricity), this level of acceptance depended on the distance between homes and the plant locations for all sources of energy (RQ4). This difference was observed regardless of the reported political ideology. For example, in this study, renewable energies changed from 32% of approval rating for distances less than 5 km to 91% for distances larger than 20 km. Within renewables, solar was the source that had the least change in its level of acceptance according to distance (only 45 % of variation between 5 and 20 km, while wind and biomass changed by 67% and 68%, respectively), which was consistent with the average of 80% of RES incorporation to the energy mix envisioned by respondents (Fig. A1). This low NIMBY effect reported for solar plants in our study is consistent with what has been found in a similar survey at the national level. According to the Ministry of Energy (2016), on average 90% of Chileans agree with the construction of a solar power plant within their borough of residence or nearby (less than 5 km from people’s homes), which perhaps can be explained by the fact that Chile is experiencing a fast energy transition to solar energy systems, in which local markets enable the successful viability of solar projects, and Chileans are already using solar panels in their homes [57]. This low NIMBY effect for solar has been found in other studies in Brazil, Germany, the United States, and Portugal [6,13]. In Brazil, the NIMBY phenomenon is quite small for solar and also for wind technologies, which might indicate that locals tend to favor large-scale RES plants if they bring benefits for particular communities [83]. In the United States, there is evidence that support for solar energy construction does not vary significantly from regional to local geographical areas [98], although there is one study indicating that solar is only a preferred technology after nuclear, wind, biomass, and natural gas [11]. Among renewables in the United States, solar and wind have a 75 % approval rating at 8 km [6], but wind plants, despite high levels of support, still have problems of social acceptance at the local level [99]. In the United Kingdom, solar energy has the highest level of support (80% for the 2012–2018 period), and the NIMBY effect is not conclusive for this source, as well as for others; the level of acceptance might be explained by other determinants, such as, people’s familiarity, values, worldviews, and not typically observed predictor variables [84]. In Germany, the level of acceptance for solar technology changes only by around 50% when minimum distance increases from 0 to 1 km; at the latter distance the level of acceptance is relatively high (80%) [13]. In Portugal, the perception of renewable energies is conditioned by individual factors related to location [87]. There is a general positive attitude towards RES and the NIMBY syndrome is present only in biomass and hydroelectricity [17].

The level of acceptance for hydroelectric power plants changed only by 40% between distances less than 5 km and larger than 20 km. This result is consistent with what was estimated by similar studies [50,57]. From the point of view of the average citizen, hydroelectricity, despite being an RES, was perceived as if it were a fossil fuel, such as natural gas which usually has an important NIMBY effect [13]. The low approval rating for the installation of hydroelectric power plants at the local and regional level can be explained by serious environmental consequences, national problems related to environmental movements [75], other funding issues such as citizen participation [26], and current water scarcity in Chile [100,101]. One of the most controversial aspects of hydroelectric megaprojects is the significant irreversible impact on the ecosystems of the geographical areas where they are located, along with the resettlement of local populations [26]. Climate change-induced water scarcity might also play a central role in the level of acceptance of hydroelectricity in Chile. The General Board of Water (DGA) has registered a rainfall deficit of between 31% and 84%, and a flow deficit of between 25% and 97%, when comparing the period of 1991–2020 with that of 1981–2010 in different geographical regions of the country [100,101]. These changes in hydrological patterns might deepen the NIMBY effect in those communities with high levels of dryness and lack of access to water resources, as hydroelectricity installations in these areas exacerbate the perception of drought.

Fossil fuel-based power plants maintained a high level of opposition (87% disapproval for coal and 50% for natural gas) for plants located in a radius greater than 20 km from respondents’ homes. Furthermore, the level of acceptance was quite small, particularly for coal, whose level of approval was 0% for distances less than 5 km and increased only by 11% for distances larger than 20 km. The case of natural gas had subtle differences, with a level of acceptance varying from 2% at the local level (<5 km) to 20% at the regional or national scale (<20 km). Our findings report that the local acceptance level for natural gas was higher than hydroelectric, which is comparable to what has been reported in previous studies in the country [50]. For the Southern Cone (Chile and Argentina), the preference for coal has been reported to be only 5.1% and 30.7% for natural gas [57]. In Germany, preference for fossil fuel sources is second only to nuclear plants [11], and 50% of respondents would approve of a coal-fired plant with a radius greater than 5 km. In contrast, 80% would approve of natural gas plants, reporting that the NIMBY effect is not as important for coal as it is for natural gas [13]. In the United States, coal-fired plants are the most rejected technology, followed by natural gas [11], and their levels of acceptance are around 40% and 65%, respectively, for distances larger than 8 km from people’s homes [6].

This low rate of acceptance reported by our study in Chile might also be related to the notion of ‘sacrifice zones’, which are urban areas exposed to high degrees of environmental pollution and degradation derived from industrial activities, such as coal mining and electricity generation. In 2015, municipal leaders of the Tocopilla, Huasco, Quintero, Coronel, and Puchuncaví Chilean boroughs demanded action from the national government, since the negative environmental externalities derived from the extractive model and the transformation of energy resources were severely damaging local livelihoods [102]. Later, in 2019, the Supreme Court ruling on pollution in the Concón, Quintero, and Punchacaví sacrifice zones forced the government to create public policies that would protect the environment, people’s life and health rights, and expectations for future generations [103]. This ruling, seen as a win for citizens’ health and environmental protection in the sacrifice zones, together with the incorporation of local representatives of sacrifice zones and health institutions in a round table discussion on decarbonization, and the shutdown of some carbon plants, helped to diminish energy conflicts, since for the first time health effects were analyzed within the context of decarbonization. In Germany, similar problems have arisen from these sacrifice zones [104], and in Virginia there is also evidence that the existence of sacrifice zones are related to the level of acceptance of renewable energies [105].

In our study, we found a substantial difference in local acceptance when compared to the national level, particularly in the case of biomass and wind. These differences are probably due to diverse local concerns that arise despite generally high approval rates [13]. Our results are comparable with the existing literature, with variations depending on the type of technology and the geographical region studied. For example, wind power plants also reveal differences between national and local support in the United Kingdom and Germany [13], and Portugal in the case of biomass [17]. Problems that arise in the context of the regional energy transformation cannot be generalized beyond regional circumstances but should be considered as specific regional phenomena that must be overcome by energy concepts adapted to the region [106]. Exhaustive analysis for each location in which the energy project is established is required to successfully bridge the gap between national and local challenges, translating national policy objectives into locally accepted policies, and managing conflicts differently depending on their national and local aspects [10].

5.3. Influence of socio-demographic variables

One result worth highlighting is the role of political ideology in determining respondents’ approval of power plant installations, which is aligned with similar studies in other nations [38,88,107] (RQ5). The awareness of how diverse groups of people perceive technologies can help policy makers, politicians, and other key stakeholders interested in designing and evaluating energy projects. Early conception and project designs that take into consideration a community’s political ideology, along with technical, environmental, and financial aspects, increase the chances of choosing and constructing plants that better fit local preferences.

In addition, in our study all political ideologies agreed that education plays an important role in the RET. To further understand the impact of schooling on the acceptance of diverse energy sources, as is suggested by the Ministry of Energy (2016), a sample with a larger variation in educational level and age should be analyzed in future research. In our sample, the educational level among participants was 44% higher than that of the average Chilean [78]. A more diverse sample could alter the support for RET and decarbonization acceptance. With that said, in a study performed in Germany targeted at high educated participants with an average age of 41.3 years old (SD: 15.4), people clearly favored renewable energies, and in Wolsink (2007b) and Parker (2020), it was also pointed out that people with more education tended to have higher acceptance of renewable sources (especially wind and solar).

Another relevant socio-demographic predictor for acceptance of renewable energy sources is age, as has been demonstrated in studies carried out in the Netherlands [16], Portugal [17], the United States, and Germany [11]. For example, this later study, with a sample average age of 41.3 years old (SD: 15.4), notes that younger participants preferred renewable portfolios and discarded carbon sequestration technology, while the older participants tended to favor fossil fuel technologies. The low variation in the participants’ age of our sample (22.8 years old on average with an SD of 2.7) as compared to the average Chilean (43.1 years old with an SD of 18) [78] does not allow us to examine the impact of age on the level of approval of renewable energy sources. Therefore, the study of the relationship between age and RET and decarbonization preferences is an opportunity for future research.

6. Conclusions

According to our survey results, university students in Chile generally had a high level of support for RET and the decarbonization process regardless of their political ideology (RQ1). Liberals tended to approve a faster transition towards a net-zero energy mix in comparison with other political groups (RQ2). Given a choice, respondents preferred future energy to have a higher RPP than the current government plan (RQ3). For all political ideologies, local acceptance played a relevant role, particularly for solar and wind, when analyzing the public approval rating of power plant construction. The level of acceptance decreased up to 56% for solar and wind when the installation was located within a radius lower than 5 km from the respondent’s house (RQ4). Since current policies do not include any type of regulation regarding the specific location of RE plants, these figures are not biased by procedures for the installation of RE near homes. Current government policies, such as the Participation Standards Guide [111], that encourages diverse ways of including the local community at different stages of RE projects, and the Environmental Impact Assessment [112], that may include mitigation measures for potential social and environmental impacts, are the only occasions in which the government interacts directly with stakeholders. The purpose of these procedures is to ensure that projects are as complete as possible by considering the interests of related stakeholders in advance, rather than establishing a specific location in which projects should be installed. The level of rejection was 97% for hydroelectricity and 99% for non-renewable power plants if they were located within 5 km. There was a broad willingness to change current lifestyle, and a considerable WTP a higher energy price than current prices to support a transition towards clean energy sources, particularly among liberals and independents. Knowledge of renewable energy implied a higher WTP. Limited knowledge of technologies might explain the overestimation of current participation of oil, solar, wind, biomass and geothermal sources in the energy mix, and the underestimation of hydroelectricity and coal. More research needs to be done to assess whether additional socio-demographic variables, such as income, gender, and age, affected these findings (RQ5). Additionally, since this study used a convenience sample, it is suggested that future research expand the sample to other geographic areas to verify the factors that influence the acceptance of renewables in other regions of the country. Also, other studies should go more in depth, measuring the level of impact of education and political partisanship on the acceptance of renewable policies.

The study of perceptions on the sustainable energy transition and decarbonization process in Chile holds global significance by showcasing an example of a relatively fast incorporation of renewable technologies into the market, adaptable policies, and a general societal openness towards a clean energy transition. As such, this Chilean case study provides valuable insights for a variety of nations and regions seeking to achieve sustainable energy goals.

6.1. Implications for public policy

Current public and private stakeholder efforts to encourage RPP and coal phase-out in the Chilean energy mix should advance at a coordinated pace with societal perception of energy. The fast and constant evolution of socio-economic and environmental conditions, as well as sensitivity to new problems related to RET and a willingness to prevent them, are the underlying forces that should lead policy actions to implement a fair and equitable process of moving towards a post-carbon society. These prompt actions based upon distributive, restorative, and strategic principles may also mitigate potential risks derived from past experiences with socio-environmental conflicts. Centralism of decisions must also be avoided, so we suggest using a timely, grassroots information collection instrument to address the transdisciplinary concerns related to power plant construction in a given location. Otherwise, progress towards a fast and just energy transition may slow down development. Public and private policy makers at the national and local level should recognize the importance of local perceptions in the design and the implementation of systems with low carbon emissions that maintain the use of resources, avoid overexploitation, have stable levels of industrial production, and provide participatory opportunities in its planning.

Declarations

Ethics Statement: Data collection were conducted according to established ethical guidelines. Informed consents were obtained from participants when these samples were collected.

Data availability statement

Data associated with this study have not been deposited into a publicly available repository. Data used for this study is confidential.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Karina Véliz: Conceptualization, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Supervision, Validation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Sergio Silva: Data curation, Formal analysis, Software, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft. Beatriz Hernández: Conceptualization, Funding acquisition, Methodology.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Abbreviations

RE

Renewable Energy

NIMBY

Not In My Backyard

RE

Renewable Energy Transition

RQ

Research Questions

NGOs

Non-Governmental Organizations

RPP

Renewable Power Plants

RES

Renewable Energy Sources

VIF

Variance Inflation Factor

WTP

Willingness to Pay

Appendix A. Supplementary data

The following is the Supplementary data to this article: