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. 2024 Feb 22;26(3):188. doi: 10.3390/e26030188

The c-Differential-Linear Connectivity Table of Vectorial Boolean Functions

Said Eddahmani 1,2, Sihem Mesnager 1,2,3,*
Editor: Lu Wei
PMCID: PMC10969117  PMID: 38539700

Abstract

Vectorial Boolean functions and codes are closely related and interconnected. On the one hand, various requirements of binary linear codes are needed for their theoretical interests but, more importantly, for their practical applications (such as few-weight codes or minimal codes for secret sharing, locally recoverable codes for storage, etc.). On the other hand, various criteria and tables have been introduced to analyse the security of S-boxes that are related to vectorial Boolean functions, such as the Differential Distribution Table (DDT), the Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT), and the Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (DLCT). In previous years, two new tables have been proposed for which the literature was pretty abundant: the c-DDT to extend the DDT and the c-BCT to extend the BCT. In the same vein, we propose extended concepts to study further the security of vectorial Boolean functions, especially the c-Walsh transform, the c-autocorrelation, and the c-differential-linear uniformity and its accompanying table, the c-Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (c-DLCT). We study the properties of these novel functions at their optimal level concerning these concepts and describe the c-DLCT of the crucial inverse vectorial (Boolean) function case. Finally, we draw new ideas for future research toward linear code designs.

Keywords: differential uniformity, vectorial function, S-box, linear codes, minimal codes

1. Introduction

Vectorial Boolean functions are intensively used to produce S-boxes in block ciphers such as DES [1], Rinjdael or AES [2], Blowfish [3], GOST [4], and Serpent [5]. Various criteria have been proposed to test the resistance of S-boxes and the corresponding vectorial Boolean functions to known cryptanalytical attacks, such as the differential attack [6], the linear attack [7], and some of their variants.

Let F:F2nF2m be a (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function. The derivative of F in the direction of aF2n is the function Da(F)(x)=F(x)+F(x+a). The derivative is used to analyse the resistance of a vectorial Boolean function to the differential attack [6] and serves to build the Differential Distribution Table (DDT). The derivative is also used in the Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) [8] and in the Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (DLCT) [9,10]. The entry at (a,b)F2n×F2m of the DDT is defined by

DDTF(a,b)=#xF2n:F(x)+F(x+a)=b.

To measure the resistance of a vectorial Boolean function, Nyberg [11] introduced the differential uniformity as

δF=maxDDTF(a,b)|(a,b)F2n×F2m,anda0.

The most resistant vectorial Boolean functions have small differential uniformities. The reader can consult the [12] for a complete background on vectorial Boolean functions with a deep analysis of their cryptographic aspects.

At FSE 2002, Borisov et al. [13] proposed a variant of the differential attack to study ciphers’ resistance based on using modular multiplication as a primitive operation. This motivated Ellingsen et al. [14] to introduce the concept of c-differentials to study the resistance of a vectorial Boolean function to multiplicative variants of the differential attack. For a vectorial Boolean function F:F2nF2m and cF2m, the c-derivative F with respect to aF2n is the (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function DacF defined by DacF(x)=F(x+a)+cF(x) for all xF2n. The c-derivative is used to study the resistance of ciphers based on popular vectorial Boolean functions such as the inverse function [15], the Gold function [16], and various other functions [17,18,19,20,21]. As for the DDT, a c-differential table was proposed in [14], where the entry at (a,b)F2n×F2m is defined by

DDTFc(a,b)=#xF2n|F(x+a)+cF(x)=b.

Also, a c-differential uniformity was proposed in [14] by

δFc=maxDDTFc(a,b)|(a,b)F2n×F2m,anda0ifc=1.

The construction of functions, particularly permutations, with low c-differential uniformity is an interesting problem, and recent work has focused heavily on this direction. Likewise, regarding the original notion of differential uniformity leading to optimal functions Perfect Nonlinear (PN) and Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) over finite fields in odd and even characteristics, respectively, optimal functions having the lowest possible values of a c-differential uniformity have also been introduced. One can refer to [19,22,23,24,25,26,27] and the references therein. Some of those functions with low c-differential uniformity have been investigated. There are relatively few known (non-trivial, nonlinear) optimal classes of PcN and APcN functions over finite fields with an even characteristic (see, e.g., [18,28,29,30,31] and the references therein).

Another popular cryptanalysis attack on S-boxes derived from Boolean functions is the boomerang attack, proposed by Wagner [32] in 1999. In connection with the boomerang attack, Cid et al. [8] proposed the Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) for a vectorial Boolean function where the entry at (a,b)F2n×F2m is defined by

BCTF(a,b)=#{xF2n:F1(F(x)+b)+F1(F(x+a)+b)=a}.

Based on the BCT, Boura and Canteaut [33] introduced the boomerang uniformity of a vectorial Boolean function to measure its resistance against boomerang attack. The boomerang uniformity of F is defined by

βF=maxaF2n,bF2mBCTF(a,b).

To extend the BCT and the boomerang uniformity of a vectorial Boolean function, Stǎnicǎ [34] introduced the concept of the c-Boomerang Connectivity Table (c-BCT). For cF2m, the c-BCT is defined at the entry (a,b)F2n×F2m by

BCTFc(a,b)=#{xF2n:F1(cF(x)+b)+F1c1F(x+a)+b=a}.

The corresponding c-boomerang uniformity is defined by

βFc=maxaF2n,bF2mBCTFc(a,b).

More generalizations of the differential and boomerang uniformities can be found in [35].

In 2019, Bar-On et al. [10] (see also [9]) introduced the Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (DLCT) of a vectorial Boolean function where the entry at (a,b)F2n×F2m is defined by

DLCTF(a,b)=#xF2n|b·(F(x+a)+F(x))=02n1,

where x·y is the inner product of x and y on F2m. To measure the resistance of an S-box connected to a vectorial Boolean function, the differential-linear uniformity of F can be used, as defined by Li et al. in [36],

γF=maxaF2n,bF2mDLCTF(a,b).

Various links exist between the DLCT and the Autocorrelation Table (ACT) of a vectorial Boolean function F. The ACT is defined at (a,b)F2n×F2m by

ACTF(a,b)=xF2n(1)b·(F(x)+F(x+a)).

The corresponding absolute indicator is defined as

ΔF=maxuF2n,u0,bF2mACTF(a,b).

In [37], Canteaut et al. showed that the DLCT and the ACT of a vectorial Boolean function satisfy γF=12ΔF and DLCTF(a,b)=12ACTF(a,b) for all (a,b)F2n×F2m.

One can observe that the derivative Da(F)(x)=F(x)+F(x+a) of a Boolean function F is used in various tables, such as the DDT, the BCT, and the DLCT. Motivated by the crucial role of the derivative in the former tables and the attacks related to them, we propose three new concepts towards the c-derivative Dac(F)(x)=F(x+a)+cF(x):

  • The c-Walsh transform of a vectorial Boolean function F: For cF2m, it is defined for aF2n and bF2m by
    WFc(a,b)=xF2n(1)a·x+b·cF(x).
  • The c-autocorrelation of a vectorial Boolean function: Let cF2m, c0. The c-autocorrelation of F at (a,b)F2n×F2m is the integer
    ACFc(a,b)=xF2n(1)b·(F(x+a)+cF(x)).
    The absolute indicator is
    ΔFc=maxuF2n,u0ifc=1,bF2mACFc(a,b),
    and the autocorrelation spectrum is
    ΛFc=ACFc(a,b),aF2n,bF2m.
  • The c-Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (c-DLCT) where we use the c-derivative: Let cF2m. The c-DLCT of F is a 2n×2m table where the entry at (a,b)F2n×F2m is defined by
    DLCTFc(a,b)=#xF2n|b·(F(x+a)+cF(x))=02n1.
    We also define the c-differential-linear uniformity of F as
    γFc=maxuF2n,u0ifc=1,bF2mDLCTFc(a,b),
    and, also, we define the c-DLCT spectrum of F by
    ΓFc=DLCTFc(a,b),aF2n,bF2m.

We show that there are numerous relationships between the three new concepts. Typically, we show that DLCTFc(a,b)=12ACFc(a,b) for all (a,b)F2n×F2m and γFc=12ΔFc.

Moreover, we focus on the inverse function defined on F2n by F(x)=1x if x0, and F(0)=0. We study its c-DLCT and give an explicit value for the entries, including when c=1.

We mention that there is an interesting connection between c differential uniformity and combinatorial designs, which has been highlighted in [38] by showing that the graph of a perfect c-nonlinear function (an optimal function concerning the c differential uniformity) is a set of differences in a quasigroup. Difference sets give rise to symmetric designs, which are known to build optimal self-complementary codes. Some types of designs also have concrete applications such as secret sharing and visual cryptography.

Finally, we emphasise that one of our practical applications in brother research lines is to use the derived (optimal) functions (see, e.g., [12]) to derive minimal binary linear codes (see, e.g., [39]) that are needed for their theatrical interests but, more importantly, for their practical applicants such as few-weight codes or minimal codes for secret sharing and securing two-party computation.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some known results that will be used in this paper. In Section 3, we define the c-Walsh and the c-autocorrelation of a vectorial Boolean function and study some of their properties. In Section 4, we present the concept of the c-DLCT and study its properties. We investigate the c-DLCT of the inverse function in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and presents new ideas for future research toward linear code designs along the same lines as designing (minimal) codes from Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN) and recent achievements [40] on minimal codes from low differential uniformity.

2. Preliminaries

In this section, we present some results and definitions that will be used in the next sections, including the c-derivative and the c-differential uniformity of a vectorial Boolean function.

For bF2n, we define the orthogonal space b of b as follows.

Definition 1.

For bF2n, the orthogonal space b of b is defined by

b=xF2n|b·x=0,

where b·x is the inner product of b and x on F2n.

The following result gives an explicit value for #b.

Proposition 1.

For bF2n, the orthogonal space b of b satisfies

#b=2nifb=0,2n1ifb0.

Proof. 

It is obvious that #0=2n. Suppose that b0. Then, the binary expansion of b is in the following form.

b=(bn1,bn2,,bj,,b0).

Suppose that bj=1 for some j with 0jn1. Let xF2n such that xb, that is b·x=1, with the binary expansion

x=(xn1,xn2,,xj,,x0).

Let yF2n with the binary expansion

y=(yn1,yn2,,xj+1(mod2),,x0).

Then,

b·y=b·x+bj1+10(mod2).

Hence, yb. It follows that for b0, each element x of F2n satisfying b·x=1 is in correspondence with one element y of F2n satisfying b·y=0. As a consequence, we have #b=2n1. □

For n1, let F2n be the finite field with 2n elements. The trace of an element xF2n is given by

Tr(x)=x+x2++x2n1,

and satisfies Tr(x){0,1}. The trace function satisfies Tr(x2)=Tr(x) for all xF2n.

The following lemma is well known and is useful for our work.

Lemma 1.

Let n and k be positive integers and e=gcd(k,n). Then,

gcd2k+1,2n1=1ifneisodd,2e+1ifneiseven.

Some specific equations on F2n may be involved. The following result deals with the quadratic equation.

Lemma 2.

(Proposition 1 of [41]) Let a,b,cF2n. The equation ax2+bx+c=0 has

  • (i)

    One root if and only if b=0.

  • (ii)

    Two roots if and only if b0 and Tracb2=0.

  • (iii)

    No root if and only if b0 and Tracb2=1.

The following lemma concerns another equation on F2n.

Lemma 3.

Let k and n be positive integers such that k<n. Let d=gcd(k,n), m=nd>1, and βm1=Trdn(B). Then, the trinomial f(X)=X2k+X+B has no root if βm10 and has 2d roots x+δτ in F2n if βm1=0, where δF2d, τF2n is any element satisfying τ2k1=1, and

x=1Trdn(c)i=0m1j=0ic2kjB2ki,

with any cF2n satisfying Trdn(c)F2d.

In [14], Ellingsen et al. proposed the concept of c-differentials. The following definitions are valid for binary finite fields.

Definition 2.

Let F:F2nF2m be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function and cF2m. The c-derivative F with respect to aF2n is the (n,m)-vectorial function DacF satisfying pxt

DacF(x)=F(x+a)+cF(x)

for all xF2n.

Definition 3.

Let F:F2nF2m be a (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function, and cF2m. The c-differential table of F is an 2n×2m table whose components are defined for aF2n and bF2m by

ΔFc(a,b)=#{xF2n|F(x+a)+cF(x)=b}.

Definition 4.

Let F:F2nF2m be a (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function, and cF2m. The c-differential uniformity of F is

ΔFc=maxaF2n,bF2mΔFc(a,b)ifc1,maxaF2n{0},bF2mΔFc(a,b)ifc=1.

3. The c-Walsh and c-Autocorrelation of a Vectorial Boolean Function

The Walsh transform of a Boolean function f:F2nF2 is defined at uF2n by

Wf(u)=xF2n(1)u·x+f(x),

where u·x is the inner product of u and x. The Walsh transform serves to compute the linearity of f as

L(f)=maxuF2n|Wf(u)|.

For a vectorial Boolean function F:F2nF2m, the Walsh transform of F is defined for uF2n and vF2m by

WF(u,v)=xF2n(1)u·x+v·F(x),

and is used to compute the linearity of F by

L(F)=maxuF2n,vF2n{0}|WF(u,v)|.

We extend the Walsh transform of a vectorial Boolean function to the c-Walsh transform as follows.

Definition 5.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function, and cF2m. The c-Walsh transform of F is defined for uF2n and vF2m by

WFc(u,v)=xF2n(1)u·x+v·cF(x).

The autocorrelation function is used to study various properties of the Boolean functions (see [42]).

Definition 6.

Let f be Boolean function defined on F2n. The autocorrelation of f at uF2n is the integer

ACf(u)=xF2n(1)f(x)+f(x+u),

and its absolute indicator is Δf=maxuF2n,u0ACf(u).

We notice that u=0 is excluded in the definition of the absolute indicator since ACf(0)=xF2n(1)f(x)+f(x)=2n. The generalization of the autocorrelation to vectorial Boolean functions can be then defined as follows.

Definition 7.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function defined on F2n. The autocorrelation of F at (u,v)F2n×F2m is the integer

ACF(u,v)=xF2n(1)v·(F(x)+F(x+u)).

The absolute indicator is

ΔF=maxuF2n,u0,vF2m,v0ACF(u,v),

and the autocorrelation spectrum is

ΛF=ACF(u,v),uF2n,u0,vF2m,v0.

The trivial values are not considered in the definition of the absolute indicator since ACF(0,v)=ACF(u,0)=2n.

Inspired by Definition 6, we introduce the notion of c-autocorrelation of a Boolean function.

Definition 8.

Let f be the Boolean function defined on F2n, and cF2m, c0. The c-autocorrelation of f at uF2n is the integer

ACfc(u)=xF2n(1)f(x+u)+cf(x),

and the c-absolute indicator is Δfc=maxuF2nACf(u).

Similarly, to generalize Definition 7, we define the c-autocorrelation of a vectorial Boolean function.

Definition 9.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function defined on F2n, and cF2m, c0. The c-autocorrelation of F at (u,v)F2n×F2m is the integer

ACFc(u,v)=xF2n(1)v·(F(x+u)+cF(x)).

The absolute indicator is

ΔFc=maxuF2n,u0ifc=1,vF2m,v0ACFc(u,v),

and the autocorrelation spectrum is

ΛFc=ACFc(u,v),uF2n,vF2m,.

To ease the study of the c-autocorrelation of a vectorial Boolean function F, we present its c-autocorrelation table defined at (u,v)F2n×F2m by

ACTFc(u,v)=xF2n(1)v·(F(x+u)+cF(x)).

The following result links the c-autocorrelation of a vectorial Boolean function and its c-Walsh transform.

Proposition 2.

Let F be an (n,m) Boolean function. Then, for any uF2n and any vF2n,

WF(u,v)WFc(u,v)=zF2n(1)u·zACFc(z,v).

Proof. 

We have

WF(u,v)WFc(u,v)=xF2n(1)u·x+v·F(x)yF2n(1)u·y+v·cF(y)=x,yF2n(1)u·(x+y)+v·(F(x)+cF(y)=y,zF2n(1)u·z+v·(F(y+z)+cF(y))=zF2n(1)u·zyF2n(1)v·(F(y+z)+cF(y))=zF2n(1)u·zACFc(z,v).

This finishes the proof. □

4. The c-Differential-Linear Connectivity Table of a Vectorial Boolean Function

In this section, we present a new concept, called the c-Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (c-DLCT), which generalizes the standard DLCT, independently defined in 2018 by Kim et al. [9] and Bar-On et al. [10].

We start by defining the standard Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (DLCT).

Definition 10.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function. The DLCT of F is an 2n×2m table where the entry at (u,v)F2n×F2m is

DLCTF(u,v)=#xF2n|v·(F(x+u)+F(x))=02n1.

The DLCT is a tool that could analyse the relationships between differential and linear parts of a block cipher. One can observe that if xF2n is such that v·(F(x+u)+F(x))=0, then v·(F((x+u)+u)+F(x+u))=0. Consequently, DLCTF(u,v) is always even. Moreover, if u=0, or if v=0, then DLCTF(u,v)=2n1. This induces the following definition for differential-linear connectivity uniformity.

Definition 11.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function. The differential-linear connectivity uniformity of F is

γF=maxuF2n,vF2mDLCTF(u,v).

The DLCT of a vectorial Boolean function is related to the autocorrelation function by the following relation.

ACF(u,v)=#{xF2n|v·(F(x)+F(x+u))=0)}#{xF2n|v·(F(x)+F(x+u))=1}=2#{xF2n|v·(F(x)+F(x+u))=0}2n=2DLCTF(u,v).

The DLCT is a tool to study the relationships between the linear and the differential properties of a block cipher. For (u,v)F2n×F2m, it counts the number of elements xF2n such that v·(F(x+u)+F(x))=0. Let aF2m, a0, and bF2m, b0, be two fixed non-zero elements. It is possible to study the relationships between the linear and the differential properties of a block cipher by studying the number of solutions of the equation v·(aF(x+u)+bF(x))=0 or equivalently v·(F(x+u)+cF(x))=0, where c=ab. This leads us to define a function’s c-Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (c-DLCT).

Definition 12.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function, and cF2m, c0. The c-DLCT of F is an 2n×2m table where the entry at (u,v)F2n×F2m is

DLCTFc(u,v)=#xF2n|v·(F(x+u)+cF(x))=02n1.

Moreover, the c-differential-linear connectivity uniformity of F is

γFc=maxuF2n,u0ifc=1,vF2m,v0DLCTFc(u,v),

and the c-DLCT spectrum of F is defined for (u,v)F2n×F2m by

ΓFc=DLCTFc(u,v),uF2n,vF2m.

From Definitions 9 and 12, we obtain the following connection between the ACTc and the DLCTc of a vectorial Boolean function.

Proposition 3.

Let F be (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function. Then, for all uF2n and vF2m,

DLCTFc(u,v)=12ACFc(u,v),andγFc=12ΔFc.

Proof. 

We have

ACFc(u,v)=#{xF2n|v·(F(x+u)+cF(x))=0)}#{xF2n|v·(F(x+u)+cF(x))=1}=2#{xF2n|v·(F(x+u)+cF(x))=0}2n=2DLCTFc(u,v).

which gives DLCTFc(u,v)=12ACFc(u,v). On the other hand, we have

ΔFc=maxuF2n,u0ifc=1,vF2m,v0ACFc(u,v)=2maxuF2n,u0ifc=1,vF2m,v0DLCTFc(u,v)=2γFc,

and γFc=12ΔFc. This finishes the proof. □

As a consequence of the former proposition, the following result connects the c-DLCT and the c-derivative of a vectorial Boolean function via the Walsh transform.

Proposition 4.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function, and cF2m, c0. Then, for any (u,v)F2n×F2m,

DLCTFc(u,v)=12W(DucF)(0,v).

Proof. 

Combining Definition 2 and the definition of the Walsh transform, we obtain

W(DucF)(0,v)=xF2n(1)v·(F(x+u)+cF(x))=ACFc(u,v).

Then, using Proposition 3, we have

WDucF(0,v)=ACFc(u,v)=2DLCTFc(u,v),

and DLCTFc(u,v)=12W(DucF)(0,v). □

The following result shows a connection between the c-DLCT and the c-derivative of a vectorial Boolean function via the Walsh transform.

Proposition 5.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function, and cF2m, c0. Then, for any (u,v)F2n×F2m,

WF(u,v)WFc(u,v)=2ωF2n(1)u·ωDLCTFc(ω,v).

Proof. 

Combining Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, we obtain

WF(u,v)WFc(u,v)=zF2n(1)u·zACFc(z,v)=2ωF2n(1)u·ωDLCTFc(ω,v),

as claimed. □

The following result gives a link between DLCTFc and ΔFc(a,b).

Proposition 6.

Let F be an (n,m)-vectorial Boolean function, and cF2m, c0. Then, for any (u,v)F2n×F2m,

DLCTFc(u,v)=12ωF2n(1)ω·vΔFc(u,ω).

Proof. 

By Proposition 3, we have

2DLCTFc(u,v)=ACFc(u,v)=#{xF2n|v·(F(x+u)+cF(x))=0)}#{xF2n|v·(F(x+u)+cF(x))=1}=ωF2n,ω·v=0#{xF2n|F(x+u)+cF(x)=ω}ωF2n,ω·v=1#{xF2n|F(x+u)+cF(x)=ω}=ωF2n(1)ω·v#{xF2n|F(x+u)+cF(x)=ω}=ωF2n(1)ω·vΔFc(u,ω).

This leads to

DLCTFc(u,v)=12ωF2n(1)ω·vΔFc(u,ω),

which finishes the proof. □

5. The c-DLCT of the Inverse Function

In this section, we give the explicit values of the entries of the c-DLCT, including the case c=1, and give some numerical results on F2n with 3n8.

5.1. The 1-DLCT of the Inverse Function

For c=1, the 1-DLCT satisfies the following result.

Theorem 1.

Let F:F2nF2n be the inverse function defined by F(0)=0, and F(x)=x2n2 for x0. For a,bF2n, define the set

E0(a,b)=zb|z0,Tr1az=0,

where b is the orthogonal space of b. Then,

DLCTF1(a,b)=2n1ifa=0,orb=0,2#E0(a,b)+22n1if1ab,2#E0(a,b)2n1if1ab.

Proof. 

We use the definition

DLCTF1(a,b)=#xF2n|b·(F(x+a)+F(x))=02n1.

We consider the following cases.

Case 1. 

Suppose that b=0. Then, for all xF2n, b·(F(x+a)+F(x))=0. Hence,

DLCTF1(a,0)=2n2n1=2n1.

Case 2. 

Suppose that b0 and a=0. Then, for all xF2n, b·(F(x+a)+F(x))=b·0=0. This leads to

DLCTF1(0,b)=2n2n1=2n1.

Case 3. 

Suppose that b0 and a0. Consider the equation

b·(F(x+a)+F(x))=0. (1)

Case 3.1. 

If x=0, then

b·(F(x+a)+F(x))=b·F(a)=b·1a.

Hence, x=0 is a solution of the Equation (1) if and only if 1ab.

Case 3.2. 

If x=a, then

b·(F(x+a)+F(x))=b·F(a)=b·1a.

Hence, x=a is a solution of the Equation (1) if and only if 1ab.

Case 3.3. 

Suppose that x0 and xa. We have

F(a+x)+F(x)=1a+x+1x=ax2+ax.

If b·(F(a+x)+F(x))=0, then F(a+x)+F(x)=z for some zb, that is ax2+ax=z, or equivalently

zx2+azx+a=0. (2)

Case 3.3.1. 

If z=0, then the Equation (2) reduces to a=0, which is not possible.

Case 3.3.2. 

Suppose that z0. If Tr1az=1, then, by Lemma 2, the Equation (2) has no solution, and if Tr1az=0, it has two solutions.

  • Define the set

E0(a,b)=zb|z0,Tr1az=0.

The DLCT1 in Case 3 is then

DLCTF1(a,b)=2#E0(a,b)+22n1if1ab,2#E0(a,b)2n1if1ab,

which finishes the proof. □

5.2. The c-DLCT of the Inverse Function for c1

Theorem 2.

Let F:F2nF2n be the inverse function defined by F(0)=0, and F(x)=1x for x0. Let cF2n with c0 and c1. For a,bF2n, define the set

E0(a,b,c)=zb|z0,z1+ca,Tracz(1+c+az)2=0,

where b is the orthogonal space of b. Then,

DLCTFc(a,b)=2n1ifb=0,0ifa=0,b0,2#E0(a,b,c)+22n1if1ab,cab,2#E0(a,b,c)+22n1if1ab,cab,2#E0(a,b,c)+42n1if1ab,cab,2#E0(a,b,c)+22n1if1ab,cab.

Proof. 

Suppose that c0 and c1. We use the definition

DLCTFc(a,b)=#xF2n|b·(F(x+a)+cF(x))=02n1.

We consider the following cases.

Case 1. Suppose that b=0. Then, for all xF2n, b·(F(x+a)+cF(x))=0. Hence,

DLCTFc(a,0)=2n2n1=2n1.

Case 2. Suppose that b0 and a=0. If b·(F(x+a)+cF(x))=0, then b·(1+c)F(x)=0, and (1+c)F(x)b. Observe that x=0 is a possible solution. If x0, then there exists zb{0} such that (1+c)F(x)=z, that is 1+cx=z, and x=1+cz. This leads to

DLCTFc(0,b)=#b2n1=0.

Case 3. 

Suppose that a0 and b0. Consider the equation

b·(F(x+a)+cF(x))=0. (3)

Case 3.1. 

If x=0, then

b·(F(x+a)+cF(x))=b·F(a)=b·1a.

Hence, x=0 is a solution of the Equation (3) if and only if 1ab.

Case 3.2. 

If x=a, then

b·(F(x+a)+cF(x))=b·cF(a)=b·ca.

Hence, x=a is a solution of the Equation (3) if and only if cab.

Case 3.3. 

Suppose that x0 and xa. We have

F(a+x)+cF(x)=1a+x+cx=(1+c)x+acx2+ax.

If b·(F(a+x)+cF(x))=0, then F(a+x)+cF(x)=z for some zb, that is (1+c)x+acx2+ax=z, or equivalently

zx2+(1+c+az)x+ac=0. (4)

Case 3.3.1. 

If z=0, then the Equation (4) reduces to (1+c)x+ac=0, which has one solution x=ac1+c.

Case 3.3.2. 

If z0=1+cab, then for z0, the Equation (4) reduces to z0x2+ac=0, which, by Lemma 2, has one solution.

Case 3.3.3. 

Suppose that z0 and z1+ca. If Tracz(1+c+az)2=1, then, by Lemma 2, the Equation (4) has no solution, and if Tracz(1+c+az)2=0, it has two solutions.

  • To summarize all the cases, we define the set

E0(a,b,c)=zb|z0,z1+ca,Tracz(1+c+az)2=0.

The DLCTc in Case 3 is then

DLCTFc(a,b)=2#E0(a,b,c)+22n1if1ab,cab,2#E0(a,b,c)+22n1if1ab,cab,2#E0(a,b,c)+42n1if1ab,cab,2#E0(a,b,c)+22n1if1ab,cab,

which finishes the proof. □

5.3. Numerical Results for the c-DLCT of the Inverse Function

We have computed the c-DLCT of the inverse function over F2n for 3n7, and all cF2n, while for n=8, we only compute it for c=1,2,,10. The inversion and multiplication in F2n are processed modulo the polynomials presented in Table 1.

Table 1.

The polynomials of F2n for 3n8.

F2n Polynomial
F23 x3+x+1
F24 x4+x+1
F25 x5+x3+1
F26 x6+x3+1
F27 x7+x3+1
F28 x8+x4+x3+x2+1

In Table 2, we present the values of DLCTFc(u,v) of the inverse function over F24 with c=0×9.

Table 2.

The values of DLCTFc(u,v) of the c-DLCT of the inverse function over F24 for c=0×9.

uv 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 8 0 2 2 0 −4 2 −2 2 −4 0 2 2 0 0 −2
2 8 2 0 −2 2 2 2 −2 0 2 −4 2 −4 0 0 0
3 8 0 2 0 −2 −4 0 0 −2 0 2 2 2 2 2 −4
4 8 −2 2 −2 0 2 −4 0 2 0 2 2 2 −4 0 0
5 8 2 0 2 0 0 −2 2 −4 0 2 2 −2 0 2 −4
6 8 0 −2 0 −2 2 2 −4 0 2 −4 0 0 2 2 2
7 8 2 −4 −4 2 −2 0 2 2 0 2 −2 0 0 2 0
8 8 −2 0 0 2 2 2 0 −2 2 2 −4 0 2 −4 0
9 8 2 −4 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 −4 2 0 −2 −2
a 8 2 0 2 −4 2 −2 −4 2 0 0 −2 0 2 0 2
b 8 −4 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 −2 0 0 −2 2 −4 2
c 8 0 −2 −4 0 0 0 2 0 −2 2 2 2 −4 2 2
d 8 0 2 2 −4 0 −4 0 2 2 0 0 2 −2 −2 2
e 8 −4 2 2 2 −2 0 0 2 −4 −2 0 0 2 0 2
f 8 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 −4 2 −2 0 −4 −2 2 0

For the inverse function over F2n, we present in Table 3 the c-DLCT spectrum ΓFc and c-differential-linear uniformity γFc for 3n8 and for small values of c. All the other c-DLCT spectrums reduce to one of the listed ones in the table.

Table 3.

The c-DLCT spectrum and the c-differential-linear connectivity uniformity of the inverse function over F2n for 3n8 and small c.

F2n c ΓFc γFc
F23 1 {4,0,4} 4
F23 2 {2,0,2,4} 2
F24 1 {4,0,4,8} 4
F24 2 {4,2,0,2,8} 4
F24 6 {2,0,2,4,8} 4
F25 1 {4,0,4,16} 4
F25 2 {6,4,2,0,2,4,6,16} 6
F25 3 {6,4,2,0,2,4,16} 6
F25 7 {4,2,0,2,4,16} 4
F26 1 {8,4,0,4,8,32} 8
F26 2 {8,6,4,2,0,2,4,6,8,32} 8
F26 6 {8,6,4,2,0,2,4,6,32} 8
F26 8 {6,4,2,0,2,6,8,32} 8
F27 1 {12,8,4,0,4,8,64} 12
F27 2 {12,10,8,6,4,2,0,2,4,6,8,10,64} 12
F28 1 {16,12,8,4,0,4,8,12,16,128} 16
F28 2 {16,14,12,10,8,6,4,2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,128} 16
F28 6 {16,14,12,10,8,6,4,2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,128} 16
F28 10 {14,12,10,8,6,4,2,0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,128} 16

6. Conclusions

In this paper, we introduced and studied new cryptographic tools and parameters to help us quantify the security of S-boxes (mathematically, vectorial Boolean functions) involving block ciphers as main components: the c-Walsh transform, the c-autocorrelation, and the c-differential-linear uniformity. We also introduced a new table called the c-Differential-Linear Connectivity Table (c-DLCT) to analyse attacks related to the differential and the linear attacks. We considered various S-box family properties associated with the above-mentioned notion and presented the values of the c-DLCT of the particular crucial case of the inverse function. Finally, recall that codes over finite fields have been studied extensively because of their linear structures and practical implementations. It is the basis of the research on various kinds of codes. One well-known construction method of linear codes is derived from special functions (essentially from cryptographic functions which play a crucial role in symmetric cryptography) over finite fields (see the book [12]). Cryptographic multi-output Boolean functions and codes have essential data communication and storage applications. These two areas are closely related and have had a fascinating interplay (see, e.g., the book chapter in [43] and the references therein). Cryptographic functions and linear codes are closely related and have had a fascinating interplay. Cryptographic functions (e.g., highly nonlinear functions, Perfect Nonlinear (PN), Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN), Bent, Almost Bent (AB), and Plateaued) have essential applications in coding theory. For instance, Perfect Nonlinear (APN or PN) functions have been employed to construct optimal linear codes (see, e.g., [44,45,46,47,48] and the references therein). Very recently, Mesnager, Shi, and Zhu [40] proposed several constructions of minimal (cyclic) codes from low differential uniform functions. Given these works, the derived functions from this paper would help design new families of binary minimal codes. We will keep an in-depth study of them in future work and cordially invite interested readers to investigate them.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and P. Solé for his kind invitation to contribute to this Special Issue.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, S.E. and S.M.; Methodology, S.E. and S.M.; Validation, S.E. and S.M.; Formal analysis, S.E. and S.M.; Investigation, S.E. and S.M.; Writing—original draft, S.E.; Writing—review and editing, S.M. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Funding Statement

This research received no external funding.

Footnotes

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Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.


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