Skip to main content
The BMJ logoLink to The BMJ
. 1999 Jan 9;318(7176):126. doi: 10.1136/bmj.318.7176.126a

Bournewood: an indefensible gap in mental health law

Law Commission’s proposals for incapacity jurisdiction strike reasonable balance

Donna Dickenson 1, Ajit Shah 1
PMCID: PMC1114589  PMID: 9880300

Editor—We agree with Eastman and Peay that capacity will become a major issue for mental health services,1 particularly in the light of the consultation paper Who Decides?.2 The Law Commission’s proposals on which the paper was based3 afford a mechanism that could resolve much of the practical difficulty arising from the Appeal Court’s decision while also affording the rights that the House of Lords’ decision denies.4

The Law Commission proposed an incapacity jurisdiction, to provide an integrated framework for decisions concerning personal welfare, health, or financial matters of incapacitated people. As with similar provisions,5 the court was intended to be a jurisdiction of last resort. Its jurisdiction would be invoked only if the making of an order would be of greater benefit to the incapacitated person than would no order.

The recommendation for the incapacity jurisdiction covered giving or refusing approval for particular forms of health care, appointing managers to give or refuse such consent, and requiring people to allow a proxy to take over responsibility for their health care. In relation to mental disorders the Law Commission recommended that the court’s incapacity jurisdiction should extend to the power to order admission to hospital for assessment or treatment of mental disorder if there are grounds for admission under section 2 or 3 of the Mental Health Act and it is in the person’s best interest to be admitted.

Although the existence of another court might seem a further burden on busy clinicians, we believe that it would help considerably. The right to apply to the mental health review tribunal and the right of the nearest relative to obtain the patient’s discharge would not apply during the first period of detention in these circumstances, since a judicial determination would already have been made. This provision would mean that most cases would not need to be reviewed, since the median period for admission of patients with dementia is 5-10 weeks.

Who Decides? asked whether a new provision for compulsory admission to hospital is needed. The House of Lords’ judgment has underlined the urgency of a new procedure, and the Law Commission’s proposals for an incapacity jurisdiction strike a reasonable balance between the rights of incapacitated people and the duties of clinicians. The risk of confusion between the two procedures would be minimised if an NHS directive advised psychiatrists to use the incapacity jurisdiction procedures wherever they would have used informal admission.

References

  • 1.Eastman N, Peay J. Bournewood: an indefensible gap in mental health law. BMJ. 1998;317:94–95. doi: 10.1136/bmj.317.7151.94. . (11 July.) [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 2.Lord Chancellor’s Department. Who decides? Making decisions on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults. London: HMSO; 1997. (Cm 3803.) [Google Scholar]
  • 3.Law Commission. Mental incapacity. London: HMSO.; 1995. (Com 231.) [Google Scholar]
  • 4.Shah A, Dickenson D. The Bournewood case and its implications for health and social services. J R Soc Med. 1998;91:349–351. doi: 10.1177/014107689809100702. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 5.Children Act 1989. London: HMSO; 1991. [Google Scholar]
BMJ. 1999 Jan 9;318(7176):126.

Law is inappropriate for patients admitted informally but who lack capacity

G I Szmukler 1, F Holloway 1

Editor—Why do Eastman and Peay think of patients with a mental disorder as constituting a special class of patients whose treatment must be regulated by specific mental health legislation?1-1 In the wake of the House of Lords overturning of the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Bournewood case, concern is being expressed about what Lord Steyn called “an indefensible gap in our mental health law” for non-objecting patients without capacity who are admitted to hospital informally. What should the safeguards be for these so called detained patients?

Many see these safeguards as requiring changes in mental health law or the involvement of the Mental Health Act Commission.1-2 This is inappropriate. One of the options mentioned by Eastman and Peay needs to be put more strongly and extended. We fail to see any difference between patients with mental incapacity, whether they have a mental or a physical disorder. Both groups require the same protections, whether they are on a psychiatric, medical, or surgical ward. We see the Law Commission’s proposals1-3 and the subsequent consultative paper Who Decides?1-4 as offering an excellent framework for all patients who lack capacity, including those who are mentally ill. The range of useful options presented will, we believe, improve the care of all patients. A mental health act or the Mental Health Act Commission has no role.

One could go further. The Bournewood case illustrates the disjunction in mental health legislation between the legal criteria for detention in hospital and the question of capacity. The question of capacity has no direct role, yet for all patients (other than those who are mentally ill) non-consensual treatment cannot be given in their best interests unless they lack the capacity to make treatment decisions. We see no justification for this discrepancy. If a patient with a mental disorder has the capacity to make treatment decisions why should this not be respected as it is for all other patients?

Who Decides? discusses provisions for all patients with incapacity, including those who object and thus might require treatment against their will. These provisions include advance directives, continuing powers of attorney covering healthcare decisions, managers appointed by the court, and judicial decisions. Thus a mental health act for interventions with a paternalistic justification is not needed. Indeed, a strong case can be made that mental health legislation discriminates against patients with a mental disorder, supporting prejudicial stereotypes of difference, incompetence, and dangerousness.1-5

References

  • 1-1.Eastman N, Peay J. Bournewood: an indefensible gap in mental health law. BMJ. 1998;317:94–95. doi: 10.1136/bmj.317.7151.94. . (11 July.) [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 1-2.Dyer C. New safeguards planned for psychiatric patients. BMJ. 1998;317:7. doi: 10.1136/bmj.317.7150.7. . (4 July.) [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 1-3.Law Commission. Mental incapacity law. London: HMSO; 1995. (Com 231.) [Google Scholar]
  • 1-4.Lord Chancellor’s Department. Who decides? Making decisions on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults. London: HMSO; 1997. (Cm 3803.) [Google Scholar]
  • 1-5.Campbell T, Heginbotham C. Mental illness: prejudice, discrimination and the law. Vermont: Dartmouth; 1991. [Google Scholar]

Articles from BMJ : British Medical Journal are provided here courtesy of BMJ Publishing Group

RESOURCES