Editor—In some hospitals in the Republic of Ireland newborn babies are electronically tagged to prevent kidnapping. The use of such devices is well established for convicted criminals in some jurisdictions. Animals are also often tracked by means of electronic tags. Therefore, consideration to extend this technology to people with dementia, as mentioned in the editorial by Hughes and Louw, evokes unfortunate metaphors for our attitudes to people with dementia: infantilisation, custody, and a subhuman existence.1-1
To those who might see this interpretation as unduly melodramatic, it is important to be aware of movements in bioethics which seek to diminish or deny personhood in dementia. A typical example is the Royal Dutch Medical Association's use of the word ontluistering (removal of the light) for this condition, suggesting a lower level of being.1-2 One prominent ethicist, Daniel Callahan, has stated a viewpoint that the presence of dementia should be considered as a basis for the rationing of health care.1-3 Another has likened people with severe dementia to dogs, since they supposedly lack capacities for hopes and fears, dreads, and longings for their futures.1-4
Fortunately, an ethical countercurrent exists which is actively promoting the concept of personhood in dementia. One eloquent defender of the preserved humanity of people with dementia has spoken of the challenge of asserting this position in a hypercognitive society where people are valued for what they produce rather than for what they are.1-5 In this book, Post urges us to convert the dictum “I think, therefore I am” to “I will, feel, and relate while disconnected by forgetfulness from my former self, but still, I am.”
This position challenges us to reflect carefully and study in depth the causes of behavioural and psychological symptoms in dementia. Wandering may be triggered or exacerbated by external factors such as inappropriate environments, inadequate staffing, and failure to provide for the specialised emotional and social needs of a vulnerable group of people.
Although Hughes and Louw are to be applauded for opting for a predominantly libertarian approach to electronic tagging, they seem to imply that in certain circumstances its use should be considered.1-1 This is disappointing: our focus should be not only on understanding the basis of wandering in dementia but also on addressing support for people with dementia and their carers at home as well as deficits in the design and staffing of our institutions.
References
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1-1.Hughes JC, Louw SJ. Electronic tagging of people with dementia who wander. BMJ. 2002;325:847–848. doi: 10.1136/bmj.325.7369.847. . (19 October.) [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
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