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. 2024 Aug 20;14:19310. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-70179-y

Individuals who rarely adopt observer perspectives report richer scene-based autobiographical memories

Peggy L St Jacques 1,✉
PMCID: PMC11336166  PMID: 39164341

Abstract

For most people, the capacity to adopt alternative visual perspectives when remembering emerges spontaneously due to the reconstructive nature of memories. Particularly as memories become more remote and are vulnerable to distortions, there is a shift in the perspective of memories from own eyes to observer-like views. Yet not all individuals report adopting novel perspectives in memories. The current study examines how self-reported differences in adopting an observer-like perspective influences autobiographical memory retrieval. Participants who reported rarely adopting an observer-like perspective had a diminished shift in perspective with memory remoteness and reported richer scene-related aspects of remembering. Additionally, the reduced tendency to use observer-like perspectives during autobiographical memory retrieval was linked to more accurate spatial visualization on a standardized objective test. Together these findings offer insights into individual differences in the malleability of memories, and the central role that maintaining our original perspective plays in preserving the personal past.

Subject terms: Psychology, Human behaviour

Introduction

Memories are not veridical records of the past but instead can be retrieved in novel ways, such as when people adopt alternative visual perspectives that differ from how events were originally experienced. When asked to retrieve autobiographical memories from their personal past, people report an own eyes perspective, in which events are recalled from a similar viewpoint from which they were originally experienced, as well as an observer-like perspective, in which rememberers are embedded within the event from any one of several viewpoints in which they could see themselves1. The idea that we can adopt alternative perspectives that differ from our original point-of-view is evidence for the constructive nature of memory. While own eyes perspectives are associated with greater preservation of memories2,3, observer-like perspectives are attributed to greater malleability during remembering that can lead to a lack of correspondence between our memories and reality4–6. Supporting these ideas, observer-like perspectives are more frequent in remote memories1,7 and are associated with reductions in the consistency and accuracy of memories8–10. Additionally, other research has demonstrated that adopting an observer-like perspective reduces elements that imbue memories with the sense of reexperience, such as the vividness of visual information11, degree of emotional intensity12, and the setting in which events occurred13,14. Despite the consequence that adopting an observer-like perspective can sometimes signal distortions in memory15, the ability to construct mental images from novel points-of-view enables memories to be updated with new information16 and may support more flexible long-term memory representations17,18.

Autobiographical memory performance can substantially differ across individuals19, and there is growing evidence that the prevalence of own eyes and observer-like perspectives in memories can also vary among individuals. While most people can flexibly adopt alternative viewpoints within the remembered scene and dynamically shift between these perspectives within the same memory7, anecdotal evidence indicates that some people rarely adopt observer-like perspectives and instead solely recall memories from an own eyes perspective20. Empirical evidence has supported these claims by demonstrating that a small proportion of participants report that they do not typically experience observer-like perspectives when reflecting upon the viewpoint they generally adopt during autobiographical memory retrieval21. Several studies have also demonstrated that the preferred visual perspective one adopts is a trait-like property14,20,22, such that individuals report using the same perspective across different memories. Moreover, the tendency to adopt an own eyes perspectives has been linked to better spatial abilities23, perhaps reflecting richer visuospatial imagery abilities in some individuals that support the maintenance of the original perspective of memories. Together this research points to the important question of how individual differences in adopting an observer-like perspective contributes to the malleable nature of memory, which is relevant for understanding real-world situations in which memory accuracy is critical such as eyewitness testimony15. Yet, whether self-reported differences in the rarity of adopting an observer-like perspective impacts how people remember specific memories from the personal past is unknown.

The current research investigates autobiographical memory in people who report that they rarely adopt an observer-like perspectives when compared to people who report that they typically experience observer-like perspectives. Across two studies participants were asked to recall specific autobiographical memories and the remoteness of memories was manipulated using temporal cues ranging from the last week to more than 10 years ago. Participants in the rare observer group were predicted to have a diminished shift in perspective over time, as reflected by less decrease in own eyes perspectives coupled with less increase in observer perspectives with memory remoteness when compared to participants in the typical observer group. Critically, the quality of memories was also compared by asking participants to provide subjective ratings of the vividness of visual imagery, emotional intensity, and the integrity of scene-related characteristics. If maintaining the original perspective of events helps to preserve the richness of memories, then participants who report rarely adopting an observer-like perspective should also show an enhancement in phenomenological properties of remembering associated with visual perspective12,14,16. Such findings would suggest that individual differences in adopting an observer-like perspective can protect memories from reconstructive related changes. Additional individual difference questionnaires and standardized tests were also included to examine whether the groups differed on visuospatial imagery abilities.

Study 1: methods

Participants

Given the small percentage of individuals who were expected to report an absence of observer perspectives (i.e., roughly 10% of participants based on previous research), an initial screening was conducted as part of an online mass testing procedure in the psychology research participation pool at the University of Alberta. The screening included four statements targeting key aspects that are commonly used to distinguish own eyes and observer-like perspectives based on the prior literature, such as the visibility of the self, use of a first-person perspective, and a photograph analogy when describing observer-like perspectives1,24. Participants indicated how strongly they agreed with the statements on a five-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Two of the statements were designed to target the tendency to adopt an own eyes perspective: (1) When I remember specific events, I see them from a first-person perspective, as if I were experiencing them again through my own eyes, and (2) I have difficulty seeing myself in specific memories when I remember. Thus, strong agreement with these statements would indicate the tendency to use an own eyes perspective. The remaining two questions were designed to target the tendency to adopt an observer-like perspectives: (1) When I remember specific events, I see myself in the memory as if looking at a photograph of myself, and (2) I have difficulty remembering specific memories from a first-person perspective. Composite own eyes and observer-like scores were created by averaging the responses to own eyes and observer-like perspective statements. Individuals were invited to participate in the main study based on their composite scores as indicated below. The use of the pre-screening approach also served to minimize recruitment bias, since participants were unaware of the relationship between their participation in the study and their responses during mass testing.

A total of 366 young adults (18–30 years of age) participated in the study, which was conducted in-person. Participants were assigned to perspective groups based on their responses to visual perspective statements administered during the in-person study. Individuals who reported rarely experiencing observer-like perspectives were identified based on observer composite scores ≤ 2 and own eyes composite scores ≥ 4, which will be referred to here as the observer rare group. Individuals who reported the typical experience of a mixture of both own eyes and observer perspectives included all other individuals in the sample, except individuals with own eyes composite scores ≤ 2 and observer composite scores ≥ 4 (n = 35) or individuals who reported extremely low scores on both (i.e., ≤ 2; n = 2), which will be rereferred to here as the observer typical group. Participants were excluded if they did not respond to all visual perspective statements (n = 1). Thus, the final sample size was 328 (observer rare: n = 129, 71 women, 55 men, two non-binary, one did not report; mean age = 19.27, SD = 1.81; observer typical: n = 199, 113 women, 82 men, four non-binary; mean age = 19.18, SD = 1.94). Supporting the hypothesis that the absence of observer-like perspective is a stable individual difference, 78% of individuals (i.e., 101 out of 129) in the observer rare group were consistent in the visual perspective composite scores collected in-person and during mass testing scores collected several weeks to months earlier. The observer typical group, as might be expected given their flexible ability to adopt both own eyes and observer-like perspectives, were considerably more variable in self-reported perspective with 52% showing consistent responses (i.e., 94 out of 199). Here, I chose to include participants based on their in-person scores, as this maximized the number of participants in each group. However, the results reported below were identical using a more conservative approach that restricted the analysis to individuals who reported consistent responses about their self-reported perspective (see Supplementary Results). An a priori sample size of 200 was determined based on obtaining 80% power to detect a small to moderate effect size (d = 0.4) using a between-groups design with two-levels25. Thus, the sample size was more than adequate. Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants.

Procedure

Participants were asked to retrieve specific autobiographical memories that they were personally involved in, and which occurred at a particular time and place. They were asked to retrieve one memory that occurred within each of the following time periods: last week, last month, last year, 3 years ago, 5 years ago (but less than 10 years), and 10 or more years ago. Following the presentation of the retrieval cue, participants pressed a button to indicate when they had a specific memory in mind. Then they were asked covertly recall each memory and to provide subjective ratings on five-points scales from 1 = low to 5 = high including vividness, emotional intensity, positive valence, negative valence, own eyes perspective, observer perspective, rehearsal, and belief, which were adapted from the autobiographical memory questionnaire26. After memory retrieval, participants then completed several questionnaires targeting visuospatial and other individual differences linked to visual perspective (see Supplementary Materials), as well as a demographic form indicating their age and gender. All methods were carried out in accordance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement: on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS 2).

Analysis

Response time and subjective ratings for the memory task were analyzed separately in 2 (group: observer rare, observer typical) X 6 (time period: week, month, year, 3 years, 5 years 10 years) mixed ANOVAs with group as a between-subjects variable and time period as a within-subjects variable. Main effects and interactions with time period were analyzed using polynomial within-subject contrasts to isolate linear and quadratic trends on memory performance. Response times to elicit a specific memory were trimmed to exclude extreme values (i.e., < 100 ms, > 75,000 ms) which included 1.3% of the total number of trials. Follow-up analyses were conducted using Bonferroni adjusted family wise error rates. Outliers were identified as values 1.5 times the interquartile range above the upper quartile or below the lower quartile. Separate analyses excluding detected outliers did not influence the results, and thus outliers were included here.

Study 1: results

As predicted, there were significant differences between the groups in the visual perspective that participants reported during memory retrieval (for means and SD see Supplementary Table 2). First, for own eyes perspectives there was a main effect of group, F (1, 326) = 27.61, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.08, reflecting higher own eyes ratings in the observer rare than the observer typical groups. There was also a significant linear trend for time period, F (1, 326) = 89.55, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.22, reflecting a decrease in own eyes perspectives with memory remoteness. However, the quadratic trend for time period was not significant, F (1, 326) = 0.490, p = 0.484, η2p = 0.002. These effects were qualified by a significant linear trend for the time period × group interaction, F (1, 326) = 11.24, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.03. The quadratic trend for the time period × group interaction was not significant, F (1, 326) = 0.733, p = 0.393, η2p = 0.03. Simple effects indicated that the linear trend in own eyes ratings was significant in both groups, but the effect size was nearly three times as large in the observer rare group, F (1, 198) = 96.44, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.33, compared to the observer typical group, F (1, 128) = 17.64, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12. As shown in Fig. 1a, the observer typical group had a steeper decrease in own eyes ratings with memory remoteness (i.e., mean difference between last week and last 10 years = 1.21), when compared to the observer rare group (i.e., mean difference between last week and last 10 years = 0.60).

Figure 1.

Figure 1

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Visual perspective ratings in study 1. The observer rare group (n = 129) had higher own eyes perspective ratings (A) coupled with lower observer perspective ratings (B) and had a diminished shift in perspective with memory remoteness when compared to the observer typical (n = 199). Error bars reflect 95% CI. Five-point scales from 1 = low to 5 = high.

Second, for observer perspectives there was a main effect of group, F (1, 326) = 47.60, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.13, reflecting lower observer ratings in the observer rare than the observer typical groups. There was also a linear trend of time period, F (1, 326) = 64.32, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.17, reflecting an increase in observer perspectives with memory remoteness. However, the quadratic trend of time period was not significant, F (1, 326) = 0.87, p = 0.352, η2p = 0.003. These main effects were qualified by a significant linear trend in the time period × group interaction, F (1, 326) = 11.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.03. However, the quadratic trend for the time period × group interaction was not significant, F (1, 326) = 2.06, p = 0.152, η2p = 0.006. Simple effects indicated that the linear trend in observer ratings was significant in both groups, but the effect size was more than three times as large in the observer typical group, F (1, 198) = 72.60, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.27, compared to the observer rare group, F (1, 128) = 11.28, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.08. As shown in Fig. 1b, the observer typical group (i.e., mean difference between last week and last 10 years = 1.06) had a steeper linear increase in observer ratings with memory remoteness when compared to the observer rare group (i.e., mean difference between last week and last 10 years = 0.40). Thus, the groups differed in the visual perspective they adopted during memory retrieval, with higher own eyes ratings and lower observer ratings in the observer rare compared to the observer typical group. Moreover, the pattern of visual perspective ratings over time also differed between the groups, such that the observer rare group had fewer changes in own eyes to observer perspectives with memory remoteness when compared to the observer typical group.

Contrary to the study predictions there were no differences between the groups on subjective ratings of vividness or emotion (see Supplementary Fig. 1). First, for vividness ratings there was an overall linear trend of Time Period, F (1, 326) = 176.07, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.35, reflecting a reduction in ratings with memory remoteness. The quadratic trend for time period was also significant, F (1, 326) = 6.23, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.02, which reflected that the reduction in vividness was steeper for the most remote time periods. However, there was no main effect of group, F (1, 326) = 1.27, p = 0.261, η2p = 0.004, nor a linear trend in the interaction for time period × group, F (1, 326) = 1.57, p = 0.211, η2p = 0.005 on vividness ratings. For emotional intensity ratings, the linear trend for time period was not significant, F (1, 326) = 2.45, p = 0.119, η2p = 0.007. However, there was a significant quadratic trend, F (1, 326) = 52.13, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.14, reflecting higher emotional intensity for memories from the last year to 3 years when compared to more recent or remote memories. However, there was no main effect of group, F (1, 326) = 0.590, p = 0.443, η2p = 0.002, nor a linear trend in the interaction for time period × group, F (1, 326) < 0.001, p = 0.986, η2p < 0.001. There were no significant differences between the groups on ratings of emotional valence, belief, or rehearsal or response times to elicit a memory (see Supplementary Results).

Study 1: discussion

Participants who reported rarely adopting an observer-like perspective were more likely to maintain an own eyes perspective irrespective of the remoteness of events queried, suggesting that their memories were less prone to changes in viewpoint over time. Vividness and emotional intensity ratings showed the expected reduction with memory remoteness, reflecting the fading of memories over time. Contrary to the predictions, however, there were no differences between the groups on subjective ratings of vividness or emotion. Additionally, there was also no differences between the groups on standardized questionnaires of visual imagery (see Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary Fig. 2). Study 2 was conducted to replicate these findings and to test the additional prediction that individual differences in adopting an observer-like perspectives would influence the quality of scene-related aspects of remembering by including additional subjective ratings27. A standardized test of spatial visualization was also included to examine whether potential individual differences between the observer groups contributed to objective performance in spatial ability23. Additionally, in study 2 we tested these questions using an online sample because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Study 2: methods

Participants

Participants were recruited from Prolific (www.prolific.co), based on a custom sample determined by responses on the visual perspective questionnaire presented during a pre-screening session. A total of 359 participants were then invited to participate in the main study, which took place up to a week later. As in study 1, participants were assigned to perspective groups based on their responses to visual perspective statements administered in the main study. Participants who could not be categorized in the observer rare or observer typical groups were excluded (n = 12). Thus, the final sample included 347 participants (observer rare = 113, 70 women, 40 men, three non-binary; mean age = 22.16, SD = 3.11; observer typical = 234, 146 women, 85 men, two non-binary, one did not report; mean age = 22.48, SD = 3.19). Effect sizes from study 1 ranged from small to large, and thus, an a priori sample size of 200 was deemed adequate to obtain 80% power to detect a small to moderate effect size (d = 0.4) using a between-groups design with two-levels25. As found in study 1, participants in the observer rare group were more consistent in self-reported visual perspective scores with 90% of individuals reporting the same scores (i.e., 102 out of 113), whereas in the observer typical group only 49% of individuals reported the same scores (i.e., 114 out of 234). Similar to study 1, participants were included in the analysis based on the self-reported perspective scores collected during the main study. However, the results were identical using a more conservative approach that restricted the analysis only to those individuals who reported consistent perspective responses (see Supplementary Results). Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants.

Procedure

The study was conducted online using Qualtrics (September, 2022) software (https://www.qualtrics.com) and included additional procedures to improve the quality of online data collection (see Supplementary Material). In the pre-screening task, participants were asked to complete the same visual perspective questionnaire as indicated in study 1. The memory task was identical to study 1, except that three additional subjective ratings were included to capture the quality of scene related aspects of memory14: (1) setting layout: while remembering, I experience a scene in which the elements of the setting are located relative to each other in space, (2) setting name: while remembering, I can identify or name the setting where the memory occurred, although I might not be able to describe it clearly, and (3) where I am: while remembering, I can identify where I am in relation to the things that I am remembering. Scene related ratings were assessed on a five-point scale from 1 = low to 5 = high. After recalling all memories, participants were then asked to fill out additional questionnaires (see Supplementary Methods) and demographics form. The questionnaires included the paper folding task28, a classic measure of spatial visualization ability. All methods were carried out in accordance with the tri-council policy statement: on ethical conduct for research involving humans (TCPS 2).

Data analysis

Subjective ratings during autobiographical memory retrieval were analyzed separately in 2 (group: observer rare, observer typical) X 6 (time period: week, month, year, 3 years, 5 years 10 years) mixed ANOVAs with group as a between subjects variable and time period as a within subjects variable. Main effects and interactions with time period were analyzed based on a polynomial analysis focussing on linear and quadratic trends. Follow-up analyses were adjusted using a family-wise Bonferroni correction. Outliers were identified as values 1.5 times the interquartile range above the upper quartile or below the lower quartile. Outliers detected for vividness ratings in the observer typical group (n = 8) were found to drive a significant difference between the groups, and thus, were excluded from the main analyses. For all other analyses, excluding detected outliers did not influence the results and were included in the reported results.

Study 2: results

Replicating the results from study 1 there were significant differences between the groups in the visual perspective that participants reported during memory retrieval (for means and SD see Supplementary Table 4). First, for own eyes perspectives there was a main effect of group, F (1, 344) = 61.91, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.153, reflecting higher ratings in the observer rare than observer typical group. There was also a linear trend for time period, F (1, 344) = 205.833, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.374, reflecting a decrease in rating with memory remoteness. The quadratic trend for Time Period was not significant, F (1, 344) = 3.48, p = 0.063, η2p = 0.01. However, these effects were qualified by a linear trend for the time period × group interaction, F (1, 344) = 16.81, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.047. There was no quadratic trend for the time period × group interaction, F (1, 344) = 0.641, p = 0.424, η2p = 0.002. Simple effects indicated that the negative linear trend for time periods was significant in both the observer typical group, F (1, 232) = 241.67, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.510, and observer rare group, F (1, 112) = 46.48, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.293. However, as reflected by the effect sizes and inspection of the mean differences in own eyes perspectives across the time periods within the two groups (see Fig. 2a), the observer typical group had a steeper decrease over time (i.e., maximum mean difference between last week and last 10 years = 1.42) when compared to the observer rare group (i.e., maximum mean difference between last week and last 10 years = 0.80). Second, for observer perspectives there was a main effect of group, F (1, 343) = 61.89, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.153, reflecting lower ratings in the observer rare than observer typical group (see Fig. 2b). There was also a positive linear trend for time period, F (1, 343) = 44.16, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.114, reflecting higher observer perspectives with memory remoteness. However, contrary to study 1, the linear trend for the time period × group interaction was not significant, F (1, 343) = 0.50, p = 0.480, η2p = 0.001. Thus, the groups differed in the visual perspective they adopted during autobiographical memory retrieval, with the observer rare group reporting higher own eyes ratings and lower observer ratings when compared to the observer typical group. Compared to the observer typical group, the observer rare group had less decline in own eyes ratings with memory remoteness, coupled with overall lower observer-like ratings.

Figure 2.

Figure 2

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Visual perspective ratings in study 2. The observer rare group (n = 113) had higher own eyes perspective ratings (A) coupled with lower observer perspective ratings (B), and had less steep decline in own eyes ratings with memory remoteness compared to the observer typical group (n = 234). Error bars reflect 95% CI. Five-point scales from 1 = low to 5 = high.

As found in study 1 there were also no differences between the groups on vividness and emotion (see Supplementary Fig. 3). First, for vividness ratings there was a linear trend for time period, F (1, 336) = 714.97, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.68, reflecting lower ratings with memory remoteness. The quadratic trend for time period was also significant, F (1, 336) = 44.72, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12, reflecting a steeper decline for the most remote time periods. However, there was no main effect of group, F (1, 336) = 3.452, p = 0.064, η2p = 0.01, nor a linear trend for the time period × group interaction, F (1, 336) = 1.70, p = 0.193, η2p = 0.005. Similarly, for emotional intensity ratings, there was a linear trend for time period, F (1, 342) = 81.70, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.193, reflecting a decrease in ratings with memory remoteness. The quadratic trend for time period was also significant, F (1, 342) = 84.82, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.199, indicating that ratings decreased more rapidly for the most remote time periods. There was no main effect of group, F (1, 342) = 0.37, p = 0.543, η2p = 0.001, nor a linear trend for the time period × group interaction, F (1, 342) = 0.08, p = 0.783, η2p < 0.001. There were also no differences in ratings of emotional valence and belief, but the groups did differ in rehearsal (see Supplementary Results).

As predicted, the groups differed in subjective ratings targeting scene construction (see Fig. 3). First, for setting layout there was a main effect of group, F (1, 343) = 8.94, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.025, reflecting higher ratings in the observer rare than the observer typical group. There was also a linear trend of time period, F (1, 343) = 289.84, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.458, reflecting a decrease in ratings with memory remoteness. There was no linear trend in the time period × group interaction, F (1, 343) = 0.10, p = 0.755, η2p < 0.001. Second, for setting name there was a main effect of group, F (1, 344) = 16.68, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.046, reflecting higher ratings in the observer rare than the observer typical group. There was also a linear effect of time period, F (1, 344) = 146.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.299, reflecting a decrease with memory remoteness. There was no linear trend in the time period × group interaction, F (1, 344) = 2.39, p = 0.123, η2p = 0.007. Finally, for self-location ratings there was a main effect of group, F (1, 344) = 8.81, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.025, reflecting higher ratings in the observer rare than the observer typical group. There was also negative linear trend for time period, F (1, 344) = 317.12, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.480, reflecting a decrease in ratings with memory remoteness. There was no linear trend in the time period × group interaction, F (1, 344) = 0.40, p = 0.529, η2p = 0.001.

Figure 3.

Figure 3

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Group differences in subjective ratings of scene-related aspects of memories. The observer rare group (n = 113) had higher ratings for setting layout (A), setting name (B), and self-location (C) when compared to the observer typical group (n = 234). Error bars reflect 95% CI. Five-point scales from 1 = low to 5 = high.

Going beyond self-report data, I investigated differences between the groups in an objective measure of spatial visualization ability. Consistent with their enhanced scene construction abilities during autobiographical retrieval, the observer rare group also had superior performance on the paper folding task (see Fig. 4), as reflected by a higher proportion of correct responses when compared to the observer typical group, t (345) = 2.87, padj = 0.016, d = 0.185. However, there were no differences in other questionnaires measuring visual imagery ability (see Supplementary Table 5 and Supplementary Fig. 4). Thus, individual differences in visual perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval were associated with better spatial visualization ability.

Figure 4.

Figure 4

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Group differences in spatial visualization ability. The observer rare group (n = 113) had a greater proportion of correct responses on the paper folding task when compared to the observer typical group (n = 234). Error bars reflect 95% CI.

Study 2: discussion

Study 2 replicates the findings from study 1, such that participants in the observer rare group had a diminished shift from own eyes to observer-like perspectives with memory remoteness. As found in study 1, vividness and emotional intensity showed the expected reduction with memory remoteness, but there were no differences between the groups. However, the observer rare group had higher ratings on scene-related qualities of remembering and more accurate spatial visualization abilities. Thus, maintaining the original perspective of memories preserved the integrity of the mental scenarios constructed during remembering.

General discussion

The current findings reveal that naturally occurring shifts in visual perspective in memories are attenuated in some individuals, who instead were more likely to maintain their original perspective across both recent and remote memories. When remembering specific events, individuals who reported rarely adopting an observer-like perspectives could better mentally represent the scene and their original location within it. However, there were no differences between the groups in memory content related to the resolution of visual information and the intensity of emotions experienced. Individual differences in adopting an observer-like perspective in autobiographical memories was related to superior spatial visualization ability, suggesting that a lack of spontaneous adoption of novel perspectives in memories is tied to the preservation of accurate representations of mental scenarios.

Shifts in perspective are the natural outcome of a constructive memory system that reassembles memory content but can sometimes contribute to changes in memories from how events were originally experienced. Observer-like perspectives are believed to represent inaccuracies or distortions in memories by both memory researchers and laypeople alike15,29. Supporting these assumptions, shifts in visual perspective impact the fidelity of remembering8,10, reshape how memories are recollected16, and recruit brain regions associated with altering the past during episodic counterfactual simulation30. The current findings challenge the assumption that all individuals are prone to the same degree of shifts in perspective due to reconstructive errors in memory and contributes to growing research highlighting that real-world memories can be surprisingly accurate in some contexts31. Whether the rarity in spontaneously adopting observer-like perspectives in memories also reflects individual differences in the inability to flexibly shift to alternative viewpoints on demand remains unknown. Participants in the observer rare group often remarked during the debriefing “I don’t have observer perspectives,” suggesting that they might also have lacked the ability to exert control over the vantage point they used. Future work is needed to understand this issue and the broader implications of whether individual differences in visual perspective impact other outcomes of constructive memory processes, such as episodic simulation32.

The current findings highlight the central role that visual perspective plays in shaping how scenes are built. Scenes provide the scaffolding that supports how memory content is reassembled to support the unfolding of mental events33 and are intrinsically linked to point-of-view34,35. Rarity in experiencing observer-like perspectives was associated with the enhanced ability to visualize the setting layout and to pinpoint self-location within the event, suggesting that maintaining the original perspective of events better reproduces the encompassing scene. Supporting this interpretation, the observer rare group also had superior performance on the paper folding task, a standardized test of spatial visualization. Similarly, Lorenz and Neisser23 found that individuals high in spatial visualization ability were less likely to adopt an observer-like perspective, and proposed that these individuals had richer and more detailed memories that prevented the shift in perspective over time. Strikingly, in the current study there were no differences in the resolution of visual information when remembering autobiographical memories in the observer groups, suggesting a decoupling between memory content and scene-related aspects of memory27. Prior research has attributed spatial visualization abilities to the quality of spatial representations and the accuracy with which spatial information is preserved during transformations36. An intriguing possibility is that the observer rare group maintained their original perspective with memory remoteness due to their superior ability to construct coherent scenes, thereby leveraging impoverished and transient memory traces37. An alternative possibility is that the observer rare group initially formed richer scene-related memory representations, thus contributing to their enhanced scene memory when remembering these experiences later. Irrespective of the underlying mechanisms, variations in visual perspective among individuals may contribute to their vulnerability to memory inaccuracies and distortions that can arise due to reconstructive processes.

Visual perspective is linked to the construction of mental images in the mind’s eye11,38,39. Yet prior studies examining individual differences in self-reported mental imagery ability have failed to find a relationship with visual perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval, and instead have linked mental imagery abilities to sensory and emotional qualities of event memories40–42. Similarly, in the current study there were no differences between the observer rare and typical groups on questionnaires assessing self-reported differences in vividness of visual imagery or object-spatial imagery, nor did the groups differ on subjective ratings of vividness or emotional intensity. Instead, the observer rare group reported superior scene-related qualities of their memories along with more accurate spatial visualization abilities on a standardized test. Collectively, these findings suggest that perspective might not be so “visual” as previously thought. Instead, the viewpoint adopted in event memories might be more closely tied to the mental scenario constructed, with variations in the quality of visual information reflecting more downstream effects.

Shifts from own eyes to observer-like perspective are often associated with reductions in vividness and emotional intensity11,12. Yet, in the current study there were no differences in subjective ratings of vividness or emotional intensity between the groups, although both groups showed the expected reduction in these experiential aspects of remembering with memory remoteness. Such findings highlight that changes in vividness and affect associated with remembering are not the sole mechanism that contributes to construction of a particular viewpoint15. One explanation is that the observer rare group was able to exploit their superior spatial abilities to maintain their original point-of-view despite reductions in other recollective qualities of their memories with memory remoteness. Future research using a retrospective design and employing measures that target the visual and affective content of memory narratives10 may offer a more nuanced understanding of potential similarities and differences in the reconstructive nature of memories within this group.

Limitations

The current research focused on individuals who self-reported rarely adopting an observer-like perspective, but the screening questions indicated that there may be other more extreme cases of visual perspective abilities who present the opposite (i.e., rarely adopting own eyes perspectives) or who reported a lack of either viewpoint, both of which were too infrequent to analyze here. Given growing research indicating individual differences in visual perspective in event memories20,21, and the relationship between changes in viewpoint and the veridicality of memory15, future research is needed to better understand self-reported visual perspective abilities and to develop questionnaires that can target variability in these abilities.

One of the strengths of the current research was the large sample size (n = 675 across both studies) and replication of the effects. However, a limitation was that only a small number of memories were queried in keeping with other studies on autobiographical memory14,40. Including a larger number of memories could help to better understand whether the differences between the groups generalize across a wider sample of autobiographical events and allow for additional analyses examining the relationship at the level of the individual memory.

Conclusion

Across two studies the current research demonstrates that self-reported differences in the tendency to adopt an observer-like perspective is a key individual difference. Individuals in the observer rare group may be dubbed akin to other syndromes that characterize extreme dimensions in autobiographical remembering19,43 as having “own perspective autobiographical memory” (OPAM), reflecting that they primarily use own eyes perspectives during autobiographical memory retrieval. Despite potential costs to memory accuracy the ability to adopt novel viewpoints confers several benefits. Adopting an observer-like perspective is one of the most effective ways to regulate emotional responses44, alters how memories are evaluated in relation to the self and the broader meaning of our lives39,45, enables us to update our memories16, and influences how people will behave in the future46. Furthermore, the ability to consider alternative points of view is a necessary step to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people to cultivate empathy47. More generally, constructive memory processes that enable us to adopt alternative perspectives in memories serve many adaptive functions48. Limited to our original perspective in our experiences, we would not be able to view the world in different ways.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary Information. (30.5MB, docx)

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Chloe King and other members of the Memory for Events Lab for assistance with participant recruitment, and to Daniela Palombo for comments on a draft version. This research was conducted with the support of funding from the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (RGPIN-2019-06,080) and the Canada Research Chairs Program (Tier 2—2020-09-01).

Author contributions

Peggy L. St. Jacques: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal Analysis, Investigation, Data Curation, Writing—Original Draft, Visualization, Funding Acquisition.

Data availability

The datasets generated and analysed during the current study available in the Open Science Framework (OSF) repository, https://osf.io/g3n6e/?view_only=e9d36be9798a42e0bf60937b0993d277.

Competing interests

The author declares no competing interests.

Footnotes

Publisher's note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1038/s41598-024-70179-y.

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Associated Data

This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

Supplementary Materials

Supplementary Information. (30.5MB, docx)

Data Availability Statement

The datasets generated and analysed during the current study available in the Open Science Framework (OSF) repository, https://osf.io/g3n6e/?view_only=e9d36be9798a42e0bf60937b0993d277.

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