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. 2024 Oct 12;405(11):261. doi: 10.1007/s00220-024-05121-4

Generalised Entropy Accumulation

Tony Metger 1,, Omar Fawzi 2, David Sutter 3, Renato Renner 1
PMCID: PMC11470903  PMID: 39403569

Abstract

Consider a sequential process in which each step outputs a system Ai and updates a side information register E. We prove that if this process satisfies a natural “non-signalling” condition between past outputs and future side information, the min-entropy of the outputs A1,,An conditioned on the side information E at the end of the process can be bounded from below by a sum of von Neumann entropies associated with the individual steps. This is a generalisation of the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) (Dupuis et al. in Commun Math Phys 379: 867–913, 2020), which deals with a more restrictive model of side information: there, past side information cannot be updated in subsequent rounds, and newly generated side information has to satisfy a Markov condition. Due to its more general model of side-information, our generalised EAT can be applied more easily and to a broader range of cryptographic protocols. As examples, we give the first multi-round security proof for blind randomness expansion and a simplified analysis of the E91 QKD protocol. The proof of our generalised EAT relies on a new variant of Uhlmann’s theorem and new chain rules for the Rényi divergence and entropy, which might be of independent interest.

Introduction

Suppose that Alice and Eve share a quantum state ρAnE. From her systems An:=A1An, Alice would like to extract bits that look uniformly random to Eve, except with some small failure probability ε [1]. The number of such random bits that Alice can extract is given by the smooth min-entropy Hminε(An|E)ρ [2]. This quantity plays a central role in quantum cryptography: for example, the main task in security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols is usually finding a lower bound for the smooth min-entropy.

Unfortunately, for many cryptographic protocols deriving such a bound is challenging. Intuitively, the reason is the following: the state ρAnE is usually created as the output of a multi-round protocol, where each round produces one of Alice’s systems Ai and allows Eve to execute some attack to gain information about A1,,Ai. These attacks can depend on each other, i.e., Eve may use what she learnt in round i-1 to plan her attack in round i. This non-i.i.d. nature of the attacks makes it hard to find a lower bound on Hminε(An|E)ρ that holds for any possible attack that Eve can execute. In contrast, it is typically much easier to compute a conditional von Neumann entropy associated with a single-round of the protocol, where the non-i.i.d. nature of Eve’s attack plays no role. Therefore, it is desirable to relate the smooth min-entropy of the output of the multi-round protocol to the von Neumann entropies associated with the individual rounds.

From an information-theoretic point of view, this question can be phrased as follows: can the smooth min-entropy Hminε(An|E)ρ be bounded from below in terms of von Neumann entropies H(Ai|Ei)ρAiEii for some (yet to be determined) systems Ei and states ρAiEii related to ρ? While for general states ρAnE no useful lower bound can be found, previous works have established such bounds under additional assumptions on the state ρAnE.

The first bound of this form was proven via the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [3]. It assumes that the system E is n-partite (i.e., we replace E by En=E1En) and that the state ρAnEn=ρA1E1ρAnEn is a product of identical states. Then, the AEP shows that1

Hminε(An|En)ρi=1nH(Ai|Ei)ρ-O(n).

For applications in cryptography, the assumption that ρ is an i.i.d. product state is usually too strong: it corresponds to the (unrealistic) assumption that Eve executes the same independent attack in each round, a so-called collective attack.

The entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) [1] is a generalisation of the AEP which requires far weaker assumptions on the state ρAnE. Specifically, the EAT considers states that result from a sequential process that starts with a state ρR0E0 and in every step outputs a system Ai and a piece of side information Ii. The system E is not acted upon during the process. The full side information at the end of this process is E=I1InE. We can represent such a process by the following diagram, where Mi are quantum channels. graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Figa_HTML.jpg The EAT requires an additional condition on the side information: the new side information Ii generated in round i must be independent from the past outputs Ai-1 conditioned on the existing side information Ii-1E. Mathematically, this is captured by the condition that the systems Ai-1Ii-1EIi form a Markov chain for any initial state ρR0E0. With this Markov condition, the EAT states that2

Hminε(An|InE)MnM1(ρR0E0)i=1ninfωH(Ai|IiE~)Mi(ω)-O(n), 1.1

where E~ is a purifying system isomorphic to Ri-1 and the infimum is taken over all states ω on systems Ri-1E~.3

Let us discuss the model of side information used by the EAT in more detail. The EAT considers side information consisting of two parts: the initial side information E (which is not acted upon during the process) and the outputs In=I1In. This splitting of side information into a “static” part E and a part In which is generated in each step of the process is particularly suited to device-independent cryptography: there, Eve prepares a device in an initial state ρR0E0, where R0 is the device’s internal memory and E is Eve’s initial side information from preparing the device. Then, Alice (and Bob, though we only consider Alice’s system here) executes a multi-round protocol with this device, where each round leaks some additional piece of information Ii to Eve, so that Eve’s side information at the end of the protocol is InE. Indeed, the EAT has been used to establish tight security proofs in the device-independent setting, see e.g., [4, 5].

The Markov condition in the EAT captures the following intuition: if we want to find a bound on Hminε(An|InE) in terms of single-round quantities, it is required that side information about Ai is itself output in step i, as otherwise we cannot hope to estimate the contribution to the total entropy from step i. To illustrate what could happen without such a condition, consider a case where Ai is classical and no side information is output in the first n-1 rounds, but the side information In in the last round contains a copy of the systems An (which can be passed along during the process in the systems Ri). Then, clearly Hminε(An|InE)=0, but for the first n-1 rounds, each single-round entropy bound that only considers the systems Ai and Ii can be positive.

Main result In this work, we further relax the assumptions on how the final state ρAnE is generated. Specifically, we consider sequential processes as in the EAT, but with a fully general model of side information, i.e., the side information can be updated in each step in the process. Diagrammatically, such a process can be represented as follows:graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Figb_HTML.jpg

Our generalised EAT then states the following.

Theorem 1.1

Consider quantum channels Mi:Ri-1Ei-1AiRiEi that satisfy the following “non-signalling” condition (discussed in detail below): for each Mi, there must exist a quantum channel Ri:Ei-1Ei such that

TrAiRiMi=RiTrRi-1. 1.2

Then, the min-entropy of the outputs An conditioned on the final side information En can be bounded as

Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρR0E00)i=1ninfωH(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω)-O(n), 1.3

where E~i-1Ri-1Ei-1 is a purifying system for the input to Mi and the infimum is taken over all states ω on systems Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1.4

We give a formal statement and proof in Sect. 4 and also show that, similarly to the EAT, statistics collected during the process can be used to restrict the minimization over ω (see Theorem 4.3 for the formal statement). By a simple duality argument, Eq. (1.3) also implies an upper bound on the smooth max-entropy Hmax, which we explain in Appendix A. This generalises a similar result from [1], although in [1] one could not make use of duality due to the Markov condition and instead had to prove the statement about Hmax separately, again highlighting that our generalised EAT is easier to work with.

The intuition behind the non-signalling condition in our generalised EAT is similar to the Markov condition in the original EAT: by the same reasoning as for the Markov condition, since the lower bound is made up of terms of the form H(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω), it is required that side information about Ai that is present in the final system En is already present in Ei. This means that side information about Ai should not be passed on via the R-systems and later be included in the E-systems. The non-signalling condition captures this requirement: it demands that if one only considers the marginal of the new side information Ei (without the new output Ai), it must be possible to generate this state from the past side information Ei-1 alone, without access to the system Ri-1. This means that any side information that Ei contains about the past outputs A1Ai-1 must have essentially already been present in Ei-1 and could not have been stored in Ri-1.

The name “non-signalling condition” is due to the fact that Eq. (1.2) is a natural generalisation of the standard non-signalling conditions in non-local games: if we view the systems Ri-1 and RiAi as the inputs and outputs on “Alice’s side” of Mi, and Ei-1 and Ei as the inputs and outputs on “Eve’s side”, then Eq. (1.2) states that the marginal of the output on Eve’s side cannot depend on the input on Alice’s side. This is exactly the non-signalling condition in non-local games, except that here the inputs and outputs are allowed to be fully quantum.

To understand the relation between the Markov and non-signalling conditions, it is instructive to consider the setting of the original EAT as a special case of our generalised EAT. In the original EAT, the full side information available after step i is EIi, and past side information is not updated during the process. For our generalised EAT, we therefore set Ei=EIi and consider maps Mi=MiidEi-1, where Mi:Ri-1AiIiRi is the map used in the original EAT. We need to check that with this choice of systems and maps, the Markov condition of the original EAT implies the non-signalling condition of our generalised EAT. The Markov condition requires that for any state input ωAi-1Ii-1Ri-1Ei-1, the output state ωAiIiRiEi=Mi(ωi-1) satisfies Ai-1Ii-1EIi.5 It is then a standard result on quantum Markov chains [6] that there must exist a quantum channel Ri:Ii-1EIiE such that ωIiEi=Ri(ωIi-1Ei-1). Remembering that we defined Ei=EIi (so that Ri:Ei-1Ei) and adding the systems Ai-1 (on which both Mi and Ri act as identity), we find that Mi satisfies the non-signalling condition:

TrAiRiMi(ωAi-1Ri-1Ei-1i-1)=ωAi-1Eii=Ri(ωAi-1Ei-1i-1)=RiTrRi-1(ωAi-1Ri-1Ei-1i-1).

Then, noting that all conditioning systems on which Mi acts as the identity map can collectively be replaced by a single purifying system isomorphic to the input, we see that we recover the original EAT (Eq. (1.1)) from our generalised EAT (Eq. (1.3)).

We emphasise that while the original EAT with the Markov condition can be recovered as a special case, our model of side information and the non-signalling condition are much more general than the original EAT; arguably, for a sequential process they are the most natural and general way of expressing the notion that future side information should not contain new information about past outputs, which appears to be necessary for an EAT-like result. To demonstrate the greater generality of our result, in Sect. 5 we use it to give the first multi-round proof for blind randomness expansion, a task to which the original EAT could not be applied, and a more direct proof of the E91 QKD protocol than was possible with the original EAT. Our generalised EAT can also be used to prove security of a much larger class of QKD protocols than the original EAT. Interestingly, for (device-dependent) QKD protocols, no “hidden system” R is needed and therefore the non-signalling condition is trivially satisfied, i.e., the advantage of our generalised EAT for QKD security proofs stems entirely from the more general model of side information, not from replacing the Markov condition by the non-signalling condition; see Sect. 5.2 for an informal comparison of how the original and generalised EAT can be applied to QKD, and [7] for a detailed treatment of the application of our generalised EAT to QKD, including protocols to which the original EAT could not be applied.

Proof sketch. The generalised EAT involves both the min-entropy, which can be viewed as a “worst-case entropy”, and the von Neumann entropy, which can be viewed as an “average case entropy”. These two entropies are special cases of a more general family of entropies called Rényi entropies, which are denoted by Hα for a parameter α>1 (see Sect. 2.2 for a formal definition).6 The min-entropy can be obtained from the Rényi entropy by taking α, whereas the von Neumann entropy corresponds to the limit α1. Hence, the Rényi entropies interpolate between the min-entropy and the von Neumann entropy, and they will play a crucial role in our proof.

The key technical ingredient for our generalised EAT is a new chain rule for Rényi entropies (Theorem 3.6 in the main text).

Lemma 1.2

Let α(1,2), ρARE a quantum state, and M:REARE a quantum channel which satisfies the non-signalling condition in Eq. (1.2), i.e. there exists a channel R:EE such that TrARM=RTrR. Then

Hα(AA|E)M(ρ)Hα(A|E)ρ+infωREE~H12-α(A|EE~)M(ω) 1.4

for a purifying system E~RE, where the infinimum is over all quantum states ω on systems REE~.

We first describe how this chain rule implies our generalised EAT, following the same idea as in [1, 8]. For this, recall that our goal is to find a lower bound on Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρR0E00) for a sequence of maps satisfying the non-signalling condition TrAiRiMi=RiTrRi-1. As a first step, we use a known relation between the smooth min-entropy and the Rényi entropy [3], which (up to a small penalty term depending on ε and α) reduces the problem to lower-bounding

Hα(An|En)MnM1(ρR0E00)=Hα(AnAn-1|En)MnM1(ρR0E00).

To this, we can apply Lemma 1.2 by choosing A=An-1, A=An, E=En-1, E=En, R=Rn-1, R=Rn, and ρ=Mn-1M1(ρR0E00). Then, since the map Mn satisfies the non-signalling condition, Lemma 1.2 implies that

Hα(A1n|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)Hα(A1n-1|En-1)Mn-1M1(ρR0E0)+infωS(Rn-1En-1E~n-1)H12-α(An|EnE~n-1)Mn(ω).

We can now repeat this argument for the term Hα(A1n-1|En-1)Mn-1M1(ρR0E0). After n applications of Lemma 1.2, we find that

Hα(A1n|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)i=1ninfωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)H12-α(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω).

To conclude, we use a continuity bound from [8] to relate H12-α(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω) to H(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω). It can be shown that for a suitable choice of α, the penalty terms we incur by switching from the min-entropy to the Rényi entropy and then to the von Neumann entropy scale as O(n). Therefore, we obtain Eq. (1.3). We also provide a version that allows for “testing” (which is crucial for application in quantum cryptography and explained in detail in Sect. 4.2) and features explicit second-order terms similar to those in [8].

We now turn our attention to the proof of Lemma 1.2. For this, we need to introduce the (sandwiched) Rényi divergence of order α between two (possibly unnormalised) quantum states ρ and σ, denoted by Dαρσ. We refer to Sect. 2.2 for a formal definition; for this overview, it suffices to know that Dαρσ is a measure of how different ρ is from σ, and that the conditional Rényi entropy is related to the Rényi divergence by

Hα(A|B)ρ=-DαρAB1AρB.

Our starting point for proving Lemma 1.2 is the following chain rule for the Rényi divergence from [9]:

DαM(ρ)F(σ)DαρAREσARE+limn1nsupωRnEnE~nDαMn(ω)Fn(ω), 1.5

where M and F are (not necessarily trace preserving) quantum channels from RE to ARE, and ρ and σ are any quantum states on ARE. The optimization is over all quantum states ω on n copies of the systems REE~ (with E~RE as before).

Making a suitable choice of F (which depends on M) and σ (which depends on ρ), one can turn Eq. (1.5) into the following chain rule for the conditional Rényi entropy:

Hα(AA|E)M(ρ)Hα(A|RE)ρ+limn1ninfωRnEnE~nHα((A)n|(E)nE~n)Mn(ω). 1.6

This chain rule resembles Lemma 1.2, but is significantly weaker and cannot be used to prove a useful entropy accumulation theorem. The reason for this is twofold:

  • (i)

    Equation (1.6) provides a lower bound in terms of Hα(A|RE), not Hα(A|E). The additional conditioning on the R-system can drastically lower the entropy: for example, in a device-independent scenario, R would describe the internal memory of the device. Then, Alice’s output A contains no entropy when conditioned on the internal memory of the device that produced the output, i.e. Hα(A|RE)=0. On the other hand, Alice’s output conditioned only on Eve’s side information E may be quite large (and can usually be certified by playing a non-local game), i.e. Hα(A|E)>0.

  • (ii)

    Equation (1.6) contains the regularised quantity limn1ninfωRnEnE~nHα((A)n|(E)nE~n)Mn(ω). Due to the limit n, this quantity cannot be computed numerically and therefore the bound in Eq. (1.6) cannot be evaluated for concrete examples.

We now describe how we overcome each of these issues in turn.

  • (i)
    We prove a new variant of Uhlmann’s theorem [10], a foundational result in quantum information theory. The original version of Uhlmann’s theorem deals with the case of α=1/2; we show that for α>1, a similar result holds, but an additional regularisation is required. Concretely, we prove that for any states ρARE and σAE:
    limk1kinfσ^AkRkEks.t.σ^AkEk=σAEkDαρAREkσ^AkRkEk=DαρAEσAE. 1.7
    The proof of this result relies heavily on the spectral pinching technique [11, 12] and we refer to Lemma 3.3 for details as well as a non-asymptotic statement with explicit error bounds. We make use of this extended Uhlmann’s theorem as follows: for the case we are interested in, the map F in Eq. (1.5) satisfies a non-signalling condition. We can show that this condition implies that for any state σ^AkRkEks.t.σ^AkEk=σAEk:
    DαM(ρ)F(σ)=1kDαMk(ρAREk)Fk(σ^AkRkEk).
    Applying Eq. (1.5) to the r.h.s. of this equality results in a bound that contains DαρAREkσ^AkRkEk. We can now minimise over all states σ^AkRkEks.t.σ^AkEk=σAEk and take the limit k. Then, Eq. (1.7) allows us to drop the R-system. Therefore, under the non-signalling condition on F, we obtain the following improved chain rule for the sandwiched Rènyi divergence, which might be of independent interest:
    DαM(ρ)F(σ)DαρAEσAE+limn1nsupωRnEnE~nDαMn(ω)Fn(ω).
    Using this chain rule, we can show that Eq. (1.6) still holds if Hα(A|RE) is replaced by Hα(A|E).
  • (ii)
    To remove the need for a regularisation in Eq. (1.6), we show that due to the permutation-invariance of Mn and Fn, for α>1 and n one can replace the optimization over ωRnEnE~n with a fixed input state, namely the projector onto the symmetric subspace of RnEnE~n. For this replacement, one incurs a small loss in α, replacing it by 12-α (which is only slightly larger than α in the typical regime where α is close to 1). The projector onto the symmetric subspace has a known representation as a mixture of tensor product states [13]. Combining these two steps, we show that the optimization over ωRnEnE~n can be restricted to tensor product states, which means that the regularisation in Eq. (1.6) can be removed (see Sect. 3.2 for details):
    limn1ninfωRnEnE~nHα((A)n|(E)nE~n)Mn(ω)infωREE~H12-α(A|EE~)M(ω).

Combining these results yields Lemma 1.2 and, as a result, our generalised EAT.

Sample application: blind randomness expansion. The main advantage of the generalised EAT over previous results is its broader applicability. For example, as demonstrated in [7], the generalised EAT can be used to prove the security of prepare-and-measure QKD protocols, which is of immediate practical relevance, and can also simplify the analysis of entanglement-based QKD protocols as discussed in Sect. 5.2. Here, we focus on the application of our generalised EAT to mistrustful device-independent (DI) cryptography. In mistrustful DI cryptography, multiple parties each use a quantum device to execute a protocol with one another. Each party trusts neither its quantum device nor the other parties in the protocol. Hence, from the point of view of one party, say Alice, all the remaining parties in the protocol are collectively treated as an adversary Eve, who may also have prepared Alice’s untrusted device.

While the original EAT could be used to analyse DI protocols in which the parties trust each other, e.g. DIQKD [14], the setting of mistrustful DI cryptography is significantly harder to analyse because the adversary Eve actively participates in the protocol and may update her side information during the protocol in arbitrary ways. Analysing such protocols requires the more general model of side information we deal with in this paper. As a concrete example for mistrustful DI cryptography, we consider blind randomness expansion, a primitive introduced in [15]. Previous work [15, 16] could only analyse blind randomness expansion under the i.i.d. assumption. Here, we give the first proof that blind randomness expansion is possible for general adversaries. The proof is a straightforward application of our generalised EAT and briefly sketched below; we refer to Sect. 5.1 for a detailed treatment.

In blind randomness expansion, Alice receives an untrusted quantum device from the adversary Eve. Alice then plays a non-local game, e.g. the CHSH game, with this device and Eve, and wants to extract certified randomness from her outputs of the non-local game, i.e. we need to show that Alice’s outputs contain a certain amount of min-entropy conditioned on Eve’s side information. Concretely, in each round of the protocol Alice samples inputs x and y for the non-local game, inputs x into her device to receive outcome a, and sends y to Eve to receive outcome b; Alice then checks whether (xyab) satisfies the winning condition of the non-local game. For comparison, recall that in standard DI randomness expansion [1721], Alice receives two devices from Eve and uses them to play the non-local game. This means that in standard DI randomness expansion, Eve never learns any of the inputs and outputs of the game. In contrast, in blind randomness expansion Eve learns one of the inputs, y, and is free to choose one of the outputs, b, herself. Hence, Eve can choose the output b based on past side information and update her side information in each round of the protocol using the values of y and b.

To analyse such a protocol, we use the setting of Theorem 1.1, with Ai representing the output of Alice’s device D from the non-local game in the i-th round, Ri the internal memory of D after the i-th round, and Ei Eve’s side information after the i-th round, which can be generated arbitrarily from entanglement shared between Eve and D at the start of the protocol and information Eve gathered during the first i rounds of the protocol. The map Mi describes one round of the protocol, and because Alice’s device and Eve cannot communicate during the protocol it is easy to show that the non-signalling condition from Theorem 1.1 is satisfied. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 1.1 to lower-bound Alice’s conditional min-entropy Hmin(An|En) in terms of the single-round quantities infωH(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω).7 This single-round quantity corresponds to the i.i.d. scenario, i.e. the generalised EAT has reduced the problem of showing blind randomness expansion against general adversaries to the (much simpler) problem of showing it against i.i.d. adversaries. The quantity infωH(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω) can be computed using a general numerical technique [22], and for certain classes of non-local games it may also be possible to find an analytical lower bound using ideas from [15, 16]. Inserting the single-round bound, we obtain a lower bound on Hmin(An|En) that scales linearly with n, showing that blind randomness expansion is possible against general adversaries. We also note that as explained in [15], this result immediately implies that unbounded randomness expansion is possible with only three devices, whereas previous works required four devices [21, 23, 24].

Future work In this work, we have developed a new information-theoretic tool, the generalised EAT. The generalised EAT deals with a more general model of side information than previous techniques and is therefore more broadly and easily applicable. In particular, our generalised EAT can be used to analyse mistrustful DI cryptography. We have demonstrated this by giving the first proof of blind randomness expansion against general adversaries. We expect that the generalised EAT could similarly be used for other protocols such as two-party cryptography in the noisy storage model [25] or certified deletion [16, 26, 27]. In addition to mistrustful DI cryptography, our result can also be used to give new proofs for device-dependent QKD, as demonstrated in Sect. 5.2 and [7], and is applicable to proving the security of commercial quantum random number generators, which typically have correlations between rounds due to experimental imperfections [28].

Beyond cryptography, the generalised EAT is useful whenever one is interested in bounding the min-entropy of a large system that can be decomposed in a sequential way. Such problems are abundant in physics. For example, the dynamics of an open quantum system can be described in terms of interactions that take place sequentially with different parts of the system’s environment [29]. In quantum thermodynamics, such a description is commonly employed to model the thermalisation of a system that is brought in contact with a thermal bath. For a lack of techniques, the entropy flow during a thermalisation process of this type is usually quantified in terms of von Neumann entropy rather than the operationally more relevant smooth min- and max-entropies [30]. The generalised EAT may be used to remedy this situation. A similar situation arises in quantum gravity, where smooth entropies play a role in the study of black holes [31].

In a different direction, one can also try to further improve the generalised EAT itself. Compared to the original EAT [1], our generalised EAT features a more general model of side information and a weaker condition on the relation between different rounds, replacing the Markov condition of [1] with our weaker non-signalling condition in Eq. (1.2). It is natural to ask whether a further step in this direction is possible: while the model of side information we consider is fully general, it may be possible to replace the non-signalling condition with a weaker requirement. We have argued above that our non-signalling condition appears to be the most general way of stating the requirement that future side information does not reveal information about past outputs, which seems necessary for an EAT-like theorem.8 It would be interesting to formalise this intuition and see whether our theorem is provably “tight” in terms of the conditions placed on the sequential process. Furthermore, it might be possible to improve the way the statistical condition in Theorem 4.3 is dealt with in the proof, e.g. using ideas from [33, 34].

Finally, one could attempt to extend entropy accumulation from conditional entropies to relative entropies. Such a relative entropy accumulation theorem (REAT) would be the following statement: for two sequences of channels {E1,,En} and {F1,,Fn} (where Fi need not necessarily be trace-preserving), and ε>0,

DmaxεEnE1FnF1?i=1nDregEiFi+O(n).

Here, Dmaxε is the ε-smooth max-relative entropy [11] and we used the (regularised) channel divergences defined in Definition 2.5. The key technical challenge in proving this result is to show that the regularised channel divergence DαregEiFi is continuous in α at α=1, which is an important technical open question. If one had such a continuity statement and the maps Fi additionally satisfied a non-signalling condition (which is not required for the statement above), one could also use our Theorem 3.1 to derive a more general REAT, which would imply our generalised EAT.

Preliminaries

Notation

Throughout this paper, we restrict ourselves to finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The set of positive semidefinite operators on a quantum system A (with associated Hilbert space HA) is denoted by Pos(A). The set of quantum states is given by S(A)={ρPos(A)|Trρ=1}. The set of completely positive maps from linear operators on A to linear operators on A is denoted by CP(A,A). If such a map is additionally trace preserving, we call it a quantum channel and denote the set of such maps by CPTP(A,A). The identity channel on system A is denoted as idA. The spectral norm is denoted by ·.

A cq-state is a quantum state ρS(XA) on a classical system X (with alphabet X) and a quantum system A, i.e. a state that can be written as

ρXA=xX|xx|ρA,x

for subnormalised ρA,xPos(A). For ΩX, we define the conditional state

ρXA|Ω=1PrρΩxΩ|xx|ρA,x,wherePrρΩ:=xΩTrρA,x.

If Ω={x}, we also write ρXA|x for ρXA|Ω.

Rényi divergence and entropy

We will make extensive use of the sandwiched Rényi divergence [35, 36] and quantities associated with it, namely Rényi entropies and channel divergences. We recall the relevant definitions here.

Definition 2.1

(Rényi divergence). For ρS(A), σPos(A), and α[1/2,1)(1,) the (sandwiched) Rényi divergence is defined as

Dαρσ:=1α-1logTr(σ1-α2αρσ1-α2α)α

for supp(ρ)supp(σ), and + otherwise.

From the Rényi divergence, one can define the conditional Rényi entropies as follows (see [11] for more details).

Definition 2.2

(Conditional Rényi entropy). For a bipartite state ρABS(AB) and α[1/2,1)(1,), we define the following two conditional Rényi entropies:

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ152_HTML.gif

From the definition it is clear that Inline graphic. Importantly, a relation for the other direction also holds.

Lemma 2.3

([11, Corollary 5.3]). For ρABS(AB) and α(1,2):

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ153_HTML.gif

In the limit α1 the sandwiched Rényi divergence converges to the relative entropy:

limα1Dαρσ=D(ρσ)=Trρ(logρ-logσ).

Accordingly, the conditional Rényi entropy converges to the conditional von Neumann entropy:

limα1Hα(A|B)ρ=H(A|B)ρ=H(AB)ρ-H(B)ρ=-TrρABlogρAB+TrρBlogρB.

Conversely, in the limit α, the Rényi entropy Inline graphic converges to the min-entropy. We will make use of a smoothed version of the min-entropy, which is defined as follows [2].

Definition 2.4

(Smoothed min-entropy). For ρABS(AB) and ε[0,1], the ε-smoothed min-entropy of A conditioned on B is

Hminε(A|B)ρ=-loginfρ~ABBε(ρAB)infσBS(B)σB-12ρ~ABσB-12,

where · denotes the spectral norm and Bε(ρAB) is the ε-ball around ρAB in term of the purified distance [11].

Finally, we can extend the definition of the Rényi divergence from states to channels. The resulting quantity, the channel divergence (and its regularised version), will play an important role in the rest of the manuscript.

Definition 2.5

(Channel divergence). For ECPTP(A,A), FCP(A,A), and α[1/2,1)(1,), the (stabilised) channel divergence9 is defined as

DαEF=supωS(AA~)DαE(ω)F(ω), 2.1

where without loss of generality A~A. The regularised channel divergence is defined as

DαregEF:=limn1nDαEnFn=supn1nDαEnFn.

We note that the channel divergence is in general not additive under the tensor product [37, Proposition 3.1], so the regularised channel divergence can be strictly larger that the non-regularised one, i.e., DαregEF>DαEF. The regularised channel divergence, however, does satisfy an additivity property:

DαregEkFk=limn1nDαEknFkn=klimn1nDαEnFn=kDαregEF, 2.2

where we switched to the index n=kn for the second equality.

Spectral pinching

A key technical tool in our proof will be the use of spectral pinching maps [38], which are defined as follows (see [12, Chapter 3] for a more detailed introduction).

Definition 2.6

(Spectral pinching map). Let ρPos(A) with spectral decomposition ρ=λλPλ, where λSpec(ρ)R0 are the distinct eigenvalues of ρ and Pλ are mutually orthogonal projectors. The (spectral) pinching map PρCPTP(A,A) associated with ρ is given by

Pρ(ω):=λSpec(ρ)PλωPλ.

We will need a few basic properties of pinching maps.

Lemma 2.7

(Properties of pinching maps). For any ρ,σPos(A), the following properties hold:

  • (i)

    Invariance: Pρ(ρ)=ρ .

  • (ii)

    Commutation of pinched state: [σ,Pσ(ρ)]=0 .

  • (iii)

    Pinching inequality: Pσ(ρ)1|Spec(σ)|ρ .

  • (iv)

    Commutation of pinching maps: if [ρ,σ]=0, then PρPσ=PσPρ .

  • (v)

    Partial trace: TrBPρA1B(ωAB)=PρA(ωA)ωABPos(AB).

Proof

Properties (i)–(iii) follow from the definition and [3, Chapter 2.6.3] or [12, Lemma 3.5].

For the fourth statement, note that since [ρ,σ]=0, there exists a joint orthonormal eigenbasis {|xi} of ρ and σ. Let Pλ be the projector onto the eigenspace of ρ with eigenvalue λ, and Qμ the projector onto the eigenspace of σ with eigenvalue μ. We can expand

Pλ=is.t.ρ|xi=λ|xi|xixi|andQμ=js.t.σ|xj=μ|xj|xjxj|.

Since {|xi} is a family of orthonormal vectors,

PλQμ=is.t.ρ|xi=λ|xiandσ|xi=μ|xi|xixi|=QμPλ,

which implies commutation of the pinching maps.

For the fifth statement, note that if we write ρ=λλPλ with eigenprojectors Pλ, then the set of eigenprojectors of ρA1B is simply {Pλ1B}. Hence,

TrBPρA1B(ωAB)=λTrBPλ1BωABPλ1B=λPλTrBωABPλ=PρA(ωA).

It is often useful to use the pinching map associated with tensor power states, i.e., Pρn. This is because for ρPos(A), the factor |Spec(ρn)| from the pinching inequality (see Lemma 2.7) only scales polynomially in n (see e.g. [12, Remark 3.9]):

|Spec(ρn)|(n+1)dim(A)-1. 2.3

In fact, we can show a similar property for all permutation-invariant states, not just tensor product states.

Lemma 2.8

Let ρPos(An) be permutation invariant and denote d=dim(A). Then

|Spec(ρ)|(n+d)d(d+1)/2.

Proof

By Schur-Weyl duality and Schur’s lemma (see e.g. [39, Lemma 0.8 and Theorem 1.10]), since ρ is permutation-invariant, we have

ρλId,nρ(λ)Qλ1Pλ,

where denotes equality up to unitary conjugation (which leaves the spectrum invariant), Id,n is the set of Young diagrams with n boxes and at most d rows, Qλ and Pλ are systems whose details need not concern us, and ρ(λ)Pos(Qλ). From this it is clear that

|Spec(ρ)|λId,n|Spec(ρ(λ))|λId,ndim(Qλ).

It is known that |Id,n|(n+1)d and dim(Qλ)(n+d)d(d-1)/2 (see e.g. [40, Section 6.2]). Hence

|Spec(ρ)|(n+1)d(n+d)d(d-1)/2(n+d)d(d+1)/2.

Corollary 2.9

Let ρ,σPos(A) and d=dim(A). Then

|SpecPρn(σn)|(n+d)d(d+1)/2.

Proof

Note that Pρn(σn) is itself not a product state because the eigenprojectors of ρn do not have a product form. However, since every eigenspace of ρn is permutation-invariant, Pρn(σn) is permutation-invariant, too, so we can apply Lemma 2.8.

Strengthened Chain Rules

One of the crucial properties of entropies are chain rules, which allow us to relate entropies of large composite systems to sums of entropies of the individual subsystems. In this section, we prove two new such chain rules, one for the Rényi divergence (Theorem 3.1, which is a generalisation of [9, Corollary 5.1]) and one for the conditional entropy (Theorem 3.6). The chain rule from Theorem 3.6 is the key ingredient for our generalised EAT, to which we will turn our attention in Sect. 4. Theorem 3.6 plays a similar role for our generalised EAT as [1, Corollary 3.5] does for the original EAT, but while the latter requires a Markov condition, the former does not. As a result, our generalised EAT based on Theorem 3.6 also avoids the Markov condition.

The outline of this section is as follows: we first prove a generalised chain rule for the Rényi divergence (Theorem 3.1). This chain rule contains a regularised channel divergence. As the next step, we show that in the special case of conditional entropies, we can drop the regularisation (Sect. 3.2). This allows us to derive a chain rule for conditional entropies from the chain rule for channels (Sect. 3.3).

Strengthened chain rule for Rényi divergence

The main result of this section is the following chain rule for the Rényi divergence.

Theorem 3.1

Let α>1, ρS(AR), σPos(AR), ECPTP(AR,B), and FCP(AR,B). Suppose that there exists RCP(A,B) such that F=RTrR. Then

DαE(ρAR)F(σAR)DαρAσA+DαregEF. 3.1

This is a stronger version of an existing chain rule due to [9], which we will use in our proof of Theorem 3.1:

Lemma 3.2

([9, Corollary 5.1]). Let α>1, ρS(A), σPos(A), ECPTP(A,B), and FCP(A,B). Then

DαE(ρ)F(σ)Dαρσ+DαregEF. 3.2

The difference between Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 is that on the r.h.s. of Eq. (3.1), we only have the divergence DαρAσA between the two reduced states on system A. In contrast, if we used Eq. (3.2) with systems AR, then we would get the divergence DαρARσAR between the full states. In particular, the weaker Lemma 3.2 can easily be recovered from Theorem 3.1 by taking the system R to be trivial, in which case the condition F=RTrR becomes trivial, too.

While the difference between Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 may look minor at first sight, the two chain rules can give considerably different results: in general, the data processing inequality ensures that DαρAσADαρARσAR, but the gap between the two quantities can be significant, i.e., there exist states for which DαρAσADαρARσAR. In such cases, Theorem 3.1 yields a significantly tighter bound. This turns out to be crucial if we want to apply this chain rule repeatedly to get an EAT.

We also note that the statement of Theorem 3.1 is known to be correct also for α=1 [37, Theorem 3.5]. However, this requires a separate proof and does not follow from Theorem 3.1 as it is currently not known whether the function αDαregEF is continuous in the limit α1.10

We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.1. The key question for the proof is the following: given states ρAR and σA, does there exist an extension σAR of σA such that DαρAσA=DαρARσAR? For the special case of α=1/2, an affirmative answer is given by Uhlmann’s theorem [10] (see also [11, Corollary 3.14]). This also holds for α=, but not in general for α1 as discussed in Sect. B. The following lemma shows that a similar property still holds for α>1 on a regularised level.

Lemma 3.3

Consider quantum systems A and R with d=dim(A). For nN, we define An=A1An, where Ai are copies of the system A, and likewise Rn=R1Rn. Then for ρS(AR), σPos(A), and α>1 we have

DαρAσAinfσ^AnRns.t.σ^An=σAn1nDαρARnσ^AnRnDαρAσA+αα-1d(d+1)log(n+d)n.

Proof

The inequality

DαρAσAinfσ^AnRns.t.σ^An=σAn1nDαρARnσ^AnRn

follows directly from the data processing inequality for taking the partial trace over Rn, and additivity of Dα under tensor product [11].

For the other direction, we consider n-fold tensor copies of ρAR and σA, which we denote by ρAnRn=ρA1R1ρAnRn and σAn=σA1σAn. We define the following two pinched states

ρAnRn=PσAn1Rn(ρAnRn)andρ^AnRn=Pρn1Rn(ρAnRn). 3.3

By definition of ρ^AnRn and using the pinching inequality (see Lemma 2.7(iii)) twice, we have

ρAnRn|Spec(σAn)||Spec(ρn)|ρ^AnRn.

Using the operator monotonicity of the sandwiched Rényi divergence in the first argument [11] we find for any state σ^AnRn

1nDαρARnσ^AnRn1nDαρ^AnRnσ^AnRn+1nαα-1η(n), 3.4

with the error term

η(n)=log|Spec(σAn)|+log|Spec(ρn)|.

To prove the lemma, we now need to bound the error term η(n) and construct a specific choice for σ^AnRn for which σ^An=σAn and 1nDαρ^AnRnσ^AnRnDαρAσA. We first bound η(n). Since σAn=σAn, we have from Eq. (2.3) that |Spec(σAn)|(n+1)d-1, where d=dim(A). To bound |Spec(ρn)|, we note that by Eq. (3.3) and Lemma 2.7(v)

ρn=TrRnPσAn1Rn(ρAnRn)=PσAn(ρAn)=PσAn(ρAn). 3.5

We can therefore use Lemma 2.9 to obtain |Spec(ρn)|(n+d)d(d+1)/2. Hence,

η(n)d(d+1)log(n+d). 3.6

It thus remains to construct σ^AnRn satisfying the properties mentioned above. To do so we first establish a number of commutation statements.

  • (i)
    From Lemma 2.7(ii) we have that [ρ^AnRn,ρn1Rn]=0. Recalling the definition of ρ from Eq. (3.3), we get
    ρ^An=TrRnPρn1Rn(ρAnRn)=Pρn(ρn)=ρn, 3.7
    where the final step uses Lemma 2.7(i). As a result we find
    [ρ^AnRn,ρ^An1Rn]=0. 3.8
  • (ii)
    From Lemma 2.7(ii) we have that [ρAnRn,σAn1Rn]=0. Taking the partial trace over Rn, this implies [ρn,σAn]=0, so by Lemma 2.7(iv) and Eq. (3.3)
    ρ^AnRn=Pρn1RnPσAn1Rn(ρAnRn)=PσAn1RnPρn1Rn(ρAnRn).
    Therefore, by Lemma 2.7(ii),
    [ρ^AnRn,σAn1Rn]=0. 3.9
  • (iii)
    Taking the partial trace over Rn in Eq. (3.9), we get
    [ρ^An,σAn]=0. 3.10

Having established these commutation relations, we define TCPTP(An,AnRn) by11

T(ωAn)=ρ^AnRn1/2ρ^An-1/2ωAnρ^An-1/2ρ^AnRn1/2.

By construction,

T(ρ^An)=ρ^AnRn. 3.11

We define

σ^AnRn=T(σAn). 3.12

To see that this is a valid choice of σ^, i.e., that σ^An=σAn=σAn, we use Eqs. (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) to find

σ^An=TrRnρ^AnRn1/2ρ^An-1/2σAnρ^An-1/2ρ^AnRn1/2=TrRnρ^AnRnρ^An-1σAn=σAn.

Using Eqs. (3.11) and (3.12) followed by the data processing inequality [11], we obtain

1nDαρ^AnRnσ^AnRn=1nDαT(ρ^An)T(σAn)1nDαρ^AnσAn. 3.13

By Eqs. (3.7) and (3.3) we have ρ^An=ρn=PσAn(ρAn). Therefore, continuing from Eq. (3.13) and using σAn=PσAn(σAn) followed by the data processing inequality gives

1nDαρ^AnRnσ^AnRn1nDαρAnσAn=1nDαρAnσAn=DαρAσA.

Inserting this and our error bound from Eq. (3.6) into Eq. (3.4) proves the desired statement.

With this, we can now prove Theorem 3.1.

Proof of Theorem 3.1

Because Dα is additive under tensor products, for any nN we have

DαE(ρAR)F(σAR)=1nDαEn(ρARn)Fn(σARn)=infσ^AnRns.t.σ^An=σAn1nDαEn(ρARn)Fn(σ^AnRn), 3.14

where the second equality holds because F=RTrR, so Fn(σARn)=Fn(σ^AnRn) for any σ^AnRn that satisfies σ^An=σAn. From the chain rule in Lemma 3.2 we get that for any σ^AnRn:

1nDαEn(ρARn)Fn(σ^AnRn)1nDαρARnσ^AnRn+1nDαregEnFn=1nDαρARnσ^AnRn+DαregEF,

where for the second line we used additivity of the regularised channel divergence (see Eq. (2.2)). Combining this with Eq. (3.14), we get

DαE(ρAR)F(σAR)infσ^AnRns.t.σ^An=σAn1nDαρARnσ^AnRn+DαregEF. 3.15

Finally, using Lemma 3.3 and the fact that d:=dim(A) and α>1 are constants independent of n, we have

limninfσ^AnRns.t.σ^An=σAn1nDαρARnσ^AnRnDαρAσA+limnαα-1d(d+1)log(n+d)n=DαρAσA.

Therefore, taking n in Eq. (3.15) and inserting this yields the theorem statement.

Removing the regularisation

The chain rule presented in Theorem 3.1 contains a regularised channel divergence term, which cannot be computed easily and whose behaviour as α1 is not understood. In this section we show that in the specific case relevant for entropy accumulation, this regularisation can be removed. From this, we then derive a chain rule for Rényi entropies in Theorem 3.6.

Definition 3.4

(Replacer map). The replacer map SACP(A,A) is defined by its action on an arbitrary state ωAR:

SA(ωAR)=1AωR.

Note that as usual, when we write SA(ωAR), we include an implicit tensoring with the identity channel, i.e. SA(ωAR)=(SAidR)(ωAR).

Lemma 3.5

Let α(1,2), ECPTP(AR,AR), and F=SAE, where SA is the replacer map. Then we have

DαregEFD12-αEF.

Proof

Due to the choice of F, we have that for any state ψnS(AnRnR~n) (with R~AR):

DαEn(ψn)Fn(ψn)=-Hα(A)n|(R)nR~nEn(ψn).

From [41, Proposition II.4] and [2, Lemma 4.2.2] we know that for every n, there exists a symmetric pure state |ψ^nSymn(ARR~) such that

DαEnFn=DαEn(ψ^n)Fn(ψ^n)=-Hα(A)n|(R)nR~nEn(ψn),

where ψ^n=|ψ^nψ^n| and the supremum in the definition of the channel divergence is achieved because the conditional entropy is continuous in the state. Let d=dim(ARR~) and gn,d=dim(Symn(ARR~))(n+1)d2-1. We define the state

τAnRnR~nn=μ(σARR~)σARR~n, 3.16

where μ is the Haar measure on pure states. We now claim that in the limit n, we can essentially replace the optimizer ψ^AnRnR~nn by the state τAnRnR~nn in Eq. (3.16). More precisely, we claim that

limn1nHα((A)n|(R)nR~n)En(ψ^n)limn1nH12-α((A)n|(R)nR~n)En(τn). 3.17

To show this, we first use Lemma 2.3 to get

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ154_HTML.gif

It is know that τAnRnR~nn is the maximally mixed state on Symn(ARR~) (see e.g. [13]). Therefore,

ρAnRnR~nn:=gn,dτn-ψ^ngn,d-1

is a valid quantum state (i.e. positive and normalised). Hence, we can write

τn=1-1gn,dρn+1gn,dψ^n.

Using [1, Lemma B.5], it follows that

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ155_HTML.gif

Since log(gn,d)n(d2-1)lognn vanishes as n, taking the limit and using Inline graphic proves Eq. (3.17).

Having established Eq. (3.17), we can now conclude the proof of the lemma as follows

DαregEF=-limn1nHα((A)n|(R)nR~n)En(ψ^n)-limn1nH12-α((A)n|(R)nR~n)En(τn)=limn1nD12-αEn(μ(σARR~)σARR~n)Fn(μ(σARR~)σARR~n)limnsupσARR~S(ARR~)1nD12-αEnσARR~nFnσARR~n=D12-αEF,

where we used joint quasi-convexity [11, Proposition 4.17] in the fourth line and additivity under tensor products in the last line.

Strengthened chain rule for conditional Rényi entropy

We next combine Theorem 3.1 with Lemma 3.5 to derive a new chain rule for the conditional Rényi entropy which then allows us to prove the generalised EAT in Sect. 4.

Lemma 3.6

Let α(1,2), ρS(ARE), and MCPTP(RE,ARE) such that there exists RCPTP(E,E) such that TrARM=RTrR. Then

Hα(AA|E)M(ρ)Hα(A|E)ρ+infωS(REE~)H12-α(A|EE~)M(ω) 3.18

for a purifying system E~RE.

Proof

We define the following maps12

N=SAMCP(RE,ARE),M~=idATrRMCPTP(ARE,AAE),N~=SAM~CP(ARE,AAE).

Note that in Eq. (3.18), we can replace M by M~, as the system R does not appear in Eq. (3.18). With σARE=1AρRE and N~=SAM~, we can write

-Hα(AA|E)M(ρ)=DαM~(ρARE)N~(σARE).

We now claim that there exists a map R~CP(AE,AAE) such that N~=R~TrR. To see this, observe that by assumption, TrAM~=idARTrR for some RCP(E,E). Then, we can define R~CP(AE,AAE) by its action on an arbitrary state ωAE:

R~(ωAE):=1A(idAR)(ωAE)=1ATrAM~(ωARE)=N~(ωARE)

for any extension ωARE of ωAE. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 3.1 to find

DαM~(ρARE)N~(σARE)DαρAEσAE+DαregM~N~.

By definition of σ, we have DαρAEσAE=-Hα(A|E)ρ. Since the channel divergence is stabilised (see Footnote 9), tensoring with idA has no effect, i.e.,

DαregM~N~=DαregTrRMTrRN=DαregTrRMSATrRM.

To this, we can apply Lemma 3.5 and obtain

DαregM~N~D12-αTrRMSATrRM=-infωS(REE~)H12-α(A|EE~)M(ω)

with E~RE. Combining all the steps yields the desired statement.

Generalised Entropy Accumulation

We are finally ready to state and prove the main result of this work which is a generalisation of the EAT proven in [1]. We first state a simple version of this theorem, which follows readily from the chain rule Theorem 3.6 and captures the essential feature of entropy accumulation: the min-entropy of a state MnM1(ρ) produced by applying a sequence of n channels can be lower-bounded by a sum of entropy contributions of each channel Mi. However, for practical applications, it is desirable not to consider the state MnM1(ρ), but rather that state conditioned on some classical event, for example “success” in a key distribution protocol – a concept called “testing”. Analogously to [1], we present an EAT adapted to that setting in Sect. 4.2.

Generalised EAT

Theorem 4.1

(Generalised EAT). Consider a sequence of channels Mi CPTP(Ri-1Ei-1,AiRiEi) such that for all i{1,,n}, there exists RiCPTP(Ei-1,Ei) such that TrAiRiMi=RiTrRi-1. Then for any ε(0,1) and any ρR0E0S(R0E0)

Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)i=1ninfωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)H(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω)-O(n)

for a purifying system E~i-1Ri-1Ei-1. For a statement with explicit constants, see Eq. (4.1) in the proof.

Proof

By [1, Lemma B.10], we have for α(1,2)

Hminε(A1n|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)Hα(A1n|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)-g(ε)α-1

with g(ε)=log(1-1-ε2). From Theorem 3.6, we have

Hα(A1n|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)Hα(A1n-1|En-1)Mn-1M1(ρR0E0)+infωS(Rn-1En-1E~n-1)H12-α(An|EnE~n-1)Mn(ω).

Repeating this step n-1 times, we get

Hα(A1n|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)Hα(A1|E1)M1(ρR0E0)+i=2ninfωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)H12-α(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω)i=1ninfωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)H12-α(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω),

where the final step uses the monotonicity of the Rényi divergence in α [11, Corollary 4.3]. From [1, Lemma B.9] we have for each i{1,,n} and α sufficiently close to 1,

infωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)H12-α(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω)infωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)H(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω)-α-12-αlog2(1+2dim(Ai)).

Setting dA=maxidim(Ai) and combining the previous steps, we obtain

Hmin(A1n|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)i=1ninfωiS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)H(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ωi)-nα-12-αlog2(1+2dA)-g(ε)α-1. 4.1

Using α=1+O(1/n) yields the result.

Generalised EAT with testing

In this section, we will extend Theorem 4.1 to include the possibility of “testing”, i.e., of computing the min-entropy of a cq-state conditioned on some classical event. This analysis is almost identical to that of [8]; we give the full proof for completeness, but will appeal to [8] for specific tight bounds. The resulting EAT (Theorem 4.3) has (almost) the same tight bounds as the result in [8], but replaces the Markov condition with the more general non-signalling condition. Hence, relaxing the Markov condition does not result in a significant loss in parameters (including second-order terms).

Consider a sequence of channels MiCPTP(Ri-1Ei-1,CiAiRiEi) for i{1,,n}, where Ci are classical systems with common alphabet C. We require that these channels Mi satisfy the following condition: defining Mi=TrCiMi, there exist channels TiCPTP(AiEi,CiAiEi) and TCPTP(AnEn,CnAnEn) such that Mi=TiMi and MnM1=TMnM1, where Ti and T have the form

Ti(ωAiEi)=yYi,zZi(ΠAi(y)ΠEi(z))ωAiEi(ΠAi(y)ΠEi(z))|ri(y,z)ri(y,z)|CiT(ωAnEn)=yY,zZ(ΠAn(y)ΠEn(z))ωAnEn(ΠAn(y)ΠEn(z))|r(y,z)r(y,z)|Cn, 4.2

where {ΠAi(y)}y and {ΠEi(z)}z are families of mutually orthogonal projectors on Ai and Ei, and ri:Yi×ZiC is a deterministic function Similarly, {ΠAn(y)}y and {ΠEn(z)}z are families of mutually orthogonal projectors on An and En, and r:Y×ZC is a deterministic function. (Note that even though we use the same symbol for both, in principle there does not have to be any relationship between the single-round projectors ΠAi and the projector ΠAn (and likewise for ΠEi and ΠEn), although in practice the latter will usually be the tensor product of the former.) Intuitively, this condition says that for each round, the classical statistics can be reconstructed “in a projective way” from the systems Ai and Ei in that round, and furthermore the full statistics information Cn can be reconstructed in a projective way from the systems An and En at the end of the process. The latter condition is not implied by the former because future rounds may modify the Ei-system in such a way that Ci can no longer be reconstructed from the side information En at the end of the protocol. To rule this out, we need to specify the latter condition separately. In particular, this requirement is always satisfied if the statistics Ci are computed from classical information contained in Ai and Ei and this classical information is not deleted from Ei in future rounds. This is the scenario in all applications that we are aware of, but we state Eq. (4.2) more generally to allow for the possibility of protocols where the statistics are constructed in a more general way.

Let P be the set of probability distributions on the alphabet C of Ci, and let E~i-1 be a system isomorphic to Ri-1Ei-1. For any qP we define the set of states

Σi(q)={νCiAiRiEiE~i-1=Mi(ωRi-1Ei-1E~i-1)|ωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)andνCi=q}, 4.3

where νCi denotes the probability distribution over C with the probabilities given by Prc=c|νCi|c. In other words, Σi(q) is the set of states that can be produced at the output of the channel Mi and whose reduced state on Ci is equal to the probability distribution q.

Definition 4.2

A function f:PR is called a min-tradeoff function for {Mi} if it satisfies

f(q)minνΣi(q)H(Ai|EiE~i-1)νi=1,,n.

Note that if Σi(q)=, then f(q) can be chosen arbitrarily.

Our result will depend on some simple properties of the tradeoff function, namely the maximum and minimum of f, the minimum of f over valid distributions, and the maximum variance of f:

Max(f):=maxqPf(q),Min(f):=minqPf(q),MinΣ(f):=minq:Σ(q)f(q),Var(f):=maxq:Σ(q)xCq(x)f(δx)2-xCq(x)f(δx)2,

where Σ(q)=iΣi(q) and δx is the distribution with all the weight on element x. We write freq(Cn) for the distribution on C defined by freq(Cn)(c)=|{i{1,,n}:Ci=c}|n. We also recall that in this context, an event Ω is defined by a subset of Cn, and for a state ρCnAnEnRn we write PrρΩ=cnΩTrρA1nEnRn,cn for the probability of the event Ω and

ρCnAnEnRn|Ω=1PrρΩcnΩ|cncn|CnρAnEnRn,cn

for the state conditioned on Ω.

Theorem 4.3

Consider a sequence of channels MiCPTP(Ri-1Ei-1,CiAiRiEi) for i{1,,n}, where Ci are classical systems with common alphabet C and the sequence {Mi} satisfies Eq. (4.2) and the non-signalling condition: for each Mi, there exists RiCPTP(Ei-1,Ei) such that TrAiRiCiMi=RiTrRi-1. Let ε(0,1), α(1,3/2), ΩCn, ρR0E0S(R0E0), and f be an affine13 min-tradeoff function with h=mincnΩf(freq(cn)). Then,

Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)|Ωnh-nα-12-αln(2)2V2-g(ε)+αlog(1/PrρnΩ)α-1-nα-12-α2K(α), 4.4

where PrΩ is the probability of observing event Ω, and

g(ε)=-log(1-1-ε2),V=log(2dA2+1)+2+Var(f),K(α)=(2-α)36(3-2α)3ln22α-12-α(2logdA+Max(f)-MinΣ(f))ln322logdA+Max(f)-MinΣ(f)+e2,

with dA=maxidim(Ai).

Remark 4.4

The parameter in α in Theorem 4.3 can be optimized for specific problems, which leads to tighter bounds. Alternatively, it is possible to make a generic choice for α to recover a theorem that looks much more like Theorem 4.1, which is done in Corollary 4.6. We also remark that even tighter second order terms have been derived in [42]. To keep our theorem statement and proofs simpler, we do not carry out this additional optimization explicitly, but note that this can be done in complete analogy to [42].

To prove Theorem 4.3, we will need the following lemma (which is already implicit in [1, Claim 4.6], but we give a simplified proof here).

Lemma 4.5

Consider a quantum state ρS(CADE) that has the form

ρCADE=cΩ|cc|ρAE,cρD|c,

where ΩC is a subset of the alphabet C of the classical system C, and for each c, ρAE,cPos(AE) is subnormalised and ρD|cS(D) is a quantum state. Then for α>1,

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ156_HTML.gif

Proof

Let σES(E) such that

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ157_HTML.gif

Then

σE1-α2αρCADEσE1-α2αα=cΩ|cc|σE1-α2αρAE,cσE1-α2ααρD|cα.

Hence,

TrσE1-α2αρCADEσE1-α2αα=cΩTrσE1-α2αρAE,cσE1-α2ααTrρD|cαsupσ~ES(E)TrcΩ|cc|σ~E1-α2αρAE,cσ~E1-α2αα×maxcΩTrρD|cα=supσ~ES(E)Trσ~E1-α2αρCAEσ~E1-α2ααmaxcΩTrρD|cα

Recalling the definitions of Dα (Definition 2.1) and Inline graphic (Definition 2.2), we see that the lemma follows by taking the logarithm and multiplying by 1α-1.

Proof of Theorem 4.3

As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we first use [1, Lemma B.10] to get

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ33_HTML.gif 4.5

for α(1,2] and g(ε)=log(1-1-ε2). We therefore need to find a lower bound for

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ34_HTML.gif 4.6

where the equality holds because of Eq. (4.2) and [1, Lemma B.7].

Before proceeding with the formal proof, let us explain the main difficulty compared to Theorem 4.1. The state for which we need to compute the entropy in Eq. (4.6) is conditioned on the event ΩCn. This is a global event, in the sense that it depends on the classical outputs C1,,Cn of all rounds. We essentially seek a lower bound that involves minνΣi(freq(cn))Hα(Ai|Ei)ν for some cnΩ, i.e., for every round we only want to minimize over output states of the channel Mi whose distribution on Ci matches the frequency distribution freq(cn) of the n rounds we observed. This means that we must use the global conditioning on Ω to argue that in each round, we can restrict our attention to states whose outcome distribution matches the (worst-case) frequency distribution associated with Ω. The chain rule Theorem 3.1 does not directly allow us to do this as the r.h.s. of Eq. (3.18) always minimizes over all possible input states.

To circumvent this, we follow a strategy that was introduced in [1] and optimized in [8] (see also [16, 21, 43] for related ideas and [44] for follow-up work). For every i, we introduce a quantum system Di with dim(Di)=2Max(f)-Min(f) and define DiCPTP(Ci,CiDi) by

Di(ωCi)=cCc|ωCi|c·|cc|τDi|c.

For every cC, the state τDi|cS(D) is defined as the mixture between a uniform distribution on {1,,2Max(f)-f(δc)} and a uniform distribution on {1,,2Max(f)-f(δc)} that satisfies

H(Di)τDi|c=Max(f)-f(δc),

where δx stands for the distribution with all the weight on element x. This is clearly possible if dim(Di)=2Max(f)-Min(f).

We define M¯i=DiMi and denote

ρCnAnRnEnn=MnM1(ρR0E0)andρ¯CnAnDnRnEnn=M¯nM¯1(ρR0E0).

The state ρ¯|Ωn has the right form for us to apply Lemma 4.5 and get

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ35_HTML.gif 4.7

where

ρ¯Dn|cnn=τD1|c1τDn|cn.

We treat each term in Eq. (4.7) in turn.

  • (i)
    For the term on the l.h.s., it is easy to see that ρ¯CnAnRnEn|Ωn=ρCnAnRnEn|Ωn, so
    graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ36_HTML.gif 4.8
  • (ii)
    For the first term on the r.h.s., we compute
    Hα(Dn)ρ¯Dn|cnn=iHα(Di)τDi|ciiH(Di)τDi|ci=nMax(f)-if(δci)=nMax(f)-nf(freq(cn)), 4.9
    where the last equality holds because f is affine.
  • (iii)
    For the second term on the r.h.s., we first use [1, Lemma B.5] to remove the conditioning on the event Ω, and then use that removing the classical system Cn and switching from Inline graphic to Hα can only decrease the entropy:
    graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ158_HTML.gif
    where we used PrρnΩ=Prρ¯nΩ. Now noting that TrDiM¯i=Mi, we see that the non-signalling condition TrAiRiCiMi=RiTrRi-1 on Mi implies the non-signalling condition TrAiRiCiDiM¯i=RiTrRi-1 on M¯i. We can therefore apply the chain rule in Theorem 3.6 to find
    Hα(AnDn|En)ρ¯ni=1nminωi-1S(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1)Hβ(AiDi|EiE~i-1)M¯i(ωi-1),
    where we introduced the shorthand β:=12-α and the purifying system E~i-1Ri-1Ei-1. Noting that for α(1,3/2) we have β(1,2), we can now use [8, Corollary IV.2] to obtain
    Hβ(AiDi|EiE~i-1)M¯i(ωi-1)H(AiDi|EiE~i-1)M¯i(ωi-1)-(β-1)ln(2)2V2-(β-1)2K(β),
    where V2 and K(β) are quantities from [8, Proposition V.3] that satisfy
    K(β)16(2-β)3ln22(β-1)(2logdA+Max(f)-MinΣ(f))ln322logdA+Max(f)-MinΣ(f)+e2,V2=log(2dA2+1)+2+Var(f)2,
    where dA=maxidim(Ai). Note that the above expressions derived in [8, Proposition V.3] also hold in our case due to the first part of Eq. (4.2). Furthermore, as in the proof of [8, Proposition V.3], we have
    H(AiDi|EiE~i-1)M¯i(ωi-1)Max(f).
    Therefore, the second term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (4.7) is bounded by
    graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ38_HTML.gif 4.10

Combining our results for each of the three terms (i.e. Eqs. (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10)) and recalling h=minxnΩf(freq(xn)), Eq. (4.7) becomes

graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Equ159_HTML.gif

Inserting this into Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6), and defining K(α)=K(β)=K(12-α) we obtain

Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)|Ωnh-n(β-1)ln(2)2V2-g(ε)+αlog(1/PrρnΩ)α-1-n(β-1)2K(β) 4.11

as desired.

Corollary 4.6

For the setting given in Theorem 4.3 we have

Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)|Ωnh-c1n-c0,

where the quantities c1 and c0 are given by

c1=2ln(2)V2η(g(ε)+(2-η)log(1/PrρnΩ)),c0=(2-η)η2log(1/PrρnΩ)+η2g(ε)3(ln2)2V2(2η-1)321-ηη(2logdA+Max(f)-MinΣ(f))ln322logdA+Max(f)-MinΣ(f)+e2

with

η=2ln(2)1+2ln(2),g(ε)=log(1-1-ε2),V=log(2dA2+1)+2+Var(f).

Proof

We first note that for any Ω with non-zero probability, hlogdA. Therefore, if nc12logdA2, it is easy to check that nh-c1n-nlogdA, so the statement of Corollary 4.6 becomes trivial. We may therefore assume that n(c12logdA)2.

As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we define β=12-α. The first part of the proof works for any α(1,2-η) for η=2ln(2)1+2ln(2)0.58; later we will make a specific choice of α in this interval. Then, β-1=12-α-1α-1η and β(1,1/η). Therefore, using K(β) as defined in the proof of Theorem 4.3 and noting that in the interval β(1,1/η)(1,2) this quantity is monotonically increasing in β, we have

K(β)K:=η36(2η-1)3ln221-ηη(2logdA+Max(f)-MinΣ(f))ln322logdA+Max(f)-MinΣ(f)+e2,

Hence, we can simplify the statement of Theorem 4.3 to

Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρR0E0)|Ωnh-n(α-1)ln(2)2ηV2-g(ε)+(2-η)·log(1/PrρnΩ)α-1-n(α-1)2Kη2. 4.12

We now choose α>1 as a function of n and ε so that the terms proportional to α-1 and 1α-1 match:

α=1+2ηnln(2)V2(g(ε)+(2-η)log(1/PrρnΩ)).

Inserting this choice of α into Eq. (4.12) and combining terms yields the constants in Corollary 4.6. The final step is to show that this choice of α indeed satisfies α2-η for n(c12logdA)2. For this, we note that for n(c12logdA)2, we have

α=1+ηln(2)V2c1n1+2ηlogdAln(2)V2.

We can now use that V2log(2dA2)24logdA since dA2, so

α1+2ηlogdAln(2)V21+η2ln(2)=2-η,

where the last inequality holds because η=2ln(2)1+2ln(2).

In many applications, e.g. randomness expansion or QKD, a round can either be a “data generation round” (e.g. to generate bits of randomness or key) or a “test round” (e.g. to test whether a device used in the protocol behaves as intended). More formally, in this case the maps MiCPTP(Ri-1Ei-1,CiAiRiEi) can be written as

Mi=γMi,Ri-1Ei-1CiAiRiEitest+(1-γ)Mi,Ri-1Ei-1AiRiEidata||Ci, 4.13

where the output of Mitest on system Ci is from some alphabet C that does not include , so the alphabet of system Ci is C=C{}. The parameter γ is called the testing probability, and for efficient protocols we usually want γ to be as small as possible.

For maps of the form in Eq. (4.13), there is a general way of constructing a min-tradeoff function for the map Mi based only on the statistics generated by the map Mitest. This was shown in [8] and we reproduce their result (adapted to our notation) here for the reader’s convenience.

Lemma 4.7

([8, Lemma V.5]). Let MiCPTP(Ri-1Ei-1,CiAiRiEi) be channels satisfying the same conditions as in Theorem 4.3 that can furthermore be decomposed as in Eq. (4.13). Suppose that an affine function g:P(C)R satisfies for any qP(C) and any i=1,,n

g(q)minωS(Ri-1Ei-iE~i-1){H(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω):Mitest(ω)Ci=q} 4.14

where E~i-1Ri-1Ei-1 is a purifying system. Then, the affine function f:P(C)R defined by

f(δx)=Max(g)+1γ(g(δx)-Max(g))xCf(δ)=Max(g)

is a min-tradeoff function for {Mi}. Moreover,

Max(f)=Max(g)Min(f)=1-1γMax(g)+1γMin(g)MinΣ(f)Min(g)Var(f)1γ(Max(g)-Min(g))2.

Sample Applications

To demonstrate the utility of our generalised EAT, we provide two sample applications. Firstly, in Sect. 5.1 we prove security of blind randomness expansion against general attacks. The notion of blind randomness was defined in [15] and has potential applications in mistrustful cryptography (see [15, 16] for a detailed motivation). Until now, no security proof against general attacks was known. In particular, the original EAT is not applicable because its model of side information is too restrictive. With our generalised EAT, we can show that security against general attacks follows straightforwardly from a single-round security statement.

Secondly, in Sect. 5.2 we give a simplified security proof for the E91 QKD protocol [45], which was also treated with the original EAT [1]. This example is meant to help those familiar with the original EAT understand the difference between that result and our generalised EAT. In particular, this application highlights the utility of our more general model of side information: in our proof, the non-signalling condition is satisfied trivially and the advantage over the original EAT stems purely from being able to update the side information register Ei. We point out that while here we focus on the E91 protocol to allow an easy comparison with the original EAT, our generalised EAT can be used for a large class of QKD protocols for which the original EAT was not applicable at all. A comprehensive treatment of this is given in [7].

Blind randomness expansion

We start by recalling the idea of standard (non-blind) device-independent randomness expansion [1721]. Alice would like to generate a uniformly random bit string using devices D1 and D2 prepared by an adversary Eve. To this end, in her local lab (which Eve cannot access) she isolates the devices from one another and plays multiple round of a non-local game with them, e.g. the CHSH game. On a subset of the rounds of the game, she checks whether the CHSH condition is satisfied. If this is the case on a sufficiently high proportion of rounds, she can conclude that the devices’ outputs on the remaining rounds must contain a certain amount of entropy, conditioned on the input to the devices and any quantum side information that Eve might have kept from preparing the devices. Using a quantum-proof randomness extractor, Alice can then produce a uniformly random string.

Blind randomness expansion [15, 16] is a significant strengthening of the above idea. Here, Alice only receives one device D1, which she again places in her local lab isolated from the outside world. Now, Alice plays a non-local game with her device D1 and the adversary Eve: she samples questions for a non-local game as before, inputs one of the questions to D1, and sends the other question to Eve. D1 and Eve both provide an output. Alice then proceeds as in standard randomness expansion, checking whether the winning condition of the non-local game is satisfied on a subset of rounds and concluding that the output of her device D1 must contain a certain amount of entropy conditioned on the adversary’s side information.

For the purpose of applying the EAT, the crucial difference between the two notions of randomness expansion is the following: in standard randomness expansion, the adversary’s quantum side information is not acted upon during the protocol, and additional side information (the inputs to the devices, which we also condition on) are generated independently in a round-by-round manner. This allows a relatively straightforward application of the standard EAT [4]. In contrast, in blind randomness expansion, the adversary’s quantum side information gets updated in every round of the protocol and is not generated independently in a round-by-round fashion. This does not fit in the framework of the standard EAT, which requires the side information to be generated round-by-round subject to a Markov condition. As a result, [15, 16] were not able to prove a general multi-round blind randomness expansion result.

In the rest of this section, we will show that our generalised EAT is capable of treating multi-round blind randomness expansion, using a protocol similar to [14, Protocol 3.1]. A formal description of the protocol is given in Protocol 1.graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Figc_HTML.jpg

The following proposition shows a lower bound on on the amount of randomness Alice can extract from this protocol, as specified by the min-entropy. For this, we assume a lower-bound on the single-round von Neumann entropy. Such a single-round bound can be found numerically using a generic method as explained after the proof of Lemma 5.1.

Proposition 5.1

Suppose Alice executes Protocol 1 with a device D that cannot communicate with Eve. We denote by Ri and Ei the (arbitrary) quantum systems of the device D and the adversary Eve after the i-th round, respectively. Eve’s full side-information after the i-th round is Ei:=TiXiYiBiEi. A single round of the protocol can be described by a quantum channel NiCPTP(Ri-1Ei-1,CiAiRiEi). We also define Nitest to be the same as Ni, except that Nitest always picks Ti=1. Let ρAnCnRnEn be the state at the end of the protocol and Ω the event that Alice does not abort.

Let g:P({0,1})R be an affine function satisfying the conditions

g(p)infωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1):Nitest(ω)Ci=pH(Ai|EiE~i-1)Ni(ω),Max(g)=g(δ1), 5.1

where E~i-1Ri-1Ei-1 is a purifying system. Then, for any εa,εs(0,1), either PrΩεa or

Hmins(An|En)ρ|Ωnh-c1n-c0

for c1,c00 independent of n and

h=minpP({0,1}):p(0)1-ωexp+δg(p),

where ωexp is the expected winning probability and δ the error tolerance from Protocol 1. If we treat εs,εa,dim(Ai),δ,Max(g), and Min(g) as constants, then c1=O(1/γ) and c0=O(1).

Furthermore, if there exists a quantum strategy that wins the game G with probability ωexp, there is an honest behaviour of D and Eve for which PrΩ1-exp(-δ21-ωexp+δγn).

Remark 5.2

The condition on g(p) in Eq. (5.1) is formulated in terms of the entropy

H(Ai|EiE~i-1)Ni(ω)=H(Ai|TiXiYiBiEiE~i-1)Ni(ω)

with E~i-1Ri-1Ei-1. However, the map Ni corresponding to the i-th round does not act on the systems Ti-1Xi-1Yi-1Bi-1. Therefore, we can view these systems as part of the purifying system. Since the infimum in Eq. (5.1) already includes a purifying E~i-1, we can drop these additional systems and without loss of generality choose E~i-1 to be isomorphic to those input systems on which Ni acts non-trivially, i.e. E~i-1Ri-1Ei-1. This means that we can replace the upper bound on g in Eq. (5.1) by the equivalent condition

g(p)infωS(Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1):Nitest(ω)Ci=pH(Ai|BiXiYiTiEiE~i-1)Ni(ω) 5.2

with E~i-1Ri-1Ei-1. For the proof of Lemma 5.1 we will use Eq. (5.1) since it more closely matches the notation of Theorem 4.3, but intuitively, Eq. (5.2) is more natural as it only involves quantities related to the i-th round of the protocol.

Proof of Lemma 5.1

To show the min-entropy lower bound, we will make use of Corollary 4.6. For this, we first check that the maps Ni satisfy the required conditions. Since Ci is a deterministic function of the (classical) variables Xi,Yi,Ai, and Bi, it is clear that Eq. (4.2) is satisfied. For the non-signalling condition, we define the map RiCPTP(Ei-1,Ei) as follows: Ri samples Ti,Xi and Yi as Alice does in Step 5.1 of Protocol 1. R then performs Eve’s actions in the protocol (which only act on Yi and Ei-1, which is part of Ei-1). It is clear that the distribution on Xi and Yi produced by Ri is the same as for Ni. By the assumption that D and Eve cannot communicate, the marginal of the output of Ni on Eve’s side must be independent of the device’s system Ri-1. Hence, TrAiRiCiNi=RiTrRi-1.

To construct a min-tradeoff function, we note that we can split Ni=γNitest+(1-γ)Nidata, with Nitest always picking Ti=1 and Nidata always picking Ti=0. Then, we get from Lemma 4.7 and the condition Max(g)=g(δ1) that the affine function f defined by

f(δ0)=g(δ1)+1γ(g(δ0)-g(δ1)),f(δ1)=f(δ)=g(δ1)

is an affine min-tradeoff function for {Ni}.

Viewing the event Ω as a subset of the range {0,1}n of the random variable Cn and comparing with the abort condition in Protocol 1, we see that cnΩ implies freq(cn)(0)(1-ωexp+δ)γ. Therefore, for cnΩ and denoting p=freq(cn),

f(freq(cn))=p(0)f(δ0)+(1-p(0))f(δ1)=p(0)γg(δ0)+1-p(0)γg(δ1)h,

where the last inequality holds because g is affine and the distribution p(0)=p(0)/γ,p(1)=1-p(0)/γ satisfies p(0)1-ωexp+δ. The proposition now follows directly from Corollary 4.6 and the scaling of c1 and c0 is easily obtained from the expressions in Corollary 4.6.

To show that an honest strategy succeeds in the protocol with high probability, we define a random variable Fi by Fi=1 if Ci=0, and Fi=0 otherwise. If D and Eve execute the quantum strategy that wins the game G with probability ωexp in each round, then E[Fi]=(1-ωexp)γ. Using the abort condition in the protocol, we then find

Prabort=Pri=1nFi>(1-ωexp+δ)·γn=Pri=1nFi>1+δ1-ωexp·E[i=1nFi]e-δ21-ωexp+δγn,

where in the last line we used a Chernoff bound.

To make use of Lemma 5.1, we need to construct a function g(p) that satisfies the condition in Eq. (5.1). For this, we will use the equivalent condition Eq. (5.2). A general way of obtaining such a bound automatically is using the recent numerical method [22].14 Specifically, using the assumption that Alice’s lab is isolated, the maps Ni describing a single round of the protocol take the form described in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 1

Circuit diagram of N:Ri-1Ei-1AiRiTiXiYiBiEi. For every round of the protocol, a circuit of this form is applied, where A and B are the (arbitrary) channels applied by Alice’s device and Eve, respectively. As in the protocol, Ti is a bit equal to 1 with probability γ, and Xi and Yi are generated according to q whenever Ti=1, and are fixed to x,y otherwise. We did not include the register Ci in the figure as it is a deterministic function of TiXiYiAiBi

The method of [22] allows one to obtain lower bounds on the infimum of

H(Ai|BiXiYiTiEiE~i-1)Ni(ωRi-1Ei-1E~i-1)

over all input states ωRi-1Ei-1E~i-1 and for any map Ni of the form depicted in Fig. 1. Importantly, for any Ni we may also restrict the infimum to states ω that are consistent with the observed statistics, i.e., Ntest(ω)Ci=p for some distribution p on Ci, using the notation of Lemma 5.1. Using this numerical method for the CHSH game, we obtain the values shown in Fig. 2. From this, one can also construct an explicit affine min-tradeoff function g(p) in an automatic way using the same method as in [46]. As our focus is on illustrating the use of the generalised EAT, not the single-round bound, we do not carry out these steps in detail here.

Fig. 2.

Fig. 2

Lower bound on the conditional entropy H(Ai|BiXiYiTiEi)ρ|Ti=0 for any state generated as in Fig. 1 and such that on test rounds the obtained winning probability for the CHSH game is ω. This lower bound was obtained by using the method from [22]. For each input yY, the channel By is modelled as By(ω)=bΠy(b)ωΠy(b), where {Πy(b)}bB are orthogonal projectors summing to the identity, and similarly for the map A. It is simple to see that this is without loss of generality

Combining this single-round bound and Lemma 5.1, one obtains that for Protocol 1 instantiated with the CHSH game, ωexp sufficiently close to the maximal winning probability of 12+122, and γ=Θ(lognn), one can extract Ω(n) bits of uniform randomness from A1An while using only polylog(n) bits of randomness to run the protocol. In other words, Protocol 1 achieves exponential blind randomness expansion with the CHSH game.

E91 quantum key distribution protocol

The E91 protocol is one of the simplest entanglement-based QKD protocols [45, 47]. This protocol was already treated using the original EAT in [1]. Here, we do not give a formal security definition and proof, only an informal comparison of how the original EAT and our generalised EAT can be applied to this problem; the remainder of the security proof is then exactly as in [1]. For a detailed treatment of the application of our generalised EAT to QKD, see [7]. To facilitate the comparison with [1], in this section we label systems the same as in [1] even though this differs from the system labels used earlier in this paper. The protocol we are considering is described explicitly in Protocol 2. It is the same as in [1] except for minor modifications to simplify the notation.graphic file with name 220_2024_5121_Figd_HTML.jpg

We consider the systems Bi,B¯i,Ai,A¯i,Qi,Q¯i as in Protocol 2 and additionally define the system Xi storing the statistical information used in the parameter estimation step:

Xi=AiA¯iifBi=B¯i=1,otherwise.

Denoting by E the side information gathered by Eve during the distribution step, we can follow the same steps as for [1, Equation (57)] to show that the security of Protocol 2 follows from a lower bound on

Hminε(An|BnB¯nE)ρ|Ω. 5.3

Here, ρ|Ω is the state at the end of the protocol conditioned on acceptance.

We first sketch how the original EAT (whose setup was described in Sect. 1) is applied to this problem in [1]. One cannot bound Hminε(An|BnB¯nE)ρ|Ω directly using the EAT because a condition similar to Eq. (4.2) has to be satisfied. Therefore, one modifies the systems A¯i from Protocol 2 by setting A¯i= if Bi=B¯i=0 and then applies the EAT to find a lower bound on

Hminε(AnA¯n|BnB¯nE)ρ|Ω. 5.4

For this, a round of Protocol 2 is viewed as a map Mi:QinQ¯inQi+1nQ¯i+1nAiA¯iBiB¯iXi, which chooses BiB¯i as in Protocol 2, applies Alice and Bob’s (trusted) measurements on systems QiQ¯i to generate AiA¯i, and generates Xi as described before. To apply the EAT, Ri-1:=QinQ¯in takes the role of the “hidden sytem”, and AiA¯i and BiB¯i are the output and side information of the i-th round, respectively. It is easy to see that with this choice of systems, the Markov condition of the EAT is satisfied, so, using a min-tradeoff function derived from an entropic uncertainty relation [48], one can find a lower bound on Eq. (5.4).

However, adding the system A¯i in this manner has the following disadvantage: to relate the lower bound on Hminε(AnA¯n|BnB¯nE)ρ|Ω to the desired lower bound on Hminε(An|BnB¯nE)ρ|Ω one needs to use a chain rule for min-entropies, incurring a penalty term of the form Hmaxε(A¯n|AnBnB¯nE)ρ|Ω. This penalty term is relatively easy to bound for the case of the E91 protocol, but can cause problems in general.15

We now turn our attention to proving Eq. (5.3) using our generalised EAT. For this, we first observe that

Hminε(An|BnB¯nE)ρ|ΩHminε(An|BnB¯nXnE)ρ|Ω,

so it suffices to find a lower bound on the r.h.s. This step is similar to adding the A¯i systems in Eq. (5.4) in that its purpose is to satisfy Eq. (4.2). However, it has the advantage that here, Xn can be added to the conditioning system and therefore lowers the entropy, not raises it like going from Eqs. (5.3) to (5.4). The same step is not possible in the original EAT due to the restrictive Markov condition.

Using the same system names as before, we define Ei:=Qi+1nQ¯i+1nBiB¯iXiE.16 Then, analogously to the original EAT, we can describe a single round of Protocol 2 by a map Mi:Ei-1AiEiXi. (Compared to the map Mi we described above for the original EAT, we have traced out A¯i, added a copy of Xi, and added identity maps on the other additional systems in Ei-1.) Denoting by ρQnQ¯nE0 the joint state of Alice and Bob’s systems QnQ¯n before measurement and the information E that Eve gathered during the distribution step, the state at the end of the protocol is ρ=MnM1(ρ0). To apply Corollary 4.6 to find a lower bound on

Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρ0)|Ω,

we first observe that the condition in Eq. (4.2) is satisfied because the system Xn is part of En, and the non-signalling condition is trivially satisfied because there is no Ri-system. A min-tradeoff function can be constructed in exactly the same way as in [1, Claim 5.2] by noting that all systems in Ei on which Mi does not act can be viewed as part of the purifying system.

This comparison highlights the advantage of the more general model of side information in our generalised EAT: for the original EAT, one has to first bound Hminε(AnA¯n|BnB¯nE) (rather than Hminε(An|BnB¯nE)) in order to be able to satisfy the Markov condition, and then perform a separate step to remove the A¯n system. In our case, the non-signalling condition, the analogue of the Markov condition, is trivially satisfied because we need no Ri-system. This is because we can add the quantum systems QnQ¯n to the side information register E0 at the start and then, since we allow side information to be updated and Alice and Bob act on QiQ¯i using trusted measurement devices, we can remove the systems QiQ¯i one by one during the rounds of the protocol.

Acknowledgements

We thank Rotem Arnon-Friedman, Peter Brown, Kun Fang, Raban Iten, Joseph M. Renes, Martin Sandfuchs, Ernest Tan, Jinzhao Wang, John Wright, and Yuxiang Yang for helpful discussions. We further thank Mario Berta and Marco Tomamichel for insights on Lemma 3.2, and Frédéric Dupuis and Carl Miller for discussions about blind randomness expansion.

Dual Statement for Smooth Max-Entropy

In the main text we have focused on deriving a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy. Here, we show that this also implies an upper bound on the smooth max-entropy by applying a simple duality relation between min- and max-entropy. A similar upper bound was also derived in [1]. However, that bound is subject to a Markov condition and cannot be derived by a simple duality argument since the “dual version” of the Markov condition is unwieldy. We show that the bound from [1] follows as a special case of our more general bound even without any Markov conditions or other non-signalling constraints. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to an asymptotic statement without “testing”, i.e. we derive an Hmaxε-version of Theorem 4.1. By applying the same duality relation to the more involved statement in Theorem 4.3, one can also obtain an Hmaxε-bound with explicit constants and testing.

Recall that for ρABS(AB) and ε[0,1], the ε-smoothed max-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as

Hmaxε(A|B)ρ=loginfρ~ABBε(ρAB)supσBS(B)ρ~AB12σB1212,

where ·1 denotes the trace norm and Bε(ρAB) is the ε-ball around ρAB in terms of the purified distance [11]. The smooth min- and max-entropy satisfy the following duality relation [11, Proposition 6.2]: for a pure quantum state ψABC,

Hminε(A|B)ψ=-Hmaxε(A|C)ψ.

For the setting of Theorem 4.1, let Vi:Ri-1Ei-1AiRiEiFi be the Stinespring dilation of the map Mi, and let |ρ0R0E0F0 be a purification of the input state ρR0E00. Then, VnV1|ρ0 is a purification of MnM1(ρ0), so by the duality of the smooth min- and max-entropy,

Hminε(An|En)MnM1(ρ0)=-Hmaxε(An|FnRn)VnV1|ρ0.

Furthermore, by concavity of the conditional entropy the infimum in Theorem 4.1 can be restricted to pure states |ωRi-1Ei-1E~i-1, so Vi|ω is a purification of Mi(ω). Then, by the duality relation for von Neumann entropies,

H(Ai|EiE~i-1)Mi(ω)=-H(Ai|RiFi)Vi|ω.

Therefore, we obtain the following dual statement to Theorem 4.1:

Hmaxε(An|FnRn)VnV1|ρ0i=1nmax|ωH(Ai|RiFi)Vi|ω+O(n), A.1

where the maximisation is over pure states on Ri-1Ei-1E~i-1. This holds for any sequence of isometries Vi for which the maps MVi:Ri-1Ei-1AiRiEi given by MVi(ρ)=TrFiViρVi satisfy the non-signalling condition of Theorem 4.1: for each i, there must exist a map RiCPTP(Ei-1,Ei) such that TrAiRiMVi=RiTrRi-1.

To gain some intuition for the above statement, consider a setting where an information source generates systems A1,,An and F1,,Fn by applying isometries Vi:Si-1AiFiSi to some pure intial state |ρ0S0. We might be interested in compressing the information in An in such a way that given Fn, one can reconstruct An except with some small failure probability ε. Then, the amount of storage needed for the compressed information is given by Hmaxε(An|Fn). To apply Eq. (A.1), for i<n we split the systems Si into RiEi in such a way that the channel MVi defined above satisfies the non-signalling condition, and set En=Sn (so that Rn is trivial). Then Eq. (A.1) gives an upper bound on Hmaxε(An|Fn). Note that this bound depends on how we split the systems Si=RiEi: the non-signalling condition can always be trivially satisfied by choosing Ri to be trivial, but Eq. (A.1) tells us that if we can describe the source in such a way that Ei is relatively small and Ri is relatively large while still satisfying the non-signalling condition, we obtain a tighter bound on the amount of required storage.

From Eq. (A.1) we can also recover the max-entropy version of the original EAT, but without requiring a Markov condition. To facilitate the comparison with [1], we first re-state their theorem with their choice of system labels, but add a bar to every system label to avoid confusion with our notation from before. The max-entropy statement in [1] considers a sequence of channels M¯i:R¯i-1A¯iB¯iR¯i and asserts that under a Markov condition, for any initial state ρR¯0E¯ with a purifying system E¯R¯0:

Hmaxε(A¯n|B¯nE¯)M¯nM¯1(ρR¯0E¯)i=1nmaxωS(R¯i-1R¯)H(A¯i|B¯iR¯)M¯i(ω)+O(n), A.2

where R¯R¯i-1. We want to recover this statement from Eq. (A.1) without any Markov condition. For this, we consider the Stinepring dilations V¯i:R¯i-1R¯iA¯iB¯iF¯i of M¯i. We make the following choice of systems:

Ri=B¯iE¯,Ai=A¯i,Ei=R¯iF¯i,

and choose Fi to be trivial. By tensoring with the identity, we can then extend V¯i to an isometry Vi:Ri-1Ei-1AiRiEi. Then, the maps MVi satisfy the non-signalling condition since Vi acts as identity on Ri-1. Therefore, remembering that Rn=B¯nE¯ and Fn is trivial, we see that Eq. (A.1) implies Eq. (A.2). Note that our derivation did not require any conditions on the channels M¯i we started with, i.e. we have shown Eq. (A.2) holds for any sequence of channels M¯i, not just channels satisfying a Markov or non-signalling condition.

Uhlmann Property for the Rényi Divergence

We establish that for the max-divergence (where α), Uhlmann’s theorem holds.

Proposition B.1

Let σAS(A) and ρARS(AR). Then we have

Dmax(ρAσA)=infσ^AR:σ^A=σADmax(ρARσ^AR). B.1

In addition, if ρAR,ρAidR and σAidR all commute, then for any α[12,), we have

Dα(ρAσA)=infσ^AR:σ^A=σADα(ρARσ^AR). B.2

Proof

We start with Eq. (B.1). The inequality is a direct consequence of the data-processing inequality for Dmax. For the inequality , we use semidefinite programming duality, see e.g., [50]. Observe that we can write 2Dmax(ρAσA) as the following semidefinite program

minτAPos(A),λR{TrτAsubject toρAτAandτA=λσA}.

Using semidefinite programming duality, this is also equal to

maxXAPos(A),YAHerm(A){TrXAρAsubject toidA+YA=XAandTrYAσA=0}. B.3

We can also write a semidefinite program for infσ^AR:σ^A=σA2Dmax(ρARσ^AR). We introduce the variable θAR=λσ^AR and get

minθPos(AR),λR{TrθARsubject toρARθARandθA=λσA}.

Again, by semidefinite programming duality, we get that it is equal to

maxXARPos(AR),YAHerm(A){TrXARρARsubject to(idA+YA)idR=XARandTrYAσA=0}. B.4

Eliminating the variable XAR, we can write this last program as

maxYAHerm(A){Tr(idA+YA)ρAsubject toidA+YAPos(A)andTrYAσA=0},

which is the same as Eq. (B.3). This proves Eq. (B.1). Equation (B.2) follows immediately by choosing σ^AR=σAρA-1ρAR and using the commutation conditions.

However, for α1 and arbitrary σAS(A), ρAES(AE), the Uhlmann property given by Eq. (B.2) does not hold. A concrete example is ρAR=|ψψ|AR with

|ψAR=14|00AR+34|11AR

and σA=13|++|+23|--|. In this case, D2(ρAσA)<0.476 whereas

infσ^AR:σ^A=σAD2(ρARσ^AR)infσ^AR:σ^A=σAD(ρARσ^AR)>0.48.

This computation was performed by numerically solving the semidefinite programs via CVXQUAD [51]. Putting everything together shows that Eq. (B.2) does not hold for α{1,2}:

D(ρAσA)D2(ρAσA)<infσ^AR:σ^A=σAD(ρARσ^AR)infσ^AR:σ^A=σAD2(ρARσ^AR).

Funding

Open access funding provided by Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. TM and RR acknowledge support from the National Centres of Competence in Research (NCCRs) QSIT (funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation under grant number 51NF40-185902) and SwissMAP, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) via project No. FA9550-19-1-0202, the SNSF project No. 200021_188541 and the QuantERA project eDICT. OF acknowledges funding from the European Research Council (ERC Grant AlgoQIP, Agreement No. 851716), from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 QuantERA II Programme (VERIqTAS, Agreement No 101017733) and from a government grant managed by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the Plan France 2030 with the reference ANR-22-PETQ-0009. Part of this work was carried out when DS was with the Institute for Theoretical Physics at ETH Zurich.

Data Availability

No experimental data has been generated as part of this project. The introduction of this work has been published as an extended abstract in the proceedings of FOCS 2022 [49].

Declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors have no Conflict of interest to declare.

Footnotes

1

Since ρ is a product of identical states, all of the terms H(Ai|Ei)ρ are equal, i.e., i=1nH(Ai|Ei)ρ=nH(Ai|Ei)ρ for any i. We write the sum here explicitly to highlight the analogy with the EAT presented below.

2

The EAT from [1] also makes an analogous statement about an upper bound on the max-entropy Hmax. We derive a generalisation of that statement in Appendix A but only focus on Hmin in the introduction and main text since that is the case that is typically relevant for applications.

3

In fact, the EAT is more general in that it allows taking into account observed statistics to restrict the minimization over ωAiBiE, but we restrict ourselves to the simpler case without statistics in this introduction.

4

As usual, the channels Mi act as identity on any additional systems that may be part of the input state, i.e. Mi(ωRi-1Ei-1E~i-1)=(MiidE~i-1)(ωRi-1Ei-1E~i-1) is a state on AiRiEiE~i-1. In particular, the register E~i-1 containing a purification of the input is also part of the output state.

5

Strictly speaking, the EAT as stated in [1] only requires that this Markov property holds for any input state ωi-1 in the image of the previous maps Mi-1M1. The same is true for the non-signalling condition, i.e., one can check that our proof of the generalised EAT still works if the map Ri only satisfies Eq. (1.2) on states in the image of Mi-1M1. To simplify the presentation, we use the stronger condition Eq. (1.2) throughout this paper.

6

We note that the definition of Rényi entropies can be extended to α<1, but we will only need the case α>1.

7

In fact, in order for this single-round quantity to be positive one has to restrict the infimum to input states that allow the non-local game to be won with a certain probability. This requires using the generalised EAT with testing (Sect. 4.2), not Theorem 1.1. We refer to Sect. 5.1 for details.

8

In an EAT-like theorem, the entropy contribution from a particular round i has to be calculated conditioned on the side information revealed in that round because we want to analyse the process round-by-round, not globally. If a future round revealed additional side information, then the total entropy contributed by round i would decrease, but there is no way of accounting for that in an EAT-like theorem that simply sums up single-round contributions. As an extreme case, the last round of the process could reveal all prior outputs as side information, so that the total amount of conditional entropy produced by the process is 0, but single-round entropy contributions could be positive. This demonstrates the need for some condition that enforces that future side information does not reveal information about past outputs. We note that this does not mean that there is no way of proving an entropy lower bound in more general settings: for example, [32] do show a bound on the entropy produced by parallel repeated non-local games, but this requires a global analysis.

9

“Stabilised” refers to the fact that the supremum in Eq. (2.1) maximises over states in S(AA~), not just S(A), i.e. the maximisation includes a purifying system A~. One can also consider non-stabilised channel divergences, where the supremum is only over states in S(A). However, in this paper we only use the stabilised channel divergence.

10

It is well-known [3, Lemma 8] that limα1DαEF=D(EF), but it is unclear whether the same holds for the regularised quantity.

11

In case ρ^An does not have full support, we only take the inverse on the support of ρ^An.

12

The map M in the theorem statement is also implicitly tensored with an identity map on A, but for the definition of M~ we make this explicit to avoid confusion when applying Theorem 3.1.

13

A function f on the convex set P(C) is called affine if it is linear under convex combinations, i.e., for λ[0,1] and p1,p2P(C), λf(p1)+(1-λ)f(p2)=f(λp1+(1-λ)p2). Such functions are also sometimes called convex-linear.

14

The main result of [15] (Theorem 14) does not appear to be sufficient for this. The reason is that the statement made in [15] essentially concerns the randomness produced on average over the question distribution q of the game G. However, choosing a question at random consumes randomness, so to achieve exponential randomness expansion, in Protocol 1 we fix the inputs x,y used for generation rounds. To the best of our knowledge, the results of [15] do not give a bound on the randomness produced in the non-local game for any fixed inputs x,y. If one could prove an analogous statement to [15, Theorem 14] that also certifies randomness on fixed inputs for a large class of games, our Lemma 5.1 would then imply exponential blind randomness expansion for any such game. Alternatively, one can also assume that public (non-blind) randomness is a free resource and use this to choose the inputs for the non-local game. Then, no special inputs x,y are needed in Protocol 1 to “save randomness” and the result of [15] combined with our generalised EAT implies that such a conversion from public to blind randomness is possible for any complete-support game.

15

An error correction scheme is reliable if, except with negligible probability, either Bob’s guess of Alice’s string is correct or the protocol aborts.

16

In Protocol 2, instead of Alice distributing the systems QiQ¯i and Eve gathering side information E by intercepting Q¯i, we can equivalently imagine that Eve first prepares a state ρQnQ¯nE0 and distributes QiQ¯i to Alice and Bob in each round. Then, the choice of Ei intuitively captures the side information available to Eve from the first i rounds: Eve still possesses the systems Qi+1nQ¯i+1n to be distributed in future rounds, has gathered classical information BiB¯iXi, and keeps the static side information E from preparing the initial state.

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Associated Data

This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

Data Availability Statement

No experimental data has been generated as part of this project. The introduction of this work has been published as an extended abstract in the proceedings of FOCS 2022 [49].


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