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. 2025 Jan 7;5(1):e0004051. doi: 10.1371/journal.pgph.0004051

Countries’ progress towards Global Health Security (GHS) increased health systems resilience during the Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) pandemic: A difference-in-difference study of 191 countries

Tyler Y Headley 1, Sooyoung Kim 2, Yesim Tozan 3,*
Editor: Sanjana Mukherjee4
PMCID: PMC11706378  PMID: 39775240

Abstract

Research on health systems resilience during the Coronavirus Disease-2019 pandemic frequently used the Global Health Security Index (GHSI), a composite index scoring countries’ health security and related capabilities. Conflicting results raised questions regarding the validity of the GHSI as a reliable index. This study attempted to better characterize when and to what extent countries’ progress towards Global Health Security (GHS) augments health systems resilience. We used longitudinal data from 191 countries and a difference-in-difference (DiD) causal inference strategy to quantify the effect of countries’ GHS capacity as measured by the GHSI on their coverage rates for essential childhood immunizations, a previously established proxy for health systems resilience. Using a sliding scale of cutoff values with step increments of one, we divided countries into treatment and control groups and determined the lowest GHSI score at which a safeguarding effect was observed. All analyses were adjusted for potential confounders. World Bank governance indicators were employed for robustness tests. While countries with overall GHSI scores of 57 and above prevented declines in childhood immunization coverage rates from 2020–2022 (coef: 0.91; 95% CI: 0.41–1.41), this safeguarding effect was strongest in 2021 (coef: 1.23; 95% CI: 0.05–2.41). Coefficient sizes for overall GHSI scores were smaller compared to several GHSI sub-components, including countries’ environmental risks (coef: 4.28; 95% CI: 2.56–5.99) and emergency preparedness and response planning (coef: 1.82; 95% CI: 0.54–3.11). Our findings indicate that GHS was positively associated with health systems resilience during the pandemic (2020) and the following two years (2021–2022), that GHS may have had the most significant protective effects in 2021 as compared with 2020 and 2022, and that countries’ underlying characteristics, including governance quality, bolstered health systems resilience during the pandemic.

Introduction

Research on health systems resilience during the Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic frequently focused on evaluating the role of Global Health Security (GHS), a global policy framework defined as “the existence of strong and resilient health systems that can prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats” [1]. To do so, a large body of empirical research employed the Global Health Security Index (GHSI), a composite index first released in November 2019 as “the first comprehensive assessment of health security and related capabilities across the 195 countries that make up the States Parties to the International Health Regulations” [2]. The GHSI built on the Global Health Security Agenda and was developed due to concerns that the widely-used WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) scores were subject to self-assessment and selection biases and were unconducive to cross-country comparisons [3,4]. The GHSI comprises six categories spanning 37 indicators—which themselves are composites of 96 sub-indicators—all of which are normalized, neutrally weighted, and aggregated into an overall GHSI score [5]. Prior to the pandemic, GHSI scores were found to be associated with reduced deaths from communicable diseases [3], but some scholars questioned the GHSI’s reliance on open-source information; its emphasis on indicators, such as biosecurity, that may be more relevant to high-income countries; and the overall selection process of the index’s indicators [6,7].

The GHSI was nonetheless widely viewed as a transparent and veracious index and was frequently operationalized in evaluative studies of health systems performance during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, scholars alternatingly found that countries’ progress towards GHS, as measured by GHSI scores, had null [810], mixed [11], detrimental [12], or beneficial [13,14] effects on health systems performance. These findings’ inconsistencies were attributed to factors such as the GHSI’s potential overestimation or underestimation of national health systems’ robustness [9]; its failure to adequately account for contextual, political, public, and environmental factors [15]; or flaws in its aggregation or weighting methods [9]. These inconsistent findings may have also stemmed from methodological issues in the studies themselves and their reliance on COVID-19 outcomes. First, as the pandemic’s impact extended beyond 2020, studies that only examined the relationship between GHSI scores and countries’ health systems performance in 2020 might have overlooked the possible long-term protective effects of GHS capacity [16]. Second, oversimplified data analyses and the misclassification of COVID-19 deaths may have contributed to findings suggesting an inverse correlation between GHSI scores and health systems performance during the pandemic [17]. Notably, higher GHSI scores were found to be positively associated with higher completeness rates in COVID-19 infection and mortality data, which may have skewed the results [18].

In response to these contradictory results, the developers of the GHSI encouraged researchers to “examine scores at more granular levels… and consider more nuanced outcomes,” including examining the relationships between health systems performance and GHSI categories rather than the overall GHSI score alone [2]. This approach opened the door for increasingly multifaceted analyses aimed at elucidating the individual drivers of health systems resilience, which we have defined for the purposes of this paper as the functioning of health systems throughout long-shocks like a pandemic [19]. However, breaking a composite index into its sub-components risks leaving out crucial systems-level dynamics and interactions [20], and may suggest that the GHSI does not necessarily measure GHS capacity as a single, unified concept.

To better understand the varying results and more accurately assess the effect of countries’ progress towards GHS on health systems resilience during the pandemic, we used longitudinal data and a difference-in-difference causal inference strategy to quantify the effect of GHSI scores on coverage rates for essential childhood immunization. These rates serve as a well-established proxy for health systems resilience, as immunization is considered an essential health service in all health care settings. Declines in coverage rates following a shock are thus considered indicative of lower levels of resilience [14,21]. Given the significance of GHS as a global policy framework, understanding its effect—if any—on health systems performance during the pandemic is critical for policymakers.

Methods

This analysis employed longitudinal data from 191 countries and a standard quasi-experimental difference-in-difference causal inference design to quantify the effect of GHSI scores on countries’ essential childhood immunization coverage rates [14,21]. There is a global consensus that the provision of key childhood vaccines constitutes an essential health service [22]. As such, this data is subject to a standardized surveillance and review process and has been consistently reported by countries to the WHO and UNICEF for decades [23]. We chose not to use mortality and morbidity rates due to COVID-19 because of concerns about their validity and bias, which compromise comparability across countries [24]. Further, these rates may be confounded by factors such as population age structures and underlying morbidities/co-morbidities [25], which limits the ability to infer causality between countries’ policies and the resilience of their health systems.

Data

Our dependent variable—national essential childhood immunization coverage estimates—was obtained from the WHO/UNICEF Joint Estimates of National Immunization Coverage [26]. This dataset includes annual vaccination coverage estimates for 14 essential childhood vaccines across 195 countries from 1997 to 2022. For our analysis, we used data from 2015 to 2022 that met the required parallel pre-trend assumption (S2 Fig) [14]. In accordance with established methodological guidelines on data imbalance and availability [14,21], we excluded the yellow fever vaccine (YFV) from our analysis, as it is not widely administered across all countries, leading to data imbalance [21]. We also excluded the first dose of the inactivated polio vaccine (IPV-1) due to the unavailability of IPV-1 data across all years under observation [21]. Following these exclusions, our analysis included 12 different childhood vaccines: Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG); the first and third dose of diphtheria, tetanus toxoid, and pertussis containing vaccine (DTP1, DTP3); the birth dose of hepatitis B vaccine (HEPB-3); the third dose of hepatitis B containing vaccine (HEPBB); the third dose of Haemophilus influenzae type B containing vaccine (HIB3); the first and second doses of measles containing vaccine (MCV1, MCV2); the third dose of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV3); the third dose of polio containing vaccine (POL3); the second or third dose of rotavirus vaccine (ROTAC); and the first dose of rubella containing vaccine (RCV1). Most of these vaccines were for infants for whom coverage was estimated during the first year of life, but some vaccines, such as MCV2, were for older children with coverage rates estimated during the second year of life. A list of recommended ages for estimating vaccination coverage is available in the WHO/UNICEF Joint Estimates of National Immunization Coverage methodology [26]. A number of countries—Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Slovenia—had missing data on BCG vaccinations for 2022 or did not report data due to variations in national vaccination requirements. These missing observations accounted for just 0.07% of our total sample.

Our primary exposure variable was the 2019 GHSI scores for each country, released in 2021 following a methodological update for the second iteration of the index [5]. This dataset consists of six GHSI categories—prevention, detection and reporting, rapid response, health system, compliance with international norms, and risk environment—measured by a combination of 37 indicators, which are themselves composites of 96 sub-indicators (S1 Table). These sub-indicators, indicators, and categories are subsequently normalized, equally weighted, and then aggregated into an overall GHSI score [5]. The GHSI and its six categories range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the highest level of preparedness capacity, both overall and in each individual category. We re-computed the overall GHSI score and its first category (countries’ ability to prevent the emergence or release of pathogens) after removing the vaccination coverage indicator and re-averaging the remaining indicators with equal weights. This adjustment ensured that our dependent and independent variables were not drawn from the same data.

Our dataset also included the World Bank’s income level data (2019), which we used to categorize countries into high, upper-middle, lower-middle, or low income groups, as well as the WHO’s regional classifications [27,28]. For robustness checks, we repeated our analyses using the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (2019), which include indices for governance effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption [29]. These indicators ranged from −2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 representing the greatest progress towards the theme of each index (e.g., effective governance). Countries with significant missing data, specifically the Cook Islands, Niue, the State of Palestine, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, were excluded from the analysis. As a result, our sample included data from 191 countries.

Statistical analysis

We employed the doubly-robust DiD estimation methods proposed by Sant’Anna and Zhao [30] to obtain the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of higher scores of 36 GHSI indicators, six GHSI categories, and the overall GHSI in safeguarding essential childhood immunization coverage during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020) and the following two years (2021–2022). This DiD method offered two primary advantages: first, it allowed us to systematically test our parallel trend assumptions; and second, in contrast to other DiD estimators, Sant’Anna and Zhao’s estimators are less sensitive to model misspecifications. Our outcome model is enumerated in Equation 1, wherein the binary Treated variable represents countries’ assigned group based on their GHSI scores (for instance, based on the below criteria, we assigned countries in our main model to high and low GHSI groups based on a cutoff score of 57). We included time (year) and country fixed effects (as represented respectively by γt and δi), θ is the coefficient for the interaction term Treatedi×Postt, and Xit is a vector of covariates including region and income group. The doubly-robust DiD estimator works by combining the outcome model with a treatment model (handled by the interaction term), adjusting for covariates and time-varying factors to provide a consistent estimate of the treatment effect θ. The doubly-robust DiD estimator combines two components: inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW), which is estimated from a propensity score model, and outcome model adjustment. This approach allows for appropriate adjustment of covariates and time-varying factors, yielding a consistent estimate of the treatment effect. By including the same covariates in both the propensity score model and the outcome model, this method protects against model misspecification and enhances the robustness of the treatment effect estimate.

Coverageit=α+γt+δi+θTreatedi×Postt+Xitβ+ϵit (Equation 1)

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic was used to define the pre-post period, wherein the years prior to 2020 were defined as pre-pandemic and 2020–2022 were defined as post-pandemic. For the overall GHSI score, its six categories, and its 36 indices, we divided countries into treatment and control groups by testing cutoff values on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 with step increments of one. This process allowed us to determine the minimum GHSI score at which the parallel pre-trend assumption was met and a positive protective effect was observed, indicating countries’ progress towards that policy goal was sufficient to yield a significant safeguarding effect [14,21]. For robustness, we tested the effect of countries’ progress along the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (2019) on countries’ essential childhood immunization coverage rates to help validate our governance-related findings. While the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness indicator (one of the three World Bank indicators we tested) generally measures similar thematic areas as the GHSI’s government effectiveness (6.1.1) and political and security risk (6.1) categories, we assessed that the differences were large enough to be meaningful, with correlations of 0.91 and 0.74, respectively. We included countries’ income group as per the World Bank classification and countries’ geographical region as per the WHO regional classification as covariates in our analyses. All analyses were conducted using R software (Version 4.0.3). The reporting of this study conformed with the STROBE guidelines (S1 Checklist). Our curated dataset used in this study is publicly available at https://github.com/tyh255/GHSI_2024.

Patient and public involvement

Patients and/or the public were not involved in the design, or conduct, or reporting, or dissemination plans of this research.

Results

Descriptive analysis

Fig 1 and Table 1 show countries included in the analysis and their summary statistics stratified by GHSI scores, respectively. Additional details about the dataset can be found in S1 Text. The minimum treatment cutoff value at which a significant protective effect was first observed was 57 (89th percentile) for the overall GHSI score; 67 (97th percentile) for the prevention of the emergence or release of pathogens; 55 (96th percentile) for the early detection and reporting of epidemics of potential international control; 65 (94th percentile) for the rapid response and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic; 55 (89th percentile) for sufficient and robust health systems to treat the sick and protect health workers; 69 (95th percentile) for commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adherence to global norms; and 70 (82nd percentile) for countries’ overall risk environment and vulnerabilities to biological threats (Fig 3). Vaccination rates were generally lower from 2020–2022 compared to 2015–2019. As shown in Fig 2A , this decline was particularly pronounced for countries with GHSI scores below 57, where the average coverage dropped from 86.3% prior to the pandemic (2015–2019) to 83.7% in 2020, 82.2% in 2021, and 83.1% in 2022. In contrast, countries with GHSI scores of 57 and above experienced a smaller decline, with average coverage dropping from 92.9% prior to the pandemic (2015–2019) to 92.8% in 2020, 92.2% in 2021, and 92.4% in 2022.

Fig 1. Map of countries with high Global Health Security capacity (GHSI≥ 57).

Fig 1

Countries which had an overall GHSI score of or above 57 included Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States. A full list of all countries is included in S2 Table. The public domain base map is available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CIA_WorldFactBook-Political_world.svg and is derived from the CIA World Factbook. This map is for illustrative purposes only.

Table 1. Childhood immunization and summary statistics by GHSI scores (2019).

Countries with GHSI ≥ 57 (N = 22) Countries with GHSI < 57 (N = 169) Total (N = 191)
GHSI Mean (SD) 64.6 (5.0) 34.4 (10.2) 37.8 (13.6)
World Bank Income Group (N, %)
 High 19 (31.7) 41 (68.3) 60
 Upper-Middle 3 (5.6) 51 (94.4) 54
 Lower-Middle 0 (0.0) 48 (100.0) 48
 Low 0 (0.0) 29 (100.0) 29
WHO Region (N, %)
 Americas 2 (5.7) 33 (94.3) 35
 Europe 16 (30.2) 37 (69.8) 53
 Western Pacific 3 (12.0) 22 (88.0) 25
 Eastern Mediterranean 0 (0.0) 21 (100.0) 21
 Southeast Asia 1 (10.0) 9 (90.0) 10
 Africa 0 (0.0) 47 (100.0) 47
Immunization Coverage Rates (Mean, SD)
 2015–2019 92.9 (8.7) 86.3 (15.8) 87.0 (15.3)
 2020 92.8 (8.4) 83.7 (15.4) 84.7 (15.0)
 2021 92.2 (8.5) 82.2 (17.1) 83.3 (16.7)
 2022 92.4 (8.7) 83.1 (16.7) 84.1 (16.3)
 2015–2022 92.8 (8.6) 85.0 (16.1) 85.9 (15.7)

Fig 3. Difference-in-difference model results for overall GHSI and GHSI categories (2020–2022).

Fig 3

DiD models were only run when there were pre-treatment periods to test. Trendlines and their standard errors (in light blue) were calculated based on local polynomial regression fitting.

Fig 2. Average childhood immunization coverage rates by treatment (GHSI≥ 57) and control (GHSI < 57) groups and overall effect of treatment (GHSI ≥ 57) on preventing declines in childhood immunization coverage rates with 95% confidence intervals.

Fig 2

Overall GHSI and sub-component analyses

Table 2 presents the results of the DiD models analyzing the relationship between countries’ overall GHSI and individual GHSI category scores and childhood immunization coverage rates. From 2020 to 2022, the relationship between overall GHSI scores and coverage rates was positive and statistically significant (average coefficient: 0.91; 95% CI: 0.41–1.41). In other words, we found that countries with an overall GHSI score of 57 and above prevented an average 0.91 percentage point decline in vaccination coverage each year from 2020 to 2022. As shown in Fig 2B, this positive coefficient size was greater in 2021 (average coefficient: 1.23; 95% CI: 0.05–2.41) as compared to 2020 (average coefficient: 0.74; 95% CI: 0.28–1.20) and to 2022 (average coefficient: 0.77; 95% CI: 0.06–1.46). As presented in Table 2, the effect sizes varied across the six GHSI categories, with the strongest results associated with the “prevention of the emergence or release of pathogens” category (average coefficient: 1.86; 95% CI: 1.11–2.60) and the “rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic” category (average coefficient: 1.30; 95% CI: 0.83–1.78).

Table 2. Difference-in-difference model results for overall GHSI and GHSI categories (2020–2022).

Average DiD effect size (2020–2022) DiD effect size for 2020 DiD effect size for 2021 DiD effect size for 2022 p-value for parallel trend Cutoff value (percentile)
Overall GHSI Scores (95% CI) 0.91*
(0.41, 1.41)
0.74*
(0.28, 1.20)
1.23*
(0.05, 2.41)
0.76*
(0.06, 1.46)
0.11 57
(0.89)
1: Prevention of the Emergence or Release of Pathogens 1.86*
(1.05, 2.66)
1.45*
(0.61, 2.30)
2.74*
(0.77, 3.72)
1.37*
(0.21, 2.52)
0.33 67
(0.97)
2: Early Detection and Reporting for Epidemics of Potential International Concern 0.82*
(0.24, 1.40)
1.02*
(0.46, 1.57)
1.17
(−0.03, 2.37)
0.28
(−0.53, 1.09)
0.53 55
(0.96)
3: Rapid Response to and Mitigation of the Spread of an Epidemic 1.30*
(0.83, 1.78)
0.84*
(0.34, 1.34)
2.04*
(1.06, 3.03)
1.02*
(0.34, 1.69)
0.28 65
(0.94)
4: Sufficient and Robust Health System to Treat the Sick and Protect Health Workers 0.42
(−0.12, 0.96)
−0.09
(−0.74, 0.56)
0.98*
(0.03, 1.99)
0.37
(−0.44, 1.17)
0.11 55
(0.89)
5: Commitments to Improving National Capacity, Financing Plans to Address Gaps, and Adhering to Global Norms 0.66*
(0.02, 1.30)
0.63
(−0.03, 1.29)
0.93
(−0.12, 1.97)
0.43
(−0.41, 1.26)
0.05 69
(0.95)
6: Overall Risk Environment and Country Vulnerability to Biological Threats 1.04*
(0.44, 1.64)
1.07*
(0.41, 1.72)
0.96
(−0.08, 1.99)
1.10*
(0.28, 1.93)
0.05 70
(0.82)

* indicates statistical significance (95% CI).

We found that across most GHSI categories, the results in 2021 were stronger than in 2020 or 2022. The exception was the sixth GHSI category—countries’ overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats—where the coefficient size in 2021 (average coefficient: 0.96; 95% CI: −0.08–1.99) was smaller compared to 2020 (average coefficient: 1.07; 95% CI: 0.41–1.72) and to 2022 (average coefficient: 1.10; 95% CI: 0.28–1.93). This category was also notable for having the lowest treatment cutoff percentile (82nd percentile) at which a significant protective effect was observed.

We also observed a general trend, as shown in Fig 3, where the DiD effect sizes became more significant as the treatment cutoff increased. For instance, at the cutoff value of 65 (95th percentile), the relationship between overall GHSI scores and childhood immunization rates was positive and statistically significant (average coefficient: 0.97; 95% CI: 0.37–1.57) from 2020–2022. However, at the extreme end of the scale (cutoff: 74; 99th percentile), the effect size was significantly higher (average coefficient: 3.14; 95% CI: 0.62–5.66). This trend was most pronounced for the fourth category, which assesses the sufficiency and robustness of health systems to treat the sick and protect health workers. The average coefficient from 2020–2022 was 0.42 (95% CI: −0.12–0.96) at the 89th percentile, but at the 99th percentile (cutoff: 68), the coefficient increased to 2.39 (95% CI: 1.01–3.78). However, this trend of increasing DiD effect sizes with higher overall GHSI and GHSI category scores was not observed for the “rapid response to and mitigation of epidemics” category where higher values failed to meet the parallel pre-trend assumption and even showed negative effects. Similarly, the “risk environment and vulnerability” category exhibited a modest and yet significant positive effect at lower cutoffs, but this effect quickly plateaued at higher cutoffs.

GHSI indicator analyses

We next analyzed the potential protective effects of the 36 GHSI indicators on essential childhood immunization coverage during the pandemic. The most significant results are reported in Table 3, with full results available in S3–S8 Figs and S3S16 Tables. From 2020 to 2022, we found that the most significant indicators were “environmental risks” (average coefficient: 4.28; 95% CI: 2.56–5.99), “biosecurity” (average coefficient: 1.87; 95% CI: 0.83–2.91), and “emergency preparedness and response” (average coefficient: 1.82; 95% CI: 0.54–3.11). Consistent with previous findings, the DiD effect sizes in 2021 were generally larger than in 2020 or 2022. However, there were to two notable exceptions. First, the effects of countries’ supply chains for health systems and healthcare workers showed a stronger DiD effect in 2022 (average coefficient: 1.74; 95% CI: 0.84–2.64) compared to 2021 (average coefficient: 1.29; 95% CI: 0.08–2.49) and to 2020 (average coefficient: −0.45; 95% CI: −1.87–0.98). Second, the DiD effect for countries’ public health vulnerabilities was greater in 2022 (average coefficient: 2.44; 95% CI: 0.88–3.99) than in 2021 (average coefficient: 1.58; 95% CI: 0.06–3.09) and 2020 (average coefficient: 0.51; 95% CI: −0.39–1.42).

Table 3. Difference-in-difference model results for significant GHSI Indicators and World Bank Indices (2020–2022).

Category-Subcategory Average DiD effect size (2020–2022) DiD effect size for 2020 DiD effect size for 2021 DiD effect size for 2022 p-value for parallel trend Cutoff value (percentile)
GHSI 1.3: Biosecurity 1.87*
(0.83, 2.91)
1.25*
(0.18, 2.31)
3.25*
(1.87, 4.62)
1.12
(−0.51, 2.74)
0.44 77
(0.98)
GHSI 3.1: Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning 1.82*
(0.54, 3.11)
1.45*
(0.06, 2.84)
2.94*
(0.11, 5.77)
1.08*
(0.12, 2.05)
0.06 84
(0.98)
GHSI 4.1 Health capacity in clinics, hospitals, and community care centers 1.14*
(0.68, 1.59)
0.79*
(0.25, 1.35)
1.59*
(0.79, 2.39)
1.02*
(0.24, 1.81)
0.31 54
(0.96)
GHSI 4.2: Supply chain for health system and healthcare workers 0.86*
(0.09, 1.63)
−0.45
(−1.87, 0.98)
1.29*
(0.08, 2.49)
1.74*
(0.84, 2.64)
0.33 73
(0.98)
GHSI 5.3: International Commitments 1.27*
(0.58, 1.97)
0.42
(−0.47, 1.31)
1.79*
(0.48, 3.09)
1.61*
(0.66, 2.56)
0.32 97
(0.88)
GHSI 6.2: Socioeconomic Resilience 0.61*
(0.05, 1.16)
0.48*
(0.09, 0.86)
1.48*
(0.31, 2.66)
−0.13
(−1.01, 0.74)
0.21 94
(0.94)
GHSI 6.3: Infrastructure Adequacy 0.79*
(0.23, 1.36)
0.64*
(0.05, 1.22)
0.89
(−0.34, 2.13)
0.86*
(0.15, 1.57)
0.12 76
(0.87)
GHSI 6.4: Environmental Risks 4.28*
(2.56, 5.99)
3.04*
(1.53, 4.54)
6.84*
(4.65, 9.03)
2.96
(−1.41, 7.33)
0.19 72
(0.96)
GHSI 6.5: Public Health Vulnerabilities 1.51*
(0.61, 2.41)
0.51
(−0.39, 1.42)
1.58*
(0.06, 3.09)
2.44*
(0.88, 3.99)
0.43 51
(0.38)
World Bank: Governance Effectiveness 1.04*
(0.52, 1.55)
0.54*
(0.10, 0.97)
1.62*
(0.65, 2.59)
0.95*
(0.19, 1.70)
0.09 1.7
(0.94)
World Bank: Rule of Law 1.08*
(0.49, 1.66)
0.80*
(0.36, 1.24)
1.17
(−0.46, 2.79)
1.26*
(0.49, 2.02)
0.07 1.3
(0.88)

* indicates statistical significance (95% CI). World Bank Index Range: (−2.5–2.5). The Control of Corruption variable did not satisfy the parallel pre-trend assumption (i.e., the treatment and control groups did not have parallel vaccination rates prior to 2020) necessary for a difference-in-difference test, and therefore was not included in the results.

Robustness analysis

Given that our GHSI indicator findings suggested that countries’ underlying characteristics, such as infrastructure adequacy and governance quality, were significant determinants of health systems resilience, we tested alternate indicators from the World Bank to confirm our findings (Table 3). From 2020–2022, both countries’ governance effectiveness (average coefficient: 1.04; 95% CI: 0.52–1.55) and rule of law (average coefficient: 1.08; 95% CI: 0.49–1.66) were both statistically significant and carried similar substantive significance. In contrast, countries’ control of corruption did not satisfy the parallel pre-trend assumption. The DiD effect size for governance effectiveness was greatest in 2021 (average coefficient: 1.62; 95% CI: 0.65–2.59) whereas the DiD effect size for rule of law was largest in 2022 (average coefficient: 1.26; 95% CI: 0.49–2.02).

Discussion

Our analyses showed that GHS played a significant role in safeguarding health systems resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic. We found evidence suggesting that countries with high GHS capacity (GHSI ≥ 57) safeguarded against an average annual 0.91% decline in essential childhood immunization coverage rates from 2020 to 2022. Specifically, countries with less progress towards GHS (GHSI < 57) saw larger declines in immunization rates during the pandemic, averaging a 4.1 percentage point decline in coverage rates in 2021 compared to 2015–2019. In contrast, countries with high GHS capacity experienced a smaller decline, with an average drop of 0.7 percentage points from their pre-pandemic immunization rates. We also found that the GHSI’s categories and sub-categories often had more significant safeguarding effects than the overall GHSI score. However, the relatively high cutoff values for all categories and sub-categories, as shown in Tables 2 and 3, suggest that countries must make substantial progress in these areas to reap the protective benefits during a health shock. Some of the most significant sub-components included “environmental risks,” “biosecurity,” and “emergency preparedness and response planning.” The large effect size of environmental risks is particularly noteworthy. Environmental risk is a composite measure, incorporating factors such as urbanization (greater urbanization leads to lower scores), land use (more deforestation leads to lower scores), and natural disaster risk (higher disaster risks leads to lower scores due to potential negative risk to economic circumstances). The large effect size may suggest a possible mechanism: evidence indicates that more urbanized countries experienced higher COVID-19 incidence rates [31]. This higher burden of disease may have, in turn, negatively affected health systems resilience. The mechanism behind the relationship between emergency preparedness and health systems resilience appears more straightforward. Countries that had prepared for national emergencies were comparatively better equipped to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, they could allocate fewer resources to emergency responses and more resources to other essential health systems functions, such as vaccination programs, than countries that were less prepared.

This study is among the first to examine the relationship between GHSI and health systems resilience from 2020 to 2022. We identified a general increase in coefficient sizes from 2020 to 2021, followed by a decline from 2021 to 2022. This temporal variation supports the hypothesis that countries’ progress towards GHS increases resilience to health shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic. As the burden of disease peaked in 2021, GHS’ protective effects on childhood immunization coverage, a proxy for overall health systems resilience, was also at its highest. One possible mechanism is that progress towards GHS strengthens health system infrastructure and capacity, enabling critical health system functions to be maintained during a health shock [32]. Another possibility is that countries with more progress towards GHS may have had more capacity, especially circa 2021, to adopt to the COVID-19 emergency measures and then reallocate resources to sustain routine health services later in the year. In contrast, countries with less progress towards GHS struggled to ramp up and then scale down their COVID-19 programs [32]. Despite a 0.8 percentage point increase in the average immunization coverage rate from 2021 to 2022, the average coverage rate of 84.1% in 2022 remains significantly lower than the global average of 87.0% from 2015–2019 (t = −7.34; p-value < 0.001). Further research and data on subsequent years is needed to more assess whether this general decline in effect sizes persists and, if so, to understand the underlying causes.

When examining the relationship between GHSI sub-components and essential childhood immunization coverage, we generally found that the most substantively and statistically significant indicators were often proxies for countries’ underlying characteristics (like the share of population in urban settings) and governance quality. The causal mechanism for the positive effect of governance quality on health systems resilience is likely straightforward: countries with effective governance are better able to appropriately allocate resources, manage logistical challenges, and adapt to changing circumstances. These characteristics enable them to efficiently deploy resources to maintain both COVID-19 emergency measures and non-COVID health services [32]. To confirm this effect, we tested the World Bank’s governance indicators, finding that both governance effectiveness and the rule of law were positively associated with safeguarding against declines in essential childhood immunization coverage. One unexpected finding from this robustness analysis was that while the effect of governance effectiveness on health systems resilience was more significant in 2021 than 2022, similar to the general trend with the overall GHSI scores, the inverse was true for the rule of law, where the effect size was both larger and more significant in 2022 than in 2021 or 2020. This may suggest that the rule of law is positively related to continued adherence to essential service delivery standards by government and frontline workers [33], which could have contributed to larger effect sizes after 2020 as countries stabilized after the initial COVID-19 shock. However, further research is needed to fully understand the effects of governance effectiveness and the rule of law on health systems resilience, both during and after the pandemic.

The primary strength of this study lies in its application of best practices for evaluating the relationship between GHS and health systems resilience, building on previous methodological considerations in the literature. Specifically, we used longitudinal data, employed a robust causal inference methodology, and disaggregated the GHSI into its sub-components. Our findings align with more recent research suggesting that progress towards GHS positively impacts health systems resilience during the pandemic [14,16,21]. While our overall findings were similar to those of these studies, slight differences in effect sizes were likely due to the use of different statistical methods and cutoffs. For instance, Kim (2023) defined high GHSI scores as those in the 80th percentile (a score of 51) and found that countries with high scores prevented a 2.02% reduction in immunization coverage in 2021, with no significant effect in 2020 [14]. In contrast, this study used a slightly higher cutoff value of 57, determined by a more robust methodology, and found that countries with high GHSI scores prevented a 0.74% decline in 2020, a 1.23% decline in 2021, and a 0.76% decline in 2022. Our strong findings at the sub-category level further corroborate previous suggestions that disaggregating the GHSI enhances analyses of health systems resilience during the pandemic [2] and that the relationship between GHSI and health systems resilience is most pronounced over a multi-year time horizon [16]. As noted in the literature, measuring a multi-dimensional concept like GHS is challenging due to methodological issues related to weighting and aggregation processes and the inherently subjective procedure of creating composite indices [20]. While disaggregating GHSI into its sub-components helps address concerns related to index weighting and aggregation by clarifying the impact of individual factors, this approach may limit the ability to evaluate GHS as a unified policy framework.

This study is not without limitations. First, our results suggest that there are intricate feedback effects at play among components of this complex system, as evidenced by the significant and time-dependent variations in GHSI indicator coefficients. Further research using advanced analytical methodologies is needed to unravel these dynamics, which are important to understand the long-term impacts of decreased childhood immunization coverage rates and identify the key drivers of health systems resilience during public health crises. Second, this study used a single indicator—childhood immunization coverage rates—as a proxy for health systems resilience during the pandemic. While this choice offers advantages over using direct measures like COVID-19 mortality rates (as was noted earlier), future research should incorporate additional proxy indicators to enhance robustness. Third, this study focused on the years from 2020–2022 as its observation period. Future studies should include longitudinal data beyond 2022 to test whether the general decline in effect sizes from 2021 to 2022 persists into 2023 and beyond to improve our understanding of the trends and their implications.

Supporting information

S1 Checklist. STROBE statement—checklist of items that should be included in reports of cross-sectional studies.

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s001.docx (18.9KB, docx)
S1 Text. Description of the dataset.

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s002.docx (13KB, docx)
S1 Table. GHSI categories and indicators.

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s003.docx (15.8KB, docx)
S2 Table. GHSI countries grouped by recomputed GHSI scores.

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s004.docx (14.5KB, docx)
S3 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for overall GHSI and GHSI categories by cutoff values (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s005.docx (24KB, docx)
S4 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for overall GHSI and GHSI categories which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at varying cutoff intervals of five (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s006.docx (18.6KB, docx)
S5 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 1 (Prevention) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s007.docx (20.8KB, docx)
S6 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 1 (Prevention) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s008.docx (18.4KB, docx)
S7 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 2 (Early Detection) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s009.docx (25.9KB, docx)
S8 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 2 (Early Detection) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s010.docx (19.3KB, docx)
S9 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 3 (Rapid Response) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s011.docx (24.9KB, docx)
S10 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 3 (Rapid Response) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s012.docx (19.5KB, docx)
S11 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 4 (Health System) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s013.docx (26.3KB, docx)
S12 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 4 (Health System) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s014.docx (23.3KB, docx)
S13 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 5 (Compliance with International Norms) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s015.docx (21KB, docx)
S14 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 5 (Compliance with International Norms) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s016.docx (18.3KB, docx)
S15 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 6 (Risk Environment) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s017.docx (18.9KB, docx)
S16 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 6 (Risk Environment) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s018.docx (15.9KB, docx)
S17 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for World Bank Governance Indexes (Effective Governance, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s019.docx (19.9KB, docx)
S18 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for World Bank Governance Index (Effective Governance, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s020.docx (14.2KB, docx)
S1 Fig. Distribution of original and recomputed overall Global Health Security Index (2019) scores.

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s021.docx (131.4KB, docx)
S2 Fig. Parallel pre-trends between treatment and control groups for overall GHSI scores and GHSI categories (2015–2019).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s022.docx (166.8KB, docx)
S3 Fig. Distribution of original and recomputed category 1 (Prevention) scores, 2019.

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s023.docx (98KB, docx)
S4 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 1 (Prevention) (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s024.docx (237.8KB, docx)
S5 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 2 (Detection and Reporting) (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s025.docx (264.6KB, docx)
S6 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 3 (Rapid Response) (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s026.docx (257.9KB, docx)
S7 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 4 (Health System) (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s027.docx (259.9KB, docx)
S8 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 5 (Compliance with International Norms) (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s028.docx (241.5KB, docx)
S9 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 6 (Risk Environment) (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s029.docx (248.2KB, docx)
S10 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for World Bank Governance Indexes (Effective Governance, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) (2020–2022).

(DOCX)

pgph.0004051.s030.docx (185.9KB, docx)

Data Availability

Our curated dataset used in this study is publicly available at https://github.com/tyh255/GHSI_2024.

Funding Statement

The authors received no specific funding for this work.

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PLOS Glob Public Health. doi: 10.1371/journal.pgph.0004051.r001

Decision Letter 0

Sanjana Mukherjee

Transfer Alert

This paper was transferred from another journal. As a result, its full editorial history (including decision letters, peer reviews and author responses) may not be present.

20 Sep 2024

PGPH-D-24-01417

Countries’ Progress Towards Global Health Security (GHS) Increased Health Systems Resilience During the Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) Pandemic: A Difference-in-Difference Study of 191 Countries

PLOS Global Public Health

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Reviewer #1: The manuscript “Countries’ Progress Towards Global Health Security Increased Health Systems Resilience During the Coronavirus Disease-19 Pandemic: A Difference-in-Difference Study of 191 Countries” leverages longitudinal data from around the world to explore the association between the Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and health systems resilience during times of crises—in this case the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only is this an incredibly important issue we need to know more about—the risk of public health emergencies continues and lessons from the last should be used for future policies—but their strategy of breaking down the index into its subcategories provides insight into areas ripe for future research.

The authors’ strategy of separating countries into treatment and control groups via one-step increments of their GHSI scores (overall and subcategories) and testing their association via a difference-in-difference model on childhood immunization coverage rates to show outcomes on health systems resilience is well thought out and posits a few very interesting concepts. One, breaking down complex indices is a viable approach to gain more specific understanding of a measure’s meaning. Two, health systems resilience’s positive association to environmental risks being more than double than the next closest subcategory (biosecurity) and having a much larger magnitude than the other components of the GHSI deserves further scrutiny by future researches and consideration by policymakers.

MAIN ISSUES

- Needs further clarification in the discussion section on how the results should be interpreted and how they align with current literature.

- Lack of possible mechanisms for the sub-component results undercuts their importance and is in detriment of the manuscript as a whole.

ISSUES

• Line 111: Data on childhood vaccination rates should be until 2022, if not you should clarify given that your results on the outcome are until 2022.

• Line 126: Clarify is data is missing or if the recommendation is not universal (Portugal only vaccinates BCG to children at risk, Austria it hasn’t been mandatory in a while, etc.)

• Lines 156-7: Consider briefly stating what the possible groups are (even if its explained later) since at this point it isn’t clear.

• Line 195: The table needs at a minimum clarification of the fact that both row and column wise percentages are being presented. Consider simplifying, while the n is important to know, the total column for the Income Group and Region are not that informative.

• Lines 260-1: Note provides insufficient information on what Control of Corruption means.

• Lines 286-9: Unclear, do you mean that less urban area reduce COVID deaths? Less deforestation and urbanization result in a higher environmental GHS and this is protective which is reflected by lower decline in vaccination? What are the potential mechanisms? Urbanization has more health care provider availability but a higher concentration of people during the COVID-19 pandemic led to an easier spread, so what is the mechanism here? Is this in line with current findings in the literature?

• Add if the study conforms to any relevant guidelines (CONSORT, MIAME, QUORUM, STROBE).

Reviewer #2: Thank you for the opportunity to review this interesting paper. The topic of the paper is critical as building health systems that are resilient to major shocks can prevent avoidable morbidity and mortality. In this study, the authors assess the relationship between preparedness and vaccine coverage as a proxy for resilience. They found that more prepared countries were able to improve vaccine coverage during the pandemic. While the paper is well-written, I think there should be several improvements to improve the clarity of the manuscript. The following are my comments:

Background

Lines 80 – 87: I think it is critical to define health system resilience in this section or the next. This is important point because there are many definitions of resilience in the literature and it would be important to describe resilience to the reader. It may also be helpful to briefly include what other studies have found to modulate resilience across countries and to briefly speculate why/how preparedness may also impact a countries’ resilience.

Lines 93: It would be helpful to briefly describe why childhood immunization coverage rates is an adequate proxy/measure of resilience.

Lines 75-78: The following a paper may also be a helpful citation of undercounting of COVID impacts impacting analyses: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38879515/

Methods

Lines 110-111: For readers who may be unfamiliar, it would be helpful to know what age group the vaccine coverage estimates represent. For example, are the vaccine coverage estimates for children under 1 or under 15?

Line 112: In Figure S2, please add a caption/footnote describing what each blue line represents. I’m somewhat confused why there are two lines, and what average coverage rate means.

Line 152-155: Can you describe how the doubly-robust method was used here? I’m not an expert in DiD methods but from my understanding, you use a doubly-robust method to protect from model misspecification when you have a propensity logistic model and outcome model. But you don’t have a propensity score model here so why use a doubly-robust method? Please justify the use of this method and the benefit of the doubly-robust property in this instance?

Equation: Again, I’m inexperienced in the DiD method but it was my understanding that interaction terms between time and the intervention are needed in the outcome model. But there are no interaction terms in the equation, I assume this is needed to get the year-specific results in Table 3.

Lines 168-169: Why did the authorship team include the government indicators as a robustness check? Many of these indicators, especially the government effectiveness indicator, are already included in the GHS Index. So how is this additional analysis a robustness check? Please justify.

Results

Table 1: I believe this would be better communicated as a map showing what group each country belongs. Reading through the table may be too burdensome for readers.

The results section could be improved by describing trends in childhood vaccination rates and how rates were impacted during COVID. Perhaps included temporal trends of vaccinations may be helpful to improve the section.

Lines 201-202: It would be helpful to include an interpretation of your main effect size here rather than just providing the coefficient.

Many DiD studies generally present a time trend plot of the outcome by treatment group to show the effect of the intervention. I think this figure is needed to show readers the impact of preparedness on resilience.

Discussion

Please describe the mechanisms by which preparedness may improve resilience? Is that more prepared countries have pre-existing plans for maintaining essential health services during the pandemic? Perhaps they have a strong healthcare workforce and resources? Or perhaps they have fewer lockdowns? I think more discussion on why preparedness promotes vaccine services is needed to improve the impact of this paper.

More discussion on why the effect size is strongest in 2021 can further improve the discussion.

Minor: Can the authors briefly comment on the very high cutoff values for treatment effects in the analysis in the discussion? This implications for many countries because they would have substantial improvements to make

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Reviewer #1: No

Reviewer #2: No

**********

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PLOS Glob Public Health. doi: 10.1371/journal.pgph.0004051.r003

Decision Letter 1

Sanjana Mukherjee

18 Nov 2024

PGPH-D-24-01417R1

Countries’ Progress Towards Global Health Security (GHS) Increased Health Systems Resilience During the Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) Pandemic: A Difference-in-Difference Study of 191 Countries

PLOS Global Public Health

Dear Dr. Tozan,

Thank you for submitting your manuscript to PLOS Global Public Health. After careful consideration, we feel that it has merit but does not fully meet PLOS Global Public Health’s publication criteria as it currently stands. Therefore, we invite you to submit a revised version of the manuscript that addresses the points raised during the review process.

Please submit your revised manuscript by Dec 18 2024 11:59PM. If you will need more time than this to complete your revisions, please reply to this message or contact the journal office at globalpubhealth@plos.org. When you're ready to submit your revision, log on to https://www.editorialmanager.com/pgph/ and select the 'Submissions Needing Revision' folder to locate your manuscript file.

Please include the following items when submitting your revised manuscript:

  • A rebuttal letter that responds to each point raised by the editor and reviewer(s). You should upload this letter as a separate file labeled 'Response to Reviewers'.

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  • An unmarked version of your revised paper without tracked changes. You should upload this as a separate file labeled 'Manuscript'.

Guidelines for resubmitting your figure files are available below the reviewer comments at the end of this letter.

We look forward to receiving your revised manuscript.

Kind regards,

Sanjana Mukherjee, Ph.D., M.Sc.

Guest Editor

PLOS Global Public Health

Journal Requirements:

Please review your reference list to ensure that it is complete and correct. If you have cited papers that have been retracted, please include the rationale for doing so in the manuscript text, or remove these references and replace them with relevant current references. Any changes to the reference list should be mentioned in the rebuttal letter that accompanies your revised manuscript. If you need to cite a retracted article, indicate the article’s retracted status in the References list and also include a citation and full reference for the retraction notice.

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[Note: HTML markup is below. Please do not edit.]

Reviewers' comments:

Reviewer's Responses to Questions

Comments to the Author

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Reviewer #1: All comments have been addressed

Reviewer #2: All comments have been addressed

**********

2. Does this manuscript meet PLOS Global Public Health’s publication criteria ? Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions? The manuscript must describe methodologically and ethically rigorous research with conclusions that are appropriately drawn based on the data presented.

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

3. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

4. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available (please refer to the Data Availability Statement at the start of the manuscript PDF file)?

The PLOS Data policy requires authors to make all data underlying the findings described in their manuscript fully available without restriction, with rare exception. The data should be provided as part of the manuscript or its supporting information, or deposited to a public repository. For example, in addition to summary statistics, the data points behind means, medians and variance measures should be available. If there are restrictions on publicly sharing data—e.g. participant privacy or use of data from a third party—those must be specified.

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

5. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

PLOS Global Public Health does not copyedit accepted manuscripts, so the language in submitted articles must be clear, correct, and unambiguous. Any typographical or grammatical errors should be corrected at revision, so please note any specific errors here.

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

6. Review Comments to the Author

Please use the space provided to explain your answers to the questions above. You may also include additional comments for the author, including concerns about dual publication, research ethics, or publication ethics. (Please upload your review as an attachment if it exceeds 20,000 characters)

Reviewer #1: (No Response)

Reviewer #2: I thank the authors for their diligent edits to the manuscript. The authors responded to my comments with edits to the text and additional analyses. The paper elucidates on how health system resilience can be improved in the coming years to avert preventable morbidity and mortality from shocks. I just have the following small comments:

Lines 174-177: In reviewing the Anna and Zhao (2020) citation and the corresponding code in github, it looks like the authors did combine the propensity score weighting methods and outcome model adjustment during modeling. To better reflect this, I recommend re-writing this line with the following:

“The doubly-robust DiD estimator works by combining inverse probability of treatment weighting, estimated from a propensity score model, and outcome model adjustment to appropriately adjust for covariates and time-varying factors and generate a consistent estimate of the treatment effect. The inclusion of the same covariates in the propensity score model and outcome model protects from model misspecification.”

This language better communicates what was actually done in the study and the benefits of the DR DiD approach.

Line 244: Instead of using “significant” to describe the difference in coefficients, consider saying that the coefficient or effect size was larger compared to in 2020 or 2022.

**********

7. PLOS authors have the option to publish the peer review history of their article (what does this mean? ). If published, this will include your full peer review and any attached files.

Do you want your identity to be public for this peer review? If you choose “no”, your identity will remain anonymous but your review may still be made public.

For information about this choice, including consent withdrawal, please see our Privacy Policy .

Reviewer #1: No

Reviewer #2: No

**********

[NOTE: If reviewer comments were submitted as an attachment file, they will be attached to this email and accessible via the submission site. Please log into your account, locate the manuscript record, and check for the action link "View Attachments". If this link does not appear, there are no attachment files.]

While revising your submission, please upload your figure files to the Preflight Analysis and Conversion Engine (PACE) digital diagnostic tool, https://pacev2.apexcovantage.com/. PACE helps ensure that figures meet PLOS requirements. To use PACE, you must first register as a user. Registration is free. Then, login and navigate to the UPLOAD tab, where you will find detailed instructions on how to use the tool. If you encounter any issues or have any questions when using PACE, please email PLOS at figures@plos.org. Please note that Supporting Information files do not need this step.

PLOS Glob Public Health. doi: 10.1371/journal.pgph.0004051.r005

Decision Letter 2

Sanjana Mukherjee

25 Nov 2024

Countries’ Progress Towards Global Health Security (GHS) Increased Health Systems Resilience During the Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) Pandemic: A Difference-in-Difference Study of 191 Countries

PGPH-D-24-01417R2

Dear Dr Tozan,

We are pleased to inform you that your manuscript 'Countries’ Progress Towards Global Health Security (GHS) Increased Health Systems Resilience During the Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) Pandemic: A Difference-in-Difference Study of 191 Countries' has been provisionally accepted for publication in PLOS Global Public Health.

Before your manuscript can be formally accepted you will need to complete some formatting changes, which you will receive in a follow up email. A member of our team will be in touch with a set of requests.

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Thank you again for supporting Open Access publishing; we are looking forward to publishing your work in PLOS Global Public Health.

Best regards,

Sanjana Mukherjee, Ph.D., M.Sc.

Guest Editor

PLOS Global Public Health

***********************************************************

Reviewer Comments (if any, and for reference):

Associated Data

    This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

    Supplementary Materials

    S1 Checklist. STROBE statement—checklist of items that should be included in reports of cross-sectional studies.

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s001.docx (18.9KB, docx)
    S1 Text. Description of the dataset.

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s002.docx (13KB, docx)
    S1 Table. GHSI categories and indicators.

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s003.docx (15.8KB, docx)
    S2 Table. GHSI countries grouped by recomputed GHSI scores.

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s004.docx (14.5KB, docx)
    S3 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for overall GHSI and GHSI categories by cutoff values (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s005.docx (24KB, docx)
    S4 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for overall GHSI and GHSI categories which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at varying cutoff intervals of five (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s006.docx (18.6KB, docx)
    S5 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 1 (Prevention) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s007.docx (20.8KB, docx)
    S6 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 1 (Prevention) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s008.docx (18.4KB, docx)
    S7 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 2 (Early Detection) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s009.docx (25.9KB, docx)
    S8 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 2 (Early Detection) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s010.docx (19.3KB, docx)
    S9 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 3 (Rapid Response) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s011.docx (24.9KB, docx)
    S10 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 3 (Rapid Response) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s012.docx (19.5KB, docx)
    S11 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 4 (Health System) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s013.docx (26.3KB, docx)
    S12 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 4 (Health System) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s014.docx (23.3KB, docx)
    S13 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 5 (Compliance with International Norms) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s015.docx (21KB, docx)
    S14 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 5 (Compliance with International Norms) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s016.docx (18.3KB, docx)
    S15 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 6 (Risk Environment) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s017.docx (18.9KB, docx)
    S16 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for GHSI category 6 (Risk Environment) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s018.docx (15.9KB, docx)
    S17 Table. Difference-in-difference model results for World Bank Governance Indexes (Effective Governance, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) by cutoff values (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s019.docx (19.9KB, docx)
    S18 Table. Difference-in-difference model results by year for World Bank Governance Index (Effective Governance, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) scores which fulfilled the parallel pre-trend assumption at cutoff intervals varying by five (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s020.docx (14.2KB, docx)
    S1 Fig. Distribution of original and recomputed overall Global Health Security Index (2019) scores.

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s021.docx (131.4KB, docx)
    S2 Fig. Parallel pre-trends between treatment and control groups for overall GHSI scores and GHSI categories (2015–2019).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s022.docx (166.8KB, docx)
    S3 Fig. Distribution of original and recomputed category 1 (Prevention) scores, 2019.

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s023.docx (98KB, docx)
    S4 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 1 (Prevention) (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s024.docx (237.8KB, docx)
    S5 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 2 (Detection and Reporting) (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s025.docx (264.6KB, docx)
    S6 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 3 (Rapid Response) (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s026.docx (257.9KB, docx)
    S7 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 4 (Health System) (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s027.docx (259.9KB, docx)
    S8 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 5 (Compliance with International Norms) (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s028.docx (241.5KB, docx)
    S9 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for GHSI category 6 (Risk Environment) (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s029.docx (248.2KB, docx)
    S10 Fig. Difference-in-difference model results for World Bank Governance Indexes (Effective Governance, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) (2020–2022).

    (DOCX)

    pgph.0004051.s030.docx (185.9KB, docx)
    Attachment

    Submitted filename: GHSI Response to Reviewers.docx

    pgph.0004051.s031.docx (34.7KB, docx)
    Attachment

    Submitted filename: Rebuttal letter_Nov 20_2024.docx

    pgph.0004051.s032.docx (22.4KB, docx)

    Data Availability Statement

    Our curated dataset used in this study is publicly available at https://github.com/tyh255/GHSI_2024.


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