Regulation and regulators play a critical role in assuring the quality and safety of care, and undertake a range of influential activities. This includes setting appropriate standards of care; assessing and monitoring care actually being delivered within healthcare systems, often through intensive data collection and inspection; intervening when standards of care are suboptimal, with options ranging from supportive guidance to legal sanction; and, perhaps most fundamentally, determining whether organisations and practitioners can provide care in the first place, through licensing and registration. Healthcare organisations and practitioners are heavily scrutinised by an array of these external regulatory actors and activities. In the English National Health Service, for instance, around 126 different oversight bodies have some role in assessing, monitoring and regulating patient safety. 1 Despite this – and indeed, likely in part due to this supervisory complexity 2 – disastrous care failures still happen with distressing regularity,3,4 with healthcare regulators often identified as having missed or misunderstood the emerging signs of impending failure. 5 Moreover, regulators themselves can struggle to establish regulatory strategies, practices and cultures that enable effective regulation of increasingly complex and pressured health services,6,7 leading to regulatory crises that threaten the legitimacy of, and trust in, the regulatory system itself.8,9
This situation poses an urgent set of questions. How can regulators, and the regulatory work that they do, be organised in ways that: enable close and attentive monitoring of the complex activities of delivering care; support constructive, honest but appropriately challenging interactions with healthcare organisations and practitioners; and facilitate ongoing improvement and learning – both within healthcare organisations and regulators themselves? These are fundamental regulatory challenges, but they are similar to the safety and quality challenges faced within healthcare organisations themselves, and by organisations in many other safety-critical sectors. 10 They are also questions that have been engaged with by decades of organisational and social scientific research.
One of the most productive arenas of organisational research to engage with these questions has, over the past 40 years, explored the characteristics, systems and strategies that underpin organisational high-reliability in challenging settings, such as aircraft carrier flight decks.11–14 These insights have been translated into studies of high-reliability organising in healthcare,15,16 and now inform the organising principles of many leading approaches to quality and safety, including the US Joint Commission. 17 One useful synthesis of this work identifies a set of organisational and cultural characteristics that can underpin highly-reliable performance,18,19 including a widespread preoccupation with failure, a heightened sensitivity to monitoring operational activities, a reluctance to simplify in the face of complexity, an enduring cultivation of and deference to expertise and a deep commitment to organisational resilience (Box 1).
Box 1.
Key characteristics of high-reliability organising.
Organisational and cultural characteristics of high-reliability organising |
The study of high-reliability organisations was initiated in the 1980s and aimed to understand how organisations that operated in challenging, unforgiving and dynamic environments were able to maintain greater-than-expected levels of reliability.11,13 These studies focused on settings such as aircraft carrier flight decks, 12 nuclear power plants 14 and air traffic control facilities. 23 Research into the organisational processes and cultural characteristics that underpin high-reliability organising has developed over the past four decades, and a popular and widely applied framework developed by Weick and Sutcliffe18,19 synthesises a set of foundational characteristics that underpin high-reliability organising and has been popularised and applied in different settings, including healthcare. Some key aspects of these organisational and cultural characteristics can be summarised as follows: |
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These characteristics of organisational high-reliability have been derived from – and are particularly relevant to – organisations that directly deliver and manage complex services, like hospitals or airlines. But they also resonate with the challenges faced by organisations that are responsible for regulating the delivery of complex services, too. Regulators may not be involved in the direct delivery of care services, but regulatory work involves engaging with, understanding, monitoring and intervening in these complex systems. And regulators are also, of course, organisations whose primary purpose is the systematic and reliable identification, analysis and management of risk. 20 Accordingly, models of organisational high-reliability offer a rich and expansive framework for exploring the creation of regulatory high-reliability, and provide insights into the organising principles that may enable healthcare regulators to more effectively – and more reliably – govern the safety and quality of healthcare systems.
Towards principles of regulatory high-reliability
The core characteristics and practices of high-reliability organising developed by Weick and Sutcliffe18,19 can be elaborated and reoriented to reflect the supervisory challenges and oversight objectives of regulatory work, providing an initial set of organising principles for regulatory high-reliability (Table 1). These principles illustrate the many ways that healthcare regulators might better support the attentive monitoring, constructive challenge and systemic improvement that is required to assure safety and quality across complex healthcare systems.
Table 1.
Principles and illustrative strategies and practices of regulatory high-reliability.
Principles, strategies and practices of regulatory high-reliability | |
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Principles of regulatory high-reliability | Illustrative strategies and practices |
1. Preoccupation with risk |
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2. Sensitivity to practice |
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3. Engaging with diversity |
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4. Enabling of expertise |
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5. Commitment to learning |
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Preoccupation with risk
First, regulators need to develop a rigorous and sustained preoccupation with risk that is founded on a clear articulation and meticulous analysis of the adverse outcomes that regulators – and those they regulate – are seeking to avoid. High-reliability organisations develop sophisticated shared understandings 13 of the organisational outcomes they are continuously working to avoid – and, importantly, the precursors and conditions that can lead to those outcomes, 18 and the risk controls that defend against them.10,14,21 The terminology of risk is common in healthcare regulation, but is rarely translated into the structured and systematic exploration of specific risk outcomes, precursor events and risk controls that is a hallmark of high-reliability organising. Healthcare regulators should define and focus on the risk outcomes that matter in each arena of care they regulate, and ensure that the people and organisations they regulate can effectively and consistently identify, understand, communicate, monitor and manage those risks.
Sensitivity to practice
Second, regulators need the capacity for close examination of and deep sensitivity to practice and the practical realities of care in the settings they regulate. A hallmark of high-reliability organising is an intensive effort to pay close and relentless attention to the organisational front line, where the work gets done, 18 and avoid the broad abstractions, generalisations and summaries that can obscure those practical realities.19,21,22 Regulators are often awash with data about those they regulate, but the more abstracted and summative this information, the less is revealed about the practical challenges, risks and capabilities in different areas of care. Diagnosing problems and supporting improvements necessarily requires nuanced and detailed understanding of how care is being organised and delivered in practice. Healthcare regulators should privilege data collection and analysis methods that provide rich, granular and diagnostic insight into the practical realities of those they regulate.
Engaging with diversity
Third, regulators need to remain open to multiple perspectives and actively engage with diversity of experiences and evidence, to fully understand the quality and safety of care. A key characteristic of high-reliability organising is a reluctance to rely on simplified or reductive explanations of complex phenomena, 18 and a commitment to seek out and engage with dissenting views, diverse experiences and divergent perspectives that may illuminate otherwise hidden issues.13,14,21 Organising and delivering care is an enormously complex endeavour, and regulators need to maintain an equally complex and multivocal narrative of care quality that acknowledges and integrates diverse experiences and data, including the qualitative insights from peripheral voices and professional intuitions that can contain the early – though often weak and fragile – signals of emerging risks. Healthcare regulators should seek out and synthesise diverse experiences and evidence by creating cultures that value dissent and challenge, spaces that accommodate a plurality of experience and evidence, and methods that encourage curiosity, openness and inquisitiveness.
Enabling of expertise
Fourth, regulators need to ensure that they draw extensively on and are consistently enabling of expertise and the array of specialist knowledge that is required to thoroughly understand healthcare systems and practices. One of the distinct markers of high-reliability organising is a widespread but nuanced deference to expertise, 19 in which people with the greatest practical expertise and experience in an area are recognised, sought out and listened to – rather than simply deferring to those in positions of greatest authority.14,22,23 A huge range of knowledge and expertise is needed to rigorously understand the quality and safety of care. This expertise comes in many different forms spanning, for instance, from highly specialist clinical insight, to lived experience and expertise of patients, to expertise in safety management and quality improvement. Healthcare regulators should recognise and nurture all these forms of knowledge and expertise, and become adept at flexibly organising, integrating and applying relevant expertise to each regulatory problem being addressed.
Commitment to learning
And fifth, regulators need to enact and demonstrate a deep commitment to learning, supporting both the learning efforts of those they regulate and learning within their own regulatory activities. High-reliability organisations commit considerable time and effort to orchestrating adaptive and resilient responses to unexpected events 19 and surprising disruptions.18,22,24 Learning from moments of disruption and change – which encompasses both adverse incidents and innovative improvements – has long been central to healthcare quality and safety.5,15 Regulators occupy a special place in healthcare, having both a wide view across the system and deep insights into specific arenas of practice, providing a unique vantage point to both survey and steer the current landscape of learning opportunities, activities and challenges. Healthcare regulators should develop the organisational capabilities to encourage and support learning through open, constructive and challenging conversation; continuously synthesise and share the insights that the unique regulatory perspective affords; and enable learning in their own activities through ongoing reflection on regulatory practice and iterative tests of change.
Designing and organising regulatory high-reliability
Regulation and regulators have critical roles to play in assuring the quality and safety of healthcare, and in maintaining public confidence and trust. Regulators occupy a uniquely privileged position, combining a wide-angle view across the system with deeply granular insights into specific places and practices. Our increasingly complex, innovative and pressured healthcare systems need regulators with sophisticated and reliable capabilities to attentively monitor, constructively challenge and systemically improve the quality and safety of care. To achieve this – and to minimise the risks of future regulatory crises and failures – much more attention needs to be paid to how regulators themselves are organised, how regulatory activities are structured, and how regulatory cultures and practices are shaped and supported. The principles of regulatory high-reliability described here offer some well-established organisational foundations on which regulators might build.
Footnotes
ORCID iD: Carl Macrae https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3198-7808
Declarations
Competing Interests
CM holds an advisory position at the Care Quality Commission, England’s regulator of health and social care. All views expressed are solely those of the author.
Funding
None declared.
Ethics approval
Commentary article: no data collected or analysed. Ethics approval not applicable.
Guarantor
CM.
Contributorship
Sole author.
Provenance
Not commissioned; peer reviewed by Lorelei Jones and Bill Kirkup.
Acknowledgements
Views expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the beliefs or opinions of any organisations the author is affiliated with.
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