Migration Management and Responsibility Sharing with Afghanistan Through EU Funding?

Abstract

This paper analyses EU migration funding aimed at supporting responsibility sharing towards Afghanistan. The analysis combines desk research with original empirical qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews from various actors. The findings reveal a top-down design for EU migration funding programmes towards Afghanistan, with very few Afghan actors involved to a limited extent in project design. In addition, EU funding for national and regional projects pursues migration management objectives, thus prioritising EU interests over the needs of Afghan migrants and the context of Afghanistan. The results also illustrate that funding is essential but insufficient for enhancing responsibility sharing.

Introduction

During its nearly two-decade presence in Afghanistan (2001–2021), the EU provided more than EUR 4 billion in development assistance to promote peace, security, and prosperity in the country (European Commission, ^n.d.). The EU’s total aid volume (disbursed or committed) positioned Afghanistan as the largest recipient of EU development assistance worldwide (European Commission, ^n.d.; European Commission, ²⁰²⁰). EU development aid towards Afghanistan was mobilised from the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (European Commission, ^n.d.).

In addition, Afghanistan has been a major source of forced migrants to Europe over the last four decades in several waves (e.g. see Meshkovska et al., ²⁰¹⁹; Nasrat, ²⁰²²). For example, Afghans were the second largest group of asylum seekers in Europe in 2015 (EASO, ²⁰¹⁵) and 2016 (EASO, ²⁰¹⁶). To address migration issues and challenges, the EU and Afghanistan signed the Joint Way Forward (JWF)—a non-binding agreement—in 2016.

The JWF demonstrates the commitment of the EU and the former Afghan government to cooperate in preventing irregular migration and in the return of failed Afghan asylum seekers (after all legal procedures) (see European External Action Service [EEAS], n.d.). The JWF and its successor, the Joint Declaration on Migration Cooperation (JDMC), became ineffective after the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan in August 2021, as the international community, including the EU, does not recognise the Taliban regime. However, with the JWF/JDMC agreement, Afghanistan remains a crucial case study of governance through funding, with responsibility sharing at the core of the EU-Afghan cooperation on migration. Responsibility sharing refers to financial and non-financial support for the protection of refugees and displaced persons from developed to developing countries (see the next section). Funding has become a viable instrument to attain this objective, and conditionality acts as a mechanism to steer enforcement (ECRE, ²⁰²⁰). In doing so, the EU tried to introduce a new norm in Afghanistan based on the EU experience. Studies on Europeanisation beyond the EU, however, show that such an approach is effective if the design of EU-funded migration cooperation programmes meets certain conditions (e.g. see Szymańska et al., ²⁰²⁰; Spijkerboer, ²⁰²²; Tsourdi et al., ²⁰²³; see also the next section). The conditions include the involvement of local actors and the inclusion of their agendas in cooperation programmes (refer to the section on findings).

Studies of EU-Afghanistan migration relations have focused on Afghan migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Europe (e.g. Schuster, ²⁰¹¹; Dimitriadi, ²⁰¹⁷) as well as return from Europe (e.g. Van Houte et al., ²⁰¹⁵; Majidi, ²⁰²¹). Notably, Quie and Hakimi (2020) focus on the “EU and the politics of migration management in Afghanistan”. To date, however, no study has focused on Afghanistan through a funding lens. The present study has two objectives: to assess the extent to which the design and implementation of EU-funded migration cooperation programmes and projects in Afghanistan support “shared” responsibility, and to analyse how the goal of responsibility sharing has influenced these programmes and projects. It answers the following questions: to what extent do the design and implementation of EU-funded migration cooperation programmes and projects in Afghanistan support a shared responsibility? And how has responsibility sharing as a goal influenced migration-related programmes and projects in Afghanistan?

This paper argues that EU-funded migration-related programmes do not involve local actors in the overarching programme design and only marginally in project design; programmes generally fail to reflect Afghan priorities or interests; and there is no shared understanding of how responsibility should be shared between the EU and Afghanistan.

This paper makes an important empirical contribution by uncovering the role that EU-funded programmes and projects in Afghanistan play in steering migration policy objectives. In addition, it advances theoretical debates on the notion of responsibility sharing by reflecting on the conditions enabling or constraining this goal in EU-third countries’ cooperation. The second section of the paper analyses responsibility sharing beyond the EU. It also fleshes out the framework of Europeanisation beyond Europe. The third section presents JWF/JDMC and EU funding for Afghanistan. The fourth section presents and analyses the research methodology. The fifth section develops the argument through empirical findings and discusses them according to the main research questions. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research directions.

Responsibility sharing beyond the EU

Funding plays an important role as a tool for the EU’s cooperation with third countries in migration (den Hertog, ^2016a). Since the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015/2016, funding has gained heightened importance in the EU’s external migration policy (European Commission, 2018). The EU and its member states have invested billions of euros in migration management projects around the world. Notable examples of this evolving approach to foreign assistance are seen in initiatives like the EUTF (Norman & Micinski, 2023) and the EU Türkiye deal (Demirbaş & Miliou, 2024). These and other agreements with non-EU countries (see Niemann & Zaun, ²⁰²³) show that the EU uses financial assistance as a form of responsibility sharing.

With notably increasing forced displacement (UNHCR, ²⁰²³) and its uneven distribution, shared responsibility for safeguarding refugees and displaced persons is deemed crucial (Martin et al., 2019). However, a globally binding legal agreement is lacking to ensure equitable sharing of these responsibilities (Martin et al., 2019). The 1951 Convention does not establish an obligation for the sharing of responsibility in protecting refugees (United Nations, 1951). The Global Compact on Refugees and its Global Refugee Forum have created a rare opening for a global responsibility-sharing mechanism focused on access (see The 2018 Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration, ²⁰¹⁸). Nevertheless, it is also not legally binding but depends on voluntary contributions. Consequently, responsibility sharing remains elusive within the global refugee protection regime (Fonteyne, 1983; Tsourdi et al., ²⁰²³).

Responsibility sharing is complex in practice due to its association with concepts of international cooperation, solidarity, and burden sharing (see Türk, ²⁰¹⁶; Betts et al., ²⁰¹⁷). International cooperation is the broadest of these concepts (UNHCR, ²⁰¹¹; Betts et al., ²⁰¹⁷), while “burden sharing” may diminish refugees’ socio-economic contribution by portraying them as a burden to host societies. Therefore, responsibility sharing is preferred as it is both more neutral and more specific (Betts et al., 2017).

There is no consensus on the definition of responsibility sharing in the context of refugee protection. Its scope is also contested, and the available definitions do not encompass Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returnees, despite their important protection needs (UNHCR, ²⁰¹⁶). For example, Hathaway and Neve (1997) describe responsibility sharing as encompassing all forms of a state’s contribution to protect, assist, and find solutions for refugees, indicating a broader understanding. Conversely, Mathew and Harley (2016) define responsibility sharing as the arrangements made among states for refugees’ protection and durable solutions, which involve sharing financial and non-financial resources such as information, technology, and specialised personnel. Additionally, Betts et al. (2017) characterise responsibility sharing as the “contribution of states towards supporting refugees who are on the territory of another state through the redistribution of money or people” (p. 22).

Responsibility sharing is pursued mainly through two methods: resettlement of refugees and financial and other contributions by wealthier countries to low- and middle-income countries hosting refugees and/or internally displaced persons (see also Dowd & McAdam, ²⁰¹⁷; Martin et al., ²⁰¹⁹). Hurwitz (2009) indicated that providing financial assistance from developed to developing countries is considered the “most convenient and common” method of addressing the responsibility to protect refugees (p. 146). This observation is particularly relevant within the framework of the EU’s external migration policy, which places significant emphasis on the concept of responsibility-sharing and positions EU funds as a viable instrument towards this objective (Niemann & Zaun, 2023).

For example, in Asia, Jordan signed a compact with the EU in 2016, which has been identified as a model for global refugee protection (see Vaagland, ²⁰²¹). The compact attracted both praise and criticism. It was praised for being innovative in turning the refugee crisis into a development opportunity but criticised for having donor-driven elements, for example prioritising the inclusion of Syrian refugees in the formal labour market over non-Syrian migrants and refugees due to the increasing movement of Syrians towards Europe (Almasri, 2021). Additionally, in Africa, particularly in Ghana and Senegal, the EU funding has contributed to local officials’ capacity building but has also increased the dependency of bureaucracies in Ghana and Senegal on the EU (Roos et al., 2024).

In the EU context, funding third countries to protect refugees is considered a form of external solidarity (European Parliament, 2015). Nonetheless, despite cooperation with third countries being framed as a crisis response and lifesaving, scholars have criticised it as essentially serving to protect the EU from external threats (Karageorgiou & Noll, 2022).

Furthermore, responsibility sharing through funding is not without challenges. For example, the EU uses funding as a tool to incentivise developing countries’ cooperation in achieving its own migration agenda (see also Vives, ²⁰¹⁷). Thus, a responsibility-sharing challenge for the EU is ensuring that financial incentives are used effectively in migration management to not lead to human rights abuses and violations or undermine international protection standards. The governments of Libya and Tunisia have prevented migrants and asylum seekers from reaching the EU in exchange for EU funding. These practices have resulted in human rights violations of migrants and asylum seekers in these countries (Casajuana & Pintus, 2023). Additionally, Davitti and La Chimia (2017) argued that by using funding as a tool for cooperation with third countries in migration management, the EU and its member states failed to extend their international protection to migrants who need it, reflecting a shortfall in compliance with the EU’s legal obligations.

Responsibility sharing through funding can be effective under several conditions. Funding programmes must adhere to international and EU humanitarian responsibilities for better migration management (Szymańska et al., 2020). Additionally, the design, administration, and implementation of EU migration-related projects should be coherent and transparent, as they involve various actors at the EU level (den Hertog, ^2016a). This is important for effective coordination and accountability and prevents fragmentation in the funding landscape (den Hertog, ^2016a). It is also crucial that EU funding for migration management in non-EU countries is not limited to a few preferred partners, such as the UN agencies and European-based development agencies, often referred to as “Europe’s ‘clients’” (Spijkerboer, 2022).

Including local actors and NGOs is also important in enhancing the effectiveness of projects, as they have local knowledge (Rahmani, 2012). Additionally, the funding should provide mutual benefits for both the EU and recipient countries (Tsourdi et al., 2023). Such a model, for example, is the EU-Jordan compact (Vaagland, 2021). Alongside financial support, the EU should offer capacity-building assistance to enhance recipient countries’ migration management capabilities without leading to human rights abuses (Norman & Micinski, 2023). Finally, funding should focus on long-term and sustainable projects; rather than short-term, donor-driven initiatives (Tsourdi et al., 2023). Sustainable and needs-based projects—such as those in health, education, and employment generation for refugees and migrants—contribute to lasting solutions (United Nations, 2018).

The literature analysed above shows that responsibility sharing is being integrated into migration management agreements with third countries (including Afghanistan) and is enforced through funding. This process means that the EU, based on its understanding of and experience with responsibility sharing, is exporting this norm to third countries. Such an approach resonates with the literature on Europeanisation beyond the EU that studies under which mechanisms Europeanisation is effective and what the domestic impact of exporting EU norms to third countries is (see Schimmelfennig, ²⁰¹⁵). This article, therefore, examines the process of integrating responsibility sharing into EU-Afghanistan cooperation through this analytical lens. Among the possible mechanisms of Europeanisation (see Schimmelfennig, ²⁰¹⁵), conditionality is one of interest in this case.

Conditionality is a fundamental mechanism for the EU’s impacts beyond Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2015; Roos et al., ²⁰²⁴). It refers to linking EU funds and other (additional) resources, such as strengthening institutional capacities, to third countries to support them in fulfilling EU conditions (Schimmelfennig, 2015). Conditionality is a key aspect of the externalisation process, allowing the EU to incentivise or pressure third countries to align with EU interests (Lavenex & Uçarer, 2004; Cortinovis & Conte, ²⁰¹⁸).

For conditionality to be effective, it is essential that third countries be actively involved and share ownership of both the process and its underlying principles (e.g. Tsourdi et al., ²⁰²³). Without this involvement, the mechanism may fail, potentially leading to unintended consequences such as reversed conditionality for the EU and aid dispersion or ineffectiveness for the partner country (Tittel-Mosser, 2018; Roos et al., ²⁰²⁴).

Financial incentives are key in promoting and implementing “Europeanisation beyond Europe” for migration management (see the next section). For instance, between 2005 and 2011, nearly 300 migration-related projects were funded through various EU financial instruments, totalling EUR 800 million to third countries (European Commission, 2011).

EU funding to Afghanistan before and after the JWF

Based on the Migration Partnership Framework (MPF), the EU signed the JWF with the former Afghan government in 2016 (EEAS, ^n.d.). The agreement aimed to facilitate the deportation of failed Afghan asylum seekers from EU member states. It was signed during the Brussels donor conference in 2016 without the European Parliament’s involvement or a transparent reporting mechanism for its implementation (ECRE, ²⁰²⁰). This agreement, among others, was also criticised for being more beneficial for the EU than for Afghanistan (ECRE, ²⁰²⁰). A former Afghan government official called the JWF a “poisoned cup” that the Afghan government was forced to drink in exchange for development aid (Shea, 2017).

Despite its criticisms and weaknesses, the JWF was replaced by the Joint Declaration on Migration Cooperation (JDMC) in 2021 (European Union External Action [EUEA], 2021). Regarding themes, the JWF and its successor JDMC address similar areas, such as facilitating the return process, providing reintegration assistance, and enhancing information and awareness-raising efforts in Afghanistan. They also emphasise the need to combat human smuggling and trafficking while establishing a joint working group to ensure ongoing dialogue and collaboration on these issues (EEAS, ^n.d.; EUEA, ²⁰²¹). However, the JDMC provides a broader framework for cooperation with indefinite duration compared to its predecessor (EEAS, ^n.d.; EUEA, ²⁰²¹). Additionally, the JDMC made it easier for EU member states to deport failed Afghan asylum seekers to Afghanistan (for more details, see ECRE, ²⁰²¹). Notably, the JDMC became ineffective after the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, as they are not recognised as a legitimate government by the international community, including the EU.

The EU had two funding streams for Afghanistan. The first was development cooperation aid, and the second was the humanitarian aid stream under the Global Decision within the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020 (Widya, 2023). Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021, the EU suspended its development assistance to the de facto government in Afghanistan. Before this event, EU development aid towards Afghanistan was mobilised from the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (European Commission, ^n.d.). Under the 2014–2020 MIP for Afghanistan, EUR 1.4 billion was allocated for four key priority sectors: agriculture and rural development, health, policing and the rule of law, and democratisation and accountability (EEAS, ²⁰¹⁴). In addition, the EU provided almost EUR 365 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan via the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (Woollard et al., 2022).

Migration was not a priority in the MIP 2014–2020 for Afghanistan. However, following the 2015 migration crisis, particularly after the JWF agreement, the EU funded several migration-related projects in Afghanistan, primarily under the DCI. A notable example is the three-year TAALIM (TVET Actions for Alternative Livelihood to Irregular Migrants)¹ project that began in 2017 is a notable example. In the same year, the RADA (Reintegration Assistance and Development in Afghanistan) project (EUR 50 million),² implemented by the IOM, started operations in Afghanistan. In 2018, the regional project on Integrated Border Management in the Silk Routes countries funded the operation of a Migrant Resource Centre³ in Afghanistan. Additionally, the EU funded the Comprehensive Migration Policy (CMP) for Afghanistan with the technical assistance of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) between 2017 and 2019 (Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation [MoRR], ^2019a).

Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative methodology with a single case study research design. A case study generates thorough information and a multifaceted understanding of complex issues in everyday or real-life contexts (Crowe et al., 2011). This study focuses on Afghanistan as a case from the signing of the JWF in 2016 to August 2021, when the Taliban regained control of Kabul, and the international community ceased direct involvement in the country.

For this study, I collected both primary and secondary data. Secondary data included policy documents (e.g. JWF and CMP), reports, and grey literature. After reviewing the secondary data, I collected primary data through semi-structured interviews. The interviews aimed to obtain insightful information from various actors to achieve the objectives of this study.

While 25 experts were invited to participate in this study, only 12 ultimately participated due to non-response or unavailability. However, some experts who declined participation were subsequently asked to recommend alternative colleagues for interviews. Interviews were conducted with EU institutions (3), civil society organisations (4), international organisations (3), and former senior Afghan government officials (2) (see Appendix, Table A1). I approached the interviewees using my personal and institutional networks, as well as snowball sampling during 2022–2023. Among the interviewees, five were female, and seven were male. Most interviews (ten) were conducted online due to participant preference and safety concerns arising from the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, which prevented fieldwork. Eight interviews were conducted in English and four in the interviewees’ native languages (Dari or Pashto). Interview durations ranged from 30 to 60 minutes. Ten interviewees consented to audio recording, while two preferred note-taking.

The interviews were semi-structured, and the questions depended on the participants’ perspectives. Nevertheless, to address the article’s research questions, some of the key guiding questions included: Which actors are involved in the design of funding programmes? Has EU funding for migration enhanced responsibility sharing in Afghanistan? What are the main priorities for the EU when designing migration funding towards Afghanistan? What are the main priorities of the Afghan government in relation to migration?

Participants provided informed consent, acknowledging the study’s purpose, methods, and voluntary participation. The personal data of interviewees were pseudonymised. Participants were assured of strict confidentiality, with data access limited to the researcher and his supervisor. All interview data were securely stored on SurfDrive at Maastricht University for data protection.⁴

As an Afghan national who lived in Afghanistan for approximately seven years before moving to Europe in 2015, I had first-hand knowledge of the country’s political landscape. This experience enabled me to assess potential risks to the safety and well-being of the study participants who were based in Afghanistan or had evacuated/emigrated from there.

For the analysis, I first transcribed the interviews conducted in English and simultaneously translated and transcribed those conducted in Pashto and Dari. Then, thematic analysis was employed to analyse the data, utilising a blend of inductive and deductive coding approaches (see Graebner et al., ²⁰¹²; Linneberg & Korsgaard, ²⁰¹⁹). Atlas.ti was used for coding and data analysis. The resulting codes were synthesised into major and minor themes to address the research questions outlined in the subsequent sections.

From absence to marginality: the role of local actors in the design of EU-funded programmes

The involvement of key actors in the overarching design of the EU’s migration funding programmes towards Afghanistan was controversial among the interviewees, and their perceptions of it varied.

As explained by an EU-level interviewee, the EU perceived its funding design for Afghanistan as inclusive, involving various actors such as the UN, EU member states, international organisations, NGOs, CSOs, the EC office in Kabul, and certain Afghan diaspora organisations (EU_2). Moreover, another EU-level interviewee noted a lack of consultation with local actors in designing funding programmes for Afghanistan (EU_1). This interviewee added that consultations primarily involved international organisations like UN agencies and NGOs such as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), which have extensive experience in Afghanistan, including with local organisations there. The interviewee mentioned the involvement of local CSOs at the contracting level but highlighted that the EU’s main interlocutors are international NGOs or UN agencies to prevent contract fragmentation (EU_1).

In contrast, CSOs and International Organisations (IOs) criticised the EU’s migration funding programme design for lacking broad consultation. For example, a CSO member expressed concerns and stated: “I have not seen a lot of evidence of wider consultations either at the European level or European with the Afghans or with any other country” (CSO_2). Additionally, another CSO based in Europe noted their exclusion from consultations regarding funding priorities by the Directorate General for International Partnerships (CSO_1). IOs were even more critical, emphasising the predominantly top-down design approach of EU funding for migration in Afghanistan (IO_1; IO_3). As the EU had its own priority in Afghanistan, there was no room for the IOs to steer funding.

When asked why local actors are not involved in the EU’s overarching migration funding programme design, one CSO interviewee suggested that funding allocations may be driven by the political priorities or needs of key European member states or the EU as a whole (CSO_2). Similarly, two other interviewees, one from a CSO (CSO_3) and the other from an International Organisation (IO_1), identified bureaucracy within EU institutions, including the European Commission, as a significant barrier. Another interviewee highlighted a lack of transparency in the EU’s migration funding design (CSO_1).

The Afghan government’s perspective aligns with that of CSOs and IOs. A senior former Afghan government official noted that, at the outset of the EU’s engagement (until the JWF agreement in 2016), the Afghan government was not involved in any overarching funding programme directed towards Afghanistan. Instead, the EU and its member states independently planned projects, drafted proposals, secured funding, and only informed the Afghan government of implementation details after obtaining approvals and completing EU-level procedures (AGov_2). However, when asked about involvement in project planning and design (e.g. project scope, project activities) of the EU-funded programmes in Afghanistan, the same interviewee elucidated that the Afghan government was engaged to a limited extent after the JWF agreement. The interviewee added that they frequently asked the EU to be involved in order to improve the impact of the EU’s programmes and projects (AGov_2).

An interviewee at the EU level (EU_1) and an IO-level interviewee from an EU-funded migration-related project in Afghanistan confirmed the Afghan government’s involvement in the project design but to a limited extent (IO_3). However, as the interviewees mentioned, other local actors, such as CSOs based in Afghanistan, despite their experience, were not really engaged in consultations regarding the EU-funded project design in Afghanistan (IO_1; IO_2; IO_3).

The findings indicate the lack of involvement of Afghan local actors in the overarching design of the EU’s migration funding programmes towards Afghanistan and the limited involvement of very few Afghan local actors in the design of migration-related projects in the country. Previous studies have highlighted this trend. For example, Jackson (2010) noted the donor-driven nature of international aid (including EU aid) in Afghanistan, and Rahmani (2012) observed that local actors, including local NGOs, had innovative ideas but were sidelined by donor agendas in the country. This trend persisted until 2021, as shown by Zürcher’s critique of donor-driven, top-down approaches in Afghanistan, Mali, and South Sudan (Zürcher, 2023).

One of the key principles of extending EU norms beyond borders is to foster closer cooperation between the EU and external actors. However, the limited involvement of local actors in the design of EU-funded programmes undermines the notion of responsibility sharing by the EU. Additionally, donor-driven approaches, coupled with the conditionality mechanisms associated with the framework of Europeanisation beyond Europe, are ineffective as they often marginalise local perspectives. This marginalisation, in turn, hampers effective responsibility-sharing by sidelining local actors who understand local needs better than external actors or donors. While Europeanisation through migration funding is not limited to Afghanistan alone, it is also observed in other countries that serve as sources of migrants or transit, such as Tunisia (Pastore & Roman, 2020; Amnesty International, ²⁰²³). In addition, in the case of the EU-Morocco “Mobility Partnership”, den Hertog (2016b) argued that EU funding does not clarify the priorities pursued via cooperation on borders, asylum, and migration; instead, it obscures them. Hence, he argued that EU funding for migration is concealed within institutional, legal, and political efforts (den Hertog, ^2016b).

Unequal responsibility: Afghan interests in EU-funded programmes

The EU’s migration funding to Afghanistan is primarily driven by its migration management objectives, often sidelining Afghan interests. Most interviewees highlighted how EU migration funding had steered some national, sub-national, or sub-regional programmes and projects in Afghanistan to align with EU priorities.

For example, the three-year (2017-2020) TAALIM project⁵ focused on “sustainable reintegration and alternatives to irregular migration” in several provinces of Afghanistan, demonstrating the significant influence of EU funding in steering a project in the country. The EU designed and funded this sub-national project in Afghanistan for a consortium of four international NGOs after the 2015/2016 migration wave to Europe. An international organisation-level interviewee stated that for this project, the EU pushed to choose locations for services in those areas of Afghanistan that were somewhat better off but had relatively higher rates of out-migration. On the other hand, the Afghan government negotiated hard with the EU and emphasised that the project should provide services in the poorest areas of Afghanistan to improve the livelihoods of people (who were less likely to migrate to the EU) (IO_3). This shows a conflict of priorities, where EU funding is conditioned on its own preferences, such as the choice of project location, rather than addressing local development needs in Afghanistan.

Another example is the five-year RADA project (2017-2022) implemented in eight provinces, including Kabul, Kandahar, Balkh, Herat, and Nangarhar.⁶ IOM developed this project, but the idea and funding came from the EU as part of the JWF agreement in 2016. According to an IO-level interviewee, there was no consultation with the Afghan government on the idea and design of this project at the EU level. In the interviewee’s opinion, the project was designed at the EU level based on the wishes of the EU, who were funding the project with the aim of stopping migration from Afghanistan (IO_1). However, the EU funding influenced the Afghan government’s decision to accept the JWF, as a result of which RADA began implementation in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, as reported by Quie and Hakimi (2020), who referenced MoRR (2019b), the former Afghan minister for the MoRR stated during a meeting with the IOM in Geneva in October 2019 that RADA’s implementation in Afghanistan was “incredibly slow, bordering on failure” (p. 17). The minister also mentioned that the IOM does not share its concept notes and priorities with the MoRR, which affects effective cooperation (Quie & Hakimi, 2020). Additionally, the study by Majidi et al. (2021) found that “attention and funding for returns from Europe remain mainly donor-driven” (p. 3). Despite its impact on improving the living conditions of its beneficiaries, the RADA project has sidelined local actors’ involvement in Afghanistan and aimed to pursue Europeanisation beyond borders

In addition to the two examples discussed above with a direct influence, EU funding also indirectly influenced the steering of programmes at the national level. For example, the EU was a major donor to the Citizens’ Charter Afghanistan Programme (CCAP).⁷ A former senior Afghan government official noted that the EU specifically provided additional funding for the expansion of the CCAP through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).⁸ He explained that this additional funding was approximately USD 45 million, which the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) received from the Ministry of Finance in 2020. The fund was allocated to expand the CCAP activities in ten cities across the country, particularly targeting areas with poor infrastructure, high numbers of returnees from Iran and Pakistan, and significant numbers of IDPs. The funding aimed to boost local development in these cities by creating employment opportunities and improving infrastructure (AGov_1).

This project was largely designed and developed by local actors (e.g. Afghan government institutions and local people), as the CCAP is basically a bottom-up approach. The Afghan government presented the project proposal to the ARTF for approval (e.g. funding and project design), in which the EU also had a representative (AGov_1). This is how the EU provided additional funding specifically for expanding and implementing the CCAP in those cities. This shows that the EU had no influence on the project’s design. However, the interviewee believed that this project attracted the attention of the EU for funding because of, among other things, its impact on the prevention of irregular migration from Afghanistan (AGov_1).

Another former senior Afghan government official stated that after a request by the Afghan government, the EU also financially supported refugee returnees’ townships implementation in 29 out of 34 provinces (e.g. in terms of shelter and employment generation). This national project was mainly planned and designed by the former Afghan government. The EU provided funding support for this project through international organisations (e.g. UNHCR, NRC) and also through the CCAP, for which the EU was a major donor. In the interviewee’s opinion, a rationale for the EU funding of this national project stemmed from the EU’s aim to curb irregular migration of Afghans, including returnees, to Europe by providing them with shelter and employment opportunities within Afghanistan (AGov_2).

The examples in this section show how reliance on external funding, driven by EU migration control priorities, leads to an uneven distribution of responsibility. EU policies have influenced national, sub-national, and sub-regional programmes in Afghanistan to align with EU migration management objectives, sidelining Afghan needs and priorities. This approach prioritises migration control over addressing the needs of refugees, IDPs, and returnees, thereby creating an imbalance in the distribution of responsibilities. Through the lens of Europeanisation beyond Europe and responsibility sharing, it is clear that the EU is exporting its policy preferences, taking decision-making away from local actors, and undermining efforts to protect vulnerable Afghans.

The findings presented above are in line with previous research (e.g. Frelick et al., ²⁰¹⁶; Stock et al., ²⁰¹⁹). Specifically, Stock et al. (2019) highlighted that economic development projects or programmes funded by the EU to address the root causes of migration are often equally linked to aspects of migration control. As Mouthaan (2019) pointed out, in Ghana and Senegal, EU funding support has brought certain local actors, such as the Ministry of the Interior, to the forefront as preferred entities in controlling out-migration. Bisong (2019) found that the EU and its member states have implemented a significant number of development initiatives in the ECOWAS region. However, these initiatives are conditional on supporting the return of nationals residing (without documents) in the EU and stemming the flow of irregular migration towards Europe (Bisong, 2019). This aligns with conditionality as a central mechanism of EU impact beyond its member states (see Schimmelfennig, ²⁰¹⁵) and with the external incentives identified in the European Union Readmission Agreement (Wolff, 2014).

Contested understanding of responsibility sharing

As described in the previous section, the EU has funded several projects in Afghanistan on migration management. The EU has also contributed funding at the regional level, for example, through the Support Platform for the Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), to ensure that the needs and rights of Afghan migrants are respected and protected in neighbouring countries, in particular Pakistan and Iran.

However, when asked about the role of funding in enhancing responsibility sharing, all the interviewees pointed out that funding is necessary but not sufficient in itself to enhance responsibility sharing. For example, one interviewee explained that responsibility sharing is not just about funding (CSO_1). The same interviewee added that the EU does not play its role in sharing responsibility with large refugee-hosting countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, or with countries that are significant sources of asylum seekers, including Afghanistan (CSO_1).

A similar point was highlighted by another CSO: “I think […] the problem with the European approach is that they want to fix [things] very quickly,” and they make mistakes (CSO_2). International organisations had a similar view of the EU’s approach to funding migration-related projects, including those discussed above. For example, an interviewee from an IO described how the EU was in a hurry to fund a project to stop migration from Afghanistan, and the funding was not even put out to tender. The interviewee did not believe that EU migration funding had contributed to responsibility sharing for Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan due to insufficient funds and a lack of accountability, nor in Afghanistan for returnees or IDPs because of the conflict and weak state-building (IO_3).

Furthermore, an interviewee from an IO criticised solidarity as a component of responsibility sharing through the funding approach that the EU adopted in the context of Afghanistan. The interviewee described the EU’s notion of responsibility sharing in Afghanistan as “absolutely false”. The interviewee added:

There is no amount of funding that buys responsibility for breaches of international humanitarian law and breaches of protection. The […] EU countries classified Afghanistan as a safe country, but it was not; there was an active war. The amount of money the EU [is] throwing to this country [Afghanistan] is like peanuts; it is literally peanuts (IO_1).

In addition to criticisms by the CSOs and IOs, a senior Afghan government official also criticised the EU’s approach to pursuing responsibility sharing through funding in practice. The interviewee stated: “[O]n the paper or in reports, responsibility has been shared, but in practice, it is very weak; migrants have not taken advantage of the funding or given any facilities. They are even abused [in neighbouring countries]” (AGov_1).

The issues of responsibility sharing were also discussed with the EU institutions. In this regard, interviewees confirmed that funding is insufficient as the only response for enhancing responsibility sharing; it is just one part of the response (EU_2; EU_3).

The explanations that emerged from the interviews highlight what is missing in the EU’s funding approach towards Afghanistan. However, the interviewees also shared suggestions on how funding could be enhanced to better contribute to responsibility sharing. The most common point raised was that the EU did not appropriately target funding to address the root causes of migration. This was primarily due to the EU’s top-down and donor-driven approach to quickly curb irregular migration from Afghanistan rather than broadly focusing on the root causes, such as insecurity and poverty. For instance, an EU-level interviewee and a CSO based in Europe explained that to enhance responsibility sharing, funding should address the root causes of migration, focusing on the stability of the recipient country (EU_2; CSO_1).

The same CSO interviewee suggested that the EU should support countries hosting large numbers of Afghan refugees to improve their policies regarding these refugees (CSO_1). Interviewees from CSOs (e.g. CSO_1; CSO_4) and IOs (e.g. IO_1) also suggested providing legal pathways for Afghans who need international protection. An IO interviewee suggested that the EU should have established appropriate measures regarding state-building in Afghanistan to improve the capacity of the Afghan government for positive project impacts (IO_3).

A senior former Afghan government official explained that funding alone was insufficient for responsibility sharing and should be complemented by effective coordination and cooperation between the EU and the Afghan government. The interviewee highlighted that this approach could enhance the impact of EU-funded projects on job creation and poverty eradication for Afghans, including returnees and IDPs (AGov_2). Similarly, the former Afghan minister for MoRR commented on the EU-funded RADA project to IOM, stating that its implementation was “incredibly slow, bordering on failure” due to the lack of IOM’s cooperation with MoRR (see Quie & Hakimi, ²⁰²⁰, p. 17).

The above findings reveal that funding is necessary, but it has not enhanced responsibility sharing. This is due to the EU’s prioritisation of migration management through Europeanisation beyond Europe over sharing responsibility for the protection of IDPs and returnees in Afghanistan, as well as Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries. These findings, in the case of Afghanistan, are consistent with other recipients of EU migration funding. For example, the study by Raty and Shilhav (2020) on the EUTF for Africa concludes that development assistance for EUTF-funded projects is more closely linked to donors’ interests in stopping irregular migration than to contributing to reducing inequality and poverty. In addition, Coggio (2021) reported that the EUTF is not an appropriate approach to tackling the root causes of key problems in a society.

Conclusion

The objective of this study was to examine the extent to which the design and implementation of EU-funded migration cooperation programmes and projects in Afghanistan support shared responsibility and to analyse how the goal of responsibility sharing has influenced these programmes and projects. The findings reveal a predominantly top-down design for EU migration funding programmes towards Afghanistan, with the marginal role of local actors in the design of EU-funded projects. This marginalisation not only reflects a lack of genuine responsibility-sharing but also raises questions about the effectiveness of Europeanisation in this context.

In addition, the study highlights inadequate attention to Afghan interests in EU-funded programmes at national, sub-national, and regional projects or programmes in Afghanistan. This indicates a disconnection between local needs in Afghanistan and an EU policy. The empirical findings further indicate a contested understanding of responsibility sharing through EU funding in Afghanistan, reflecting Europeanisation’s influence. The funding design of EU-Afghanistan migration cooperation programmes and projects does not sufficiently meet the criteria for shared responsibility. This gap not only affects the effectiveness of these programmes but also holds significant implications for Afghanistan. This issue is underscored by Cassarino’s (2010) notion of “unbalanced reciprocities,” which highlights disparities in power, influence, and resources between the EU and Afghanistan in migration management cooperation programmes. Furthermore, the EU is prioritising its interests over the needs of Afghans, including returnees, IDPs in Afghanistan, and Afghan migrants, particularly in neighbouring or transit countries. The discrepancy between the EU’s migration funding objectives and the actual local needs of Afghans can exacerbate the contentious issue of responsibility sharing.

To address these issues, it is necessary to enhance the participation of local Afghan actors in programme design and ensure that EU funding is aligned more closely with Afghan priorities, local needs, and international law. This approach would foster genuine solidarity and mutual benefit in EU-Afghanistan migration relations. This study contributes to the current literature on migration management and responsibility sharing through EU migration funding by focusing on the understudied case of Afghanistan before the Taliban regained power in August 2021. Further research could expand to focus on financial governance in Iran and Pakistan, where the EU has spent millions of euros in support of Afghan refugees. It could also examine the shift towards restrictive national policies affecting Afghan refugees in these neighbouring countries.

Appendix A.

Table A1.

List of interviewees by category.

Category	Number of interviewees
EU Institutions	3
Civil Society Organisations	4
International Organisations	3
Former Afghan Government	2
Total interviewees 12

Funding Statement

Hestia Impulse programme grant (project Nr. VidW.1154.20.042, PI: Lilian Tsourdi. Researcher/Hestia laureate: Nasrat Sayed), Dutch Research Council (NWO).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.