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Published before final editing as: Curr Sociol. 2024 Jul 23:10.1177/00113921241260430. doi: 10.1177/00113921241260430

Remitting amid autocracy: Venezuelan migrant remittances to relatives enduring widespread structural violence

Deisy Del Real 1, Blanca A Ramirez 2
PMCID: PMC12333921  NIHMSID: NIHMS2042758  PMID: 40786008

Abstract

Homeland conditions shape how migrants and refugees perceive the purpose and impact of their remittances (i.e. financial support). Countries of origin with low violence and stable conditions allow migrants to remit with hopes of improving their non-migrant relatives’ long-term material circumstances, while homelands with armed conflict limit remittance objectives to securing recipients’ immediate safety and basic survival. However, scholarship has under-theorized how homelands with widespread structural violence–economic devastation resulting in deprivation for most of the population–impact migrants’ remittance practices and perceptions. Drawing on in-depth interviews with forced Venezuelan migrants in Chile and Argentina–whose homeland has an emerging autocrat and economic sanctions that have resulted in widespread structural violence–we find that interviewees are highly concerned about relatives’ survival in Venezuela. They remit with resignation to secure relatives’ bare subsistence while grappling with their inability to counter the economic deterioration, infrastructural decay, and essential goods shortages that are decreasing their relatives’ lifespan. Broadly, findings indicate that widespread structural violence reshapes migrants’ transnational care; as deprivation spreads in the homeland, migrants are increasingly aware that the impact of their remittances is diminishing and seek to fulfill their relatives’ immediate basic needs.

Keywords: Democratic backsliding, emerging autocrats, remittances, transnational care, Venezuelan migration, widespread structural violence

Introduction

International migrants and refugees worldwide send financial support and in-kind aid, or remittances, to kin residing in their countries of origin. When relatives remain in countries with relatively stable economic and political conditions, immigrants send remittances to improve their family’s long-term living conditions, expand their future opportunities, and diversify household investments (Abrego, 2009; Aysa-Lastra, 2019; Dreby, 2006; Massey and Parrado, 1994; Salazar Parreñas, 2008; Stark and Lucas, 1988). However, in countries inflicted with state persecution and generalized violence from armed conflicts, remittances serve the immediate objective of moving people to safety and sustaining their livelihoods (Abrego, 2017; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018; Rodima-Taylor, 2022; Vargas-Silva, 2017).

Although existing research has provided valuable insights into how homeland conditions shape migrants’ understandings of the impact of their remittances, it has under-theorized how homelands with chronic structural violence, which does not immediately manifest physically, impact this type of monetary and in-kind aid. Departing from this trend and using insights from structural violence research, we examine political transformations without armed conflict that produce widespread deprivation. Typically, structural violence refers to how uneven distribution of resources and economic exploitation deprive marginalized groups of opportunities, proper medical care, and nourishment needed for long-lasting, healthy, and dignified lives (Bourgois, 2004; Galtung, 1990; Menjívar, 2011). Chronic poverty, deprivation, malnutrition, and illness produce a slow death–or withering of life expectancy–among marginalized groups within a society (Galtung, 1990). Scholars originally conceptualized structural violence to capture exploited and excluded groups’ experiences within societies where some enjoy the benefits of opportunities, wealth, and power.

We build on this research to examine how political transformations that sharply deteriorate the national economy and widen structural violence to most of the population, including the once privileged, impact remittances. Thus, this article examines the following research question: How do forced immigrants practice and perceive the remittances they send to relatives enduring widescale structural violence in their country of origin?

To answer this question, we focus on remittances to Venezuela, where internal and geopolitical pressures have spawned widespread structural violence. Internal pressures refer to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s (2013–present) and his administration’s corruption, state oil mishandling, and autocratic grip on power that have generated economic, political, and social crises (Corrales, 2022; Del Real and Menjívar, 2024; OHCHR, 2018; Page et al., 2019; Roy, 2022). To weaken this Venezuelan autocrat’s rule, the United States and various countries have imposed geopolitical pressure via sanctions, including blocking Venezuelan state oil imports and freezing elites’ political and economic assets (Corrales, 2022; Rodríguez, 2022; Roy, 2022). Economic sanctions are a form of interstate disagreement and are viewed as less damaging than armed conflict (Rodríguez, 2022). The post-2017 general economic sanctions, particularly those on oil,1 have exacerbated existing domestic crises and further collapsed the Venezuelan economy (Corrales, 2022; Rodríguez, 2022; Roy, 2022). The authoritarian regime’s corruption and economic sanctions punish the citizenry by weakening public infrastructures, producing shortages of essential goods, and enabling generalized social disorder (Corrales, 2022; OHCHR, 2018; Roy, 2022)–or what we conceptualize as widespread structural violence.

Although President Maduro and his administration have violated human rights, persecuted opponents, and collaborated with non-state armed groups to repress opponents (OHCHR, 2018), to our knowledge, Venezuela is not in a civil war, experiencing an invasion, or exhibiting signs of genocide. Yet, the political transformation and economic sanctions have spread structural violence’s injuries and harm to most citizens. The population is showing signs of widespread structural violence’s slow death. Three years into President Maduro’s tenure, the Venezuelan Living Conditions Survey (Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, ENCOVI) showed that Venezuelan life expectancy decreased by an average of 3.5 years (Gandini et al., 2019). According to ENCOVI, in 2018, 91% of the Venezuelan population lived in poverty and suffered from acute malnutrition (OHCHR, 2018). The widespread impoverishment, malnutrition, and shortages of essential goods needed to nourish and protect life inflict invisible injuries that not only slowly reduce lifespan but also coexist with more targeted state persecution (Corrales, 2022; OHCHR, 2018). These political changes have forced more than 7.8 million Venezuelans to leave the country (R4V, 2024).

We consider Venezuelans to be forced migrants because they cross international borders to escape unsustainable living conditions (Arar and FitzGerald, 2023). Due to the circumstances in Venezuela, these forced migrants could qualify for refugee status under the 1984 Cartagena Declaration. However, the South American governments categorize them as immigrants to avoid the public and political cost of expanding refugee benefits (Blouin et al., 2020; Del Real, 2024; Gandini et al., 2019). This governmental response exemplifies why the refugee/migrant binary is problematic; it is politicized, erases human complexity, and posits refugees as rights-deserving due to their involuntary migration compared with migrants as rights-undeserving because of their more ‘voluntary’ migration (Arar and FitzGerald, 2023; Hamlin, 2021; Zetter, 2007).2 By treating Venezuelan migrants as more voluntary, governments justify not giving them the much needed public benefits (e.g., monetary aid) and protections, such as guaranteeing their right of non-refoulement to a country where their lives would be at risk.

To examine how widespread structural violence inflicting the home country impacts migrants’ remitting practices and perceptions, we draw on 70 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with Venezuelan immigrants in Chile and Argentina and 62 follow-up interviews with the same interviewees. We demonstrate that widespread structural violence shapes how migrants perceive their remittances’ longevity, purpose, and effectiveness. Our findings show that most migrants base their perception of remittances on the political and socioeconomic crises inflicting Venezuela.

Worried about their elderly relatives’ survival in Venezuela’s dire context–where basic goods, food, and healthcare services remained inaccessible–senders intend for their remittances to address recipients’ immediate subsistence needs, not as a long-term life improvement. Most remit with resignation as they grapple with the likelihood that their support is insufficient to amend Venezuela’s widespread structural violence, which contributes to loved ones’ slow death. Our theoretical framework demonstrates that the widespread structural violence constrains migrants’ remittances to the present, forcing them to witness the slow-paced, preventable harm that political transformation inflicts on their loved ones’ bodies.

Revising remittance literature

Conditions in migrants’ countries of origin change how refugees and immigrants perceive the purpose and impact of their remittances; however, research has under-theorized how different types of violence in the homeland change remitting practices and perceptions. Most remittance research builds on the new economics of labor migration model, which suggests that remitters seek to make long-term improvements to relatives’ lives who remain in countries where long-term planning is feasible. According to this model, household members migrate to overcome local market limitations in their home countries, including the lack of access to capital, credit, insurance, and pensions (Massey and Parrado, 1994; Stark, 1991; Stark and Lucas, 1988). As part of the household agreement, remittances diversify income sources and mitigate long-term economic risks (Stark, 1991; Stark and Lucas, 1988).

Scholars consider remittances as a form of transnational care entrenched in caregiving norms because migrants send remittances to improve their relatives’ livelihood and long-term material conditions by paying for better living arrangements, private education, and healthcare (Abrego, 2009; Carling et al., 2012; Dreby, 2006; Smith, 2006). Such care is transnational because migrants and families in countries of origin are geographically separated but remain socially and economically linked (Abrego, 2009; Arnold, 2020; Carling et al., 2012; Dreby, 2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997; Salazar Parreñas, 2008; Schmalzbauer, 2004). The assumption that countries of origin conditions allow for immigrants to perceive remittances with the potential to achieve these long-term improvement objectives underpins these studies.

However, countries inflicted with armed conflict change how migrants perceive remittances’ purposes and longevity. Political transformations with armed conflicts – such as nation-building, invasions, civil war, and genocide, which often consist of persecution and generalized violence–significantly limit remittances’ likelihood of improving recipients’ life circumstances long-term; instead, remittances serve to mitigate the risk of physical harm (Arar and FitzGerald, 2023). For example, resettled refugees in wealthy countries, such as Norway and the United States, remit to secure relatives’ survival amid ongoing conflict in the country of origin (Abrego, 2017; Blue, 2004; Carling et al., 2012; Horst, 2006; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018; Vargas-Silva, 2017). Amid armed conflicts, remittances are a lifeline and help people survive, move to safer areas within their countries of origin, leave refugee camps to find work in urban centers (Blue, 2004; Carling et al., 2012; Horst, 2006; Vargas-Silva, 2017), or move to wealthier countries for economic opportunities (Abrego, 2017; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018).

Although insightful, most research de-emphasizes how structural violence changes remittances’ role. A few studies show that once an armed conflict ends, economic devastation continues, and non-state actors reproduce the state’s violent tactics in everyday life (Menjívar, 2011; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018). For example, decades after U.S.-sponsored conflict ended in El Salvador and Guatemala, gendered and non-state violence (e.g. femicide and gangs) coupled with the structural violence of scarce economic opportunities and poverty forced lower-income people to migrate and send remittances to secure their other relatives’ livelihoods (Abrego, 2017; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018). Nonmigrant relatives, who were not targeted for violence, often depend on remittances to sustain their livelihoods in the long term (Abrego, 2017; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018).

We contribute to the remittance literature by examining how ‘widespread structural violence’ in the country of origin with a new autocracy impacts forced migrants’ remittance practices and perceptions. Scholars conceptualize structural violence to capture the deprivation that reduces marginalized groups’ lifespans (Bourgois, 2004; Galtung, 1990; Menjívar, 2011). In any given society, marginalized groups suffer from structural violence while others enjoy the privileges of hoarding wealth, opportunities, and power (Ibid). We amend the structural violence concept by adding ‘widespread’ to illustrate nation wide economic deterioration that spreads structural violence beyond marginalized social groups to the wider population. An array of conditions–including the corruption of emerging autocratic regimes, international sanctions on the main economic sectors that induce collective punishment, and armed conflict–can bring such deterioration that devastates the economy and public infrastructures.

The present study contributes to migration research by examining how widespread structural violence impacts migrants’ remitting practices and perceptions. We examine these dynamics within one of the largest internationally displaced populations, the Venezuelan exodus. These forced migrants who remain abroad send remittances to relatives living in Venezuela (Del Real et al., 2023; Maldonado and Flores, 2021). There is tentative evidence that Venezuelan migrants’ financial remittances are not for productive or human capital investments but to secure recipients’ survival (Del Real et al., 2023; Maldonado and Flores, 2021). The present study contributes to this nascent research by further examining the perception and remitting practices among Venezuelans who migrated to Chile and Argentina.

Data and methods

To examine how Venezuelan forced migrants understand the impact of their remittances, the study draws on semi-structured, in-depth interviews with migrants residing in the Metropolitan Region (formerly known as Santiago), Chile, and Buenos Aires, Argentina. Argentina and Chile are among the top destinations for the Venezuelan exodus (R4V, 2024). According to government estimates based on legal residency applications (that undercount undocumented immigrants), approximately 444,423 Venezuelan migrants reside in Chile, and 217,742 reside in Argentina (R4V, 2024). In these countries, Venezuelans tend to migrate to urban centers (Gandini et al., 2019).

Between 2018 and 2019, the first author and three research associates conducted in-depth interviews with 70 Venezuelan migrants. Then, they conducted 62 follow-up interviews with the same individuals between 2020 and 2022. Our sample in Argentina was based on 32 extended and 29 follow-up interviews; in Chile, it consisted of 38 extended and 33 follow-up interviews. Extended interviews were between 1 and 2.5 hours long, while follow-up interviews were between 20 and 45 minutes long. All interviewees were born in Venezuela, were over 18 years old, and migrated to and resided in the destination countries for more than 90 days.

To recruit interviewees, we utilized a snowball and respondent-driven sampling technique by asking interviewees, research associates, and community partners to refer study participants to avoid oversampling one person’s social network (Ellard-Gray et al., 2015). Three research associates and four key respondents from two nongovernmental migrant-serving organizations helped to increase sample variability and include hard-to-reach individuals. The first author and research assistants who collected the data were all Latin American immigrants; their immigration experiences helped create rapport and trust with interviewees. Initially, interviews were conducted in person at locations where participants felt at ease, such as cafes or their homes. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews were conducted over the phone, Skype, WhatsApp, or Zoom, to ensure adherence to social distancing guidelines. Interviewees found online interviews more convenient, though uneven Internet connections created some disruptions (Oliffe et al., 2021). We prioritized the use of video to maintain rapport with interviewees.

Table 1 shows that interviewees in Chile and Argentina had similar demographic characteristics. On average, interviewees were 38 years old in Chile and 32 years old in Argentina. In both countries, we interviewed a similar proportion of men and women (only one person identified as non-binary); most interviewees had at least some college education or higher, and most had middle socioeconomic backgrounds in Venezuela. In the destination countries, interviewees resided for an average of four years and had comparable monthly household incomes, though more interviewees lived below the poverty line in Chile because the country has a higher cost of living.

Table 1.

Demographic characteristics of interviewees in Chile and Argentina, 2019–2022.

Demographic characteristics Country of destination
Chile Argentina
Total interviews 38 32
Average age and range 40 (21–62) 32 (20–51)
Gender
 Women 18 17
 Men 19 14
 Non-binary 0 1
Educational attainment
 High school or less 3 1
 Some college or technical college degree 10 19
 Bachelor’s degree or higher 25 12
Socioeconomic background in Venezuelaa
 Middle-high to high 5 5
 Middle 19 20
 Low 14 5
Average monthly household income in the destination country US$770 US$794
Range of monthly household incomes in the destination country US$78–US$2630 US$264–US$1951
Monthly poverty line for a household of fourb US$572 US$336
Number of interviewees living in households below the monthly poverty line 19 7
Average time of residence at destination and range 4 years (3 months–7 years) 4 years (1–17 years)
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a

For more on how we coded socioeconomic background in Venezuela, see Del Real (2022: 10).

b

The estimates of the poverty line for a household of four in Chile was CLP 450,165 in 2020 (Strajilevich, 2020) and CLP 490,916 in December 2021 (CSES, 2021). Due to inflation, in Buenos Aires, the poverty threshold for a family of four was AR$12,087 in 2019 and AR$76,146 in December 2021 (INDEC, 2022).

The first author created two semi-structured interview protocols–one for the extended initial interviews and another for follow-up interviews. Existing studies and the research question informed the questions in the protocol; the first author adjusted the protocols as new themes emerged (Deterding and Waters, 2021). During the initial and follow-up interviews, Venezuelan interviewees were asked about their economic situation in the destination country, if they remitted to relatives back home, who they remitted to, how they believed their remittances impacted their recipients, whether they worried about loved ones in Venezuela, and if they expected the Venezuelan situation to improve. The responses obtained during the initial interviews served as a baseline, enabling us to recognize patterns in remitting practices and perceptions.

We utilized HyperRESEARCH, a qualitative data analysis software, and followed a deductive and inductive approach to analyze the considerable number of interviews (Deterding and Waters, 2021). First, we conducted a frequency count of interviewees sending remittances and their recipients. Among 64 of 70 interviewees who sent remittances, we identified four major index codes that allowed us to build analytical codes. We coded ‘concerns for non-migrants’ where interviewees expressed concern for loved ones’ survivability in Venezuela. Another major theme that emerged was ‘subsistence remittances’, which we coded as instances when interviewees sent money and in-kind support, such as medicine, to relatives to cover existing essential needs – as opposed to long-term investments or projects. These basic goods included food, medicine for chronic diseases, gasoline, electricity, and water. We coded ‘team remittances’ as instances when immigrants pooled resources with other migrants to send remittances to loved ones in Venezuela, as opposed to remitting alone. Finally, we coded ‘remitting with a sense of resignation’ as instances when interviewees expressed bleak perceptions about Venezuelan structural conditions and the limits of their remittances to help their loved ones’ survival. Surprisingly, we did not find gender differences. Among the 36 remitters in Chile, 47% were women and 53% were men. Similarly, among the 28 remitters in Argentina, 46% were women and 54% were men.

Results

Concerns and subsistence remittances for elderly relatives in Venezuela

Venezuela’s widespread structural violence forced most interviewees to emigrate, prevented others from returning, and shaped how they viewed their remittances. Interviewees tended to leave Venezuela because they struggled to sustain their livelihoods amid the growing economic crisis, crumbling infrastructures, and essential goods shortages. A few others migrated before President Maduro’s contested election and were forced to remain abroad due to the widespread structural decay. Likewise, most worried that recipients of their remittances, usually elderly relatives, lacked access to proper nutrition, medicine, and facilities needed to thrive. For example, Federico, who resided in Chile, explained his biggest worry: ‘That my parents, who are there in Venezuela, … have all their medicines, that they have enough food’. Similarly, during our interview, Monica explained that the most challenging part of migrating to Argentina was ‘leaving them [my parents] in a bad place because Venezuela worsens daily’. Similar to Federico and Monica, most interviewees expressed deep concerns about leaving their loved ones to endure the broadscale, worsening dysfunction in Venezuela.

Given these concerns, interviewees in both countries viewed remittances as serving as an important, albeit insufficient, safety net for their elderly relatives. Venezuelan migrants’ elderly relatives were generally retired and relied on remittances to supplement dismal pensions. As Carlos (in Chile) explained, his parents’ pension amounted to ‘almost nothing’, purchasing a mere ‘pound of cheese and an egg carton a month’. Venezuela’s rampant hyperinflation dwindled pensions’ and retirement savings’ purchasing power.

Venezuelans residing in Chile and Argentina prioritized sending subsistence remittances to cover their elderly relatives’ basic living and healthcare expenses, including food, water, gasoline, and medicine for chronic diseases. Interviewees viewed their subsistence remittances as barely sufficient to secure their relatives’ survival in the present. Jessica had worked as a nurse in Venezuela and described how crumbling infrastructures brought slow death: ‘Seeing that there are no materials [to treat patients and] seeing that there were children, people, that we had no way to treat them because we did not have medicines’. Once in Argentina, Jessica prioritized sending her mother financial support to pay for ‘food and medications’. Jessica’s mother needed medication for hypertension and other ailments to prevent a medical emergency in a country unlikely to provide the needed treatment.

Interviewees viewed their subsistence financial support as essential. In Buenos Aires, Leonor explained why she sent her parents subsistence remittances:

I send my parents around US$100 a month to buy food … Without that money, they would be dead. With what my dad earns, they can’t even afford to eat. … The minimum wage in Venezuela is 40,000 bolivars, that’s not even enough to buy eggs. They can’t eat with that. … They have barely enough to subsist.

Leonor understood that her parents’ basic survival depended on her monthly US$100. Rather than improving her parents’ lives or aiding in investments for a better future, her remittances barely helped them survive in the present.

When forced migrants faced economic hardships, such as unemployment, their concerns for loved ones in Venezuela surpassed personal concerns mainly because their country of origin’s situation was much worse – pushing them to continue remitting. In Argentina, Venezuelan migrants confronted several crises restraining their remitting capacity. The 2019 presidential election devalued the Argentine peso by 30%,3 and the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated this situation.4 This devaluation diminished Venezuelan immigrants’ ability to support non-migrant loved ones. For example, Flor struggled to sustain her household in Argentina while caring for her elderly parents in Venezuela. She explained, ‘I must take care of them completely. … If I don’t send them money, they don’t eat. … They are 75 and 79 years of age. … I am spending my savings’. Flor was draining her financial safety net to support her parents, whose survival depended entirely on her. As inflation increased in both countries, she still sent more Argentine pesos to help her parents pay for the same items in Venezuela. Despite struggling, Flor could not cease remitting.

Chilean interviewees also expressed the dilemma of prioritizing remitting despite experiencing hardships. Domingo, a man in his sixties, sent remittances to an older cousin who stayed in Venezuela. After losing his job, Domingo continued sending the little remaining money because he had determined his cousin’s situation was more precarious. Domingo struggled with the possibility of stopping because ‘nothing [income] is coming in anymore … almost nothing … and one does not know when it [any income] will come back again’. Despite running out of money, Domingo could not reconcile ceasing to remit because he viewed Venezuela as a place with a ‘void … there is nothing left’. His perception of Venezuela instigated Domingo’s yearning to continue sending his elderly cousin monetary aid despite his struggles, and even if his aid was insufficient.

As these examples illustrate, Venezuelan migrants sent subsistence remittances to pay for basic food items, essential goods, and healthcare to help loved ones survive in the present. Given the Venezuelan government’s failure to provide a social safety net for its elderly population, migrants’ subsistence remittances seek to fill this void. The financial and in-kind remittances do not provide recipients with lavish lifestyles, provide a surplus to diversify their investments, or provide new opportunities for a better future.

Team remittances: pooling resources to send subsistence support

A few interviewees devised what we call ‘team remittances’, a strategy of pooling resources with other migrant relatives to send remittances to loved ones in Venezuela. This strategy tended to lessen individual migrants’ load of supporting relatives in their country of origin while undergoing labor market insertion in the destination countries. For example, Julian resided in Argentina and pooled resources with a sister, who migrated to Europe. Together, they sent their parents in Venezuela between AR$5000 to AR$7000 monthly (or US$53 to US$74 in 2021). Julian explained how team remittances helped them continue supporting their parents while facing struggles: ‘When I couldn’t send … my sister would send it. … It is easier for her because [she earns] the Euros’. Similarly, Cristian, who migrated to Argentina, explained that when he divorced his wife, he could not send his father the usual US$100 a month. During this challenging life transition, he explained that ‘my sister, who also works, was able to help him … [and] my uncle – my dad’s brother – also helped’. Teaming up to engage in transnational care created a safety net. When one relative could not send support, another stepped in, so no individual became solely responsible for elderly relatives.

Team remitting also allowed Venezuelan migrants to respond quickly and support their relatives during unexpected emergencies. For instance, Roberto and his brother worked in Chile and sent financial support to their elderly father monthly. Roberto explained how they confronted a medical emergency together:

My brother … and I never stopped sending money to my dad in Venezuela. … We had to send a lot more money when my dad got COVID. Because of the horrible situation there, all the medicines were incredibly overpriced. … Basically, my brother and I spent over CLP1,000,000 [~US$1,315 in 2021] … to buy my dad’s medicine.

Venezuelan medical supply shortages increased medical costs, including treatment for severe COVID-19 infections. Roberto and his brother’s habit of sending remittances as a team helped them respond effectively to their father’s emergency. Had they been sending remittances alone, they would have found it challenging to help their father in this crisis and maintain their livelihoods in Chile.

Other interviewees alternated sending remittances to other relatives regularly. Pedro and his sister adopted team remittances while working in Chile. They partnered to send money to more than five elderly relatives in Venezuela–including their grandmother, uncle, aunt, and parents. Pedro stated:

My sister and I have an agreement; each sends CLP80,000 [~US$105 in 2021] monthly. … I send it to my father and my uncle who is a professor … and does not have children or any other way of supporting himself. … Things have deteriorated so much … and I think that the money I send them is one of the few sources of income that they have … My sister sends it to my parents … and my dad helps many people there.

Before 2015, Pedro, his sister, and his extended family lived a very comfortable upper-middle-class lifestyle in Venezuela. Their parents and extended relatives were highly skilled professionals and worked to secure a comfortable retirement. However, Venezuela’s context left them, and many other older adults, in highly precarious situations. Pedro’s aunt and uncle were highly vulnerable without children to care for them in old age and dependent on meager pensions. Pedro and his sister felt compelled to support their aunt, uncle, and other relatives largely due to cultural kinship norms. Ultimately, various extended family members depended on these remittances to pay basic living expenses.

Similarly, Jorge resided in Chile and collaborated with his sister to send financial support to their elderly parents in Venezuela. When asked how often he sent remittances, Jorge responded: ‘I coordinate with my sister who lives in Chile. Between the two of us, we make sure that [our parents] receive the remittances weekly’. Jorge and his sister pooled resources and shared the work of caring for their aging parents.

Overall, team remittances were possible because elderly adults often had multiple familial ties, including children, siblings, and grandchildren. Given that most interviewees were working-age adults with ties to non-migrant elderly relatives–parents, aunts, uncles, and grandparents – remitters tended to engage in a team strategy with siblings and other extended relatives. This strategy proved beneficial in reducing the individual load and served as a safety net during unforeseen emergencies.

Remitting with a sense of resignation

Despite all their efforts and strategies, most interviewees sent remittances with a sense of resignation. They reluctantly accepted the unpleasant reality that their aid failed to compensate for Venezuela’s crumbling healthcare infrastructures, food shortages, and general scarcity. This resignation was also the case for interviewees who remitted substantial funds.

The conditions in Venezuela, and not those in Chile or Argentina, explain our findings. For instance, Paula recalled living a comfortable lower-middle-class life in Venezuela in 2013 as a teacher but migrated to Argentina to obtain a postgraduate degree in education. In 2013, her parents were healthy, could cover their living expenses, and enjoyed a few luxuries. However, starting in 2015, hyperinflation diminished her parents’ purchasing power, so Paula started sending monetary support. She explained the importance of supporting her elderly parents (in their seventies) who care for her adult sister with a mobility impairment:

Last time, I sent ARG$5,000 [~US$74 in 2019] because I always sent ARG$3,000 or ARG$2,500 [~US$44 or US$37 in 2019], but it was not enough for anything; hyperinflation has eaten up the price of the dollar, and prices are going up every day. … If I don’t send that, they don’t eat protein; they can’t buy groceries; that’s the help, there is no other help. … Everyone [Venezuelan migrants] sends money; you feel remorseful if you do not send money because if you don’t send it, they probably won’t eat. How are you going to eat peacefully knowing that your family has an empty stomach?

As illustrated by this quote, the life of Paula’s parents drastically worsened after President Maduro (2013-present) took power and the international community sanctioned his authoritarian regime. By 2019, Paula’s remittances helped her parents buy some essential goods, but hyperinflation diminished her transnational care’s positive impact.

Paula’s support could not offset the broadscale scarcity of essential goods in the homeland for her parents and sister. When Paula visited Venezuela in December 2019, hopelessness overcame her as she realized that her remittances were meager:

I noticed a change in the city, in the people, in the way people looked at me. … My dad and my mom were very skinny; I am talking about weighing 25 kg less, not two kg. … My dad took off his shirt and asked me to scratch his back, and I could see the bones in his back. I said, ‘Dad?’ and he told me, ‘Well, my daughter, if we do not eat carbohydrates, if there is not enough protein, we have to prioritize’. He was very skinny, and my mom was also very skinny. … The weight loss is not due to any dietary regime; it is because of scarcity; there was no sugar, no coffee, no milk, no flour to make arepas. I waited for I don’t know how many hours outside the bakery to get bread. … That’s when I noticed the decay.

In the seven years Paula spent abroad, Venezuela’s economy and infrastructures further deteriorated; her parents’ malnourished bodies showed the scars of the decline. In her last visit, Paula faced the explicit evidence that her remittances were unable to counter the widespread deprivation. Despite her efforts, Paula’s parents were slowly starving because they were unable to purchase nutritious food due to shortages, price hikes, and their impoverishment.

Likewise, Alvaro immigrated to Argentina in the early 2000s and lived a comfortable life in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He sent his elderly parents, both in their seventies, remittances regularly because their pensions were unlivable. Alvaro’s remittances paid for more than 80% of his parents’ expenses. Suffering from hypertension, his mother needed daily medication. When Venezuela experienced medication shortages, Alvaro funded her three roundtrip airfares to Argentina to buy medicines in bulk. When asked how he could ensure his parents received the needed medication during an emergency in Venezuela, he responded blankly: ‘No, in that case, they will probably die. I have had to come to terms with that’. Despite having the resources to consistently care for his parents through multiple strategies, by 2019, Alvaro knew his monetary aid could not ensure his parents’ access to lifesaving medical care in Venezuela. With deep resignation, he accepted that his money could not purchase medical equipment, personnel time, and functional healthcare infrastructure in Venezuela.

In Argentina, Jessica remitted to her elderly mother and struggled with the reality that her financial support did not pay for all the food and medicine needed to secure her mother’s survival. Although Jessica calculated her remittances, the calculations were complicated because of Venezuela’s unpredictable situation:

I call a relative and ask how much things cost. … Sometimes, I send ARG$1,000 or ARG$3,000 [~US$14 to US$44 in 2019], it all depends. During our conversations, she [my mom] says what she needs, and then I make a mental budget and send her what she needs. But as I said, everything varies weekly, daily, so sometimes, she lies and says it is enough.

The scarcity of basic goods increased prices. Jessica relentlessly sought to determine food and medicinal cost increases to help her mother. Yet, Jessica slowly accepted that, at times, she miscalculated, so her mother had to survive with less.

Venezuelan interviewees in Chile expressed a similar sense of bleakness when they sent remittances. Such was Andres’ situation; he grew up middle-class in Venezuela, obtained a university degree, and worked in the entertainment industry. In 2018, he felt forced to migrate because ‘the situation was getting more critical every day. The fact of not finding food … not having a pair of shoes, … and what if my family gets sick, and I can’t find medicine; I can’t find food’. He left, fully aware of the pervasive shortages of essential goods. When he found work in Chile, Andres remitted to his mother to cover her basic living expenses. A year into his migration journey (2019), a resignation that his remittances would not help his elderly mother survive had set in:

My mother is almost 60 years old, and I am terrified that she will get sick and not be able to get medicine, that she will not have anything to eat. … The reality today is that almost nothing is available. Sometimes, my mom calls me and says, ‘I have the money you sent me, but I don’t know what I am going to buy because there is nothing’, or if you put 40 thousand bolivars, a kg of sugar costs 15 thousand and a kg of chicken costs 25 thousand, and all the money is gone.

Andres experienced great anguish. He knew his remittances had a limited impact on Venezuela’s economic deprivation, barely covering any of his mother’s food expenses and not addressing the country’s broader food scarcity.

During follow-up interviews in 2020 and 2021, we learned Andres was suspended from work at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and sent less money. He eventually asked migrant relatives in Peru and Chile to remit to his mother, but this request proved insufficient. Before the pandemic, Andres sent his mom CLP30,000 (~US$39) per month; during the pandemic, he sent CLP10,000 (~US$13). By 2021, he remitted sporadically and reluctantly accepted that he could not help his mother as he had intended.

Ultimately, the various crises inflicting Venezuela impacted how these forced migrants perceived sending remittances. They remitted money and medications to barely sustain the lives of relatives left behind, not to invest in their futures. The remitting came with resignation; Venezuelan migrants had to acquiesce to the likely possibility that despite, at times, sacrificing to send aid, it was inadequate to guarantee their relatives access to nutrients, medicines, and other essential goods needed to survive.

Discussion

We find that conditions in the homeland impact migrants’ remittances. In the case of Venezuela, the rise of an autocratic regime through pointed political violence (e.g. persecution of opponents) and corruption has ignited geopolitical oppositions, or sanctions, that together, have deteriorated the economy (Corrales, 2022; OHCHR, 2018; Rodríguez, 2022; Roy, 2022) and inflicted widespread deprivation and a slow death among large segments of the population. The widespread structural violence impacts how Venezuelan migrants practice and perceive the impact of their remittances. As our findings illustrate, Venezuelan migrants go to great lengths, including teaming up with relatives during economic turmoil or sacrificing their economic stability in their destination countries, to send their elderly relatives monetary and in-kind support to secure their bare subsistence in the present.

Findings show that, despite their ongoing efforts to sustain their relatives’ lives as long as possible, Venezuelans remit with a sense of resignation. They have resigned to their ability to only provide short-term care because their remittances cannot fix or make long-term improvements to the essential goods’ shortages, crumbling infrastructures, and multiple crises inflicting Venezuela. They concede to the undesired possibility that even with remittances, their loved ones will not receive the proper nutrition, live in adequate living conditions, and obtain the medical care needed for survival. These findings were prevalent among Venezuelan migrants despite the different contexts of Argentina and Chile.

As seen in Figure 1, we contribute to and expand existing research by creating a framework to understand how the conditions in the homeland (horizontal axis) impact migrants’ perceptions of their remittances’ potential impact and the temporality of this impact (vertical axis). The country cases in the figure are examples and do not discount other cases. We posit that as the structural and physical violence in the country of origin becomes more generalized, the impact migrants attribute to their remittances becomes more limited and short-term.

Figure 1.

Figure 1.

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How conditions in the homeland shape migrants’ perception of their remittances.

Source: Authors’ elaboration and Mexican migrants (Massey and Parrado, 1994), Salvadoran migrants (Abrego, 2017; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018), and Somali refugees (Carling et al., 2012).

*State persecution, gendered violence such as femicide, and the targets of non-state criminal groups (e.g. gangs).

Figure 1 shows that at one end of the spectrum, previous research has shown that economic inequality imposes structural violence on marginalized people. This lack of economic opportunities (or structural violence) motivates labor migrants to send remittances to diversify the long-term material conditions of non-migrants (Duquette-Rury, 2020; Massey and Parrado, 1994; Stark, 1991; Stark and Lucas, 1988) with the hopeful objective of making long-lasting improvements to their children’s education and future (Abrego, 2009; Carling et al., 2012; Dreby, 2006) as well as parents’ longevity and quality of life (Aysa-Lastra, 2019; Baldassar and Merla, 2014; Bruhn and Oliveira, 2022; Flippen, 2015). The example in the figure for this end of the spectrum is Mexican immigrants in the 1990s who sent remittances to make long-term improvements in the lives of recipients (Massey and Parrado, 1994).

In the middle, Figure 1 shows that in other homelands, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, the structural violence of inequality coexists with the threat of physical violence that disproportionally affects some groups (Abrego, 2017; Menjívar, 2011; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018). For example, femicide victimizes women, and gang violence victimizes young men; remittances help individuals at risk of violence to migrate (Abrego, 2017; Menjívar, 2011; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018). Yet, migrants send remittances to relatives who are not targeted with the expectation that they can help sustain their long-term livelihoods (Abrego, 2017; Menjívar, 2011; Menjívar and Cervantes, 2018).

At the other end of the spectrum, Figure 1 shows that armed conflict in the homeland produces generalized violence, which deteriorates the economy and public infrastructures (Arar and FitzGerald, 2023; Zolberg et al., 1989) to the point that it generates widespread structural violence. When the homeland is inflicted with generalized physical violence and widespread structural violence, refugees remit to help their kin avoid physical injuries of armed conflict or subsist in refugee camps because life in the homeland is unsustainable (Arar and FitzGerald, 2023; Blue, 2004; Carling et al., 2012; Horst, 2006; Vargas-Silva, 2017). Nevertheless, these remittances cannot guarantee protection from physical harm or prevent murder, as the case with Somali refugees illustrates (Carling et al., 2012).

Finally, as seen in Figure 1, our findings advance existing research by showing that widespread structural violence of emerging autocracy, without armed conflict, and limited threat of physical violence that affects some groups (e.g. targets of state persecution and organized crime) reshape immigrants’ remittance practices and perceptions of the impact of their aid. They remit with resignation on an ongoing basis and despite experiencing economic hardships themselves. Broadly, our framework in Figure 1 contributes to transnational care and remittances research by bridging siloed literature often divided by type of migration (economic vs refugee), identifying how a continuum of conditions in the homeland shapes migrants’ perception of the impact of their remittances on the lives of recipients. Finally, we situate the condition of an emerging autocratic regime and subsequent widespread structural violence within this continuum.

Furthermore, our study shows that as homeland conditions change, migrants’ perception of their remittances impact shifts. Initially, the Venezuelans who migrated before Venezuelan President Maduro’s autocratic rise, and subsequent widespread structural violence, sent remittances hoping to make a long-term impact on recipients’ lives. As they became familiarized with the country’s structural decay and scarcity, they began to remit with resignation. Existing research has shown that conditions in the country of origin are not static; shifts change migration patterns, and migrants keep up with this information (Arar and FitzGerald, 2023). Our findings provide empirical evidence that shifting conditions in the country of origin reshape migrants’ remitting objectives.

Finally, our study shows that most Venezuelan forced migrants, regardless of gender, remitted to their elderly relatives largely because they perceived Venezuela’s situation as bleak. Previous research demonstrates that remittances have gendered patterns unless the recipients are experiencing medical emergencies, such as surgeries or cancer treatments (Baldassar and Merla, 2014; Flippen, 2015). During these medical crises, men and women remit at similar rates (Baldassar and Merla, 2014) and tend to pool resources to remit together (Flippen, 2015). We show the widespread structural violence permeating Venezuela ignited a similar but ongoing urgency to remit among Venezuelan men and women migrants. In turn, Venezuela’s chronic crises continuously strain migrant remitters to the extent that some need to remit despite facing personal economic hardships or as a team on an ongoing basis. In sum, our examination of transnational remittances shows how the emergence of an autocratic regime and economic sanctions produce widespread structural violence that affects forced migrants.

This study’s contributions and limitations are generative for future research. Scholars are encouraged to conduct quantitative research to examine the prevalence of these trends with larger samples that compare remittances of migrants who remit to countries of origin with different types and degrees of violence. Future research can apply our framework to examine other empirical cases (such as a comparison between migrants from the same nationality in wealthy versus lower-income countries of destination) and compare how varied conditions in the countries of origin impact migrants’ remitting practices and perceptions.

Finally, policymakers and advocates are encouraged to reconsider the impact of democratic backsliding and economic sanctions on human life. Democratic governments use economic sanctions to weaken emerging autocrats without the use of force (Rodríguez, 2022). Sanctions may not pose an immediate threat to the physical integrity of humans the way bombs, bullets, and armed conflict do. However, as this study has shown, sanctions that further deteriorate national economies impose a collective punishment that withers the lives of those who stay. In turn, those forced to migrate continue to endure the economic and emotional toll of caring for relatives left to withstand slow death.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to the Venezuelan migrants for sharing their stories and to the migrant-serving organizations that helped us recruit interviewees. They also thank the following people for their support during data collection or the development of this manuscript (in alphabetical order): Amanda Gregolin, Amy Zhou, Daniel Lucak, Eli Wilson, Felipe Crowhurst-Pons, Hajar Yazdiha, Lizeth Olave, Lynnette Arnold, Rocio Leon, and Vernetta Williams. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2023 Global Carework Summit. All errors are the authors’ own.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study was possible with funding from the University of Southern California’s (USC) Provost, Sociology Department, Equity Research Center, and the National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities with the USC Keck School of Medicine’s MADRES Center for Environmental Health Disparities [#P50MD015705].

Biographies

Deisy Del Real is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Southern California and is the delegate of the American Sociological Association to the International Sociological Association (2002–2026). Her research examines how bureaucrats and policymakers negotiate immigration legislation and how varying immigration legal structures affect immigrants’ access to rights, livelihoods, and well-being across the Western Hemisphere. She received her PhD in Sociology from the University of California-Los Angeles.

Blanca A. Ramirez is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin. Her research theorizes how state structures like law and policing shape group understandings of the legal system, perceptions of agency, and the larger consequences of these dynamics. She earned her PhD in Sociology from the University of Southern California.

Footnotes

1.

In April 2024, the US government reimposed oil sanctions on Venezuela after 6 months of lifting them. https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-united-states-sanctions-maduro-fair-elections-17589aed0dcab89ac1075dd041f8198d

2.

The migrant/refugee binary also obscures power asymmetries between countries by masking how the global North displaces people in the global South (e.g., postcolonialism) (Hamlin, 2021).

Contributor Information

Deisy Del Real, University of Southern California, USA.

Blanca A. Ramirez, The University of Texas at Austin, USA

Data availability

Access to data is restricted due to privacy and ethical considerations.

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