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. 2025 Sep 26;20(9):e0331739. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0331739

Change in population structure, policy adjustment, and China’s public pension sustainability

Weiqiang Fan 1, Jia Meng 2,*, Hualei Yang 3
Editor: Agus Faturohim,4
PMCID: PMC12469360  PMID: 41004478

Abstract

This study assesses the impact of population structure changes and policy adjustment on public pension sustainability. The analysis is based on actuarial models for pension income, expenditure, and accumulated balance, assessed under varying scenarios. Based on the results, China’s pension financial situation will be in deficit by around 2028, with accumulated deficit potentially as high as RMB 147,411.037 billion in 2050 without population policy adjustment. Second, matching the fertility level with replacement level will only slightly ease the pension financial situation after 2041 and cannot change the deficit trend or the time of first appearance of deficit. The short-term situation may worsen slightly. Third, delaying the legal retirement age to 65 years significantly improves the pension financial situation and ensures no accumulated pension deficit before 2050. Lastly, although increasing economic growth and reducing pension growth can significantly improve the pension financial situation, if the accumulated pension deficit does not appear before 2050, the pension growth rate should be controlled below 0 and economic growth must double in future. In conclusion, to improve the financial status of pensions and ensure elderly welfare, we should focus on reducing pension growth, increasing economic growth, and postponing the statutory retirement age.

1. Introduction

Most developed countries entered the aging society in the middle of the 20th century; the adverse effects of population aging on the economy and social security system attracted the attention of several scholars [13]. Previous studies [4]pointed out that the aging population in Germany will cause the pension insurance system to bear huge repayment pressure and even generate funding gaps. Some researchers [5] predicted that the ratio of US pension insurance expenditure to GDP will rise from 8% in 1999 to 21% in 2075 with aging. It has been argued that population ageing under pay-as-you-go will result in an unsustainable pension system for most OECD countries [6]. Some researchers [712] use other countries as samples and corroborate the inference that “population aging will reduce the sustainability of basic pension funds.” Scholars have also actively explored the impact of China’s aging population on pension funds. It has been [13] pointed out that given the context of population aging and the pay-as-you-go fund arrangement, if no institutional reform measures are undertaken, the Chinese public pension fund will have a current deficit by 2025. Some researchers [14,15] believes that a quarter of the world’s elderly will live in China in 2030 and that the population aged over 65 years will account for 22% of China’s total population. If the pension system is not adjusted accordingly, China will use the equivalent of 10% of the same period’s GDP to subsidize the pension gap. Some researchers [16] used the actuarial model to find that China’s basic pension insurance fund will have a current gap in 2030 and will expand annually thereafter. If a pension gap is achieved through the contribution rate, the latter will reach 37%. As China’s population ages, Some researchers [17] predicted that the size of China’s pension fund gap will reach 2.023 trillion yuan in 2020 and 731.319 billion yuan by 2050. Some researchers [18] further corroborates the above points.

In order to mitigate the adverse effects of population aging on pension funds, scholars have actively investigated potential policy responses. Among these, the effects of fertility policy adjustments have generated considerable debate. At the international level, it has been [19] advocated restoring fertility rates to the replacement level to maintain a balanced population structure, while some researchers [20], using a demographic simulation model, demonstrated that a two-child policy would be more effective than a one-child policy in reducing pension deficits. Similarly, previous studies [21], based on an overlapping generations (OLG) model, found that increasing fertility could alleviate the financial pressure on public pension systems, though only when fertility reached a certain threshold. Studies by Chinese scholars reveal that the effects of fertility policies are characterized by significant time lags and regional heterogeneity. Some researchers [22] simulated the impact of the selective two-child policy and found that it could postpone the onset of pension deficits but could not reverse the long-term trend of deficit expansion. Some researchers [23] argued that although the universal three-child policy might increase the future contribution base, in the short run it could reduce current contribution capacity due to a decline in female labor force participation.

Research on strategies to enhance pension sustainability has primarily focused on two major reform directions: delayed retirement and the optimization of contribution parameters. First, regarding delayed retirement, extending the retirement age could improve pension fund balances by prolonging contribution periods and shortening benefit durations [24]. However, its effectiveness could be constrained by the benefit replacement effect and potential crowding-out effects in the labor market [25]. Chinese empirical studies show that delayed retirement significantly improves pension sustainability during the first 15 years of implementation, but the positive effects gradually diminish over a 30-year horizon, exhibiting an initial increase followed by a subsequent decline [26,27]. Second, regarding optimization of contribution parameters, transitioning from a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system to a multi-pillar pension system has become an international consensus [28,29]. Some researchers [30] suggested lowering the basic pension replacement rate to address demographic changes, whereas another researchers [31] criticized the current benefit adjustment mechanism for excessive administrative intervention, which could exacerbate long-term payment risks.

Although these studies have made significant achievements, there are at least four aspects to expand on. First, considering that urban employee pension insurance is the most important component of China’s social pension insurance system, based on the Chinese sample, there have been scarce studies that investigate the impact of changes in population structure on the sustainable development of urban employee pension insurance funds in China. Second, when scholars study the impact of fertility on pension funds, they usually neglect the impact of fertility on actuarial parameters including payment base and contribution base, thereby ignoring the short-term effects of the fertility policy. Third, there is little international work to measure the impact of China’s delayed retirement on pension funds. Fourth, there is a relative lack of attention to economic growth and the effect of adjusting the treatment mechanism in public policies to deal with the impact of population structural changes on pension funds.

Based on the above shortcomings, this study establishes an actuarial model to simulate the impact of changes in population structure on urban employee pension insurance funds during the critical period of realizing two hundred-year goals in China. Using this model, we answer three streams of questions: First, we address scientific questions such as whether there will be a current deficit and accumulated deficit in China’s pension fund before 2050, and if so, when; second, whether the financial situation of pension funds can be improved if the fertility level reaches the replacement level in the future or the plan of delaying retirement is adopted; finally, should the pension growth rate be controlled and to what extent or by how much will economic growth minimally increase if there is no accumulated deficit in future pension funds.

2. Model building and parameter setting

The Decision of the State Council on Establishing a Unified Basic Pension Insurance System for Corporate Employees (State Council Document No. 26, 1997), promulgated on July 16, 1997, marked the establishment of China’s basic pension insurance system for urban employees. Subsequently, the Decision of the State Council on Improving the Basic Pension Insurance System for Corporate Employees (State Council Document No. 38, 2005), issued on December 3, 2005, partially amended the provisions of the 1997 decision. Notably, the two decisions adopt different classification criteria for participants in the basic pension insurance system, resulting in inconsistencies across policy stages. For analytical clarity and to facilitate comparative research, this study reclassifies participants into four distinct groups based on their policy exposure and benefit calculation rules. Pre-1997 retirees (Pre-1997 retirces refer to those retired before 1997), post-1997 retirees(Post-1997 retirees refer to those retired between 1998 and 2005), post-2005 retirees(Post-2005 retirees refer to those retired after 2006), and post-1997 employees(Post-1997 employees refer to those slart working from 1998). China’s Urban Employee Basic Pension (UEBP) system adopts a partially funded model that combines social pooling with individual accounts. The social pooling component operates on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, while the individual accounts are fully funded, functioning essentially as personal savings and therefore not directly relevant to sustainability concerns. Accordingly, in this paper, the term “pension fund” refers exclusively to the social pooling component of the public pension system. The actuarial analysis of the UEBP in this study covers the period from 2020 to 2050, representing a medium- to short-term simulation of pension fund sustainability.

2.1 Pension income model

The social pension fund income in year t equals the number of current employees who pay the social pension insurance in that year multiplied by the corresponding insurance contribution base, and by the insurance contribution ratio in year t. This can be expressed as follows:

AIt=[\nolimitsi=14\nolimitsx=atbt1Nt,xi]×wt×Rt=[\nolimitsi=14\nolimitsx=atbt1Nt,xi]×wt01×\nolimitss=t0t(1+ks)×Rt  (1)

where, AIt represents the pension income; i is the individual identity variable such that i = 1 for pre-1997 retirees, i = 2 for post-1997 retirees, i = 3 for post-2005 retirees, and i = 4 for post-1997 employees;  at  and bt respectively denote the age of participation in social pension insurance and the retirement age in year t; i=14Nt,xi  denotes the total number of current employees participating in social pension insurance in year t; wt  denotes the contribution base in year t; t0  is the start time of actuarial analysis (i.e., 2020); kt denotes growth rate of this contribution base in year t; and  Rt  denotes the contribution ratio in year t.

2.2 Pension expenditure model

ACt  denotes the social pension fund expenditure in year t, which includes basic pension fund expenditure,  ACt,b, and transitional pension expenditure, ACt,g, in year t.

The basic pension fund expenditure in year t equals the total number of retired employees multiplied by the per capita basic pension in year t. In turn, the per capita basic pension in year t equals the basic pension calculation base multiplied by the calculation ratio and the growth rate. This can be expressed as follows:

ACt,b=\nolimitsi=14\nolimitsx=btct[Nt,xi×Bt,xi×st,xi×\nolimitss=tx+btt(1+gs)]  (2)

where ct  is the maximum survival age of i-class workers in year t, Bt,xi  and st,xi  respectively denote the pension calculation base and calculation ratio for i-class employees in year t, and  gt  and gt+1  respectively denote the basic pension growth rate and growth coefficient.

Transitional pension expenditure in year t equals the number of post-1997 and post-2005 retirees in year t multiplied by the per capita transitional pension in that year. In turn, the latter is given by the transitional pension calculation base multiplied by the deemed payment period, transitional pension calculation ratio, and growth rate. It can be expressed as follows:

ACt,g=\nolimitsi=23\nolimitsx=btct{Nt,xi×Gt,xi×[1998(tx+at)]×vt,xi×\nolimitss=tx+btt(1+gs)}  (3)

where Gt,xi is the transitional pension calculation base of i-class workers in year t; [1998-(t-x+at)] (≥ 0)denotes the deemed payment period of i-class workers in year t; vt,xi denotes the transitional pension calculation ratio of i-class workers in year t; and the growth rate of the transitional pension in year t equals the growth rate of the base pension in year t.

2.3 Pension accumulated balance model

The accumulated balance of the pension in year t equals the accumulated balance of the pension in year t-1 plus the current balance of the pension fund in year t. In turn, the latter equals the income minus the expenditure of the pension insurance in year t. This can be expressed as follows:

Ft=Ft1(1+r)+(AItACt) (4)

The r represents the one-year fixed deposit interest rate offered by banks.

2.4 Projection of urban employee pension contributors

The age-specific population distribution in urban and rural areas from 2020 to 2050 is projected using the cohort-component method. Specifically: The population by age and by urban/rural residence in year t equals the corresponding population in year t–1 multiplied by the age-specific survival probability. The number of newborns in year t equals the sum of the product of the female population aged 15–49 years and the age-specific fertility rates in that year. By incorporating the urbanization rate, the age-specific urban and rural population distribution can be derived.

Next, the future number of urban employees enrolled in the basic pension system is projected: Baseline year assumption (2019): It is assumed that the age distribution of insured urban employees mirrors that of the total urban employed population, and the age distribution of urban retirees enrolled in the pension system corresponds to that of the total urban retired population. For example, in 2019, urban employees aged 20 accounted for 2.119% of the total urban employed population. Given that the total number of insured urban employees was 262.192 million, the number of insured 20-year-old employees was 5.556 million (262.192 million × 2.119%). Repeating this calculation yields the number of insured employees aged 20–54 and the number of retired employees aged 55–100 in 2019.

Dynamic projection (2020–2050): Using the cohort-component method, the number of urban employees contributing to the pension system and those receiving pension benefits is estimated annually by age group for 2020–2050. Each year, employees aged 100 years are removed from the system, while new employees aged 20 years are added, ensuring the dynamic turnover of the insured population.

2.5 Parameter setting

In terms of labor and retirement age, the Labor Law stipulates that the minimum age for working is not less than 16 years. However, considering the extension of education, it is assumed that the age at first employment of urban employees is 20 years. At present, the retirement age is 60 years for male workers, 50 years for female workers, and 55 years for female cadres. It is assumed that the average retirement age of urban employees is 55 years. Based on the sixth census, the relaxation of the fertility policy in China, and World Bank estimates, China’s current fertility level is set at about 1.6.

Regarding the contribution rate of social pension insurance, enterprises pay 20% and individuals pay 8%. The contribution base of social pension insurance is the average wage of the employees in the previous year. In terms of contribution base and pension growth rate, the former is mainly affected by wages, and wages are determined by the market. Therefore, the growth rate of the pension contribution base is directly linked with the economic growth rate. Due to the different economic growth rates in the two fertility scenarios, the growth rate of the contribution base also differs. This economic growth rate in the two fertility scenarios (presented in Table 1) mainly refers to the previous papers [32]. While the pension growth rate is controlled by the government, the latter’s pension regulation is mostly based on the economic growth rate. If the pension growth rate is not adjusted in the high-fertility situation, it remains set on the basis of the economic growth rate in the benchmark fertility situation; otherwise, it is set based on the economic growth rate under the high-fertility scenario.

Table 1. GDP growth rate at different fertility rates in 2020–2050.

GDP growth rate 2020 2021–
2025
2026–
2030
2031–
2035
2036–
2040
2041–
2045
2046–
2050
Benchmark (TFR = 1.6) 6.6 5.633 4.983 4.54 3.935 3.151 2.474
High fertility (TFR = 1.94) 6.493 5.296 4.513 4.344 4.132 3.519 2.832

According to State Council Document No. 26 of 1997 and No. 38 of 2005, the basic pension of pre-1997 and post-1997 retirees accounts for 70% and 20% of the contribution base, respectively. Using the calculation ratio of the basic pension of post-2005 and post-1997 retirees, and each additional year in pension contributions, the basic pension and transitional pension calculation ratios increased by 1% and 1.2%, respectively.

3. Results: Change in population structure and pension sustainability

3.1 Changes in the population structure of urban employees in China under population aging

Accurately predicting future trends in the urban employee population is fundamental for estimating the future pension revenues and expenditures. Based on the aforementioned population projection method and calibrated with relevant real-world parameters, this study first simulates the trends in the total urban employee population, the number of pension contributors, the number of pension beneficiaries, and the system dependency ratio up to 2050. The results are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Changes in the population structure of urban employees in China.

Year Total Urban Employee Population Number of Pension Contributors Number of Pension Beneficiaries System Dependency Ratio Year Total Urban Employee Population Number of Pension Contributors Number of Pension Beneficiaries System Dependency Ratio
10,000 persons 10,000 persons 10,000 persons 10,000 persons 10,000 persons 10,000 persons 10,000 persons 10,000 persons
2020 37644.62 26094.90 11549.71 0.44 2036 43475.72 24093.41 19382.31 0.80
2021 38099.83 25956.63 12143.19 0.47 2037 43765.49 23905.7 19859.79 0.83
2022 38517.82 25897.68 12620.14 0.49 2038 44020.81 23801.87 20218.94 0.85
2023 38931.84 25623.65 13308.20 0.52 2039 44248.65 23668.68 20579.97 0.87
2024 39371.10 25465.35 13905.75 0.55 2040 44443.73 23519.98 20923.75 0.89
2025 39806.50 25249.10 14557.40 0.58 2041 44609.81 23247.11 21362.71 0.92
2026 40226.43 25116.77 15109.66 0.60 2042 44750.77 22837.74 21913.03 0.96
2027 40632.00 24995.00 15637.00 0.63 2043 44850.62 22459.02 22391.6 1.00
2028 41016.15 24850.17 16165.98 0.65 2044 44915.51 22010.19 22905.32 1.04
2029 41387.69 24719.49 16668.20 0.67 2045 44946.53 21503.06 23443.47 1.09
2030 41682.32 24570.73 17111.59 0.70 2046 44924.26 21193.58 23730.68 1.12
2031 42007.36 24465.41 17541.95 0.72 2047 44865.86 20891.81 23974.05 1.15
2032 42329.74 24448.49 17881.25 0.73 2048 44776.2 20558.74 24217.46 1.18
2033 42629.08 24364.34 18264.74 0.75 2049 44661.28 20270.91 24390.36 1.20
2034 42922.08 24270.34 18651.74 0.77 2050 44506.56 19990.65 24515.91 1.23
2035 43171.77 24164.11 19007.66 0.79

According to Table 2, several key trends can be observed: First, regarding the total urban employee population, the overall trend shows a gradual increase throughout the projection period, albeit with a slowing growth rate. Under the current fertility level, the total urban employee population is expected to peak at 449.4653 million in 2045, after which it will begin to decline. Second, in terms of the number of pension contributors, the current fertility level indicates a continuous downward trend, decreasing from 260.949 million in 2020 to 199.9065 million in 2050. Third, regarding the number of pension beneficiaries, the current fertility level suggests a steady increase, rising from 115.4971 million in 2020 to 245.1591 million in 2050. Fourth, as for the system dependency ratio, it exhibits an upward trend under the current fertility level, increasing from 0.44 in 2020 to 1.23 in 2050.

3.2 Financial performance of the pension system under changes in population structure

The impact of a change in population structure on pension sustainability is analyzed based on the above theoretical model and the results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Financial status of pension under a change in population structure.

Year Income
(RMB 100 million)
Expenditure
(RMB 100 million)
Current balance
(RMB 100 million)
Accumulated balance
(RMB 100 million)
2020 42717.40 41305.53 1411.87 52866.48
2021 45295.45 45217.32 78.14 52944.62
2022 47738.28 49019.37 −1281.09 51663.52
2023 49893.78 53852.87 −3959.09 47704.44
2024 52378.71 58716.00 −6337.29 41367.15
2025 54859.34 64153.94 −9294.60 32072.55
2026 57645.86 69181.78 −11535.92 20536.63
2027 60224.97 74427.12 −14202.16 6334.48
2028 62859.62 80021.02 −17161.40 −10826.93
2029 65644.87 85852.91 −20208.04 −31034.97
2030 68501.22 91778.40 −23277.18 −54312.15
2031 71606.38 97611.99 −26005.61 −80317.76
2032 74805.55 103297.37 −28491.82 −108809.58
2033 77932.56 109544.78 −31612.22 −140421.80
2034 81156.37 116202.76 −35046.40 −175468.19
2035 84469.52 123078.14 −38608.62 −214076.81
2036 88046.08 129770.82 −41724.74 −255801.55
2037 90797.74 137521.13 −46723.40 −302524.95
2038 93960.75 144908.89 −50948.13 −353473.08
2039 97111.61 152726.34 −55614.72 −409087.80
2040 100298.87 160857.03 −60558.16 −469645.97
2041 103036.18 168927.29 −65891.11 −535537.08
2042 104411.29 178269.90 −73858.61 −609395.69
2043 105915.26 187473.27 −81558.01 −690953.69
2044 107069.32 197443.45 −90374.13 −781327.83
2045 107898.36 208095.19 −100196.84 −881524.66
2046 109696.41 215609.21 −105912.80 −987437.46
2047 110809.72 222989.26 −112179.55 −1099617.01
2048 111740.83 230621.44 −118880.61 −1218497.61
2049 112902.22 237825.21 −124922.99 −1343420.60
2050 114095.79 244785.56 −130689.76 −1474110.37

According to Table 3 and Fig 1, it can be observed that, first, the current pension balance shows a downward trend under a change in population structure, while the accumulated pension balance shows a slight upward trend followed by a sharp downward trend. Second, the expected time interval for the current pension balance deficit is 2022–2050 and for the accumulated pension balance deficit is 2028–2050. Third, the current pension balance is expected to decrease from RMB 141.187 billion in 2020 to RMB 13,068.976 billion in deficit in 2050. The accumulated balance of pension is expected to increase from RMB 5,286.648 billion in 2020 to RMB 5,294.462 billion in 2021, followed by an expansion in deficit to RMB 147,411.037 billion in 2050.

Fig 1. Financial performance of the pension system under changes in population structure (Unit: RMB 100 million).

Fig 1

4. Results: Policy adjustment and pension sustainability

4.1 Financial status of pension under different fertility scenarios

In order to analyze the impact of fertility policy on the financial status of social pension, two fertility scenarios were set up. One is the benchmark fertility scenario under the current fertility level while the other is the high fertility scenario under China’s universal two-child policy.

According to Table 4, it can firstly be observed that the high-fertility scenario is not expected to change the trend of a slight increase followed by a rapid decline in the accumulated pension balance. Second, the high fertility scenario is not expected to change the time node of 2021 and 2028, when the current deficit and accumulated deficit first appeared in the benchmark scenario, respectively. Third, before 2041, high fertility is expected to worsen the financial status of pensions with an average annual increase in accumulated deficit of RMB 769.285 billion. After 2041, the high-fertility scenario is likely to greatly improve the pension financial status with the average annual deficit reducing by RMB 7,562.718 billion.According to Table 4, under the benchmark scenario, the accumulated pension balance will increase from RMB 5,265.106 billion in 2020 to RMB 5,294.462 billion in 2021. Thereafter, the accumulated pension deficit is expected to continue increasing. Specifically, the accumulated deficit would occur from 2028 to 2050 and would increase to RMB 147,411.037 billion in 2050. Under the high fertility scenario, the accumulated balance of pension is expected to increase from RMB 5,265.106 billion in 2020. It is expected to exhibit a downward trend from 2021 onwards until there would be an accumulated deficit for the first time in 2028, with the accumulated pension deficit expanding to RMB 129,721.132 billion in 2050.

Table 4. Financial operation of pension under different fertility situations.

Year Current balance(RMB 100 million) Accumulated Balance (RMB 100 million)
Benchmark scenario High fertility scenario Benchmark scenario High fertility scenario
2020 1411.87 1302.26 52866.48 52651.06
2021 78.14 −70.98 52944.62 52580.08
2022 −1281.09 −1570.17 51663.52 51009.91
2023 −3959.09 −4381.20 47704.44 46628.71
2024 −6337.29 −6898.39 41367.15 39730.32
2025 −9294.60 −9989.03 32072.55 29741.30
2026 −11535.92 −12373.45 20536.63 17367.85
2027 −14202.16 −15248.73 6334.48 2119.12
2028 −17161.40 −18412.12 −10826.93 −16293.00
2029 −20208.04 −21662.49 −31034.97 −37955.49
2030 −23277.18 −24937.58 −54312.15 −62893.06
2031 −26005.61 −27875.64 −80317.76 −90768.71
2032 −28491.82 −30408.83 −108809.58 −121177.54
2033 −31612.22 −33545.73 −140421.80 −154723.27
2034 −35046.40 −36978.65 −175468.19 −191701.91
2035 −38608.62 −40529.10 −214076.81 −232231.01
2036 −41724.74 −42559.89 −255801.55 −274790.91
2037 −46723.40 −45980.87 −302524.95 −320771.78
2038 −50948.13 −48573.45 −353473.08 −369345.23
2039 −55614.72 −51495.87 −409087.80 −420841.10
2040 −60558.16 −54601.42 −469645.97 −475442.51
2041 −65891.11 −57977.90 −535537.08 −533420.41
2042 −73858.61 −63707.17 −609395.69 −597127.58
2043 −81558.01 −69136.35 −690953.69 −666263.93
2044 −90374.13 −75610.20 −781327.83 −741874.13
2045 −100196.84 −83027.89 −881524.66 −824902.02
2046 −105912.80 −86412.94 −987437.46 −911314.96
2047 −112179.55 −90416.24 −1099617.01 −1001731.20
2048 −118880.61 −94824.18 −1218497.61 −1096555.38
2049 −124922.99 −98593.89 −1343420.60 −1195149.26
2050 −130689.76 −102062.06 −1474110.37 −1297211.32

4.2 Financial Status of Pensions under Different Delayed Retirement Scenarios

Referring to the provisions of the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China and some researchers [33] setting of retirement scenarios, we analyze the impact of delayed retirement on the financial status of pensions by setting up three retirement scenarios. First, there is no delay in retirement under the benchmark scenario with the retirement age set at 55 years. In the second scenario, there is an immediate postponement in retirement age such that the individuals who have not yet retired would only retire at the age of 65. The third scenario involves a gradual postponement in retirement age by six months each year to eventually reach the 65 years mark.

According to Table 5, first, by and large, delayed retirement is expected to change the declining trend of the accumulated pension balance under the benchmark scenario, while the corresponding graph under the delayed retirement scenario has an inverted U-shape that rises first and then decreases slightly. Second, delayed retirement delays the time at which accumulated pension deficit first appears under the benchmark scenario. Third, delayed retirement is expected to improve the financial situation of pensions, and the improvement is greater under the immediately delayed retirement scenario than under the gradually delayed retirement scenario. Before 2050, the accumulated pension deficit was expected to be reduced by an average of RMB 80,435.282 billion per year under the immediately delayed retirement scenario and by an average of RMB 63,698.256 billion per year under the gradually delayed retirement scenario.

Table 5. Financial Operation of Pension under Different Delayed Retirement Scenarios.

Year Current balance(RMB 100 million) Accumulated Balance (RMB 100 million)
Benchmark scenario Immediately Delayed retirement Gradual Delayed retirement Benchmark scenario Immediately Delayed retirement Gradually Delayed retirement
2020 1411.87 16268.42 8951.86 52866.48 86942.40 67551.31
2021 78.14 19850.53 7993.61 52944.62 106792.93 75544.91
2022 −1281.09 23288.69 10795.55 51663.52 130081.62 86340.47
2023 −3959.09 27100.30 9120.71 47704.44 157181.91 95461.17
2024 −6337.29 31372.35 12452.75 41367.15 188554.27 107913.92
2025 −9294.60 36087.61 10833.83 32072.55 224641.88 118747.75
2026 −11535.92 41463.79 15033.15 20536.63 266105.67 133780.90
2027 −14202.16 41739.29 13992.35 6334.48 307844.96 147773.25
2028 −17161.40 40010.89 18361.43 −10826.93 347855.85 166134.68
2029 −20208.04 38918.72 15516.32 −31034.97 386774.57 181650.99
2030 −23277.18 37260.96 20266.46 −54312.15 424035.54 201917.45
2031 −26005.61 35930.26 18093.66 −80317.76 459965.80 220011.11
2032 −28491.82 35117.36 23561.03 −108809.58 495083.16 243572.14
2033 −31612.22 31995.35 20246.31 −140421.80 527078.51 263818.45
2034 −35046.40 29491.44 26390.89 −175468.19 556569.95 290209.35
2035 −38608.62 25995.42 23738.96 −214076.81 582565.37 313948.31
2036 −41724.74 24011.54 31330.33 −255801.55 606576.91 345278.64
2037 −46723.40 21415.88 28864.13 −302524.95 627992.79 374142.77
2038 −50948.13 18468.42 26028.83 −353473.08 646461.21 400171.60
2039 −55614.72 15531.76 23186.40 −409087.80 661992.97 423358.00
2040 −60558.16 13008.69 20734.75 −469645.97 675001.65 444092.75
2041 −65891.11 11318.53 19029.46 −535537.08 686320.18 463122.21
2042 −73858.61 9647.53 17314.04 −609395.69 695967.71 480436.25
2043 −81558.01 7086.21 14672.29 −690953.69 703053.92 495108.54
2044 −90374.13 4137.27 11604.99 −781327.83 707191.19 506713.53
2045 −100196.84 1339.96 8652.79 −881524.66 708531.15 515366.32
2046 −105912.80 −1177.79 5894.09 −987437.46 707353.36 521260.41
2047 −112179.55 −6727.95 65.99 −1099617.01 700625.41 521326.41
2048 −118880.61 −10722.62 −4240.74 −1218497.61 689902.80 517085.67
2049 −124922.99 −15067.72 −8929.02 −1343420.60 674835.07 508156.65
2050 −130689.76 −19494.52 −13726.31 −1474110.37 655340.55 494430.34

According to Table 5, the accumulated pension balance is likely to increase from RMB 5,286.648 billion in 2020 to RMB 5,294.462 billion in 2021 under the benchmark scenario. Thereafter, the accumulated balance is expected to exhibit a downward trend with an accumulated deficit occurring from 2028 to 2050. Under the immediately delayed retirement scenario, the accumulated pension balance is expected to increase from RMB 8,694.240 billion in 2020 to RMB 70,853.115 billion in 2045, subsequently, showing a downward trend, although the accumulated deficit would likely not appear before 2050. Under gradually delayed retirement, the accumulated pension balance is expected to increase from RMB 5,286.648 billion in 2020 to RMB 52,132.641 billion in 2047 before showing a downward trend subsequently, although no accumulated deficit is expected before 2050.

4.3 Financial Status of Pension under Different Pension Growth Rates

In order to analyze the impact of different pension growth rates on the financial status of pension, three pension scenarios are set up. First, under the benchmark scenario, pension growth rate is set to be equal to the corresponding economic growth rate. Second, the annual pension growth rate is decreased by 50% compared to the benchmark scenario. Third, the annual pension growth rate equals 0, which guarantees no accumulated deficit before 2050.

According to Table 6, first, reducing pension growth rate delays the time when the accumulated deficit first appears compared to the benchmark scenario. Second, reducing pension growth rate improves the financial status of the pension; the lower the pension growth rate, the better is the pension financial status. If the pension growth rate was reduced by 50%, the accumulated deficit of pension is expected to reduce by RMB 28,175.049 billion annually on average before 2050, and if the pension growth rate is 0, there is expected to be no accumulated deficit until 2050.

Table 6. Financial status of pension under different pension growth rates.

Year Current balance(RMB 100 million) Accumulated Balance (RMB 100 million)
Benchmark scenario Pension growth rate slowed by 50% Pension growth rate is 0 Benchmark scenario Pension growth rate slowed by 50% Pension growth rate is 0
2020 1411.87 4678.43 7752.61 52866.48 59152.78 65184.61
2021 78.14 4479.92 8515.88 52944.62 63632.71 73700.49
2022 −1281.09 4358.41 9402.17 51663.52 67991.11 83102.66
2023 −3959.09 3015.65 9104.95 47704.44 71006.77 92207.61
2024 −6337.29 2096.67 9292.95 41367.15 73103.43 101500.56
2025 −9294.60 720.14 9078.76 32072.55 73823.57 110579.32
2026 −11535.92 −39.48 9375.65 20536.63 73784.10 119954.97
2027 −14202.16 −1123.95 9394.44 6334.48 72660.15 129349.41
2028 −17161.40 −2398.80 9270.38 −10826.93 70261.35 138619.79
2029 −20208.04 −3652.04 9219.99 −31034.97 66609.31 147839.77
2030 −23277.18 −4813.41 9316.45 −54312.15 61795.90 157156.22
2031 −26005.61 −5763.38 9514.10 −80317.76 56032.52 166670.32
2032 −28491.82 −6381.00 10088.51 −108809.58 49651.52 176758.83
2033 −31612.22 −7554.76 10140.20 −140421.80 42096.76 186899.03
2034 −35046.40 −8952.23 10012.79 −175468.19 33144.53 196911.82
2035 −38608.62 −10385.50 9897.34 −214076.81 22759.03 206809.16
2036 −41724.74 −11724.29 9644.22 −255801.55 11034.74 216453.38
2037 −46723.40 −14882.44 7613.59 −302524.95 −3847.70 224066.97
2038 −50948.13 −17186.20 6496.91 −353473.08 −21033.90 230563.88
2039 −55614.72 −19861.14 5058.25 −409087.80 −40895.04 235622.13
2040 −60558.16 −22733.88 3478.20 −469645.97 −63628.92 239100.33
2041 −65891.11 −26691.17 388.34 −535537.08 −90320.08 239488.67
2042 −73858.61 −33246.16 −5252.81 −609395.69 −123566.25 234235.86
2043 −81558.01 −39482.95 −10514.08 −690953.69 −163049.19 223721.78
2044 −90374.13 −46778.09 −16770.17 −781327.83 −209827.28 206951.61
2045 −100196.84 −55027.29 −23916.13 −881524.66 −264854.57 183035.48
2046 −105912.80 −59937.72 −28190.32 −987437.46 −324792.29 154845.16
2047 −112179.55 −65400.66 −32994.12 −1099617.01 −390192.95 121851.04
2048 −118880.61 −71305.34 −38221.51 −1218497.61 −461498.29 83629.54
2049 −124922.99 −76551.78 −42768.32 −1343420.60 −538050.07 40861.21
2050 −130689.76 −81535.83 −47041.04 −1474110.37 −619585.90 −6179.82

According to Table 6, when the pension growth rate is decreased by 50%, the accumulated pension balance is expected to increase from RMB 5,286.648 billion in 2020 to RMB 7,382.357 billion in 2025, and subsequently, show a declining trend. While this would not result in a deficit until 2037, by 2050, the accumulated deficit will likely be as high as RMB 61,958.59 billion. Next, when the pension growth rate is zero, the accumulated pension balance is expected to increase from RMB 5,286.648 billion in 2020 to RMB 23,948.867 billion in 2041; subsequently, the expected accumulated pension balance shows a declining trend, but there is no accumulated deficit until 2050.

4.4 Financial status of pension under different economic growth

In order to analyze the impact of economic growth rates on pension financial status, three scenarios of economic growth are set up here. First, under the benchmark scenario, the economic growth rate remains unchanged. Second, compared with the benchmark scenario, the current economic growth rate is increased by 50.3%. Third, compared with the benchmark scenario, the economic growth rate is increased by 100.6%, which guarantees that there would be no accumulated deficit in pensions before 2050.

According to Table 7, first, higher economic growth delays the time at which the accumulated pension deficit first appears. Second, increasing economic growth would improve the financial situation of pensions; the higher the economic growth rate, the better would be the financial situation. Third, compared with the benchmark scenario, under the condition of 50.3% increase in economic growth, the total pension deficit is likely to be reduced by RMB 29,657. 449 billion annually, on average, before 2050, while under the condition of 100.6% increase in economic growth, the total pension deficit is expected to be reduced by RMB 71,746.055 billion annually, on average, and, of course, there would be no accumulated deficit before 2050.

Table 7. Financial operation of pension under different economic growth rates.

Year Current balance (RMB 100 million) Accumulated Balance (RMB 100 million)
Benchmark scenario Economic growth increased by 50.3% Economic growth increased by 100.6% Benchmark scenario Economic growth increased by 50.3% Economic growth increased by 100.6%
2020 1411.87 9690.33 15693.11 52866.48 76218.08 90120.30
2021 78.14 9469.79 17215.20 52944.62 85687.87 107335.49
2022 −1281.09 9796.92 19580.61 51663.52 95484.79 126916.11
2023 −3959.09 8648.24 20428.91 47704.44 104133.04 147345.01
2024 −6337.29 7981.17 22084.39 41367.15 112114.20 169429.41
2025 −9294.60 6694.11 23221.71 32072.55 118808.31 192651.11
2026 −11535.92 5642.61 24531.52 20536.63 124450.92 217182.63
2027 −14202.16 4567.54 26038.28 6334.48 129018.46 243220.91
2028 −17161.40 3183.72 27378.74 −10826.93 132202.18 270599.65
2029 −20208.04 1774.32 28950.74 −31034.97 133976.50 299550.39
2030 −23277.18 431.11 30910.85 −54312.15 134407.61 330461.24
2031 −26005.61 −1118.37 32438.31 −80317.76 133289.25 362899.55
2032 −28491.82 −1775.22 35564.44 −108809.58 131514.03 398464.00
2033 −31612.22 −3313.07 37693.65 −140421.80 128200.96 436157.65
2034 −35046.40 −5256.05 39530.47 −175468.19 122944.91 475688.12
2035 −38608.62 −7331.95 41498.37 −214076.81 115612.95 517186.48
2036 −41724.74 −10177.78 41606.40 −255801.55 105435.17 558792.88
2037 −46723.40 −15352.90 38133.14 −302524.95 90082.28 596926.02
2038 −50948.13 −19248.00 36961.39 −353473.08 70834.28 633887.41
2039 −55614.72 −23925.15 34701.88 −409087.80 46909.13 668589.28
2040 −60558.16 −29117.52 31790.20 −469645.97 17791.61 700379.49
2041 −65891.11 −37830.80 20983.42 −535537.08 −20039.19 721362.91
2042 −73858.61 −50172.05 3602.54 −609395.69 −70211.24 724965.45
2043 −81558.01 −62292.49 −13594.95 −690953.69 −132503.73 711370.50
2044 −90374.13 −76777.02 −35337.44 −781327.83 −209280.76 676033.06
2045 −100196.84 −93527.21 −61621.15 −881524.66 −302807.97 614411.91
2046 −105912.80 −105427.71 −81176.69 −987437.46 −408235.68 533235.22
2047 −112179.55 −117293.17 −100969.27 −1099617.01 −525528.85 432265.95
2048 −118880.61 −130316.13 −123330.87 −1218497.61 −655844.98 308935.08
2049 −124922.99 −142314.76 −144032.24 −1343420.60 −798159.74 164902.84
2050 −130689.76 −154058.14 −164575.01 −1474110.37 −952217.89 327.84

According to Table 7, when the economic growth rate is increased by 50.3%, the accumulated deficit pension balance increases from RMB 7,621.808 million in 2020 to RMB 13,440.761 billion in 2030; subsequently, it shows a declining trend such that there is no deficit until 2041 but, by 2050, the accumulated deficit would be as high as RMB 95,221.789 billion. When the economic growth rate is increased by 100.6%, the cumulative pension balance is expected to increase from RMB 9,012.030 billion in 2020 to RMB 72,496.545 billion in 2042; subsequently, the accumulated pension balance shows a declining trend, but there is no accumulated deficit before 2050.

5. Conclusions

Based on the actuarial model and taking the basic pension insurance of urban employees in China as an example, this study focuses on the impact of changes in population structure and population policy adjustments on pension sustainability in the critical period of realizing China’s “two hundred-year goals.”

The conclusions are as follows: (1) With a change in population structure, China’s pension financial situation is likely to show a deteriorating trend such that a pension accumulated deficit would first appear in 2028 and would be as high as RMB 147,411.037 billion in 2050. (2) Compared with the benchmark scenario, the high fertility scenario would improve the financial situation of pensions after 2041 while slightly worsening the situation before 2041. However, even if the fertility level matched the replacement level, it would not change the trend of pension accumulated deficit after 2028. (3) Delayed retirement significantly improves the financial situation of pensions; the greater is the intensity of delayed retirement, the better is its effect. Generally speaking, it results in an increasing trend in the accumulated balance of pensions with no deficit before 2050. (4) Reducing the pension growth rate would help to improve the financial situation of pensions; the lower is the pension growth rate, the better is the pension financial situation. If the pension growth rate is equal to or below 0, there would be no accumulated deficit until 2050. (5) The higher the economic growth rate compared to the benchmark scenario, the better is the pension financial situation. If the future economic growth is more than double that of the benchmark scenario, there would be no deficit in pensions before 2050.

In summary, given China’s trend of rapid aging in the future, in order to improve the financial status of pensions and protect the welfare of the elderly, we should focus on reducing pension growth and increasing economic growth, and especially postponing the statutory retirement age. Nonetheless, this study has some limitations. For example, it does not consider the status of pension funds in other fertility scenarios, the impact of retirement policies on actuarial parameters, and the effect of gender differences on pension funds. These areas could form topics for future research.

Supporting information

S1 Data. Support data.

(XLSX)

pone.0331739.s001.xlsx (96.6KB, xlsx)

Data Availability

All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting information files.

Funding Statement

21FRKB003/The Post-funded Projects of the National Social Science Fund.

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Decision Letter 0

Agus Faturohim

31 Jan 2025

PONE-D-24-42892Change in Population Structure, Policy Adjustment, and Public Pension SustainabilityPLOS ONE

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Reviewer #1: This is a well thought out, well reasoned paper. I enjoyed reading it and I think it adds to our knowledge.

The only comment that I have is making the definition of "high-fertility" scenario more clear earlier in the manuscript. The first time you mention "high-fertility" I would describe what that means in the context of this paper. A TFR of 1.94 is not high-fertility in much of the world, but is within the context of China. Just define it as soon as possible.

Reviewer #2: This paper deals with predictions for the public pension fund of urban employees in China under various assumptions about fertility, economic growth and policy decisions on retirement age and pension growth rate. The results look interesting.

However, the analysis/elaboration suffers from important shortcomings, such as details on the actuarial model used and the methodology applied to derive the projections. Also missing is an explanation of the public pension system in China and a justification of why only urban workers are analysed.

Specific remarks:

The paper concentrates specifically in China. This should be incorporated in the tittle.

The paper states that the analysis is based on actuarial models for pension income, expenditure and accumulated balance, but does not make explicit or explain what these actuarial models are; in particular, what actuarial tables on future survival/mortality are used?

Does immigration/emigration play no role in the evolution of the population in China? This aspect needs to be explained.

The literature review in the Introduction section is too generic and should be more specific. On the other hand, the terminology used, ‘pension funds’, has different interpretations depending on the pension system in each country. The characteristics of the public pension system in China should be explained succinctly, which, from the subsequent development, seems to use only the pay-as-you-go system, so the term ‘pension fund’ may not be the most appropriate.

In Section 2. First paragraph. The definition of the four groups into which the participants are divided is not clear and needs to be better explained, it is not sufficient to cite Documents No 26, 1997 and 38, 2005. Issues such as, for example, should be made clear:

A person from the post-1997 employees group can also be a member of the post-2005 retiree group?

Can a person from the post-1997 retirees also be a member of the post-2005 retiree group?

In formula (1):

Where does t start?

What is t_0?

If {AI}_t represents the pension income, for t>1997, why do we include the group i=1 which collects pre-1997 retirees?

In formula (2):

Where does the variable t begin and end?

{\bar{B}}_{t,x}^i and s_{t,x}^i depend on x?

The product \prod should end at t-1.

In formula (3):

Where does the variable t begin and end?

{\bar{B}}_{t,x}^i and s_{t,x}^i depend on x?

Is it possible that 1998-(t-x+a_t) becomes negative?

The product \prod should end at t-1.

In formula (4), r should be defined.

Subsection 2.4:

The assumption that “the age at first employment of urban employees is 20 years” should be better justified, perhaps using official statistics. This age is constant for all of the years included in the study?

Which is the difference between “female workers” and “female cadres”?

Given the large difference in the retirement ages of men and women, do expressions (1) and (2) take into account that the parameters a_t and b_t are different for each sex? How is this issue implemented in the calculations? Are the same parameters used for both sexes?

The assumption that “the age at the average retirement age of urban employees is 55 years” should be better justified, perhaps using official statistics.

The cohort component method used to predict the population distribution by age in urban and rural areas must be explained, at least in outline, and the predictions obtained should be shown in an annex.

The number of pension contributors, the age distribution of pension recipients and the labor participation rates of corresponding age groups and also the number of pension contributors and pension recipients in the future. All these results should be shown in an annex.

Why only two future fertility scenarios, and why not include a scenario of declining fertility?

What are the values of c_t?

Section 3. What is the ‘change in the population structure’ ? Describe this change.

The authors should consider changing the presentation of the results, replacing some tables with graphs and leaving the tables in an annex. It would also be useful to create more elaborate tables that include summarised information: for example, first year of deficit occurrence according to the scenario.

The introduction mentions different articles that make predictions about the China's pension fund gap. The results obtained in this paper should be compared with those of previous work.

Although I have not checked the rest of the references, references 18, 23, 32 and 34 are incorrect.

Reviewer #3: Reviewer Feedback

Specific Comments:

Regarding the statement: "If the pension system is not adjusted accordingly, China will use the equivalent of 10% of the same period’s GDP to subsidize the pension gap," could you elaborate further? Is this an obligation for the Chinese government as a lender of last resort? Is there a legal basis for this, or is it simply a social contract? Please clarify.

For the claim: "Improvement in fertility levels can significantly improve the financial status of the pension fund, especially when the newborn grows and enters the labor market," is this policy always beneficial? For instance, if China pursues this policy, wouldn't it be akin to taking one step forward and one step back (e.g., considering the 1980s one-child policy)? Please expand on this.

In "this study divides the participants of the old-age insurance system into four samples: pre-1997 retirees, post-1997 retirees, post-2005 retirees, and post-1997 employees," what was the rationale behind dividing the sample into these four groups? Was this based solely on the two government documents (State Council decisions), or are there best practices from other countries influencing this approach? Please elaborate.

In "Pension Income Model, equation 1," could you explain what each variable represents? Additionally, why is pension income represented as a summation notation? It seems that pension benefits should vary across individuals, even within the same cohort. How did you simulate this? Please include further details in the article.

For "the total number of current employees participating in social pension insurance in year t," individuals have varying contribution periods and cannot be generalized. As an economist (not an actuary), I would assume you used individual-level data to analyze this. Is this correct?

Regarding "growth rate of contribution base in year t," is this actual data or an assumption? Was this rate determined by the government, or did you establish the assumptions yourself? Please clarify.

For "total number of retired employees multiplied by the per capita basic pension in year t," this appears to calculate the average pension income as a simple product of two averages. Could you provide the data distribution? Is it normally distributed? Based on my experience, pension recipients are typically from the middle-to-upper income classes. I am unfamiliar with the definition of “basic pension” in China—does this mean everyone is eligible for the benefits? Is a basic pension equivalent to a universal pension scheme? Please explain.

The mention of "i-class workers" is intriguing. Do you also distinguish workers by sector? Pension programs predominantly benefit formal sector workers, but what about informal workers or unpaid family laborers? In family-run Chinese businesses, for example, children often work without formal pay. Am I mistaken?

The "Pension Accumulated Balance Model" appears to follow a simple accumulation method. Why is compound interest not incorporated here, as it typically is when calculating future value using discounting methods?

In "It is assumed that the average retirement age of urban employees is 55 years," who established this assumption?

For "Regarding the contribution rate of social pension insurance, enterprises pay 20% and individuals pay 8%," who covers the remaining contributions?

The statement "the growth rate of the pension contribution base is directly linked with the economic growth rate"—whose claim is this? Is there a literature basis for it?

"Table 2. Financial Status of Pension under a Change in Population Structure"—this table would be easier to understand as a multiple line chart. For instance, the statement "According to Table 2, it can be observed that the current pension balance shows a downward trend" suggests that trends are better visualized in graphs than in tables.

The scenario "Financial Status of Pensions under Different Delayed Retirement Scenarios" seems to appear abruptly. How did you arrive at this scenario? Please explain.

In "this study focuses on the impact," it may be better to avoid the term "impact," as it implies causality. Consider using alternative terms such as "simulation" or "forecasting."

The conclusion section should directly answer the research questions. If there are four research questions, ensure the conclusions align with and address each one.

The statement "we should focus on reducing pension growth and increasing economic growth, especially by postponing the statutory retirement age"—I agree that postponing the retirement age is the most manageable policy. Could you further elaborate on specific public policies related to your findings? For example, link them to existing regulations or real-world conditions.

General Comments:

Please adopt a deductive writing approach: start with a main topic sentence, followed by explanatory sentences. Limit each paragraph to a single main idea.

There are numerous technical terms that might be difficult for general readers to understand. Consider providing simple definitions for these terms to aid comprehension.

As an economist, I noticed several economic assumptions lacking sufficient references. For instance, the paper by Lu and Cai (2016) is over eight years old. Are their forecasts still relevant?

Analytical tools could be better chosen. For example, trends are better analyzed with graphs rather than tables.

The writing appears somewhat disjointed. For readers without an actuarial background, it may be challenging to follow.

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Reviewer #3: No

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Attachment

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pone.0331739.s002.pdf (168.4KB, pdf)
PLoS One. 2025 Sep 26;20(9):e0331739. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0331739.r002

Author response to Decision Letter 1


2 Aug 2025

Response to reviewers

Dear Editor,

We sincerely thank you and the reviewers for the thorough evaluation of our manuscript and the constructive suggestions provided. We have carefully revised the manuscript in response to all comments, improving its clarity, rigor, and completeness. Below we summarize the major revisions made in response to each reviewer’s feedback.

Response Summary

Revisions Based on Reviewer 1’s Comments

Clarification of “high fertility rate”

We added a clear definition at the first mention: the “high fertility rate” scenario refers to the fertility level under China’s universal two-child policy. Following Lu & Cai (2016), a theoretical TFR of 1.94 is adopted as a hypothetical scenario for simulation purposes only, and we explicitly note that actual TFR levels remain much lower.

Revisions Based on Reviewer 2’s Comments

Title modification

Revised to: “Change in Population Structure, Policy Adjustment, and China Public Pension Sustainability.”

Detailed actuarial model explanation

A full description of the three core modules (Pension Revenue, Pension Expenditure, and Cumulative Balance Models) has been added, with explicit variable definitions and references to China’s National Life Tables (2010 & 2020).

Migration explanation

We clarified that migration was excluded due to the national-level policy focus but acknowledged its importance for future research.

First employment age assumption

Provided justification based on legal, educational, and modeling considerations, confirming that a fixed age of 20 years balances realism and model simplicity.

Definition of female workers vs. female cadres

Clarified based on occupational distinctions under China’s retirement system.

Average retirement age assumption

Justified using official MOHRSS data (average 54+, rounded to 55 years for modeling).

Population projections

Added a brief description of the cohort-component method.

Fertility scenarios

Clarified that only baseline (TFR=1.6) and high fertility (TFR=1.94) scenarios were set due to policy relevance.

Presentation improvements

Converted key tables to graphs, and added comparisons with previous studies in Section 4.3.

References

Corrected formatting errors, especially references 18, 23, 32, and 34.

Revisions Based on Reviewer 3’s Comments

Clarification of the “10% GDP subsidy” statement

Explained its legal basis (Social Insurance Law, Article 13), fiscal responsibility (MOHRSS statements), and clarified it as a worst-case warning from James (2002) rather than a deterministic forecast.

Fertility policy evaluation

Added detailed analysis showing that increased fertility has short-term fiscal costs (extra CNY 769.3 bn/year deficit pre-2041) and only modest long-term benefits (12% deficit reduction by 2050), emphasizing the need for parametric reforms.

Four-group classification

Explained its policy basis (State Council Documents No.26 (1997) and No.38 (2005)) and its purpose to quantify transition costs.

Formula 1 clarification

Defined all variables and justified summations as necessary for group and age aggregation, with heterogeneity reflected indirectly.

Macro vs. micro data

Justified the use of macro-aggregated data due to data access limits and the study’s focus on long-term sustainability.

Contribution base growth rate

Clarified it as an assumed parameter, supported by policy documents and academic research linking wage and GDP growth.

Cumulative balance model

Explained that no discounting was applied as the focus is on cash flow solvency, with present-value analysis reserved for future work.

Policy implications

Highlighted gradual delayed retirement as the most feasible reform, consistent with China’s 2025 Progressive Retirement Law (surplus of CNY 49.44 tn by 2050 under gradual delay).

Conclusion

We have revised the manuscript substantially to address all reviewers’ comments. The revised version now provides clearer model definitions, improved methodological transparency, and enhanced policy relevance. We thank you and the reviewers again for your valuable feedback, which has greatly improved the quality of our work.

Best regards,

[Meng Jia]

Response to Reviewer 1

Dear Reviewer,

Thank you very much for your thoughtful and encouraging comments on our manuscript. We truly appreciate your recognition of our work and your constructive suggestion, which will help us improve the clarity of the paper.

Regarding your concern about the definition of the “high fertility rate” scenario:

We agree that the definition should be clarified at the beginning of the manuscript, as a total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.94 may not generally be considered “high” in many parts of the world, but it has specific contextual meaning in China. In the revised manuscript, we have added a clear definition when the term is first introduced. Specifically, we state that in this study, the “high fertility rate” scenario refers to the fertility level under the universal two-child policy in China, under which families are allowed to have up to two children. Based on the simulation assumptions of Lu and Cai (2016) (From Demographic Dividend to Reform Dividend: A Simulation Based on China’s Potential Growth Rate, Population & Economics, 39, 3–23), we adopt a theoretical TFR of 1.94 to represent this “high fertility” scenario. We also explicitly note that this is a hypothetical assumption for theoretical discussion only, and that the actual TFR in China is expected to remain far below this level.

We have revised the corresponding section accordingly to ensure that readers can easily understand the context-specific meaning of “high fertility rate.”

Thank you again for your valuable comment.

Response to Reviewer 2

Dear Reviewer,

Thank you very much for your careful reading and valuable comments on our manuscript. Your suggestions are constructive and have greatly helped us improve the clarity, rigor, and completeness of the paper. We have carefully addressed each point, and the manuscript has been revised accordingly. Our detailed responses are as follows:

1. Title should explicitly indicate that the study focuses on China

Response: The title has been revised as suggested. The new title is:

“Change in Population Structure, Policy Adjustment, and China Public Pension Sustainability.”

2. Clarification of the actuarial model and mortality/life tables used

Response: A detailed explanation of the actuarial model has been added in Section 2, specifying its three core modules:

1. Pension Revenue Model

The annual pension revenue is calculated based on the number of contributors, wage growth rate, and contribution rate. The formula incorporates age-specific survival rates to estimate the number of active insured individuals N_(t,x)^i.

〖AI〗_t=[∑_(i=1)^4▒〖∑_(x=a_t)^(b_t-1)▒N_(t,x)^i ]×w ¯_t×〗R_t�1�

where N_(t,x)^i is estimated based on age-specific surviving population projections.

2. Pension Expenditure Model

The calculation of pension expenditure involves the survival years of retirees, pension growth rate, and benefit level, which require age-specific mortality rates to compute the survival rate of retirees.

〖AC〗_(t,b)=∑_(i=1)^4▒〖∑_(x=b_t)^(c_t)▒〖[N_(t,x)^i×B ¯_(t,x)^i 〖×s〗_(t,x)^i×∏_(s=t-x+b_t)^t▒〖(1+g_s)〗〗]〗 (2)

〖AC〗_(t,g)=∑_(i=2)^3▒∑_(x=b_t)^(c_t)▒〖〖{N〗_(t,x)^i×G ¯_(t,x)^i 〖×[1998-(t-x+a_t )]×v〗_(t,x)^i×∏_(s=t-x+b_t)^t▒(1+g_s ) }〗(3)

Here, the age-specific number of retirees N_(t,x)^i is directly derived from life tables.

3. Cumulative Balance Model

The cumulative pension balance is dynamically updated by iterating the revenue-expenditure difference, relying on the outputs of the previous two models. The assumptions of survival rates and mortality rates remain crucial in this module.

F_t=F_(t-1) (1+r)+(〖AI〗_t-〖AC〗_t ). (4)

where AI_t and〖 AC〗_t are calculated based on the active and retired population sizes adjusted by mortality rates.

We specify that age-specific mortality rates are based on China’s National Population Census Life Tables (2010 and 2020 editions), with interpolations to estimate annual survival probabilities. Variables and formulas (1)–(4) are now fully defined in the text.

3. Explanation for excluding migration in the model

Response: Migration was not incorporated into the core analytical model of this study; however, this does not imply that migration plays “no role” in China’s demographic evolution. The exclusion of migration primarily reflects the scope and focus of the present research.

The central objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of population structure changes (aging and fertility rates) and domestic policy adjustments (delayed retirement and pension growth rates) on the sustainability of China’s Urban Employee Basic Pension (UEBP) system. Accordingly, all model parameters are set at the national level, based on macro variables such as fertility rates, statutory retirement ages, and economic growth rates. Regional variations in migration patterns and the influence of population mobility on the composition of insured participants were not considered. Specifically, the number of contributors in the actuarial model�N_(t,x)^i) is projected solely based on age distribution and fertility assumptions, without incorporating cross-regional migration variables. The macro-policy scenarios designed in this study are limited to fertility policy, retirement age, pension growth rate, and economic growth, and no migration scenarios were simulated.

That said, numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that population mobility significantly affects China’s demographic dynamics and the regional sustainability of pension systems by reshaping population structures, labor supply, and the distribution of aging. Recognizing this limitation, future research will seek to integrate migration factors to enhance the accuracy and policy relevance of pension sustainability simulations.

4. Assumption of first employment age at 20

Response: The assumption that the first employment age of urban employees is 20 years is based on a combination of legal requirements, educational realities, and the need for model simplification. This age remains fixed throughout the study period and is not dynamically adjusted across historical stages, for the following reasons:

Legal and educational constraints

The statutory minimum employment age in China is 16 years (Labor Law, Article 15). However, the actual labor market entry age has increased significantly due to the universalization of compulsory education and the expansion of higher education.

Extended education duration: Most individuals enter the labor market after completing high school or vocational education, typically around 18 years of age.

Job-seeking transition period: Adding a transitional period for job seeking, assuming a stable first employment age of 20 years is consistent with the current labor market reality.

Model simplification and consistency

Rationale for a fixed parameter: Actuarial forecasting requires controlling for certain parameters to isolate policy effects (e.g., delayed retirement, fertility changes). Allowing the first employment age to vary over time would unnecessarily increase model complexity.

Limited historical variation: Although the average working-age population increased from 32.25 years in 1985 to 39.72 years in 2022, changes in the first employment age have been relatively small (e.g., only a 1–2 year delay for post-2000 cohorts compared to post-1990 cohorts), exerting negligible impact on long-term pension sustainability projections.

In summary, assuming a fixed first employment age of 20 years strikes a balance between the legal minimum age (16 years), educational attainment (post-high school entry), and the need for model simplicity. While this assumption does not fully account for urban–rural or gender differences or minor historical fluctuations, it is unlikely to affect the robustness of the long-term pension sustainability results and remains broadly consistent with the dominant trend in China’s labor market.

5. Difference between “female workers” and “female cadres”

Response: According to China’s current retirement system, the distinction between female workers and female cadres primarily lies in the nature of their positions:

Female workers (non-managerial positions): This category refers to women engaged in production, operational, or service-oriented roles that are non-managerial in nature, such as assembly line workers, cashiers, or logistics and support staff.

Female cadres (managerial/technical positions): This category refers to women holding managerial or professional technical positions with decision-making authority or specialized technical functions, such as department managers, financial supervisors, engineers, or teachers.

6. Average retirement age assumption (55 years)

Response: The assumption is based on the statement by Vice Minister Zhang Yizhen (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security), who reported that the average retirement age of urban employees is slightly above 54 years. For modeling simplicity, we rounded it to 55 years.

7. Population projection method & results

Response: We added a brief explanation of the cohort-component method used for projecting age-specific population distributions in Section 2.4.

8. Fertility scenarios

Response: We clarified that only baseline (TFR = 1.6) and high fertility (TFR = 1.94) scenarios were set to evaluate policy interventions. A lower fertility scenario was not included because it had limited policy relevance at the time of the study.

9. Presentation of results & comparison with previous studies

Response: We converted part of the tables into graphs for better readability, and added a comparison with previous studies in Section 4.3.

10. Reference corrections

Response: We thoroughly checked and corrected all reference formatting errors, including references 18, 23, 32, and 34.

Response to Reviewer 3

Dear Reviewer,

Thank you very much for your detailed and insightful comments. We have carefully revised the manuscript and provide the following responses to your specific questions, maintaining as much detail as possible for clarity.

1. Clarification of the statement “China will need to subsidize pension deficits equivalent to 10% of GDP”

The statement originates from James (2002) and should be interpreted in the context of legal obligations, government roles, and the nature of the projection:

(1) Legal basis and fiscal responsibility

The Social Insurance Law of China (Article 13) clearly stipulates that “when the basic pension fund is insufficient to cover payments, the government shall provide subsidies.” This legal provision makes fiscal subsidies a mandatory state responsibility, not a voluntary or merely contractual arrangement.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) has officially stated that historical pension liabilities are jointly borne by the social insurance system and the national budget, with fiscal transfers used to fill the funding gap. Therefore, government subsidies are a statutory fiscal safety net rather than an ad hoc intervention.

(2) Social contract dimension

China’s public pension system embodies an intergenerational social contract: the working-age population finances current retirees, and the government, as the institutional guarantor, ensures system sustainability.

When demographic aging undermines the balance of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system (e.g., our baseline projection indicates a cumulative deficit of CNY 147.4 trillion by 2050), fiscal subsidies become necessary to maintain this social contract. However, the contract is institutionalized through law, making it a state obligation rather than simply a moral or political commitment.

(3) Nature of the “10% of GDP” projection

James’s estimate assumes a no-reform scenario (low statutory retirement age, high replacement rates) and represents a worst-case risk warning rather than a deterministic outcome.

Our simulations show that policy adjustments—such as raising the statutory retirement age to 65 or controlling pension growth rates to ≤0—can effectively avoid such extreme deficits. Thus, the 10% of GDP figure should be seen as a cautionary assumption rather than a predicted realit

Attachment

Submitted filename: 0727-Response to reviewers.docx

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Decision Letter 1

Agus Faturohim

21 Aug 2025

Change in Population Structure, Policy Adjustment, and Public Pension Sustainability

PONE-D-24-42892R1

Dear Dr. MENG,

We’re pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been judged scientifically suitable for publication and will be formally accepted for publication once it meets all outstanding technical requirements.

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Kind regards,

Agus Faturohim

Guest Editor

PLOS ONE

Additional Editor Comments (optional):

I appreciate your efforts to completely address all of the reviewers' requests. Congratulations on your article's strong statistical explanation and meeting all of the reviewers' revision requests.

Reviewers' comments:

Acceptance letter

Agus Faturohim

PONE-D-24-42892R1

PLOS ONE

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