Intersecting injustices: child marriage and the law in conflict-affected Sudan

Abstract

Sudan is the only country in North Africa that is yet to reform its family law embodied by the Personal Status Act for Muslims of 1991. This law legalises child marriage, contradicts the National Child Act of 2010 that outlaws child marriage. This study aimed to understand how the pluralistic legal system in Sudan affects the occurrence and circumstances of child marriage in Kassala State in the context of the current war, to inform future advocacy efforts to ban child marriage. Thirteen key informants were interviewed in Kassala state and at the national level, complemented by one focus group discussion (FGD) at national level. In Kassala state, seven FGDs and eight in-depth interviews were held with young people who married as children and with parents whose children married under 18 years. Data were transcribed and coded, after which thematic analysis was undertaken. The findings affirm that child marriage is a commonplace practice, often justified by religion, driven by financial incentives and the on-going war. The closure of schools since 2023, abuses of girls by armed forces, and growing financial precarity are prompting parents to marry their daughters early. Community informants displayed a lack of awareness regarding the laws around child marriage and the legal minimum age of marriage. Contradictions between the laws create confusion and leave room for different interpretations, which are influenced by religion and social norms, further complicating the legal landscape. Although mazons (local marriage registrars) are mandated to follow civil law, they officiate underage marriages to conform to ‘local culture’, due to parental pressure, or because of false age certificates presented by families. Previous legal reform efforts failed to create consensus among religious hardliners and activists. Sudan’s pluralistic legal system has institutionalised gender inequality and legitimised the culturally accepted practice of child marriage. A future post-war recovery period might provide a window of opportunity for law reform. Sudan could build on successful strategies used by neighbouring countries to reform the family law. Policy and legal reform need to be accompanied by broader social and economic change, including advances in gender equality, to address child marriage in Sudan.

Background

Child marriage, defined as any legal or customary union involving a girl or a boy below the age of 18, is a violation of human rights. Child marriage has negative effects on girls’ and young women’s health, education, economic and social status [1]. Many countries have legally banned the practice [2]. Legal reform – accompanied by interventions addressing social norm change, education, economic empowerment and access to services – makes child marriage less acceptable in society and provides girls with legal protection. Legal reform is instrumental in preventing child marriage and achieving the Sustainable Development Goal target of ending child marriage by 2030 [3, 4].

In Sudan, girls are not protected from child marriage by a legal minimum age of marriage nor by abolishment of parental and judicial consent in cases of underage marriage [4]. In 2014, 38% of women (20–49 years) were married before the age of 18 and 12% of women (15–49 years) were married before the age of 15. Child marriage was more prevalent in rural (42%) than in urban (29%) areas [5]. Unlike in other countries, there has been no consistent decline in child marriage rate over time in Sudan [6].

Research from Eastern Sudan reveals that child marriage indeed occurs because of the legality of the practice, combined with poverty and gender discriminatory norms [7]. Child marriage is practiced to prevent premarital sex and maintain girls’ chastity, avoid related stigma, and keep the family honour. Marrying girls young is also believed to be good for socializing girls to be obedient to their husbands, and to avoid stigma related to ‘not being demanded for marriage’ [7]. Girls’ education is often regarded as unimportant and is also seen as encouraging immoral behaviour [6]. Further, marrying a girl early decreases dowry and shifts the financial burden from the family of the girl to the husband [7].

The legal pluralism that characterises Sudan’s legal system is an outcome of colonialism [8], combining Egyptian, Ottoman, British and Sudanese systems [9, 10]. The legality of child marriage in Sudan stems from a conservative interpretation of Sharia1. Sudan’s Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 [11], based heavily on Sharia, does not define a minimum age of marriage and states that marriage can take place at the age of ‘tamyeez’ i.e. maturity. Maturity is interpreted as reaching puberty, where female puberty begins with menarche. The law implies 10 years to be the minimum age of marriage [12]. The law also states that a guardian of a minor girl (10 years) cannot conclude her marriage contract unless there is permission from the judge. The Personal Status Law for Muslims, considered to be a law with the most severe gender gaps when compared with other Islamic countries [6], contradicts with the National Child Act of 2010 [13], which defines a child as a person younger than 18 years. However, this National Child Act does not explicitly refer to marriage. For those who are not Muslim (an estimated 9% of the population) [14], there is a Sudan Marriage of Non-Muslims Act (1926), where the minimum age for marriage is 13 for girls and 15 for boys [15]. This Act also states that consent in the case of minors is required for marriage, which is primarily the written and signed consent of the father. Although the Sudanese Criminal Act of 1991 does not directly refer to child marriage, it criminalises female genital mutilation (FGM) and addresses violence against women [12]. In addition, customary law is recognized in Sudan, and it is highly influenced by Sharia law. Personal, family and community disputes are often settled through informal customary institutions via religious leaders, tribal councils or customary institutions (town and rural courts) applying customary law via traditional leaders [16, 17]. Customary laws have been contentious due to gender bias and being arbitrary in their definition and application, which has also made it difficult to differentiate custom as a legal source from religious or traditional/cultural practices [17].

Over the past decade, there have been several efforts to reform the Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991. In 2006, a National Committee for Review of Women’s Status in Laws was established by the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security. This First National Committee proposed significant amendments of the law, including a minimum age of marriage of 18 years, based on the constitution’s bill of rights, the National Child Act of 2010, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1990. None of the Committee’s proposals were adopted because of religious backlash. Between 2009 and 2012, the Sudan Organisation for Research and Development (SORD), a non-governmental organisation (NGO), proposed an alternative family law to address, amongst others, the issue of child marriage. Islamists found the proposed reforms too radical [18]. This, combined with limited civic space for mobilization of women’s rights, halted the initiative. In 2014, the National Council for Child Welfare developed a national Child Marriage Abandonment Strategy, but the Strategy was never endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministers (UNICEF 2017). In 2016, the Ministry of Justice established a National Committee for Family Law Reform (Second National Committee) and invited a representative from SORD to take part – they presented the voices of other activists in this Committee [19]. The intention was to explicitly legislate a minimum age of marriage of 18, however, religious institutions, Members of Parliament, the media and the courts mobilised against this effort. This counter-mobilization argued that the National Child Act conflicts with Sharia and therefore with the 2005 Constitution, and that the National Child Act should be invalidated. This invalidation did not happen, but at the same time the Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 was not amended and in practice, remained superior to the National Child Act [20]. Following the Sudanese Revolution of 2018–2019, the Transitional Government of Sudan approved a National Strategy and Action Plan for Ending Child Marriage (2020–2030). The Transitional Government executed legal reform vis-à-vis FGM, apostasy and women being able to travel without permits in July 2020 [21] and aimed for comprehensive reform to address child marriage [14]. Further, a National Taskforce to End Child Marriage in Sudan with representatives from several Councils, Ministries, UN agencies and NGOs was established. These initiatives did not bring legal reform efforts further, as the dismission, subsequent reinstation and eventual resignation of the Prime Minister (2021- [22]) left Sudan in a political impasse. The current war that started in April 2023 makes further progress in legal reform impossible.

In the meantime, child marriage has reportedly increased since schools have been shut since April 2023, and families are using it as a strategy to protect their daughters and mitigate financial difficulties [22, 23]. Especially in these times, there is a need to give voice to young women to provide insight into the current situation of child marriage in Sudan, and to reflect on current interpretations of child marriage-related laws among key actors. This study aims to increase our understanding of how the pluralistic legal system in Sudan affects the occurrence and circumstances of child marriage in Kassala State in the context of the current war, to inform future advocacy to prevent and ultimately ban child marriage by law.

Methodology

This was an exploratory qualitative study conducted between July 2022 and January 2025. The research team included a Sudanese researcher (who was first based in Sudan and then in Uganda), a research coordinator and four research assistants (based in Sudan), and researchers from KIT Institute (the Netherlands). All members of the research team were women except for one male research assistant.

Study area

Kassala state was selected because this study sought to inform the Break Free! Programme (2021–2025) that aims to prevent child marriage in this state. Kassala’s child marriage rate was 45% among women (15–49 years) in 2014 [5]. Based on the security situation, the rural area of El-Elio community in River Atbara locality, the urban areas of Elthoura (also known as Al-Thawra) community in New Halfa locality, and Kassala town were selected for data collection.

Kassala has a population of 2.9 million people. The state hosts over 116,000 refugees and asylum seekers (primarily from Ethiopia and Eritrea), and Kassala has welcomed large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Various ethnic groups reside in Kassala state, but the Beja and its dominant Handandawa tribe dominate Kassala’s culture. Agriculture and raising livestock are the main economic activities and there is gendered division of labour, with women primarily restricted to the home. Despite high enrolment rates in secondary school prior to the war, the literacy rate among young women (15–24 years) is only 48% [24, 25].

Study methods and participant selection

Thirteen interviews and one focus group discussion (FGD) with key informants provided insights into law interpretation and implementation, conflict impacts, and past legal reform efforts concerning child marriage. Insights into local law enforcement were provided by marriage registrars, police, civil society, youth organisations, religious associations, and government officials in Kassala. Seven FGDs and eight in-depth interviews (IDIs) were conducted with parents/caregivers and young people who were married as children. While the FGDs with them provided insight into group norms on child marriage, the IDIs gave participants the opportunity to share individual stories. Six to eight persons participated in each FGD and a total of 76 persons participated in the study (Table 1). The study tools were developed by the authors and were informed by the literature.

Table 1.

Overview of methods and study participants

Participants	Locality/Level	Numbers
Key informant interviews (KIIs)
Civil society organisations (incl. women organisations)	Kassala town National level	1 1
Religious associations/organisations	New Halfa National level	1 1
(Former) Government officials	Kassala state National level	1 2
Legal group/Lawyer associations	National level	1
Marriage registrars	River Atbara	1
Traditional leaders	River Atbara	1
Youth organisations	Kassala town	1
Police	Kassala town	1
Total number of KIIs		13
Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)
Young people (18–24 years) married as children (32 participants) 2 with females 2 with males	River Atbara New Halfa New Halfa	1 1 2
Parents/caregivers (16 participants) Female caregivers Male caregivers Mixed genders	New Halfa River Atbara Kassala town	1 1 1
Key informants (lawyers and human rights defenders) (7 participants)	Kampala, Uganda	1
Total number of FGDs		8
In-depth interviews (IDIs)
Young people (18–24 years) married as children 4 with females 2 with males	River Atbara Kassala town River Atbara Kassala town	2 2 1 1
Parents/caregivers, involved in child marriage	New Halfa	2
Total IDIs		8
Total number of study participants		76

The Break Free! team based in Kassala supported the research team in the selection and recruitment of participants. People living in Kassala for at least five years and who had knowledge of local issues were selected. Prior to data collection, the Sudanese lead researcher and research coordinator trained the research assistants on the study objectives, methods, research ethics, positionality, data management and security while in the field. The tools and consent forms were developed by the authors in English and translated into Arabic. All tools were discussed, tested and refined with the full research team before data collection started.

Data collection

Key informants at the national level were interviewed by telephone as data collection was not possible in Khartoum due to the war and several government officials and civil society organisation (CSO) staff had left the country during the study period. An FGD with key informants was conducted in person in Kampala, Uganda. All informants at the state and local level in Kassala were interviewed in person. The FGDs and IDIs were conducted in private spaces chosen by the participants. All interviews were conducted in Arabic. The Kassala team stayed in close contact with the Sudanese lead researcher via phone and internet during data collection. All data collection was conducted in March 2024 except for the FGD with key informants, which was conducted in January 2025.

Interviews and FGDs were digitally recorded upon consent of the participants. Since many participants felt uncomfortable with being recorded, comprehensive notes were taken by two notetakers to capture all nuances. Research assistants also took field notes. The recorded interviews were transcribed and then translated into English by the Sudanese lead researcher. Transcripts were checked at random against audio files to ensure quality. Interview and field notes were translated in English as well.

Researchers informed local authorities and leadership about the study’s objectives to prevent misconceptions and obtained permission from the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) before data collection. The team discussed the security situation daily to ensure participants’ and researchers’ safety.

Data analysis

An initial coding framework was developed based on the topic guides and literature. This coding framework was used to code all data using Microsoft Excel and Nvivo. New codes were added to the framework after discussion among the authors. Main themes and sub-themes were identified and narratives were written. The team worked jointly on data analysis to reduce bias. A session with Break Free! staff, the research team, partner organisations and government representatives was organised to validate the study findings.

Findings

Contextualising the findings: demographic characteristics of the participants and impact of the conflict

The participants from all localities were a mix of homemakers (primarily women), petty traders, farmers, animal herders, traders, teachers and shopkeepers. Their education levels varied, with most participants having basic or lower levels of education. Following the study inclusion criteria, most participants were permanent residents of Kassala State. They were primarily from the Beja ethnic group. All young people were married and 18 years or older. Key informants had different backgrounds, levels of education and came from different disciplines and geographical locations.

The impact of the war was visible through participants’ accounts. Essential commodities, food and fuel have become prohibitively expensive. Free healthcare is absent at local health centres, and access to basic medication and emergency assistance is sporadic. Frequent power outages disrupt the internet and financial transactions. A few participants spoke of the scarcity and unaffordability of clean water. Several participants observed an increase in IDPs and overcrowding as people from cities returned to their villages. Schools have been closed since April 2023 and have been converted to shelters to house IDPs. Many IDPs have lost their proof of identity and face challenges to seek formal jobs. There is neither a formal government at the national level, nor a governmental rule of law. A local government official in Kassala spoke of the increase in sexual violence faced by women in shelters, alongside a higher risk of sexual violence by the military.

Child marriage in Kassala state is custom, is driven by financial incentives and recently by war.

Among the tribes in Eastern Sudan, particularly the Handandawa tribe of the Beja group, child marriage is custom. Most participants believed that it was the norm to be married early. Despite many participants (youth, mothers and some fathers) experiencing the negative consequences of child marriage, it is widely accepted as a long-standing tradition.

Customs and traditions do not change, they are unchangeable in our tribe, and alas, I am going to do the same for my children, and even if I try to change, the tribe will not allow me to do so, and I will be considered an outcast. Deep inside me, I wish for my children to go to school and to be free to decide for themselves whom to marry and what type of work they like. Unfortunately, this is a farfetched dream, and I am not seeing any crack in our solid customs that make us hope for a change. [Young man, 18 years IDI, New Halfa, Kassala]

Across the board, as per youth and parents alike, fathers decide the partner and timing of marriage and continue to safeguard the custom of child marriage, with young people having no possibility to refuse. Some participants’ beliefs on child marriage are also informed by Islamic norms. According to some participants such as a representative of a religious organisation, a marriage registrar and parents in an FGD, child marriage is acceptable as Prophet Mohammed reportedly married Aisha when she was nine years old. Two key informants noted that customary law and the Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 uphold child marriage, and that religious leaders and elders enforce these laws.

Families also believed that child marriage is a means to alleviate poverty. Many participants outlined that girls’ families find it advantageous if the financial responsibility of raising the young woman can be passed on to a wealthy suitor. Moreover, they see the bride price (known as dowry in Sudan) received from the groom and his family as a financial benefit as well. A young woman chose to marry young so that she could lighten the financial burden on her mother. In fact, because girls are viewed as financial burdens, their education is not prioritised. This further reinforces marriage as a suitable next step for the future.

I was forced to stop at the basic level, because I was engaged while in the sixth grade, and I didn’t refuse because society treats those who refuse as lacking manners and going against prevailing customs. After the engagement, they prevented me from getting an education. My desire was to continue my studies and obtain a certificate. [Young woman, 23 years old, IDI, River Atbara]

With schools closed due to the conflict and poverty increasing, many participants reported that child marriage had increased. In such a context, people perceived the likelihood of pregnancies out of wedlock to be higher now as ‘girls go stroll with their friends’ (as per a young woman, FGD, New Halfa). Parents are prompted to marry girls early as there have been reports of sexual violence in the shelter centres (as mentioned by a youth organisation representative) and reports of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) assaulting young women (as per a young man). Huge dowries paid by men from armed forces is an additional incentive for child marriage. As per two participants, the conflict has prompted families to return to their native villages where norms and customs are stronger than in cities, which has reportedly increased child marriage.

Unfortunately, marriage is one of the outlets. Families under the burden of conflict, are no longer thinking about education or building their girls ‘careers, the easy solution is to get them a man to marry. [Key informant, FGD with lawyers and activists, Kampala, Uganda]

Low awareness and contradictions between laws cause confusion

Differing levels of awareness on the various laws around child marriage, contradictions between them and their different interpretations make the legal landscape in Sudan complex.

Key informants working at the national level had considerable knowledge of laws related to child marriage, while community members in Kassala displayed varying levels of awareness. Some young people and parents in FGDs and some in IDIs acknowledged that a minimum age of marriage exists, but they were unaware of the specifics. They emphasized, especially in rural areas, to follow their own traditional tribal oral laws (forming customary law), which allow girls and boys to marry early – often without their consent. A former government official traced this minimal awareness among the public to weak dissemination of the laws, their different interpretations and contradictions between them.

Representatives of CSOs (youth organisation, women’s organisation, and a representative of a Christian religious organisation), lawyers and activists, a traditional leader and former government officials were able to differentiate between the Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 and the National Child Act 2010. Most key informants knew that 18 years is the age of adulthood according to the National Child Act 2010. According to key informants (FGD with lawyers and activists), the Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 lacks explanatory notes about the minimum age of marriage, which leaves it open for interpretation. Moreover, certain conditions of this law that are meant to protect minor girls (10 years) are not enforced, which reinforces the use of subjective interpretations and practices. For instance, guardians cannot decide a minor’s marriage if the court’s permission has not been taken, or if it is not in her ‘best interest’. Furthermore, there is a lack of accountability as there is no punishment if these conditions are not followed. Despite the existence of the National Child 2010 Act Law, which clearly specifies 18 as the age of majority and prevails over any provision in any other law, a key informant explained that judges in Sharia courts (those courts that operate from an Islamic perspective) apply the Personal Status Law. A lawyer from a legal association pointed out that national and local law enforcement officers also have poor legal education and varying levels of awareness.

My opinion regarding the intersections between law, Sharia, and custom regarding child marriage; well, the law in Sudan has no intersections with Sharia, because the law is the source of Sharia in Sudan. – [Local government official, KII]

Awareness and interpretation of laws are also influenced by religious beliefs and Islamic norms. Two key informants from national CSOs indicated that child marriage is heavily rooted in culture, religion and tradition, and that politicians do not want to oppose it, out of fear to challenge communities. Therefore, they accept child marriage from a religious perspective. One of these key informants expressed that elite groups tend to accept child marriage because deviating from the norm could be interpreted as diminished faith by others.

Limited law enforcement reinforces child marriage

Legal personnel such as judges, lawyers, police officers, (official/unofficial) marriage registrars (mazons), sheikhs and local marriage contractors and male guardians such as fathers, uncles or grandfathers usually facilitate the marriage. In some cases, consent for the marriage is given by the wali or male guardian, and girls are not informed of their marriage.

My family went … and completed the marriage contract procedures with the groom’s family (without me) … I saw some buses with people singing inside them … I didn’t know they were celebrating my wedding. [Young woman, 18 years, FGD, River Atbara, Kassala]

Mazons and sheikhs play the most important role when it comes to legalising marriage and law enforcement at the local level. Mazons are informed and are mandated to adhere to the National Child Act which outlaws child marriage. They use birth certificates for age verification of the bride and groom. However, many choose to officiate underage marriages for various reasons, and in some cases, they are pressurised to do so by community members.

....right now my sister who is 15 [years old] is going to be married and I am sick worried for her based on my experience. The local mazon will finalize the marriage. Our current mazon concludes marriage for young girls and he forges the age. [Young woman, 18 years, In-depth interview, River Atbara]

The local marriage registrar in River Atbara was aware that marriage under 18 years is illegal (referring to the National Child Act), and that it has adverse psychological and health consequences on children. However, he obeys the custom and families’ wishes as ‘this is the local culture’. He explained:

Sometimes young girls are happy to get married and perceived as adults unknowing about the responsibilities and risks ahead. Despite that, as a mazon, I don’t interfere, and I conclude marriages based on the desire of the families around … I don’t issue a [marriage] certificate because this might put me in conflict with law.

It was common practice that the mazon would issue the certificate once the couple turned 18 years to circumvent being implicated. If a certificate was issued at the time of marriage, the age would be forged. However, mazons would not always do this of their accord. In fact, participants’ accounts illustrate how male family members pressurize law-abiding mazons to break the law, officiate the underage marriage in question and issue a certificate.

After I gave my word … the mazon concluded the marriage after the Friday prayers … However, the mazon refused to give us the official certificate and he said she was young. However, we forced him to fake the age as 18 and he issued us the certificate. [Father, 62 years, In-depth interview, New Halfa]

Sheiks officiate marriages when there are no mazons in the village, if couples do not have their birth certificates (a common issue in rural areas) or if the mazon refuses to officiate an underage marriage. This is because sheikhs solemnise marriages with witnesses (as opposed to age verification), explained by a young man in New Halfa in an FGD. A father in an FGD in River Atbara further explained the sheikh issues a written document which is then used to procure the marriage certificate from the relevant authorities when the couple turns 18 years.

The war has dismantled or ‘reshaped’ the rule of law

The war has led to the popularization of unjust tribal and customary laws, the RSF installing their own courts, and community leaders becoming the de-facto legal authorities. This was mentioned in the FGD with lawyers and activists and by a CSO informant. Although the law enforcement systems in Kassala are functioning, courts and judicial bodies have been weakened by the war. This is an outcome of a rising number of IDPs in ‘safer’ states increasing the number of court cases and slowing down processes, the inability to move procedures to the central level in Khartoum, and insufficient numbers of lawyers and judges due to mass migration and displacement.

There is a dire lack of accountability, and many violations are no longer considered serious issues, as reported by a few key informants in the FGD and by a government official in the violence against women unit. These marriages are taking place without the mazon and as per a key informant, in RSF-controlled areas, the whole brigade is married to young, often underaged women.

There is no chaos in the courts, but rather a chaotic situation. Recently, before the war, marriage officials were required to check the bride’s national identity document to verify her age and were questioned about it. But during the war and the absence of law enforcement, there are no complaints … [Lawyer, National-level, KII]

The future of legal reform and the way forward

Key informants who spoke of several legal reform efforts dating back to 1997 lamented on the failure of these efforts. While some felt that the law needed to precede social acceptance, others believed that societal interventions needed to take place to prepare the public for the acceptance of the new/alternative law which specified a minimum age of marriage. A local government official illustrated the challenges that come with imposing a law on the public that is at odds with their social norms. He referred to the recent legal reform banning FGM.

I mean, give you an example of the Children’s law [referring to the National Child Act], the special article. With FGM, it was preceded by many projects in awareness, until Article 141 of the law came in the Criminal Code to criminalize female circumcision. After all of that, there is a challenge in implementing it. Therefore, you cannot get a law by decision as much as you can get it by persuasion and collective decision at the levels of legislation. [Local government official, Kassala]

Social and economic change could strengthen girls’ education and economic empowerment, according to a former government official. He further posited that ‘religious awareness’ was needed to prevent religion from being misused for political purposes. In this vein, two key informants suggested that child marriage should be framed as an issue arising from social traditions or customs and not arising from religion (as it is often understood). This would make the issue more amenable to the public and this could subsequently prompt legislators to amend the law. An informant from the Police, Child and Family unit asserted the urgent need for the law to move away from the religious justification of Aisha marrying Prophet Mohammad as a child. Many key informants highlighted political will as an issue, especially as the second transitional government lacked the momentum for reform that the first transitional government had. The military coups and the start of the war in 2023 wiped out all the efforts made.

Alongside the absence of national-level efforts, the findings indicate that there are no child marriage prevention initiatives by the state government. The issue of child marriage is integrated into FGM prevention initiatives which are widespread due to the recent criminalisation of the practice. A CSO informant indicated that this entanglement of FGM and child marriage meant that insufficient attention was given to the sole issue of child marriage. Lack of monitoring mechanisms on child marriage also makes it difficult for CSOs to conduct effective advocacy.

Although key informants, across the board, acknowledged that there was no room for legal reform during the conflict due to the focus on emergency assistance and other sexual and gender-based violence cases, many remained hopeful for the future of Sudan. A key informant highlighted that the draft laws developed were comprehensive and could be used once a new civilian government was established. There was a clear call from many key informants for harmonising laws in Sudan. As per the key informants in the FGD, a reform of the entire policy framework is needed due to the poor state of the legal system in Sudan. The development of ‘alternative rights-based policies’ could inform the legal reform of the Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 and criminalise child marriage. Such a law that centres the rights of the child could protect Sudanese citizens regardless of religion. As per a key informant working on violence against women, this could be supported by training law enforcement units on human rights, particularly women’s and child rights.

Discussion

Child marriage is a commonplace tradition among the Handandawa tribe of the Beja group [26] in Kassala state, Eastern Sudan. The practice is legally sanctioned by the state, widely accepted by communities and serves as a mechanism to protect family honour (through the protection of girls’ chastity) [26]. Our study findings indicate that families in Kassala are also driven by economic incentives via the dowry received from the groom, and child marriage can pass on the financial burden of raising the girl to the groom [27]. Girls and boys have no say and adult male family members control the decision-making. Participants’ anecdotes confirm what international literature has documented in recent months—that child marriage of girls has increased due to the war [22, 23, 28]. The closure of schools and the risks of sexual and gender-based violence, whether in shelter centres, or by armed personnel (by the RSF [22, 23] or by the Sudanese Armed forces [29]) has further led families to marry girls young as a protection mechanism.

These findings clearly denote what Al Nagar et al. succinctly state in their report on child marriage in Eastern Sudan, “child marriage is a culturally articulated form of denying girls’ rights” [27]. Child marriage impinges on women’s agency and freedom to choose if and when they wish to marry. Gender inequality, unequal gender norms and related discriminatory attitudes that systematically undervalue women have been widely documented as underpinning girl child marriage [30–32] globally and in Kassala [33].

Under the backdrop of colonialism, the institutionalisation of gender inequality is evident in the legal systems of Sudan and is embodied by the Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991. When Sharia was codified via this law in 1991 under the Bashir regime, as part of the Islamisation of the Sudan, many considered it a ‘backlash against women’ [18]. Key source texts have been interpreted by jurists through a patriarchal lens, codifying and legitimising a value system which contradicts human rights principles [34, 35] and is at odds with gender equality. In the past, Sharia as a law system i.e. medieval Islamic law “was characterized by a multiplicity of opinions, different doctrinal schools, and competing theories of interpretive analysis” [36]. Codification made the law system a determinate, rigid and abstract system [9] which justified the authority of certain Muslims so that they could remain in power. This reductive interpretation of Islamic laws had already begun with the advent of European colonisation which marginalised and misinterpreted source texts and made Islamic law a text-based system [36]. Emon writes that “… colonialists contributed to the view that Islamic law is an unchanging, inflexible religious code” and this was particularly so in the field of family law [36]. Due to this, Muslim women have become the vehicle of morality [33] and symbolise cultural and Islamic purity [32]. The principle of qiwama (loosely translated as male guardianship) is fundamental to the family law and the Personal Status Law for Muslims in particular. The wali (male guardian) can consent to marriage on behalf of a girl, can annul a marriage if a woman’s partner is not deemed satisfactory, and the law obliges women to obey the wali. Sexual relations between children, and between adult men and girl children is legalised via this law. In 2009, the Women’s Centre for Human Rights, a Sudanese governmental body working with the National Committee for Review of Women’s Status in Laws, found that 88 articles from all Sudanese laws needed to be reviewed to address gender equality [18].

In Sudan, civil law, family law (including the Personal Status Law of 1991 for Muslims) and customary law are simultaneously practiced and intersecting. Contradictions between these systems, particularly around issues of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, reinforce gender inequality and ensure that child marriage remains legal. Customary law is often oral and influenced by Sharia2, and fiqh (fiqh refers to Islamic rulings and jurisprudence), while the Personal Status Law for Muslims implicitly specifies the minimum age of marriage as 10 years (i.e. the age of physical maturity), contradicting the National Child Act that defines the age of majority and sexual consent as 18 years. While some call for the harmonisation of these laws, our findings urgently point to the need for a broader policy reform for gender justice, based on which legal reform concerning child marriage can take place. For example, not only the minimum age of marriage should be raised, but the principle of qiwama should be abolished.

In the past, between 2009 and 2017, activists who lobbied for the dismantling of qiwama clashed with Islamists in the country, such as the Islamic Fiqh Academy. The ‘soft’ approach, which argued that Aisha was older at the time of her marriage to Prophet Mohammad, was too accommodating and could not diminish the influence of Islamic religious conservatives [18]. The existence of a state-religion nexus strengthened the position and authority of discriminatory laws that are patriarchal and justified by religion, which further slowed down family law reform [18, 37]. Muriaas et al. posit that it is the codification of Sharia into a family law that has triggered counter-mobilisation of religious conservative actors in Sudan [20]. Since the Sudanese 2005 constitution outlines that Sharia must be the source of all law, reform of any law directly implies that there is a problem with the current interpretation of Sharia, and puts these religious power-holders at risk.

To chart the future of legal reform in Sudan, one can draw from the successes of neighbouring countries in North Africa who have succeeded in reforming their family law, by striking a balance between the international human rights discourse and local Islamic ideals and fiqh (e.g. in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria). A key aspect underpinning the various strategies used by women’s activists in the region has been to draw a distinction between Sharia (i.e. the way of life as per Islamic texts) and fiqh (rulings and jurisprudence) [34]. Welchman and many other Islamic scholars argue that values of equality and justice underline the Sharia and these ideals can be used for reinterpretation and reframing of fiqh [34]. Moreover, international legal and human rights frameworks can also be leveraged to support arguments made by reformists [35]. However, this must be carefully done in contexts like Sudan where international human rights law and agreements are seen as ‘Western’ and “the idea of modernizing Islamic law is seen as culturally surrendering to the hegemony of the west” [36]. Reforming the law (i.e. changing the text or certain articles in the law), administrative and procedural reform (birth registration, marriage registration processes) and legal reform in matters outside of family law but which affect family law (for example laws regarding violence against women) have been strategies commonly advocated for by activists in the Middle East and North Africa [34]. Islamic reformists have used the approaches of takhayyar (i.e. selective choice) and talfiq (what Al-Nagar and Tønnessen refer to as ‘patching’) [19, 34]. The former uses the diversity of Islamic schools of thought and selectively refers to more ‘enlightened’ or progressive hadiths, arguments, and versions (as used in Egypt to reform the Personal Status Law). The latter uses parts of different rules from different Islamic schools of thought to create a new rule (for example used in Morocco for its comprehensive family law reform in 2004). Both these strategies stayed in the broader Islamic framework of fiqh. Emon (2006) suggests the “development of a Muslim family-service civil society” which would provide legal services for Muslim citizens [36]. These services would be based on different Islamic legal ideals and schools of thought, encouraging competing interpretations of Sharia [36]. Such an exercise acknowledges the limitations of the state during and post-conflict. In a country like Sudan, affected by war [38], any future reform needs to keep gender justice at the core, while also appreciating the pluralistic legal systems that operate in the country [8, 39].

While these reforms take place at policy level, they need to be complemented by reforms at the grassroots [26]. Culturally contextualised approaches that have been successful in other Muslim and Islamic contexts can be used at the community level to engage religious and traditional leaders (such as the sheikhs and mazons) to advocate for girls’ and women’s rights [18]. Alongside, transforming existing social norms that undervalue women and facilitating a common normative understanding are crucial to bring together a plural society [40]. This should be accompanied by women’s educational and economic empowerment. Keeping girls in school can delay child marriage, and improve their chances of being financially independent, and improve their negotiating power and confidence. Economic empowerment components in social norms change interventions are crucial in delaying marriage for young people (even when the impact on changing norms is minimal) [41]. Such transformative interventions could have a place post war, as such times could provide windows of opportunity for change. This can support the creation of new norms that value girls’ education to pave way for a holistic conception of tamyeez which entails not just physical maturity but emotional and intellectual maturity.

This study has some limitations. Some participants did not agree to being audio recorded and preferred that the researcher took notes. Due to this, some of the nuances in the data may have been lost. The study did not dive into the opportunities that legal pluralism presents as a theoretical framework and vis-à-vis legal reform and gender equality. Perspectives of child marriage presented in the study are primarily derived from speaking to young people who faced child marriage and from community members in eastern Sudan, particularly in Kassala state. Hence, the study could not capture the diversity of opinions and practices that exist across different tribes and ethnicities in the country. Due to the security situation, it was not possible for the study team to conduct the research in other areas of the country, the Break Free! programme had moved its operations to Kassala. However, the findings on legal reform apply across the country since various key informants at the national level were interviewed. Moreover, we were able to triangulate study findings by speaking to different stakeholders, and the study was able to capture voices of Sudanese citizens despite the war.

Conclusion

In a country where civil law, customary law and family law deeply intersect and contradict each other, Sudan’s pluralistic legal system has institutionalised gender inequality and legitimised the culturally accepted practice of child marriage. With far-reaching consequences for girls and young women, child marriage undermines their wellbeing, socio-economic opportunities and autonomy. A combination of broader policy and legal reform at the national level and social norm transformation and educational and economic empowerment at the grassroots level can pave way for reimagining gender equality, family law and criminalisation of child marriage in Sudan in a future reconstruction period post conflict.

Abbreviations

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

FGD

Focus Group Discussions

FGM

Female Genital Mutilation

IDI

In-Depth Interview

IDPs

Internally Displaced Persons

KII

Key Informant Interview

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

RSF

Rapid Support Forces

SORD

Sudan Organisation for Research and Development

Authors’ contributions

TK and MK, with the support of AKAE conceptualized the study. AKAE coordinated the data collection. TK, AKAE and LK conducted the data analysis. TK led the preparation of the manuscript and TK, LK and MK wrote the first draft. AKAE provided key input and conducted a detailed review. All authors reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript.

Funding

For the purpose of open access, the authors have applied a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence to any Author Accepted Manuscript version arising from this submission. This study was part of the Break Free! programme, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs SRHR Strategic Partnership Fund (2021-2025).

Data availability

The datasets used and analysed are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Declarations

Ethical approval

The research team and Break Free! Sudan team thoroughly discussed the necessity of continuing the research during the ongoing war, concluding that the study was vital due to the lack of research on child marriage laws and the anecdotal increase in child marriage caused by the conflict. Before the war started in April 2023, the team applied for local ethics approval from the Ministry of Social Affairs, but the proposal was not reviewed as it fell outside their scope. Therefore, ethical approval was sought and obtained from the KIT Institute Research Ethics Committee. The research was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants received comprehensive information introducing the study prior to consenting (written consent). They were informed of the confidentiality of their input and their right to withdraw consent. The consent form included contact details of a local counsellor in case referral was needed.

Consent for publication

Not applicable.

Competing interests

Asha Khalil Abdalla Elkarib has had a long-standing association with Sudanese Organisation for Research and Development (SORD), a forerunner in advocating for legal reform in Sudan. The authors declare that they have no other competing interests.