Perspectives on Time and Personality: Philip G. Zimbardo (1934–2024) in Memoriam

ABSTRACT

The present paper aims to honor the memory of one of the most notable figures in psychological science over the past five decades, Philip G. Zimbardo, who sadly passed away in late 2024. To this end, we provide a multi‐perspective view on psychological time—a topic that deeply engaged Phil Zimbardo during the later stages of his prolific career. From the basic mechanisms of mental time travel to the experience of the passage of time, the phenomena of temporal construal, intertemporal choices, and complex representations of future selves, as well as the concepts of balanced time perspectives and temporal metacognition, the authors of this article construct this symbolic memoir by linking their own ideas and research with Zimbardo's time perspective theory. In the concluding part of the paper, we propose that temporality‐related processes and traits constitute a fundamental part of personality and seek to highlight the pathways through which considering psychological‐temporal phenomena may advance personality science and even serve as a unifying theme for various approaches to personality.

1. Introduction

In his popular scientific book—“The Time Paradox” (Zimbardo and Boyd 2008)—Philip Zimbardo argued that the way in which people cognitively structure time remains one of the most important influences on their psychological processes and resulting behavior. The capacity to move beyond the present moment, and either reverse (Tulving 2002) or outpace (Atance and O’Neill 2001) the seemingly unidirectional flow of time, has been considered an exceptional feature of our nature (Suddendorf and Corballis 1997, 2007), allowing for such fundamental human capacities as decision making, prospective memory, spatial navigation and emotion regulation (Schacter et al. 2017). Phil Zimbardo devoted the final decades of his prolific career to the investigation of time perspectives and to the popularization of knowledge about the elusive yet powerful phenomenon of psychological time (see, e.g., Zimbardo and Boyd 1999, 2008; Stolarski et al. 2018). Despite the enduring popularity of his Stanford Prison Experiment (e.g., Haney et al. 1973), his most cited publication does not pertain to this legendary—albeit controversial—study. Instead, it is the seminal Journal of Personality and Social Psychology article (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999) introducing time perspective theory that appears to have had the greatest impact on contemporary psychological science, at least in terms of citation count. ¹

Interestingly, Phil's fascination with this topic dates back to the early 1970s, when, together with his beloved wife Christina Maslach, he studied the effects of hypnosis on time perception (Zimbardo et al. 1971, 1973). Due to various external circumstances (see Maslach 2015), as well as the overwhelming fame of the Stanford Prison Experiment conducted in 1971, he set aside this line of research for many years. Fortunately, in the mid‐1990s, Phil returned to his interest in the psychology of time and, supported by a group of enthusiastic students—including John Boyd, Kent Harber, and Alison Holman—developed a novel individual differences measure: the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI; Zimbardo and Boyd 1999), which became one of the most widely used psychometric tools in the field of psychological time research. The scale has been adapted in numerous countries, enabling cross‐cultural research on time perspectives (see, e.g., Sircova et al. 2014). Zimbardo's theory—popularized through the widely read book The Time Paradox—has inspired a wealth of studies examining temporality across diverse domains of human functioning.

In brief, Zimbardo and Boyd's (1999, 2008) conceptual approach, often referred to as time perspective theory, posits that individuals habitually allocate attention to the past, present, and future according to relatively stable cognitive–motivational orientations that shape emotions, judgments, and behavior. The original model distinguishes five core perspectives: Past‐Positive (nostalgic and affectionate past focus), Past‐Negative (regretful and aversive past focus), Present‐Hedonistic (pleasure‐ and sensation‐seeking in the moment), Present‐Fatalistic (helplessness and fate‐determined outlook), and Future (goal‐directed planning and delay of gratification). Optimal functioning is associated with a Balanced Time Perspective—flexibly shifting between temporal frames depending on contextual demands (Zimbardo and Boyd 2008). Subsequent extensions introduced additional dimensions, such as Future‐Negative (pessimistic, threat‐focused future orientation; Carelli et al. 2011) and Present‐Eudaimonic (meaning‐oriented, mindful focus on the present; Vowinckel et al. 2017), and highlighted the distinction between relatively stable, trait‐like time perspectives and fluctuating, state‐like temporal foci, responsive to situational cues, underscoring that time perspective reflects both enduring predispositions and flexible, context‐dependent processes (Stolarski et al. 2018).

A global scientific community, the Time Perspective Network, has united researchers and time enthusiasts from around the world, fostering a range of interdisciplinary projects that transcend traditional psychological science and extend into fields such as technology, art, and design. The Network's memorable biennial meetings have provided invaluable opportunities to exchange ideas, discuss research findings, and reflect on the future directions of time‐related research in psychology and beyond. At these conferences, Phil consistently held a special place—not only as a keynote speaker, seasoned researcher, and mentor, but above all as the founding father of the entire network. The edited volume Time Perspective Theory: Review, Research and Application (Stolarski, Fieulaine, and van Beek 2015) brought together 103 authors from 27 countries, across six continents, with a dual purpose: to summarize the state of the art in time perspective research and to honor Phil Zimbardo on the occasion of his 80th birthday. The celebration, held during the International Time Perspective Conference in Warsaw, was a truly special moment for Phil. Participants fondly recall his deeply emotional reaction upon receiving the book, as well as his unforgettable vitality on the dance floor during the gala dinner. These joyful memories stand in poignant contrast to the message we all received almost exactly a decade later.

On October 14, 2024, Philip Zimbardo passed away, concluding his earthly journey through time and leaving behind an irreplaceable void—both in the scientific community and in the personal lives of those who knew him. For Phil, these two worlds were never separate; his personal warmth and scientific passion were deeply intertwined. Fortunately, his scientific legacy endures, transcending his passing and living on through the ideas he championed and the memories of our encounters with him—memories colored by his unforgettable warmth, generosity, and disarming sense of humor.

Some of us may hold on to the hope of meeting Phil again in some transcendental future (Boyd and Zimbardo 1997); others remain grounded in a profound sense of gratitude, enriched by the moments we shared with him. Regardless of which group we belong to, through this paper we collectively honor the life and legacy of Philip Zimbardo. Each of us has contributed a perspective on psychological time, reflecting our individual areas of expertise within this field. Though our contributions vary, they are all anchored in Phil's theoretical framework—both as a recognition of his enduring influence and as our heartfelt way of saying a final ciao to the unforgettable Dr. Z.

2. Perspective 1: Mental Access to the Fourth Dimension (Thomas Suddendorf)

Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) introduced their influential time perspective inventory with an appeal to the subjective nature of time and the fundamental role monitoring time must have played in the evolution of human cognition. Sandwiched between references to Einstein and Kant, I was surprised to see my own work cited. We had argued that the capacity to remember past events and to imagine possible future scenarios is based on the same neurocognitive machinery, and that the emergence of this ability was a prime mover in human evolution (Suddendorf and Corballis 1997). We called this mental time travel, as in a sense, the human mind is a virtual time machine allowing us to effortlessly travel through the fourth dimension, as we daydream about next year's holiday, reminisce about yesterday's triumph or worry about upcoming challenges.

It has since become increasingly clear that both mental time travel into the past and future do indeed draw on many of the same neurocognitive mechanisms (Addis et al. 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007), such as the use of memory traces to construct scenarios (Cheng et al. 2016). Commonalities have been reported not only in associated brain activation (e.g., Okuda et al. 2003; Schacter et al. 2012), but also in terms of psychological characteristics (e.g., D'Argembeau and Van der Linden 2004; Trope and Liberman 2003), cognitive development (e.g., Atance 2015; Busby and Suddendorf 2005), and impairments (e.g., Hassabis et al. 2007; Tulving 2005).

Zimbardo's work shows how people differ in the way they use their virtual time machines and interpret their travels. But there is much we all share. Mental time travel is a fundamental capacity characteristic of our species, endowing us all with extraordinary powers. Especially, our ability to think about the future has had profound adaptive consequences, as it enables us to prepare for opportunities and threats in advance and to control creatures with less ability to think ahead.

The future, of course, also matters to other animals as they face recurring patterns in nature such as fluctuations in temperature and food availability. Even single cell organisms have evolved ways to act in tune with what is about to happen. As E. coli travel through the human digestive tract, it switches on genes for maltose digestion a couple of hours before it will reach the maltose‐rich areas (Mitchell et al. 2009). This does not imply that bacteria think about the future though: the strains that happened to activate genes with this timing survived and replicated more than the ones that did not. In this way, natural selection can forge effective behaviors that seem intelligently calibrated to upcoming events. Animals have evolved instincts that drive them to make nests or cache food without a need to think about future breeding or hunger.

This is not to say that animals cannot think ahead at all. Many foresee what is about to happen—such as when a prey animal disappears behind a bush, the predator expects it to re‐emerge. Human foresight, however—on current evidence—appears to be unique in two critical ways: first, we can imagine events far removed from the here and now, such as happenings that may occur next week, next year, or in decades time. We can flexibly construct such remote scenarios and embed them into larger narratives (Suddendorf 2013).

Second, humans can consider multiple, even mutually exclusive, possibilities, such as various ways in which things could go wrong. We not only remember what was and foresee what will be, but we can consider counterfactuals (what did not happen and what will not happen) and possibilities (what might have happened and what might happen). Consider the following simple experiment where we drop a target into a vertical tube with two exits at the bottom, like an upside‐down Y, and ask participants to catch it (Redshaw and Suddendorf 2016). To prepare for the drop, two‐year‐old children tend to cover only one or the other exit. But by age four, children instantly cover their bases and hold one hand under each of the exits, ensuring they will catch the prize regardless of where it falls. These preschoolers know that they do not know for certain where the target will appear, and so they prepare for both possibilities. We have found similar results in populations from diverse cultures, suggesting that this capacity is part of universal human development (Redshaw et al. 2019). By contrast, when we give this task to apes and monkeys, they act like the young toddlers and do not prepare for both possibilities (Suddendorf et al. 2017, 2020).

The archaeological record contains various clues about when these capacities emerged in our ancestors (Langley and Suddendorf 2022). For instance, evidence of preparation for remote eventualities appears from about 1.8 million years ago, when Homo erectus made and transported sophisticated stone tools for repeated future use. Later innovations such as mobile containers to carry resources and traps to catch animals without combat are just some of the ways our ancestors increasingly harnessed foresight to dominate their environments.

Foresight also impacts our understanding of who we are. Our awareness of possibilities gives us our intuitive sense of free will—our arguably fanciful impression that we are the masters of our own destiny (Redshaw and Suddendorf 2020). We can ponder the potential consequences of our choices. We can even decide to change our own future selves. For instance, through deliberate practice and study we can shape what we will be able to do in future, a capacity children demonstrate from around age 5 (Davis et al. 2016). Because humans make different decisions about what to get better at, we end up being tremendously diverse in expertise. Remember that when you encounter people for the first time, their capacities are a mystery. Are they musically inclined, technologically adept, or perhaps great at some sport? While inherent talent plays a role, the primary driver behind our remarkably varied capabilities is the time and effort that people spend honing their chosen skills and knowledge. The onus is on us, and there may be no optimal choice. In fact, as a cooperative group, we benefit from having diverse and complementary capacities.

As the extensive body of work with Zimbardo's Time Perspective Inventory shows, we also vary in how we focus on past, present, and future. While there has been speculation about what might be an optimal perspective, it is possible that differences may be good for us as a group. What is more, there is increasing recognition that temporal focus can vary radically intra‐individually, as a transient state (e.g., Stolarski et al. 2018). Even children who may inhibit eating a present marshmallow in favor of a larger reward later can adjust their strategy when circumstances change, and, say, the experimenter that promised the later reward has proven unreliable in another situation (Kidd et al. 2013). At times it is more advantageous to prioritize the present rather than the future. Context matters. And it may be the capacity for prudent shifting of strategies that is most adaptive.

We can also recognize our own shortcomings and biases, and devise strategies that compensate for them, such as when we pre‐commit to avoid future temptation. In our recent book, The Invention of Tomorrow (Suddendorf et al. 2022) we argue that, paradoxically, some of the greatest benefits of foresight derive from awareness of its limits.

Mental time travel enables a huge amount of plasticity, underpinning a staggering array of individual differences in human behavior and outlook. Philip Zimbardo helped us chart some of the major ways in which people vary, putting time perspective on the map.

3. Perspective 2: The Presently Experienced Passage of Time (Marc Wittmann)

Psychological time can be classified into at least three interconnected dimensions, all of which play a significant role in everyday experience and decision‐making (Wittmann and Paulus 2016): (1) the time perspective, encompassing the past, present, and future; (2) an individual's ability to estimate time, assessed by their accuracy in judging clock time; and (3) time awareness, which refers to the subjective experience of time passing quickly or slowly.

Philip Zimbardo's seminal work on the time perspective as an individual trait, as outlined here, can be linked to how the personality of individuals affects estimates of duration and experienced time passage. Notably, an individual's time perspective as personality influences the degree of attention directed towards time. For example, an individual's stronger focus on the present moment and a reduced future perspective—as assessed with the ZTPI (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999)—lead to a relative overestimation of duration and a slower passage of time during a real waiting situation (Jokic et al. 2018). Impulsivity is understood as extreme temporal shortsightedness, characterized by an increased focus on the present at the expense of future considerations. This trait is closely associated with impulsive behaviors such as gambling, unprotected sex, risky driving, and drug use (Keough et al. 1999). Moreover, impulsive individuals overestimate the duration of time intervals and feel that time passes slowly (Wittmann and Paulus 2008). Impulsivity is commonly linked to time perception, not only in individuals with psychiatric conditions but also in healthy participants (Lucci 2013). For instance, examining the relationship between ZTPI scores and the perception of time passage reveals that a past‐negative perspective is positively associated with feelings of time pressure and the experience of time expansion, such as during boredom (Wittmann et al. 2015).

The time perspective was successfully manipulated in individuals trained in hypnosis through verbal instructions to subjectively expand the present moment while reducing the past and future orientations (Zimbardo et al. 1971). Not only did they change their language by using present tense verbs, the expansion of the present focus led to more sensitivity towards sensory stimuli. This early investigation is in accordance with a prevailing consensus in the fields of philosophy and psychology that phenomenal consciousness is temporally extended (Kent and Wittmann 2021). What the study by Zimbardo et al. (1971) showed is that the phenomenal now is malleable in duration. Later empirical attempts have further provided evidence that the present moment can be expanded by experienced meditators (Sauer et al. 2012). Only a few concepts, however, explicitly address the question concerning the specific duration of the present moment. Several temporal processing levels, ranging in duration from milliseconds to a few seconds, are related to temporally structured perception and the temporally coordinated timing of behavior, which are thought to correlate with the impression of a phenomenal now (Pöppel 1997; Wittmann 2011; Singhal and Srinivasan 2021). On an upper temporal level, the working‐memory span can be considered a “mental presence” which maintains cognitive operations and emotions across time intervals lasting from many seconds to a few minutes (Wittmann 2011). The “working memory provides a temporal bridge between events—both those that are internally generated and environmentally presented—thereby conferring a sense of unity and continuity to conscious experience” (Goldman‐Rakic 1997, 559). The time span of the mental presence is based on working‐memory functions which are correlated with activation in the prefrontal cortex and connected structures. It integrates the recall of long‐term memory (the past) and the preparation for anticipated events (the future) with momentary attentional and executive demands in continuously ongoing perception‐action cycles (Fuster 2001).

The questions of where (in which brain regions) and how (by which cerebral mechanisms) neural networks are associated with the presently experienced passage of time have, until very recently, found no consensus; too many different theories existed (Wittmann and Van Wassenhove 2009). Several distinct neural networks supporting duration processing in humans had been identified using functional neuroimaging (Wiener et al. 2010; Teghil et al. 2019). Two meta‐analyses recently produced complementary patterns of neuroimaging results revealing only two decisive areas in the brain across different time scales and independent of modality, the bilateral insula and the (pre‐) supplementary motor area (SMA) (Mondok and Wiener 2023; Naghibi et al. 2024). The sense of time within the mental presence are accordingly driven by sensorimotor timing mechanisms (SMA) and by the processing of body signals, the insula being the primary sensory interoceptive cortex and also related to the passage of time (Craig 2009; Wittmann 2013).

The insular cortex activation identified across neuroimaging studies of time perception provides a clue as to how time passage is experienced within the time frame of the human mental presence. As the primary interoceptive cortex, the insula not only provides the foundation for the physiological conditions of the body, but also for subjective feelings, emotions, and self‐awareness (Craig 2015). The association of the insula with subjective time corroborates numerous studies illustrating how participants' judgments of duration and the passage of time are linked to felt bodily states, affective responses, and peripheral‐physiological activation (Droit‐Volet and Gil 2009; Wöllner et al. 2018; Khoshnoud et al. 2024; Teghil 2024). Constantly up‐and‐down regulated physiological arousal levels, reflecting the balance of activity in the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems which affect the heart rate, breathing rate, and skin conductance, underlie our emotional feelings and, in turn, influence perceived time (Mella et al. 2011; Ogden et al. 2019; Piovesan et al. 2019). These empirical results correlate with Craig's theory (2009, 2015) that a succession of emotional and physical self‐realizations across time provides a continuity of conscious awareness. Time perception is, accordingly, the experienced progression of such successive moments of self‐realization.

Heightened arousal levels thereby result in a relative overestimation of duration, and negatively felt emotions lead to a stronger overestimation of duration relative to positively felt emotions, as described in a meta‐analysis of 31 empirical studies involving 3776 participants (Cui et al. 2023). Pain similarly affects perceived duration. In one study, strong pain stimuli were perceived as lasting subjectively longer than weaker pain stimuli, and these differences in time estimates corresponded to the respective skin‐conductance levels, which were positively correlated with increases in duration estimates in relation to increasing intensity levels (Piovesan et al. 2019).

In synthesizing these and many other empirical findings, the authors of the “contextual self‐duration theory of the passage of time” propose that the judgment of time passage results from an introspective analysis of the self, that is, the awareness of the dynamics of the emotional and bodily self, corresponding to a temporally slowing down or speeding up of subjective time (Droit‐Volet et al. 2023). In a study where participants watched three different video clips lasting 45 s each, a fear‐inducing horror video was judged to last the longest, followed by a documentary and a funny cartoon, the latter being estimated as having lasted the shortest time (Pollatos et al. 2014). These relative over‐ and underestimations were more pronounced when subjects were instructed to pay attention to their bodily reactions to the videos. Physical and emotional perceptions in a given situation thus automatically influence judgments of time passage. The awareness of subjective time also helps us become aware of our emotions, for example, when we verbalize metaphors that time “flies” or “drags”. Our everyday experience confirms this: when we are bored, we are strongly self‐aware, focused inwards on our internal states, and time subjectively slows down (Witowska et al. 2020). In contrast, when we are immersed in an exciting and pleasant activity, in typical flow states, time passes quickly. The more flow is experienced, that is, when playing video games, the faster the passage of time is reported (Rutrecht et al. 2021). These two contrasting everyday examples demonstrate how subjective time is linked to affective body sensations. The degree of attentional focus on the self thus determines the sense of the passage of time as presently experienced.

Individuals' trait‐like ability to perceive bodily states in daily life contributes to the subjective sense of time. Participants who have more body awareness in daily life, as assessed with a validated questionnaire were also more accurate in judging duration in the range of seconds in laboratory studies (Teghil, Boccia, et al. 2020; Khoshnoud et al. 2024). These individual differences in daily interoceptive sensibility also predicted the strength of functional connectivity between the insular cortex and other brain regions, again confirming the connections among time perception, interoceptive awareness, and insular cortex activation (Teghil, Di Vita, et al. 2020).

Philip Zimbardo, through his work on time perspective, provided a framework for understanding the trait‐related tendency to focus on the past, present, or future. Nested within this framework, our subjective sense of duration and the passage of time evolve according to our momentary attentional focus on current emotional and bodily experiences. Future research exploring the connection between time perspective and subjective judgments of duration will build on the legacy that Zimbardo has left for us time perception researchers.

4. Perspective 3: Being Future‐Focused Does Not Mean What We Think It Does: Identity‐Based Motivation and Engaging With Future‐Focused Action (Daphna Oyserman)

People live their lives within time; the present, right now, matters, but so does later, and the past shapes who they are in the present. In that sense, having a self implies having a temporal self. People seem to care about their future selves—they think about their futures (Baumeister et al. 2020) and find their future selves to be truer versions of themselves than their current ones (Wakslak et al. 2008). Yet they also often shortchange their future selves—choosing present‐focused gains at the expense of future‐focused ones (Pronin et al. 2008). These incompatible results imply that thinking about and valuing the future self is not enough to overcome the affordances and constraints of the present. Something else needs to occur for people to take future‐focused action. Identity‐based motivation theory, a social cognitive theory of self, self‐regulation, and goal pursuit (Oyserman 2007, 2009, 2015a, 2015b, 2024; Oyserman and Destin 2010; Oyserman, Lewis Jr., et al. 2017) addresses this gap. It provides a novel perspective on a familiar paradox: people can imagine their future selves without taking or sustaining future‐focused action.

Identity‐based motivation theory explains why by focusing on the inferences people draw from difficulty as an underappreciated aspect of how and when identities motivate current action (Oyserman and Dawson 2019; Oyserman et al. 2012; Oyserman and Horowitz 2023). This identity‐based motivation explanation starts with an observation (experienced self‐stability) and two counter‐observations (context sensitivity and metacognition as input to judgments). The observation is that people generally feel they know who they are and that their future self's wants, needs, and values are known to them and use this feeling of self‐knowledge as an anchor to take present‐focused and future‐focused action (as reviewed in Oyserman et al. 2012). The counter observation is that though feeling fixed, identities are dynamically constructed—shaped by features of the immediate situation and how easy or difficult thinking feels (as reviewed in Oyserman 2007, 2009; Oyserman and Dawson 2019; Oyserman, Destin, and Novin 2017). Identity‐based motivation theory regards this combination as a design feature, not a flaw, postulating that experienced self‐stability combined with dynamic construction—sensitivity to context and metacognitive experience—facilitates people's investments in their long‐term goals and adaptation to changing circumstances.

Using the identity‐based motivation theory terminology, identity‐based motivation theory predicts that people prefer to act (action‐readiness) and make sense of their experiences (procedural‐readiness) in ways that fit their identities and that identities are not fixed (dynamic construction). Inferences from ease and difficulty of thinking, on‐the‐mind identities, and actions mutually shape one another, varying between and within individuals (Oyserman 2007). These predictions build on a rich literature in social cognition that documents that people are sensitive to their experiences of difficulty while thinking and apply the inferences they draw from that difficulty as inputs in their thinking (e.g., Schwarz 2004, 2012; Schmidt and Heck 2024). Because people are not necessarily sensitive to the source of this difficulty, they may carry inferences relevant to one reasoning context into the next, with consequences for judgment and behavior (e.g., Schwarz 2004). Identity‐based motivation theory synthesizes these insights to make novel predictions about the self and its role in thinking and doing (Oyserman 2007, 2009).

Oyserman and Horowitz (2023) did a full review of the future‐self to current action literature. In addition to the identity‐based motivation approach, they identified three other approaches, each with a separate and non‐overlapping empirical literature; for ease, they named these “possible self”, “self‐gap”, and “self‐continuity” approaches. Each provides conflicting explanations for when a future self leads to current action, with supporting evidence. A possible self approach posits that what matters is that a particular valence (e.g., “hoped for”) or content (e.g., “good parent”) linked to the future self is on the mind; whenever it is, future‐focused action occurs. A self‐gap approach posits that action only occurs if people notice a gap between their current and future self, can articulate a specific obstacle in their way, and feel efficacious to address it. A self‐continuity approach posits that action only occurs if people experience continuity between their current and future self. The first and last approaches are silent on the issue of obstacles, and the last two approaches diametrically differ in whether the mechanism is contrast or inclusion, and do not provide evidence on which might matter when. Oyserman and Horowitz (2023) synthesize the empirical evidence across the three approaches by drawing on identity‐based motivation theory and draw the following conclusions:

1. People switch from present to future‐focused action when an aspect of the future self (a possible identity in this terminology) is on the mind (accessible), feels relevant to the action affordances in the situation, and difficulty thinking about the identity and connected action is interpreted as implying importance rather than impossibility.

2. If people interpret their metacognitive experience of difficulty as implying importance rather than impossibility, the source of difficulty can be thinking about the content of the possible identity, its similarities or differences from the current self, or any other source

Within an identity‐based motivation perspective, people can experience their future selves as relevant to current action in two ways (Oyserman and Dawson 2019). First, they can experience their future selves as included in their current selves, making the future feel like right now. Second, they can experience their future selves as a standard that their current selves must take action to progress on. In both cases, the paradox of future‐focused action is that it entails current action, and hence involves the current self, in the service of what the current self believes are the values, goals, needs, and desires of the future self. Though not discussed much in the literature on the link between future self and current action, Bandura's (1997) self‐efficacy theory highlights that current action builds on the temporally past self. Current self‐competency beliefs are built on the current self's recall of what the past self has done. This line of reasoning highlights that the self is both inherently temporal and that future selves reside in relationship with current and past selves; future‐focused action requires a current self that time travels forward and backward.

Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) reminded psychologists that this temporal aspect matters for human reasoning. They suggested individual differences in time perspective, proposed that people differ across multiple time perspectives and ways of understanding them, and provided multi‐item scales for measuring them. That is, their account does not simply distinguish people as past, present, and future‐oriented to varying degrees. Rather, Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) argue for individual differences across five time‐related dimensions. In their formulation, people differ in how much they relive the past and experience nostalgia for it and how much they experience the past negatively, as something to be avoided. Regarding present focus, rather than consider present focus as a necessity—people live in the present even as they time travel, in the Zimbardo and Boyd account, people differ in the extent that they experience the present as excluding the future in two ways. They can fatalistically accept the present (and future) as outside of their control and they can hedonistically revel in the pleasures of the moment ignoring the future. The fifth time perspective in the Zimbardo and Boyd formulation is a future time perspective, which describes individual differences in planning for future goals and attainments. Zimbardo and Boyd argue that past and future focus provide a rationale for future focused action—to re‐live or avoid the past or to attain future success.

Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) focused on individual differences in these time perspectives and proposed culture‐based and social structure‐based differences in the extent to which groups of people endorse each. They argued that approaches which focus on any one perspective alone may misrepresent the other perspectives by omission. That is, a person may be both high in experiencing the past positively and high in future focus—being high in one dimension does not necessarily imply being low in another. While their initial 56 items did not fare well over time, their ideas have had a very large impact and researchers have created brief three to four item scales that produce the intended five‐factor structure (Orosz et al. 2017). As intended, modest positive correlations are observed between each of the five latent factors except for modest negative correlations between future focus and each of the other factors (Orosz et al. 2017). Given the modest correlations, the factor structure implies practical independence among the features of time orientation envisioned by Zimbardo and Boyd (1999).

While an identity‐based motivation perspective does not imply that people are either past, present, or future focused, it does imply that taking future‐focused action requires involvement of the temporal (past, current, and future) self. Yet, unlike Zimbardo and Boyd (1999), identity‐based motivation theory has focused less on individual or group‐based differences in time perspective and more on features of the situation that shift people from present to future‐focused action. Identity‐based motivation theory suggests context‐dependency. No matter how much people endorse being future‐focused, they will tend to stay engaged with the press of the current situation unless the future, as operationalized by aspects of the future self, feels accessible and apt—more relevant than whatever else is on the mind, and they interpret their metacognitive experiences of difficulty as meaning task importance.

Individual difference approaches like Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) ask for whom future me affects future‐focused action, predicting first that people higher in future time perspective will be more likely to have future me on their mind and second that they will engage in future‐focused action when this is the case. Future time perspective measures seek to quantify how much people plan for and achieve their future goals (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999) or base their decisions on the future rather than the immediate consequences of their actions (Strathman et al. 1994; for a review, Andre et al. 2018). Oyserman and Horowitz (2023) summarize studies measuring the association between future‐time perspective and an array of outcome measures including impulse shopping and finding housing after homelessness.

Rather than consider the individual differences in future focus and identity‐based motivation as two opposing theoretical perspectives, it is more useful to consider which aspect of human experience each approach highlights. The former perspective highlights the possibility that only people high in future time perspective take future‐focused action while the latter perspective highlights the possibility that everyone will when a future me is on the mind and feels relevant to the choices facing a current me. Integrating the two perspectives implies that people who are low in future orientation may require clearer contextual cues than high scorers; the two perspectives would only yield conflicting predictions if the context or individual differences never matter. Hence, individual differences and identity‐based motivation can be integrated by considering individual difference measures as quantifying individual variation in the tendency to chronically experience future me as relevant to the choices facing current me. Identity‐based motivation predicts three ways people higher in future time perspective might more frequently experience a future me as relevant to the choices facing current me. First, future me may be on the mind more often. Second, future me may be more likely to be experienced as part of the current me. Third, difficulty imagining future me and starting or persisting in future‐focused action may be more likely to be seen as a signal of importance and not of impossibility. That is, people higher in future orientation are more likely to interpret their experiences of difficulty as implying the importance of investing in future me and not the impossibility of attaining that future me.

5. Perspective 4: Social and Temporal Dilemmas: Fertile Ground for Investigating the Role of Temporal Concerns in Human Functioning (Jeff Joireman)

In the three decades leading up to the publication of Zimbardo and Boyd's (1999) seminal paper, a stream of research was unfolding focused on decision‐making in social dilemmas (Parks et al. 2013; Van Lange et al. 2013). At the time, social dilemmas had typically been defined broadly as situations in which individual and collective interests were at odds, underscoring the “social conflict” inherent in all social dilemmas. Consequently, researchers interested in the role of individual differences in social dilemmas focused almost exclusively on prosocial, individualistic, and competitive social value orientations, which reflect the weight an individual assigns to their own and others' outcomes in interdependent settings (Balliet et al. 2009; Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Pletzer et al. 2018).

Although the social dimension underlying social dilemmas captured the bulk of the attention, several scholars highlighted an additional temporal dimension within many social dilemmas (Axelrod 1981; Messick and Brewer 1983; Messick and McClelland 1983), especially those relevant to environmental problems (Joireman 2005; Joireman et al. 2004). Indeed, the “temporal conflict” between present and future well‐being appeared to characterize the majority of real‐world social dilemmas.

In the context of this more novel temporal dimension, several temporally‐related individual difference constructs received attention, including the consideration of future consequences or “CFC” (Strathman et al. 1994). As an aspiring social dilemma scholar with interests in personality, Strathman et al.'s CFC construct felt like a key missing piece in the social/temporal dilemma puzzle. As a result, for the next thirty years, it became a lens through which I approached many temporal dilemmas, including environmental dilemmas, financial decision‐making, aggression, health behavior, and workplace sacrifice. This sustained line of research is largely attributable to the fact that the CFC scale “works.” Its two subscales (CFC‐Immediate and CFC‐Future; Joireman et al. 2012) are highly reliable, relatively independent (with a typical correlation of approximately r = −0.35), and predictive of decision‐making across a wide range of temporal dilemmas.

Since its introduction, Strathman et al.'s (1994) CFC construct has generated considerable interest, resulting in over 2500 citations. Over the years, my colleagues and I have published several narrative reviews of the CFC literature (Joireman et al. 2006; Joireman and King 2016; Phifer and Joireman 2026). Beyond summarizing the primary literature, one goal of each review has been to advance theory on CFC. In our first review, for example, we articulated an integrative model of CFC (Joireman et al. 2006). In sum, the integrative model proposes that a variety of developmental processes, life events, and broader personality dimensions serve as predictors of CFC (e.g., education, traumatic brain injury, sensation seeking). The model also posits that several temporal and goal‐related processes (e.g., delay of gratification, temporal discounting, self‐efficacy) serve as mediators between CFC and subsequent behavior.

In a subsequent review (Joireman and King 2016), we summarized debates over the factor structure of the CFC scale and highlighted two additional theoretical perspectives including the awareness vs. concern models of CFC and the buffering vs. susceptibility models of CFC.

While a complete treatment of the various models is beyond the scope of the present commentary, a brief summary may help to highlight what makes work on CFC theoretically rich. To begin, the awareness model is an indirect effect model which posits that the link between CFC and a given behavior is mediated by an awareness of the consequences of one's behavior (CFC ➔ perceived consequences ➔ behavior). By comparison, the concern model is an interactive model postulating that CFC moderates the impact of perceived consequences on behavior (CFC × perceived consequences ➔ behavior). Several applications illustrate how the two models can be combined to predict the same outcome, including commuting decisions (Joireman et al. 2004) and credit card debt (Joireman et al. 2010).

Like the concern model, the buffering and susceptibility models are both moderation models. What makes them unique is their explicit grounding in the distinction between the CFC‐Future and CFC‐Immediate subscales. In sum, the buffering model suggests that high levels of CFC‐Future can mitigate the tendency for a risk factor (e.g., alcohol) to encourage negative behavior (e.g., aggression) (e.g., Bushman et al. 2012). In contrast, the susceptibility model suggests that high levels of CFC‐Immediate can heighten the tendency for a risk factor (e.g., compulsive buying tendencies) to increase negative behavior (e.g., credit card debt) (e.g., Joireman et al. 2010).

In our most recent review, we zeroed in on the relevance of CFC for consumer behavior, including an empirical analysis of how a range of consumer decisions (e.g., smoking and saving money) are perceived as temporal traps and fences (Phifer and Joireman 2026). Our results supported the view that consumer behaviors like smoking and alcohol consumption reflect traps, while other behaviors, like saving money and exercising, are perceived as fences.

In reflecting back on the CFC literature, I was asked to highlight CFC contributions that I viewed as especially impactful. As someone who has studied CFC for most of my career, I consider every contribution to the CFC literature interesting and useful for understanding human functioning within a temporal perspective. With that said, three issues stand out as especially noteworthy. First, there has been significant work advancing understanding and applicability of the CFC scale. While some researchers continue to use the original one‐factor solution (recoding the immediate items prior to averaging them with the future items), many recent studies utilizing the CFC‐14 scale (Joireman et al. 2012) employ a two‐factor solution (computing CFC‐Immediate and CFC‐Future subscale scores). This is likely due to the fact that (a) a two‐factor solution routinely fits better than a one‐factor solution and (b) examining which subscale is most predictive sheds more nuanced light on the link between CFC and the outcome of interest (for a longer discussion of CFC measurement issues, see Joireman and King 2016). Notably, the CFC scale has also been translated into a number of languages and adapted to specific domains (e.g., McKay et al. 2020), and researchers have published brief and very brief versions of the CFC scale (e.g., Chng et al. 2022). Second, CFC is relevant to human functioning at the (a) individual level (e.g., academic performance, financial decision‐making, health behavior), (b) interpersonal/group level (e.g., aggression, forgiveness, organizational citizenship behaviors), and (c) societal level (e.g., criminal behavior, sustainability). This underscores its applicability to scholars interested in a wide range of issues. Finally, as noted earlier, several broad theoretical models have been offered to help understand how and under what conditions CFC is likely to predict such behaviors (e.g., integrative, awareness, buffering).

Although the preceding highlights the usefulness of the CFC construct, it is important to consider how the CFC scale is different from Zimbardo and Boyd's (1999) time perspective inventory. From a measurement perspective, the ZTPI offers scales to assess Past‐Positive and Past‐Negative time perspective, whereas the CFC scale offers no subscale to measure a similar focus on the past. In addition, while the ZTPI and CFC scales assess “present/immediate” orientation, the ZTPI offers a distinction between Present‐Fatalistic and Present‐Hedonistic, whereas the CFC‐Immediate scale does not. Both scales, of course, offer a future‐oriented scale.

Another difference can be seen in the domains where ZTPI and CFC have been applied. For example, while the ZTPI has been used to predict sustainable attitudes and behavior, the number of studies linking CFC with environmental attitudes and behavior appears to be larger (e.g., Milfont et al. 2012). Similarly, relative to the ZTPI, CFC has been more often applied within the health domain (e.g., healthy eating and exercise) (Murphy and Dockray 2018). On the other hand, with its inclusion of the Past‐Negative, Past‐Positive, and Present‐Fatalistic scales, and its emphasis on a balanced time perspective, the ZTPI is arguably more suited than CFC to predicting mental health and well‐being (e.g., anxiety, depression, life satisfaction).

The differences between the ZTPI and CFC scale, however, go beyond the number of scales and domains of emphasis. More broadly speaking, the ZTPI arguably reflects a person's relative focus on different time zones, whereas the CFC scale more explicitly taps the extent to which a person bases decisions on immediate versus delayed consequences when faced with intertemporal tradeoffs. Restated, whereas the ZTPI captures an individual's relative temporal focus, CFC tends to emphasize the mechanisms through which CFC translates into concrete action. Indeed, in line with the integrative model of CFC (Joireman et al. 2006), a growing body of work shows that CFC predicts behavior through appraisal of consequences, the weighting of relevant concerns, and regulatory focus. Much of this work has been done in the context of health and environmental behavior.

For instance, in the health domain, Whitaker et al. (2011) found that CFC predicted a higher likelihood of screening for colorectal cancer through two mediators including higher perceived benefits and lower perceived barriers of screening. In other health‐related research, CFC was found to predict healthy eating through an increased concern with one's health and sustainability (Bénard et al. 2024) and by encouraging a promotion orientation emphasizing growth and aspirations (Joireman et al. 2012).

Turning to the environmental domain, several studies demonstrate that CFC predicts sustainable attitudes and intentions via perceived environmental consequences (Joireman et al. 2004) and concerns regarding sustainability (Tuu and Khoi 2024). Collectively, these findings illustrate how the CFC construct explains not only whether people think about the future but also how CFC shapes the cognitive and motivational processes that mediate health and sustainability outcomes. As a concrete example, when deciding whether to bike or drive to work, a person high in CFC may anticipate the long‐term environmental and health benefits of biking and the long‐term costs associated with driving, which could, in turn, increase the commuter's likelihood of biking to work.

From this perspective, the ZTPI is useful when assessing the relative emphasis people place on the past, present, and future, and how they think about the past, present, and future, whereas the CFC scale is more narrowly applicable to precisely how people make decisions. One way to frame their interconnection is to view CFC as a narrower construct nested within the broader ZTPI, suggesting CFC is one possible mediator that could account for relationships between the ZTPI and different outcome criteria (e.g., Guo et al. 2023). Indeed, Zimbardo and Boyd originally utilized CFC in their tests for convergent validity of the ZTPI. CFC was positively related to the ZTPI‐Future scale (r = 0.52) and negatively related to both the Present‐Fatalistic (r = −0.51), Present‐Hedonistic (r = −0.31), and Past‐Negative scale (r = −0.19). These correlations suggest meaningful overlap between the ZTPI and CFC scales. At the same time, the correlations suggest that two scales measure slightly different underlying constructs.

Two additional differences are worth mentioning. First, while efforts have been made to articulate mediation, moderation, and integrative models of CFC, relatively more attention has been paid to the theoretical underpinnings of time perspective. Second, relative to CFC, much more thought has been paid to the interrelationships between the five ZTPI dimensions—including the idea of a balanced time perspective (Stolarski et al. 2011). In light of these similarities and differences, future work integrating the ZTPI and CFC would seem to offer significant opportunities for theoretical and empirical advances.

Whether one's focus is on the ZTPI or CFC, there can be no doubt that Zimbardo played a major role in advancing our understanding of how people think about their past, present, and future; navigate through different time zones; and make choices within a temporal context. Considering the vast array of decisions involving a temporal component, this rich tradition is sure to continue, with scholars drawing on the past to inform the present and push into the future, shedding additional light on the fundamental temporal aspect of human behavior.

6. Perspective 5: Regulating Across Time Perspectives: The Role of Abstract Cognition (Kalman Victor& Yaacov Trope)

Time Perspective Theory (TPT), primarily a framework for understanding human relationships to “subjective time” (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999; Stolarski et al. 2018), can also serve to underscore some of the regulatory challenges we face when trying to relate to the past and future from our “specious present” (James 1890; Stolarski et al. 2018). TPT's exploration of different state and trait orientations to past, present, and future speaks not only to the psychological richness and complexity of experiences of temporality and the attitudes we hold towards different categories of time, but also to some of the cognitive challenges of mental time travel. From the singular vantage point of being rooted in the self in the here‐and‐now and the specific trappings of a local situation, we must ultimately find a way to integrate memories, goals, predictions, and much else. Time perspective is defined as “the often non‐conscious personal attitude that each of us holds towards time and the process whereby the continual flow of existence is bundled into time categories that help to give order, coherence, and meaning to our lives” (Zimbardo and Boyd 2008). The idea of a Balanced Time Perspective (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999) identifies the challenge of flexibly applying time perspectives and posits an optimal or adaptive “balance” of time categories and attitudes towards them.

How do we manage this balancing act, in which we can create meaning and order out of disparate information we source from the present moment, our retrospections, and our prospection? What cognitive stances or strategies might one use to establish a temporal scope for self‐regulation that can deal with the vacillating representations of mental targets that appear so different across time categories?

We would like to posit that abstract cognitions that can better remain stable across the flexible usage of time perspectives, without sacrificing a sense of continuity or superordinate structure, would be best suited to achieving something like a Balanced Time Perspective. Our work in Construal Level Theory (CLT) (Liberman and Trope 2008, 2014; Trope and Liberman 2010) emphasizes the importance of the ego in the here‐and‐now as the anchor point for mental travel, including mental travel across time. It is the subjective experience of distance from the target of a mental representation that determines whether we think of it abstractly or concretely. With the development of Regulatory Scope Theory (Trope et al. 2021), we elaborate on how abstraction or concretion can serve to help us bring distal or proximal concerns to the fore to meet regulatory demands. Abstraction and high‐level representations in particular can help us expand our scope of concerns to include those things that may feel remote, including expanding our temporal scope to include salient factors from the past and future. Low‐level representations, on the other hand, can better emphasize important incidental and situational affordances, particularly those in the present. The low‐level details of daily errands or work assignments and the high‐level of grand ambitions for home improvements and getting promotion may indeed compete for our attentions and only serve as selectively useful for different situations, much like different time perspectives.

Perhaps we can then think of how abstraction might facilitate the expansive, flexible, integrative temporal scope (Trope et al. 2021) that may be an important part of a Balanced Time Perspective. For example, research has shown that more abstract, schematized representations of the self, such as broader versus narrow identity categories, traits versus states, and primary versus secondary attributes, are more likely to be used in the context of mental travel to the future (Wakslak et al. 2008). Other work has demonstrated that one's high‐level values can be integral to their representations of goals and behavioral intentions in the future (Eyal et al. 2009). Numerous studies have emphasized the use of abstraction for mental travel across time to distal targets such as events, behaviors, goals, etc. Often, the farther we get from the present in our mental travels, the more likely it is that we prioritize desirability vs. feasibility concerns; end/why vs. means/how characterizations of goals and behaviors; and other high‐level construals of targets that are general enough to remain stable across the uncertainties of our predictions (Liberman et al. 2002; Liberman and Trope 1998; Nguyen et al. 2023). And though the past is somewhat understudied in CLT, work on self‐distancing also shows us how a third‐person self, seemingly more stable, decontextualized, and general than the first‐person self within specific memories, can even help us process and integrate negative past experiences (Kross and Ayduk 2017).

Obvious predictions, though, prove elusive when we consider that mental abstraction is not inherently adaptive vs. maladaptive. Depending on the perceiver's individual psychology and any number of contextual variables, abstraction might be just as easily implicated in the sweeping catastrophizing that accompanies a past‐negative orientation as much as it can enable a productive future orientation towards long‐term goal‐pursuit. However, while CLT has been studied largely in terms of the primacy of the situation, in which level of representation is induced with manipulations of mindset (e.g., focusing on how vs. why or means vs. ends) or psychological distance, some measures do try to establish general tendencies towards abstract vs. concrete thinking at the person level which may be more suited to study as co‐variates with certain time perspectives. The Behavior Identification Form (BIF) (Vallacher and Wegner 1985; Vallacher and Wegner 1989), for example, where participants can choose a how versus why characterization of an action, has been used as a dispositional diagnostic for high‐ versus low‐level construals. Most recently, a general construal level questionnaire was tested and validated as its own standalone assessment (Yin et al. 2025), providing an exciting opportunity to think about whether certain trait‐level time orientations rely on more stable tendencies to think abstractly vs. concretely.

Recent work has in fact implicated regulatory scope (Trope et al. 2021; Fujita et al. 2025) in self‐control mechanisms, which likely pertain to many aspects of TPT such as the Present‐Hedonistic time perspective which focuses on local and short‐term gains, though regulatory scope has not yet been looked at as a potential individual difference variable. However, we return to the contention that an expansive scope which relies on mental abstractions would certainly prove useful when it comes to allowing for the flexibility and integration that characterize a Balanced Time Perspective. A Balanced Time Perspective emerges when temporal categories do not unduly or rigidly influence my present self's situationally grounded regulatory demands, which means a certain degree of flexibility broadens temporal scope at the dispositional level. Mental travel begins and ends with the present self, but it ultimately requires abstract cognitions that can synthesize across the various time categories to successfully come to bear on decisions in the here‐and‐now. Thus, using abstraction from the here‐and‐now to consider targets and concerns across time categories—whether we do so by emphasizing traits, values, broader categories, “why” characterizations, desirability‐focused concerns, etc.—may indeed be a necessary, though of course not wholly sufficient, facilitator of a Balanced Time Perspective. Though the evidence in this short piece is indirect, we contend that abstraction may be a critical piece of the broader temporal scope needed to be inclusive of considerations that emerge from across the various time perspectives. Dispositional measures of construal and regulatory scope could help clarify whether certain general tendencies towards high‐ vs. low‐level thinking might be important to understand how a Balanced Time Perspectives, or other time perspectives, are scaffolded by cognitions.

7. Perspective 6: From the Balanced Time Perspective to Temporal Metacognition: Psychological Time as a Self‐Regulatory Feature (Maciej Stolarski)

After Philip Zimbardo's brilliant lecture on “The Time Paradox” at my home faculty in 2009, I had the chance to speak with him about some ideas that had sparked in my mind during his presentation—particularly those related to the idea of balanced time perspective. At the time, I was a first‐year doctoral student studying the regulatory role of emotional intelligence. While listening to Phil, I began to see temporal balance as a potential self‐regulatory mechanism, with meaningful implications for emotion regulation and broader socio‐emotional adaptation. I was thrilled to share these early thoughts with one of the most recognizable figures in psychological science. I remember Phil listening to me carefully, with great focus and kindness. When I finished, he handed me his business card and encouraged me to write to him once I had tested the idea empirically. About a year and a half later, we published the results of that study in our first joint paper (Stolarski et al. 2011), which marked the beginning of my scientific journey into psychological time—a journey that continues to this day.

Although many of the ideas included in Zimbardo and Boyd's theory were derived from earlier approaches (e.g., Lewin 1942; Nuttin 1985), the proposition that individual differences in temporal perspectives should be analyzed within a multidimensional space of trait‐like variables (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999) enabled a more nuanced understanding of the complex nature of psychological time. First, the present focus was no longer conceptualized merely as the opposite pole of the future orientation. Despite the (at best, moderate) negative correlation between these temporal dimensions—Present‐Hedonistic and Future—in Zimbardo's model, they both could coexist at relatively high levels within the same individual. This coexistence allows, for example, the selection and enjoyment of hedonic pleasures that do not entail undesirable consequences in the future. Moreover, the inclusion of past time perspectives recognized the importance of this temporal domain, which had been largely overlooked in earlier models of temporal orientation. This multidimensional approach significantly enhanced the predictive power of time perspective, which, in some studies, even surpassed that of the Big Five personality traits (e.g., Zhang and Howell 2011). More importantly, it provided the conceptual foundation for the emergence of the balanced time perspective (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999; Boniwell and Zimbardo 2004) idea—a development that, in my view, represents the most significant theoretical contribution made by Zimbardo and Boyd.

Defined as the “mental ability to switch between time perspectives depending on task features, situational considerations, and personal resources rather than be biased toward a specific time perspective” (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999, 1285), the concept of balanced time perspective stems from the rather simple observation that being overly focused on any specific temporal horizon—even the future, which, as Thomas Suddendorf has demonstrated above, may in fact be the peak evolutionary achievement of Homo sapiens —is never fully adaptive. On the contrary, people need all temporal horizons to function harmoniously and fully realize their potential. Despite its conceptual appeal and potential applications in psychological practice (Boniwell and Zimbardo 2004), balanced time perspective remained a largely theoretical construct for many years, with only a few moderately successful attempts at operationalization (see Stolarski et al. 2015). Our proposal to apply a Euclidean distance‐based formula to compute the deviation between an individual's time perspective profile (as measured by the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory) and a theoretical “optimal” profile—referred to as Deviation from the Balanced Time Perspective (DBTP; Stolarski et al. 2011)—has become a widely accepted and commonly used method for assessing temporal balance (see also Jankowski et al. 2020, for an improved version of the coefficient: DBTP‐r). This method has enabled a number of studies which, taken together, provide robust evidence for the fundamental regulatory role of temporal balance in domains such as mental health, well‐being, cognitive effectiveness, self‐control, and interpersonal relationships (see Stolarski et al. 2020; Stolarski, Czajkowska‐Łukasiewicz, et al. 2024, for reviews). Intervention‐based studies using the DBTP have shown that temporal balance can be cultivated, leading to improvements in mental health and well‐being (Rönnlund et al. 2019; Kuan and Zhang 2022).

Despite its popularity and utility, the DBTP is not without limitations. As a static measure of an individual's alignment with the theoretical optimal time perspective profile, a low deviation score does not necessarily indicate that the individual is capable of effectively switching between temporal horizons. To address this issue, we proposed a more nuanced approach to studying temporal self‐regulatory capacities. Drawing on established theories of metacognition (e.g., Flavell 1979), we introduced the concept of temporal metacognition (Stolarski and Witowska 2017). This framework challenges Zimbardo and Boyd's (1999) original assumption that time perspective and mental time travel are primarily non‐conscious processes. In contrast, our work suggests that individuals frequently engage in deliberate, purposeful mental time travel to meet situational demands, pursue personal goals, and regulate behavior in the face of temptation.

Exploratory factor analyses conducted on a large set of items—designed to capture various hypothetical manifestations of temporal metacognitive features—enabled the development of an individual differences metric encompassing three largely independent self‐regulatory capacities: (1) metacognitive temporal control, reflecting the ability to intentionally inhibit unwanted or intrusive temporal foci (e.g., present‐oriented temptations or past‐related ruminations); (2) cognitive reconstruction of the past, denoting the capacity to maintain a flexible and reconstructive view of one's personal past, open to reinterpretation and new meaning; and (3) goal‐oriented metatemporal interconnectedness, capturing the ability to cognitively shift between and integrate different temporal horizons in order to draw wise conclusions and apply them towards the pursuit of personal goals. These features not only provide bases for temporal balance (Stolarski and Witowska 2017), but also appear to play a vital role in shaping well‐being and emotion regulation (Witowska et al. 2022).

Interestingly, each of these capacities appears to foster distinct aspects of metacognitive self‐regulation, thereby independently contributing to the development of a balanced time perspective and the cultivation of adaptive temporal self‐regulation. Cognitive reconstruction of the past may enable adaptive reappraisal processes, reduce the emotional burden of negative autobiographical memories, foster learning from past experience without becoming fixated on it, and support meaning‐making processes central to psychological resilience (Gross 2015; Conway and Pleydell‐Pearce 2000). Metacognitive temporal control likely supports the volitional inhibition of maladaptive temporal impulses—such as resisting present‐focused temptations, interrupting ruminative past‐focus, or diminishing excessive worry—aligning with broader models of effortful control and executive self‐regulation (Hofmann et al. 2012; Baumeister et al. 2007). Goal‐oriented metatemporal interconnectedness likely facilitates strategic shifting among time frames, enabling integration of past lessons, present demands, and future outcomes—echoing perspectives on motivational control, goal pursuit, and prospection (Baumeister et al. 2016; Duckworth and Gross 2014). Although conceptually and psychometrically distinct, these capacities may operate synergistically as a flexible metacognitive system (Flavell 1979; see also Wells 2019), allowing individuals to dynamically recruit the temporal horizon most conducive to adaptive behavior.

Although research on temporal metacognition is still in its early stages, the concept provides a foundation for future developments in the field, including the formulation of theories focused on the adaptive, regulatory functions of mental time travel and temporal metacognition—such as the temporal regulation of emotion, or even a broader, temporality‐based theory of personality that envisions the self as a temporal navigator, a cognitive‐affective entity that emerges from the aggregate of episodic memories of the past and regulates present behavior in pursuit of future goals and the realization of desired future selves. This perspective naturally sends me on two mental time travels: one into the future, envisioning forthcoming research and conceptual syntheses, which fills me with motivation and excitement; and one into the past, revisiting meaningful encounters and inspiring discussions with Phil—moments that evoke deep gratitude and a gentle nostalgia for the shared beginnings of my scientific journey into the psychology of time.

8. Perspective 7: Integrating Psychological Time and Personality Theory (Gerald Matthews)

Personality can operate only in the present. However, the past exerts an influence on the present through current structures and memories. In addition, the future exerts an influence on the present through expectations and goals. Our dreams of the future are as much a part of personality as are our memories of the past and our perceptions of the present. As noted in the text, the future cannot determine the present but our views of the future can do so. Clearly the person with a negative schema for the future will feel and behave very differently from the person with a positive future schema (Pervin 2003, 448).

It's perhaps ironic that Philip Zimbardo, an eminent social psychologist in the 1960s, came to develop the ZTPI (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999), a leading dimensional trait measure, given the antagonism between social psychology and trait psychology during this period. Zimbardo's insights prefigured contemporary interest in integrating trait and social‐cognitive theories (Matthews 2020a). Indeed, Zimbardo (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999) cited the Stanford Prison Experiment, an example par excellence of the power of the situation, as one of his inspirations for investigating individual differences.

Zimbardo (2016) acknowledged Kurt Lewin (e.g., Lewin 1942) as the first psychologist to explore the concept of time perspective in depth. Among other insights, Lewin (1942) identified the individual's time perspective as an important factor in well‐being, goal‐setting, and achievement. The ZTPI was designed to follow Lewin's recognition of individual differences in time perspective (Zimbardo 2016). At one level, Zimbardo's work in developing the ZTPI follows a familiar scale development path—define a new construct, sample items, verify basic psychometrics, and establish construct validity, including divergence from established major traits. However, his ability to link the descriptive traits to a rich theoretical background and people's lived experiences, including his own, sets him apart as a personality theorist. The contributors to this article highlight the theoretical panorama opened up by Zimbardo's research on time perspective. In this concluding section, I briefly review Zimbardo's legacy for personality trait theorists and its connections to the different perspectives explored in this article.

Zimbardo's personality theory has a broader and deeper scope than many accounts of major traits. Standard trait theory, based on between‐person analyses, can be overly descriptive and overly reductive to universal supertrait models (Rauthmann 2024). Furthermore, trait theory neglects intra‐individual dynamic factors in personality, including the cognitive and affective processes that shape behaviors in changing external environments (Cervone and Little 2019). Social‐cognitive theories have addressed the stable personality architecture that supports processing dynamics, such as the Cognitive Affective Processing System model (CAPS: Mischel and Shoda 1995) and the Knowledge‐and‐Appraisal Personality Architecture model (KAPA: Cervone 2004). The issues addressed by between‐ and within‐person analyses can diverge substantially. However, modern accounts of personality architecture define knowledge structures and cognitive processes that contribute to a deeper understanding of between‐person trait variation (Cervone and Little 2019; Matthews et al. 2009). In particular, the acquisition and execution of context‐specific skills mediate the behavioral expressions of traits (Matthews 2018). Framing the individual differences in time perspectives measured by the ZTPI within architecture models highlights Zimbardo's contributions to personality theory.

Cognitive‐Adaptive Trait Theory (CATT: Matthews 2018, 2020b) is a skill‐based model of personality architecture that identifies three focal challenges for personality theory. First, traits require a multi‐leveled understanding that refers to neural processes, to virtual information‐processing, and to the harnessing of cognition and emotion to support adaptation to life challenges. Second, constructs commonly conflate process and content; for example, trait anxiety reflects both intrinsic threat‐processing biases and contextualized negative self‐beliefs. Third, individual differences in adaptation underpinning traits primarily reflect contextualized skills rather than basic neurocognitive processes. Zimbardo's unique contributions to personality trait theory can be understood in relation to these critical issues.

8.1. Time Perspective Theory Is Multileveled

The perspectives in this article illustrate the multi‐leveled nature of time perspective theory. Temporal processing stems from human evolutionary biology (Suddendorf). Zimbardo's rejection of the heritability of time perspective traits (Stolarski, Zawadzki, et al. 2024) was a rare lapse of judgment. Traits for time perspective are related to fundamental time perception processes supported by increasingly well‐defined neural circuits (Wittman). Similarly, time perspective can be linked to temporal information‐processing models identifying key cognitive functions such as attention and working memory (Wittmann) and autobiographical memory (Matthews and Stolarski 2015). Decision‐making is a key bridge between information‐processing and real‐world adaptation. Many classic decision‐making bases have a central temporal element. For example, availability bias results from overweighting vivid, easily‐recalled past events. Joireman elaborates on the temporal context for decision‐making. Time perspective resolves not only explicit temporal dilemmas such as deciding whether to defer gratification but also for social dilemmas, which frequently require trade‐offs between present and future well‐being. Other perspectives focus on relationships between time perspective and higher‐level self‐referent social cognition, including the dynamic construction of identity (Oyserman) and the anchoring of mental representations of time in the ego (Victor & Trope). The theoretical assumptions of the different contributors are diverse but Zimbardo's work has paved the way for a multi‐level integration of different perspectives.

8.2. Distinguishing Process and Content in Personality Theory

The content of self‐referent memories and knowledge can be distinguished from the encoding and retrieval processes that build content, although process and content are reciprocally linked. For example, selective attention to past failures elaborates negative memories and makes them more easily accessible, which in turn biases attention through the perception‐action cycle (Wells and Matthews 2014). Multi‐leveled temporal processes build self‐referent memories that underpin individual differences in time perspective. Beyond the obvious link between past time perspective and memory, all perspectives depend on constructing and retaining the mental models of one's positioning in time to which Suddendorf alludes. This process requires metacognitions of the temporal self (Stolarski). Social psychological perspectives emphasize how time perspective is related to abstract representation of the self as well as those that are grounded in specific events or contexts (Victor & Trope). The future self interacts with situational contingencies and metacognition to motivate future actions (Oyserman).

8.3. Skill‐Based Perspectives on Time Perspective, Balance, and Adaptation

A third issue is the close bonds between adaptations, skills and traits (Matthews 2018, 2020b). Individuals have diverse expertise as a result of differing choices in the investment of time and effort in skill acquisition (Suddendorf). The link between time perspective and skills is most obvious for future time perspective and deferring immediate gratification to build for future success. More generally, sensemaking is a skill that encompasses both outer and inner worlds (Urquhart et al. 2025) and supports people's capacity to explore differing adaptations to temporal challenges (Joireman, Suddendorf).

By contrast with cognitive‐motor skills, sensemaking skills may be maladaptive, especially in the modern world in which knowledge related to past, present, and future is increasingly unmoored from evidence (Matthews et al. 2024). Research on emotional disorders demonstrates the harm of irrational rumination on the past and worrying over future threats (Wells and Matthews 2014). Suddendorf's example of variability in response to the marshmallow test emphasizes that time perspectives relate to skills, not simple biases. Depending on context, a future‐oriented person may still be present‐ or future‐oriented in a given situation. The skill resides in flexibly matching state time perspective to the needs of the situation (Victor & Trope, Suddendorf).

Adaptive models of personality traits (e.g., Matthews 2018, 2020b) typically perform a cost–benefit analysis of traits, which are beneficial in some contexts but limiting in others. The tradeoff of immediate pleasure and future gains (Joireman) is a good example. Current time perspective theory goes further by defining an optimal adaptation, balanced time perspective (Stolarski). From a Lewinian perspective (Zimbardo 2016), balanced time perspective represents a dynamic state in which the dominant time perspective switches flexibly to maintain equilibrium with the changing situation (Stolarski et al. 2018). Victor and Trope expand on balance as an expansive, flexible, integrative temporal scope that maintains both a stable self in the abstract and contextual adaptability. Metacognitive skills are critical for adaptation (Stolarski). Sensemaking requires a constructive but veridical understanding of how one experienced and managed past events, one's present psychological state, including mindfulness, and future projection of the self. For example, a present‐hedonic individual might want to ski, but enjoying skiing requires future‐oriented investment in equipment, training, and travel planning. The ski‐curious hedonist needs an accurate sense of whether the eventual excitement of the slopes is worth the grind of the preparations.

Stolarski distinguishes multiple capacities for temporal metacognition that contribute to balance, pointing towards future empirical research on these issues. The metaphor of the self as temporal navigator is especially apt. Navigation requires skillful adaptation to the environment, including backtracking and detouring where necessary. It requires past, present, and future‐oriented resources (e.g., event logs, real‐time maps, weather forecasts). It also requires the navigator to have an accurate sense of their own capabilities, limitations, and goals.

9. Conclusion

In sum, Philip Zimbardo's prescient integration of social psychology and dimensional personality models provides a beacon illuminating the way to a richer understanding of personality traits. The multiple perspectives presented in this article do more than illustrate the scope and diversity of research on time perspectives. They provide directions towards resolution of fundamental issues in personality theory without falling into the two classical traps of the field: reducing theory to dry structural descriptions and neglecting sources of stability and consistency in individual differences (including biology). Specifically, time perspective research illustrates how multiple levels of analysis contribute to traits, the importance of both process and content, and the adaptive basis of time perspectives in sensemaking and metacognitive skills.

Author Contributions

Maciej Stolarski: conceptualization, supervision, writing‐original draft, writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. Thomas Suddendorf: writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. Marc Wittmann: writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. Daphna Oyserman: writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. Jeff Joireman: writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. Kalman Victor: writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. Yaacov Trope: writing – original draft, writing – review and editing. Gerald Matthews: writing – original draft, writing – review and editing.

Funding

The present work received no external funding.

Ethics Statement

This article does not report any original research involving human participants or animals. Ethical approval was not required.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Data Availability Statement

No empirical data is associated with this manuscript.