Corporate influence on food and nutrition policies in Latin America and the Caribbean: key determinants and policy directions

Abstract

Background

In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), diets are increasingly dominated by ultra-processed products (UPPs). Although public health policies aimed at reducing UPPs consumption show promise, these are often undermined by corporate influence. Understanding how countries respond to this influence is essential for strengthening food policy development in LAC.

Objective

Examine how different sectors (government, academia, and civil society organizations) respond to corporate influence throughout the public policy cycle and analyze the key determinants that enable or constrain industry power across six analytical environments in five LAC countries, with the aim of informing actionable policy directions.

Methods

The study follows two sequential and complementary components: (1) policy mapping conducted to assess the progress of six health, food, and nutrition policies within the policy cycle in LAC countries, and (2) a qualitative component consisting of in-depth interviews with key informants from Guatemala, Paraguay, Argentina, Jamaica and Barbados; conducted between May 2024 and May 2025. Data analysis followed a constant comparative approach to identify cross-cutting patterns and context-specific insights.

Results

Policy progress varies substantially across food policies and countries. For example, taxation on sugar-sweetened beverages is generally advanced, while marketing restrictions on unhealthy products remain at earlier stages. Regarding the qualitative component, fifteen informants were interviewed; Argentina and academia were the most represented. Based on informants´ responses, corporate strategies and counterstrategies were identified and classified into six environments, each comprising determinants that either constrain corporate power or hinder efforts to address it. These encompassed: (1) political and governance processes; (2) legal and regulatory frameworks, as evidenced in Argentina and Jamaica; (3) narrative and communication strategies leveraging media; (4) knowledge production and dissemination characterized by misleading or suppressed information; (5) advocacy efforts, notably observed in Argentina and the Caribbean; and (6) a cross-cutting, cross-sectoral collaboration to present a unified response to corporate influence.

Conclusion

Findings indicate that the UPPs industry operates across multiple environments and is shaped by country-specific contexts. Nevertheless, promising responses include transparency and conflict-of-interest mechanisms, strengthened civil society advocacy, and cross-sectoral collaboration to counter corporate influence. These strategies require adaptation to national and local conditions.

Clinical trial number

Not applicable.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12992-026-01198-9.

Background

In Latin America and The Caribbean (LAC), as well as globally, diets are increasingly dominated by ultra-processed products (UPPs), a trend with significant implications on food public policy [1, 2]. The UPPs are branded, commercial formulations made from cheap ingredients, with little or no whole food, designed to compete with natural food, their preparation as dishes and meals, and to maximize corporate profits [3]. The LAC region currently ranks as the fifth-largest market worldwide for solid UPPs (e.g. ready-to-eat meals) and the third largest for liquid UPPs (e.g. sweetened beverages) [4]. This growing consumption plays a crucial role in the ongoing ‘nutrition transition’, characterized by a shift from traditional diets to dietary patterns associated with obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs) [5, 6]. Although the rise in NCDs is a multifactorial phenomenon, structural changes in food systems—especially the availability, affordability, and aggressive marketing of UPPs—have emerged as key drivers [7, 8]. These changes have been sustained, among other factors, by the significant influence of the food industry on food systems.

In response to this panorama, a growing body of evidence demonstrates the effectiveness of public health, food, and nutrition policies aimed at reducing the consumption of UPPs. These measures include taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) [9], mandatory front-of-package nutrition labeling (FOPNL) [10], marketing restrictions —particularly targeting children and adolescents— [11] and regulations promoting healthier food environments in schools [12]. However, corporate influence in shaping food policy is a major barrier to advancing effective measures [12].

This corporate influence broadly refers to the capacity of corporations to shape societal norms, research agendas, market conditions, and policy environments to serve their interests, often resulting in interference, such as delaying, weakening, or obstructing public health policymaking [13, 14]. Within this broader construct, corporate political activity (CPA) —a concept originated in tobacco control and business literature— [15] encompasses strategies through which companies shape public policy and opinion to protect their interests [16]. The food industry employs CPA strategies to defend its products, safeguard its profits and influence policy decisions directly or indirectly [17]. While often considered acceptable in a business framework centered on shareholder value [16], these strategies ultimately harm population health [12, 18].

In LAC, this influence extends beyond lobbying through CPA, including institutional capture, manipulation of scientific discourse, and shaping of public opinion [19–24]. These strategies are subtly adapted to the political context and policy cycle [24], exerting a direct influence and power at critical points when key policy decisions are formulated, enacted, and implemented [25]. Given the adaptive nature of these strategies, it is crucial to understand not only how the food industry operates in specific countries of the LAC region, where CPA remains under-documented, but also how different countries and sectors respond to corporate influence in public health, food, and nutrition policy, and how this knowledge can support public health efforts.

In the region, several countries have started addressing corporate influence, with some efforts documented in prior research. For example, a global scoping review identified mechanisms adopted at national, regional, and global levels, including transparency requirements, conflict-of-interest (COI) governance, monitoring and education about corporate practices, and explicit prohibitions on industry interactions [26]. However, existing evidence remains fragmented and uneven across countries, with limited comparative analyses throughout the policy cycle in LAC.

Therefore, this qualitative study builds on a mapping of key food and nutrition policies across LAC countries, the identification of country-level policy progress. It examines how different sectors—particularly government (executive and legislative branches), academia, and civil society organizations (CSOs)—respond to corporate influence throughout the policy cycle in selected countries. The study also analyzes the key determinants that enable or constrain industry power across six analytical environments, with the aim of informing actionable policy directions.

Methods

Building on prior work based on a literature review [24] we conducted a qualitative study in five countries of the region. The study comprises two sequential and complementary components: (a) policy and stakeholder mapping, and (b) a qualitative component based on in-depth interviews, described below:

Policy and stakeholder mapping

Six health, food, and nutrition policies were mapped at national and regional levels across 33 LAC countries in 2024. These included FOPNL, SSBs taxation, UPPs taxation (referring to taxes applied to ultra-processed food products other than SSBs), unhealthy food marketing restrictions (UMR), industrially trans fatty acids (iTFAs) regulations, and school nutrition policies or programs (SNPs). These policies were defined based on regional policy benchmarking assessments, such as the Healthy Food Environment Policy Index (Food-EPI) [27], and international recommendations identifying effective regulatory measures to address unhealthy diets, including World Health Organization’s “best buy” interventions [28]. Collectively, they represent priority strategies that have been widely promoted and implemented across LAC [29, 30].

The policies were assessed using official documents, the Global Database on the Implementation of Food and Nutrition Action (GIFNA) platform, reports from CSOs [31–33] and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) [9, 34, 35]. Each policy was classified within the Knill and Tosun (2008) [36] public policy cycle: Agenda Setting, Formulation, Adoption, Implementation, or Evaluation, or marked as “No data available” when evidence was insufficient. This analytical framework enabled a comparative understanding of food policy development across the region to characterize the policy landscape in LAC, to inform country selection for the interviews, and to guide subsequent phases of the study. In parallel, key stakeholders were identified through a prior literature review [24] and the policy mapping process. This dual approach enabled the development of a comprehensive stakeholder map.

Country selection

Countries were selected through a four-step process using predefined criteria including the number of CPA-related publications, potential stakeholder participation, and strategic policy phase selection to ensure a diverse and analytically relevant sample of countries for in-depth interviews with key stakeholders. Additionally, a score system was assigned to each country (see Additional File 1). Countries with no relevant policy activity, experiencing active conflict or with extensive published evidence were excluded to prioritize less-documented contexts. Four countries met all inclusion criteria for the qualitative component —Paraguay, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Barbados—while Argentina was included as a special case due to its critical policy moment, regarding the implementation of the front-of-package warning labeling system.

Qualitative component: in-depth interviews

This phase involved in-depth interviews with informants from the legislative and executive branches, CSOs, and academic institutions, identified through stakeholder mapping. Informants directly involved in food policy design, implementation, or advocacy were purposely sampled and invited by email [37]. Additional informants were recruited through a snowball sampling strategy, leveraging the research team’s regional networks and existing professional contacts.

Generating data and instruments

To gain a deeper understanding of countries’ responses to corporate influence, two distinct interview guides were developed: one for policy “makers” (executive and legislative actors) and another for policy “observers” (academics and CSOs). For Caribbean countries, the guide was translated into English. The instruments addressed the context of current food policies, strategies used by the food industry using the CPA framework [38], and country responses–or planned responses– to counter such interference.

Before implementation, the instruments were piloted internally and adjusted for clarity and contextual relevance. Interviews were conducted remotely via Zoom, in the interviewee’s native language (English or Spanish), following formal invitations and informed consent. Two researchers with expertise in food and nutrition policy and qualitative research methods (VP-A, LM-V) conducted the interviews between May 2024 and May 2025, with durations ranging from 33 to 72 min.

Interview data analysis

All interviews were audio- or video-recorded with prior consent and transcribed verbatim. Data were analyzed using a thematic analysis approach following established guidelines [39, 40]. A systematic coding process was employed. An initial coding tree was developed from the first set of transcripts and refined through discussions among three researchers (VP-A, LM-V, and T-FL). Categories emerging from later transcripts were added to the tree. Data were organized in Excel into categories and subcategories, enabling constant comparative analysis and the identification of key environments and policy directions.

Ethical considerations

This study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the National Institute of Public Health of Mexico (approval no. 1925) and conducted in accordance with the Belmont Report [41] and CIOMS/WHO International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans [42], ensuring adherence to fundamental ethical principles. Risks were minimized, and all participants provided written informed consent after receiving clear information on the study’s purpose. Confidentiality and anonymity were ensured through data encryption, anonymized transcripts, and the identification of testimonies by sector and country only: Academia (A1-A5), CSOs (CSO1-CSO6), and Executive and Legislative branches (EL1-EL3).

Results

Mapping of food and nutrition policies in LAC countries

Based on the policy mapping across the policy cycle, we found significant variation in policy progress across both food policies (n = 6) and subregions within LAC (n = 4 subregions, encompassing a total of 33 countries). For instance, SSBs taxation (n = 24) and SNPs (n = 22) are generally more advanced, with most countries already in the implementation or evaluation phases. In contrast, UMR (n = 3) and iTFAS (n = 9) are usually at earlier stages (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1.

Food policies progress in LAC countries by policy cycle, 2024. * Countries selected for in-depth interviews (see Methods section). ** Countries excluded due to limited data access or verifiable policy data (see Methods section). (1) The classification follows the policy cycle framework developed by Knill and Tosun (2008). (See Methods section). (2) The six key food-related policies adopted in LAC are abbreviated as follows: FOPNL – Front-of-package Nutrition Labeling; SSB tax – Sugar-sweetened beverage taxation; UPP tax – Ultra-processed Products taxation; UMR – Unhealthy food and beverages marketing regulation; iTFAs – Industrial trans fatty acids regulation; SNP – School nutrition policies or programs (covering all initiatives promoting healthy school environments, beyond UPPs restrictions or advertising in schools). (3) The policy reflects formal adoption or implementation progress, but not its strength or alignment with international recommendations

Several countries —particularly Mexico and South American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru— have progressed to the implementation and evaluation phases of various food policies. Conversely, in many Central American and Caribbean countries, policies remain stalled in the agenda-setting or formulation phases. Despite the submission of several FOPNL bills in these two subregions, all have either been rejected or remain under formulation. With respect to UPPs taxation, limited publicly available information prevented an assessment of whether this policy was under discussion.

This policy landscape in LAC sets the context for the analysis that follows, which explores how different environments and determinants of corporate influence shape the uneven and non-linear progress of food and nutrition policies across the region. Figure 1 presents a detailed mapping of each policy by country and its phase within the policy cycle.

In-depth stakeholder interviews in selected countries

Informants’ description

A total of 32 informants from the selected countries were invited: academia (n = 10), CSOs (n = 11), and representatives from executive and legislative branches (n = 11). Of these, 18 agreed to participate (response rate: 56%). Despite multiple follow-ups, three interviews could not be scheduled. Ultimately, 15 informants were interviewed: 5 from academia, 7 from CSOs, and 3 from executive and legislative branches. Argentina had the highest number of informants (n = 5), followed by Paraguay (n = 3) and Guatemala (n = 3). Four informants were from Caribbean countries—Jamaica and Barbados—, though individual counts are not disclosed for confidentiality.

Informants held relatively senior positions, and most interviewees were women (n = 12). To ensure anonymity, no further details are provided. All interviews were conducted individually, except for one pair interviewed together due to their complementary expertise. Identifying informants in the Caribbean proved challenging due to newly formed stakeholder networks. Overall, access to legislators was limited by the high turnover associated with short political terms.

Selected countries’ socio-political context and food policy progress

The information gathered through interviews reflects a comparative range of experiences across Central America (Guatemala), South America (Argentina and Paraguay), and the Caribbean (Jamaica and Barbados). Table 1 provides a contextualized description of each setting.

Table 1.

Countries’ socio-political context and food policies progress based on stakeholder information

Country	Socio-political context	Food policies context	Informant’s information
Central America
Guatemala	Centralized republic where public health and food security are primarily overseen by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance and the Ministry of Agriculture. Although the change in political regime has allowed for greater progress in food policies, full support for adoption is still lacking.	Bill No. 5504 on the promotion of healthy eating was presented in Guatemala´s Congress in October 2018. It encompasses four components: dietary guidelines, promotion, and education of healthy eating, UPPs marketing regulation, and FOPNL. However, opposition from the industry ultimately blocked its approval.	Block of bill No. 5504: “In Guatemala, there is bill 5504, “the Healthy Eating Promotion Act”, which seeks to implement a front-of-package nutritional labeling warning system and advertising regulations for minors under the age of 18. This bill was introduced in Congress in 2018, and to date (2025) it has not been approved… In early 2024, it perhaps made the most progress, coinciding with a change in government, and in the first months of the current administration, it moved quickly through Congress and was approved in the first and second readings. […] Unfortunately, when it was presented for the third reading, which was the final one, there was heavy interference from the opposition blocs and the food industry, and the bill ended up shelved once again. So, it’s basically been a year now that the bill has been stalled…” (A2, Guatemala)
South America
Argentina	Federal republic with politically and administratively autonomous provinces. Due to the country’s political and administrative structure, there are significant challenges, particularly in terms of provincial implementation. In December 2023, Argentina transitioned from a left-wing to a libertarian and pro-market government, whose current agenda appears to consistently favor corporate interests. This was evident in Argentina´s legal process to withdraw from the WHO, an action expected to significantly limit access to global health tools and cooperation.	Argentina has implemented national laws such as PAS law, which seeks to promote healthier diets. The Law has four components regarding FOPNL, healthy school environments with restriction on availability of UPPs in schools, the regulation of marketing aimed at children, and public food procurement. In late December 2024, amendments were made to weaken the PAS Law, including modifications to the nutrient profile, regulation of nutritional claims, and legislative proposals submitted by two national deputies to revoke the law entirely.	Pro-market government and repeal of public health laws: “…the situation worsened with the change of national government to a far-right, pro-market, pro-free market government that believes ‘the market regulates itself’. Through a decree, they repealed a whole bunch of laws that protect rights. (A4, Argentina) “I believe [the interference] affects the executive branch in its attempts to promote changes that weaken the law because they know that this government favors industry over health. This was recently demonstrated by Argentina’s withdrawal from the WHO. This is a very serious matter, which shows how the government doesn’t prioritize health in its agenda and that its priority is economic development.” (CSO4, Argentina) PAS Law: “Law 27,642, known as the Healthy Eating Promotion Law was passed by Congress in October 2021, regulated in March 2022, and is currently in effect. The law has four components and is very comprehensive. It has a FOPNL component based on octagons and the PAHO nutrient profile system […] It also includes a component on school environments. […] Another component has to do with the regulation of marketing aimed at children. And then there is a fourth component, which is public procurement, where it states that products without labels will be prioritized when making public purchases.” (CSO3, Argentina) Challenges in provincial implementation: “The school environment component is perhaps the most challenging due to the country’s structure and its federal system… because although the [PAS] law is in force, as long as the provinces do not issue complementary regulations it is difficult for them to have the capacity to enforce it at the local level” (CSO3, Argentina) Amendments made to weaken the PAS Law: “…​​Previously, the nutrient profile followed PAHO’s model and considered both intrinsic and extrinsic nutrients. Now it only considers extrinsic ones. […] Previously, the law stated that claims were prohibited on products carrying at least one warning label. Now the law specifies that claims are prohibited only with respect to the nutrient in question. […] Another quite serious change is the lowering of the age definition for marketing directed at children and adolescents—from 18 years to 16 years—leaving a legal loophole that allows marketing to continue. Moreover, the regulation now permits the use of licensed characters indicating they are not “directly” aimed at children and adolescents. […] Previously, the presence of any sweetener required a precautionary legend, now, if the sweetener is listed under another function in the ingredients—for example, sorbitol labeled as “anti-caking agent” instead of “sweetener”—the precautionary statement is no longer mandatory. I think I’ve covered the most important, but there are many more…” (CSO4, Argentina)
Paraguay	Paraguay is a unitary republic characterized by a highly centralized government where most of the decision-making power rests at the national level. In August 2023, the administration change was accompanied by a notable decline in political commitment to advancing regulatory measures that may impact commercial interests, including UPPs restrictions. This restrictive political context deepened with the November 2024 enactment of the “Anti-NGO Law” (Law No. 7363), which adds administrative and operational requirements on CSOs, potentially limiting their role in public health advocacy.	Law No. 7092 on FOPNL was enacted in May 2023; however, the approved labeling system Lupa (meaning ‘magnifying glass’ in English) does not meet the highest standards and was driven by the food industry. Implementation remains limited due to the lack of a regulatory framework, and key elements—label design and placement, sanctions, and responsible authorities—remain undefined, hindering enforcement.	Law No. 7363 ("Anti-NGO" Law"): “…Now the President has enacted a law in Paraguay called the “Anti-NGO Law” [laughs]. It’s literally called Anti-NGO, which imposes a series of additional obligations on NGOs—extra reporting requirements beyond those they already had, disclosure of their accounts, and even consultants and researchers; any invoice that exists must be made public. It’s a counter-agenda. So, the possibility of moving forward on a “pro-rights” agenda faces all these obstacles I’ve just mentioned…” (CSO2, Paraguay) Law No. 7092 on FOPNL: “Unfortunately, this [FOPNL] policy was approved in 2023 after many attempts, but not in the form proposed by the Ministry of Health. First, we wanted black warning label octagons, but it wasn’t accepted. It was enacted with the Magnifying Glass, just like in Brazil’s regulation. We didn’t reach a consensus on the size or the criteria. We fought hard for the word “excess,” for example, but it ended up being “high.” Also, for leaving the determination of values, the nutrient profile, and ensuring it was based on PAHO’s nutrient profile system to the regulatory decree—as would have been appropriate—that was not approved either. Already in Parliament, criteria appeared in the law itself that we don’t know, that have no scientific basis. They are the same as those in Brazil’s regulation, without evidence. And the article states that the Ministry of Health is the one that establishes these criteria in accordance with the best scientific evidence. So even that was included without our knowledge, right? We only noticed it once it was enacted. Evidently, there was very strong lobbying behind it…” (EL1, Paraguay)
The Caribbean
Barbados and Jamaica	Caribbean Island states with relatively small territories and limited national markets. Both share a colonial legacy of economic power concentration within a few families. They operate under centralized national government systems; however, their policies are also shaped by regional Caribbean organizations. These centralized governances coexist with a high dependence on imported foods, which presents substantial challenges for the implementation of national food policies. Furthermore, constrained financial and institutional resources hinder both governments from fully addressing public health priorities.	Since 2018, there has been an effort to promote the FOPNL policy in the Caribbean, but it has been rejected by member states due to significant industry influence over decision-making processes. Neither country has adopted this policy yet. Barbados has taken significant steps in promoting healthy food environments through the introduction of its National School Nutrition Policy (February 2023) in all public and private schools. This policy establishes nutrition standards for food and beverages, bans marketing of non-compliant products, and incorporates nutrition education, health services, and physical activity into the curriculum. In Jamaica School Nutrition Policy is expected to be implemented in September 2025. In the interim, the Ministries of Health and Education issued guidelines banning SSBs in schools exceeding a set sugar limit in January 2019. The guidelines set a gradual sugar reduction target, ending at 2.5 g of sugar per 100 milliliters.	Regional Caribbean organizations: “…At the regional level, there is an organization called the Caribbean Private Sector Organization, which is an official associate institute of CARICOM, which means that they have access to meetings of the Heads of State and Heads of Government, to important forums and ongoing unfettered access […] One of the attributes of the UPP industry in our region, because we’re small, is that they’re very much connected with the broader private sector, not just food…” (CSO6, The Caribbean) Regional process of FOPNL: “There’s a process that’s been in place since 2018. But it kind of derailed in 2023–2024 when the standard which contained the FOPNL, the octagonal warning label and the PHAO profile model, was basically rejected by Member States due to significant industry opposition and industry penetration of decision making. So, we’re now dealing with trying to respond to a proposal for a new a new version of QR code which is just absurd, even just saying it. But I would say that we’re pretty much stalled right now. Now, the countries can pursue it at a national level, but many of them have expressed reservations about doing that because there is such strong industry opposition...” (CSO6, The Caribbean) Barbados National School Nutrition Policy implementation: “…So, the School Nutrition Policy in Barbados is a good example because they have a restriction around marketing, but the annual sports days are still funded largely or in part by food actors, ultra-processed or fast-food actors.” (CSO6, The Caribbean) Interim Guidelines to reduce sugary drinks in schools: “We collaborated with the ministry to reduce the sugary drink in schools over a period of years. And we’re now at 2.5 g per hundred mil. The challenge with that is that there’s no audit that has been done and of course COVID sort of messed that up. […] What is needed is an audit to see exactly how many schools have put in the policy, what drinks they’re selling, and getting the levels tested because the manufacturers were supposed to get their certificate of analysis…” (CSO5, The Caribbean)

CARICOM: Caribbean Community; FOPNL: front-of-package nutrition labeling; NGOs. Non-Governmental Organizations; PAHO: Pan American Health Organization; PAS law: Promotion of Healthy Eating law (Law 27.642); SSBs: Sugar-Sweetened Beverages; UPPs: ultra-processed products; WHO: World Health Organization. A: Academia; CSO: civil society organization, EL: executive and legislative branches

As seen in Table 1, Argentina has implemented comprehensive national food policy laws such as the Law 27.642 on the Promotion of Healthy Eating (here after PAS law), however there are significant challenges, particularly regarding provincial implementation. In Paraguay the approved labeling system ‘Lupa’ (meaning ‘magnifying glass’ in English) does not meet the highest standards and has yet to be fully implemented. In Guatemala, there have been attempts to approve a comprehensive bill known as the “Promotion of Healthy Eating”. However, strong opposition from the private sector has delayed and blocked its approval. In Jamaica and Barbados despite notable progress on FOPNL, neither has yet approved a national policy. Nonetheless, both countries have taken significant steps in promoting healthy food environments.

Navigating corporate influence: country experiences across six key environments

This section outlines countries’ responses to corporate influence based on the insights of key stakeholders. These were classified into six environments, each encompassing different determinants that have either hindered efforts to address it –including different forms of CPA–or constrained corporate power (Fig. 2). Quotes from informants are used to illustrate the findings, with further examples available in Additional File 2.

Fig. 2.

Determinants of corporate influence in five LAC countries. COI: Conflict of interest; CSOs: civil society organizations; UPPs: ultra-processed products. AR: Argentina; CAR: The Caribbean; GT: Guatemala; PY: Paraguay

Political and governance environment

Susceptibility to corporate interest

Weak governance—often rooted in limited institutional capacity, insufficient resources, or corruption—was identified by informants as a central factor that led to corporate influence. For instance, the Argentine government’s limited capacity to enforce the PAS law has allowed industry actors to violate the regulations, thereby weakening the law repeatedly. Alternatively, in the Caribbean, where most islands operate within resource-constrained contexts, it is common for the food industry to intervene to fill governmental gaps, as reported by an informant:

We live in a resource-limited context, and the governments can’t cover it. They’re always going to be these fiscal gaps, and because of that, a limited kind of fiscal space, the private sector is always filling a role, whatever it is. And so, I think we need to start with that starting point, ‘hey, there’s going to be gaps, and these guys [industry] are going to fill spaces… (CSO5, The Caribbean)

Levers to constrain corporate power

Establishing or leveraging political allies, especially during political transitions, can help prevent and mitigate corporate influence. This dynamic was clear in Guatemala, where Bill No. 5504 advanced quickly through its first two readings in early 2024 under the new left-leaning administration. However, the leadership change has not yet secured full approval and remains stalled in its third reading—when amendments are typically introduced, and further debate occurs—largely due to significant influence from the food industry. As one informant explained:

…Last year, there was a change of government; so, the representatives who were leading this initiative [Bill No. 5504], took advantage of that change of government to form alliances and to move quickly. The current ruling party supports the bill, but it´s a party with weakened leadership. So, the representative who allied himself with the ruling party pushed this law very quickly, quietly, and secretly, so that it would be approved quickly in the first and second readings; and the industry did not have time to react. But when they saw that it was already going through the second reading, that’s when several strategies were put in place… (EL1, Guatemala)

The strategic use of contextual constraints can function as a political counterstrategy to mitigate corporate influence, thereby advancing public health agendas. While in some countries the COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted policy progress—allowing for legislative setbacks—in Argentina, it created conditions that hindered face-to-face negotiations between industry representatives and policymakers. For example, Coca-Cola faced public denunciation from advocates when email to senators was uncovered seeking to alter the wording of the nutrient profile model in the FOPNL debate.

…Coca-Cola sent an email to all senators trying to influence changes in the wording of certain articles, particularly Article 6, which defined that the nutrient profile model–that is, the threshold values to be used in our law–would be those of the PAHO nutrient profile model. Coca-Cola sent an email requesting that these be modified… and the proposal they put forward was so subtle that one had to be very knowledgeable; in other words, for a legislator who was not sufficiently familiar with the issue, it seemed as if what they were asking for was nothing… (A4, Argentina)

Additionally, using “positive” revolving doors, –where individuals move across government, academia, and civil society to support public health–, by advocates has proven beneficial. by advocates has proven beneficial. In Argentina, the movement of advocates from academia and CSOs into positions within public institutions has effectively advanced public health policies through coordinated, cross-sectoral efforts. This practice has facilitated greater alignment and enhanced institutional capacity by ensuring the presence of committed allies in critical decision-making spaces.

Legal and regulatory environment

Susceptibility to corporate interests

Weak or absent transparency and accountability mechanisms hinder efforts to mitigate corporate influence. This gap is exemplified by closed-door meetings and the absence of public records on lobbying activities or political donations. In Guatemala, as one informant noted, ‘votes have a price’, enabling a systemic corporate presence embedded within Congress that designs and implements policies favoring their commercial interests while using state resources to do so:

…there was a small, mysterious dark room inside Congress, which was a VIP room where no one knows what they did there, but it is suspected that it was a place for shady negotiations, for storing money, because obviously that kind of purchase is not made with bank transfers, but with cash. So, that’s known, It’s an open secret… A vote has a price. […] In the case of Guatemala, industry interference is organic. In other words, it is not interference that occurs occasionally in Congress. No, the business sector is in Congress, many representatives respond to industry agendas. […] So, something very complex in Guatemala is that the business sector normally designs its policies, implements them, and allocates the state resources it wants… (A1, Guatemala)

The presence of COI in decision-making has been identified as another common determinant to exert corporate influence across all countries, particularly among policymakers or high-level officials with ties to the food industry. These connections frequently manifest through political campaign financing and sustained interactions. This proximity remains especially pronounced in the Caribbean, where food industry representatives reportedly enjoy even more direct access to decision-makers. As one informant highlighted:

…Pathways are more complex in our setting in the sense that because we’re such small communities, the access between the private sector and policymakers, um, they’ve far more access points, and even if you had COI safeguards, it would be very difficult to protect against those interactions… (CSO6, The Caribbean)

Such ties are even closer in provinces, departments, or parishes that produce ingredients for the food industry or host factories and distribution centers. For example, particular alliances between industry representatives and legislators from sugar-producing provinces:

…depending on the contexts of the provinces where the legislators come from [is their vote]. It is not the same in the case, for example, of the sugar-producing provinces, where the influence of the sugar industry was extremely strong on all legislators from all political blocs, regardless of their political affiliation, all of whom were influenced in one way or another… (EL3, Argentina)

Levers to constrain corporate power

A crucial determinant in this environment is the existence of official government mechanisms—including legal instruments and formal procedures— to ensure transparency and regulate COI. According to informants from Jamaica and Argentina these mechanisms have helped countries mitigate corporate influence and advance their policy agendas, yet only those countries reported having them in place. In Argentina, a multi-sectoral commission led by the former Ministry of Health required all participants in the PAS law debate to sign a declaration of COI, enhancing transparency and clarifying affiliations. As one informant stated:

…Various actions taken when designing this law involved a commission within the Ministry of Health, within the Department of NCDs, in which we all participated: industry with its chambers, academia, CSOs, and various Ministries participated. […] And what was done in that commission, around 2018, was that when the recommendations were established, everyone signed a ‘declaration of COI,’ where you stated whether you had a COI. So, although different actors participated, this allowed us to see the different positions regarding your ‘greater connection’ to the food industry or not… (CSO3, Argentina)

In the Caribbean, an informant described the development of a tool to analyze the regional standards-setting process, identify points of industry interference, and provide governance-based recommendations to strengthen transparency, accountability, and public health leadership. However, as one informant from the Caribbean noted, transparency remains limited across most of the region:

…Very few countries in the region have access to information legislation. Jamaica does, and so that really hampers us in, in really holding the process to account. There’s very little transparency… (CSO6, The Caribbean)

Narrative and communication environment

Susceptibility to corporate interests

Use of media outlets financed by the food industry was identified as a key determinant in amplifying industry narratives or promoting its products, thereby shaping public perception. For example, according to participants, in Paraguay, where both economic and media power are highly centralized, business elites often own media outlets and use them as propaganda tools to reinforce their commercial interests. In Guatemala and the Caribbean, media outlets linked to the food industry have selectively disseminated information to undermine advocacy efforts, as seen during a recent international campaign against SSBs in the Caribbean.

…So, we had pressed articles and a press pack, so we sent it to our link at one of our newspapers, and they were going to print it [Kick Big Soda Out Campaign]. But then it was stopped by the senior people of the newspaper because they said, ‘Listen, we get plenty of ads from Pepsi or Coke’. So, the senior person said: ‘No, we’re not going to run this article because our advertising dollar comes from these SSBs’ you know? So, the article was shelved, even though it was an international campaign… (CSO5, The Caribbean)

The food industry’s influence also extends to individuals with significant public or professional visibility, including influencers, celebrities, and opinion leaders. In some cases, this also includes experts with strong ties to the industry who are strategically positioned to shape policy debates beyond their national borders to promote industry-friendly narratives (see Additional file 2).

Additionally, the industry has strategically employed discursive strategies in contextual events (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic or natural disasters) as opportunities to engage with the public through food aid donations or financial contributions. In these critical moments, the industry has sought to position itself and enhance its legitimacy and influence. This practice appears particularly prevalent in the Caribbean, where recent monitoring efforts have documented corporate donations during the latest hurricane season (2024) and throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. As one informant noted:

During disaster scenarios, we see them [food industry actors] undermining policy. […] we’ve had some governments talked, since COVID, about healthy donations in the wake of disasters and we’ve had private sector come out and be very vocal about the fact that they play an important role […] they provide food donations, financial donations, and we tracked some of it during the last hurricane season when we had hurricane Beryl… (CSO6, The Caribbean)

Levers to constrain corporate power

The strategic use of social media by advocates can function as an effective means of countering the influence of corporate narratives—particularly discursive strategies—and promoting food policy in the region. In Argentina, this approach mobilized a critical mass of public support for Bill N° 27.642, as large-scale digital campaigns pressured the legislature. This advocacy not only accelerated policy debate but also influenced procedures, with sustained pressure prompting the Chamber President to reduce referrals and streamline approval. As one informant explained:

…When the bill was first introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Chamber referred it to several committees, five, I believe. This would obviously delay its consideration because we were talking about a very large number of legislators, and it was not a joint effort, making it practically impossible for it to be passed before it lost parliamentary status. Pressure on social media forced him to change that decision and only refer it to three committees. Social pressure meant that the debate was held in a joint committee… (EL3, Argentina)

Knowledge production and dissemination environment

Susceptibility to corporate interests

A weakened academic sector marked by COI with the food industry was identified as a significant constraint to addressing corporate influence. In Paraguay, the lack of support from scientific societies and the silence of academic institutions in the labeling law debate posed a major challenge, as it left the legislative process without a critical counterbalance to industry interference, contributing to the passage of a labeling policy that did not align with the best regional standards. Instead, the adoption of the ‘Lupa’ labeling system reflected industry interests, as mentioned by an informant:

…for us [in Paraguay] it has been a problem that we have never been able to prove it [the interference] and that it is so visible, because scientific societies never came out in favor of labeling. When it came time to vote in Congress, they did nothing; they made no noise; there was no support from professionals. So, it remained a small group that seemed to be more of a noisy minority than anything else (A3, Paraguay)

The connections between the food industry and academic institutions were described as problematic, particularly regarding the pervasive influence of corporations in all countries and their significant impact on the training of nutritionists through professional associations and universities. Moreover, in the Caribbean, food industry representatives have secured positions on university boards, indicating a clear COI and academic capture. This is exemplified by the following quote:

…In the university, one of the lead manufacturers who works with the lead organization, I am allowed to call names, Coca-Cola, for instance, somehow made its way to be the chair of the business school. It’s a non-academic post in the university, and he’s somehow now the chair… (A5, The Caribbean)

Levers to constrain corporate power

On the contrary, the role of research and academic institutions, the creation of evidence-based knowledge, and academic integrity free from COI were considered key determinants in supporting or limiting efforts to address corporate influence. The academic sector’s role was particularly evident in the discussion of Law No. 26.905 in Argentina—also known as the Sodium Reduction Promotion Law—, where the academic nutrition entity, who was a strong ally, declared itself free from COI and set a positive precedent for the LAC region. An informant describes this crucial role of academia:

…Something important in Argentina had to do with the fact that the entity that brings together nutritionists from across the country is called FAGRAN, which stands for the Argentine Federation of Nutrition Graduates. In 2019, it declared itself free of COI […] So for me, that was key, the fact that in Argentina, the nutritionist community engaged in that discussion and got involved in advocacy and lobbying on this side… (A4, Argentina)

Additionally, cross-country learning visits made by advocates were described as particularly valuable, offering valuable insights on advancing food policies and countering industry interference by learning from others’ successes and challenges. Finally, access to high-quality international and local evidence, free from COI, was also considered crucial for supporting legislation and building counter-narratives:

…We always say that a law that was passed by a democratic process with a large majority goes beyond the legislative aspect. It is a law based on the best public health standards of international organizations, which is also based on local evidence free of COI and has the support of UNICEF and PAHO, as well as broad support from the population, civil society, and academic organizations… (CSO4, Argentina)

Advocacy environment

Susceptibility to corporate interests

A crucial determinant is the undermining of stakeholders—specifically weakened civil society—as it enables the industry to operate and influence policy with little to no opposition. Notable differences emerge between countries, as seen in Argentina, where a well-organized and active civil society has enabled significant progress in advancing food policy. In contrast, although civil society in Central America is active and growing, fear of reprisals has hindered meaningful outcomes. This contrasts sharply with Paraguay, where informants consistently reported an almost absent civil society engagement in food policy advocacy, a situation attributed to multiple underlying factors. One informant, a member of a scientific society—the closest equivalent to an organized civil society—explained:

…Civil society is weak…there are two strategic issues that I think are important to analyze from the perspective of civil society in general for public policy. Paraguay went from being a low-income country to a lower-middle-income country, and now to an upper-middle-income country. And being an upper-middle-income country, it has lost, let’s say, eligibility for financial cooperation from various cooperation agencies […] So, many CSOs ultimately function by raising funds from the government sector, bidding on contracts to provide services to the government, and then, by becoming “partners” or “service providers” to the government. In this way, it becomes problematic to criticize or have a critical agenda or demands […] In one sense, civil society is weakened because it is highly dependent on the government for the provision of services… (CSO2, Paraguay)

Another determinant is the use of CSOs as front groups that serve corporate interests. For instance, in Guatemala, a front group held a meeting in Congress to promote the ‘Lupa’ labeling system—known for being promoted by the food industry—across Central America, which has resulted in delays to the process:

…I know of another meeting that took place in Congress between industry representatives, the Ministry of Health, and a CSO [front group] before the Economic Integration Committee of the Congress of the Republic, where they again discussed ‘Lupa’ labeling. They said they were proposing this model, and that it was a model they wanted to promote at the Central American level. So here, what we can infer is that they are delaying or have managed to delay the process in Guatemala, and they want to bet on a Central American Technical Regulation with the ‘Brazilian Lupa model’… (EL1, Guatemala)

Levers to constrain corporate power

Having a strong civil society free from COI and being organized through coalitions that demonstrate unity, coordination, and the capacity to act were consistently emphasized by informants as fundamental for countering corporate influence. According to participants, these coalitions played a critical role in counterbalancing industry interference in policy processes, particularly in Argentina and The Caribbean. Within civil society, the collaboration of multiple organizations—each contributing diverse perspectives and approaches—was viewed as both valuable and necessary for having a strong opposition. Informants also emphasized the importance of strong grassroots coalitions in mobilizing public support and sustaining advocacy efforts when facing pushbacks from industry.

…With the school nutrition policy, I would say one of the reasons for success is that the civil society has been a real strong advocate, and so this has really been pushed by a coalition of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, supported by a strong grassroots coalition of civil society. They are having issues right now with the marketing piece, where there is pushback from the private sector… (CSO6, The Caribbean)

Cross-cutting and cross-sectoral collaboration environment

Positive collaborations for food policy

The first cross-cutting determinant is the strength of alliances among key public health actors, including CSOs, academia, independent media, and COI-free advocates such as policymakers or heads of state. Such alliances are essential for presenting a unified, credible front. A successful example happened in Guatemala, where a technical committee of government, civil society, and academia mounted a strong, coordinated response to one of the industry’s attempts to undermine Bill No. 5504. Similarly, in Argentina, actors advanced the PAS Law as a unified bloc:

…They [the industry] act as a bloc, and we need to act as a bloc. In fact, what allowed us to have such a solid Law in Argentina was the fact that different CSOs and academia agreed and acted as a bloc, each with its own profile and its own, let’s say, subtleties. But basically, it was a matter of identifying the messages, focusing on them, and conveying them, because the industry in general always chooses three messages and repeats them endlessly… (A4, Argentina)

Strong collaboration with international organizations, particularly through PAHO and regional CSOs, has been crucial in advancing significant health and nutrition policy reforms. Active public mobilization to assert rights has also been identified, as it both legitimizes advocacy efforts and pressures political decision-makers to resist industry lobbying. For instance, in Argentina, youth groups mobilized around Bill No. 27.642, generating public pressure that helped advance the legislative process.

Having countries in the region with already implemented food policies have proven beneficial, alongside regional communities of practice that facilitate the exchange of information, research, and practical experiences. Finally, the production of evidence-based regional policy reference models contributes significantly. Guatemala, for instance, shares a long northern border with Mexico, fostering strong cross-border ties that encompass cultural, social, and economic exchanges. As a result, by the time the FOPNL policy had already been implemented in Mexico, discussions regarding the FOPNL Bill were underway in Guatemala. Consequently, products bearing these labels began to appear in Guatemalan supermarkets, raising consumer awareness and mobilizing social media support for the adoption of a similar policy:

…There was something very interesting when the Labeling Law was approved in its first and second readings in Guatemala. […] People said, ‘Finally, we see the Mexican labeling on products!’ There are a lot of Mexican products imported here, and companies haven’t changed the label, meaning that here in our supermarkets, there are many Mexican products with octagons and people already know them, and there are also many Colombian products with octagons. So, they said, ‘It wasn’t until I saw products from Mexico that I realized this cereal isn’t healthy!’ So, how important this is for Guatemala, for Central America. People began to recognize the importance (EL1, Guatemala)

However, passing a law without solid scientific evidence can also set a negative precedent for other countries. To illustrate, this occurred when Paraguay adopted the ‘Brazilian Lupa’ model.

Negative collaborations for food policy

We analyze the food industry’s organizational structures, identifying three ways they coordinate to consolidate corporate power. First, forming alliances with other powerful, unhealthy commodity industries (UCIs)—such as Big Tobacco and Big Pharma—that share the same playbook of interference strategies and play a major role in most NCDs. Second, forming alliances within the food industry (e.g., dairy, meat, UPPs). Third, operating through business chambers.

All informants emphasized how the business sector in LAC is highly interconnected and operates through closely aligned CPA strategies. These corporate alliances amplify their collective power to act as a unified bloc to oppose policies that threaten their shared interests, regardless of sectoral boundaries, this dynamic was explained by an informant:

…They work together [UPPs and other food industry companies]. I think because they’re so small, they’re accustomed to working together for everything else. They have these umbrella organizations, so they work together […] if I think about Barbados the dairy industry is also the same company that produces milk, is also making all the SSB´s, and water, and at one point, alcohol. So, it’s difficult to disentangle them… (CSO6, The Caribbean)

Business chambers are widespread throughout LAC. They create powerful lobby groups that allow private companies to oppose important policies, such as the FOPNL, while working behind the scenes instead of going public. There is a notable example Paraguay, where the Unión Industrial del Paraguay (in Spanish) operates as both a civil society front group and a business chamber, described by an informant:

…There is an organization here called the ‘Unión industrial del Paraguay’, which is a CSO, which brings together the different industries in the country. They declare themselves to be civil society. […] they say: ‘we are also civil society and we defend industrial development’. So, in that group are the tobacco growers, the food industry, the alcohol industry, the cement industry, the road industry, the entire industrial sector; and they are a corporation. So, if you present an agenda that affects the tobacco sector, everyone else comes out to defend the tobacco sector; if you present an agenda that affects the food sector, even the tobacco growers come out in defense of the food sector [ironic laughter] that is the Unión industrial del Paraguay… (CSO2, Paraguay)

The way the food industry and the private sector in general conduct business alliances has resulted in significant interference in the development of food policies throughout the LAC region, prioritizing the pursuit of profit over the well-being of individuals. Therefore, recognizing and exposing these alliances is crucial to protect the public interests.

Policy directions

Drawing from informants’ perspectives, we outline key recommendations to counter corporate influence. These recommendations synthesize stakeholders’ collective experiences and strategic viewpoints, providing practical guidance for future policy actions. As shown in Fig. 3, five overarching areas of recommendations emerged from the analysis, focusing on strengthening regional and intersectoral collaboration, establishing frameworks, building strategic capacity, and addressing COI across all stages of the policy.

Fig. 3.

Stakeholder recommendations to counter corporate influence in LAC food policies. CPA: Corporate Political Activity, COI: Conflict of interest

Discussion

This study contributes to the growing body of research by providing evidence-based insights into corporate strategies and counterstrategies on food and nutrition policies in the LAC region. The analysis documented countries’ progress in implementing key policies and classified their responses into determinants that either mitigated or hindered corporate influence, structured across six key environments: Political and Governance; Legal and Regulatory; Narrative and Communication; Knowledge production and Dissemination; Advocacy, and Cross-Cutting and Cross-Sectoral Collaboration. These findings also provide an understanding of the mechanisms through which countries confront—or struggle to confront—corporate influence, which permeates every stage of the policy cycle and often intensifies at critical moments of policy deliberation [36].

Several common determinants create an enabling environment for corporate influence, with systemic corruption playing a central role. Weak enforcement, limited transparency, and undue influence over public decision-making undermine institutional safeguards and regulatory frameworks. Data from the World Justice Project’s Absence of Corruption indicator [43] show that countries in LAC generally face greater corruption challenges than global and regional averages, with low scores observed in Guatemala (114th out of 142) and Paraguay (128th). While Jamaica (56th) and Barbados (27th) perform relatively better, they still face challenges related to transparency and accountability [43]. These results highlight structural governance weaknesses across the region that create opportunities for corporate actors to shape policy processes, dilute regulations, and influence food systems in ways that may conflict with public health objectives.

Another determinant is the dissemination of misleading information or suppression of information, shaping scientific evidence to corporate advantage. Our findings align with other studies on how the food industry has successfully deployed discursive strategies to foster misinformation by shifting the focus to individual responsibility and instrumentalizing dominant discourses—such as neoliberal and anti-rights narratives—to obstruct regulation [44]. This pervasive practice mirrors what Robert Proctor documented in Golden Holocaust, where Big-Tobacco deliberately designed and disseminated misleading messages to create doubt, confuse the public, and delay government action [45]. In both unhealthy commodity industries, misinformation is not incidental but rather a deliberate strategy that safeguards economic interests, amplified through academic and media capture.

Disseminating misleading information is reinforced through direct sponsorship of institutions and ownership of media outlets, which amplifies its influence on information flows. In Guatemala, Kroker Lobos et al. documented how a broadcaster openly opposed Bill No. 5504, to deliberately orchestrate disinformation [46]. Comparable dynamics were observed in Paraguay, where an informant stated that industry-owned media platforms are routinely deployed as propaganda tools. In Colombia, the RCN Channel—a leading television network—is owned by the Ardila Lülle economic group, a major sugary beverage corporation [47]. These corporate linkages have fostered the censorship of public health campaigns and enable strategic control of information to safeguard commercial agendas in LAC.

The unregulated circulation of this misleading information in mass media poses a threat to both public health and democracy. In this context, the urgent need for a counter-narrative becomes clear, as does the importance of structural approaches to address the intentional production and dissemination of misinformation. Promising practices have emerged in some settings, for example, fact-checking initiatives and independent journalistic platforms have played an important role in critically examining corporate claims and counteracting misleading narratives in public health debates [26]. It is therefore crucial to engage with independent, non-traditional media outlets and journalists free from COI, as well as to translate academic evidence into accessible public communication that connects with real-life experiences.

The coordination and capacity to act of CSOs constitute another environment; however, it varies significantly across countries. In Argentina, a strong civil society has played a key role in counterbalancing corporate influence, whereas in Paraguay, CSOs are comparatively non-existent and cannot act independently. The experiences of Brazil and Mexico further highlight the importance of civil society involvement in the policy process to promote accountability and transparency [27, 48]. In Brazil, the Institute of Consumer Protection (IDEC) engaged with the Brazilian Health Surveillance Agency (Anvisa, in the Portuguese acronym), to encourage public participation and for advancing the FOPNL process [48]. These structural conditions, rooted in broader political and economic contexts, are key to understanding the varied policy outcomes observed across LAC.

These results highlight that a country’s ability to respond effectively depends on its capacity to contain industry interference. Countries that have most effectively resisted and made greater progress in adopting comprehensive policies, such as Argentina, took advantage of important political changes that favored the policy. They were also prepared with solid scientific evidence, legal preparation, and strong working groups from various sectors. Our study aligns with the one conducted in Argentina by Wahnschaffe et al. [49], who explored how advocates used different forms of power—structural, instrumental, and discursive—to promote the passage of the PAS Law. A similar positive response was documented in Australia, where despite the tobacco industry’s strong lobbying against a policy, the government was able to enact and enforce progressive measures to protect public health due to its robust legal preparation and comprehensive approach [50].

This brings us to another crucial factor: governance. In the Caribbean, civil society and academia are gaining strength; however, they have faced challenges in advancing their policy agenda due to limited institutional capacity and insufficient resources for implementation and monitoring. The region’s constrained economic context has enabled industry actors to permeate the socio-political landscape. Moreover, participants reported that in Guatemala and Paraguay, the food industry has deeply embedded itself in legislative affairs, political decision-making, and the implementation of social and philanthropic programs, which are supposedly intended to contribute to the well-being of communities. This corporate practice is known as corporate social responsibility, and its negative implications for public health have been reported around the world, with Big Tobacco and Big Food being some of the main players [51, 52].

Considering the range of country responses to address corporate influence and its political power, this article highlights how transparency mechanisms implemented in Argentina and Jamaica may serve as effective tools to counteract such influence. These findings align with broader regional efforts, exemplified by countries adopting robust policies; for instance, Chile enacted the Lobbying Law [No. 20,730], which regulates lobbying activities before public authorities, seeking transparency in public decision-making [53]. Colombia´s Law 2013, requires public officials to disclose COI up to the third degree of consanguinity (i.g., close blood relatives) [54]. Similarly, Brazil introduced the Law on Access to Information [Law nº 12527 of 2011], which regulates public access to information and requests to government entities [55]. Together, these measures represent meaningful steps toward enhancing accountability and safeguarding public policymaking from corporate influence.

However, the mere existence of transparency mechanisms is insufficient, especially in the LAC context, where legal and institutional frameworks often serve as a facade for genuine accountability, and administrative bureaucracy presents an even greater challenge [56]. Transparency alone does not prevent COI or their potential harms, as it typically reveals their existence only after they have occurred and does not prevent them from influencing decisions or policies, and may create a false sense of security [57]. Therefore, it is equally necessary to take concrete actions based on the information these mechanisms reveal.

Finally, we draw attention to key insights from the countries’ experiences: First, the response must always be adapted to national and local contexts, and it benefits from regional support and regulatory measures. Second, industry must be always monitored, and the inherent conflict of their involvement in policymaking must remain on the agenda. Third, there cannot be a single response to counteract the corporate influence–nor should there be, as responses naturally emerge from multiple sectors. Fourth, however, these diverse responses must be coordinated and integrated into a multisectoral collective action, ensuring sustained advocacy and driving structural change. Fifth, allies must remain committed to consistently exposing corporate influence across all sectors —including political institutions, academic settings, universities, and among the public—. Finally, the industry is persistent and opportunistic, continuously seeking opportunities to assert its influence and undermine progress. This was demonstrated in Argentina, where significant policy progress was swiftly reversed [58]. Therefore, advocates must not stop applying pressure and monitor industry tactics.

These findings provide actionable guidance for policymakers, CSOs, and public health advocates aiming to strengthen food environment governance. By identifying recurring industry strategies across the policy cycle, the study supports targeted measures, transparency efforts, and advocacy to prevent policy setbacks, while informing capacity-building and collaborative initiatives that strengthen governance and policy implementation. The study´s strength lies in its comparative analysis of diverse political contexts across LAC countries. Guatemala and Jamaica, for example, were in early policy formulation, though their socio-political contexts differed. Argentina had made more progress but faced attempts to reverse policies during implementation, while Paraguay had passed an industry-favorable law yet was blocked in other political areas. This variation provides a nuanced understanding of how industry interference manifests and is addressed at different stages of the policy process.

Despite its contributions, the study has notable limitations like the insufficient representation of informants from the legislative branch in four out of five countries. This gap restricted access to comprehensive perspectives across all sectors involved in the policymaking process, potentially limiting the depth of insights regarding legislative dynamics and decision-making influences. Another limitation of our study was the low response rate in the Caribbean countries, which led to a limited number of interviewees and may have narrowed the range of perspectives represented from that subregion.

Conclusions

This study examined how countries in LAC respond to food industry influence in public health, food, and nutrition policies. The findings indicate that the food industry operates across key environments in all subregions, although country-specific shape the intensity and forms of interference. Examples include the weakened civil society in Paraguay, limited institutional resources in the Caribbean region, political shifts favoring industry interests in Argentina, and industry involvement in policy implementation in Guatemala.

Across countries, systemic corruption and weak governance structures emerged as common factors creating fertile ground for corporate influence. These results suggest that effective responses must be tailored to national and local contexts and strengthened through cross-sectoral collaboration, evidence-based information free from COI, regional support, and sustained policy progress. Our findings also underscore the importance of transparency mechanisms and continuous advocacy to monitor, challenge, and counteract industry tactics. Future research should prioritize longitudinal analyses of industry strategies, deeper examination of legislative dynamics, and rigorous evaluation of governance and transparency mechanisms, particularly in underrepresented subregions such as the Caribbean.

Supplementary Information

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Abbreviations

COI

Conflict of interest

CPA

Corporate Political Activity

CSOs

Civil society organization(s)

FOPNL

Front-of-Package Nutrition Labeling

GIFNA

Global Database on the Implementation of Food and Nutrition Action

iTFAs

Industrially Trans-Fatty acids

LAC

Latin America and the Caribbean

NCDs

Non-communicable Diseases

PAS

Promotion of Healthy Eating Law

PAHO

Pan American Health Organization

SNPs

School nutrition policies or programs

SSBs

Sugar-sweetened beverages

UCIs

Unhealthy Commodity Industries

UMR

Unhealthy food and beverages marketing restrictions

UPPs

Ultra-processed products

WHO

World Health Organization

Author contributions

AV-P: Conceptualization, Methodology, Data analysis and Writing-original draft. VL-M: Conceptualization, Data analysis and Writing-original draft. FT-L: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing-review & editing. LT-M: Conceptualization, Project administration, Supervision and Writing-review & editing. All the authors have read and approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

Funding

This work was supported by Colansa (Latin American and Caribbean Nutrition and Health Community of Practice) and Bloomberg Philanthropies. The funders had no role in the study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Data availability

All data from the public domain collected during this study are available with this manuscript. To preserve informants’ confidentiality and protection of the informant, data from our interview transcripts are not publicly available.

Declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate

The Ethics, Research and Biosafety Committees of the Mexican National Institute of Public Health evaluated and approved this study (CI: 1925).

Consent for publication

Written informed consent for participation and publication was obtained from all interview informants. All necessary measures were taken to ensure confidentiality and anonymity throughout the study.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.