Perspectives on the future: Combining work and family care in 2040

Abstract

The work-family interface is in constant flux and faced with numerous future challenges. Yet much work-family scholarship problematizes current work-family issues or analyses past experiences with little detailed consideration of the risks and opportunities individuals are likely to encounter in the future. This perspective is needed to challenge and extend current work-family scholarship to how external developments are likely to affect the ways in which workers will combine work and family life in the future. We contribute to extant work-family scholarship by exploring this future work-family perspective in 2040. We do this by considering crucial demographic, technological and climate developments and relating these developments to potential future work-family scenarios. Respondents participating in a scenario workshop were asked to consider: What might work-family futures look like depending upon societies’ orientation to ‘more’ or ‘enough’ in life against the extent of individualism versus social solidarity? We study the feasibility of the resulting work-family scenarios and consider potential work-family policy responses that make certain scenarios more or less possible. We argue that “future proof” policy needs to address (i) work-family policy accessibility; (ii) policy fragmentation; and (iii) the increasing complexity of work-family demands. We conclude with a research agenda on what is needed to translate future visions into effective support for optimally combining work and family life in the future.

1. Introduction

The future of work is a key policy concern. Global institutions such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Economic Forum have all published reports investigating future challenges of “the world of work” (World Economic Forum, 2023; ILO, 2019; OECD, 2023). Alongside the pandemic, major societal changes, such as digitalization, globalization, ageing, migration, and social-cultural diversity are expected to have a substantial impact on paid work in the decades to come.

At the same time, the future of work is a personal and family concern. Individuals and their families increasingly struggle to combine work and family as demands and pressures from both domains increase. Explorations of possible work and family futures are essential to help governments and global institutions recognize relevant developments, map future uncertainties, and form the basis for anticipatory governance, meaning: “governing (or steering) in the present to engage with, adapt to or shape uncertain futures” (Muiderman et al. 2020, pp. 2).¹

Although the future of work is a key policy concern, very few existing policy efforts to understand the challenges associated with the future of work look beyond the boundaries of paid work. While work-family scholarship has long established the connection between the public and private sphere (Crompton, 2006), most studies tend to focus on the past and present. Moreover, although several scholars have delineated work-family research agendas, these are based on current knowledge gaps rather than on expected future challenges (see, for example, Bianchi and Milkie’s (2010) and Perry Jenkins and Gerstel’s (2020) work-family research reviews). A better understanding of the potential future impact of societal changes on the interface of paid work and family life contributes to the future of work scholarship as well as work-family research. These societal changes do not operate in isolation but often interact. It is therefore necessary to look beyond a simple dimension of social change, paying attention to interdependencies in order to address these complex relationships at the institutional level (Yerkes, Nelson & Nieuwenhuis, 2022). In doing so, we aim to provide insights that can be used to inform sustainable policies that strengthen the work-family interface.

Studying the future empirically is challenging, however, as the future cannot be studied in the classical sense of the word given an absence of data. Nevertheless, there are several ways of analyzing and anticipating the future (Bakker & Van der Kolk, 2017). Such studies can center on the ideal future (“what should the future look like?”) or the expected future (“what is the most likely future?”). Currently, research forecasting the future in terms of the interface between work and family lags behind other fields of research, such as macro-economic simulation modelling or simulation modelling for climate change. Such prediction and modelling are much more difficult when trying to capture future social outcomes, like inequalities in work and family.

This contribution takes a first step in exploring what the expected future of the work-family interface may be. We do so by combining insights from family and organizational sociology in order to identify likely challenges in combining work with family life in 2040. This arbitrary year is far enough in the future for significant change to have occurred in the organization of work and family, but not so far away that current societal processes and scientific insights are no longer applicable. We focus on combining work with family life as it is related to work-life balance (i.e., the ways in which individuals experience the blurring of boundaries between paid work, family life and leisure; Hobson, 2014) and explore the future of work-family balance. Inherent in work-family balance are multiple dimensions of work and family, including relational, spatial, structural and temporal (e.g., Yerkes et al., 2020). Here our primary focus is on the temporal dimension, considering potential future time pressures related to work-family balance, while also acknowledging the importance and interrelated nature of the other dimensions. We pose two research questions. First, considering societal developments that include demographic changes, technological changes and climate change, which scenarios might be imagined for the future of work-family balance? We answer this first question by outlining these societal developments and diving into a scenario-based thought experiment that helps us understand possible work-family balance futures. Based on this thought experiment, we present four scenarios that differ regarding potential time pressure experienced in the blurring of paid work, family life and leisure.

The feasibility of any of the scenarios presented is likely dependent on work-family policies. Our second research question is therefore: What policy implications might arise from these scenarios? Answering this question is central to this Voices article, which aims to convey the perspectives and reflections of participants from a scenario workshop on potential work–family futures. We show how these voices contribute to the broader academic and policy conversation on this topic and conclude by outlining a research agenda that is needed to translate future visions into an optimization of work-family balance. We largely focus on the core preoccupations and developments in the work-family sphere of the Global North, while recognizing the need for greater scope in subsequent studies to include work-family futures incorporating the Global South (Milkie, Chung and Jaga, 2023).

2. Which societal developments make certain work-family scenarios more or less realistic?

Over the last several decades, we have witnessed major economic, social, demographic, technological and climate developments, many of which are often the focus of work-family scholarship (Bianchi and Milkie, 2010; Perry Jenkins and Gerstel, 2020). These developments are all interrelated and likely to shape the future of the work-family interface. Demographically, there have been major shifts in family life, both in wealthy western countries and across the globe (Smock & Schwartz, 2020). These demographic changes are an essential component of imagining the future of combining work with family life and the related time pressure it creates, if only because families and households are fundamental units of production and consumption in all societies. Technologically, developments encompass innovation, automation, and flexibility and have the potential to alter the combination work and private life entirely (Ollier-Malaterre et al., 2019; Fingerman et al., 2020). Finally, an understudied issue in the work-family literature (see, e.g., Dengler and Lang, 2022), but crucial for the future work-family interface is the environment (e.g., the climate crisis and energy developments).

Demographic developments

Key developments in the demographics of society and family life are ageing, declining fertility and the decline in marriage and partnering. With respect to ageing, a larger segment of societies will be old in 2040. Between 2020 and 2040, the old age dependency ratio (65+ compared to economically active adults) in the world is expected to increase from 19% to 33% (United Nations, 2023). While this ageing started in high-income countries, low- and middle-income countries are expected to experience the greatest change in the coming decades. These older adults will become beneficiaries of public pensions, health care, and social services. In addition, fertility levels are expected to continue to decline, reducing the number of children requiring care but also available to provide care as adults. Marriage, which is often seen as the bedrock of family life, has already declined worldwide and is likely to decline further (Hewitt & Churchill, 2020). The prevalence of divorce has also increased, and therefore the stability and longevity of marriage as an institution has declined. In some wealthy western countries, such as the US, UK, and Sweden, divorce rates have peaked and declined (or stabilized), while in other countries with historically low divorce rates, such as China and Italy, divorce rates have more recently begun to increase (Wang & Schofer, 2018). There is an expectation that these trends of decline in marriage and fertility and increases in divorce and unmarried cohabitation will become more prevalent in some lower income countries in the future as they develop economically (Madsen & Moslehi, 2018). It also implies that there will be increases in adults living alone throughout their life course.

In an ageing society, scarcity increases because the population ages and that increases the average number of dependents per every 100 economically active adults in a society. We thus cannot retain our current welfare levels, which means we will have to realize we cannot maximize our needs. This might imply that only the wealthy will have access to resources in retirement, with inter- and intragenerational wealth differences already occurring (see, e.g., Bruder, 2017). Moreover, with marriage potentially no longer the major institution in family life, the legal impetus to “take care of each other” both during and after a romantic relationship is less present: people do not automatically take care of each other. Increases in time alone and high levels of social isolation may further influence work-family balance (Office of the Surgeon General 2023; World Health Organization 2022).

Together, these demographic changes lead to diverse and diffuse life courses (Sweet and Moen, 2015), with uncertain and overlapping trajectories (e.g., working, marriage, retirement) and transitions (e.g., moving out of the parental home, relationship dissolution, the shift from work to retirement). The “life course of the future” is almost certain to include such overlapping and uncertain trajectories. One recent analysis suggests that from age 15, women and men will be providing family care in half of their remaining years of life (Ophir & Polos, 2022). Life course transitions out of care provider roles will eventually be followed by a transition into care receiver roles. Longer life expectancy and smaller families have also increased intergenerational caregiving (Patterson & Margolis, 2019). These changing life courses and care roles will continue to be inherently gendered (Esping-Adersen & Billari, 2015). Across time and space, women do the majority of care work, even when combining it with employment, and men do more paid work (Sayer, 2016). Gender differences in daily time use throughout the life course have diminished since the 1960s (Pailhé et al., 2021), with the movement towards convergence stalling by the 1990s in most countries in the Global North (Frejka et al., 2018; Kan et al., 2022). In the US, however, for core “feminine” housework such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry, the gender gap converged considerably over time among married individuals (Milkie et al., 2025). Simultaneously, expectations that parents immerse themselves in child-centered, developmentally appropriate, time intensive parenting have increased the time devoted to care of children across western countries as well, with mothers devoting more time than fathers to parenting tasks (Craig et al., 2014).

Technological developments

While it is difficult to know what future technological developments there will be, families already rely heavily on digital technologies to juggle work and family responsibilities. Technology experts also predict that substantial amounts of time currently spent on housework and care work might be saved through automation in the coming decade (Lehdonvirta et al., 2023). A recent expert study highlighted teleworking, flexibility and the platform economy, robotization, and automation as emerging technological developments related to combining work and family life (Roeters et al., 2021).

Considering each of these future developments in turn, telework is clearly becoming more entrenched in the workforce. Coronavirus response measures, coupled with the diffusion of technological enablement, have accelerated the transition to telework, with the proportion of Europeans who work remotely rapidly increasing from 5% to 40%, with predictions that the percentage of teleworkers is unlikely to return to pre-COVID 19 pandemic levels (Aczel et al., 2021). Second, the rise of the platform economy and flexible work has the potential to change work-family futures. Although difficult to give a precise figure, around 10% of the EU workforce says they have provided services through a computerized platform, and new rules have been developed to improve their working conditions (European Commission, 2022, Council of the European Union, 2024). As the labor market of the future becomes more flexible and platforms keep developing and improving, the proportion of workers on these contracts is likely to increase (Rozer et al., 2021). Platforms that provide passenger transport or home delivery services such as Uber and Deliveroo are well known examples, but the range of work and services available is broader and expanding (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk) to different sectors, such as the hospitality industry (e.g., Tenoer) and nursing (e.g., Care.com). Third, technological change relates to automation. A general expectation is that the number of robots used to undertake menial repetitive jobs (i.e., factory work) will increase over the next years. Further, digitalization and automation are increasingly transforming domestic life with the advance of artificial intelligence that allows machines and processes to guide themselves. According to the International Federation of Robotics, the sales of “household service robots” are rising rapidly and in 2019 close to 20,000,000 such robots were sold worldwide, suggesting a strong and rapidly rising demand for domestic automation (Hertog et al., 2023). Smart technologies to help with domestic tasks are also increasingly seen as a necessary part of welfare service provision. To give one example, the “European Care Strategy for Caregivers and Care Receivers” released by the European Commission in September 2022 advocates a roll-out of “accessible digital solutions in the provision of care services” (European Commission, 2022).

Research on current platform work, which tends to be highly flexible, suggests that this flexibility makes platform work attractive, especially for women and groups with physical impairments (Rozer et al., 2021). However, the high level of flexibility also has a downside. Most platforms provide strong incentives to work at specific moments in the day, when there is peak demand for services, and may “punish” workers for declining work on a regular basis and financially penalize them for breaks or interruptions to work (Adams-Prassl et al., 2023). Another disadvantage from a work-family perspective is the high, and sometimes unpredictable, work expectations. The high dependency on customer evaluations can be extremely demanding. There is also the uncertainty that comes with the lack of a fixed income. This uncertainty can provide an incentive to work more hours pre-emptively, which counteracts the beneficial effects of flexibility. The exact balance between advantages and disadvantages of platform work in 2040 will largely depend on the quality of this work.

There may also be some efficiency benefits to automation that could improve work-family balance. Lehdonvirta et al. (2023) estimate that the level of domestic automation could result in a 44 per cent reduction in the time currently spent on housework and a 28 per cent reduction in time spent on care work in the next 10 years. If these technological changes materialize, they may have consequences for social equality in work and family. For example, domestic work is not shared equally between individuals and between genders, and those most heavily involved in domestic work may also be the ones to benefit the most from domestic automation. This could result in greater equality of overall domestic workload (Hertog et al., 2023).

While positive outcomes are possible, we cannot assume that domestic automation will result in positive social transformations if left to the market. Domestic technologies have historically promoted individualism, rather than looked for collective solutions to improving work-family balance (Hester & Srnicek, 2023). The rise of domestic automation has the potential to exacerbate existing work-family inequalities and to give rise to new ones by 2040. Given that many AI-powered technologies that alleviate unpaid domestic work tasks are likely to carry a substantial price tag when they hit the market, they could exacerbate existing “available time” inequalities between rich and poor (Heisig, 2011), in gendered, intersectional ways (Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020).

The opportunities center around the high level of flexibility modern workers have with regard to when and where they work and around technologies taking over some housework and care work tasks, thus replacing human labor. Moreover, a switch to working from home could have advantages for employees. For example, not having to commute may provide more leisure time and a better work-family balance. However, there are risks as well. Employees tend to work more hours when working from home, and social isolation might be an issue (Fan & Moen, 2022).

Flexible working arrangements can enable workers to curtail work for family and other demands and to work from home. Depending on what we value in the future, flexible working and working from home may lead to a more relaxed lifestyle. In today’s labor market reality, however, technology removes barriers to work from anywhere and at any time and flexible work often leads to self-exploitation (Chung, 2022). Technologically enabled remote work may reduce solidarity in the workplace (Yang et al., 2022), pushing our societies into more individualistic directions. Domestic work is also not just work; housework and care work are relational activities which bind families together. These are activities we use to express love and care for each other.

Climate developments

The earth we live on is under threat. Global warming, environmental pollution, extreme weather conditions and the loss of biodiversity show that climate change is one of the greatest ecological and social existential problems now and in the future (e.g., Brulle & Dunlap, 2015; IPCC, 2015, 2021). The global impact of climate change has driven many researchers to understand why it is occurring and what can be done to alleviate and solve the consequences that come along with it. Most of this research comes from the natural sciences (Brulle & Dunlap, 2015), but social scientists have also attempted to understand why climate change has happened and how it will affect our societies (Rendall, 2011; Ortiz et al., 2023; Frankenberg et al., 2020). Ultimately, climate change is caused by human behavior and thus needs social theory to understand how it can be solved (see, e.g., Bal and Stok, 2022; Fielding and Hornsey, 2016).

Awareness and understanding of climate change have increased since the 1980s when it first entered public consciousness. Most Europeans believe that climate change is real and caused by humans, but this does not translate to climate action (Steg, 2019). Both the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report and the EU Climate Adaptation Strategy acknowledge the challenges and lack of implementation (IPCC, 2023; European Commission, 2021).

Extreme climate-related events, including wildfires, floods and hurricanes, have become a frightening new normal. Hotter temperatures, air pollution and violent storms are leading to immediate, life-threatening dangers for work and family, and this is only expected to increase further in the future (World Economic Forum, 2018; World Economic Forum, 2024). Global climate change has an uneven impact on regions around the world, driven by uneven material consumption patterns (e.g., air travel) across the planet: people in high income countries consume vastly more than in the rest of the world (Hickel et al., 2022). Such inequalities are also evident within the Global North: Since climate risks are generally higher in southern than northern European countries, the expected impact decreases and skepticism increases in Europe from the South to the North (Kröner et al, 2025).

Climate developments are likely to shape the work-family interface in multiple ways. In extreme cases, the threat of climate change can be existential and might imply that entire groups of people are driven out of their homelands, changing where families live but also where and how they work, care or undertake leisure. Yet surprisingly, climate appears to be a neglected topic in the work-family balance literature.

3. A thought experiment: Possible work-family futures

These developments in society are related to the scenarios which can be imagined for the future of work-family balance (Kosow, & Gaßner, 2008). Scenario analysis is used to align divergent perspectives on how the future may unfold and to help explore the likely implications of living in the future. Systematic use of scenarios for clarifying thinking about the future started after World War II. The US Department of Defense used scenarios for the development of new weapons systems 25 years into the future, with the scenarios taking into account uncertainties in the political environment, end results, and other nations’ behavior regarding weapons systems (Bradfield et al., 2005).

Our scenarios were derived from a small-scale scenario workshop conducted in 2020 in the Netherlands. Although country context matters, the scenarios may also have relevance for other countries given that the Netherlands is characterized by a wide variety of elements that encompass different policy regimes. The Netherlands is often described as a hybrid form of welfare state, incorporating conservative and socio-democratic regime characteristics (Kammer et al, 2012) and even more liberal aspects in recent years, for example with the marketization of childcare and education. It therefore offers a relevant context for research work-family balance futures.

The scenario workshop involved a small group of ten employees, students, and retirees whose ages ranged from early 20s to 70s (Author reference, 2021). Respondents were gathered via snowball method. Some had young children, some had older children, others had no children and/or no partner. When they had a paid job, they worked at the university, a research agency or at a firm. Workshop participants included subject matter experts such as a professor of labor economics and a professor of sociology in work and family life; practitioners working in a diverse set of fields, such as HR, applied research or impact in different organizations; and members of the general public. The workshop took 6 hours, and the questions guiding the scenario analysis are provided in Appendix 1. Guidelines for ethical approval were followed by providing participants with information about the study; asking for and receiving informed consent; and informing participants of the voluntary nature of their participation. We also note that the person who organized the scenario workshop was highly experienced and followed the rules of safety and respect in the workshop (Bakker & Van der Kolk, 2017).

The group was divided into two sub-groups (one with participants younger than 40; one with participants 40 and over) to identify the social forces underpinning the axes for the four scenarios to be created. Both groups independently identified the same two social forces, suggesting that the scenarios outlined below are not merely coincidental.

The first axis ranged from “more” to “enough”. In a society that is characterized as “more”, people are always looking for a better job, a bigger house, higher incomes and newer technological appliances. In an “enough” society, people are satisfied with what they have and do not need to obtain newer, better, and even more things. The second axis relates to the importance attached to individualism versus solidarity. On one side of this axis, we mainly take care of ourselves (individualism; see, e.g., de Beer, 2007), whereas solidarity suggests practical and normative attachments between people based on some common identity (see, e.g., Bayertz, 1999; Yerkes and Bal, 2022). The two extremes of each social force are plotted along two axes, resulting in four quadrants (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Four future scenarios for combining work with family life

The axes were regarded as critical by the workshop participants in terms of the impact they might have on the future of work and family life and the perceived balance between the two. One axis (more – enough) appeared to be economically driven, while the other one appeared to be socially driven (individualism – solidarity). Based on these axes, the participants derived four imagined futures, or scenarios, which included the Rat Race, Team Pursuit, Yoga Class, and Smurf’s Village. The names for these scenarios were formulated in the workshop. Following the workshop, the scenarios were further finetuned and refined by the researchers using the notes and the data collected during the workshop. Data from the workshop included (1) detailed information about the axes, the values related to work life balance and the four scenarios; and (2) the process of the construction of the scenarios.

Scenario 1: Rat Race

In the Rat Race scenario survival of the fittest is paramount. People act based on their and their families’ self-interest and always want and consume more than they actually need. All members of the family are ambitious in their work, want the absolute best for their own children and the weekends and evenings are filled with sports practices and games, friends, and working overtime. Those who cannot keep up with the hectic pace of society are considered failures and the source of this failure is attributed to their own lack of trying or ambition. The government provides minimal support in the Rat Race scenario. In the absence of a solid social benefit safety net, those who cannot participate and who make insufficient money to provide for themselves are forced to depend on family or charity. Organizations invest in smart, young people with exceptional talents, but others live from paycheck to paycheck in a “tumbleweed society” that only will worsen (Pugh, 2015). To cope with time constraints, many household tasks are outsourced, such as shopping services and pick-up and drop-off services for children. This future is reminiscent of the American Dream: we can make or break our own life. People are always on call, available and communicating with others. Health apps are popular and help us get just enough rest to prevent burnout, but nothing more than that. There is little time for reflection and rest and the general level of time pressure is high. Sometimes it is unclear precisely why people want more, but such thoughts are immediately dismissed.

Scenario 2: Team Pursuit

In the collectivist world of Team Pursuit, each team member has his or her own task within the team. Everyone is doing what they can to improve and contribute to the collective good. This work-family scenario represents a highly regulated society on a tight schedule in which the state has a large influence on people’s (daily) lives. Technological innovations are applied to monitor people. People have relinquished their privacy and individualism to a ‘big brother’ government that has a larger reach than Google, Meta, and Microsoft combined.

In this future, both individuals and the government thus strive for the highest economic prosperity possible. Technological innovation is a large part of this. Economic growth and technological innovation are made possible by providing formal and informal incentives that stimulate people to work long hours. The government also takes care of people and motivates people to age in the healthiest way possible. People continue to work into old age, depending on their wishes and abilities. To the extent possible, everyone has a permanent job. Society invests as much as possible in collective and family care of children, and algorithms indicate who should do the most family care.

Scenario 3: Smurf’s Village

The Smurf’s Village work-family scenario represents a society that is highly organized and where solidarity plays a major role. The interest of the individual citizen is subordinate to the collective interest. The basic principle is that having enough is enough. It is sufficient to have a roof over our heads, to work, eat and socialize. There are no incentives or requirements in this society to do more. The government distributes work and allocates people to jobs. Traditional problems such as unemployment and underutilization are relatively easy to solve thanks to strong central management. This means that men and women are equal in terms of work, and that other inequalities are also reduced or eliminated.

We eat together and make sure we spend enough time together to be happy. There is no need to make the best use of our time because there is time enough for everything. Work-family balance has been optimized. There is technology, of course – mobile phones and computers – and they are being developed and refined, but progress is sporadic and regulated. We realize that neither mothers nor fathers are best equipped to take care of their children on their own. Rather, we depend on each other’s help and insights to raise our children. Sufficient supports are available, such as childcare and parental leave, to help parents take care of their children. There are also plenty of other options such as community health clinics and community facilities for meals, companionships, and care of elderly.

Scenario 4: Yoga Class

In this vision of the work-family future, the drive for more is low, as in the Smurf’s Village, but societal norms are much more individualistic. People focus on themselves and those who are closest to them. They are satisfied with themselves, their jobs, income, home, friends and family. It is a society in which self-reflection is an important part of daily life and people invest in personal growth. People take care of themselves and their close friends and kin, and the level of social benefits provided by the government is limited.

Small scale and self-sufficiency are paramount in this society. People eat modestly to maintain the balance between body and mind, and people are satisfied with small houses – perhaps even with tiny houses. These limitations in consumption patterns help people remain independent of the government. Technology plays a role in daily life, but the level of technological development is lower and slower than in the Rat Race or the Team Pursuit scenarios. Care robots help care for the elderly and others. From early childhood onwards, children are taught to use electronic devices responsibly. They also learn to be tolerant, to pay attention, and to develop socio-emotional talents over human capital ones.

4. Policy implications

A key advantage to scenario analysis is being able to consider policy implications for the future. Our second research question therefore focuses on this issue from a work-family balance perspective. Despite significant advancement in work-family policies in recent decades (e.g., Nieuwenhuis and van Lancker, 2020), future work-family policy challenges loom large. The four scenarios provide reflective space to consider the extremes of what can happen in relation to some of the key developments in society. This reflective space formed the foundation for a discussion amongst all authors, following a panel discussion in which each of the societal developments outlined here were discussed in relation to the future of work and family.

Considering the unequal distribution of resources within and across welfare regimes as well as individual and group-based inequalities in being able to translate resources into valued work-family balance futures (Hobson, 2014; Robeyns, 2017; Yerkes, Hoogenboom and Javornik, 2020), we identify three key future policy challenges and discuss how they relate to the scenarios, given the demographic, technological and climate developments outlined above. These policy challenges include the need for increased attention to: 1) equitable work-family policy accessibility; 2) policy integration; and 3) recognition of the increased complexity of work-family demands.

First, future work-family policies must give increased attention to equitable accessibility of policies (Eaton, 2003). Attention to work-family policies is insufficient if unaccompanied by attention to aspects of policy design beyond its theoretical availability, such as the accessibility or flexibility of policies (Brega et al., 2023; Javornik & Kurowska, 2019; Yerkes & Javornik, 2019). Families in lower socio-economic positions may be less able to access expensive smart domestic appliances that can reduce domestic workloads, or less able to maintain these technologies, resulting in class-based inequalities and non-inclusiveness. This type of inequality will become especially visible in the Rat Race, where the focus is on individualized rather than collective welfare, which might be the future in countries characterized by liberal welfare regimes. Equitable work-family policy accessibility is thus most likely to take place in the Smurf’s Village, which is more plausible in socio-democratic welfare regimes. When inclusiveness is not highly valued, as in the Rat Race, work-family policy accessibility does not automatically take place, and extra efforts will be needed to promote the accessibility of these policies in an equitable manner. Strategic efforts are needed to make work-family policies an important goal and to make strong connections to overall organizational effectiveness. Perceiving work-family policies as an integral part of social justice indeed also shapes its accessibility (Su, Li, & Curry, 2017). Awareness of inequality regarding accessibility may lead to actions such as providing extra information or organizing special events for groups in an organization that has less access to work-family policies, thus providing extra support (Ollier-Malaterre & Andrade 2016, Van der Lippe, Den Dulk & Begall, 2024).

Second, the future of work-family challenges outlined here suggest greater policy integration is needed in the future to develop and implement policies capable of overcoming policy fragmentation across multiple levels (Yerkes et al., 2022). Historically, governments have attempted to maintain economic growth and curb costs (e.g., those associated with population aging) by decentralizing responsibility for social services to lower levels of government or to private sector or not-for-profit organizations (e.g., Martinelli et al., 2019). Given the greater diversity and fluidity in family relationships that is expected to deepen by 2040, demand for such social and care services is likely to increase. As responsibility for these services is increasingly spread across multiple administrations (national, regional, local), provided by organizations with varying interests (e.g., public interest vs. private sector profit), greater administrative burden looms, also in the work-family interface (Zamanbin, Seibel and Yerkes, 2025). Greater policy integration is possible: for example, at the European level, there are increased calls for work-family policy packages, with the EU Work-Life Balance Directive exemplifying such policy efforts (European Parliament, 2019). The directive outlines combinations of policies and services needed to improve work-family reconciliation. These challenges are likely to be visible across multiple country contexts, given widespread decentralization and privatization that cuts across traditional welfare characterizations (Martinelli et al., 2019). Therefore, without concurrent implementation and coordination, efforts such as the Work-Life Balance Directive are likely to fall short.

Alternatives are available. Best practices have already been identified in policies with an eye on decreasing administrative burden, such as promoting compliance as well as outreach to previously non-compliant individuals (Linos et al., 2020). Across policies and programs, steps identified as contributing to a reduction in administrative burdens on consumers, clients, and families include outreach to raise program awareness, less paperwork and in-person interviews, streamlined applications for multiple programs, simplified recertification, ending asset tests and work requirements, coordinated state and federal programs, and funds for agencies to efficiently process claims. It is most likely that in the Team Pursuit scenario there will be room for policy integration. In this scenario, everyone, including the policymaker, is doing everything they can to improve and contribute to the collective. In countries with more universalist approaches to welfare, such as socio-democratic regimes (and to a limited extent some conservative welfare states), this scenario is more probable. In contrast, attention for the necessity of policy integration is less likely in scenarios where individualization is high (e.g., in liberal welfare regimes), such as the Rat Race and the Yoga Class.

Third, taken together, the changes outlined above highlight the growing complexity of work-family demands. The future of work and family, as described in the four scenarios, is highly dependent on recognition of the persistence and wicked nature of many work-family issues, such as conflicts between work and care. Wicked work-family problems cannot be seen in isolation; rather, they are deeply connected with other wicked societal problems like climate change. Although there has been recognition of the “care crisis” in many aging countries, the ability of policymakers to enact policies that would expand the family social safety net are limited by the growth of extreme right-wing nationalist movements, the urgency of devoting resources to address climate change, and global political and social unrest that have increased migration and decreased international cooperation. Meeting the growing complexities of work and family demands might be more doable in the Rat Race and the Team Pursuit scenarios, where investments in talents are high on the agenda. This will support the necessary creativity needed to deal with these complex issues, and more so than in the Yoga Class or Smurf’s Village.

The likelihood of these scenarios and the policy implications that follow is also dependent on how effective governments are, political trends, as well as what people want and how they weigh aspects such as income and security against others, such as workload in combining work with family life in the future. It is precisely these viewpoints that often remain understudied by work-family researchers. In the next section, we therefore outline a research agenda focusing on the future combination of work and family.

5. A research agenda on the future of work and family

In discussing the future of the combination of work with family life, we have come to realize that there is much that we do not know. It is thus essential to highlight what we feel are important steps for a future research agenda. However, we also recognize that these plans for new research are dynamic and are constantly shifting within changing contexts. There are at least six fields where more knowledge is needed, but there might be more. So we see this first set of ideas as the start of a discussion about how the research agenda could look for the future of combining work and family life.

First of all, we feel that the values citizens perceive as important for work and family life in the future deserve more attention in research. Given demographic and other societal changes, and the increasing amount of care needed in the future, the zero-sum nature of the 24-hour day implies heavy choices regarding work and family life, irrespective of which scenario one embraces. Much has been written about what constitutes quality work and family life but less is known about how citizens view this. Research thus needs to expand to include the values regarding work and family life as well as the effects of certain values for this combination. For example, higher expectations might mean that workers are more likely to discuss their working conditions with their employer, but also that it depends on the extent to which this work can be combined with care tasks. To what extent do citizens see work and family as intertwined, and how can policy take this into account (Bear, 2019)? We thus need to connect more with citizens themselves. Moreover, independent of the theoretical perspective taken, the experience of work and family demands and who shifts time around to fulfill those demands is deeply gendered and this has to be taken into account as well (Bianchi & Milkie, 2010; Doucet, 2022).

Second, a future research agenda needs to move beyond well-known aspects of work and family life, such as paid work, housework and childcare, and give attention to the tasks that are new or are likely to dramatically increase in the future. Extra-familial aspects also did not arise in the discussion of the scenarios. Rather, discussions remained centered on the nuclear family. An example is informal care, which remains understudied in relation to care for children within the work-family literature and is only recently gaining in attention due to social and demographic developments (Perry-Jenkins and Gerstel, 2020). Informal care refers to care for persons with disabilities or others (e.g., elderly people) with care and support needs that is carried out by relatives, friends, acquaintances or neighbors, often without a contractual agreement or formal payment. Informal care needs to be more explicitly considered as part of the combination of work and family life, as the consequences for policies, organizations and societies are widespread. We urge for more work-family research looking into the causes and consequences of the increase in informal care. In addition, more attention is needed for new areas in work-family research, issues that are now hardly visible but are only likely to grow. An example is the administrative burden of life. Establishing one’s eligibility for government programs, paying bills, activating the warranty on a new washing machine, and filing taxes are all essential household activities that generate time-consuming administrative burden (Moynihan & Herd, 2018). According to our prediction, by 2040, such administrative burden on families may decrease but not for everyone to the same extent. Because burdens are not experienced equally, the future may bring more inequalities, more difficulties for some and fewer for others, depending on educational level, income, age, health, and other factors (see, e.g., Zamanbin et al., 2025). Drilling down, we must ask: What kind of institutional changes need to be made to decrease the unnecessary administrative burden to favor the care of family members? Future work-family research must address questions such as these to ensure the sustainability of work-care combinations by the year 2040.

Third, a research agenda focusing on the combination of work and family should take a life course perspective to understand which trajectories lead to more problematic combinations of work and family life (Moen, 2011; Sweet and Moen, 2015). This is also a methodological challenge, as quantitative life course panels are expensive; although we have excellent panels in a few countries such as the UK and Switzerland, this is not the case for every country. A collaborative effort should be made to have these panel studies available in multiple countries similar to, for example, the World Values Study. Since the complexity of the life course is likely to increase, more qualitative (longitudinal) studies are necessary as well, to gain a better understanding of how events and trajectories develop, evolve and are experienced by workers around the globe.

Fourth, most research on work and family life comes from western countries (Milkie et al., 2023). The societal developments we discussed need to be examined in low- and middle-income countries, investigating consequences for family relations in the future and the implications for combinations of work with family life. How do work-care combinations in these countries differ from high income countries and why? How could the greater diversity and fluidity in family relationships and family ties influence the organization of work globally? And what are the implications of this for the flow of work and services between low-, middle- and high-income countries? Greater collaborations are needed between Global South and Global North scholars to ensure a diversity of perspectives in answering these questions (Milkie et al., 2023).

We also need more research into the societal developments outlined above. Work and family scholars are well informed about demographic developments, but less so when it comes to technological developments and work-family consequences. Therefore our fifth research recommendation is that it is crucial to understand the power imbalances involved in the development and implementation of technologies being used to make domestic life more convenient and housework and care work more manageable, and to consider how best to regulate these technologies to minimize such power imbalances. We need to better understand not only which unpaid domestic tasks can be automated but also consider the broader social consequences. Technology is so quick to develop that we may lock into changes before we have time to anticipate the consequences. We are concerned that digitalization and automation at home and at work may deepen social and economic inequalities in work and family in new and unanticipated ways in the next decades. To that end, a more sustained research and policy focus on the way technologies are transforming work and family is needed.

Sixth, little research has been done in relation to automation and the combination of work and family life; even less research has investigated climate change and combining work and family life. This is quite unimaginable, as we are facing the greatest crisis of human society. Where organizations were mainly busy dealing with ‘people’ and ‘profit’, they now need to center more attention on aspects of sustainability in the fields of climate, environment, energy, on the ‘planet’ (see also the Sustainable Development Goals). Also, regarding work and family life, the health of the ‘planet’ has to be taken into account. The limits on economic growth posed by climate change and the need for sustainability as well as social, structural, and cultural differences between countries will influence how work and family is arranged in the future for all countries. What are the consequences of overconsumption for work and family life; how does climate mitigation relate to work and family life, and, maybe even more importantly, how does climate adaptation relate to the combination of work and family life? Answering these questions is crucial in the coming decades (e.g., Dengler and Lang, 2021).

Finally, research needs to take account of possible new pandemics and health crises, and what the consequences are for combining work with family life. Although researchers profusely studied the gendered impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, we advise including the possibility of a new pandemic as well in our future work-family research (Settersten et al., 2020). Future pandemics will certainly lead to increasing demands on work and family life, and we can study under which conditions we can mitigate the negative consequences for combining work with family life.

6. Concluding

In this article, we have attempted to explore the future of the work-family interface, imagining potential scenarios for combining work with family life in 2040. We started with social developments related to work-family balance and subsequently related them to a thought experiment based on the idea of time pressure experienced in balancing work and family life, and what work-family futures might look like dependent upon our orientation to ‘more’ or ‘enough’ in life and the extent of individualism versus social solidarity. Work-family policy implications of these four scenarios were elaborated along the lines of the equitability of policy accessibility, complexity, and integration. A limitation of our approach is that these scenarios are based on a small-scale scenario workshop in the Netherlands meant to sketch possible futures. Future research with more expansive scenario analysis, also in other country contexts, would be useful to expand our understanding of potential work-family futures. The scenarios may also appear to provide a rather simplistic view of quite complex work-family issues. However, we perceive the current work as a jumping off point to get us thinking about the future of the work-family interface.

Together, this look into the potential future of work and family suggests multiple directions for future research. We therefore concluded this Voices article by outlining a provisional research agenda for studying the combination of work and family life in the future. In this research agenda, the general message is to move beyond existing research about work and family and focus on new areas, for example by paying attention to new and unexpected parts of work and family life, climate change, and giving greater consideration to low- and middle-income countries. Only in this way can we hope to reach a sustainable work and family future. We would like to remind work-family researchers and reviewers why we offer this rather unconventional analysis and our admittedly uncertain prognosis: At a time when the future is less certain yet more existential, as social and behavioral scientists, we often remain mired in rather minor concerns. Drawing on the tradition of established research questions at the work-family interface, this contribution is an invitation and challenge to broaden the work-family research scope. If we do so, we are in an excellent position to help optimize the way work and family life are combined in the future, building on our extensive and existing work-family research traditions.

Appendix 1. Information about scenario workshop on work-family balance in 2040

Questions for the workshop

1. Values: what are the most important values that are positively or negatively associated with time pressure for you? Formulate the most important values that you want to safeguard.

2. Forces: What are the major trends and forces in society that influence the strength and/or characteristics/characteristics of time pressure? Choose the most important two dimensions and/or opposing developments and plot them on an x and y axis

3. Futures: What alternative futures, future societies can we imagine in the four quadrants (and how did we get there)? Look at extremes.

4. Evaluation: What are the consequences of the different scenarios for achieving the set goals and realizing the chosen values? (1 = not likely to become reality / to be realized / conditions are unfavorable to 5 = good chance that these will be realized / conditions are supportive)

5. Trade repertoire: Who can realize the chosen values and goals in these scenarios?

Set of logically linked scenarios

The scope of possible scenarios is narrowed down by having clear goals and providing information to the participants about the current state of affairs related to the topic of the scenarios. The output is a coherent set of logically linked scenarios in discursive narrative forms. There is no predetermined optimal number of scenarios, nevertheless between 2 and 6 is recommended, and 4 is most likely (Amer, Daim & Jetter, 2013). The decision to have two axes for our scenarios was an outcome of the workshop. Researchers had to combine all information from the workshop, analyze and reanalyze and turn it into narratives. Identifying most of the information that defined and described the scenarios was the outcome of the workshop, but to make it a clear narrative the researchers had to analyze the data further.