Abstract
Purpose:
This brief report examines the impact of a defendant’s Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) diagnosis, as well as the influence of expert testimony and genetic evidence, on the perceptions, knowledge, and sentencing views of a sample of state court judges in the U.S.
Methods:
Data were collected from sixty-one California Superior Court judges who responded to a survey featuring a structured case study about a defendant diagnosed with ASD. The survey assessed judges’ views on the influence of the defendant’s ASD diagnosis and its genetic etiological influences on sentencing, responsibility, and perceptions of the defendant’s behavior.
Results:
Findings indicate that most judges believe that an ASD diagnosis and its genetic influences would influence their sentencing decisions, with almost all considering it a mitigating factor to sentencing, but that it did not substantially affect a defendant’s legal responsibility. Survey responses revealed significant gaps in judges’ knowledge about ASD, underscoring the need for enhanced judicial training.
Conclusion:
Findings highlight the influence of ASD and behavioral genetic evidence on judicial views and potential decision-making in cases involving defendants with ASD, indicating a clear need for improved access to education and resources on the disorder. Addressing these educational gaps can help the criminal justice system better accommodate the complexities associated with scientific and ASD evidence, which may promote more equitable treatment for defendants with ASD.
Keywords: Autism Spectrum Disorder, Judges, Decision-making, Expert testimony, Sentencing, Mental health
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a complex neurodevelopmental disorder– characterized by considerable variability in its presentation and symptom severity–that involves difficulties in social communication and restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities (APA, 2022). Individuals with ASD often face significant challenges when navigating the criminal justice system as defendants, particularly in communication, comprehension, and social interactions, which can negatively impact their court experiences and legal outcomes (Allely, 2022; Caliman & Berryessa, 2025a; Slavny-Cross et al., 2022). These complexities underscore the unique challenges that defendants with ASD pose to judges when assessing criminal responsibility and intent during the legal process (Freckelton, 2011, 2013).
Previous studies have highlighted how judges’ decision-making in cases involving diagnosed defendants is often shaped by their limited knowledge of ASD and personal beliefs about the causes and implications of the defendant’s actions (Berryessa, 2014b, 2016a). Legal decision-makers across jurisdictions have grappled with determining the forensic relevance of ASD, including challenges in understanding how the diagnosis should influence their decisions (Freckelton & List, 2009; Freckelton, 2013). Understanding these nuances is essential for ensuring fair legal practices that consider the unique characteristics of ASD (Berryessa, 2021; Caliman & Berryessa, 2025a).
Moreover, the widely accepted genetic etiological influences on ASD may add another layer of complexity (Berryessa et al., 2015). Judges’ lack of knowledge surrounding behavioral genetic evidence in criminal cases may be influenced by folk psychological beliefs about how genetics affects behavior, which commonly can lead to negative and punitive views of defendants with mental disorders and their lack of potential for rehabilitation (Berryessa, 2019; Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011).
Although previous qualitative research has explored judges’ views on the sentencing and responsibility of defendants with ASD (Berryessa, 2014a, 2014b, 2016a, 2016b), there remains a lack of survey studies from the United States (U.S.) that analyze judges’ views on how ASD may impact their decisions during the legal process. Although the data for this study were collected over a decade ago, empirical research directly examining judges’ perceptions of autism in criminal cases remains limited in the U.S. context; further contemporary concerns remain related to judicial knowledge and education surrounding autism, its forensic relevance, and how misunderstandings of ASD may lead to unjust or particularly punitive legal outcomes (Berryessa, 2021). This study, drawing from a survey of a sample of 61 California state court judges in the U.S., seeks to examine how evidence of a defendant’s ASD diagnosis may impact their views on notions of responsibility and sentencing, as well as explore judges’ knowledge and views on training needs regarding ASD.
Methods
The data presented in this analysis were collected as part of a larger mixed-methods project on judges’ views of defendants with ASD, utilizing previously documented methods in Berryessa (2014a, 2014b, 2016a, 2016b). The methods for this analysis are briefly outlined below. The research received approval from the Stanford Institutional Review Board.
Recruitment and sample
The target population of the survey was a sample of California Superior Court judges. The mailing addresses of ~1500 eligible California Superior Court Judges were collected from California Superior Court websites; a random sample of 500 judges was sent surveys by U.S. mail. The mailings included a cover letter explaining the study’s purpose, survey instrument, and return postage. Judges were asked to indicate on the returned survey if they were willing to participate in a telephone interview and provide their email/phone contact information.
Survey design and analysis
All participants were exposed to the same hypothetical case of a defendant diagnosed with ASD based on a vignette originally used by Berryessa et al. (2015). The case centered around a 28-year-old male who was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon against his roommate. The incident escalated from a verbal argument about rent into a physical altercation in which the defendant sprayed his roommate with pepper spray and stabbed him with a pocketknife, causing serious injuries. Expert testimony from a psychiatrist diagnosed the defendant with ASD–highlighting that it likely influenced his perceptions of threats posed to him by his roommate and contributed to his actions–and described the etiological influences to ASD.
No explicit definitions of “legal responsibility,” “moral responsibility,” or “culpability” were provided, as the goal was to capture judges’ own professional interpretations of these concepts. The expert testimony summarized the defendant’s ASD diagnosis and behavioral traits—such as social communication difficulties and challenges interpreting others’ intentions—and explained how these could influence his understanding of intent and decision-making. The complete survey instrument is available in the Supplementary Material.
Following the vignette, judges were asked questions about their opinions on the defendant’s sentencing and responsibility, the impact of the expert testimony, and the influence of ASD on the case. Additionally, it included questions related to participants’ views on the impact of the genetic influences of ASD, as well as their knowledge and understanding of ASD. Finally, demographics were collected. The survey instrument is in the supplementary material. All participants gave written consent.
Given the nature of the survey data, which comprised a mix of multiple-choice and ranking questions, analyses focused on utilizing descriptive statistics to summarize the key features of judges’ opinions and attitudes.
Results
In total, 61 California Superior Court judges completed the survey. Demographic characteristics of judges are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.
Sample demographics (N = 61).
| Demographic | % of total sample (n) |
|---|---|
| Education Level | |
| Additional Post-graduate (Other than Juris Doctor) | 13.11 % (N = 8) |
| Time as a Judge | |
| Less than 1 year | 4.92 % (N = 3) |
| 1–5 years | 18.03 % (N = 11) |
| 6–10 years | 24.59 % (N = 15) |
| More than 10 years | 52.46 % (N = 32) |
| Cases Handled Per Day | |
| 5 or fewer | 24.59 % (N = 15) |
| 6–10 | 9.84 % (N = 6) |
| 11 −15 | 13.11 % (N = 8) |
| Greater than 15 | 50.82 % (N = 31) |
| Age Group | |
| 40–49 | 6.56 % (N = 4) |
| 50–59 | 42.62 % (N = 26) |
| 60 + | 50.82 % (N = 31) |
| Gender | |
| Male | 73.77 % (N = 45) |
| Female | 26.23 % (N = 16) |
As shown in Table 2, when asked to indicate the influence of the defendant’s ASD on their views of the case, most judges considered ASD to be influential or somewhat influential. When asked to rank specific factors in the case that they believed were influenced by the defendant’s ASD, the defendant’s criminal intention was ranked most often (see Table 3), followed by other factors including the defendant’s actions and dangerousness.
Table 2.
Influence of ASD and its genetic component on case perceptions.
| Level of Impact | % of total sample (n) | |
|---|---|---|
| ASD | Genetic Component | |
| Extremely Influential | 11.48 % (N = 7) | 11.48 % (N = 7) |
| Influential | 37.70 % (N = 23) | 36.07 % (N = 22) |
| Somewhat Influential | 34.43 % (N = 21) | 13.11 % (N = 8) |
| Little Influence | 14.75 % (N = 9) | 14.75 % (N = 9) |
| No Influence | - | 1.64 (N = 1) |
| No Answer | 1.64 % (N = 1) | - |
| Mean (SD) | 3.51 (0.95) | 3.22 (0.58) |
Note. SD = Standard Deviation.
Table 3.
Judges’ rankings of case elements affected by ASD and expert testimony.
| Case Element | Most Affected by Expert Testimony | Least Affected by Expert Testimony | Most Affected by ASD Diagnosis | Most Affected by Genetic Influence | Mean Rank (SD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MK’s Legal Responsibility | 24 | 43 * | 53 | 49 | 2.75 |
| MK’s Free Will | 20 | 41 | 50 | 47 | 3.22 |
| MK’s Action Against Roommate | 34 | 37 | 53 | 44 | 3.08 |
| MK’s Criminal Intention | 47 * | 21 | 55 * | 50 * | 2.95 |
| MK’s Dangerousness | 39 | 26 | 48 | 47 | 3.40 |
| Other | 6 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 4.10 |
Note. “Mean Rank” reflects average rankings, with lower values indicating greater perceived influence.
Represents the most chosen option.
Judges were then asked to indicate to what extent the evidence concerning the defendant’s ASD influenced the sentence they would render, with options ranging from “greatly mitigates,” “mitigates,” “no effect,” “aggravates,” to “greatly aggravates.” Out of the 61 judges, 13 (21.31 %) indicated that the evidence “greatly mitigates” the sentence, 46 (75.41 %) believed it “mitigates,” one (1.64 %) said it had “no effect,” and one (1.64 %) responded that it “aggravates” the sentence. No judges chose “greatly aggravates.” The mean rating for the influence of the defendant’s ASD on the potential sentence, based on assigned numerical values (5 for “greatly mitigates” to 1 for “greatly aggravates”), was 4.16 (SD = 0.58).
Participants were also asked to rate how much they believed the defendant should be held legally and morally responsible for the described events on a scale from 1 (not at all responsible) to 5 (completely responsible). Overall, judges rated the defendant higher on legal responsibility (M = 4.29, SD = 0.92) than moral responsibility (M = 3.24, SD = 1.28). The response distribution for both measures is provided in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1.
Judges’ Perceptions of Legal vs. Moral Responsibility. Note. The horizontal axis represents the percentage (%) of judges (N = 61). The vertical axis displays the judges’ ratings of the defendant’s legal and moral responsibility on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all responsible) to 5 (completely responsible). “No Answer” indicates judges who did not provide a response.
Judges were asked to indicate to what extent the expert testimony on the nature and symptoms of the defendant’s condition influenced their views of the case, with options ranging from “strongly changed,” “somewhat changed,” to “did not change.” Out of the 61 judges, 23 (37.70 %) indicated that the testimony “strongly changed” their opinions, 30 (49.18 %) believed it “somewhat changed” their opinions, and five (8.20 %) responded that it “did not change” their opinions. Three judges (4.92 %) did not answer the question. The mean rating for the influence of the expert testimony, based on assigned numerical values (3 for “strongly changed” to 1 for “did not change”), was 2.31 (SD = 0.62). When asked to rank factors related to the case that were most impacted by the expert testimony, perceptions of the defendant’s criminal intention and actions against his roommate were the most prevalent factors mentioned by judges (see Table 3).
Judges were asked to indicate to what extent the knowledge that the defendant’s condition is genetically influenced affected their views of the case. Most judges indicated that genetics was influential to some extent, with an overall mean influence rating of 3.22 (SD = 1.22; see Table 2). When ranking aspects of the case for them that were most impacted by knowledge of ASD’s genetic influences, the defendant’s criminal intention was ranked as the most affected (see Table 3).
Judges were also asked to self-report their level of knowledge about ASD, rating themselves from “none” to “high.” Judges indicated slightly higher average familiarity with genetics (M = 2.52, SD = 0.59) than with ASD (M = 2.37, SD = 0.73) (see Table 4). Finally, judges were asked to indicate their agreement about their level of training and understanding of ASD in forensic contexts (from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). As shown in Table 5, judges indicated an overall moderate agreement that they personally lacked sufficient training on ASD (M = 2.75, SD = 0.79) and genetic disorders (M = 2.66, SD = 0.77). They expressed stronger agreement that most of their colleagues would benefit from additional training in both ASD and genetics (both M = 3.07). Judges agreed that providing further resources and training on ASD (M = 2.84, SD = 0.78) and genetics (M = 2.88, SD = 0.83) is important for themselves and their peers. When asked about the most effective resources for obtaining information on ASD, judges identified formal judicial education and training as the most helpful (see Table 6).
Table 4.
Judges’ self-reported knowledge levels on ASD and human genetics.
| Knowledge Level | % of total sample (n) | |
|---|---|---|
| ASD | Human Genetics | |
| None | 9.84 % (N = 6) | 1.64 % (N = 1) |
| Slight | 47.64 % (N = 29) | 47.64 % (N = 29) |
| Moderate | 36.07 % (N = 22) | 45.90 % (N = 28) |
| High | 4.92 % (N = 3) | 3.28 % (N = 2) |
| No answer | 1.64 % (N = 1) | 1.64 % (N = 1) |
| Mean (SD) | 2.37 (SD = 0.73) | 2.52 (SD = 0.59) |
Table 5.
Judges’ agreement with statements on ASD and genetic training.
| Statement | % of total sample (n) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree | No Answer | Mean (SD) | |
| I do not have adequate training or understanding of ASD for legal settings | 13.11 % (N = 8) |
54.10 % (N = 33) |
21.31 % (N = 13) |
8.20 % (N = 5) |
3.28 % (N = 2) |
2.75 (0.79) |
| I do not have adequate training or understanding of genetic disorders for legal settings | 9.84 % (N = 6) |
52.46 % (N = 32) |
26.23 % (N = 16) |
8.20 % (N = 5) |
3.28 % (N = 2) |
2.66 (0.77) |
| Most colleagues need additional training on ASD | 21.31 (N = 13) |
57.38 % (N = 35) |
8.20 % (N = 5) |
3.28 % (N = 2) |
9.84 % (N = 6) |
3.07 (0.68) |
| Most colleagues need additional training on genetic disorders | 22.95 (N = 14) |
52.46 % (N = 32) |
9.84 % (N = 6) |
3.28 % (N = 2) |
11.48 % (N = 7) |
3.07 (0.72) |
| It is important that judges receive training on ASD | 18.03 (N = 11) |
49.18 % (N = 30) |
22.95 % (N = 14) |
4.92 % (N = 3) |
4.92 % (N = 3) |
2.84 (0.78) |
| It is important that judges receive training on genetics | 22.95 (N = 14) |
44.26 % (N = 27) |
24.59 % (N = 15) |
4.92 % (N = 3) |
3.28 % (N = 2) |
2.88 (0.83) |
Note. Responses ranged from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” Means and standard deviations (SD) were calculated by assigning numerical values from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (Strongly Agree). “No Answer” indicates judges who did not respond to the question.
Table 6.
Preferred judicial training and educational resources.
| Educational Resource | Total Chosen | 1st Choice | 2nd Choice | 3rd Choice | Not Used (0th Choice) | Mean Rank (SD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Formal Judicial Education/Training | 51 | 37 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 1.35 (0.61) |
| Attending Judicial Conferences | 38 | 6 | 28 | 4 | 4 | 1.95 (0.50) |
| Professional Publications | 27 | 5 | 10 | 12 | 5 | 2.48 (0.71) |
| Web-Based Materials | 25 | 4 | 5 | 16 | 5 | 2.26 (0.74) |
| Scholarly Publications | 16 | 3 | 1 | 12 | 5 | 2.23 (0.83) |
| Professional Consultation with Peers | 13 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 2.56 (0.81) |
| Other | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | 1 (N/A) |
Note. The “Not Used” column shows resources judges would not use. Lower Mean Rank values indicate higher preference.
Discussion
This preliminary survey data revealed significant insights into how a defendant’s ASD diagnosis affected judges’ views of different case-related factors. Overall, almost all judges reported that the diagnosis of ASD would be influential in their sentencing decision in the case. These findings suggest that many judges appear sympathetic and cognizant of the challenges associated with ASD in sentencing contexts, with the large majority of judges here indicating that they believe ASD should be viewed as a potential mitigating factor; this is consistent with findings from prior work (Berryessa, 2014b, 2016b). Most judges also reported that knowledge of the genetic etiological influences on a defendant’s ASD was, to some extent, influential in shaping their views on the case, which aligns with previous findings (Berryessa, 2016a).
Most judges viewed the defendant’s legal responsibility to be unaffected by his ASD, which also complements findings from Berryessa (2014b). Yet they also reported that the expert testimony on ASD particularly influenced their views on the defendant’s criminal intention. This suggests that judges may view a defendant as fully legally responsible for his behavior but, at the same time, also deeply question his understanding of his own intentions, actions, and decision-making abilities. This differentiation is consistent with judges’ professional training and their obligation to assess legal responsibility within statutory boundaries; rather than reflecting misunderstanding, the observed difference between moral and legal responsibility likely represents a nuanced awareness of how autism may influence culpability without diminishing legal accountability (Freckelton & List, 2009; Grant et al., 2018). This may suggest that judges may also be likely to view ASD as relevant to other stages of the legal process in which defendants must make decisions; aligned with other work, examining competency to stand trial may be especially relevant, as a defendant’s difficulties in understanding the intent of his own actions could also lead to challenges in comprehending the trial process and assisting in his defense (Brewer et al., 2016; Mayes, 2003). Although an ASD diagnosis alone typically does not meet the statutory criteria for insanity defenses in the United States, ASD-related evidence might be used by attorneys to contextualize behavior and argue for mitigation (Caliman & Berryessa, 2025a, 2025b). This approach mirrors the broader defense strategies observed in recent qualitative work, where attorneys emphasize diminished moral culpability, communication challenges, or atypical reasoning patterns to seek leniency and appropriate accommodations for defendants with ASD (Caliman & Berryessa, 2025b).
Additionally, almost all judges reported that the expert testimony influenced their opinions of the case in some way, indicating a potential openness to different types of expert evidence in cases involving ASD (Berryessa, 2017). A small subset of judges, however, reported that the expert testimony did not alter their opinions, which might indicate prior familiarity with ASD or prior experience with defendants with ASD. The findings of this study offer valuable insights for expert witnesses, emphasizing aspects of cases involving ASD, such as criminal intention and dangerousness, that judges may believe are most affected by expert testimony. Similar patterns appear in jury research, where providing accurate information about ASD improves understanding of atypical behavior and leads to less punitive judgments (Baker et al., 2025; Berryessa et al., 2015; Brewer et al., 2016; Maras et al., 2019). These parallels suggest that both jurors and judges benefit from targeted psychoeducation to reduce stigma and support informed decision-making.
Results also revealed significant gaps in judges’ knowledge about ASD and behavioral genetics. Most judges rated their knowledge as slight to moderate, with very few judges rating it as high–aligning with previous work emphasizing the need for better judicial education on complex scientific topics (Berryessa, 2016b, 2019). Most judges expressed an interest in formal training in order to obtain forensic information about ASD and genetics, underscoring the need for comprehensive training programs and continuing education through conferences. By enhancing their knowledge, judges may improve their ability to critically evaluate expert testimony on ASD as well as genetic evidence, mitigating the risk of over-reliance on such evidence and preventing the misuse of unqualified testimony in judicial decision-making processes.
The study does have some limitations. The sample size was limited to 61 judges from California, which may not represent judges in other jurisdictions. Additionally, the study relied on self-report data and was limited to judges who chose to respond. Further, data was collected over a decade ago, which may not fully capture contemporary judicial perspectives on ASD. The study’s descriptive, non-experimental design may also limit the findings’ generalizability and explanatory power. Although judicial understanding of ASD may have evolved since the time of data collection, recent initiatives, such as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Autism and the Courts program (The Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania, n.d), demonstrate that judicial systems are still actively addressing knowledge gaps in this area. Such initiatives signal progress, yet they also highlight the uneven and localized nature of training across jurisdictions–underscoring the continued need for empirical research on how judges currently interpret ASD-related evidence (Berryessa, 2021; Caliman & Berryessa, 2025a)
Despite these limitations, this study provides important insights into judges’ views of and decision-making processes involving defendants with ASD, particularly that providing expert testimony in cases involving defendants with ASD may allow judges to analyze and understand the circumstances of those cases more holistically. Additionally, providing judges with the comprehensive training on ASD that they desire may also help them better understand its forensic relevance and lead to more informed outcomes for diagnosed defendants. Beyond competency, these findings have practical implications for plea and sentencing advocacy. Defense counsel can use expert and educational evidence to explain how ASD affects perception and decision-making, supporting mitigation or alternative resolutions (Caliman & Berryessa, 2025b).
Supplementary Material
Statements and declarations
The authors declare no conflict of interest. This research was supported by the National Institute of Health under grant P50 HG003389–09, through the Center for Integration of Research on Genetics and Ethics. The findings reported stem from a broader study focused on judicial attitudes towards offenders with Autism and related genetic mental disorders, which has already yielded four published papers. The authors declare that they have no financial or non-financial competing interests in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript. All research procedures involving human participants were conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and comply with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments. This study did not involve any animal subjects. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. Data and materials related to this study are available upon request. C.B. was responsible for the study design, data collection and analysis, and manuscript revision, while C.R.C. drafted the initial manuscript.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: Dr. Colleen M. Berryessa reports financial support was provided by National Institute of Health. If there are other authors, they declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at doi:10.1016/j.reia.2026.202803.
Footnotes
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Colleen M. Berryessa: Writing – review & editing, Supervision, Resources, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Funding acquisition, Data curation, Conceptualization. Carolina R. Caliman: Writing – original draft, Formal analysis.
Data availability
Data will be made available on request.
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Associated Data
This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.
Supplementary Materials
Data Availability Statement
Data will be made available on request.