Abstract
Introduction
“Wrong blood in tube” (WBIT) describes the discrepancy of patient identity between tube label and tube content. WBIT events can lead to an incompatible transfusion and may have serious consequences for the patient. There are currently no comprehensive evaluations or analyses of WBIT events in Germany. This study is conducted as a feasibility study. The detected WBIT (dWBIT) events from 2020 to 2023 were retrospectively recorded and analyzed.
Methods
The reporting of this study is guided by the Checklist for Reporting of Survey Studies (CROSS). It is not mandatory to report WBIT events to a central supervisory authority in Germany. Therefore, a cooperation with four blood establishments (BEs) took place. The data were collected using a data collection form. The survey contains a total of 14 questions about each dWBIT event. A database was created in FileMaker 2023 for data storage and plausibility checks.
Results
In the 4 years under review, there were a total of 125 dWBIT events in the four cooperating BEs. The rate of dWBIT events results in an overall rate of one dWBIT per 4,530 blood group determinations. Frequencies varied between emergency room (1:6,897), outpatient ward (1:3,866), regular ward (1:2,564), and intensive care unit (1:863). The main reason for the error was incorrect labeling of the collection tube (19%) and blood sample taken from the wrong patient (32%). In most cases, the error was noticed in the laboratory (94%), and in 5% directly after the sample was taken. dWBIT events occurred in 87% of patients with a known blood group and in 13% of patients with a first blood group determination. The time of sampling for blood typing (time of day, day of the week, or weekend) had no influence on the dWBIT rate. None of these WBIT cases led to an ABO-incompatible transfusion.
Conclusion
The study examines the frequency of dWBIT incidents in Germany for the first time and shows that these cases continue to represent a relevant risk, especially with regard to incompatible transfusions. Measures to minimize risk could include improving the training of transfusion staff in combination with IT-based identification and two independent blood samples for blood group typing.
Keywords: Hemovigilance, Wrong blood in the tube, Transfusion safety, ABO-incompatible transfusions
Introduction
The term “wrong blood in tube” (WBIT) describes a discrepancy of patient identity between the tube label and the tube content. There are many possible causes such as a process error. However, the causes can essentially be divided into two categories: either blood was drawn from the wrong patient and the tube was labeled with the intended patient’s data or blood was drawn from the intended patient and the tube was labeled with a different patient’s data [1].
WBIT monitoring plays an important role as sentinel for correct patient identity and transfusion safety. The transfusion of blood components is preceded by a complex process of preparation, including various safety measures, which should ideally ensure that the right patient receives compatible blood components [2, 3]. One of the first and most important steps in the entire transfusion process is blood collection from the patient for pretransfusion testing (i.e., blood group typing, antibody screening, if necessary, antibody identification, and cross-matching). Correct patient identification and tube labeling is paramount during this crucial step because it is the most common source of errors [4, 5]. If a mistake happens, a WBIT can occur and remain undetected if the patient’s blood group was not been previously determined [6]. When requesting blood components, WBITs can lead to incompatible transfusions, which may have serious health consequences for the patient [2, 7].
The SHOT report revealed 890 confirmed WBIT events in 2022 with a reporting rate of 6.54 per 10,000 RBC units or one WBIT per 1,529 RBC units issued by the UK. A total of 78.1% of cases were due to incorrect patient identification and sample labeling errors. If these WBITs had not been detected, ABO-incompatible transfusions could have occurred in 46.4% of cases [1]. The Swissmedic Haemovigilance Report 2022 reported 168 WBIT events. This corresponds to a rate of 7.84 per 10,000 RBC units or one WBIT per 1,275 RBC units. The causes of these errors also included human error and noncompliance with work instructions [8]. Overall, an average frequency of one WBIT event per approximately 2,000–3,000 samples was reported [5, 9, 10]. In many cases, these WBIT events are seen as the main cause associated with incompatible transfusions [5], with approximately 1% leading to an ABO-incompatible transfusion [10].
There are currently no comprehensive evaluations or analyses of WBIT events in Germany. A study on this topic should be conducted in order to accurately assess the WBIT situation in Germany. However, to define the details of the study precisely, the study described here was initially conducted as a feasibility study to determine the scope and content of a more comprehensive study and collect initial data. In Germany, there is no obligation to report WBIT events to a central supervisory authority. For this reason, cooperation took place with German blood establishments (BE), which provided data on detected WBIT (dWBIT) events in German healthcare facilities on a voluntary basis. The dWBIT events from 2020 to 2023 were retrospectively recorded. The institutions included in this study are already addressing the issue of WBIT in greater depth.
This study aims to address the following research questions:
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1)
How many WBIT events were detected in selected German healthcare facilities?
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2)
Did a dWBIT event lead to an incompatible transfusion in these selected German healthcare facilities?
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3)
Are WBIT events more frequently detected in certain medical departments of these selected German healthcare facilities?
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4)
What is the best way to design a study on WBIT?
Methods
Study
This study is conducted as a survey in the manner of a feasibility study to allow for initial data on dWBIT events to be collected and problems and difficulties in data collection to be identified in order to conduct a more comprehensive study on this topic at a later point. The reporting in this study is guided by the Checklist for Reporting of Survey Studies (CROSS).
Study Design
The study design is based on a retrospective data collection of dWBIT events using data from German BEs. The BEs represented here are blood donation facilities directly affiliated with university hospitals in Germany. The participating BEs are accredited according to DIN EN ISO 15189.
It is not mandatory to report WBIT events to a central supervisory authority in Germany. A study was therefore designed in a scientific collaboration with four blood donation facilities at university hospitals (affiliated institutes). The documented dWBIT events were submitted to the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut (PEI), the German national competent authority for blood safety surveillance, for evaluation on a voluntary basis.
WBIT Case Definition
WBIT events were defined as cases in which the correct blood was not in the tube or there was a discrepancy of patient identity between the tube labeling and the tube contents confirmed. In this study, WBIT events were detected by an incorrect match between previous blood group typing, by a double test from two different samples or another detection method. The dWBIT data are collected and evaluated in most participating BEs as part of the quality management system (in one BE, these dWBIT cases were not recorded in the internal quality management system but documented and reported to the clinic). In this study, all data that apply to this dWBIT description were collected and analyzed in anonymized form for the period from 2020 to 2023.
Data Collection
A standardized questionnaire was developed by scientific employees of the Division of Safety of Biomedicines and Diagnostics at the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut (PEI) and transfusion specialists from BEs. The survey form was used to collect the essential data to record the process of requesting, testing, and issuing red blood cell (RBC) concentrates, thus enabling a targeted root cause analysis of dWBIT events (shown in the online supplementary material 1 and supplementary material 2; for all online suppl. material, see https://doi.org/10.1159/000552490). The survey contains a total of 14 questions about each dWBIT event. Each question has a selection of predefined answer options. The questions are divided into two categories: “Details of the event” and “Status of training of blood sample collection personnel.”
The BEs involved received the data collection form in Excel template format with predefined columns (column headings) and predefined drop-down menus, which they used to retrospectively collect the dWBIT events for this study.
Data Transfer and Management (FileMaker Database)
A web browser-based upload function was programmed in the relational database system FileMaker Pro 2023 (Claris FileMaker Pro; version 20.3.2) to transmit the data. The BEs were then able to upload the data collection form via the FileMaker server. A database was created in FileMaker 2023 (version 20.3.2.201) for data storage and plausibility checks.
Statistics
A descriptive statistical analysis was conducted. Absolute and relative frequencies were calculated for qualitative variables, and medians, 25% quantiles (first quartile), and 75% quantiles (third quartile) were calculated for quantitative variables. The frequencies of dWBIT events were presented as either the number of blood group determinations per case or as the number of documented cases per 10,000 blood group determinations. The upper 95% Poisson confidence interval for the occurrence of incompatible transfusions due to dWBIT per 1,000,000 transfusions performed was calculated according to Daly [11]. The statistical analysis was conducted using SAS, version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC/USA).
Results
Six BEs were asked to participate in this study. Only a few BEs were contacted within the context of this feasibility study, but it is known that all of these BEs are already addressing the issue of WBIT. Two BEs withdrew from participation in this study due to time constraints. Four BEs (a response rate of 66.7%) provided data and participated in this study.
The regular average annual usage of RBC concentrates in Germany for the period under review is 3.52 million RBCs per year. The participating facilities represent approximately 136,900 units (4%) of the RBC supply in Germany per year.
The observation period was originally designed for 5 years, from 2019 to 2023. As no reliable data could be collected for 2019, the evaluation of this study was limited to a 4-year period from January 2020 to December 2023. One cooperating BE was unable to provide data for 2019 due to the data quality of the documented dWBIT events and was only able to provide data from 2020 onward. In order to ensure high data quality in this study, a shorter time period was chosen.
In the 4 years under review, there were a total of 125 dWBIT events in the four cooperating BEs (shown in Fig. 1). The range of annual dWBIT events covers 21 dWBITs in 2022 to 44 dWBITs in 2021. The average annual number of blood group determinations and confirmations with and without blood product requirement was between approximately 135,000 and 148,000. The number of transfused RBCs was approximately 87,000 in 2020 and 2021 and approximately 80,000 in 2022 and 2023 (shown in Fig. 1).
Fig. 1.
Number of blood group typings (determinations/confirmations), number of transfused RBCs, and number of dWBIT events in the four cooperating German BEs in the period from 2020 to 2023. RBC, red blood cells; dWBIT, detected wrong blood in tube; BE, blood establishment.
During the entire observation period, the overall dWBIT rate was one event per 4,530 blood group determinations and one dWBIT per 2,677 transfused RBCs. The total number of dWBITs compared to the number of blood group determinations and confirmations was 2.21 dWBITs per 10,000 blood group determinations/confirmations and varied from 3.13/10,000 in 2021 to 1.47/10,000 in 2022. The total number of dWBITs compared to the number of RBCs transfused was 3.73 dWBITs per 10,000 RBC units and the number of dWBITs in relation to 10,000 RBCs transfused varies from 2.63 in 2022 to 5.08 in 2021.
No dWBIT event was associated with the transfusion of ABO-compatible or ABO-incompatible RBC concentrates. If this had been the case, an ABO-incompatible transfusion could have occurred in 55% (n = 69) and an ABO-compatible transfusion in 44% (n = 55). In one case (1%), this information was unknown. The upper 95% Poisson confidence interval of the occurrence of incompatible transfusions due to dWBIT was 9 cases per 1,000,000 transfusions performed.
In 80% (n = 100), the dWBIT occurred on a weekday, and in 20% (n = 25), the dWBIT occurred on a weekend or public holiday. During the day (morning [6:01 a.m.–12:00 p.m.] and afternoon [12:01 p.m.–6:00 p.m.]), the number of dWBITs was higher (70%) than in the evening or at night (6:01 p.m.–6:00 a.m.) (30%) (shown in Fig. 2). This proportion largely corresponded to the number of RBC requests during the morning and afternoon (71%) (shown in Fig. 2).
Fig. 2.
Requests for RBCs and dWBIT events broken down by time of day (morning [6:01 a.m.–12:00 p.m.], afternoon [12:01 p.m.–6:00 p.m.], and evening/night [6:01 p.m.–6:00 a.m.]) in the four cooperating German BEs in the period from 2020 to 2023. The blue area represents 12 h during the day (morning and afternoon) and the gray area represents 12 h in the evening/night. RBC, red blood cells; dWBIT, detected wrong blood in tube; BE, blood establishment.
In the 4 years under review, the number of RBC requests was 152,729 in the morning, 253,046 in the afternoon, and 163,618 in the evening or at night. The analysis of the urgency of the request showed that 61% (n = 76) were routine requests, 38% (n = 48) were emergencies with a cross-match, and one case was not specified.
With regard to the location of the request, it was found that most dWBITs occurred in the intensive care unit (42%) and in the regular ward (45%) (shown in Fig. 3), while dWBIT events occurred less frequently in outpatient clinics (4%), in the emergency room (2%), and in the operating room (2%). In relation to the number of requirements, the dWBIT rate in intensive care units (1:1,059) is higher than in emergency units (1:6,897) and regular wards (1:2,564) (shown in Fig. 3).
Fig. 3.
Location of the WBIT events, number of RBC requests divided by location (ER, outpatient ward, regular ward, ICU, OR) and the relation of dWBIT events and the number of requests in the four cooperating German BEs in the period from 2020 to 2023 presented as a dWBIT rate. *The dWBIT rate was calculated by dividing the number of requested RBCs by the detected WBIT cases (dWBIT rate = RBC requests/dWBIT). RBC, red blood cells; WBIT, wrong blood in tube; dWBIT, detected WBIT; ER, emergency room; ICU, intensive care unit; OR, operating room; BE, blood establishment.
The analysis of the error showed that in 19% (n = 24) of the dWBITs, blood was taken from the correct patient and the tube was labeled with the data of another patient. In 32% (n = 40), blood was taken from the wrong patient and the tube was labeled with the data of the intended patient. Cross-mixing occurred in 14% (n = 17) of the dWBIT. This means that blood should have been taken from 2 patients, but there was a mix-up between patients or tubes. In one case, “other” was indicated, and no information was available in 43 cases (34%).
With regard to the time of labeling in 13% (n = 16), the tube was labeled after blood collection; in 23% (n = 29), before blood collection; and in 64% (n = 80), no information was available. The location of sample labeling was unknown in 69% (n = 86), in three cases (2%), the tubes were labeled at the patient’s bedside and in 36 (29%) dWBITs, the tubes were labeled away from the patient.
The error was noticed in the laboratory in 94% (n = 118); in 5% (n = 6), directly after collection of the sample; and in 1% (n = 1), for other reasons (shown in Fig. 4). The blood samples were taken for the first time in 13% (n = 16), and in 87% (n = 109), during a follow-up blood collection from a patient with an already known blood group (shown in Fig. 4).
Fig. 4.
Where was the dWBIT error identified and whether it was an initial blood sampling or a follow-up blood sampling in which dWBIT occurred in the four cooperating German BEs in the period from 2020 to 2023. dWBIT, detected wrong blood in tube; BE, blood establishment.
In 68% (n = 85), blood was taken from the patient by the physician and in 25% (n = 31), by a nonphysician personnel. No information with respect to the blood taking person was available in 7% (n = 9) of cases.
Discussion
In our retrospective study, a total of 125 dWBIT events were compiled over a period of 4 years. Four BEs were involved in this study, which account for approximately 4% of the supply of RBCs in Germany. This corresponds to a rate of one event per 4,530 tests or 2.2 dWBIT events per 10,000 tests in selected German healthcare facilities. A more detailed analysis of the requirements for RBC concentrates in the four BEs shows a dWBIT rate of 1:1,059 in intensive care units and a rate of 1:2,564 for regular wards. In relation to the number of transfused RBC concentrates, the rate was 1:2,677 transfused units or 3.73 dWBIT per 10,000 RBC units.
In the literature, the frequencies of WBITs compared to the number of requested blood units (with associated blood typing) are reported to be one WBIT event per 2,000 and 3,000 samples [5, 9, 10]. Based on transfusions of RBC concentrates, the Swiss hemovigilance data indicated a WBIT rate of one WBIT per 1,313 units for the years 2020–2023 [8, 12]. Our study therefore shows a lower overall dWBIT rate in selected German healthcare facilities compared to published data, but a more detailed classification according to the requesting units also revealed differences between the sites of our survey. Our overall rate can only be compared with the rates found in the literature with great caution, as it is not representative for all of Germany due to the size of the study. In addition, the four institutions included may have had a comparatively lower rate because they are already dealing with the topic of WBIT in greater depth (selection bias). We assume that the actual dWBIT rate for Germany as a whole is higher.
Furthermore, it should be noted that 44% of the analyzed dWBITs were ABO-compatible. It is likely that ABO-identical WBITs (referred to as “silent errors”) also occurred during the reporting period that were not detected as they had the same blood group (detection/information bias). Due to the silent errors, it is likely difficult to capture the full occurrence of WBIT. In addition to the ABO-incompatible WBITs, these ABO-compatible cases may be significant in the development of irregular antibodies. It is likely that increased time pressure during the request is a major factor for faulty processing procedures. Other factors in this regard may be the lack of knowledge, stress, night shifts, or uneducated staff.
WBIT continues to pose a relevant risk in Germany and elsewhere, especially with regard to ABO-incompatible transfusions. Looking at the SHOT reports, it can be seen that in the UK, for example, there has been no reduction in WBIT cases over the past 10 years (2015–2024). In fact, WBIT rates have risen slightly over the last 3 years, indicating a clear need for risk-minimizing measures and thus further measures that contribute to patients receiving ABO-compatible blood transfusions [13]. A comparison of the hemovigilance data from Germany and France showed that the rate for ABO-incompatible RBCs varies between 0.02 and 0.07 per 10,000 transfused units [14]. Comparing this rate with the dWBIT rate of 2.5 per 10,000 samples shows the risk of an ABO-incompatible transfusion is therefore 1.5 to 2.0 log levels lower than the risk for a dWBIT, which may also be an underestimation of true numbers due to underreporting.
Due to the nature of study, none of the dWBIT events documented in our study resulted in a transfusion (neither ABO-compatible nor ABO-incompatible transfusion). However, based on the data of this feasibility study, there is a small theoretical risk of 9 incompatible transfusions due to dWBITs per 1,000,000 transfusions performed. In our opinion, dWBIT cases primarily lead to a delay in transfusion and to unnecessary blood sampling and repeated laboratory tests. However, it should be kept in mind that any WBIT can lead to an incompatible transfusion if it remains undetected, which can have fatal consequences if it results in an ABO-incompatible transfusion. And even a delayed transfusion can lead to harm. The risk of an incompatible transfusion is particularly high in cases of undetected WBIT. Further safety measures must therefore be established to minimize the risk.
A study by Mirrione-Savin et al. [14] showed that in the vast majority of cases (93%), the reason for an ABO-incompatible transfusion was an incorrect pretransfusion bedside procedure by the transfusing staff at the patient’s bedside, whereas incorrect ABO determination of the patient (the recipient of the RBC) led to ABO-incompatible transfusions in 6% of cases. This number appears to be comparatively low, but it clearly indicates that WBIT in fact lead to incompatible transfusions. ABO-compatible transfusions are not even included here, and these also pose a significant risk with regard to irregular antibodies.
A more detailed analysis of our documented dWBIT events revealed that most cases were identified in the laboratory facilities of the blood donation centers. Thus, in 94% of dWBIT events, the error was detected in the immunohematology/blood bank laboratory and less than 6% by other control mechanisms. In 87% of the cases, retyping was carried out on patients with a known blood group and less than 13% of patients without prior blood group typing. A WBIT event is, as expected, more difficult to identify after initial blood sampling, if the patient’s blood group is not yet known or if the WBIT is the same ABO blood group. These WBIT can be detected immediately after sampling by matching the identity of the patient and the tube, for example, through cross-mix-up if two tubes were swapped or in the case of WBIT of a different blood group through bedside testing prior to transfusion (if the bedside test is applied and interpreted correctly). The relative risk of an undetected WBIT when blood is taken for initial determination is higher in accordance with the proportion of patients for whom no follow-up request is made after the initial determination. The benefits of risk minimization measures should be discussed on the basis of these data. All WBIT cases are preventable events. A WBIT event occurs due to an error in patient identification and/or tube labeling. Therefore, this is precisely where we need to focus our attention. Furthermore, the establishment of electronic patient identification systems for accurate patient identification is crucial as an important means to prevent WBIT events, as has repeatedly been reported [3, 15].
An electronic patient identification system is helpful in recognizing an incorrect assignment for patients. As described by Staples et al. [16], this can be done by scanning the patient’s wristband and scanning the label of the blood product, whereupon the electronic comparison is then carried out. However, the entire process of blood collection, checking the labeling of the blood tube, and the available patient data should be recorded and checked. An electronic patient identification process is needed, in which the phlebotomist scans the patient’s barcoded wristband and prints a corresponding label, which is then attached to the tube at the patient’s bedside [10, 17]. This is particularly important for patients who have not undergone preliminary blood group testing, as an ABO discrepancy will not be detected in the laboratory if the patient’s blood group is not yet known. In principle, an electronic identification system is always a beneficial safety measure which can be used throughout the entire transfusion process and can serve as an important measure for preventing incompatible transfusions.
Another option to prevent WBIT events, especially in patients with an unknown blood group, could be the mandatory collection of two independent blood samples for blood group typing. Even if this procedure is not always feasible in emergency situations, the risk of incompatible transfusions could be minimized in most cases. In addition, the date, time, and initials of the person taking the blood sample could be documented as confirmation of the identity check.
Lumadue et al. [18] pointed out another aspect in the occurrence of WBIT events and the avoidance of incorrect processes. This study showed that the risk of a WBIT is 40 times higher when sample tubes are incorrectly labeled than when the labeling instructions are followed correctly [18]. Therefore, it is also important to focus on the staff.
Krishna et al. [19] found that the use of electronic patient identification systems can reduce WBIT, but that human factors, such as staff training and compliance with standard operating procedures, are also very important. We also suggest special staff training on the labeling of patient sample tubes and verification of patient identity as this is an essential and often underestimated risk-minimizing measure. Developing the competence of staff can have a significant impact on the incidence of errors, as demonstrated by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), the Chief Medical Officer’s National Blood Transfusion Committee (NBTC), and Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT). In 2006, the safer practice notice on the safety of blood transfusions was published [20]. The SHOT analysis shows that in the period from 1997 to 2005, 15 deaths occurred after ABO-incompatible transfusions and 7 deaths occurred in the period from 2006 to 2023 [21]. However, the number of ABO-incompatible RBC transfusions decreased from 2014 to 2019 and then increased again from 2019 to 2023 [21]. These data are both relevant and alarming, and clearly indicate a need for additional safety measures. In our survey, we were unable to collect precise data on the level of training of the requesting staff involved in blood sampling and requisition of RBC units. However, when analyzing the cases of confirmed transfusions with incompatible RBC concentrates, it became apparent that the quality of training of personnel in the facilities performing transfusions largely varied. A systematic review also shows, however, that there is no single measure that reliably prevents WBIT alone [9]. A combination of different measures should therefore be implemented. Improvement and national harmonization of training content is required in this area to increase the safety of RBC transfusions [3, 22]. The publication of a guideline and the provision of a checklist could be helpful for this training.
Limitations
Our survey, conducted as a feasibility study, has some deficiencies that limit the informative value of our results. The study was designed in this way in order to first check the feasibility and then conduct a more comprehensive study in which the shortcomings identified here can be considered. It should also be noted that this study refers to dWBIT cases. However, WBITs that go undetected and can subsequently lead to an incompatible transfusion pose a significantly higher risk. dWBITs reveal identified errors. The truly risky ones, however, are the “silent errors” that go unnoticed. First, it is a retrospective study in which not all parameters could be reported by the participating BEs and then documented here. No data could be collected on the level of training of the physicians performing the transfusions. Second, only a small proportion of the national BEs were involved in the data collection. Only about 4% of BEs were included in this study. Therefore, the results and conclusions cannot be considered representative for Germany. Likewise, a comparison with the rates described in the literature can only be made with great caution. It should be noted that the BEs included here are already addressing the WBIT issue more intensively. This means that the frequency of dWBIT may be higher in other institutions than in institutions that already focus on WBITs. Finally, the evaluation of the dWBIT events only included data from the BEs and not from the requesting establishments. The faulty processes (avoidable errors) in the healthcare facilities could not be recorded. It cannot be excluded that further WBIT cases occurred that were not detected. We therefore assume incomplete data and underreporting of actual events.
Outlook
This study identified potential areas for improvement for a more comprehensive study which should be conducted in another study design (e.g., prospectively, a longitudinal study before or after using a technical matching control of patient and blood sample, RFID chipped tubes). It would also be beneficial to compare facilities with and without electronic patient identification systems. A question worth considering is whether the requesting institutions should be included in addition to the BEs. A representative sample of BEs must be included in the study in order to obtain a realistic picture of the WBIT situation in Germany. Considerations must be made for the inclusion BEs that are not yet dealing with the WBIT issue as intensively. Also, smaller institutions should be included, as the occurrence of WBIT may differ there compared to university hospitals with easy blood support. A statutory reporting requirement for WBIT and other near-miss events would be helpful to obtain a better overview of the frequency of WBIT events in Germany.
Conclusion
Our feasibility study shows that WBITs continues to occur. In the cases that were detected and considered in this study, dWBIT did not lead to an incompatible blood transfusion because the faulty process was identified, particularly when patients had been pretyped and the relevant information was accessible. Nevertheless, there is still a risk of an incompatible transfusion occurring whenever an undetected WBIT happens. Based on our statistical evaluation, there may be nine incompatible transfusions due to dWBIT for every one million transfusions performed in selected German healthcare facilities. The results of this feasibility study will inform the design of a more comprehensive study on WBIT in Germany.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank all participating BEs for collecting data on WBIT events and for their active support.
Statement of Ethics
This study was reviewed by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Medicine of Goethe University c/o University Hospital Frankfurt am Main under case no. 2024-1611-Anfrage. According to the ethics committee, the WBIT study described was not subject to any obligation to obtain professional advice from it. A written informed consent to participate was not required in accordance with local guidelines. There is no mandatory requirement to report WBIT events in Germany. The data collection was based on the voluntary provision of these data by the blood suppliers involved at the university hospitals. The highest level of data protection was ensured in the study, as the data was collected in anonymized form, without storing personal data. The authors declare that the ethical principles and anonymization were observed.
Conflict of Interest Statement
A. Humpe and H. Klump were a member of the journal’s Editorial Board at the time of submission. The other authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.
Funding Sources
This study was not supported by any sponsor or funder.
Author Contributions
Research concept: Markus Benedikt Funk and Jochen Hoch. Study design: Hengameh Aghili Pour, Sarah Anna Fiedler, Doris Oberle, and Markus Benedikt Funk. Provision of data: Jochen Hoch, Thomas Frankenberger, Andreas Humpe, Diana Vajcs, Nicole Sitzmann, Monica Adrian, Hannes Klump, and Martina Wessiepe. Data management and manuscript draft: Hengameh Aghili Pour. Database and web browser-based upload function: Marcus Hoffelner and Hengameh Aghili Pour. Data analysis: Hengameh Aghili Pour, Sarah Anna Fiedler, and Markus Benedikt Funk. Manuscript review: All authors. Finalization of the manuscript: Hengameh Aghili Pour, Sarah Anna Fiedler, and Markus Benedikt Funk.
Funding Statement
This study was not supported by any sponsor or funder.
Data Availability Statement
All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this article and its online supplementary material. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Supplementary Material.
Supplementary Material.
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This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.
Supplementary Materials
Data Availability Statement
All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this article and its online supplementary material. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.




