Abstract
Public trust in security services is a critical social‐psychological phenomenon, yet existing theoretical accounts remain fragmented and insufficiently attentive to the structural power asymmetries characterising security–public relations. This article argues that the dominant paradigm, procedural justice theory, requires fundamental revision within intergroup and institutional power dynamics. Drawing upon procedural justice theory (Why people obey the law, 1990, Yale University Press; Why people obey the law, 2nd ed., 2006, Princeton University Press), social identity and self‐categorisation theory (The social psychology of intergroup relations, 1979, 33, Brooks/Cole; Rediscovering the social group: A self‐categorization theory, 1987, Blackwell), the integrative model of organisational trust (Academy of Management Review, 1995, 20, 709), intergroup contact theory (The nature of prejudice, 1954, Addison‐Wesley), system justification theory (British Journal of Social Psychology, 1994, 33, 1), institutional betrayal theory (American Psychologist, 2014, 69, 575) and the political trust tradition (A systems analysis of political life, 1965, Wiley; Trust and trustworthiness, 2002, Russell Sage Foundation; Annual Review of Political Science, 2000, 3, 475), the article advances three propositions. First, trust formation is asymmetric: trust erodes faster than it accrues, with the asymmetry amplified for subordinate‐status groups. Second, procedural justice effects are identity‐contingent: perceived fairness operates differently depending on whether the authority is categorised as in‐group protector or out‐group enforcer. Third, trustworthiness appraisal under institutional betrayal requires reconceptualising Mayer et al.'s integrity dimension as epistemic credibility. A four‐pathway model is proposed, with power asymmetry as a structural moderator and recursive feedback producing virtuous or vicious trust spirals.
Keywords: epistemic credibility, institutional betrayal, legitimacy, power asymmetry, procedural justice, public trust, security services, social identity, system justification, trust asymmetry
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between security services and the publics they serve is fundamentally a relationship of power. Security institutions, whether state police forces, private security organisations or hybrid enforcement agencies, exercise coercive or normative authority over individuals and communities, often with wide operational discretion and limited real‐time accountability (Bradford, 2014; Loader & Walker, 2007). Trust is the psychological mechanism through which populations accept or resist the exercise of this authority (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Where trust is present, compliance becomes normative rather than coerced, cooperation emerges voluntarily and operations gain the informational and social capital upon which their effectiveness depends (Jackson et al., 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Where trust is absent, the result is not simply non‐cooperation but active resistance, social fragmentation and the delegitimation of institutional authority itself (Carr et al., 2007; Tankebe, 2013).
The dominant theoretical framework for understanding this relationship is procedural justice theory (Tyler, 1990, 2006), which has generated extensive evidence demonstrating that perceptions of fair process, rather than outcome favourability, are the primary drivers of perceived legitimacy and cooperative behaviour. This contribution is substantial, yet the present article argues that it is insufficient. Procedural justice theory, as typically operationalised, treats trust as a relatively symmetrical process, undertheorises the structural conditions that constrain perceptions of fairness and gives inadequate attention to the identity dynamics through which encounters with security services acquire psychological meaning (Brunson, 2007; Tankebe, 2013). Recent integrative work has begun to address these gaps. Hamm et al. (2017) advanced an integrated framework that explicitly separates evaluations of procedural fairness from evaluations of institutional trustworthiness, with fairness predicting trustworthiness and trustworthiness in turn predicting trust and compliance. The present article builds on this conceptual separation and extends it in three directions: by theorising why the procedural fairness–trustworthiness link is itself identity‐contingent, by specifying the structural conditions that amplify trust asymmetry and by reconceptualising integrity under conditions of institutional betrayal.
This article proposes a theoretically advanced integrative model that moves beyond synthesis to identify three innovations. First, drawing on trust asymmetry research (Skogan, 2006; Slovic, 1993) and social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), it proposes that trust formation between publics and security services is fundamentally asymmetric, with this asymmetry structurally amplified for subordinate‐status groups. Second, integrating the group value model (Tyler, 1989) with self‐categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987), it proposes that procedural justice effects are identity‐contingent: the same procedural encounter produces different trust outcomes depending on whether the authority is categorised as an identity‐congruent protector or an identity‐threatening enforcer. Third, drawing on institutional betrayal theory (Smith & Freyd, 2014), the concept of epistemic trust (Fonagy & Allison, 2014) and the security assurance literature (Ray et al., 2011), it proposes that Mayer et al.'s (1995) integrity dimension requires reconceptualisation in contexts of historical institutional harm to incorporate the moral credibility of organisational truth claims. These propositions are embedded within a four‐pathway model (Figure 1) in which structural power asymmetry operates as a cross‐cutting moderator. The model is dynamic rather than static: its recursive architecture specifies how trust‐building and trust‐eroding processes interact through feedback loops that can produce either virtuous or vicious spirals.
FIGURE 1.

Four‐pathway model of public trust in security services with power asymmetry as cross‐cutting moderator. Red arrows indicate moderation; black arrows indicate contribution to trust; grey dashed arrows indicate recursive feedback across pathways. The three theoretical propositions (P1–P3) map onto the model as indicated.
TRUST, POWER AND VULNERABILITY: A RECONCEPTUALISATION
Trust is defined here as the willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of another party on the basis of positive expectations about that party's conduct (Mayer et al., 1995). In security contexts, however, vulnerability is not merely accepted; it is structurally imposed. The publics served by security institutions do not choose their vulnerability in the way that, for example, an employee chooses to trust a manager. They inhabit a power relation in which the security institution already possesses the capacity to detain, surveil or coerce, whether through legal authority or through institutionally backed normative force (Loader & Walker, 2007). This distinction is theoretically consequential. Trust in security services is not simply a risk calculation; it is a moral evaluation of an authority that already exercises power over the trustor. The psychological question is not whether to become vulnerable, but whether the vulnerability one already experiences is justified by the conduct and character of the institution that imposes it.
Trust, trustworthiness, confidence and legitimacy distinguished
Existing scholarship often conflates trust with related but distinct constructs. Following Hardin (2002) and Levi and Stoker (2000), this article distinguishes trust as a relational judgement held by the trustor from trustworthiness as a property of the trustee. The distinction is consequential because public distrust of security services may reflect not a psychological deficit but a rational evaluation of institutional conduct, performance and accountability, what Levi (1998) describes as calibrated distrust. Public distrust, on this account, is an epistemically appropriate response to demonstrated low trustworthiness rather than an obstacle to be overcome through reassurance.
Following Luhmann (1988), confidence is understood as a generalised, largely unreflective expectation that institutional arrangements will function adequately. Trust, by contrast, involves active evaluation and deliberate acceptance of relational risk (Giddens, 1990). Easton's (1965) distinction between diffuse and specific support provides a complementary frame: diffuse support is a generalised orientation towards the regime, while specific support concerns evaluation of particular institutional outputs. Critical‐citizen scholarship (Norris, 2011) demonstrates that accumulated specific dissatisfaction can erode diffuse support over time, producing the trust deficits observed in contemporary democracies. Legitimacy, understood as the perceived right of an authority to exercise power and the corresponding felt obligation to defer (Tyler, 2006; Weber, 1968), provides the normative scaffolding within which trust operates. Legitimacy in this model is not a property of institutions; it is a psychologically constructed judgement shaped by identity, power and social position (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Jackson & Bradford, 2019). The same institution can therefore be simultaneously perceived as legitimate by one social group and illegitimate by another, a point with profound implications for understanding trust differentials across communities.
Trust asymmetry as a structural feature
A foundational proposition is that trust in security services is characterised by systematic negativity bias: negative experiences erode trust more rapidly and more durably than positive experiences build it (Slovic, 1993). Skogan (2006) provided compelling empirical evidence for this asymmetry in policing contexts, demonstrating that negative police encounters predicted declines in confidence far more powerfully than positive encounters predicted increases. The asymmetry has theoretical roots in the broader negativity bias literature in social cognition (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) and in the psychology of betrayal, where violations of trust carry disproportionate weight because they activate threat‐detection systems calibrated for self‐protection (Kim et al., 2004).
This asymmetry is not uniform across populations. For groups that occupy subordinate positions within social dominance hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), including ethnic minorities, lower socio‐economic communities and historically surveilled populations, baseline trust is lower while the negativity asymmetry is amplified by accumulated intergenerational experiences of institutional harm (Brunson, 2007; Smith & Freyd, 2014). The pattern is consistent with institutional theories of political trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008), which argue that trust in state institutions is formed primarily through evaluations of actual institutional performance rather than through cultural disposition. Low trust amongst marginalised communities reflects not dispositional suspicion but historically grounded evaluation of institutional conduct, what Carr et al. (2007) termed legal cynicism. Mayer et al.'s (1995) construct of trust propensity, conceptualised as individual disposition, is therefore inadequate for these contexts. The model proposed here reconceptualises trust propensity as structurally situated rather than individually dispositional.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL
Procedural justice theory: Strengths and identity‐contingent limits
Tyler's (1990, 2006) process‐based model identifies four components of procedural fairness (voice, neutrality, respect and trustworthy motives) and demonstrates that these predict perceived legitimacy more powerfully than outcome favourability or instrumental effectiveness. The empirical support for this model is extensive and cross‐culturally replicated (Hough et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2014). Tyler and Blader's (2003) group engagement model further showed that procedural justice communicates identity‐relevant information: fair treatment signals inclusion, respect and valued membership within a shared social group. The Hamm et al. (2017) integrated framework usefully advances this tradition by separating procedural fairness from trustworthiness as distinct stages of legitimacy formation, although it does not yet specify the conditions under which the fairness–trustworthiness link weakens or fails.
This article identifies a theoretical tension that the procedural justice tradition has not adequately resolved. The group engagement model assumes that encounters with authorities are evaluated within a framework of shared group membership, that is, that the authority and the individual belong to, or are perceived to belong to, a common social category. When this assumption holds, procedural fairness functions as Tyler predicts: it communicates relational standing and promotes identification. When the authority is categorised as a member of an out‐group, an agent of a hostile or indifferent institutional apparatus, the same procedural encounter acquires different psychological meaning (Bradford et al., 2017; Radburn et al., 2018). Respectful treatment from an out‐group authority may be interpreted as strategic impression management rather than genuine relational regard; voice may be perceived as tokenistic. The present model therefore proposes that procedural justice effects are moderated by social categorisation: the extent to which the authority is perceived as identity‐congruent versus identity‐threatening determines the degree to which procedurally fair behaviour translates into trust.
This proposition is consistent with evidence from Sargeant et al. (2013), who demonstrated that procedural fairness was less important than police effectiveness in predicting trust amongst ethnic minority groups in Australia, and with Tankebe's (2013) finding that legitimacy evaluations in Ghanaian policing contexts weight effectiveness more heavily than procedural quality. These findings are not anomalies; they reflect the identity‐contingent operation of procedural justice mechanisms.
Social identity, self‐categorisation and the problem of power
Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self‐categorisation theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) provide essential tools for understanding why trust is distributed unevenly across social groups. SIT proposes that individuals derive self‐concept from group memberships and are motivated to achieve positive distinctiveness through intergroup comparison. SCT specifies the cognitive processes of categorisation, identification, and comparison through which group boundaries become psychologically salient and behaviour becomes group‐oriented.
The relationship between publics and security services is an intergroup relation, but one characterised by a fundamental power asymmetry that classical SIT does not fully address. Reicher et al. (2010) and Haslam and Reicher (2007) have extended social identity theorising to demonstrate that identity processes are embedded within power structures that determine which groups have the capacity to define social reality, control resources and impose categorisations on others. Security institutions exercise definitional power: the capacity to classify behaviour as suspicious, individuals as threats and communities as requiring surveillance (Reicher, 1996). This power‐bearing quality distinguishes security–public relations from the symmetrical intergroup contexts in which much SIT research has been conducted.
The common in‐group identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) proposes that intergroup bias can be reduced when members of different groups recategorise themselves under a superordinate identity. Applied to security contexts, trust may be enhanced when security personnel and community members perceive themselves as sharing a higher‐order identity. This recategorisation is not ideologically neutral. System justification theory (Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Banaji, 1994) warns that superordinate categorisation can function to legitimise existing power arrangements by obscuring structural inequalities under a rhetoric of shared belonging. If the notion that “we are all in this together” serves to silence the specific grievances of marginalised communities, superordinate categorisation may suppress rather than resolve the conditions that produce distrust. The model therefore treats superordinate categorisation as conditional: its trust‐building potential depends on whether it is accompanied by substantive recognition of differential experiences and by genuine power‐sharing (Dixon et al., 2012).
Organisational trustworthiness: Reconceptualising integrity as epistemic credibility
Mayer et al.'s (1995) model identifies ability, benevolence and integrity as the three antecedents of trustworthiness, each contributing independently to trust judgements. This framework has been widely validated across organisational contexts (Colquitt et al., 2007; Schoorman et al., 2007) and provides a granular account of the cognitive components underlying trust appraisal.
Its application to security services reveals an important limitation in the construct of integrity. Mayer et al. (1995) defined integrity as the perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles the trustor considers acceptable. In contexts unmarked by institutional betrayal, this definition functions adequately. Where security institutions have histories of systematic misconduct, including racial profiling, disproportionate use of force, cover‐ups or collusion, the integrity dimension requires reconceptualisation. Smith and Freyd's (2014) institutional betrayal theory demonstrates that harm perpetrated by institutions upon which individuals depend produces distinct psychological consequences, including a fundamental erosion of epistemic trust: the capacity to believe that the institution's claims about itself are truthful. Integrity, in betrayal‐marked contexts, cannot be restored merely by demonstrating adherence to principles; it requires the restoration of epistemic credibility, understood as the institution's capacity to make truth‐claims that are believed. This draws on Fonagy and Allison's (2014) concept of epistemic trust, originally developed in developmental psychology. The construct requires adaptation when scaled from dyadic developmental relationships to institutional contexts; nevertheless, the core psychological process, the evaluation of whether a source's communications can be taken at face value, is functionally analogous, and institutional betrayal research (Smith & Freyd, 2014) provides empirical grounding for the extension.
The proposed expanded integrity construct, integrity‐as‐epistemic‐credibility, treats demonstrated adherence to principles as a necessary but insufficient condition for trust. Epistemic credibility is distinct from reputation management. Research on security assurance signalling (Ray et al., 2011) shows that trustees can influence trustor perceptions of unobservable institutional qualities only through credible indirect cues, not through self‐report or display alone. Reputation can be projected to external audiences; epistemic credibility concerns whether the organisation's own communications are regarded as truthful by those who have experienced its conduct directly. An institution may successfully manage public reputation while lacking epistemic credibility amongst the communities most affected by its actions. In betrayal‐marked contexts, integrity additionally requires transparent acknowledgement of historical harm, verifiable accountability mechanisms and the ceding of epistemic authority to those who were harmed, allowing affected communities to define the terms on which institutional claims will be evaluated.
Intergroup contact under conditions of power inequality
Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis, validated meta‐analytically by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006), specifies that positive intergroup contact reduces prejudice under conditions of equal status, cooperative goals, institutional support and sustained acquaintance. Applied to security contexts, the theory provides empirical justification for community policing, liaison officer programmes and collaborative safety initiatives (Gill et al., 2014; Myhill & Bradford, 2012).
The equal status condition is structurally unattainable in encounters where one party possesses legal authority to detain, search or use force. Dixon et al. (2012) and McKeown and Dixon (2017) have further demonstrated that positive contact can paradoxically reduce support for collective action amongst disadvantaged groups by fostering harmony that obscures structural inequality, the “irony of harmony” critique. Contact‐based interventions must therefore be evaluated not only by immediate attitudinal effects but also by structural consequences: whether they redistribute power or merely pacify legitimate grievance.
THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL: FOUR PATHWAYS, THREE PROPOSITIONS
The model proposed here identifies four pathways through which public trust in security services is developed, maintained or eroded (see Figure 1). These pathways are not merely aggregated from existing theories; they are integrated through three theoretically novel propositions, structured by the recognition that power asymmetry operates as a cross‐cutting moderator.
Pathway 1: Procedural fairness and voice
This pathway operates through the mechanism of perceived process fairness. Consistent with Tyler (1990, 2006), trust is built when security organisations demonstrate neutrality, provide genuine voice, treat individuals with dignity and convey trustworthy motives. Incorporating the identity‐contingency proposition, the model specifies that this pathway's efficacy is moderated by social categorisation. When the authority is perceived as identity‐congruent, procedural fairness functions as a powerful trust‐building mechanism. When the authority is perceived as identity‐threatening, procedural fairness is necessary but insufficient, with its trust‐building effects attenuated.
Pathway 2: Identity alignment and conditional superordinate categorisation
This pathway operates through social categorisation processes. Drawing on the common in‐group identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) and incorporating the system justification critique (Dixon et al., 2012; Jost & Banaji, 1994), the model specifies that superordinate categorisation builds trust only when accompanied by substantive recognition of differential experiences and by genuine power‐sharing mechanisms. Diverse recruitment, community embedding and participatory governance contribute to this pathway, though only when structurally rather than performatively implemented. The dual identity model (Gaertner et al., 1999), which proposes that individuals can simultaneously maintain subgroup and superordinate identities, offers a more psychologically realistic framework than full recategorisation, as it preserves the validity of distinct group experiences while creating shared purpose.
Pathway 3: Demonstrating trustworthiness with epistemic credibility
This pathway operates through trustworthiness appraisal, drawing on the Mayer et al. (1995) framework with the reconceptualisation of integrity proposed above. Ability is demonstrated through operational competence; benevolence through actions that prioritise community welfare beyond narrow enforcement mandates. Integrity is reconceptualised as epistemic credibility: the perceived honesty and moral authority of the organisation's self‐representations. In contexts of institutional betrayal (Smith & Freyd, 2014), epistemic credibility requires not merely adherence to stated principles but transparent acknowledgement of past harm, independent accountability structures and the redistribution of narrative authority to affected communities.
The three trustworthiness components interact under conditions of power inequality. High ability in an organisation perceived as lacking benevolence generates fear rather than trust, a pattern characteristic of authoritarian security apparatuses. High benevolence claims in an organisation with compromised epistemic credibility are dismissed as manipulative, what critical scholars term performative care. Under conditions of historical institutional harm, integrity‐as‐epistemic‐credibility becomes the rate‐limiting factor: advances along the ability and benevolence dimensions fail to generate trust until epistemic credibility is restored.
Pathway 4: Structurally attentive intergroup contact
This pathway operates through direct intergroup encounter, consistent with contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and incorporating the structural critiques of Dixon et al. (2012) and McKeown and Dixon (2017). Contact builds trust when it satisfies the classical conditions (cooperative goals, institutional support and sustained acquaintance) and additionally attends to structural consequences. Contact interventions that redistribute influence, such as community‐led safety partnerships, restorative justice processes and participatory governance mechanisms, are predicted to generate more durable trust than those that merely increase interpersonal familiarity without altering power relations.
Power asymmetry as cross‐cutting moderator
The central structural feature of the model is that power asymmetry operates as a moderator across all four pathways. Power asymmetry, understood through the lens of social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), amplifies trust asymmetry (negativity bias is greater for subordinate groups), constrains procedural justice effects (identity‐contingency is most pronounced for groups with adversarial institutional histories), limits the trust‐building potential of superordinate categorisation (which may function as system justification) and determines whether contact produces genuine trust or superficial harmony. This structural positioning of power differentiates the present model from existing integrative accounts, which tend to treat inequality as a boundary condition rather than a constitutive feature of the trust process.
TESTABLE PROPOSITIONS AND HYPOTHESES
The integrative model generates specific, empirically testable propositions and associated hypotheses that extend beyond the predictions of any single constituent theory.
Proposition 1: The structural amplification of trust asymmetry
Trust erosion following negative security encounters is greater in magnitude and duration than trust accumulation following positive encounters, with the asymmetry moderated by social dominance position.
Holding objective encounter quality constant, negative encounters will predict trust declines of larger magnitude than positive encounters predict trust gains.
The negativity–positivity asymmetry will be larger in subordinate‐status than in dominant‐status groups, with the interaction between encounter valence and group status accounting for additional variance beyond main effects.
Trust‐building interventions targeting subordinate‐status communities will require greater dosage and duration to produce equivalent trust gains, while a single procedural failure will produce disproportionately larger trust decrements.
Proposition 2: The identity‐contingency of procedural justice
The effect of perceived procedural fairness on trust and legitimacy perceptions is moderated by the social categorisation of the authority.
When security personnel are categorised as identity‐congruent, procedural fairness will strongly predict trust; when categorised as identity‐threatening, the procedural fairness–trust relationship will be significantly attenuated.
Procedural justice training alone will produce smaller trust gains in communities with adversarial institutional histories than in communities without such histories, unless accompanied by interventions targeting identity alignment, producing an interaction between intervention type and community history.
Proposition 3: Epistemic credibility as the rate‐limiting factor
In contexts characterised by institutional betrayal, perceived integrity‐as‐epistemic‐credibility moderates the effects of perceived ability and benevolence on trust.
When epistemic credibility is low, increases in demonstrated ability and benevolence will not translate into proportionate trust gains because the institution's self‐representations are not believed.
Independent endorsement of the organisation's trustworthiness will produce larger trust effects than equivalent self‐reported claims in betrayal‐marked contexts, but not in unmarked contexts. Independent here refers to endorsement by sources that the target community recognises as outside the institution's hierarchy of interest, including in‐group community organisations, statutory oversight bodies with sanctioning authority, and verification structures whose claims are not contingent on the institution's cooperation. Endorsement by other state institutions perceived as part of the same system will not satisfy this condition.
DYNAMIC INTERDEPENDENCIES AND RECURSIVE FEEDBACK
A critical feature of the model is its recursive architecture. The four pathways do not operate independently; they interact dynamically through feedback loops that can produce either virtuous or vicious spirals. Procedural fairness experienced during contact encounters (Pathway 4 activating Pathway 1) simultaneously communicates identity‐relevant information (Pathway 2) and provides evidence for trustworthiness appraisal (Pathway 3). A single instance of procedural injustice, particularly if perceived as systemic rather than individual, can cascade across all pathways, reinforcing adversarial categorisation, destroying epistemic credibility and converting contact from trust‐building to trust‐eroding.
This recursive dynamic clarifies why trust deficits are so resistant to remediation. Vicious spirals are self‐reinforcing: low trust produces avoidance and disengagement, which reduces opportunities for positive contact and procedural fairness, which in turn prevents trust repair. Virtuous spirals are fragile: accumulated positive experiences can be rapidly undermined by a single high‐profile institutional failure. The asymmetry proposition (Proposition 1) predicts that the vicious spiral is inherently more powerful than the virtuous spiral, a prediction consistent with the empirical reality that trust in security services is far easier to destroy than to build (Skogan, 2006; Slovic, 1993).
The recursive architecture advances beyond Tyler's (2006) model, which describes trust as a relatively stable consequence of accumulated procedural justice perceptions, by specifying the dynamic, asymmetric and identity‐contingent processes through which perceptions aggregate into enduring trust orientations. It also implies that individual‐level trust is nested within community‐level trust ecologies, which are themselves embedded within institutional‐level histories of conduct, creating a three‐level structure (individual, community, institutional) that demands multilevel modelling approaches in empirical research.
CONTEXTUAL BOUNDARIES AND CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
The model is offered as a general theoretical framework, yet its application must attend to contextual variation. The relative weighting of pathways will shift across cultural contexts. Tankebe (2013) showed that in Ghanaian policing contexts, effectiveness is weighted more heavily than procedural fairness in legitimacy judgements, consistent with the identity‐contingency proposition, as the social identity dynamics governing authority perceptions differ across political systems and cultural orientations towards power (Hofstede, 2001). The model's generalisability beyond Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic (WEIRD) contexts (Henrich et al., 2010) cannot be assumed; cross‐cultural tests of the three propositions, particularly the structural amplification of trust asymmetry and the identity‐contingency of procedural justice, represent a high‐priority research agenda.
The model applies across institutional types, including state policing, private security, municipal enforcement and hybrid entities. The relative salience of pathways varies, but the psychological mechanisms (identity categorisation, trustworthiness appraisal and contact dynamics) are not specific to policing. They operate wherever organisations exercise coercive or regulatory authority over publics, including in immigration enforcement, prison services and private security operations in urban environments. Emerging evidence from healthcare regulation, border control and intelligence oversight contexts suggests that analogous trust dynamics arise wherever institutional authority is exercised over populations with limited capacity to withdraw from the relationship.
A boundary question concerns the source of power asymmetry. The model has been developed primarily with reference to legal authority, the capacity to detain, search and use force backed by statute. The same mechanisms should operate, with modulated intensity, in contexts where power asymmetry is normative or contractual rather than legal. Event stewards, transport enforcement officers, school security personnel and private guards lack the full legal authority of police, yet they exercise institutionally backed power over populations with limited capacity to withdraw from the encounter. In these contexts, perceived authority may be sufficient to introduce the power dynamics specified by the model, even where formal coercive authority is absent (Button, 2002). The empirical question is whether the model's predictions about asymmetry, identity‐contingency and epistemic credibility hold across the gradient of authority types, or whether legal authority specifically amplifies certain pathways. This question is itself testable: comparing trust dynamics across legal‐authority and normative‐authority contexts, holding community and history constant, would adjudicate the relative weight of legal versus perceived authority in producing the structural conditions the model specifies. Contexts marked by severe institutional betrayal, including post‐conflict societies, communities affected by institutional racism and populations subject to mass surveillance, represent critical test cases for Proposition 3, as the epistemic credibility barrier is predicted to be most pronounced in these settings.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE
For social‐psychological theory, the model's primary contribution is the demonstration that trust in asymmetric power contexts cannot be adequately explained by any single framework. Procedural justice theory requires modification to account for identity‐contingent effects. Social identity theory requires extension to address the power‐bearing qualities of security institutions. The Mayer et al. (1995) trustworthiness model requires reconceptualisation of integrity when applied to contexts of institutional betrayal. Contact theory requires structural supplementation to avoid reproducing the irony of harmony. Each theory is strengthened, not merely combined, through integration within the power‐attentive framework proposed here. The model also brings social‐psychological work into closer dialogue with the political trust tradition (Easton, 1965; Hardin, 2002; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Norris, 2011), where the trust–trustworthiness distinction and the institutional‐performance origins of trust have long been developed.
For organisational practice, the model yields specific, theoretically grounded recommendations. Procedural justice training remains essential but should be recognised as identity‐contingent: its efficacy will be limited in communities where security services are categorised as out‐group enforcers unless accompanied by structural identity‐alignment interventions such as diverse recruitment, community embedding and participatory governance. Superordinate identity communication strategies must be accompanied by substantive power‐sharing to avoid functioning as system justification. In contexts of institutional betrayal, trust‐building must commence with the restoration of epistemic credibility through transparent acknowledgement of harm, independent oversight with genuine sanctioning authority and the ceding of narrative authority to affected communities. The deployment of surveillance and algorithmic technologies should be evaluated through the epistemic credibility lens: opaque technologies imposed without meaningful consent undermine the very dimension of trustworthiness that is most fragile in betrayal‐marked contexts.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The three propositions generate a programme of empirical work requiring diverse methodologies. The structural amplification of trust asymmetry (Proposition 1) is testable through longitudinal panel designs tracking community trust in response to positive and negative security encounters, with social dominance orientation and group status as moderators. The identity‐contingency of procedural justice (Proposition 2) is amenable to experimental manipulation through vignette‐based and field‐experimental designs in which the social category of the authority and the procedural quality of the encounter are independently varied. The epistemic credibility proposition (Proposition 3) could be tested through factorial designs manipulating institutional acknowledgement of harm and source of trustworthiness endorsement (institutional self‐report versus independent community verification).
Qualitative and mixed‐method approaches are essential for capturing the lived experiences of trust and distrust amongst communities whose voices are underrepresented in quantitative surveys. Multilevel modelling is required to disentangle individual‐level, community‐level and institutional‐level variance in trust. Cross‐cultural comparative research is urgently needed, particularly to test whether the identity‐contingency and structural amplification propositions operate equivalently across different governance structures, policing traditions and cultural orientations towards authority. Comparative designs spanning legal‐authority and normative‐authority contexts would adjudicate the boundary question raised above.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that public trust in security services cannot be adequately understood through any single theoretical lens and that existing integrative approaches have been insufficiently attentive to the structural power asymmetries that constitute security–public relations. The model proposed here advances social‐psychological theory in three specific ways: by demonstrating the structural amplification of trust asymmetry for subordinate‐status groups, by establishing the identity‐contingency of procedural justice effects and by reconceptualising organisational integrity as epistemic credibility in contexts of institutional betrayal. These are not merely applied observations; they represent theoretically novel propositions that challenge and extend the foundational models upon which they draw.
The model implies that trust is earned through conduct rather than claimed through authority, though the conditions under which conduct translates into trust are themselves structurally variable. Organisations that exercise power over communities with histories of institutional harm face a fundamentally different psychological landscape than those operating in unmarked contexts. Recognising this asymmetry as a constitutive feature of the trust process, not as a complication to be controlled for, may prove important for both theoretical precision and practical effectiveness. The mechanisms underpinning public trust in security services extend beyond procedural fairness to encompass identity dynamics, epistemic credibility and the structural distribution of power. Whether these mechanisms operate as the model predicts remains an empirical question. Testing these propositions across diverse institutional and cultural contexts represents the necessary next step.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Paul Wood: Writing – original draft.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT
The author declares no conflicts of interest.
Supporting information
Figure S1.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
No external funding was received for this research. The author wishes to thank colleagues at Emerging Risks Global for their support, and the two reviewers and the Associate Editor for their constructive engagement with the manuscript.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.
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Associated Data
This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.
Supplementary Materials
Figure S1.
Data Availability Statement
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.
