Escaping Russia, trapped by identity: National identity negotiation in light of ingroup wrongdoing

Abstract

The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused a wave of emigration, with vast numbers of people fleeing Russia due to political persecution or safety concerns. The study explored how anti‐war Russian emigrants negotiate their national identity and moral responsibility amid ingroup wrongdoing. Previous research has shown that having a stigmatized identity can lead to self‐group distancing. Yet those studies concerned groups that can be characterized as victims of violence or discrimination, and there is a lack of research on identity performance and negotiation of people who represent perpetrator groups. We conducted semi‐structured in‐depth interviews with Russian emigrants (N = 12) in two rounds between March 2023 and early 2024. We analysed data using Reflexive Thematic Analysis. Participants described feelings of collective guilt and fear from identity disclosure, accompanied by a sense of vigilance in how they perform their identity in interactions. To avoid any implication that they supported the State's actions, participants tended to mitigate potential moral judgement by positioning themselves as morally aware yet lacking agency. Although participants actively disidentified from Russian identity, they still emphasized struggling with navigating collective responsibility and guilt. We discuss the implications of our findings for the potential resistance and future post‐conflict reconciliation.

INTRODUCTION

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 led to the biggest emigration wave from Russia since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. After one year of a full‐scale war in Ukraine, it was estimated that up to 1 million people had left Russia, relocating to various countries (Re: Russia. Expertise, Analysis and Policy Network, 2023). While refugees from Ukraine were fleeing from physical danger, anti‐war migrants¹ from Russia fled repression for political views, risk of conscription and fear of propaganda's effects on their families. Since February 2022, over 1100 criminal cases have been opened in Russia for anti‐war views (OVD‐Info, 2025). The scale of repression has been increasing continuously, causing more people to consider emigration as a means to maintain their safety.

This study examines how anti‐war Russian emigrants construct their national identity and negotiate moral responsibility in the context of ingroup wrongdoing. While national identity is not inherently tied to the actions of a state (and political authorities can be perceived as an outgroup by members of the majority; see e.g. Subašić et al., 2008), state‐led nationalist propaganda often deliberately blurs this distinction (Szostek, 2016). In Russia's case, patriotism and nationhood have been employed to justify the war in Ukraine, linking the notion of ‘being Russian’ with state aggression. Additionally, Russian authorities justify state aggression by framing a threat to the national group and emphasizing the nation's need to defend its interests and existence (Mearsheimer, 2022), a common legitimization strategy that appeals to emotions and national identity (Reyes, 2011). This has not only reinforced domestic support for the regime but also contributed to increased international scrutiny and devaluation of Russian identity and culture (Walker, 2022). Thus, representations of national identity can become closely linked with the actions of the State, shaping how Russian emigrants navigate their social category membership and how others perceive them.

Social identities are not only individually claimed or rejected but also negotiated and reconstructed through the meanings attached to groups in a given social and political context (Amer & Obradovic, 2022; Barreto & Ellemers, 2003). When group identities are devalued, stigmatized or misrecognized, people can engage in identity performance or positioning using various discursive strategies to either distance themselves, deemphasize certain aspects of the identity or regain control in other ways over how they're perceived in the interaction (e.g. Amer, 2020; Dobai & Hopkins, 2022). National identity presents a unique case as public authorities often lay claim to the narrative of what constitutes the nation, and the citizens are thus often judged through the actions of the state (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Szostek, 2016). When the State engages in worldwide‐condemned transgressions, the national identity becomes threatened, and maintaining psychological ties to the ingroup is accompanied by moral tension and stigma. Despite growing scholarship on the management of devalued identities among stigmatized and socially disadvantaged groups (e.g. Van Veelen et al., 2020), relatively little is known about how individuals negotiate identities devalued through association with group moral transgressions, particularly when they are categorized by others as supporters of, or complicit in, the perpetrator group.

For Russian anti‐war emigrants, navigating the moral tension between national identity and state‐led aggression involves not only a deeply personal negotiation of belonging but also an act of resistance against the dominant State narrative. Given the importance of shared group identification in fostering solidarity, providing moral justification and resistance (e.g. Klandermans & De Weerd, 2000; Reicher, 2004), it is especially important to examine how they navigate collective guilt, anticipated accountability and reconstruction of their national identity in the context of State‐led war and migration.

At the same time, an increasing number of states across the world have been moving away from democratic norms and engaging in actions that contradict democratic principles and moral values. Whether it is waging war against another country, state violence against civilians, persecution of minorities or other forms of repression, the question of what it means to belong to such a nation is becoming increasingly relevant. In many societies today, citizens are confronted with questions of collective responsibility, bystanderism and the extent to which those in positions of power represent the nation as a whole (Hanson & O'Dwyer, 2019). Thus, exploring how people navigate these moral tensions is not only relevant to Russian anti‐war citizens but may also become increasingly relevant worldwide.

Finally, existing research on collective emotions in response to ingroup wrongdoing has mostly focussed on retrospective contexts, such as colonial histories (e.g. Martinovic et al., 2021; Rotella & Richeson, 2013) or Germany's actions during the Second World War (Chudy et al., 2019; Clark, 2009; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Rees et al., 2013). These studies suggest that group‐based guilt, shame or moral distress depend on the strength of ingroup identification, but may also shape national attachment (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Yet, less is known about how collective responsibility and attachment to the ingroup are negotiated during an ongoing conflict. When one's moral convictions are violated by the ingroup members, social identity may be threatened, leading to distancing (for a review, see Van Veelen et al., 2020), concealment (Mackey et al., 2024) or disidentification (Becker & Tausch, 2014). While such strategies have mostly been studied in people facing stigma and discrimination based on their identity, that is disadvantaged or minority groups (e.g. Van Veelen et al., 2020), there is a lack of research addressing identity management among people who are in a more complex position from the perspective of power dynamics. For anti‐war Russian emigrants, the position of representing a perpetrator group in the eyes of others is accompanied by moral alienation from their national ingroup members and by the challenges of (semi‐)forced migration, which may further threaten identity continuity (Timotijevic & Breakwell, 2000).

In this study, we adopted a constructivist approach to social identity, examining its fluid, context‐dependent and performative nature (Barreto et al., 2003). Rather than treating identity as a fixed category, we approach it as an ongoing process of negotiation shaped by individual agency and the dynamics of social environments (Dobai & Hopkins, 2022). Drawing on qualitative interviews, this study provides an in‐depth exploration of how individuals actively reconstruct their identities in response to real or anticipated moral judgement accompanied by stigma, exclusion or misrecognition. This methodological choice is particularly significant, as it brings forward the voices of an underrepresented yet significant immigrant group whose perspectives are often silenced or overlooked in existing scholarship. The study not only documents Russian migrants' strategies of identity management and reconstruction but also enriches theoretical understandings of disidentification and collective emotions in people bearing the double stigma of being a citizen of a perpetrator country and a migrant.

Group‐based emotions in light of ingroup wrongdoing

When individuals self‐categorize as members of a group that is perceived as responsible for historical or present‐day harm, such as colonial oppression, genocide or racial discrimination, they may experience collective guilt (Castano & Giner‐Sorolla, 2006; Doosje et al., 1998; McGarty et al., 2005; Rotella & Richeson, 2013; Wohl et al., 2006). The form of group attachment or self‐categorization is one of the key factors shaping the acknowledgement of injustice and collective guilt (Penic et al., 2015). For example, blind patriotism is connected with denial, victim blaming or justification of past harm, which serve as defensive mechanisms that suppress guilt and hinder social change (Sullivan et al., 2012).

When group identity is under threat, people tend to use discursive strategies of justification to support or legitimize ingroup actions, especially in narratives of national history and past events (Rauschenbach et al., 2016; Wodak, 2017). High‐identifiers seek to alleviate feelings of guilt and can lower their identification with the group accused of transgressions (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Alternatively, it may contribute to defensive reactions, such as denial or distancing from the ingroup, to avoid the pressure of collective responsibility (Iyer et al., 2004).

While these defensive responses serve to protect the positive image of the ingroup, others adopt a more reflective stance towards national identity. People with a critical approach to their national identity or low group identifiers are more likely to feel guilt on behalf of their group and, as a consequence, embrace responsibility and seek forgiveness (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998) or become politically involved and oppose the nation's actions (Schatz et al., 1999). In such cases, members who disagree with the ingroup's actions may respond with hostility towards their own group and express support for the outgroup (e.g. Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2003).

Devalued social identity negotiation

When social identities are viewed negatively, being devalued or threatened, it can lead to various identity management strategies (Jackson et al., 1996). We see them as adaptive efforts to sustain a positive sense of self in the face of identity threat rather than merely reactive tactics (Roberts & Nkomo, 2024). People belonging to disadvantaged or low‐status groups may attempt to leave the group through individual mobility (Ellemers & Van Laar, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1979). National identity, however, is constrained by explicit legal boundaries. While some may seek membership elsewhere and acquire legal residence or citizenship in another country, many lack such alternatives. When leaving the group is not possible, people can either redefine and reinterpret the group's identity to maintain a positive self‐concept (Van Bezouw et al., 2021) or psychologically distance themselves from a stigmatized group (Becker & Tausch, 2014). In such cases, self‐group distancing serves as a form of psychological detachment without the explicit change in group membership. This type of distancing manifests in behaviours such as reducing ties and interactions with other ingroup members (Bergsieker et al., 2021) or concealing group identity (Goh et al., 2019; Mackey et al., 2024; Newheiser & Barreto, 2014; Quinn, 2017). An extreme form of self‐group distancing is disidentification (Becker & Tausch, 2014; Gligorić & Obradović, 2024). Historically, disidentification has been viewed primarily as an individual‐level strategy for upward social mobility (e.g. Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997); however, unlike indifference, it can also encourage the formation of alternative identities that aim not only to separate one from the ingroup but also to redefine or change group boundaries in opposition to certain group values (Chayinska & McGarty, 2021).

According to the Identity Process Theory (IPT; Breakwell, 1986), when identity principles of continuity, distinctiveness, self‐efficacy and self‐esteem are disrupted, individuals may also engage in a strategy of re‐construal, reinterpreting their identity to mitigate perceived threats or compartmentalization, keeping conflicting identities separate depending on the social context (Breakwell, 2015). As a more extreme strategy, people might resort to passing, concealing aspects of their identity to align with a more socially accepted category, or code‐switching–adjusting identity expression depending on situational demands (Ballard, 1994; Lukate & Foster, 2023). However, identity management strategies such as passing or concealment are often overlooked in mainstream social identity research, which tends to conceptualize identities as stable and clearly bounded. Although the original works under the Social Identity Approach emphasized the relational and context‐dependent nature of social identity (Tajfel, 1981; Turner et al., 1987), methodological limitations, particularly in experimental and survey research, have contributed to a tendency to operationalize identities as discrete and static categories (McGarty et al., 2009; O'Reilly et al., 2024; Reicher, 2004). This essentialist framing has been increasingly challenged by scholars who emphasize identity's performative, intersectional and situational nature (Condor, 2000; Hopkins & Kahani‐Hopkins, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

Identity management strategies, such as passing and concealment, point to the interactive and context‐sensitive nature of identity (Ellemers, 1993) and highlight its adaptability across shifting social contexts (Dobai & Hopkins, 2022). While the social identity approach considers self‐categorization, or internalization of group membership, as defining one's social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), this does not happen in a vacuum: it is often triggered or constrained by how others perceive the individual and their group. When external perceptions are negative or delegitimizing, they generate stigma rooted in the discrepancy between societal expectations and an individual's authentic attributes. This divergence increases individuals' awareness of how they are perceived, or expect to be perceived, by others. Such metaperceptions play a critical role in shaping and negotiating national identities, especially among marginalized groups (Jacobs & Merolla, 2017; Rockquemore & Brunsma, 2002).

An important psychological aspect of this phenomenon is the distress that occurs when individuals are categorized in ways that conflict with their self‐perception (e.g. Ryan et al., 2023). One's social identity depends not only on self‐categorization but also on recognition: whether others acknowledge one's claimed identity, deny it or impose alternative meanings onto it (Amer & Obradovic, 2022; Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011).

When others impose rigid or simplistic labels that do not capture a person's complex identity, this misalignment can lead to feelings of exclusion, threat or pressure to perform identity in the more socially acceptable ways (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011). Thus, stigma becomes more than just a social label; it transforms into a lived experience of misrecognition that undermines an individual's sense of agency, belonging and ability to act on their own terms in the public sphere (Kende et al., 2024; Ryan et al., 2023). Misrecognition is not only passively experienced but can also be resisted or challenged through acts of identity assertion and self‐positioning (Amer, 2020; Amer & Obradovic, 2022). This makes recognition particularly relevant for understanding identity negotiation as a dialogical process, shaped by both external categorization and individual agency.

The present study

Building on these perspectives, we extend the research on misrecognition, identity threat and identity management to a novel context: the situations where identity threat arises not from structural disadvantage or external stigmatization but primarily from ingroup wrongdoing. In this study, Russian anti‐war migrants present a specific case, as they are facing the twofold consequences of their State's invasion of Ukraine. As we will argue throughout the paper, in addition to navigating (dis)identification with an aggressor country, collective guilt and acknowledging responsibility for the actions of their government, the metaperceptions of blame attribution also contribute to the misrecognition and devaluation of their national identity. The war has triggered a backlash against Russian migrants in several countries, particularly those with historically tense relations with Russia, such as neighbouring states that have previously experienced Russian imperial dominance. In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, these countries have introduced restrictive policies targeting Russian nationals. Political discrimination has also intensified, manifesting as legislative restrictions, limited access to essential services and difficulties obtaining visas or asylum status (NBC News, 2022). These restrictions are often justified by the position that Russian migrants bear collective responsibility for their country's military actions, leading to widespread accusations and generalized stigmatization (Ogryzko, 2023). However, political migrants fleeing Russia due to the risk of imprisonment face the same restrictions and judgements, with no distinction made based on their reasons for migration. This context also contributes to the existing accounts of (mis)recognition and power (Amer & Obradovic, 2022). While misrecognition is often discussed in relation to marginalized groups being denied recognition by more powerful others, Russian anti‐war migrants may be (mis)recognized through the military power of the Russian state while simultaneously experiencing limited agency, or even victimhood, in relation to that state. This study, therefore, examines identity negotiation in a context where external categorization may impose not only stigma but also assumed power, complicity and responsibility.

To summarize, previous research has demonstrated how different identification and national attachment styles shape the willingness to embrace collective guilt, shame and responsibility. An unrelated yet rich field of research has examined different strategies of self‐group distancing used by people with devalued or stigmatized groups. However, less attention has been given to how people navigate moral responsibility and reconstruct their national identity in light of their ingroup's ongoing wrongdoings. This study aimed to examine how Russian migrants negotiate their national identity in response to group‐based emotions and collective responsibility connected with ingroup moral transgressions. Our results contribute to a better understanding of identity processes in people with moral conflict between their national attachment and State‐led transgressions.

METHODS

Participants

A total of 12 Russian anti‐war² migrants (aged 23–67, four male) participated in the study, each taking part in two rounds of in‐depth interviews, resulting in 24 interviews overall. This population is particularly hard to reach due to the political sensitivity of their status and the associated risks. Many individuals were reluctant to participate, citing concerns about safety, surveillance and potential repercussions both for themselves and for their families.

All participants emigrated from Russia within 8 years of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in February and March of 2014 (see Table 1). By the time of the second round of interviews, all participants had lived abroad for over a year. Status in the receiving countries varied, as they were resettled in a variety of locations across Europe and Central Asia. This diversity in age, occupation, and residence provided a broad perspective on the migration experience and the negotiation of identity in the context of semi‐forced exile.

TABLE 1.

Demographic information.

Pseudonym	Age	Gender	Place of residence
Lara	34	f	Latvia
David	43	m	Montenegro
Eva	67	f	Armenia
Ruth	23	f	Czech Republic
Nina	28	m	Armenia
Alexandra	35	f	Armenia
Agnia	35	f	Norway
Leonard	33	m	Latvia
Lilia	49	f	Slovakia
Nathan	26	m	Kazakhstan
Daria	36	f	France
Sofia	24	f	Serbia

Note: Age in Table 1 refers to the age participants reported at the time of the first‐round interview. Because the second‐round interviews were conducted later, the age indicated in extract labels may differ when the quoted material comes from the second round.

The recruitment of participants for the study used a snowball sampling method utilizing the first author's acquaintances (Parker et al., 2019). The objective of the sampling approach was to represent a variety of identity negotiation contexts, including people having mixed social, economic and professional backgrounds, age, status in the receiving countries, as well as particular triggering events for emigration (outbreak of the war, political persecution, disagreement with governmental actions, etc.).

Procedure

Data were collected in two rounds of semi‐structured in‐depth interviews. While the first round of interviews was more exploratory, the second round was more focussed on participants' identity constructions (see Table 2). Interviews in each round lasted approximately one hour. Participants were asked to reflect on their migration experience (reasons for leaving Russia, emigration hardships and feelings about living abroad) to provide researchers with a deeper understanding of their life situation. Afterwards, interviews delved deeper into self‐identification, sense of belonging and construction of national identity. The interviews aimed to obtain contextually rich data about how participants construct their identities in the light of the Russia–Ukraine war and their migration experience.

TABLE 2.

Overview of interview topics.

Interview round	Main topics	Questions focus
First	Migration, war and self‐positioning	Migration trajectory; experiences of leaving Russia; perceptions of the war as ingroup wrongdoing; self‐understanding in the context of ascribed identification and emigration
Second	National identity and identity negotiation	Representations of Russian identity; meta‐perceptions and perceived misrecognition; distinctions between state and ethnic identity; self‐categorization and identity salience; group‐based negative emotions; belonging and place attachment; identity change after war and migration; resistance, and perceived accountability claims directed at migrants from Russia

The first round of in‐depth interviews was conducted between March 2023 and July 2023', and the second in January 2024. Prior to participation, all individuals received detailed study information and provided written informed consent. Interviews were conducted in Russian either virtually via Zoom or face‐to‐face. They were recorded, transcribed verbatim manually (without the involvement of AI tools), and translated into English. Given the political sensitivity of the topic, strict anonymization procedures were applied, including the use of pseudonyms and the removal of identifying details. Initial codes were developed using the software for qualitative analysis, Atlas.ti (2023).

Analytic approach

First, the interviews were translated into English so that all authors could engage in data analysis and interpretation, and the coding was conducted in English. We analysed data using the Reflexive Thematic Analysis (RTA) approach (Braun & Clarke, 2023). RTA is an analytical framework in which themes are understood as researcher‐generated patterns of meaning, developed through sustained and reflexive engagement with the data rather than simply discovered within it. We first coded only the parts of the transcripts relevant to the research questions. Afterwards, subthemes corresponding to the second level of analysis were generated from the codes and were further organized into themes reflecting the third level of analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2023). In our analysis, theme development was primarily inductive: we did not use a pre‐existing coding framework or organize the analysis around pre‐set theoretical categories or interview questions. Instead, initial codes, subthemes and themes were developed from the empirical material through iterative engagement with the interview transcripts. At the same time, the analysis was theoretically informed. Existing concepts from SIT, disidentification, group‐based emotions, meta‐perceptions and identity negotiation literature served as sensitizing resources for interpreting the material, rather than as a deductive coding scheme. Thus, we conceptualized themes not as interview topics or descriptive summaries of questions asked in the interview guide, but as analytic patterns of meaning that captured how participants made sense of Russian national identity in the context of ingroup wrongdoing.

Our aim was not to provide an exhaustive account of participants' reports but to interpret the material at the implicit level that goes beyond the semantic or descriptive content of the data (with the use of latent codes), and examines the underlying social constructions of meaning behind the particular data analytic units (Braun & Clarke, 2023). Our analytic approach was constructivist, viewing participants' accounts as situated constructions of experience rather than objective reports of reality (Denicolo et al., 2016). Although participants' accounts focus on group‐based emotions such as guilt or helplessness, our analysis does not treat them as transparent reports of inner psychological states. Rather, in line with constructivist epistemology, we analyse the interactional functions these descriptions perform, including moral positioning, negotiating responsibility, constructing identities and managing anticipated moral judgement and misrecognition by others (Davies & Harré, 1990; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Our analysis was further informed by a contextualist orientation, acknowledging that participants' accounts are situated interpretations of experience and that themes are generated through the researchers' engagement with these accounts rather than discovered as objective features of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2021, 2022).

Reflexivity and positionality

The interviewer and the first author of the study is a woman from Russia who has lived abroad for 7 years due to disagreement with Russian politics. The second author also has a migration background. All authors critically engage with and largely reject nationalistic understandings of their home countries, viewing borders as socially constructed rather than inherent or immutable. All authors strongly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Russian regime, supporting the victims of the war.

We recognize that varying levels of familiarity, political stance and the researcher's gender could impact participants' willingness to share their viewpoints. However, the interviewer's background closely mirrors the participants' experiences. Ultimately, it is important to note that RTA does not regard researchers' subjectivity as a problematic issue requiring regulation. Instead, it highlights the importance of the researcher's subjectivity as an analytical tool and their reflective involvement with theory, data and interpretation (Braun & Clarke, 2023). Results were interpreted and reinterpreted in several rounds following discussions within the authors' team. This approach prompts researchers to consistently challenge their assumptions and methods throughout the entire process. To ensure that all viewpoints were captured accurately, after each interview was transcribed, the transcript was shown to the participant for member checking (Nowell et al., 2017).

RESULTS

Participants' accounts illustrate the contested and dynamic nature of Russian identity in the context of ongoing war. Through our engagement with the data, we developed two themes: first, that of vigilant identity, which reflects national identity as a site of tension shaped by anticipation of collective blame and negotiation of moral responsibility. Participants described their Russian identity as both highly illuminated and threatening to their moral self, marked by fear of disclosure. The second theme centred on navigating an acceptable moral self: positioning themselves or redefining an identity they could neither comfortably embrace nor completely leave behind.

Throughout the analysis, we use the term identity negotiation to refer to the ongoing process through which participants position themselves in relation to Russian national identity under conditions of anticipated moral judgement. We recognize that identity negotiation may be understood either as an internal coping and coming to terms with one's identity or as identity performance through which identities are presented as acceptable to others. While participants' accounts sometimes describe internal struggles, consistent with our constructivist approach, we treat them as forms of positioning that draw upon socially available understandings of what constitutes an acceptable response to ingroup wrongdoing.

Vigilant identity: ‘I must constantly feel guilty for speaking my native language’

First, we illustrate the high salience of national identity in participants' everyday lives. National identity is described as not something they can set aside, but as something that follows and burdens them in their day‐to‐day activities, their internal reflections, their social interactions, when dealing with bureaucracy in receiving countries or when passing border control for ‘third country nationals’ (Geoffrion & Cretton, 2021). Participants described ‘being Russian’ as an emotional trigger, something one must be cautious about. We refer to it as a vigilant identity, an inescapable part of oneself that must be continually monitored for potential threats. This is in line with studies on social stigma that describe constant anticipation of prejudice and contextual navigation of identity (e.g. Giroud et al., 2021; Kaiser et al., 2006; Parmenter et al., 2022) and with Emerson and Murphy (2014), who use the term vigilance to refer to the proactive orientation individuals adopt when they anticipate identity‐based threats. For Russian anti‐war migrants, vigilance arises not only from potential misrecognition by others (e.g. being mistaken for regime supporters; Kende et al., 2024) but also from an internalized expectation to demonstrate moral awareness publicly and take responsibility for the State's wrongdoings. At the same time, we show how participants actively manage their identities and moral positions by employing discursive strategies and micro‐level identity performances that allow them to negotiate external perceptions, while maintaining moral integrity and acknowledging attachment.

Participants emphasized how their sense of identity changed drastically with the beginning of the full‐scale invasion of Ukraine. While national identity under stable political regimes can be taken for granted, harmless or implicit (Billig, 2010), during an ongoing conflict, it becomes salient. The following extracts illustrate how external categorization by others, when made salient (by being positioned as a representative of Russia, a perpetrator state), do not necessarily align with individuals' own identity constructions (Barreto & Ellemers, 2003).

(1) Alexandra, 35: I hadn't really thought that much about what nationality I belonged to or what my citizenship was before […]³ Why would you think about it, you live in Russia, you were born here, nothing changes, so you go through thirty‐five years, everything happens exactly the same, you just don't think about it, it's there. And when I started to write letters in spring to different places where I could leave, but to leave, you have to take some actions from that side, and when they started to answer me, I felt very strongly how Russian I was for everyone. […] Until that moment, I had not identified myself [as Russian] to myself, but here, it turns out, through the assessment of others, I realised that it [being Russian] was important. […] It hasn't changed in principle, I already knew that I was Russian, but with the onset of the war, it just became very brightly illuminated.

In the extract above, Alexandra describes how national identity was brought into the foreground with the onset of the war, as others began to explicitly identify this aspect of her identity as the most central to who she is. Such experiences of misrecognition can be a totalizing experience, which positions them as always and only representative of that identity (Kende et al., 2024).

National identity becomes even more salient in bureaucratic processes, such as filling out paperwork, applying for residency, or navigating institutional systems (Geoffrion & Cretton, 2021).

(2) Eva, 67: And I feel miserable too, because when filling out any paperwork, I write RF⁴ in the ‘citizenship’ column. And that's the trigger for me now. I cannot find any other semantic aspects in this term. I would give a lot for something else to be written in this column. For example, ‘Armenia’.

Eva, who lives in Armenia, describes how stating her nationality on official documents can confront her national identity in ways that evoke feelings of distress, guilt and shame. Participants emphasized the emotional weight carried with this label, with a desire to reject it, and failing to do so, as in these very instances, they are confronted with the unavoidability of national identity and its significance on the legal level. Thus, in these bureaucratic encounters, the simple act of reporting citizenship on paper transforms nationality into an inescapable reality of the transgressions committed by the State. As Amer and Obradovic (2022) argue, institutional interactions and official documents serve as sites of legal recognition, transforming nationality from a personal identity into an institutional classification that, in this case, links participants to the state's actions.

The high salience of national identity is followed by participants' descriptions of pervasive emotions in the context of ingroup wrongdoing (Wohl et al., 2006). Even though their accounts may be characterized as instances of group‐based emotions (Mackie & Smith, 2017), participants rhetorically navigate between, on the one hand, the (lack of) agency and the acknowledgement of guilt and responsibility, and, on the other, distancing themselves from the actions of the Russian government. Even though collective responsibility for states' actions under undemocratic regimes can be contested (Lawford‐Smith & Collins, 2017), acknowledging collective guilt and moral responsibility is crucial for initiating processes of reconciliation and moral repair (e.g. Čehajić‐Clancy, 2012).

(3) Lilia, 49: I feel all the time that I am Russian, that I am from a country that is waging war, and that my country is crushing another country and is going to crush what it can reach. Of course, I feel guilty about it.

In this extract, Lilia highlights the inescapable nature of Russian identity that is now primarily associated with the state's wrongdoings. She emphasizes that she feels guilty (‘of course’), constructing guilt as the only possible or morally appropriate response to being Russian in the context of war. This positioning signals anticipation of potential accusations of indifference or complicity.

(4) Lara, 34: I get so tired of this unequivocally self‐acknowledged inferiority and guiltiness of belonging to…. well, associated with an aggressor country, and a native speaker of a language that many people now, understandably, associate with pain, destruction and grief, sometimes I think desperately, without addressing anyone except Putin, that I don't understand why now I must constantly feel guilty for speaking my native language.

Similar to Lilia, Lara describes a persistent sense of guilt that is connected not only to her national identity but also to the devaluation (‘inferiority’) of her native language, an element that is deeply personal and intrinsic to who she is (e.g. Myhill, 2003). The politicization of the language accompanying the war, such as urging Ukrainians to switch to using the Ukrainian language (Bilaniuk, 2016), rejecting the Russian language in governmental structures and social media, and constructing it as ‘fascist’ language (Paret, 2023), makes the language for Russian native speakers a separate domain of negotiation.

By using expressions such as ‘understandably’, Lara also positions herself as morally aware (Davies & Harré, 1990) to mitigate potential moral judgement and legitimize her feelings while navigating the tension between collective responsibility and personal identity. Such expressions may at times be performative, functioning as a discursive strategy to signal moral awareness while simultaneously avoiding deeper responsibility for group‐based harm (Hansson, 2015). In the present case, however, participants do not seem to employ it to distance themselves from collective wrongdoing. Rather, they position the acknowledgement of guilt as a necessary and the only possible reaction to the state's actions, and in doing so, they implicitly accept the emotional burden that is projected from the collective to the individual level.

The acknowledgement of guilt and responsibility is inherently tied to the sense of personal control or agency. In their narratives, participants grapple with the idea that the government's actions are taken in their name.

(5) Daria, 37: [I feel] a tremendous feeling of guilt… Guilt and helplessness. And that there's no way to stop it. That it's a horror that can't be stopped. A complete lack of control over the situation. It's happening, it's happening before your eyes, somehow on your behalf, somehow on behalf of your country, and there's nothing you can do about it.

[…]

And all this will be because the country from which I came, which is my country after all, decided to destroy another country, and that it will be my fault, that it is my own fault.

By using repetition (‘guilt… guilt and helplessness’) and intensifiers (‘tremendous’), Daria presents the feeling as inescapable and overwhelming. She also emphasizes her lack of control, yet at the same time she does not deny but readily embraces responsibility for these actions (‘it will be my fault’), positioning herself as helpless yet morally accountable (Davies & Harré, 1990). By phrasing ‘which is my country after all’, she acknowledges the inescapable attachment to the national identity that is simultaneously a source of moral burden.

Identity concealment is often used by people experiencing stigma to avoid distress from anticipated negative reactions (Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009).

(6) Daria, 37: …if I ever say that I'm from Russia… It's something so embarrassing, you really want to shove it under the couch. It's become indecent to talk about it. […] Well, let's go somewhere else, because it's embarrassing for everyone and…. I feel like that's the perception about Russia. There's something murky, incomprehensible, it's not clear what to do with it […] So let's talk about nature /laughs/ […] I work with tourists, they see me all the time and I sometimes don't say that I'm from Russia, I just lie about it,”

In this extract, Daria describes the embarrassment she feels when she has to answer the question of where she is from. Instead, sometimes she simply lies about her background. The collective shame is also accompanied by the lack of control and agency (‘it's not clear what to do with it’).

On the other hand, Leonard and Lara present a different perspective by actively contesting the impulse to conceal identity in everyday interactions. Similar to Lara, Leonard described an instance in which he was riding in a cab with a group of Russians, prompting him to adopt the strategy of identity concealment.

(7) Lara 34: Two days ago, we were taking a taxi […], and my husband said “[we're] from Latvia”, and somehow nobody commented anything. I… first of all, I resent it. I can't say I'm from Latvia. I never answer that I am from Latvia, I don't think that I am from Latvia… Moreover, I always say that I am from Moscow. […] And it seems to me that in terms of self‐presentation in the context of war, it's even more important. It is important that I am from Moscow, it is important that I left there, it is important why I left there.

(8) Leonard, 33: The simplest option is for me to answer that I am from Latvia. And, nominally, I am a resident of Latvia… which does not make me not Russian. But in some cases, I say that I am from Russia, […] because I wanted to be an example and to prove that not all Russians support Putin, that here I am, I am a Russian, and I do not support Putin, so I am not alone.

Both Leonard and Lara emphasize the importance of disclosing their identity to challenge the dominant narrative about the prototypical person from Russia and, by pointing out their own stance, to reframe the definition of being Russian.

Although both acknowledge that passing or temporary concealment is ‘the simplest option’, they frame identity disclosure as an ethical and political act. For them, publicly stating that they are Russian, despite anticipating stigma, is integral to asserting a politicized anti‐regime position and resisting homogenizing stereotypes of their national ingroup (Cohen & Garcia, 2005). In doing so, they construct moral agency around disclosure, reframing national identity not as fixed or inevitably devalued but as open to redefinition through individual stance‐taking. Lara's narrative highlights not only a rejection of concealment but also the conviction that asserting her origin and the political motivations behind her departure from Russia serve to morally contextualize her identity. The insistence in her word choice frames disclosure as a deliberate counter‐narrative to the common metaperceptions.

Overall, participants' narratives point to not only a highly pervasive and salient but also a continuously vigilant national identity that is always accompanied by anticipation of threat and moral judgement. To avoid any assumption of their justification or support of the state's action, participants tended to readily emphasize the moral implications of being part of the perpetrator's group. On the other hand, they also described efforts to distance themselves from the emotional weight that it carries, which we discuss in more detail in the following analysis.

Negotiation of a morally acceptable identity: ‘If they are Russian, I am certainly not’

As the analysis of the previous theme suggested, the context of ingroup wrongdoing, identity threat and the high (negative) emotional load associated with group membership are challenging to navigate, while at the same time, these circumstances make one's identity particularly salient. The context of ingroup wrongdoing and moral implications requires identity performance, that is managing and performing one's identity in public and positioning oneself in relation to moral responsibility. However, the moral tension is reflected not only in identity performance in social contexts but also in how participants narrate and present their internal negotiation of belonging. The second theme centres on the various positioning strategies that participants employed for navigating Russian national identity in the light of what may constitute an acceptable national attachment while maintaining the moral self. They accomplished this through multiple positioning practices, including disidentification, searching for alternative anchors of identification or emphasizing other ethnic roots. Finally, we show how participants portray coming to terms with the burden of national identity, describing their attachment through metaphors of a toxic family (see Stanojević & Šarić, 2019).

We first illustrate how participants described psychological distancing and disidentification. Russian migrants, just like all migrants, occupy a liminal identity position, navigating a sense of being ‘in between’ places (Stenner, 2017). Yet, in our participants' accounts, this liminality appears particularly intensified. Their undefined position is tied not only to the process of resettlement and the challenges of adaptation to the new contexts but also to a complicated relationship with the country they left. The sense of non‐belonging to one's place of origin was, for many, initiated even before emigration due to state‐driven appropriation of national identity and the narrative of loyalty and patriotism used in state propaganda.

(9) Eva, 67: I am a stranger here, I do not belong here [in Armenia]. But I am even more out of place where I came from. […] But the feeling that the people who lived around me, who walked down the same streets with me, who rode the subway, and so on and so forth, approving and accepting of everything that has happened in the last ten or fifteen years ‐ that's what really makes me not feel Russian. […] there are people who have a special love for Russia, for Russian folk culture in particular, for Russian nature, and these very people have become those who have supported, and are supporting, the current Russian authorities. These people identify themselves as truly Russian. After that, I don't come close to the concept of 'true Russian' at all. These are people who were very close to me, for me, it is very painful. Now, of course, it is a complete breakup, it is very painful for me, and here it can be like this: if they are Russian, I am certainly not.

Eva's reflection exemplifies disidentification, not with the nation or the State per se, but with a dominant, State‐endorsed definition of national identity. Her statement ‘if they are Russian, I am certainly not’ echoes the mechanism described by Hanson and O'Dwyer (2019): when dominant expressions of nationalism become conflated with patriotism and national identity, they create exclusionary boundaries around who is considered a ‘true’ member of the nation and who is not.

(10) Leonard, 33: I'm in an ethnic identity crisis right now […] I like some things from the Latvian identity. But I actually dislike quite a lot of things from the Russian identity. And for me, probably, in many things, Russian is a certain, maybe even an indicator of low quality of something.

Like Eva, Leonard describes what he considers an ‘ethnic identity crisis’ as a response to a devalued national identity and to acculturation in a new environment. He portrays Russian identity as undesirable, which suggests internalized stigma (Vogel et al., 2013).

Other participants described their search for the resolution of this internal conflict by latching onto alternative anchors of identity. Given the diverse ethnic and cultural roots of many Russian citizens, for some participants, it presents an opportunity for migration or simply a safer identity to embrace.

(11) Nathan, 26: I started to think more and to study more about my national identity, to study this issue more, my Turkic identity again. […] This crisis that happened [the war], and in the course of which I had to look for some new support for myself as a person, in terms of psychological parameters, which made me think about certain things that I hadn't thought about before.

As they actively reshape and negotiate their national identity, participants also question what it means to be Russian.

(12) Nina, 28: It occurred to me rather strange: a Rossiyanin is a person with a Russian passport, and a Russkiy is a person who tried to find some other traces of other nationalities in his, how should I say, ancestry, and didn't find any. That's when you're probably a Russkiy. Because who else are you if there is no one else?

In this extract, Nina highlights the difference between statehood and ethnic identity. In Russian, ‘Rossiyanin’ or ‘Rossiyanka’ refers to statehood or someone who holds a passport of the Russian Federation, while ‘Russkiy’ or ‘Russkaya’ are used to describe ethnic or cultural identification. According to Nina, the only ‘Russkiy’ people (in terms of not just statehood but also ethnicity) are those who did not manage to find any other ethnic or cultural roots, despite trying. Her account demonstrates the stigmatization of Russian national identity and the efforts people make to find alternative and more desirable anchors for identification. Nina herself has Armenian ancestors, which allowed her to identify as Armenian.

(13) Alexandra 35: I have no other roots, they're all there, that's why I am a Russkaya, that's how I am. Russkaya and Rossiyanka. Alexandra, 35

The explanation given by Alexandra, who doesn't have an alternative path to follow and reluctantly emphasizes that she doesn't have any other roots, resonates with Nina's account.

Some participants opt to selectively frame their identity. Instead of identifying with the nation, they emphasize belonging to lower level group identities, for example being a Muscovite or an Astrakhan, which carries less burden. Even though urban identification over the national level is common (Shaham‐Maymon et al., 2025), highlighting lower level belonging rather than the state here gives participants additional control over the assumptions their interaction partners make. It also emphasizes a more localized sense of belonging and cultural identity that feels more representative of their personal experience and less tied to the broader representations of being Russian, those associated with wrongdoing, and promoted by the nationalistic propaganda.

(14) Ruth, 23: It depends on who I'm talking to. At the beginning of the war, I had the feeling that I didn't know how they would react, but I still wanted to emphasise that yes, I'm from Moscow, because I feel that there's nothing to be ashamed of […] I always say a specific city. I don't say I'm from Russia, I say I'm from Moscow. […] It seems to me that this defines more than Russia. I think the city defines a person quite strongly, and it seems to me that Moscow defines me.

In the extract above, Ruth describes identity performance as depending on the context and the interlocutor (Barreto et al., 2003; Goffman, 1963). Moreover, by adding that ‘there is nothing to be ashamed of’ for being from Moscow, she also implies that shame is expected.

Ultimately, the participants repeatedly employed metaphors of difficult or abusive family relationships as a way of communicating their complex relationship with Russian national identity. These metaphors enabled them to simultaneously emphasize attachment, loss, distancing, and moral conflict, as illustrated in the following extracts.

(15) Lilia, 49: I think about it a lot, about my feelings about Russia, I think it's most like when you've been in a marriage, or in a difficult relationship with someone, and you finally break up with them, with blood sweat, and heartbreak, and you realize that you still can't get him out of your life, and he's still beloved, and you're sick about him, you're sad about him, but you can't be together.

Lilia's comparison of relationships with Russia to romantic ones is used to illustrate that although she has left the country in an effort to distance herself, it remains a part of her inner world, associated with feelings of both affection and sorrow. Her reflection emphasizes deep emotional ties that persist even after physical separation or psychological distancing, highlighting that national identity is not something one can easily set aside.

(16) Sofia, 23:…it's more like complicated parents… for example, alcoholics, I love them very much, but you gotta sort it out, there, to sort it out…. but like, you can't change them, I love them, and like… working on it (laughs).

Another perspective compares Russia to having ‘complicated parents’, particularly those dealing with addiction issues. This metaphor reflects a more accepting, yet resigned, view of national identity, recognizing the flaws and dysfunctions while still holding onto a deep emotional connection. Sofia describes it as a process, implying that her coping strategy is not to completely reject national identity but rather to take steps that could lead to a more acceptable reconstruction. Her account also emphasizes the lack of control (‘you can't change them’).

(17) Daria, 37: As if every hour, every minute, I can't feel it, it's easier for me to say that I'm a Parisian and to function. But I don't have the feeling that I'm a scrap, I'm not a scrap, and I never will be ‐ I've lived there for 25 years, I had my whole childhood there and so on… It's like such a distant relative who's drunk. It's very pathetic (smiles), but you can't do anything about it. You don't even have to send money, because he'll drink it. Still a relative.

Daria illustrates her negotiation of threatened identity as not only about forming new affiliations but also about learning to coexist with the parts of one's identity that cannot be left behind, to carry the weight of ambivalence without being consumed by it. Daria's words, ‘you can't do anything about it’, extend the metaphor and position her in relation to the state's actions as something that is beyond her control, a fixed reality one must learn to live with. Her description of powerlessness does not imply indifference but rather acceptance of the limits of individual influence over a system constructed as dysfunctional. In her account, agency lies not in changing the situation itself, but in finding ways to coexist with it, to maintain functionality despite the impossibility of resolution.

The comparison of a nation to a family is a common feature in nationalistic discourse, which often employs familial metaphors to frame the relationship between people and the nation‐state (Lauenstein et al., 2015). Concepts such as motherland or fatherland invoke deeply emotional, intimate and normative ideas of belonging, duty and loyalty (Lauenstein et al., 2015; Yuval‐Davis, 1997). These metaphors appear across linguistic and cultural contexts: Rodina‐mat’ in Russian, Vaterland in German, patria in Spanish, positioning the nation as a kind of symbolic parent and the citizen as a dutiful child, expected to love, obey and even sacrifice. Demasi (2026) demonstrates how familial metaphors have also been mobilized by Putin to construct an expansive and unified national community, portraying diverse ethnic groups and territories, including Ukraine, as belonging to a single Russian ‘family’ and thereby legitimizing claims of political authority and territorial unity. In contrast, our participants draw on this symbolic repertoire not to express uncritical loyalty but to narrate their ambivalent feelings towards Russia and the inescapability of national identity.

Taken together, participants' use of family metaphors may function to emphasize that, despite different strategies of self‐group distancing, national identity is not something one can fully escape from. Participants' portrayals highlight a struggle between attachment and rejection, love and resentment, as well as the inescapable presence of their homeland in their sense of self. The metaphors may help participants describe their complicated relationship with Russia in ways others can relate to, making them understandable and acceptable. By comparing the country to an abusive partner or difficult family members, they frame their experience in familiar emotional terms rather than making political stances that would have to be defended. This helps explain why they cannot fully cut ties, even when they wish to distance themselves, and how ambivalence and longing can coexist with pain and rejection. These comparisons also soften the weight of being associated with a perpetrator country: instead of appearing indifferent or defensive, participants show that their struggle comes from authentic care, loss, and disappointment. Finally, drawing on these metaphors might also communicate an effort to reach a sense of closure.

DISCUSSION

While previous studies have deepened our understanding of collective emotions associated with acknowledging past ingroup wrongdoings, there is a lack of research on self‐group distancing in response to these transgressions. In particular, qualitative accounts of how identity is managed and actively reconstructed within such morally charged contexts, and of how people negotiate collective responsibility, remain underexplored. Our study addresses this gap by examining how Russian migrants navigate these identity dilemmas when their ingroup's wrongdoing is ongoing, contested, and deeply intertwined with their personal moral positioning.

The purpose of our analysis was not to justify the political (in)action or victimize Russian anti‐war migrants. Rather, the goal was to explore how they construct their national identity in the light of the internationally condemned war waged by the country of their citizenship, how they navigate collective guilt, and manage their positions and identities in social interactions. Understanding the strategies people from oppressive regimes and those affiliated with perpetrator states use to reconstruct their devalued national identities is of great importance for social and political psychologists, as these individuals can also be actors of potential social change. Such understanding can shed light on pathways that may lead to resistance and intergroup solidarity and ultimately contribute to reconciliation.

Building on previous studies that examined responses to ingroup wrongdoing on the one hand, and, on the other, qualitative research on identity performance in the context of devalued, threatened or misrecognized identity, our findings extend the social identity literature by showing that national identity negotiation in the context of ongoing ingroup wrongdoing is not shaped only by changes in personal attachment to the group but also by changes in the social contexts within which this identity is recognized by others. Drawing on Amer and Obradović's (2022) account of recognition as a self‐other dynamic, we understand participants' identity work as shaped by the need to negotiate congruence between how they see themselves, how they believe relevant others see them, and what meanings are attached to being recognized as Russian. In this context, Russian identity became salient not necessarily (and not only) because participants re‐evaluated their sense of belonging, but because ingroup wrongdoing transformed the moral and political meanings attached to this identity in everyday encounters. This highlights the dialogical character of national identity: participants did not merely discuss whether and how they still identified as Russian, but also how this identity would be perceived by others, whether it would imply alignment with the Russian state, and whether it would expose them to anticipated misrecognition and moral judgement.

Our analysis focussed on a less‐examined context of identity threat: one that arises not primarily from structural disadvantage, minority status or external stigmatization alone, but from association with an ingroup implicated in moral wrongdoing. This case is theoretically distinctive because Russian anti‐war migrants may be (mis)recognized through the political power and the Russian state as perpetrators, while they are simultaneously rejecting the state's actions and are in a position of limited agency in relation to them.

Through this lens, the vigilant aspect of Russian identity can be understood as a response to anticipated misrecognition. Our findings illustrated how metaperceptions and the external categorization of someone as Russian are tied to an implicit imposition of responsibility, akin to the symbolic burden of stigma described in prior work (Jacobs & Merolla, 2017; Rockquemore & Brunsma, 2002). Participants' accounts suggest that being categorized as Russian was experienced as carrying a moral and political attribution: they expected others to read Russian identity through the actions of the Russian state. Their metaperceptions concerned not only how Russians were seen, but also what kind of accountability was attached to being recognized as Russian. This places Russian anti‐war migrants in a dilemma: how and whether to distance themselves from the wrongdoing, while being pressured to acknowledge responsibility for actions they perceive as beyond their control. This dynamic resonates with previous work on guilt and responsibility (Čehajić‐Clancy, 2015), illustrating how collective guilt may be constructed even without agency, yet in the presence of expectations of accountability.

Our findings may also contribute to the discussion on collective responsibility for states' actions under autocratic regimes (Lawford‐Smith & Collins, 2017), especially in the context of democratic backsliding in many countries (e.g. Waldner & Lust, 2018). The tension between personal and collective responsibility for the war was reflected in participants' constructions of agency and helplessness. Participants described the government's actions as carried out ‘on their behalf’, implying the connection to collective wrongdoing that they neither chose nor felt empowered to contest. We understand these accounts as descriptions of constrained agency within a morally compromised identity position. Participants described being positioned, and sometimes positioning themselves, as implicated in the wrongdoing attached to their national category, while simultaneously describing limited possibilities for acting effectively against the state.

The construction of constrained agency was also closely tied to disidentification, which has implications for our understanding of privileged identity management (Shuman et al., 2025) and colonial histories. Even though identity distancing can be seen as a defensive strategy of managing privileged or perpetrator identity (Shuman et al., 2025), we can understand participants' accounts of distancing from Russian identity as not simply a withdrawal from a devalued group but also an attempt to regain some control over the meaning of their national belonging. This is consistent with work conceptualizing disidentification as an active, negative self‐defining relation to a relevant group rather than merely the absence of identification (Becker & Tausch, 2014). In our case, disidentification was shaped by the perceived incompatibility between participants' moral and political self‐understanding and the dominant, state‐defined prototype of being Russian.

Those who strongly disagree with the regime often escape, disidentify and subsequently find themselves cut off from any collective ‘us’ (Becker & Tausch, 2014). After this separation and distancing from the figure of the ‘prototypical Russian’ claimed by state propaganda, many struggle to find an alternative opinion‐based group to identify with, as in the absence of a consolidated movement or unifying leadership, there is no unique ‘anti‐regime identity’ to adopt (Zamyatin, 2023, May 6). However, as shown in another study investigating Russian migrants (Mikhina et al., 2026), and in line with the work of Chayinska and McGarty (2021), disidentification is not merely a form of withdrawal, but it can also be mobilizing. Rejecting the state‐defined prototype of being Russian allows individuals to reclaim moral ground, contest dominant narratives, and in some cases, seek or build new communities grounded in shared moral dissent and democratic values.

Thus, the findings point to a complex relationship between national identity and the nation‐state: when state violence comes to define the international meaning of a national category, anti‐governmental migrants may be pushed to disidentify with the state while still seeking alternative, value‐based forms of belonging.

Theoretically, disidentification may open the possibility for new, transnational forms of resistance and solidarity, based on values rather than origins and representation of a prototypical Russian national. On the other hand, it is important to discuss the post‐conflict reconciliation perspectives. We show that our participants actively contemplate their feelings of guilt and shame, which are often associated with embracing collective responsibility (Čehajić‐Clancy & Brown, 2014). According to existing research (Čehajić‐Clancy, 2012), it is an important step for future reconciliation. These findings can be used as a stepping stone for further exploration of intergroup communication and post‐conflict interactions.

Disclosure and non‐disclosure of identity thus emerge as strategies for regaining agency: openly acknowledging their background when it helps clarify their stance and redefine the content of national identity, or withholding it when there is a risk of misrecognition (Kende et al., 2024). While participants experience the centrality of their Russian identity as involuntary and often seek ways to distance or manage its devalued aspects, they do not fully reject feelings of collective guilt or responsibility. This shows that collective emotions in the face of ingroup wrongdoing are not only shaped by ingroup attachment, as suggested in previous studies (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Roccas et al., 2006; Sullivan et al., 2012), but that they may also actively contribute to the ongoing reconstruction and negotiation of identity.

An additional layer of complexity of Russian national identity emerged through the metaphorical framing of the relationship with Russia as one with a toxic family or an abusive relationship– an entity that one wishes to escape but remains bound to through enduring ties. Even those who expressed a desire to sever all ties with Russia acknowledged the difficulty of doing so, revealing the tensions between rejection and attachment. Such metaphors are politically meaningful because they translate an abstract relationship to a nation‐state into a familiar relational domain of attachment, obligation, harm and distance. Metaphors can function as tools of political reasoning by enabling people to make sense of the political world through knowledge and experience drawn from non‐political domains (Bougher, 2012). In our data, these metaphors provided an interpretive vocabulary through which the ambivalence of national belonging could be made intelligible: participants could acknowledge an enduring bond while refusing moral identification with the actions of the Russian state.

Limitations and future directions

In this study, we used a convenience snowball sample. It is important to note the specific position of our participants as Russian anti‐war migrants. Their experiences cannot be assumed to represent those of the wider Russian population. Migration itself may serve as both a result of and an enabler of weaker national identification. Those who felt less aligned with dominant national narratives or were more critical of state actions may have been more motivated or better positioned to leave. This may have also facilitated a greater willingness to acknowledge collective guilt or embrace responsibility, compared to people who are forced to remain in the country and face stronger repression in terms of social pressures, surveillance or internalized justifications for the regime's actions.

Another limitation concerns the kind of claims our interview data allow us to make about metaphorical meaning‐making. Because our data consist of retrospective interviews rather than naturally occurring interactions, we cannot determine how participants use these metaphors in everyday encounters, whether they function as explanations for interlocutors or how they are received by others. Moreover, our constructivist and contextualist approach focussed on how participants constructed meaning in interview accounts, rather than on the phenomenology of lived subjective experience. Future research adopting interpretative phenomenological approaches (see, e. g. Miron et al., 2022) could complement the present study by examining how such metaphorical meaning‐making is subjectively lived and integrated into participants' sense of self, including whether metaphors operate as resources for coping with a devalued national identity, making sense of ambivalence or reaching a sense of closure.

While this paper focussed on how Russian migrants negotiate stigma primarily through individualized strategies such as individual mobility (achieved by emigration), concealment or disidentification, future research should examine collective forms of identity constructions that emerge in exile. Future studies could investigate how Russian anti‐war migrants attempt to redefine what it means to be ‘Russian’ through cultural production, political dissent or community activism, distancing themselves from State narratives while maintaining meaningful cultural or linguistic affiliation. This would allow us to see identity negotiation from the perspective of moral positioning (Harré, 2012) at the group level, rather than solely at the level of personal positioning in interaction. Alongside disidentifying from the ‘Russianness’ appropriated by nationalistic propaganda, some people may form new solidarities based on shared values (e.g. anti‐war, democratic, human rights), thereby forming ideologically defined diasporas that transcend national stigma. Qualitative work might also explore symbolic modes of resistance, for instance, using social creativity strategies such as satire, irony (Dobai & Hopkins, 2022), or counter‐narratives to subvert dominant portrayals of Russian identity.

CONCLUSION

This paper explored how Russian anti‐war migrants negotiate their national identity under conditions of ongoing ingroup wrongdoing and geopolitical stigma. By focussing on moral and identity positioning, it highlights the constrained agency individuals experience when navigating collective responsibility. The study extends the research on stigmatized identities by showing how moral misalignment with the State can lead not only to distancing but also to complex forms of micro‐level resistance and reconstruction of national identity.

This study makes several contributions to research on social identity, migration and collective emotions. First, it extends existing work on identity negotiation by shifting the focus from historically oppressed or victimized groups to members of a perpetrator group who experience stigma during an ongoing conflict. Second, it introduces the concept of vigilant identity to capture how national identity becomes reactively central under conditions of guilt, shame and anticipated misrecognition, thereby adding nuance to existing research on identity salience and threat. Finally, our findings provide insight into the challenges faced by people who hold the nationality of the perpetrator state, informing policymakers, NGOs and host societies about the psychological and social burden of national stigma. Recognizing these identity struggles has become increasingly important for designing integration policies and fostering intergroup dialogue that avoids homogenizing or further stigmatizing national groups with complex geopolitical backgrounds.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Elena Mikhina: Conceptualization; investigation; writing – original draft; formal analysis; data curation; project administration; methodology. Xenia Daniela Poslon: Conceptualization; investigation; funding acquisition; writing – original draft; supervision; formal analysis; methodology. Barbara Lášticová: Funding acquisition; writing – original draft; writing – review and editing; supervision; formal analysis; methodology.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Because the study employed qualitative methods using open coding, there are no survey instruments or codebooks associated with the analysis. To protect participant confidentiality and comply with ethical and institutional review board (IRB) requirements, full interview transcripts cannot be publicly shared. However, the de‐identified quotations that support the analytic claims are available in the manuscript, and the selection of all interview extracts used for the development of themes is uploaded to the Open Science Framework (OSF) directory: https://osf.io/dv27n/overview?view_only=558181ee33154ba3b75c05fb03fbd69b.