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. 2026 Jul 13;40(9):986–992. doi: 10.1111/bioe.70154

Maintaining the Divide: The Legitimate Role for the Public in Health and Science Policymaking

Joshua J Kassner 1,✉
PMCID: PMC13664647  PMID: 42439819

ABSTRACT

Many of the most pressing policy choices we face are matters of health and science. How should we prepare for the next global pandemic? How should we manage the disruption and promise of artificial intelligence? How should we address the challenge of climate change? These choices are permeated by intractable disagreement, especially disagreement over the moral and prudential values we rely on to decide. Nonetheless, we must decide. Proceduralism is one of the most widely endorsed answers to the challenge that such normative disagreement presents. The policy choices we face, however, also include descriptive questions. Given the significant difference between these types of questions, the respective roles they ought to play in our collective decision‐making, and the fact that their respective answers ought to be measured against different standards of justification and legitimacy, I argue that proceduralism fails as a complete account of legitimate decision‐making and offer a more nuanced and epistemically informed account of legitimate decision‐making. I conclude by assessing the implications the alternative account has for the role that the public should play in legitimate health and science policy‐making, arguing that the public ought to play a central role in making normative decisions, but should be largely excluded from a participatory role in inquiries meant to decide matters of policy‐relevant descriptive fact.

Keywords: democracy, epistemic legitimacy, normative legitimacy, political epistemology, proceduralism


Many of the most pressing policy choices we face are matters of health and science, and are thus grounded in our descriptive understanding of the world. Yet, the choices we must make—that is, what we ought to do about climate change, how we ought to prepare for and respond to the next pandemic, or how we ought to manage the potential promise and peril of artificial intelligence—are value‐laden normative questions. Thus, the choices we face are matters of both descriptive and normative concern, and though related, the underlying questions are different in important ways.

Further complicating matters, the normative questions implicated in our policy decisions admit of widespread disagreement. These disagreements are often disputes over the right and the good and cannot be resolved by appealing to independent epistemically accessible standards of correctness. Our inability to rely on correctness to decide in such circumstances has led many to conclude that legitimate collective decision‐making must be grounded in procedural value. See Waldron [1]. Thus, under proceduralism, what makes a choice legitimate is that it instantiates the relevant value [1].

In the discussion that follows, I reject proceduralism as incomplete and offer an alternative account of legitimate decision‐making that recognizes the dual nature of the policy choices we face and integrates the descriptive and normative aspects of our collective decision‐making into a complete account of legitimacy. I conclude by assessing the implications this has for the role the public ought to play in legitimate health and science policy‐making, arguing that the public should be largely excluded from a participatory role in answering policy‐relevant descriptive questions, but should have a determinative participatory role in answering policy‐relevant normative questions, including the ultimate question of what policy ought to be chosen.

1. Preliminary Matters: The Challenge of Legitimacy and the Appeal of Proceduralism

To begin, it is important to explain the challenge of legitimacy and discuss the reason why so many have committed themselves to proceduralism. The challenge arises because the value‐laden policy choices we face must be made within, what Jeremy Waldron calls, “the circumstances of politics” [1]. The circumstances of politics are defined by disagreements that require collective decision‐making. Those disagreements are often grounded in differences over moral and prudential judgments—normative matters that lack independent epistemically accessible standards of correctness. See Waldon [1].

By definition, legitimate answers to normative questions deserve moral respect from all affected by a decision. See Peters [2]. Thus, an account of legitimacy must identify the conditions under which the demand for such respect is justified. Yet, given the circumstances of politics, such respect will be demanded from many who do not agree with the outcome. Since such disagreements cannot be resolved by appeals to independent epistemically accessible standards of correctness, legitimacy must be independent of the correctness of the outcome. Proceduralism thus arises as a response to this challenge.

Proceduralist accounts grounded in a commitment to fairness, which require that our collective decision‐making respect the equal moral worth of all affected by a decision, are particularly compelling [2]. Since we are duty‐bound to respect the equal moral worth of others, a decision‐making process that instantiates such respect provides those affected by the decision with an outcome‐independent reason for showing moral respect for the collective decision. Failing to respect a collective decision under such circumstances is an implicit claim of moral superiority over others. See Kassner [3]. As to what constitutes such respect in practice, Waldron argues that we must avoid any arbitrary biases for or prejudices against any partisans or positions offered as alternatives in our collective decision‐making [1]. Doing otherwise treats some as morally superior to others [1].

Given this understanding, when faced with normative questions within the circumstances of politics proceduralism's appeal is transparent. Stated explicitly, in modern pluralist societies where there are often conflicts of values. An account of legitimate decision‐making that does not depend on robust moral commitments, but is grounded instead on the thin commitment to respect for the equal moral worth of others provides reasonable justification for the expectation and demand that all affected by a decision show moral respect for the outcome regardless of their view of its correctness. And as a matter of practical application, this is taken to require that all who are affected by a decision should be permitted to participate in significant and active ways in making the decision.

2. The Critique: Why Proceduralism Is Not Enough

Despite its appeal, proceduralism, so understood, fails as an account of legitimate collective decision‐making because it is incomplete. Any account of legitimacy must be able to explain why the outcome chosen deserves moral respect. Thus, if there is a reason that justifies withholding such respect, the account fails. Proceduralism is incomplete because it is not well‐suited to account for the legitimacy of our answers to the policy‐relevant descriptive questions we face.

To explain, it is helpful to think of the proceduralist position as a kind of material conditional. Let us call it the “Proceduralist Conditional,” which would run as follows:

If a decision‐making procedure is fair, then the outcomes it produces, regardless of substantive correctness, are legitimate and thus worthy of moral respect from all affected by the decision.

Waldron's argument nests the Proceduralist Conditional within another. Let us call it the “Nested Conditional.” It would be:

If we are faced with a question that cannot be answered by appealing to an independent epistemically accessible standard of correctness, then if a decision‐making procedure is fair, then the outcomes it produces, regardless of substantive correctness, are legitimate and thus worthy of moral respect from all affected by the decision.

It is unclear whether proceduralism captures what constitutes legitimacy for our answers to the policy‐relevant descriptive questions at issue. Thus, the question becomes whether these conditionals apply to policy‐relevant descriptive questions.

2.1. Critique One: Denying the Antecedent—Rejecting the Applicability of the Nested Conditional

Pursuant to the Nested Conditional, the applicability of the Proceduralist Conditional depends on our inability to answer policy‐relevant questions through appeals to independent epistemically‐accessible standards of correctness. Thus, whether, under the argument from the Nested Conditional, the Proceduralist Conditional serves as the solution to the challenge of legitimacy for the descriptive questions we face depends on whether we can answer such descriptive questions by appealing to independent epistemically‐accessible standards of correctness.

The short answer is that we can. In which case, the antecedent of the Nested Conditional is not satisfied. To explain, one of the ways in which the normative and descriptive questions that concern us are distinct is that what counts as a satisfactory answer to a descriptive question is categorically different from what counts as a satisfactory answer to the kind of normative questions we face. The policy‐relevant descriptive questions are, like any descriptive questions, about our understanding of the world and the way it works. Consequently, the correctness of our answers to such questions is our primary concern, and we, in fact, answer such questions by using discipline‐specific forms of inquiry that rely on independent epistemically‐accessible standards of correctness. As such, descriptive questions are not the kinds of questions that would satisfy the antecedent of the Nested Conditional. Thus, the Proceduralist Conditional does not follow as a modus ponens implication of the Nested Conditional.

2.2. Critique Two: A Conceptual Argument Against the Applicability of the Proceduralist Conditional

The fact that the antecedent of the Nested Conditional is not satisfied does not, however, mean that there are no circumstances under which the Proceduralist Conditional would apply to the descriptive questions we face. It merely means that the form of the argument for proceduralism that derives from the Nested Conditional does not apply. Thus, whether the Proceduralist Conditional serves as an account of legitimacy for the policy‐relevant descriptive questions we face remains an open question.

In response, one might consider an inductive approach, cataloguing all the circumstances that might justify the application of the Proceduralist Conditional to descriptive questions and assessing whether there are any such circumstances that would provide such justification. This would be practically impossible, and likely futile. If, however, fair procedures are conceptually precluded from guaranteeing legitimate answers to descriptive questions, then we can be assured that proceduralism fails as a complete account of legitimate decision‐making.

Though there are many reasons to be skeptical of the fit between fair decision‐making‐procedures and legitimate answers to descriptive questions, there is at least one argument that is determinative. Grounded in the proposition that there are important differences between the descriptive and normative matters that make up the policy choices we face, the argument is simple. Policy‐relevant normative questions are analytically different from policy‐relevant descriptive questions, playing different roles in our collective decision‐making. For this reason, each type of question ought to be measured against different standards of legitimacy. Most importantly, the legitimacy of the process we use to answer descriptive questions ought to be determined by a standard of epistemic, rather than normative, legitimacy.

Regarding the different roles played by each type of question, answering normative questions is a matter of practical rationality where normatively legitimate decision‐making provides us with a reason to respect the outcome and the demands it makes on us. See Raz [4], and see Kassner [5], see also Kassner [6]. In answering descriptive inquiries, the task is to determine the factual circumstances within which our policy choices are set, including questions of causation, technological feasibility, economic realities, and likely costs just to name a few. Such questions are about what the best policy‐relevant factual understandings are. What matters is whether a process of inquiry reliably produces correct answers. See Beddor [7].

Thus, the question becomes, “Do fair procedures—those that respect the equal moral worth of others—reliably produce correct answers?” This is an empirical question, and the simple answer is no. See Brennan [8]. It may be the case that, as a matter of contingent fact, a fair decision‐making procedure occasionally produces correct answers, but correctness is not an implication of the fairness of the procedure. It is an accident, not something that is a likely or reliable result of fair decision‐making procedures. 1

One might object that Condorcet's Jury Theorem gives us reason to think otherwise. The Marquis de Condorcet proved that if a population is made up of individuals that are slightly better at answering a question correctly than not, then the larger the number of people participating in a majoritarian decision‐making process, the more likely—bordering on near certainty—that group will choose correctly. See Condorcet [9], and see Brennan [8], see also Grofman et al. [10]. The negative converse is, however, equally true. In a population where everyone is slightly more likely to get an answer incorrect, then the larger the number of people participating in a majoritarian decision‐making process the more likely—bordering on near certainty—they will choose incorrectly.

Thus, as Jason Brennan has convincingly argued, given the fact that many are not well‐informed about the descriptive matters we are concerned with, we have reason to believe that a process that treats all affected as equal and thus permits widespread participation in the process of inquiry is not going to be epistemically reliable [8]. Though we may all be morally equal, we are not epistemic peers. Thus, we should reject, as analytically unfit, the proposition that the Proceduralist Conditional applies to the policy‐relevant descriptive questions we face because legitimate answers to such questions answer to standards of epistemic, rather than normative, legitimacy.

3. The Alternative: An Integrated Account of Legitimate Decision‐Making

Given the incompleteness of proceduralism, the task is now to develop an alternative account of legitimacy. This begins by reiterating the dual nature of the policy choices we face and the implications this has for the constitutive forms of legitimacy that must be accommodated. Understanding the duality of the policy choices we face, though important, fails to provide a sufficient accounting of the contextual foundations necessary for developing a satisfactory account of legitimate decision‐making. We also need a more complete understanding of how these different elements relate to one another. For, though descriptive and normative questions are different types of questions, within the space of policy‐making they are related in important ways. As such, our account of legitimate decision‐making must recognize these relationships and integrate them into a framework that enables us to assess whether a policy decision is all‐things‐considered legitimate.

3.1. The Relationships

There are numerous relationships that exist between the normative and descriptive issues that make up the policy choices we face, three are particularly relevant to how we ought to think about legitimate decision‐making; one of dependence, one of priority, and one of entanglement. As to the relationship of dependence, regardless of the ultimate normative choice we must make, that choice must be made within the context of the best understanding of the relevant facts of our world. This understanding determines what is possible and clarifies the costs and benefits of different choices we might make. Thus, our ultimate policy choices ought to be informed and constrained by our best understanding of the policy‐relevant descriptive facts.

One might take this to mean that descriptive matters have priority over the normative questions we face. In a very limited sense, this may be true, for example, when determining the factual context within which the normative question is asked. We must, however, recognize that the ultimate end of our collective decision‐making is to answer normative policy questions. As such, even the descriptive questions we answer are in service to a larger normative purpose. Thus, when considering our account of legitimate decision‐making, we must view it through a normative lens. This includes how we ought to think about the conditions of epistemic legitimacy.

The relationships of dependence and priority are easily understood. Entanglement, however, is less apparent. There are many policy‐relevant concepts and considerations that do not fall neatly on either side of the normative‐descriptive divide. They are entangled in different ways. See Putnam [11]. For one, what counts as a fact is often grounded in epistemic value judgments [11]. Take correlations and causations as an example; since correlation is not causation, when we rely on statistically significant correlations to justify claimed causal relationships, we are making epistemic value judgments about when bridging that epistemic gap is justified.

“Thick” concepts, are another form of entanglement. Such concepts have both normative and descriptive properties [11]. Consider the concept of “safety.” When we measure safety, we treat it as a fact. Yet, what counts as safe is based on a value judgment about competing positions on risk, freedom, and harm. Thus, there is a plurality of reasonable, and possibly incompatible, standards of safety, each implying some metric that can be quantified and measured.

3.2. The Alternative: An Integrated Account of Legitimate Decision‐Making

A complete account of legitimate decision‐making requires that we integrate the various relationships discussed above into a framework for collective decision‐making that justifies the claim that the outcomes of our decision‐making deserve moral respect from all affected by the decision. There is, however, a threshold condition that has yet to be discussed but should be recognized and accommodated. Namely, subjecting distinctly descriptive questions to collective decision‐making procedures meant to address normative questions is unjustifiable [3].

This is an implication of the argument that the Proceduralist Conditional does not apply to descriptive questions. Given that proceduralism fails as an account of legitimate decision‐making because it cannot guarantee the epistemic legitimacy of our answers to descriptive questions, it cannot provide legitimate answers to any questions that are wholly descriptive. Put constructively, only those questions that include some normative issue for which there is no independent epistemically accessible standard of correctness ought to be subjected to normatively legitimate collective decision‐making.

Assuming, however, that the policy questions we confront are appropriately subjected to collective decision‐making, what legitimacy demands depends on the further distinction between those issues that are normative and those that are comprised of both descriptive and normative questions. As to the former, though perhaps more a conceptual possibility than historical reality, if the question considered is wholly normative, then normatively legitimate decision‐making processes are sufficient for legitimacy.

If, on the other hand, the policy choice includes both descriptive and normative issues, then legitimate decision‐making depends on how we accommodate and integrate the various relationships between those normative and descriptive matters. Given that the normative choices we make depend on our answers to the policy‐relevant descriptive questions implicated by the choices we face—that our normative choices are informed and constrained by our best understanding of the relevant facts—normative legitimacy depends on epistemic legitimacy.

To understand why, consider the implications demonstrably incorrect answers to policy‐relevant descriptive questions would have on the claim that all affected by a decision—especially those who disagree with the outcome—ought to show the outcome moral respect. The fact that the outcome is grounded in an epistemically illegitimate answer to a descriptive question is reason enough to reject the claim that one ought to show moral respect for the outcome, and it would be unreasonable to demand that those who disagreed with the outcome show such respect.

Given that epistemic legitimacy is both epistemically important to, and a constraint on, normative legitimacy, it is important to understand what constitutes epistemic legitimacy in the context of collective decision‐making in the public policy arena. Epistemic legitimacy is about correctness; and, all‐other‐things‐being‐equal, one might reasonably adopt a “common sense” understanding of correctness as the basis for our understanding of epistemic legitimacy. In which case, it would make sense to conclude that epistemic legitimacy is about the accuracy of the outcome alone, making how we answer the question irrelevant.

However, given the priority of the normative purpose of our decision‐making, we ought to view epistemic legitimacy through the lens of the normative ends our collective decision‐making is meant to serve. In which case, we have good reason to prioritize how we answer descriptive questions over such purely outcome‐oriented conceptions. A focus on reliable forms of inquiry lends itself to intersubjective justification. Showing your work matters. This is not a proceduralist account of legitimacy, however, because reliability is itself dependent on the ability of a process of inquiry to consistently deliver correct answers.

Additionally, since every person is cognitively and epistemically limited, it would be unreasonable, within the realm of public policy, to require that epistemic legitimacy depend on knowing the unassailable truth. Rather, epistemic legitimacy should be determined either by what is a matter of consensus among experts in the relevant field; or, where controversy exists, since what reasons are acceptable in the deliberations of those experts is a matter of social fact, what counts as correct depends on what is intersubjectively justifiable to others within the field. See Hart [12]. A process that is reliable given the relevant consensus and social facts, serves as a framework for such intersubjective justification, thus is essential to understanding correctness in the context of justification.

Further, the issues we are concerned with have imminently practical consequences. We must make choices before the answers can be fully assessed as correct. Due to the real‐world exigencies surrounding our policy choices, we need assurance of the reliability of our answers before we can have certainty. Reliable forms of inquiry, therefore, provide us with the best account of correctness given the practical role such inquiries play in our collective decision‐making. Thus, reliability should serve as the primary standard of correctness for epistemic legitimacy, at least as a matter of policymaking. See Lichtenberg [13].

Again, this understanding of legitimate decision‐making treats the normative and descriptive questions we face as distinct. Legitimate decision‐making, however, requires that the various forms of entanglement are also accommodated. First, there is the challenge of epistemic value judgments relied on by experts in a field to establish norms or standards that are then treated as objective standards within the field (e.g., correlation to causation). This kind of value judgment should be made transparent, but it is categorically different from the kind of value judgments that are made in our efforts to answer the normative questions we face. In addition, underlying these judgments are data and arguments that are unique to the fields in which the norms and concepts are applied. There is a kind of discipline‐specific transparency that renders such judgments answerable to independent epistemically accessible standards of correctness that moral value judgments are not.

As to those forms of entanglement that define Putnam's “thick” concepts, they do not present a conceptual problem for the alternative account of legitimacy being offered, though they may make institutionalization difficult. As to the conceptual point, thick concepts, like “safety,” are grounded in value‐laden judgments but then function like objective facts of the world. Such entanglement is not; however, synchronic, but sequential and relative to the nature of the role the concept at issue is playing in the issue and the nature of the specific question being asked. Given this, it is, at least conceptually, possible to distinguish between the normative and the descriptive.

Returning to the example of safety, what counts as “safe” is a normative judgment about cost, benefits, risk, and harm. Once what counts as “safe” has been determined, we can implement and assess it. Implementation here is about what is logically and physically possible, not that it will be easy or politically possible. Regardless, a legitimate decision‐making process will need to accommodate the fact that such concepts may appear descriptive but are, in fact, “thick” and this thickness needs to be recognized and the different elements of our understanding of such concepts must answer to different forms of legitimacy.

Finally, though not exactly a form of entanglement, there is another challenge that needs to be addressed. Namely, some policy questions are ambiguous and allow for both normative and descriptive interpretations. 2 Imagine a policy question that implicates a cultural practice. Imagine further, that this cultural practice has evolved over time. That its historical origins do not necessarily match its current understanding. Now further imagine that the specific policy question at issue puts the historical understanding in conflict with the current understanding of the practice as those practitioners understand it.

Here, we have, at least, four different points of view implicated. First, there are those who engage in the practice as subjects. For example, think of the laity in an organized religion. Second, we have the officials who are authorities related internal to the practice. In our example, this would be the officiants of the religion. Third, there are historians who understand the history of the practice and its origins. Then, finally, there are anthropologists and sociologists who understand the role that the practices now plays in the life of the community.

Though complicating matters, this is not a problem for the account of legitimacy presented. The problem lies in the ambiguous nature of the policy choice confronting us. Though such ambiguity is a matter of concern, it is a reason to be clear about the nature and purpose of the question that we are asking, not a reason to reject the account of legitimacy being offered. Addressing such questions in a legitimate way, like all policy questions that arise within the circumstances of politics, requires that we begin by differentiating between the normative and descriptive questions implicated, understand how they relate to one another, sequence them in a way that appropriately reflects the epistemic and normative priorities, and then— relying on out best understanding of the relevant facts of the matter—rely on a fair collective decision‐making process to answer the ultimate normative question.

4. Conclusion: The Role of the Public in Legitimate Health and Science Policymaking

Given this understanding of legitimate decision‐making, what role should the public play in legitimate health and science policymaking? The proceduralist presumption is that disagreement over the ultimate normative questions requires that our decision‐making respect the equal moral worth of all affected by a decision. The implication being that all who are affected by the decision should be permitted to participate in making the decision. As noted, however, health and science policy choices involve both descriptive and normative questions, requiring a more complex and complete account of legitimate decision‐making.

Regarding the public's role in answering policy‐relevant descriptive questions, epistemic legitimacy requires that we use reliably accurate forms of inquiry. As noted, Brennan has pointed out the many ways that individuals fail as a reliable epistemic agents [8]. These failures render the collective judgments of the public in response to such descriptive questions unreliable [8]. As such, we have ample reason to believe that including the public would undermine reliability. Since epistemic legitimacy depends on reliability, we should exclude the public from participating in processes meant to answer the descriptive questions implicated for and by our policy choices.

This exclusion of the public is not, however, meant to exclude the pubic from all roles relevant to such inquiries. Recall, one of the ways that facts and values are entangled is through “thick” concepts. The public has an important role to play in determining the meaning of such concepts. Returning to the example of “safety,” safety is often a policy goal. Safety is, however, not some natural fact. Any operative understanding is the result of value‐laden judgments. Thus, the respect owed to the standard depends on its underlying normative legitimacy. As such, when developing such standards, the public should play a significant role in any normative judgments that will result in policy choices that will ultimately affect them, and that they will be expected—if not compelled—to respect.

There is, however, a practical gap between epistemically legitimate answers to policy‐relevant descriptive questions and the impact those epistemically legitimate answers must have on the public if we are to produce normatively legitimate decisions. Given the dependence of normative legitimacy on epistemic legitimacy, normative legitimacy requires that the public is influenced by such epistemically legitimate answers, and the public must recognize the limitations such answers place on what is possible. Whether this gap is filled depends on the public being so influenced and constrained.

One might, considering this gap and the requirement that our collective choices be informed and constrained by our best understanding of the relevant facts, argue that there is reason to give the experts we are relying on normative priority in our normative decision‐making. Assuming, however, that the policy alternatives considered are not grounded in epistemically illegitimate answers to the relevant descriptive questions, privileging the normative judgments of those with expertise would undermine normative legitimacy. As argued, legitimately answering such questions requires that we respect the equal moral worth of all affected. This requires that no partisan or position enjoys a privileged position [1, 14]. Giving experts normative priority in the face of such questions unjustifiably violates this condition, implicitly treating experts as normatively superior, thus undermining the legitimacy of the decision.

It may be useful to consider an example to close this discussion. In 2021, at the height of the COVID‐19 pandemic, a local school board in York, Pennsylvania (USA) wrestled with the question of whether to require students to wear masks in school [15]. The debates that unfolded were a model of decision‐making failure. Anti‐science members of the public—who were likely sincere in their beliefs but misinformed—were given equal time to present conspiracy theories and advocate for dangerous “cures” alongside local health officials who sought to inform the board about the best practices drawn from the public health field.

Given the fact that the members of the public (and the board) were not experts in public health, the confused nature of the testimony undermined the legitimacy of the process because the process used to answer the descriptive questions at issue was unreliable, turning a question of science into one of political allegiance. Perhaps just as troubling was the fact that many of the experts who should have been relied upon to explain the science behind the policy alternatives being considered, advocated for policies based upon their moral and prudential values, conflating their scientific expertise with an expertise in such value judgments.

One can understand why some members of the board would defer to the judgment of these individuals in such circumstances. As such, their positions as subject‐matter experts may have been relied on to give their normative judgments greater weight. Doing so would violate the requirement that in the face of such value‐laden normative questions the equal moral worth of each individual be respected, thus undermining the legitimacy of the policy chosen.

So, what do we do? The reforms we pursue should take several considerations into account. We should construct decision‐making processes that differentiate between different types of questions involved in the policy choices we face. In addition, we should provide formal and informal ways to integrate the different types of decision‐making processes in ways that accommodate the various relationships that exist between the descriptive and normative questions that make up our health and science policy choices. Finally, we must be clear about the nature of the questions themselves, being intentional about the duality and complex nature of the collective choices we face.

In the end, if correct, the alternative account of legitimacy defended here is a significant advance in our understanding of legitimate decision‐making. It should also serve as a guide for institutional design and reform. However, regardless of whether one agrees with the arguments and analyses provided, it is, at the very least, a useful foil, raising a host of issues that ought to be addressed and questions about classic accounts of legitimacy that need to be answered.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Acknowledgments

I want to thank those who saw the need to gather and discuss the question of the role the public should play in health and science policymaking, especially Nir Eyal, Leah Pierson, and Mark Sheehan. I also want to thank Ethox, Uehiro and the Institute for Health at Rutgers for making this project possible. I am also grateful for those who attended the workshop in Oxford. Lastly, I want to thank Jonathan Pugh for his invaluable comments and critiques. The work is much improved thanks to the criticisms I received from all corners. The faults that remain are my own.

Endnotes

1

This is grounded in an orthodox understanding of what counts as “fair”. There are alternative understandings that cannot be explored here but would result in a different critique of orthodox proceduralism.

2

I want to thank the editors for bringing this challenge to my attention.

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

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Associated Data

This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.


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