Risk Assessment of an Illegal Laboratory in Reedley, California, Using Geospatial Analysis of Open‐Source Epidemic Intelligence Data

ABSTRACT

An illegal laboratory discovered in Reedley, California, in December 2022 was in a warehouse, operating without a license, handling about a thousand transgenic mice, chemicals, and possibly over 20 pathogens, including vials labeled Ebola, which were never tested but destroyed. This study aimed to estimate epidemic signals around the Reedley illegal laboratory using open‐source epidemic intelligence data. We utilized data from EPIWATCH, from October 2021 to October 2023, a year prior to and a year after the establishment of the illegal laboratory. The spatial pattern of outbreak signals was analyzed using hotspot analysis, and the distances of outbreak signals from the laboratory were measured. In California, an upward trend in outbreak signals of pathogens associated with the laboratory was noted in December 2022, April 2023, and August 2023. In the hotspot analysis, California and eight other states in the United States (US) were identified as hotspots. Narrative evidence revealed the presence of a sick employee working in the laboratory, whose child also became ill. Changes in disease patterns reported in California or the US in the year following the establishment of the illegal laboratory may or may not be linked to the illegal laboratory. A subsequent illegal lab linked to Reedley was identified in Las Vegas in 2026, highlighting the ongoing threat to biosecurity. EPIWATCH geospatial and temporal analysis can enhance the public health risk assessment of threats associated with illegal laboratories, especially when there is no available testing or reporting.

1. Introduction

Private laboratories, facilities owned, controlled, or operated by private nongovernmental organizations, are increasing in number and are difficult to regulate and monitor, with the possibility of unauthorized activity, which can pose a public health threat through accidental or deliberate release (Terrell 2023; Fidler and Gostin 2020; MacIntyre 2023; McDade and Franz 1998; Casagrande et al. 2023). A report by Gryphon Scientific highlighted the sheer volume of private sector research involving human pathogens across the United States (US), noting that the private sector performs a large proportion of life science research with dual‐use potential without proper oversight (Casagrande et al. 2023). The private sector pathogen research community may be legitimate on the whole, but bad actors may exist within it and may seek to utilize these “invisible” laboratories for intentional, malicious acts (Greene et al. 2024). In addition to known private sector laboratories, there is a risk of illegal, undocumented laboratories, such as the one found in Reedley, California (Bari and MacIntyre 2025).

The 1984 Rajneesh incident in the US, state of Oregon, is an example of the threat of clandestine laboratories. In the privacy of a 64,000‐acre ranch owned by the Rajneesh Movement, cult members created an undocumented and illegal laboratory where they cultured a range of pathogens, including Salmonella typhimurium (MacIntyre 2015). Cult members intentionally contaminated 10 restaurant salad bars across the county with this pathogen as a beta test, resulting in at least 751 cases. The final attack was to be contamination of the city water supply prior to a local election. Their goal was to incapacitate county voters and sway the outcome of county elections, seize control of local government, and overcome restrictions placed on them for land development (McDade and Franz 1998). Public health authorities incorrectly declared this a natural epidemic caused by poor hygiene. It would be nearly a year before the Rajneesh laboratory was discovered by accident, and more than a decade before the public narrative was revised to state that this was a biological attack (MacIntyre 2023).

The Reedley incident has demonstrated the ease with which illegal laboratories can operate undetected, and the lack of systems or processes for identifying such threats (MacIntyre 2023). The illegal laboratory was operational from October 2022. In late December 2022, a local code officer noticed a hose coming out of a previously abandoned warehouse in Reedley, California, and raised the alarm. This building had been rewired and rebuilt in breach of established building codes and housed complex laboratory equipment. Almost 1000 humanized transgenic mice were found in inhumane conditions, with 200 of these found dead and disposed of inappropriately in general waste streams (The Select Committee 2023).

In 2023, following expressions of concern from both Republican and Democratic Members of Congress, a report on the Reedley incident was drafted by the United States Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Reviewing a substantial body of evidence, “the report identified that a wanted fugitive” (and a national of the People's Republic of China) was responsible for establishing and operating this illegal facility. The report also determined that the laboratory was able to purchase the resources and pathogens entirely from US laboratories, but that no monitoring of the purchase or sale of these substances currently exists (The Select Committee 2023). In their closing statements, the Select Committee noted that as of December 2023, it was unknown whether other laboratories similar to the one found in Reedley existed elsewhere within the US (The Select Committee 2023, Rodriguez 2023). There is no systematic method for identifying undocumented laboratories, nor has this been a focus of intelligence agencies. The Reedley illegal laboratory owner had ties with the Chinese government (Rumpf‐Whitten 2023). The owner changed his name, used a false identity in the US (U.S. FDA 2023), and had been involved in a number of fraudulent acts. These included misbranding of test kits bought in China, relabeled as made in the US, and resold as a new brand (The Select Committee 2023; Rumpf‐Whitten 2023; U.S. Attorney's Office Eastern District of California 2023; Nava 2023).

Although documented high‐containment biolabs are regulated, oversight of private laboratories is almost nonexistent (The Select Committee 2023; United States Government Accountability Office 2023). Further, illegal laboratories are not systematically considered or searched for. Legitimate laboratories in the US are expected to be overseen by the CDC or the federal government if they have research funded by the federal government (The Select Committee 2023; United States Government Accountability Office 2023). Those laboratories funded by the private sector are not overseen nor expected to report to the CDC or Federal agencies. The Reedley illegal laboratory falls outside of both these categories. Both the CDC and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initially refused the local authorities’ request to investigate, and when they did, vials labeled with the names of dangerous pathogens, which should be handled in BSL‐4 laboratories, including “Ebola,” were destroyed rather than tested (The Select Committee 2023). This fragmented system and lack of accountability create dangerous loopholes that allow for the operation of undocumented and “invisible” laboratories whose biosafety and biosecurity standards rely upon self‐policing. Ultimately, scientists with private funding may conduct unsupervised research with pathogens that could cause outbreaks, severe illness, and death (Greene et al. 2024).

Uncovering public health threats linked with illegal biological research is difficult and may be protracted. For instance, the 1984 Rajneesh Salmonella incident was dismissed by health authorities as a natural outbreak and not correctly identified as bioterrorism until a year later (MacIntyre 2015). Public officials initially declared that the Salmonella outbreak was linked to poor hygiene in salad bars and closed multiple restaurants in response to the outbreak (MacIntyre 2015). The investigation of the current Reedley illegal laboratory was also delayed and inadequate for timely detection. The CDC responded to the situation 5 months later, on May 2, 2023, and completed a review in 2 days, by May 4, 2023, during which 20 potentially infectious agents were discovered. The CDC reported that the laboratory didn't have select agent pathogens, despite failing to test any samples (Greene et al. 2024) (Table 1). A vial labeled Ebola was found on the premises, a select agent pathogen that should be handled in BSL‐4 laboratories (The Select Committee 2023; Nava 2023). Overall, thousands of vials of potentially infectious agents were seized and destroyed without being tested (The Select Committee 2023). The national security threat and true intent of this facility may never be known. The absence of a framework or guidelines on who should investigate and how to investigate such incidents may have contributed to the delay and inadequate investigation.

TABLE 1.

List of possible infectious agents found at the Reedley illegal laboratory, based on available reports (The Select Committee 2023).

Agent	Type of pathogen
Chlamydia trachomatis	Bacterial
Recombinant Escherichia coli	Bacterial
Helicobacter pylori	Bacterial
Mycobacterium tuberculosis	Bacterial
Mycoplasma pneumoniae	Bacterial
Other Mycoplasma	Bacterial
Neisseria meningitidis	Bacterial
Sphingobacterium heparinum	Bacterial
Streptococcus pneumoniae	Bacterial
Other Streptococcus	Bacterial
Hepatitis B	Viral
Hepatitis C	Viral
Dengue	Viral
HIV	Viral
Herpes simplex virus	Viral
Human cytomegalovirus	Viral
Respiratory syncytial virus	Viral
Rubella	Viral
SARS‐CoV‐2	Viral
Ebola	Viral
Malaria	Parasitic

EPIWATCH (https://www.epiwatch.org/) is an AI‐integrated infectious disease surveillance platform that collects and processes data in over 50 languages and has been evaluated and found to be a valid tool for early detection of epidemics (Quigley et al. 2025; Honeyman et al. 2025; MacIntyre et al. 2022, 2023). It significantly improves the timeliness of infectious disease outbreak detection and can flag epidemics that official sources miss or fail to report (MacIntyre et al. 2022). EPIWATCH uses prioritization, curation, and trained epidemiologist review, which provides accurate and comprehensive reports of outbreaks (MacIntyre et al. 2023). Other internet‐based disease tracking sources include BlueDot, Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources (EIOS), HealthMap, and ProMED (MacIntyre et al. 2023). However, none is as comprehensive, multilingual, or focused on early detection of infectious disease epidemics as EPIWATCH.

The Reedley illegal laboratory may have resulted in biological waste being released into the surrounding environment, or employees becoming infected and spreading infection in the community. In fact, the presence of a sick employee working in the illegal laboratory, whose child also became ill, was documented (The Select Committee 2023). In the absence of any formal testing or epidemiologic investigation by authorities, open‐source intelligence can provide signals of unusual epidemic activity occurring in proximity to the Reedley illegal laboratory. Hence, this study aimed to investigate the utility of epidemic signals associated with Reedley's illegal laboratory using EPIWATCH AI biosurveillance system (Raina MacIntyre et al. 2024).

2. Methods

2.1. Data Source and Processing

Open‐source intelligence data from the EPIWATCH epidemic surveillance system was used in this study to examine possible disease outbreaks associated with the illegal laboratory. EPIWATCH is an AI surveillance system that collects and curates global outbreak reports from open‐source media in more than 50 languages (MacIntyre et al. 2023). The data are reviewed by a team of trained analysts (MacIntyre et al. 2022). By using this surveillance system, trends in epidemic diseases over time can be analyzed independently from formal sources, providing a picture of disease trends within a geographic area (Hutchinson et al. 2023).

To evaluate if any outbreaks of disease may be associated with the Reedley illegal laboratory, we used outbreak data for California specifically and the US more broadly for the period before and after the establishment of the laboratory in October 2022 (The Select Committee 2023). The reason for including whole‐of‐country data was that contagious infections can spread rapidly due to travel, and domestic travel is common in the US. Data were extracted from the EPIWATCH system using search terms (Table 1) for the geolocations California and the US between October 2021 and October 2023. We included all outbreak signals within the study period. Search terms included all possible pathogens mentioned at the Reedley illegal laboratory (The Select Committee 2023; Nava 2023). However, we excluded country‐level reports without more granular location, at least to the state level, from our geospatial mapping (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1.

Data‐processing flow diagram of outbreak signals from October 2021 to October 2023, data from EPIWATCH.

Initially, all outbreak reports were filtered by date, and only reports made between October 2021 and October 2023 were included, 1 year prior and 1 year after the establishment of the illegal laboratory in Reedley (Nguyen and Martin 2023). Human and animal reports were included in this analysis. Some disease outbreaks initially present as clinical syndromes, and we have included syndromes likely associated with the identified pathogens (see Table 1). The included syndromes were febrile syndrome, influenza‐like illness, severe acute respiratory illness, acute gastroenteritis, pneumonia, hemolytic uremic syndrome, and hemorrhagic fever.

2.2. Data Analysis

Data curation, processing, and cleaning utilized R tidyverse packages and MS Excel; graphs were made using ggplot, and maps were made using ArcGIS. The reports were then analyzed in two ways: First, for California only, where the dataset was filtered by location and only reports for California were included, and second, for the whole of the US. Of the 19,233 outbreak signals reported in the study period, 33.3% were country‐level reports without state‐level location data, 25.2% were state‐level reports, and 41.5% were finer than the state level (Figure 1).

Each dataset (California or the whole US) was then analyzed in two ways. First, the reports were sorted into two groups: Those that contained instances of the diseases listed in Table 1 and those that did not. Hereafter, we use the term pathogens associated with the laboratory to mean pathogens for which records of samples labeled with the name of that pathogen were found in the illegal laboratory, and possible syndromes associated with that pathogen; otherwise, pathogens not associated with the laboratory were those which were not mentioned as being documented on labels in the laboratory (The Select Committee 2023). These were plotted against each other on a time series over the 2‐year study period.

We analyzed the trends of pathogens documented in the illegal laboratory, along with those not documented in the illegal laboratory in the US and California, to compare trends within and across each category. The California and US datasets were filtered into two other groups on the basis of the date they were published: period 1 (October 2021 to September 2022) and period 2 (October 2022 to October 2023), representing the pre‐ and post‐illegal laboratory establishment periods, respectively (Nguyen and Martin 2023). These two groups were plotted against each other in a time series over the course of a calendar year.

To support the existence of geospatial variations of outbreak signals at the national and local levels, we implemented a hotspot analysis in the US to identify areas with statistically significant hotspots of outbreak signals within a 100‐km distance threshold. We used a 10‐km threshold in California to provide more granular context around the illegal laboratory, and respiratory pathogens can travel 10–18 km (Kersh et al. 2013). Therefore, a hotspot within 10 km of the illegal laboratory can provide suggestive evidence of aerosol pathogen leak from the lab. Significant hotspots indicate areas with a higher than expected number of outbreak signals, whereas cold spots denote areas with lower than expected outbreak signals within a 100‐km distance for the US. Getis–Ord G_i * statistics were used to identify areas with a higher risk or lower risk of outbreaks from 2021 to 2023 (Ord and Getis 2010). To identify significant spatial clustering of outbreaks in the US and California, the statistical analysis estimates G_i * using the following equation:

$$G_i^{\ast }=\frac{{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{j=1}^n{\omega }_{ij}{x}_j-\overline{x}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{j=1}^n{\omega }_{ij}}{S\sqrt{\frac{n{\sum }_{j=1}^n{\omega }_{\mathrm{i}j}^2-{\left({\sum }_{j=1}^n{\omega }_{ij}\right)}^2}{n-1}}}$$ (1)

where ${\omega }_{ij}$ is the spatial weight between locations i and j, S and n are the standard deviation and the total number of attribute values $x_i$, respectively, and $\overline{x}$ is the mean of $x_i$. The G_i * value is classified on the basis of the outbreak signals in the US or California: hotspots (a higher number of signals than expected), cold spots (a lower number of signals than expected), and nonsignificant (with comparable numbers of observed and expected outbreak signals), based on 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals (Ord and Getis 2010).

3. Results

We identified 19,233 outbreak reports between October 1, 2021 and October 31, 2023. In the period after the establishment of the Reedley illegal laboratory in October 2022 (The Select Committee 2023; Nguyen and Martin 2023; Lopez 2023), reported outbreaks of pathogens associated with the illegal laboratory showed a slight increase in December 2022, June to August 2023, and October 2023 across the US (Figure 2). As shown by the red solid line in Figure 2, between June 2022 and August 2022 and from July 2023 to August 2023, reported outbreak signals involved a mix of illegal laboratory‐associated pathogens, including COVID‐19, malaria, dengue, hepatitis C, Escherichia coli, and respiratory syncytial virus. In the October 2023 peak, the reported outbreak signals also included a mix of pathogens, such as COVID‐19, dengue, E. coli, hepatitis B, herpes simplex, malaria, and respiratory syncytial virus.

FIGURE 2.

Trends of monthly reports of outbreak signals in the United States from October 2021 to October 2023. Period one (from October 2021 to September 2022) refers to the period before the Reedley illegal laboratory began operation, and period two represents the period after the illegal laboratory started operating. The purple dashed line indicates the time when the laboratory began operation, and the red dashed vertical line indicates the time when the illegal laboratory closed.

In California, outbreak reports of pathogens associated with the illegal laboratory (red line in Figure 3) show an increasing trend between August and November 2022, with a noticeable spike in December 2022. Other spikes occurred in April 2023 and August 2023. In contrast, the trends of pathogens not associated with illegal laboratory showed a decreasing pattern from August 2022 to January 2023 (see the light blue line in Figure 3).

FIGURE 3.

Trends of monthly reports of outbreak signals in California from October 2021 to October 2023. Period one (from October 2021 to September 2022) refers to the period before the Reedley illegal laboratory began operation, and period two represents the period after the illegal laboratory started operating. The purple dashed line indicates the time when the laboratory began operation, and the red dashed vertical line indicates the time when the illegal laboratory closed.

In the overall US hotspot analysis, California, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, central Florida, northern Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and central Alabama were identified as statistically significant hotspots. The distribution of outbreak signals in other states was not statistically significant and did not qualify as cold or hot spots (Figure 4).

FIGURE 4.

Hotspot analysis of all outbreak signals within 100 km of threshold distance, data from EPIWATCH, 2021 to 2023.

Figure 5 shows outbreak signal locations before (blue dots) and after (red dots) the Reedley illegal laboratory, along with their proximity to the illegal laboratory. The nearest outbreak signals from the Reedley illegal laboratory are ∼41 and 33 km away, before and after the illegal laboratory started operating, respectively (Figure 5).

FIGURE 5.

Outbreak signals in California, data from EPIWATCH, 2021–2023.

Figure 6 provides a polygon‐based optimized hotspot analysis to identify statistically significant hotspot areas of reported outbreak signals in California in a 10‐km radius. Statistically significant hotspots of outbreak signals were identified in San Francisco, Kern, and Los Angeles County, as displayed by the red polygons, whereas Fresno remains nonsignificant (Figure 6).

FIGURE 6.

Optimized hotspot in California, within a 10‐km radius, data from EPIWATCH, 2021–2023.

4. Discussion

The failure to test samples found at the illegal laboratory in Reedley means there is considerable uncertainty about what pathogens were present and what impact these may have had on the surrounding community or environment. In the absence of any formal testing, reporting or data, but knowing that a staff member and their child became ill, we have shown that EPIWATCH can be used to analyze whether any unusual epidemic patterns were reported in the area. Changes in disease patterns reported in California or the US in the year following the establishment of the illegal laboratory may or may not be linked to the illegal laboratory. Some of the changes could be attributed to other factors. For instance, the increase in malaria reported in the southern US during the observation period may be attributable to other factors, such as climate change, coupled with vector movements (Bansal et al. 2023, Cui and Kim 2024). The October 2023 increase in reports of disease due to pathogens associated with the laboratory is temporally related to locally acquired cases of dengue being reported in California in late 2023 (California Department of Public Health 2025, Sutter‐Yuba Mosquito and Vector Control District 2025). Dengue was one of the apparent samples in the lab, but locally acquired dengue has also been reported in California since 2013, and the vector, Aedes aegypti, is present in California (Gloria‐Soria et al. 2014, California Department of Public Health (n.d.). Early warning systems, such as EPIWATCH, have the potential to detect unusual outbreaks of infectious disease much sooner than traditional surveillance methods, and when formal data are unavailable (MacIntyre et al. 2022, 2023, Hutchinson et al. 2023). The availability of open‐source data does not depend on whether a laboratory incident has been formally reported to domestic or international authorities.

Laboratory accidents and laboratory‐acquired infections can occur even in well‐regulated and controlled situations (Duizer et al. 2023; Casassus 2021; Pappas 2022). The risk may be greater in unregulated laboratories. Given the known occurrence of laboratory‐acquired infections in legitimate laboratories (Dhawan et al. 2025), we can assume that they may also occur in clandestine laboratories.

The report from the US Select Committee on the CCP mentioned that the person caring for the laboratory mice in the illegal laboratory and his child were sick (The Select Committee 2023). Such infections may be directly linked to contact with infected mice or samples and may serve as an index case for community‐level outbreaks.

Historically, similar incidents associated with pathogens have had political or personal economic influences (MacIntyre 2023; Culp 2013; Engells 2013). The owner of the Reedley illegal laboratory had alleged ties with the Chinese military (Rumpf‐Whitten 2023). In the context of escalating geopolitical tension between the US and China, the Reedley illegal laboratory raises concerns of espionage, biological smuggling, or even the intent to conduct a Trojan Horse attack (MacIntyre 2023). The owner is a fugitive wanted by the Canadian government, who moved to the US illegally, changed his name, rebranded test kits and biological materials bought in China, sold them as made in the US, and finally was receiving payments from the Chinese government (The Select Committee 2023; U.S. FDA 2023; Nava 2023; Jeunesse and Ross 2024; Morrison 2023). In 2026, a further illegal lab also connected to this individual was identified in Las Vegas, with reports of people becoming ill (Charns 2026). This highlights the ongoing threat and the lack of tools or systems to identify or mitigate illegal labs. Tools, such as EPIWATCH, can provide early warnings of unusual epidemics, which may signal illegal biolabs.

Globally, no oversight regulation for illegal laboratories. Biosafety and biosecurity guidelines in the US target legal biosafety laboratories in research institutions, universities, and pharmaceutical companies; none for illegals (Kuiken 2024). These regulatory frameworks have no clear borders, creating overlapping responsibilities (Kuiken 2024; Howell 2026). The Reedley illegal laboratory was detected accidentally. Following the initial identification of the illegal laboratory, it took over 3 months to be granted an inspection warrant (December 2022 to March 16, 2023), and over 6 months had elapsed to secure an abatement warrant (December 2022 to June 26, 2023) (The Select Committee 2023; Willis 2023). In addition, investigations conducted by organizations, such as the CDC, were delayed and insufficient (see Table A1). Such delays can increase the public health risks to the community.

Investigating and responding to biosecurity threats require coordinated action by public health organizations (e.g., CDC and NIH), law enforcement groups, and the public. The US FBI is the leading organization to prepare and respond to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats of weapons of mass destruction (Federal Bureau of Investigation). Therefore, the FBI is expected to lead the detection and testing of unknown biological and chemical samples, like the Reedley, in collaboration with the CDC, NIH, and the public. However, the FBI closed its investigation shortly and stated, “they believe there were no materials that posed a potential weapons of mass destruction threat” to the city (The Select Committee 2023). Neither the CDC nor the FBI tested the samples.

These delays and the inadequate response may reflect a lack of regulatory oversight, creating uncertainty about what to do, when, and which organization is responsible for which action. The Reedley lab samples were discarded without testing; the lack of frameworks may be the reason, as was the case when the Reedley illegal laboratory was identified in late 2022. However, another illegal lab was identified in early 2026 in Las Vegas, Nevada. The FBI collected samples and sent them for testing (Howell 2026), but it did not publicly report the findings. After the Reedley illegal laboratory identification, legislation was developed in 2025 to incorporate bans on illegal laboratories and governance‐related measures (Buckley 2024; Willis 2024; Costa 2025), which may help the FBI and other organizations become more alert and responsible in investigating such events in Las Vegas (Cortez Masto 2026).

5. Limitations

This study has limitations. The use of open‐source data is a limitation, as it is not validated and lacks confirmatory diagnostic data; however, there was no testing or reporting of infectious agents associated with this incident, and samples were destroyed (The Select Committee 2023), so open‐source data may be the only source of intelligence on the event. We compared the number of signals by publication date, which may introduce bias in the timeliness of the outbreak signals in the region. The second limitation is that we consider pathogens potentially linked to the laboratory only if reports listed them as labeled on the samples/vials. Some samples were labeled in code, so other pathogens may have been present (The Select Committee 2023). Given the samples were untested, there remains high uncertainty about which pathogens may have been present, which may bias the comparison of outbreak signals potentially linked to the illegal laboratory. Finally, we did not have outbreak reports localized to the Fresno area, which may reflect a lack of granularity in open‐source data. These were retrospective data, which could provide suggestive evidence of association, not causation.

6. Conclusion

In a situation, such as the Reedley laboratory, where authorities failed to test or investigate adequately, open‐source intelligence may be useful in independently assessing whether any animal or human outbreaks may have been associated with the laboratory. This remains a possibility but cannot be proven in the absence of formal testing and reporting. Formal surveillance data from California public health authorities could be analyzed in a similar way to our study, which would provide validated results.

Author Contributions

Atalay Goshu Muluneh and Chandini Raina MacIntyre led conceptualization. Data curation and formal analysis were conducted by Atalay Goshu Muluneh and Rebecca Dawson. The methodology was developed by Atalay Goshu Muluneh, Rebecca Dawson, Samsung Lim, and Jared Edgeworth. Atalay Goshu Muluneh conducted project administration and visualization and handled software‐related tasks. Chandini Raina MacIntyre, Samsung Lim, Aye Moa, and Ashley Quigly supervised the project. Validation was performed by Atalay Goshu Muluneh, Natalie L.Cain, Rebecca Dawson, Samsung Lim, and Chandini Raina MacIntyre. Atalay Goshu Muluneh drafted the original manuscript. All authors contributed to the investigation, review, and editing and approved it for submission to publication.

Funding

EPIWATCH was supported by the Balvi Filantropic Fund and a Microsoft Accelerating Foundation Models Research grant. Atalay Goshu Muluneh is supported by a UNSW postgraduate scholarship.

Ethics Statement

Not applicable; we used open‐source data, and ethical approval was not required for this study.

Consent

The authors have nothing to report.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

1.

TABLE A1.

Summary of key events related to the Reedley illegal laboratory.

Date	Event	Actor	Findings and key actions	Limitations of the actions taken
2018–2020	Prestige Biotech and Universal Meditech Inc. operate in Southwest Fresno warehouses (Nguyen and Martin 2023)
August 2020	Universal Meditech had a fire in its Fortune Avenue building in Southwest Fresno (Nguyen and Martin 2023)		When inspected in August 2020, the company didn't have a hazard protection plan despite having ethanol
Since October 2022	The Reedley illegal laboratory was established (Raina MacIntyre et al. 2024)	Prestige Meditech	After Universal Meditech had a fire and financial troubles in its facility, Prestige Biotech took over operations and transferred materials and assets from Universal Meditech to a warehouse in Reedley. The company has been working with ethanol and other unspecified chemicals. The illegal laboratory has been operational since October 2022	Fresno County Department of Public Health staff received a complaint about the chemical, but were unable to access the facility (Nguyen and Martin 2023; Morrison 2023)
December 2022	An illegal laboratory was discovered at 850 I Street in Reedley, California	The local code enforcement officer	Observed the following: Building code violation; unlawful electric wiring, laboratory work without a license ∼1000 white laboratory mice Hazardous chemicals and biological agents Inspected the warehouse Referred to the Fresno County and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for further investigation
March 16, 2023	The Local officials inspected the Reedley illegal laboratory	Local officials	They found the following (The Select Committee 2023; Nguyen and Martin 2023): Blood, tissue, and samples of body fluid Thousands of vials, mostly unlabeled, some labeled in Mandarin and English. The remaining ones were labeled with codes, for which the officials couldn't find a full key to read Biosafety cabinet and centrifuge, indicating they have been working with high‐risk infectious microorganisms Ultralow temperature freezers Highly flammable, explosive, and corrosive chemicals hundreds of boxes containing faulty medical devices subject to an FDA health embargo 55 gallons of ethanol Liquid nitrogen ∼1000 transgenic mice, genetically engineered to carry COVID‐19 An employee who was caring for the transgenic mice in the illegal laboratory became sick, and his child also had a similar illness. The employee's illness was presumed to have been caused by exposure to infected mice (The Select Committee 2023)	Obtain an inspection warrant on March 16, 2023 (Nguyen and Martin 2023), after months of the initial identification being delayed
March 24, 2023	Review the biological risk of transgenic mice in the laboratory	A veterinarian specializing in laboratory specimens, which the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) recommended	Identified as no immediate risk to humans Recommend euthanizing
April 2, 2023	Lab mice euthanized	State veterinary contractor in collaboration with the Reedley code enforcement officer	All transgenic mice were euthanized
April 21, 2023	Fresno public health officials inspected the lab	Fresno public health officials	The same finding was made with the local officials' report on the March 16, 2023, inspection
May 1–2, 2023	California State officials inspected the illegal lab	California State officials	The same finding was made with the local officials' report on the March 16, 2023, inspection
May 2/2023	On May 2, 2023, the CDC initiated an investigation, which was completed on May 4, 2025	US CDC	Identified 20 pathogens based on labeling. No testing done.	A decision based solely on reading labels may be biased and requires testing by the CDC. The CDC was requested to test the samples and chemicals in the vials
			Made a report and concluded that there was no evidence of select agents or toxins
June 26, 2023	Got an abatement warranty	Judges		No further details except mentioning the warranty (Jeunesse and Ross 2023)
July 5–7, 2023	Biological agents destroyed	Local officials and a private firm specializing in remediation handled the pathogenic threat abatement	All biological agents removed	Removing without knowing the contents of the chemicals and biological agents. This may have an ongoing public health risk
July 28, 2023	Identified a freezer labeled Ebola	Local officials and a private firm specializing in remediation handled the pathogenic threat abatement	Found a freezer sealed with a silver bag that was labeled Ebola	Absence of a photograph of the freezer labeled Ebola minimizes the trust in the evidence. This might be the one possible reason the CDC has denied the presence of Ebola in the Lab
October 19, 2023	Perpetrator arrested	FDA	FDA agents arrest Zhu in connection with federal charges relating to fraud and false statements

Data Availability Statement

EPIWATCH data are restricted for public use; however, these can be accessed through a formal request or subscription.