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. 2003 Jan 7;270(1510):69–76. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2002.2151

Common language or Tower of Babel? On the evolutionary dynamics of signals and their meanings.

Minus van Baalen 1, Vincent A A Jansen 1
PMCID: PMC1691216  PMID: 12590773

Abstract

We investigate how the evolution of communication strategies affects signal credibility when there is common interest as well as a conflict between communicating individuals. Taking alarm calls as an example, we show that if the temptation to cheat is low, a single signal is used in the population. If the temptation increases cheaters will erode the credibility of a signal, and an honest mutant using a different signal ('a private code') will be very successful until this, in turn, is cracked by cheaters. In such a system, signal use fluctuates in time and space and hence the meaning of a given signal is not constant. When the temptation to cheat is too large, no honest communication can maintain itself in a Tower of Babel of many signals. We discuss our analysis in the light of the Green Beard mechanism for the evolution of altruism.

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Selected References

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