Abstract
The purpose of this article is to develop a conception of death with dignity and to examine whether it is vulnerable to the sort of criticisms that have been made of other conceptions. In this conception "death" is taken to apply to the process of dying; "dignity" is taken to be something that attaches to people because of their personal qualities. In particular, someone lives with dignity if they live well (in accordance with reason, as Aristotle would see it). It follows that health care professionals cannot confer on patients either dignity or death with dignity. They can, however, attempt to ensure that the patient dies without indignity. Indignities are affronts to human dignity, and include such things as serious pain and the exclusion of patients from involvement in decisions about their lives and deaths. This fairly modest conception of death with dignity avoids the traps of being overly subjective or of viewing the sick and helpless as "undignified".
Full Text
The Full Text of this article is available as a PDF (77.9 KB).
Selected References
These references are in PubMed. This may not be the complete list of references from this article.
- Coope C. M. "Death with dignity". Hastings Cent Rep. 1997 Sep-Oct;27(5):37–38. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- Kass Leon R. Averting one's eyes, or facing the music?--on dignity in death. Stud Hastings Cent. 1974 May;2(2):67–80. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- Ramsey Paul. The indignity of 'death with dignity'. Stud Hastings Cent. 1974 May;2(2):47–62. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
- Street A. F., Kissane D. W. Constructions of dignity in end-of-life care. J Palliat Care. 2001 Summer;17(2):93–101. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]